Files
roboco/pyproject.toml
T
0ca9d91b72 v0.16.0: fastapi-guard HTTP security layer — calibrated + scanner honeytrap (#290)
* [fastapi-guard] Phase 1a: gated config flags for the HTTP security layer

Adds the ROBOCO_GUARD_* settings (all default-off / secure-default) for the
upcoming fastapi-guard 7.2.0 hardening — guard_enabled (master switch),
guard_fail_secure (fail-closed default; NAS overrides to false),
guard_telemetry_enabled + guard_agent_api_key + guard_project_id (guard-agent
telemetry, opt-in), guard_emergency + guard_emergency_whitelist (lockdown kill
switch). Inert until consumed: nothing reads them yet, so the request path is
unchanged. Foundation for v0.16.0.

* [fastapi-guard] Phase 1b: security foundation module + gated wiring

Add fastapi-guard 7.2.0 + guard-core 3.3.0 (bare, unpinned) and roboco/security.py:
- build_security_config() from settings — behind-nginx real-IP (trusted_proxies +
  trust_x_forwarded_proto), HSTS/CSP headers, threat-ban + 404-sweep rules,
  redis-backed state, exclude_paths (/ws + health + docs), env-driven
  enforce_https, fail_secure (secure default), emergency lockdown, guard-agent
  telemetry (opt-in), passive-mode calibration switch.
- guard_deco singleton (SecurityDecorator) for per-route decorators (Phase 2+).
- Three custom content validators guard's WAF can't cover: prompt-injection /
  role-override, secret-exfil / credential-in-body, internal-SSRF.
- apply_guard(app) + guarded_lifespan() wired into create_app AFTER settings.
  guard_passive_mode config flag added.

Entirely gated by ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED (default off): create_app mounts nothing
and returns the unchanged app when off (verified). make quality GREEN
(cov 95.32%, pip-audit clean, import-linter 2/0). 12 new unit tests.

* [fastapi-guard] Phase 2: critical-path decorators

Apply guard decorators to the highest-value endpoints (metadata-only; enforced
only when the middleware is mounted, so no-op while ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED is off):
- provider keys (ollama/grok/self-hosted writes): strict rate_limit +
  max_request_size + block_clouds (no datacenter IP should touch secret writes).
- settings write + release approve/reject (CEO-gated): strict rate_limit.
- intake chat (prompter start/messages/events): rate_limit + max_request_size +
  custom_validation(prompt_injection_validator) — the prompt-facing free-text
  ingress gets the injection/role-override/secret-exfil content scan.

make quality GREEN (cov 95.32%, contracts 2/0). App builds with guard off,
decorators inert (verified).

* [fastapi-guard] Phase 3: wide decorator coverage across ingress + sensitive routes

Targeted-wide application (metadata-only; no-op until ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED). The
global SecurityMiddleware already rate-limits + WAF-scans every request, so this
adds the custom content validators on free-text ingress + tight limits on
sensitive ops (not blanket per-route rate_limit on reads):

- agent gateway do verbs (note/say/commit/dm/pitch/progress/draft_playbook/...):
  rate_limit + max_request_size + custom_validation(secret_exfil or prompt_injection).
- a2a message/send + chat writes: rate_limit + size + prompt_injection.
- optimal/RAG (kb/search, rag/query, mentor/ask, errors/decisions/standards/
  learnings): prompt_injection on searches, secret_exfil on record writes; docs
  index → internal_ssrf.
- tasks: create/update → prompt_injection; QA/doc/PM transitions → secret_exfil;
  CEO-gated verbs → tight rate_limit.
- secretary chat → prompt_injection; research → internal_ssrf; orchestrator
  spawn/mutations → rate_limit; git ops + flow verbs → tight rate_limit.
Pure GET/reads left to the global middleware. Applied via a Sonnet workflow,
then verified: app builds with guard off (decorators inert), make quality GREEN
(cov 95.37%, contracts 2/0). Decoy/honeypot-path surface deferred (needs verified
guard ban-API integration — not rushed).

