mirror of
https://github.com/safedep/pmg.git
synced 2026-08-03 07:24:09 +02:00
main
17
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Sahil BansalandGitHub
|
47dd859756 |
feat(sandbox): report landlock seccomp denials via pmg sandbox violations (#389)
* feat(sandbox): report landlock seccomp denials via pmg sandbox violations The landlock driver's seccomp supervisor already emitted structured deny events over the audit socket, but the driver drained them to io.Discard, so the violation cache was never populated on Linux and violations list / explain always came up empty. Capture the events at the driver, enrich them with access mode and process name, and implement BestEffortViolation mirroring the seatbelt reporter: failure-only collection, seccomp_deny events only, (kind, target) dedupe. The platform-neutral cache/list/explain pipeline picks it up unchanged. Only the seccomp deny-list layer is observable; denials made by the Landlock LSM itself (allow-list boundary, delete/rename, network) fail in-kernel with no userspace signal and are documented as out of scope. Also make the explain renderer driver-neutral: the raw-log label was hardcoded as "Seatbelt log" and an empty correlation ID printed a blank value. * fix: address review findings on landlock violation reporting Report the deny rule that fired, not the requested access: an O_RDWR open denied by a read-only rule now surfaces as a read denial with an effective override suggestion (allow write= prunes only deny_write). The matched rule path is emitted as rule_path and mapped to RuleTarget, bringing the "Matched rule:" line to parity with seatbelt. Dedupe deny events by (kind, path) at capture time so a retry loop on one denied path cannot fill the buffer and evict a later distinct denial; the cap now bounds distinct denials. Stamp deny events with a timestamp (they rendered "ts":0 in the raw log) and default unknown syscalls to generic_deny instead of fs_write. * refactor: single source for the deny dedupe key Capture-time and extract-time dedupe must agree on what identifies a denial; building the key in two places risks them drifting apart. * fix: bound the capture dedupe map by marking keys only on append seen grew for every distinct deny key even after the buffer was full, and keys carry attacker-chosen path bytes — a hostile process looping over crafted unique denied paths could grow the pmg parent's memory for the run's duration, defeating the cap. Marking keys only when the event is appended bounds the map at the cap and keeps the one-time drop warning reachable for distinct denials past it. * docs(sandbox): AppArmor userns fix for the Landlock driver on Ubuntu 23.10+ The shim fails with "install seccomp: ... permission denied" when kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1. Document the per-binary AppArmor profile as the recommended fix and the sysctl as the blunt alternative. * docs(sandbox): drop em dashes from the landlock sections * fix(doctor): cover landlock in the AppArmor userns probe The warn detail only named the bwrap failure and the only suggested fix was the system-wide sysctl. Name the landlock shim error too and suggest the per-binary AppArmor profile first, pointing at the new docs section. |
||
|
Sahil BansalandGitHub
|
94781d6bda |
Remove guard mode: proxy interception is now the only flow (#386)
* refactor: remove guard mode execution paths and guard-only packages Guard (non-proxy) mode is removed; all package-manager commands now always run the proxy flow. Removes the guard engine, the common flow, the extractor package, the npm/pypi dependency resolvers and the PackageResolver plumbing that only guard mode consumed. The guard package retains only PackageManagerGuardInteraction, which the proxy flow and confirmation interceptors reuse for user prompts. Proxy behavior is unchanged. * refactor: remove proxy opt-out surfaces, guard references in config, action and docs Removes Config.ProxyMode, ProxyConfig.Enabled, IsProxyModeEnabled, the proxy_mode legacy fallback, PMG_PROXY_ENABLED handling and the --proxy-mode / --include-dev-dependencies flags. Proxy interception can no longer be disabled. Also removes the proxy-mode input from the GitHub Action, the proxy-mode doctor check and setup info row, updates the E2E workflow to stop passing --proxy-mode=false, and sweeps guard-mode wording from docs and the config template. The legacy proxy_install_only flat key and PMG_PROXY_INSTALL_ONLY env var remain supported. audit.FlowTypeGuard is kept so previously recorded audit events still translate for cloud sync. * feat: fail loudly when a removed proxy opt-out is still configured A leftover proxy.enabled: false / proxy_mode: false config key or PMG_PROXY_ENABLED=false / PMG_PROXY_MODE=false env var previously meant guard mode; silently ignoring it would switch those users to proxy interception without notice. PMG now exits with an actionable error naming the exact source. Precedence mirrors