Merge pull request #24 from Strategic-Automation/dev

Release v2.0.6
2026-08-14 12:33:37 +02:00 · 2026-07-18 19:15:07 -04:00
parent 4c44d47f6b e23933099a
commit 2626e53a1e
18 changed files with 253 additions and 93 deletions
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ on:
  push:
  pull_request:

+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
 jobs:
  test:
    strategy:
@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ on:
    branches: [master, dev]
  pull_request:
    branches: [master, dev]
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
 jobs:
  guard-check:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ on:
    branches: [master]
  pull_request:
    branches: [master]
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
 jobs:
  yaml-lint:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
@@ -30,4 +34,4 @@ jobs:
              sys.exit(1)
          else:
              print(f'All {len(files)} YAML files valid')
-          "
+          "
@@ -1,5 +1,29 @@
 # Changelog

+## 2.0.6
+
+- Resolved the current CodeQL standard quality findings by making intentional exception fallbacks explicit and removing unused test and hypothesis variables.
+
+## 2.0.5
+
+- Restored exact-repeat detection for execution history entries with receipt paths and added unambiguous command-length metadata while retaining compatibility with existing history files.
+
+## 2.0.4
+
+- Hard-blocked callback and research endpoints when supplied as primary assessment targets while preserving their approved secondary-only use, including burst execution.
+
+## 2.0.3
+
+- Fixed raw-terminal compound-command classification so every pipeline, logical, semicolon, and newline segment is checked independently, and package/source exemptions require every URL in the segment to use an approved source host.
+
+## 2.0.2
+
+- Restricted all GitHub Actions workflow tokens to read-only repository contents, resolving the three least-privilege code-scanning alerts without changing workflow behavior.
+
+## 2.0.1
+
+- Upgraded the pytest development dependency to 9.0.3 or later to address CVE-2025-71176 insecure temporary-directory handling.
+
 ## 2.0.0

 - Added model-visible `violin_status` diagnostics, phase-aware 10/20-command sync windows, a 350-iteration profile budget, and atomic `violin_review_batch` reconciliation with optional receipt-backed finding output.
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # violin - supervised agentic Hermes pentest profile
 name: violin
-version: 2.0.0
+version: 2.0.6
 description: "A supervised agentic Hermes penetration testing profile for authorised Kali/Parrot-based security assessment, reconnaissance, exploit validation, and reporting workflows."
 hermes_requires: ">=0.18.0"
 author: "Violin contributors"
@@ -169,12 +169,10 @@ def _on_session_finalize_hook(session_id=None, eng_dir=None, **kwargs) -> None:
    we leave a continuity marker so a fresh session can re-read pending state.
    """
    if eng_dir:
-        try:
+        with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
            pending = state.has_pending_sync(str(eng_dir))
            if pending:
                state.set_heartbeat_pending(
                    str(eng_dir),
                    "session finalized with a pending sync lock; run violin_review_batch",
                )
-        except Exception:
-            pass
@@ -338,7 +338,6 @@ def check_hypothesis_freshness(
                "or 'source unavailable' are valid outcomes when truthful."
            )
            return result
-        relevant = researched

    # Check for stale hypotheses (no update in 48h)
    stale = 0
@@ -126,12 +126,10 @@ def _terminate_pid(pid: int) -> None:
            check=False,
        )
    else:
-        try:
+        with contextlib.suppress(ProcessLookupError):
            os.killpg(pid, signal.SIGTERM)
            time.sleep(0.2)
            os.killpg(pid, signal.SIGKILL)
-        except ProcessLookupError:
-            pass


 def _terminate_process(proc: subprocess.Popen) -> None:
@@ -144,8 +142,7 @@ def _terminate_process(proc: subprocess.Popen) -> None:
        proc.wait(timeout=1)
        return
    except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
-        pass
-    _terminate_pid(proc.pid)
+        _terminate_pid(proc.pid)
    if proc.poll() is None:
        with contextlib.suppress(OSError):
            proc.kill()
@@ -219,13 +216,11 @@ def _monitor_background(
            status_name = "timed_out"
            _terminate_process(proc)
            break
-        try:
+        with contextlib.suppress(OSError):
            if stdout_path.stat().st_size + stderr_path.stat().st_size > MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES:
                status_name = "output_limited"
                _terminate_process(proc)
                break
-        except OSError:
-            pass
        time.sleep(0.1)
    try:
        exit_code = proc.wait(timeout=5)
@@ -12,6 +12,10 @@ from pathlib import Path

