pmg/docs/sandbox.md

Sandbox

PMG sandbox design goal is to protect against unknown supply chain attacks using principle of least privilege.

We do not want to re-invent sandbox and rely on OS native sandbox primitives. This is at the cost of developer experience, where we have to work within the limitations of the sandbox implementations that we use.

Security Model

The sandbox is default-deny. Every operation is blocked unless the policy allows it, and deny rules win over allow rules when both match. PMG ships mandatory denies for credential files (.env, .ssh, .aws, .gcloud and more). See dangerous.go for the full list. This protects against accidental credential leaks and some classes of supply chain attacks that attempt to access credentials. To allow legitimate access, you can opt out of a mandatory deny via an exact match entry in allow_read or allow_write (in the policy or via --sandbox-allow).

Detailed rules

• Default deny: All operations are blocked unless explicitly allowed by the policy. An empty policy grants no access.
• Deny rules override allow rules: When a path appears in both allow and deny lists, the deny rule wins. Deny rules are placed after allow rules in the generated sandbox profile to ensure this.
• Credential and sensitive file protection: The sandbox blocks read and write access to known list of credential files by default.
• Git hooks are always blocked: Write access to .git/hooks/ in both $CWD and $HOME is always denied to prevent arbitrary code execution via repository hooks.
• Git config is blocked by default: Write access to .git/config is denied unless allow_git_config: true is set in the policy. This prevents credential helper manipulation.
• Runtime overrides remove only exact-match deny entries: When --sandbox-allow adds a path to an allow list, only a literal string match in the corresponding deny list is removed. Glob and wildcard deny patterns (e.g., /etc/**) are never removed. An exact-match entry in allow_read or allow_write (policy or runtime) opts out of the mandatory deny for that credential file. .git/hooks does not accept opt-outs.
• Profile inheritance is single-level: A profile can inherit from one built-in profile. Allow and deny lists are merged using union semantics. Boolean fields (allow_pty, allow_git_config) in the child override the parent.
• Variable expansion is runtime-only: Policy paths use ${HOME}, ${CWD}, and ${TMPDIR} which are expanded when the sandbox is set up, not when the policy is defined.
• Process-level isolation only: The sandbox restricts the package manager process and its children. It does not enforce CPU, memory, or disk quotas. Network filtering is coarse-grained — host-level filtering is not enforced on either platform.

Mandatory Credential Protection

PMG maintains a known list of credential and sensitive files at dangerous.go that are blocked by default in the sandbox. PMG injects three deny patterns per file:

• The path under ${CWD}
• The path under ${HOME}
• A **/<file> glob.

To opt out, list the literal path in allow_read or allow_write in your policy, or pass --sandbox-allow read=... / write=... at runtime. Listing a CWD-absolute or HOME-absolute path also suppresses the matching **/<file> glob on the same direction, so --sandbox-allow read=./.env is enough to read ${CWD}/.env. Suppression is exact post-expansion match; broad globs like ${HOME}/** do not opt out of ${HOME}/.aws. The unnamed absolute form stays denied. .git/hooks does not accept opt-outs because hooks can execute arbitrary code.

Environment Variable Protection

Many supply chain attacks steal credentials from the process environment rather than from files (e.g. AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, GITHUB_TOKEN, NPM_TOKEN, TWINE_PASSWORD). When the sandbox is enabled, PMG scrubs a default-deny list of credential-bearing variables from the package manager child process before it is spawned. The built-in list is an explicit, curated set of known secret names. See DANGEROUS_ENV_VARS. There are deliberately no generic *_TOKEN / *_SECRET catch-alls in the default, because broad wildcards there would risk clipping legitimate build variables.

Scrubbing is platform-independent (it filters the environment regardless of the OS sandbox driver) and runs as the last step before launch, after project overlays and --sandbox-allow overrides are merged. Scrubbed variable names (never values) are logged at info level. Run with --debug to see what was removed.