the old resolution order: env (ignored under lockdown) > proxy.enabled > legacy proxy_mode. The pmg config subtree is exempt so the config file can still be fixed with pmg config edit/set. The GitHub Action's proxy-mode input is kept as a tombstone that fails the action when set to false and warns otherwise. * refactor: extract flows.RunProxy and address review findings Collapses the identical parse-then-run body duplicated across the 12 package manager commands into flows.RunProxy. Documents the cache-hit / offline analysis trade-off versus the removed guard manifest path, fixes a stale non-proxy label in the E2E workflow and a stale guard reference in the uvx parser comment. * fix(config): mirror old proxy opt-out precedence exactly PMG_PROXY_MODE only ever took effect through the legacy fallback, which was gated on the presence of a proxy: key in the config file (even a null one). Promoting it to the top env tier caused two inversions: a stale PMG_PROXY_MODE=false hard-failed configs that resolved to proxy mode, and PMG_PROXY_MODE=true silently overrode an explicit proxy.enabled: false file opt-out. The check now resolves in the old order: PMG_PROXY_ENABLED > proxy: section (presence gates the legacy tier) > PMG_PROXY_MODE > flat proxy_mode. parseOptOutBool also accepts numeric values (0 = false) to match viper's WeaklyTypedInput/cast.ToBool coercion, so proxy.enabled: 0 and proxy_mode: 0 are detected as opt-outs. * refactor: move package manager interaction out of guard * refactor: trim package manager interaction * fix(config): normalize config keys viper-style in proxy opt-out check Viper resolved config file keys case-insensitively and expanded dotted keys, so spellings like Proxy:, Enabled:, a literal proxy.enabled key or Proxy_Mode selected guard mode before the removal. The opt-out check now lowercases keys recursively and nests dotted keys before matching, so those existing opt-outs fail loudly instead of being silently ignored. * refactor: remove inert transitive controls, dead parser state and guard audit variant transitive / transitive_depth lost their only consumers with the dependency resolvers; remove the config fields, flags, template and doc entries, and the report/audit plumbing that misreported transitive analysis as enabled. Remove write-only parser state (PackageInstallTarget.Extras, ParsedCommand.ManifestFiles, ShouldExtractFromManifest); IsManifestInstall stays as it feeds sandbox gating via IsInstallationCommand. Remove audit.FlowTypeGuard and its cloud mapping; guard events recorded by pre-removal versions in an unsynced WAL translate to UNSPECIFIED. * fix: address review findings on the opt-out wiring and cleanups Move the removed-opt-out rejection from the CLI PersistentPreRun into proxyFlow.Run: the check now fires exactly for package-manager runs, so non-install commands (pmg setup remove, doctor, config, version) stay usable to fix or remove an opted-out installation, and future commands inherit or avoid the check by construction instead of by exemption list. Also: make the e2e malicious-package assertion actually fail the job when an install is not blocked, route pmg go through flows.RunProxy, and drop the dead extras return from pypiParsePackageInfo (extras are still stripped from package names). * fix(config): make the removed opt-out check faithful to the old resolution The gate that silenced the legacy proxy_mode surfaces matched the raw proxy key case-sensitively in the old code, while values resolved viper-style (case-insensitive, dotted keys); applying each semantic where the old code did fixes both divergences: a case-variant Proxy: section no longer hides a flat proxy_mode: false opt-out, and a dotted proxy.enabled: false overridden by proxy_mode: true no longer errors. Replace the generic key-tree normalization with two targeted lookups (the check only ever resolves proxy.enabled and proxy_mode), which also makes colliding spellings resolve deterministically. Coerce legacy-tier values cast.ToBool-style so PMG_PROXY_MODE=off style opt-outs are detected, log the config read error instead of swallowing it, and shorten the error to a one-line statement with the specific remedy in the help text. Add lockdown coverage (env inert both directions) and a repeated-run determinism test. * fix(config): fall back to defaults for unrecognized proxy opt-out values The old loader swallowed viper errors and ran on defaults, so values like proxy.enabled: yes or PMG_PROXY_ENABLED=banana silently discarded the whole config and defaulted to proxy. Treat them the same way now: unrecognized values mean the default (proxy on) instead of a hard error, and the doc comment no longer claims the old loader failed loudly. Only values that actually meant guard mode fail. Also check the removed opt-out before the CA trust check in pmg go, restoring the old error precedence: a config problem must not steer the user into an unnecessary OS trust store change. * fix(e2e): PMG_PROXY_MODE