 from .state import lock_file, resolve_eng_dir

+_COMMAND_MARKER = " | command="
+_COMMAND_LENGTH_MARKER = " | command_length="
+_RECEIPT_MARKER = " | receipt="
+

 def _history_path(eng_dir: str | Path) -> Path:
    return resolve_eng_dir(eng_dir) / "state" / "history.md"
@@ -28,9 +32,12 @@ def append_history(
    path = _history_path(eng_dir)
    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    stamp = datetime.now(UTC).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
-    line = f"- {stamp} | phase={phase} | exit_code={exit_code} | command={command}"
+    line = (
+        f"- {stamp} | phase={phase} | exit_code={exit_code} | command={command}"
+        f"{_COMMAND_LENGTH_MARKER}{len(command)}"
+    )
    if receipt_path:
-        line += f" | receipt={receipt_path}"
+        line += f"{_RECEIPT_MARKER}{receipt_path}"
    with lock_file(path), path.open("a", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
        handle.write(line + "\n")

@@ -43,13 +50,32 @@ def history_contains(eng_dir: str | Path, command: str) -> bool:
    hist = _history_path(eng_dir)
    if not hist.exists():
        return False
-    marker = f" | command={command}"
    for line in hist.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines():
-        if line.endswith(marker) or f"{marker} | receipt=" in line:
+        if _recorded_command(line) == command:
            return True
    return False


+def _recorded_command(line: str) -> str | None:
+    """Read one command field, including legacy records without a length."""
+
+    if _COMMAND_MARKER not in line:
+        return None
+    payload = line.split(_COMMAND_MARKER, 1)[1]
+    command, marker, metadata = payload.rpartition(_COMMAND_LENGTH_MARKER)
+    if marker:
+        length_text = metadata.split(_RECEIPT_MARKER, 1)[0]
+        try:
+            expected_length = int(length_text)
+        except ValueError:
+            expected_length = -1
+        if expected_length >= 0 and len(command) == expected_length:
+            return command
+
+    command, marker, _receipt = payload.rpartition(_RECEIPT_MARKER)
+    return command if marker else payload
+
+
 def check_history_staleness(
    eng_dir: str | Path, command: str, *, allow_pending_repeat: bool = False
 ) -> tuple[list[str], list[str], list[str]]:
@@ -77,8 +103,7 @@ def check_history_staleness(
    # that field exactly instead of using substring matching, which can reject
    # a command merely because it contains the previous command text.
    last_line = lines[-1]
-    marker = " | command="
-    recorded_command = last_line.split(marker, 1)[1] if marker in last_line else None
+    recorded_command = _recorded_command(last_line)
    if recorded_command == command and not allow_pending_repeat:
        errors.append(
            f"command appears to be an exact repeat of the last recorded command: {last_line}"
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 name: violin-guard
-version: "2.0.0"
+version: "2.0.6"
 description: Typed scope guards and an execute-and-record boundary with bounded synchronization windows.
 kind: standalone
 provides_tools:
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ URL authorities, and ``ipaddress`` for IP/CIDR validation.

 from __future__ import annotations

+import contextlib
 import ipaddress
 import re
 import shlex
@@ -78,9 +79,16 @@ class _TargetPolicy:
            candidate, self.allowed_networks
        )

+    def is_secondary_only(self, candidate: str) -> bool:
+        return _matches_host(candidate, self.callback_hosts | self.research_hosts)
+
    def check_primary(self, candidate: str, result: TargetCheckResult) -> None:
        if self.is_excluded(candidate):
            result.errors.append(f"excluded target {candidate} must not be touched")
+        elif self.is_secondary_only(candidate):
+            result.errors.append(
+                f"secondary-only endpoint {candidate} must not be used as a primary target"
+            )
        elif self.is_assessment_target(candidate):
            return
        elif _is_ip_network(candidate):
@@ -96,9 +104,7 @@ class _TargetPolicy:
    def check_secondary(self, candidate: str, result: TargetCheckResult) -> None:
        if self.is_excluded(candidate):
            result.errors.append(f"excluded target {candidate} must not be touched")
-        elif self.is_assessment_target(candidate) or candidate in (
-            self.callback_hosts | self.research_hosts
-        ):
+        elif self.is_assessment_target(candidate) or self.is_secondary_only(candidate):
            return
        elif _is_ip_network(candidate):
            result.errors.append(f"out-of-scope target {candidate} (not present in scope.yaml)")
@@ -149,12 +155,10 @@ def normalise_target(value: str) -> str:

    raw = value.strip()
    raw = re.split(r"\s+\(", raw, maxsplit=1)[0].strip()
-    try:
+    with contextlib.suppress(ValueError):
        parsed = urlsplit(raw if "://" in raw else f"//{raw}")
        if parsed.hostname:
            return parsed.hostname.lower()
-    except ValueError:
-        pass
    return raw.lower()