* [fastapi-guard] Phase 5: arm the NAS composes in passive/log-only mode

Arm ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED=true + ROBOCO_GUARD_PASSIVE_MODE=true +
ROBOCO_GUARD_FAIL_SECURE=false on the two NAS composes (docker-compose.yaml +
.yml). Passive = guard mounts and logs what it WOULD block but blocks nothing,
so the next NAS deploy calibrates against real traffic; flip PASSIVE_MODE off
after the false-positive review to enforce. fail_secure=false keeps a
guard-internal error from 500ing the personal deploy. The registry (user-facing)
compose is deliberately left unarmed so its published default stays conservative.
Phase 4 (passive calibration) is the operational step this enables.

* feat(security): Phase 3b — full-arsenal per-route guard enrichment

Stack the applicable guard decorators per surface instead of the minimal
rate_limit/max_request_size/custom_validation triad: content_type_filter on
every JSON-body write, honeypot_detection form-traps on human-facing POSTs,
block_clouds on key-writes + CEO release ops, behavior_analysis runaway-rate
rules on the agent flow/do verbs, suspicious_detection + usage_monitor on the
sensitive surfaces. Nine distinct decorators now applied thoughtfully per
endpoint. All metadata-only — no-op while ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED is off.

* fix(a2a): permit PR reviewer to deliver gate verdicts to the owning PM

can_a2a_direct had no pr_reviewer rule, so a reviewer (team=board, or a cell
team) fell through to the cell-member path and was cross-cell-denied when the
in-path gate delivered a pr_fail change-request to main-pm (or a cross-cell
cell-pm): "Cannot A2A main-pm ... Ask None to coordinate with None". The
delivery is best-effort, so pr_fail still transitioned but the verdict never
reached the owning PM — the blind-re-submit signal-gap the pr_fail fix closes.

Add an explicit pr_reviewer handler: it may A2A only cell_pm / main_pm (its
sole comms surface — everything else it posts on the PR itself), with a matching
route hint. The cell reviewers kept same-team access by coincidence; this scopes
every reviewer to PM-only, the correct model, with no other A2A caller affected.

Refresh uv.lock to the current resolution.

* feat(models): adopt Claude Sonnet 5 as the sonnet tier

Point the 'sonnet' alias at claude-sonnet-5 (MODEL_MAP) and give pr_reviewer
its own opus tier in ROLE_MODEL_MAP — it was falling through to the sonnet
default, and the role gates untrusted external/fork PRs plus root→master, which
warrants opus.

Price claude-sonnet-5 at the promotional 33% off Sonnet 4.6 ($2.01 / $10.05,
cache 0.201 / 0.5025) through 2026-08-31 via a dedicated pricing fragment that
beats the bare 'sonnet' alias; revert to full rate when the promo ends. Bare
'sonnet' stays full-rate as a conservative fallback (prod prices the resolved
claude-sonnet-5 id from the transcript).

Update the model docs and the billing / usage / manifest / spawn tests.

* feat(security): calibrate the guard WAF for RoboCo traffic + document the layer

The first end-to-end run of the fastapi-guard layer showed active enforcement
would block ~50% of legitimate agent traffic — RoboCo request bodies are code,
SQL, diffs, file paths, HTML, and URLs, which the stock signature WAF reads as
attacks. build_security_config now excludes RoboCo's free-text top-level body
fields (derived from the real request models, including the free-form container
fields whose nested prose is stringified and scanned) from WAF scanning,
dropping the active-mode false-positive rate to zero while keeping the WAF on
every non-excluded (id/enum/slug/branch) field and leaving the
prompt-injection / secret-exfil / internal-SSRF validators — which run
independently of the exclusion — fully in force. enable_penetration_detection
is made explicit.

Only excluded_detection_body_fields is reliable on guard 7.2.1: the per-route
categories knob is bypassed for JSON bodies, and the body scanner excludes
top-level keys only (scanning str(value) of every non-excluded field), so
free-form container fields must be excluded wholesale.

Adds tests/unit/test_security_middleware.py — the first end-to-end exercise of
the middleware (mounts it, drives guard's lifespan, fires real requests):
proves passive mode is log-only, active mode does not false-positive on
realistic agent payloads, threats are still blocked inside excluded fields, and
the WAF still fires on non-excluded fields.