The shared base profiles (npm-restrictive, pypi-restrictive) allow no environment variables. Each package manager's leaf profile (npm, yarn, bun, pnpm, npx, pip, pipx, uv, uvx, poetry) re-allows only the variables that package manager legitimately needs via an environment.allow block, so package managers keep working:

environment:
  # Re-permit only what this package manager needs; everything else in the
  # default deny list stays scrubbed. allow always wins over deny.
  allow:
    - NPM_TOKEN
    - npm_config_*
  # Optionally scrub more than the default. Glob patterns are supported here
  # (they are intentionally not in the built-in default).
  deny:
    - MY_CUSTOM_SECRET
    - "*_TOKEN"

Accepted trade-off: a leaf profile re-allows its own package manager's auth token, so a malicious package executed during npm install can read NPM_TOKEN, but not a yarn or bun token, a PyPI token, AWS key, or other cloud/secret-manager credential, which stay scrubbed. The reverse holds for the other profiles. This is deliberate: the package manager needs its own auth token to function.

Configs written before the profile split may still map npm, yarn, or bun to npm-restrictive, pnpm to pnpm-restrictive, or pip, pip3, poetry, or uv to pypi-restrictive. PMG re-maps these legacy defaults to the per-package-manager leaf profile at load time, unless a custom policy template overrides the legacy name, in which case the template wins as before.

Matching is on the variable name, case-insensitive, and supports the same glob syntax as filesystem rules. A small set of core variables (PATH, HOME, LC_*, TZ, ...) is never scrubbed.

Requirements

• Linux kernel 5.13+ with Landlock enabled (default, no external dependencies)
• Bubblewrap on Linux (fallback for kernels < 5.13, or when PMG_SANDBOX_DRIVER=bubblewrap is set)
• Seatbelt on MacOS
• On Ubuntu 23.10+, an AppArmor profile granting pmg unprivileged user namespaces. See AppArmor blocks the Landlock driver

Bubblewrap Installation on Linux

For Debian-based Linux distributions, you can install Bubblewrap with the following command:

sudo apt install bubblewrap

For Arch Linux, you can install Bubblewrap with the following command:

sudo pacman -S bubblewrap

For other Linux distributions, you can install Bubblewrap from the package manager of your choice. See Bubblewrap Installation for more details.

Usage

• Make sure sandbox is enabled in your config.yml file. See configuration for the configuration schema.
• Make sure sandbox profiles are configured for the package managers you want to sandbox.

See configuration and config/config.template.yml for the configuration schema. Once sandbox is enabled, you can run package manager commands with sandbox protection.

Run pmg sandbox doctor to see platform specific sandbox setup and driver status. Continue using PMG as usual, sandbox will be applied to configured package managers automatically.

pmg npm install express

Explicitly enable sandbox if not enabled in the config.yml file:

pmg --sandbox --sandbox-profile=npm-restrictive npm install express

Run sandbox with custom policy file:

pmg --sandbox --sandbox-profile=/path/to/custom-policy.yml npm install express

Sandbox Profile Commands

Use profile commands to inspect, create, and validate sandbox profiles.

# List built-in and user profiles
pmg sandbox profile list

# Scaffold a user profile that inherits from a built-in
pmg sandbox profile init my-npm --from npm-restrictive

# Open a user profile in $VISUAL / $EDITOR, then validate and lint it
pmg sandbox profile edit my-npm

# Show a profile, or its fully resolved policy
pmg sandbox profile show npm-restrictive
pmg sandbox profile show npm-restrictive --resolved

# Lint a built-in, user profile, or profile file
pmg sandbox profile lint npm-restrictive
pmg sandbox profile lint ./my-profile.yml --strict

# Compare two resolved profiles
pmg sandbox profile diff npm-restrictive pypi-restrictive

pmg sandbox profile edit resolves the profile name to its file under the user profile directory, opens it in your editor, and re-validates and lints the result when the editor exits. Built-in profiles are embedded in the binary and cannot be edited; create an editable copy with pmg sandbox profile init <new-name> --from <builtin>.

To activate a user profile for a package manager, reference it by name in config.yml — no policy template is needed for profiles in the user profile directory:

policies:
  pnpm:
    enabled: true
    profile: my-pnpm

Policy templates (see below) are only needed to override a built-in profile name or to load a policy file from outside the user profile directory.

Sandbox Debug Commands

Use these commands when a sandboxed package manager command fails and you need to inspect why.