assertion must match the legacy gate semantics The runner's setup step writes the template config, which has a proxy: section — and with one present the legacy PMG_PROXY_MODE was always inert, so expecting a loud failure there asserts pre-fidelity-fix behavior. Assert both sides instead: inert (command succeeds) with the standard config, loud failure against an empty config dir where the legacy fallback actually applied. * refactor(config): collapse parseOptOutBool to ParseBool over the string form YAML hands us typed values (bool, int), so route them through fmt.Sprintf %v and strconv.ParseBool instead of a per-type switch. Identical behavior for every recognized value; numbers other than 0/1 now read as no opinion instead of cast.ToBool's nonzero-true, which no real config relies on. |
||
|
|
ee684a29a9 |
feat(sandbox): presets — additive workload allowance bundles (#387)
* feat(sandbox): introduce presets - additive workload allowance bundles Presets are named, additive-only bundles of sandbox allowances for a specific workload (git hooks tooling, Astro/Vite/Next.js dev servers). They solve the per-workload tuning friction from #384 without weakening the default posture: no built-in profile references a preset, presets cannot carry deny rules or profile booleans (strict YAML decoding), and mandatory denies still win everywhere except the existing exact-match suppression. - Preset schema with metadata (author, labels) and schema_version gating - Registry over ordered sources (embedded builtin, user dir); builtin wins name collisions; source abstraction is the extension point for a future hosted registry and SafeDep cloud sync - Official presets: git, astro, vite, nextjs (with threat notes) - Overlay/runtime integration: pmg sandbox allow preset=<name> and --sandbox-allow preset=<name>, stored by reference, resolved at apply time, missing presets warn (fail closed) instead of aborting - Profile integration: presets: [...] list resolved after inherits - CLI: pmg sandbox preset list (metadata filters, --json), show (prints YAML with threat notes), lint - Docs: user guide (docs/sandbox-presets.md) and design spec Closes #384 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn * fix(sandbox): address review findings on presets - Presets never modify deny lists: a profile authored deny now survives a preset allowing the same path (deny-beats-allow keeps it enforced). Regression test added. - Profile inspection commands (show, diff, lint) construct the profile registry with the user-aware preset registry so they agree with runtime resolution of custom profiles referencing user presets. - Handle stderr write error when warning about unresolvable presets. - Compute preset show underline from the uncolored header. - Use path.Join for embed.FS reads (slash-separated on all platforms). - Clarify in docs that lint-staged/astro are examples of preset workloads. - Drop the design spec from the PR per review. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn * fix(sandbox): harden preset precedence against authored denies Addresses external security review findings on the preset mechanism: - Bubblewrap: a mandatory write-denied path listed in allow_read lost its protection when a later writable parent bind covered it (bwrap last mount wins) - exactly the git preset shape (allow_read .git/config + allow_write .git/**). The mandatory deny now re-binds the path read-only after all writable mounts instead of being skipped. Regression test asserts mount ordering. Landlock and Seatbelt were unaffected (tests added for the same policy shape on Landlock). - Environment: ScrubEnv is allow-wins, so a preset environment allowance could override a profile-authored deny. Preset env allowances overlapping an authored deny pattern are now dropped at application time (conservative bidirectional glob overlap, fail closed). Surviving entries still opt out of built-in credential scrubbing as intended. - Network: removed allow_outbound from the preset schema. Both platform translators are all-or-nothing for outbound (one allow rule means blanket network access), so a preset outbound entry would silently change network posture far beyond what its YAML conveys. Strict decoding rejects the key. - Added a dual-path expansion equivalence test (profile presets: field vs overlay/--sandbox-allow) and documented the precedence guarantees in docs/sandbox-presets.md. Explicit --sandbox-allow and pmg sandbox allow overrides keep their existing semantics. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn * docs(sandbox): document env and preset allowances in allow command and overlay docs pmg sandbox allow help, the --sandbox-allow flag usage, and the project overlay docs enumerated only read/write/exec/net types. Add env and preset to all of them, with an overlay example for persisting an env allowance and a note on why env entries are not auto-promoted by --last. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn * chore(sandbox): trim preset code comments to corner cases and minimal godocs Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn * fix(sandbox): exact glob intersection for preset env deny overlap The bidirectional literal-text heuristic missed overlapping globs with different literal structure: preset allow AWS_*_KEY and authored deny AWS_SECRET_* both match AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY but neither pattern matches the other's text, so the allowance merged and allow-wins scrubbing exposed the variable. EnvPatternsOverlap now computes exact intersection non-emptiness for the name glob dialect (case-insensitive, '*' any sequence, '?' single char) via memoized DP. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn * fix(sandbox): preset env allowances are exact names, not globs Glob-vs-glob intersection is a losing game: every dialect extension (character classes today) silently reopens the deny-bypass hole. Restricting preset environment allowances to literal variable names makes the authored-deny precedence check exact by construction: each deny pattern is evaluated against the concrete name with the same matcher ScrubEnv uses at runtime, so the decision cannot diverge from enforcement regardless of deny dialect. Removes the glob intersection machinery. Profile and --sandbox-allow env globs are unaffected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn * fix(sandbox): reject mandatory-deny targets in preset paths Preset validation relied on IsSensitiveProjectTarget, which covers fewer files than util.DANGEROUS_FILES. A preset naming .git-credentials, .pgpass, .docker/config.json or .config/gh exactly would exact-match suppress the mandatory deny; .git/config in allow_write would suppress the write protection. Preset paths are now checked against DANGEROUS_FILES (single source of truth), .git/hooks is rejected in any direction, and .git/config is rejected for write/exec while read stays allowed for git repo discovery. Docs state the two deliberate opt-outs precisely. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn * feat(sandbox): preset init and edit commands for community authoring pmg sandbox preset init scaffolds a valid user preset (metadata flags, threat-note template, starter rule) and refuses built-in names since builtins win resolution. pmg sandbox preset edit opens the file via the shared editor package and validates the result, warning when a user preset is shadowed by a built-in. Docs lead with the scaffolded flow and spell out builtin-vs-community provenance in preset list. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn * refactor(sandbox): move mandatory-target matching into util Preset path validation re-encoded knowledge util already owns: the dangerous-files comparison and hardcoded .git/config and .git/hooks strings. util now exports GitConfigPath, GitHooksPath (also used by GetMandatoryDenyPatterns), PathCoveredBy and DangerousFileMatch, and preset validation consumes them so the mandatory deny policy has a single definition. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
|
695a1d739d |
feat: Add support for sandbox edit command (#385)
* feat: Add support for sandbox edit command * docs: Update sandbox docs * fix(editor): address review — neutral failure wording, skip sh-script tests on Windows Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(test): avoid pnpm init in pm-e2e — devEngines.packageManager crashes subsequent pnpm add Same workaround and rationale as the PNPM job in pmg-e2e.yml. Latest pnpm (unpinned pnpm/action-setup) writes devEngines.packageManager with onFail:download on init, and the next add fails with "Cannot use 'in' operator to search for 'integrity' in undefined". Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
Abhisek DattaandGitHub
|
d3e656edcd | feat(sandbox): enable network_via_proxy_only for the Go ecosystem profile (#375) | ||
|
|
648adcbda4 |
feat: add uvx (uv tool run) package executor (#357)
* feat(uvx): add uvx (uv tool run) package executor Adds support for `uvx`, implemented as a PyPI Executor alongside pipx. uvx is an alias for `uv tool run`: it installs a tool into an ephemeral environment and runs it, so it has no install/list subcommand and the first positional argument (or --from) is the package to audit. Parsing highlights: - --from overrides the positional command as the package to audit - --with packages are audited as additional environment dependencies - name@version shorthand (ruff@0.3.0, ruff@latest) is normalized - flag parsing stops at the tool name so the tool's own flags are not misread as uvx options; uvx's value/boolean flags are registered so none greedily consume the package positional - VCS/URL/local-path specs are skipped for registry auditing Wires up command registration, analytics, shell alias/shim, cloud audit mapping, a dedicated `uvx` sandbox profile (UV_*/PIP_* env, uv cache and tool dirs), config policy, docs, unit tests