@@ -215,12 +219,10 @@ def resolve_target(

    # Extract the requested field from a URL
    if "://" in target_val and field in ("ip", "host"):
-        try:
+        with contextlib.suppress(ValueError):
            parsed = urlsplit(target_val)
            if parsed.hostname:
                return parsed.hostname
-        except Exception:
-            pass

    return target_val

@@ -286,12 +288,10 @@ def _parse_target_token(token: str) -> str | None:
    if not raw:
        return None
    unbracketed = raw[1:-1] if raw.startswith("[") and raw.endswith("]") else raw
-    try:
+    with contextlib.suppress(ValueError):
        if "/" in unbracketed:
            return str(ipaddress.ip_network(unbracketed, strict=False)).lower()
        return str(ipaddress.ip_address(unbracketed)).lower()
-    except ValueError:
-        pass

    try:
        parsed = urlsplit(raw if raw.startswith("//") or "://" in raw else f"//{raw}")
@@ -55,11 +55,18 @@ _DOMAIN_RE = re.compile(
    re.IGNORECASE,
 )
 _URL_RE = re.compile(r"\b(?:https?|ftp|wss?|file)://[^\s'\"<>]+", re.IGNORECASE)
-_KNOWN_SOURCE_HOST_RE = re.compile(
-    r"https?://(?:[^/]*\.)?(?:github\.com|gitlab\.com|bitbucket\.org|"
-    r"pypi\.org|files\.pythonhosted\.org|registry\.npmjs\.org|"
-    r"crates\.io|proxy\.golang\.org|go\.dev)(?::\d+)?(?:/|$)",
-    re.IGNORECASE,
+_KNOWN_SOURCE_HOSTS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "bitbucket.org",
+        "crates.io",
+        "files.pythonhosted.org",
+        "github.com",
+        "gitlab.com",
+        "go.dev",
+        "proxy.golang.org",
+        "pypi.org",
+        "registry.npmjs.org",
+    }
 )
 _NETWORK_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"/(?:dev/)?(?:tcp|udp)/", re.IGNORECASE)
 _NETWORK_MODULE_RE = re.compile(
@@ -123,6 +130,13 @@ def _url_hosts(command: str) -> list[str]:
    return hosts


+def _is_known_source_host(host: str) -> bool:
+    normalized = host.lower().rstrip(".")
+    return any(
+        normalized == known or normalized.endswith(f".{known}") for known in _KNOWN_SOURCE_HOSTS
+    )
+
+
 def _has_target_literal(command: str) -> bool:
    """Inspect shell arguments, not arbitrary source code or file paths."""
    for segment in _COMMAND_SPLIT_RE.split(command):
@@ -163,6 +177,42 @@ def _has_target_literal(command: str) -> bool:
    return False


+def _block_terminal_segment(segment: str) -> str | None:
+    if _NETWORK_PATH_RE.search(segment):
+        return _message("network socket path detected in the raw terminal command")
+
+    executable = _first_executable(segment)
+    if executable in _SCRIPT_INTERPRETERS and _NETWORK_MODULE_RE.search(segment):
+        return _message("network-capable script primitive detected in the raw terminal command")
+
+    # Package/source retrieval is allowed for local setup (for example git
+    # clone or pip install).  URLs and host literals in all other commands are
+    # treated as target interaction and must use the typed guard.
+    is_source_command = _is_package_or_source_command(segment)
+    url_hosts = _url_hosts(segment)
+    if not is_source_command and url_hosts:
+        return _message("URL detected in a non-package raw terminal command")
+
+    # Public package/source URLs are host-local setup, not assessment traffic.
+    # Keep numeric authorities conservative: a clone/install from an IP may be
+    # an engagement target and must go through the typed guard.
+    if (
+        is_source_command
+        and url_hosts
+        and all(_is_known_source_host(host) for host in url_hosts)
+        and not _IPV4_RE.search(segment)
+    ):
+        return None
+
+    if executable not in _LOCAL_COMMANDS and _has_target_literal(segment):
+        return _message("target host literal detected in the raw terminal command")
+
+    if executable in _SCRIPT_INTERPRETERS and _SUSPICIOUS_SCRIPT_RE.search(segment):
+        return _message("assessment script detected in the raw terminal command")
+
+    return None
+
+
 def block_terminal_command(command: str) -> str | None:
    """Return a block message for clearly target-touching raw terminal calls.