# Check sandbox driver availability and host setup
pmg sandbox doctor

# List recent sandbox denials captured by PMG
pmg sandbox violations list

# Explain the latest captured denial and show a suggested override when possible
pmg sandbox explain --last

# Inspect the resolved policy PMG will apply
pmg sandbox profile show npm-restrictive --resolved

pmg sandbox doctor runs platform-specific checks for the current host. Cached violation reports used by violations list and explain --last are produced by macOS Seatbelt diagnostics and, on Linux, by the Landlock driver's seccomp supervisor.

Coverage differs by platform. Seatbelt logs every denial, including the default-deny allow-list boundary. The Landlock driver only reports denials made by its seccomp deny-list layer (reads and writes of deny_* paths, blocked deny_exec binaries): denials made by the Landlock LSM itself (operations outside the allow-list, delete/rename, network rules) fail in-kernel with EACCES and produce no report. deny_write entries outside writable areas are enforced by Landlock rather than seccomp, so they are likewise not reported. Operational degradation events on the audit socket (namespace_isolation_unavailable, memfd_open_failed) are not included in violation reports today; they may be added later. Bubblewrap denials only appear as command errors such as EACCES.

Runtime Allow Overrides

Use --sandbox-allow to make one-off exceptions without creating a custom profile. This is useful when a command needs access that the default profile blocks.

# Allow writing to a specific file
pmg --sandbox-allow write=./.gitignore npx create-next-app@latest

# Allow executing a binary blocked by the profile
pmg --sandbox-allow exec=$(which curl) npm install some-package

# Allow outbound connection to a private registry
pmg --sandbox-allow net-connect=npm.internal.corp:443 npm install @corp/private-pkg

# Allow a dev server to bind to a local port
pmg --sandbox-allow net-bind=127.0.0.1:3000 npx some-dev-tool

# Re-allow a sensitive environment variable that the profile scrubs by default
pmg --sandbox-allow env=AWS_PROFILE aws-cdk-using-package install

# Multiple overrides
pmg \
  --sandbox-allow write=./.gitignore \
  --sandbox-allow exec=$(which curl) \
  npm install some-package

Supported types: read, write, exec, net-connect, net-bind, env.

For env, the value is an environment variable name or name glob (e.g. NPM_TOKEN, npm_config_*) and is kept verbatim. It is not path-resolved. It is an allow-only override that re-permits a variable the profile would otherwise scrub; allow always wins, so there is no deny list to edit. If a command fails with an auth error, re-run with --debug and look for a "scrubbed" log line naming the variable, then re-allow it with --sandbox-allow env=NAME.

Overrides are non-persistent (apply to current invocation only) and logged in the event log for auditing. An override adds the path to the allow list and removes an exact match entry from the corresponding deny list. Glob deny patterns are never removed. An exact-match entry in allow_read or allow_write (in the policy or via --sandbox-allow read=... / write=...) opts out of the mandatory deny for that credential file. PMG treats both channels as explicit user intent. Suppression is exact-match only; broad paths or globs do not opt out. .git/hooks does not accept opt-outs.

Project Overlays

A project overlay is a per-repository allow-set that PMG applies automatically on every run in that repo, so you do not have to retype the same --sandbox-allow flags. The overlay is local only, keyed by the repo's git toplevel (CWD when not a git repo), and stored under <config_dir>/sandbox/overlays/. It is purely additive on top of the resolved policy, never weakens mandatory denies, and is ignored when global_lockdown is set.

# Save manual allowances for the current repo
pmg sandbox allow write=./.astro net-bind=localhost:4321

# Persist an environment variable allowance so the profile stops scrubbing it
# in this repo (same semantics as --sandbox-allow env=..., but saved)
pmg sandbox allow env=AWS_PROFILE

# Promote the primary violation from the most recent cached report
pmg sandbox allow --last

# Promote every safe FS/exec violation from that report
pmg sandbox allow --last --all

# Allow a sensitive path (e.g. .env, .npmrc) explicitly
pmg sandbox allow --force read=./.env

# Inspect the current repo's overlay
pmg sandbox project show
pmg sandbox project show --json

# List overlays across all known repos
pmg sandbox project list

# Delete the current repo's overlay
pmg sandbox project reset --yes

Presets

A preset is a named, additive-only bundle of allowances for one workload (git hooks tooling, an Astro/Vite/Next.js dev server, ...). Instead of discovering allowances one denial at a time, apply a curated bundle:

pmg sandbox preset list
pmg sandbox preset show git
pmg sandbox allow preset=git preset=astro

Presets can also be attached to a profile via a presets: list. See sandbox-presets.md for usage and how to author your own.