and an E2E workflow step. Closes #326 https://claude.ai/code/session_011hyLxq7oWJX5Dp4tCEfG19 * chore(uvx): align docs and base profile with uvx support Incorporates the low-risk, non-parser improvements from the community PR #345 (author non-responsive) into our implementation: - list uvx (and the previously-missing pipx) as PyPI managers in the pypi-restrictive base profile package_managers and its README, so the base profile applies directly when selected via --sandbox-profile - document uvx in docs/github-action.md and docs/proxy-mode.md - add version / IsExplicitVersion assertions to the uvx parser tests Our pflag-based parser is kept as-is: unlike #345 it audits --with packages and handles all uvx short flags (e.g. -w), both of which the community PR misses. * fix(uvx): skip interpreter requests; use require in tests Addresses review feedback on PR #357: - uvx interpreter requests (`uvx python`, `uvx python@3.12`, `uvx pypy`, ...) launch an isolated interpreter rather than installing a PyPI tool. Treating the positional as a package made the guard flow resolve/analyze pkg:pypi/python (and python==3.12), which could wrongly block or fail a valid invocation. Skip these for the positional; --with packages on the same command are still audited. - Use require.NoError / require.Len for fatal assertions in the uvx tests, matching the repo's testing convention, so a failure stops the subtest before a nil dereference instead of panicking. * docs(uvx): document fail-open and --with-requirements trade-offs Record the two deliberate parsing decisions raised in review as in-code trade-off comments (no behavior change): - unknown flags are tolerated (fail open), consistent with the other executors; the residual gap only affects non-proxy guard mode since the default proxy flow intercepts every registry download. - --with-requirements / --with-editable values are consumed but not expanded into audit targets; expanding them needs manifest-extractor and guard changes, tracked as follow-up. Proxy mode still covers them. * docs(uvx): drop --with-requirements limitation note Per maintainer review: guard mode is being deprecated and auditing the contents of an existing requirements file is a scanner's responsibility, not PMG's. Remove the "known limitation / follow-up" note; the flags stay registered only so their values are not mistaken for the tool positional. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
Abhisek DattaandGitHub
|
c7244f921a |
feat: Add support for environment protection (scrubbing) (#327)
* feat: Add support for environment variable protection for sandbox * chore: Update dangerous env var list * fix: Split profiles for improved environment protection * fix: pipx sandbox profile separation * chore: Show sandbox scrub info on error exit * fix: Code review fixes * test: Add e2e for sandbox environment scrubbing |
||
|
Abhisek DattaandGitHub
|
b03e82e3f2 |
feat: Add support for per-project sandbox overlays (#294)
* feat: Add support for per-project sandbox overlays * chore: Maintain consistency with TUI experience * fix: Code review fixes |
||
|
Abhisek DattaandGitHub
|
b8588e3df4 |
feat: Add Sandbox Inspection and Debugging Commands (#261)
* feat: add sandbox DX commands * fix: Linter errors * fix: Sandbox deny log parsing * fix: Sandbox docs * refactor: Maintain SSOT across pkg dependencies * fix: Linter errors |
||
|
Abhisek DattaandGitHub
|
4c42ceca0e |
feat: Add support for Landlock based Sandbox for Linux (#238)
* feat: Initial implementation of landlock based sandbox driver * fix: Handle seccom probe failure * fix: Remove unnecessary seccomp probe * fix: Use file based policy load * fix: Keep bpf filter in memory * fix: Use TSYNC for seccom filter * fix: Use TSYNC for seccom filter * fix: Update landlock translator * fix: Landlock sandbox implementation * fix: Landlock + seccomp based sandboxing on Linux * fix: Misc fixes * fix: Cleanup sandbox files * fix: Handle mandatory deny API change post merge * fix: Landlock write access translation * chore: Fix linter issues * ci: Use /tmp for npm cache for landlock |
||
|
|
d6755d3f44 |
feat/sandbox allow explicit dangerous pattern override (#239)
* feat(sandbox): allow opt-out of mandatory deny via explicit allow rules
Mandatory deny patterns (.env, .aws, .ssh, .gcloud, .kube, .gnupg,
.docker/config.json, .git/config) can now be opted out by listing the
exact literal post-expansion path in policy filesystem.allow_read /
allow_write, OR via --sandbox-allow read=... / write=... at runtime.
Both channels are treated at par.
Suppression is exact-match. Listing the CWD-absolute or HOME-absolute
form of a dangerous file additionally suppresses its **/<file> glob
sibling on the same direction so a single opt-out is sufficient.
Broad globs (${CWD}/**) and relative paths in user allow lists do not
suppress. The unnamed absolute form remains denied. .git/hooks is
unconditional and never suppressible (arbitrary code execution risk).