@@ -174,37 +224,9 @@ def block_terminal_command(command: str) -> str | None:
    if not isinstance(command, str) or not command.strip():
        return None

-    if _NETWORK_PATH_RE.search(command):
-        return _message("network socket path detected in the raw terminal command")
-
-    executable = _first_executable(command)
-    if executable in _SCRIPT_INTERPRETERS and _NETWORK_MODULE_RE.search(command):
-        return _message("network-capable script primitive detected in the raw terminal command")
-
-    # Package/source retrieval is allowed for local setup (for example git
-    # clone or pip install).  URLs and host literals in all other commands are
-    # treated as target interaction and must use the typed guard.
-    url_hosts = _url_hosts(command)
-    if not _is_package_or_source_command(command) and url_hosts:
-        return _message("URL detected in a non-package raw terminal command")
-
-    # Public package/source URLs are host-local setup, not assessment traffic.
-    # Keep numeric authorities conservative: a clone/install from an IP may be
-    # an engagement target and must go through the typed guard.
-    if (
-        _is_package_or_source_command(command)
-        and url_hosts
-        and _KNOWN_SOURCE_HOST_RE.search(command)
-        and not _IPV4_RE.search(command)
-    ):
-        return None
-
-    if executable not in _LOCAL_COMMANDS and _has_target_literal(command):
-        return _message("target host literal detected in the raw terminal command")
-
-    if executable in _SCRIPT_INTERPRETERS and _SUSPICIOUS_SCRIPT_RE.search(command):
-        return _message("assessment script detected in the raw terminal command")
-
+    for segment in _COMMAND_SPLIT_RE.split(command):
+        if message := _block_terminal_segment(segment):
+            return message
    return None


@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 [project]
 name = "violin"
-version = "2.0.0"
+version = "2.0.6"
 description = "Supervised agentic Hermes penetration-testing profile"
 requires-python = ">=3.11"
 dependencies = ["filelock>=3.13,<4"]

 [dependency-groups]
 dev = [
-    "pytest>=8.0,<9",
+    "pytest>=9.0.3,<10",
    "pyyaml>=6.0,<7",
    "ruff>=0.11,<0.12",
 ]
@@ -2,22 +2,38 @@

 from pathlib import Path

-from plugins.violin_guard.history import check_history_staleness
+from plugins.violin_guard.history import append_history, check_history_staleness, history_contains


 def test_history_deduplication_compares_the_recorded_command_field(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
    history = tmp_path / "state" / "history.md"
    history.parent.mkdir()
-    history.write_text(
-        "- 2026-07-14T10:00:00Z | phase=RECON | exit_code=0 | command=echo done\n",
-        encoding="utf-8",
-    )
+    for suffix in ("", " | receipt=evidence/executions/test.json"):
+        history.write_text(
+            f"- 2026-07-14T10:00:00Z | phase=RECON | exit_code=0 | command=echo done{suffix}\n",
+            encoding="utf-8",
+        )

-    errors, _, _ = check_history_staleness(tmp_path, "echo")
-    assert not errors
+        errors, _, _ = check_history_staleness(tmp_path, "echo")
+        assert not errors