Notes:

• --last/--last --all only auto-promotes filesystem and exec denials. Network allowances (net-connect, net-bind) and environment allowances (env) must be passed manually as type=value because drivers do not classify network denials yet and environment scrubbing is logged rather than recorded as a violation. Run with --debug to see scrubbed variable names, then persist with pmg sandbox allow env=NAME.
• pmg sandbox allow refuses sensitive targets (.env*, .npmrc, .ssh, .aws, .kube, .gnupg, ...) unless --force is given.
• Applied overlay entries are recorded in the audit event log with a +overlay source tag so they can be distinguished from --sandbox-allow flags.

Custom policy overrides using Policy Templates

Policy templates allow custom policy overrides. To setup custom policy overrides for your package manager, start by looking up the PMG configuration directory:

pmg setup info

Create a new policy template file in the PMG configuration directory and edit it to suit your needs:

# Set the PMG configuration directory
export PMG_CONFIG_DIR="/path/to/pmg/config/dir"

# Create the policy template file
cat > $PMG_CONFIG_DIR/sandbox-custom-policy.yml <<EOF
name: pnpm-macos-custom-sandbox
description: Custom profile for pnpm in MacOS
inherits: npm-restrictive

package_managers:
  - pnpm

allow_pty: true

filesystem:
  allow_write:
    # pnpm i need write access here
    - ${HOME}/Library/pnpm/.tools/**

    # pnpm i creates these tmp files in local dir, at least on MacOS
    - ${CWD}/_tmp_*

    # pnpm self-update (or likely update) creates temporary package.json files
    # for writing. This is likely for atomic update using filesystem rename operation
    # which guarantees atomicity
    - ${CWD}/package.json.*

    # Need access for dependency resolution
    - ${CWD}/.pnpm-store

  # Additional deny rules for extra security
  deny_write:
    - ${CWD}/.env
    - ${CWD}/.env.*
EOF

Edit PMG configuration file to use the custom policy template and override the default policy for your package manager:

policy_templates:
  pnpm-macos-custom-sandbox:
    path: ./sandbox-custom-policy.yml

policies:
  pnpm:
    enabled: true
    profile: pnpm-macos-custom-sandbox

Next time you run pmg pnpm install, the custom policy template will be used instead of the default policy.

Supported Platforms

Platform	Supported	Implementation
MacOS	Yes	Seatbelt sandbox-exec
Linux	Yes	Landlock (default, kernel 5.13+) or Bubblewrap (fallback)
Windows	No	Not yet supported

Platform-Specific Limitations

Linux (Landlock, default)

Default sandbox on kernel 5.13+: Landlock provides kernel-native filesystem access control without requiring external binaries or unprivileged user namespaces.

For the architecture, design tradeoffs, and known limitations see sandbox-landlock.md.

Deny enforcement: Deny rules (DenyRead, DenyWrite, DenyExec) are enforced via seccomp user notifications. This introduces a small TOCTOU window (microseconds) between reading the path and responding.

Deny enforcement across the process tree: seccomp-notify resolves the path argument of an intercepted openat(2) by reading /proc/<pid>/mem of the trapping process. PMG ships this in a two-stage architecture so enforcement applies to direct targets AND every descendant (grandchildren, great-grandchildren, etc.):

1. The helper process (pmg __landlock_sandbox_exec) clones a tiny shim (pmg __landlock_shim) with CLONE_NEWUSER and a uid/gid map of 0 -> host uid. The shim runs as uid 0 inside a fresh user namespace so it has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in that namespace.
2. The shim installs the seccomp-notify filter without PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS (permitted by CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the ns). It then applies Landlock and execves the real target.
3. Because NO_NEW_PRIVS was never set, subsequent execve calls in the tree do not reset dumpable to 0, so the helper can keep opening /proc/<pid>/mem for any descendant. Deny rules like ~/.ssh are enforced for the full process tree.

The user namespace is purely a capability vehicle. Host uid/gid are preserved through the mapping, so targets see the same filesystem ownership they normally would. Tools that refuse to run as root (npm's root-in-container warning) are unaffected because the outside-view uid never changes.