GetMandatoryDenyPatterns now returns split DenyRead / DenyWrite
slices and reports SuppressedRead / SuppressedWrite for audit. Both
translators emit per-direction deny rules and log.Warnf each
suppression. On Linux/bubblewrap, the tmpfs hide is restricted to the
intersection of DenyRead and DenyWrite; one-sided suppression falls
back to /dev/null (write) or the user's allow_read --ro-bind (read).
bwrap has no primitive that allows writes while denying reads, so
write-only opt-outs warn that the read-side mandatory deny is
unenforceable.
Updates docs/sandbox.md to document the opt-out, exact-match
semantics, and the Linux platform limitation. Updates pmg-e2e.yml to
create ./.env so the sandbox e2e test exercises the BLOCK case.
Closes #232
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: Code review fixes
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
Abhisek DattaandGitHub
|
2bb5dd3778 |
fix: Allow explicit override over deny patterns (#177)
* fix: Allow explicit override over deny patterns * test: Non-glob expansion for overrides is expected |
||
|
Abhisek DattaandGitHub
|
6074080219 |
feat: Add support for sandbox allow override (#165)
* feat: Add support for sandbox allow override * fix: Main should fail on arg processing error * fix: Remove redundant policy conflict check |
||
|
Abhisek DattaandGitHub
|
80a1747e3e |
feat: Add support for Linux Sandbox using Bubblewrap (#120)
* feat: Add support for bubblewrap sandbox * fix: Glob pattern expansion limit for linux * fix: Bug in glob pattern expansion for bwrap * fix: README on trust * fix: Multiple bubblewrap translator fix * test: Add E2E for linux sandbox * fix: Refactor bwrap sandbox to use common dangerous files * fix: Path test case * fix: Non-existent path handling bug * refactor: Misc cleanup * fix: Avoid bind mount for non-existentent deny protection * fix: Off by one bug in path depth handling * ci: Disable AppArmor on GHA runner * fix: Disable apparmor userns restrictions |
||
|
|
b97a4c2ee5 |
docs: Add trust doc (#118)
* docs: Add trust doc * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: Abhisek Datta <abhisek.datta@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Abhisek Datta <abhisek.datta@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
|
2e1f5b1a36 |
feat: Add support for policy inheritence (#113)
* feat: Add support for policy inheritence * fix: Linter fixes * Update docs/sandbox.md Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: Abhisek Datta <abhisek.datta@gmail.com> * fix: Handle boolean inheritence * ci: Add linter * Update sandbox/policy_test.go Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: Abhisek Datta <abhisek.datta@gmail.com> * fix: Linter fixes * fix: Linter fixes * fix: Sandbox rule regex format --------- Signed-off-by: Abhisek Datta <abhisek.datta@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
|
9693428171 |
feat: Experimental Sandbox Support (#101)
* feat: Sandbox implementation with seatbelt * refactor: Remove concept of PM_CACHE * fix: Misc fixes * refactor: Sandbox for separation of boundaries * fix: Apply API * fix: Add support for sandbox cleanup * test: Add variable interpolation test * fix: Misc cleanup fixes * chore: Cleanup sandbox registry * chore: Cleanup sandbox policy * chore: Cleanup sandbox * fix: Misc cleanup fixes * fix: Remove violation mode * fix: Update config template * chore: Go mod cleanup * fix: Handle the case when package manager policy is explicitly disabled * fix: Sandbox executor * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: Abhisek Datta <abhisek.datta@gmail.com> * test: Remove unused var * test: Add test for seatbelt sandbox driver * fix: Sandbox profile loader from file should use path for caching * test: Add policy test * feat: Add support for config templates * fix: Seatbelt translator handle glob * fix: Merge conflicts * fix: Fix sandbox policy generator for MacOS min permissions * fix: Sandbox path handling bugs * fix: Deny read to dangerous directories * fix: Deny read to dangerous directories * add sandbox e2e (#112) * fix: Sandbox E2E test * fix: Code review fixes * fix: Code review fixes * doc: Add sandbox debugging guide * doc: Update sandbox doc * docs: Add sandbox usage doc * fix: Use better error for sandbox without policy * fix: Add sandbox for npx * fix: Enable PTY for npm --------- Signed-off-by: Abhisek Datta <abhisek.datta@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Sahil Bansal <bansalsahil315@gmail.com> |