-    errors, _, _ = check_history_staleness(tmp_path, "echo done")
+        errors, _, _ = check_history_staleness(tmp_path, "echo done")
+        assert errors
+
+
+def test_written_history_uses_command_length_for_unambiguous_receipt_parsing(
+    tmp_path: Path,
+) -> None:
+    command = "printf 'value | receipt=fake | command_length=1'"
+    append_history(tmp_path, command, "RECON", 0, "evidence/executions/test.json")
+
+    errors, _, _ = check_history_staleness(tmp_path, command)
    assert errors
+    assert history_contains(tmp_path, command)
+
+    errors, _, infos = check_history_staleness(tmp_path, command, allow_pending_repeat=True)
+    assert not errors
+    assert any("pending batch" in info for info in infos)


 def test_malformed_history_line_does_not_create_a_false_repeat(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ def _write_scope(path: Path, *, confirmed: bool = True, callback_hosts: str = "1
  domains: [allowed.example]
 assessment_hosts:
  callback_hosts: [{callback_hosts}]
+research_hosts: [github.com, 192.0.2.10]
 exclusions:
  ip_addresses: [10.10.10.99]
  cidrs: [2001:db8:dead::/48]
@@ -102,7 +103,7 @@ def test_legacy_descriptive_target_normalises_to_host() -> None:

 def test_callback_hosts_are_secondary_only_and_exclusions_still_win(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
    scope = tmp_path / "scope.yaml"
-    _write_scope(scope, callback_hosts="10.10.14.5, 10.10.10.99")
+    _write_scope(scope, callback_hosts="10.10.14.5, listener.example, 10.10.10.99")

    callback = check_scope_targets(
        scope,
@@ -112,6 +113,13 @@ def test_callback_hosts_are_secondary_only_and_exclusions_still_win(tmp_path: Pa
    assert not callback.errors
    assert not callback.warnings

+    for host in ("listener.example", "github.com"):
+        secondary = check_scope_targets(
+            scope, f"curl https://{host}/status", primary_target="10.10.10.10"
+        )
+        assert not secondary.errors
+        assert not secondary.warnings
+
    unconfigured = check_scope_targets(
        scope, "bash -c 'echo ready > /dev/tcp/10.10.14.6/4444'", primary_target="10.10.10.10"
    )
@@ -120,7 +128,13 @@ def test_callback_hosts_are_secondary_only_and_exclusions_still_win(tmp_path: Pa
    callback_as_primary = check_scope_targets(
        scope, "nc -l -v -s 10.10.14.5 4444", primary_target="10.10.14.5"
    )
-    assert any("10.10.14.5" in error for error in callback_as_primary.errors)
+    assert any(
+        "secondary-only endpoint 10.10.14.5" in error for error in callback_as_primary.errors
+    )
+
+    for host in ("listener.example", "github.com", "192.0.2.10"):
+        primary = check_scope_targets(scope, f"curl https://{host}", primary_target=host)
+        assert any(f"secondary-only endpoint {host}" in error for error in primary.errors)

    excluded = check_scope_targets(
        scope, "nc -l -v -s 10.10.10.99 4444", primary_target="10.10.10.10"
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ _SCOPE = """targets:
  roles:
    web: 10.10.10.10
 exclusions: {}
+assessment_hosts:
+  callback_hosts: [listener.example]
+research_hosts: [github.com]
 authorized_parties: ["test owner"]
 authorisation:
  confirmed: true
@@ -72,6 +75,12 @@ def test_target_role_preserves_ipv6_url_hostname():
    assert resolve_target(scope, role="web", host_query=None, field="host") == "2001:db8::1"


+def test_target_role_preserves_malformed_url_for_review():
+    scope = {"targets": {"roles": {"web": "http://[broken"}}}
+
+    assert resolve_target(scope, role="web", host_query=None, field="host") == "http://[broken"
+
+
 def _run(*args):
    return subprocess.run(
        [sys.executable, str(ROOT / "scripts" / "violin_guard.py"), *args],
@@ -141,13 +150,6 @@ def test_target_requires_eng_dir():

 # --- violin_exec_burst -----------------------------------------------------

-_GATE_OK = {
-    "status": "ok",
-    "errors": [],
-    "warnings": [],
-    "infos": [],
-}
-

 def _patch_burst(monkeypatch, eng_dir):
    """Run handle_exec_burst in-process: the real check-command gate is used for
@@ -217,6 +219,30 @@ def test_exec_burst_clean_review_or_approved(eng, monkeypatch):
    assert state.has_pending_sync(str(eng)) is not None