Requirements: unprivileged user namespaces must be enabled (unprivileged_userns_clone=1 on Debian/Ubuntu; default on most modern distros). If disabled, the helper fails with an EPERM on clone() and the sandbox falls back to Bubblewrap.

Network filtering: Not enforced. Landlock supports TCP port filtering only (V4+, no hostname). PMG's proxy interception provides network control.

PID/IPC namespace isolation: Applied best-effort via CLONE_NEWPID|CLONE_NEWIPC|CLONE_NEWNS. If unavailable, a warning is printed and the command continues. Set PMG_SANDBOX_DRIVER=bubblewrap to force Bubblewrap if namespace isolation is required.

/proc access: The sandbox supervisor requires /proc read access. When PID namespace isolation succeeds, /proc is scoped to the child's namespace. When it fails, /proc exposes all system processes.

Fallback: If Landlock is unavailable (kernel < 5.13), Bubblewrap is used automatically. Set PMG_SANDBOX_DRIVER=bubblewrap to force Bubblewrap.

Linux (Bubblewrap, fallback)

Filesystem permissions are coarse-grained: Bubblewrap uses bind mounts for filesystem isolation.

To prevent Argument list too long errors with large directory trees, PMG automatically uses coarse-grained fallback strategies when glob patterns match many files.

Fallback Behavior:

• Small patterns (< 100 matches): Individual files are mounted (fine-grained, most precise)
• Large patterns (> 100 matches): Parent directory is mounted (coarse-grained, scalable)
• Threshold: 100 paths per pattern triggers coarse-grained fallback

Network filtering: All-or-nothing network isolation (via --unshare-net). Host-specific filtering is not enforced.

Per-direction mandatory deny is asymmetric on Linux: bwrap has no primitive that allows writes while denying reads for the same path. --bind exposes both directions; --tmpfs and --ro-bind /dev/null block both. If you opt out of write for a mandatory deny path (e.g., list it in allow_write but not allow_read), the bind mount also exposes reads, and PMG cannot enforce the read-side mandatory deny. PMG warns via log.Warnf when it detects this case. macOS Seatbelt does not have this limitation; its file-read* and file-write* rules are independent.

macOS (Seatbelt)

Network lockdown (network_via_proxy_only): Fine-grained host:port filtering is not expressible in Seatbelt, so per-host control happens at the PMG proxy instead. With network_via_proxy_only: true, the sandbox denies all non-loopback outbound network; only the running PMG proxy's port is reachable, and profiles with allow_network_bind additionally keep loopback↔loopback connects open. Raw sockets, QUIC, and arbitrary non-loopback ports are blocked at the kernel. Direct DNS is disabled by default (the proxy resolves names); allow_direct_dns: true re-opens it. The Go profile ships with lockdown enabled.

Lockdown is fail-closed: it requires the proxy flow, and pmg errors out rather than running without confinement when no proxy is available — including on Linux, where network_via_proxy_only is not yet supported (the drivers reject it with a clear error, never a silent fallback).

For local development: plain commands like npm run dev are not sandboxed unless enforce_always is set; loopback↔loopback traffic keeps working via allow_network_bind (as noted above); and proxy-honoring clients reach any destination through the proxy CONNECT path. What breaks under lockdown is direct non-loopback sockets — tools that ignore HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXY and non-HTTP wire protocols (e.g. Postgres or Redis clients pointed at non-loopback hosts). Such denials render as:

direct network access blocked by network_via_proxy_only — traffic must flow through the PMG proxy (a tool may have ignored HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXY)

Concepts

PMG layers three concepts: a Policy is the rule set defining what is allowed and denied. A Profile is a named binding from a package manager to a policy. A Policy Template maps a profile name to a YAML file so you can override the built-ins.

Detailed concepts

Policy

Policy is a set of rules that define the allowed and denied actions for a package manager. A sandbox implementation, such as sandbox-exec on MacOS enforces the policy.