+@pytest.mark.parametrize("secondary_only_host", ["listener.example", "github.com"])
+def test_exec_burst_denies_secondary_only_primary_target(eng, monkeypatch, secondary_only_host):
+    rec = _patch_burst(monkeypatch, str(eng))
+    data = json.loads(
+        service.handle_exec_burst(
+            {
+                "eng_dir": str(eng),
+                "scope": str(eng / "scope" / "scope.yaml"),
+                "phase": "recon",
+                "commands": [f"curl https://{secondary_only_host}"],
+                "target": secondary_only_host,
+                "session_id": "ts",
+                "skill_loaded_file": str(eng / "state" / ".skill-loaded-ts"),
+                "label": "secondary-only-primary",
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+    assert data["status"] == "denied"
+    assert data["executed"] == 0
+    assert "secondary-only endpoint" in data["reason"]
+    assert rec["commands"] == []
+
+
 def test_exec_burst_fail_closed_on_blocked_command(eng, monkeypatch):
    """A batch containing a hard-blocked command (e.g. `rm -rf /`) is denied
    and the batch is halted at the first BLOCK (fail-closed)."""
@@ -113,6 +113,36 @@ def test_local_source_retrieval_remains_available() -> None:
    assert result is None


+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "raw_command",
+    [
+        "echo x | nc victim.example 80",
+        "git clone https://github.com/org/repo; curl https://victim.example/admin",
+        "git clone https://github.com/org/repo && nmap victim.example",
+        (
+            "pip install https://files.pythonhosted.org/package.whl "
+            "https://victim.example/package.whl"
+        ),
+    ],
+)
+def test_compound_terminal_commands_cannot_hide_target_segments(raw_command: str) -> None:
+    result = _pre_tool_call_hook(tool_name="terminal", args={"command": raw_command})
+
+    assert result["action"] == "block"
+    assert "violin_exec" in result["message"]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "raw_command",
+    [
+        "git clone https://github.com/example/project.git && echo cloned",
+        "echo local | cat",
+    ],
+)
+def test_safe_compound_terminal_commands_remain_available(raw_command: str) -> None:
+    assert _pre_tool_call_hook(tool_name="terminal", args={"command": raw_command}) is None
+
+
 def test_safe_local_terminal_command_remains_available() -> None:
    result = _pre_tool_call_hook(
        tool_name="terminal",
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ wheels = [

 [[package]]
 name = "pytest"
-version = "8.4.2"
+version = "9.1.1"
 source = { registry = "https://pypi.org/simple" }
 dependencies = [
    { name = "colorama", marker = "sys_platform == 'win32'" },
@@ -67,9 +67,9 @@ dependencies = [
    { name = "pluggy" },
    { name = "pygments" },
 ]
-sdist = { url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/a3/5c/00a0e072241553e1a7496d638deababa67c5058571567b92a7eaa258397c/pytest-8.4.2.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:86c0d0b93306b961d58d62a4db4879f27fe25513d4b969df351abdddb3c30e01", size = 1519618, upload-time = "2025-09-04T14:34:22.711Z" }
+sdist = { url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/e4/47/b9efed96c114afcfa3c9d3fe98a76a1d14c74a9e266d397cf6eb64be5e01/pytest-9.1.1.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:1088fbde8f2b49d95a549a195707afa7a76a3ce9bcadc26b6d71f0ffda5fe313", size = 1636369, upload-time = "2026-06-19T10:58:32.857Z" }
 wheels = [
-    { url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/a8/a4/20da314d277121d6534b3a980b29035dcd51e6744bd79075a6ce8fa4eb8d/pytest-8.4.2-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:872f880de3fc3a5bdc88a11b39c9710c3497a547cfa9320bc3c5e62fbf272e79", size = 365750, upload-time = "2025-09-04T14:34:20.226Z" },
+    { url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/24/25/1de2678b631f5a49215c6c96fff41ba892b0a34df68d6d80292b1b48aa7f/pytest-9.1.1-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:37a86b45efb9a47a61a36449063e8e18d0cab3161329fc099eb21783169c4f0c", size = 386536, upload-time = "2026-06-19T10:58:31.347Z" },
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ wheels = [

 [[package]]
 name = "violin"
-version = "2.0.0"
+version = "2.0.6"
 source = { virtual = "." }
 dependencies = [
    { name = "filelock" },
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ requires-dist = [{ name = "filelock", specifier = ">=3.13,<4" }]

 [package.metadata.requires-dev]
 dev = [
-    { name = "pytest", specifier = ">=8.0,<9" },
+    { name = "pytest", specifier = ">=9.0.3,<10" },
    { name = "pyyaml", specifier = ">=6.0,<7" },
    { name = "ruff", specifier = ">=0.11,<0.12" },
 ]