PMG defines its own policy model. The design goal is simplicity and ease of use. Sandbox implementations are expected to translate the policy model into their own native policy format. Rules for policy are:

• Deny by default unless explicitly allowed
• Deny rules have higher priority than allow rules
• Policy profile allows binding package managers to a specific sandbox policy
• Package manager must have a sandbox profile when sandbox is enabled
• Package manager specific sandbox profile may be disabled to skip sandbox for the package manager

Profile

Profile is a named reference to a policy. It is used to associate a policy with a package manager. PMG ships with a set of built-in profiles that are used to enforce the policies for the package manager. See sandbox/profiles for the list of built-in profiles.

Custom profiles can be created by copying a built-in profile and modifying the rules to suit the needs. See sandbox/profiles/README.md for more details.

Policy Template

Policy template is a configuration primitive for overriding a built-in profile or creating a custom profile. It is used to map a profile name to a path. See config/config.template.yml for an example.

Threat Model

PMG trusts policy files and the operator's CLI as the source of intent. The sandbox implementation enforces what the policy declares. Translation from PMG's YAML to the native sandbox format must not weaken it. Variable interpolation consumes only trusted sources.

Detailed assumptions

• Policy files are trusted
• Policy enforcement is a sandbox implementation concern
• YAML to sandbox specific policy translation must not make the policy weaker than the original policy
• Variable interpolation in policy files must consider only trusted sources

Enforcement

The sandbox implementation currently only support block mode. This means, any policy violation will block the execution of the package manager command.

Debug

MacOS

OSX sandbox implementation is based on Chromium OSX Sandbox Design and Anthropic Sandbox Runtime. Current implementation does not support identifying sandbox policy violations.

To manually investigate sandbox policy violations, you can use the following command:

APP_LOG_LEVEL=debug APP_LOG_FILE=/tmp/pmg-debug.log pmg --sandbox --sandbox-profile=npm-restrictive npm install express

Find the log tag in the debug log file and use it to investigate the sandbox policy violation.

grep "PMG_SBX_" /tmp/pmg-debug.log

Use log(1) to filter the log file by the log tag.

log show --last 5m --predicate 'message ENDSWITH "PMG_SBX_${TAG}"' --style compact

Linux

Linux sandbox implementation uses Bubblewrap for namespace-based isolation. Enable debug logging to see translated sandbox arguments:

APP_LOG_LEVEL=debug APP_LOG_FILE=/tmp/pmg-debug.log pmg --sandbox --sandbox-profile=npm-restrictive npm install express

Review the debug log to see the translated bwrap command-line arguments:

grep "Bubblewrap arguments" /tmp/pmg-debug.log

To debug sandbox violations, you can manually test commands with increased verbosity by running the sandbox command directly:

# Extract the bwrap command from debug logs and run with --verbose
bwrap --verbose [arguments...] -- npm install express

Note: Unlike macOS, Bubblewrap does not provide real-time violation logging. Policy violations typically manifest as EACCES (Permission denied) errors.

With the Landlock driver, denials made by the seccomp deny-list layer on a failed run are captured into the violation cache and can be inspected with pmg sandbox violations list and pmg sandbox explain --last (see Sandbox Debug Commands above for coverage limits).

AppArmor blocks the Landlock driver (Ubuntu 23.10+)

Ubuntu restricts unprivileged user namespaces via AppArmor (kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1, default since 23.10). The Landlock driver needs one: it re-executes pmg inside a user namespace to install its seccomp filter. With the restriction active, sandboxed commands fail with:

Error: shim: install seccomp: SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER without NNP (user-ns CAP_SYS_ADMIN required): permission denied

pmg sandbox doctor flags this as the "AppArmor user namespaces" check.

The recommended fix is Ubuntu's own mechanism: an AppArmor profile that grants pmg (and only pmg) the userns permission. Create /etc/apparmor.d/pmg with the pmg binary path (command -v pmg):

abi <abi/4.0>,
include <tunables/global>

profile pmg /usr/local/bin/pmg flags=(unconfined) {
  userns,
  include if exists <local/pmg>
}

Load it (persists across reboots; no restart needed):

sudo apparmor_parser -r /etc/apparmor.d/pmg

Alternatively, disable the restriction system-wide. This is simpler but weakens the protection for every binary on the host, so prefer the profile:

sudo sysctl -w kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=0

References

• https://github.com/anthropic-experimental/sandbox-runtime
• https://geminicli.com/docs/cli/sandbox/
• https://github.com/containers/bubblewrap