Docs: CHANGELOG (Unreleased); a user-facing Optional-subsystems page + nav +
env reference for the HTTP security layer; the agent-facing RAG corpus
(what it is + why a request could be blocked); and the roboco mapping
(api-core-websocket / deployment-tooling / _complete_map).

* feat(security): Surface N — scanner honeytrap (guard /api auto-ban + nginx edge-drop)

Turns scanner probes against the scanner, in two layers matched to where
traffic lands. Behind nginx only /api, /ws, /health, /ready reach the
orchestrator, so guard can only see (and ban) scanner probes on those paths;
the classic root probes (/.env, /wp-login.php, /phpmyadmin, /.git/config) hit
the panel. So:

- build_security_config's threat_ban_config gains recon / sensitive_file /
  cms_probing categories. A scanner probing those fingerprints on an /api path
  is detected on the URL-path scan; repeated probes from one IP trip an adaptive
  per-IP auto-ban (redis-backed, 24h). Only bans in active mode (passive logs
  the recon hit) and needs redis (the 24h ban exceeds the in-memory cap). The
  spec's decoy-route file is redundant — the WAF url-path scan bans regardless
  of a registered route — so it is intentionally omitted.
- docker/nginx.conf drops the classic root scanner paths at the edge with 444
  (connection closed, no response) before they reach the panel, anchored to
  known scanner fingerprints so /.well-known and every real panel/API route are
  untouched. Always on, independent of ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED.

Tests: 2 unit (the exclusion set + the scanner-ban categories are present) and
2 integration (a decoy path is blocked in active mode, passes in passive). The
nginx regex was validated against 15 scanner + 19 legit paths (0 false
positives). Docs: CHANGELOG, the HTTP-security page, the roboco mapping, and the
agent-facing RAG corpus.

* Token optimization — per-role observability, compute policy, spawn preflight (#291)

* test(models): lock the sonnet→claude-sonnet-5 MODEL_MAP invariant

* feat(usage): surface cache tokens + cache_hit_rate in usage breakdowns

* feat(usage): add per-role usage breakdown endpoint

* feat(usage): add spawn-waste signal (per-role unproductive rate + respawn strikes)

* feat(panel): surface per-role cost/cache + spawn-waste on the metrics page

* feat(routing): Phase 2 per-role compute policy — qa→haiku, main_pm→sonnet, per-role effort env mechanism (default-inert)

* feat(orchestrator): Phase 3 flag-gated spawn preflight — refuse non-gateway delivery roles (respawn-forever guard)

* chore(compose): arm ROBOCO_SPAWN_PREFLIGHT_ENABLED on the NAS composes

* docs: per-role usage observability, per-role compute policy, and spawn preflight

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(panel): pin outputFileTracingRoot so the standalone build isn't broken by stray lockfiles

* feat(routing): populate ROLE_EFFORT_MAP + wire the verified --effort flag (cell_pm/board/auditor to medium)

* feat(gateway): omit empty context_briefing sections (Phase 4 payload compaction)

* refactor(orchestrator): extract spawn chokepoint guards to restore xenon rank B on spawn_agent

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-01 23:54:48 +02:00

453 lines
15 KiB
TOML

[project]
name = "roboco"
version = "0.15.0"
description = "AI Agents Company - A virtual organization of AI agents functioning as a software development workforce"
authors = [
{name = "Renzo Franceschini", email = "rennf93@users.noreply.github.com"}
]
readme = "README.md"
license = { text = "AGPL-3.0-or-later" }
requires-python = ">=3.13,<3.15"
dependencies = [
# Core
"pydantic",
"pydantic-settings",
# API
"fastapi",
"uvicorn[standard]",
"websockets",
# Database
"sqlalchemy[asyncio]",
"asyncpg", # PostgreSQL async driver
"alembic", # Migrations
# Cache/Queue
"redis",
"hiredis", # Redis performance
# AI/LLM
"anthropic",
"openai", # For embeddings
"tiktoken", # Token counting
"python-toon", # Token-efficient LLM serialization
# MCP (Model Context Protocol)
"mcp",
"tomli-w", # grok_cli_config renders ~/.grok/config.toml in the agent image
# Utilities
"httpx",
"python-multipart",
"python-jose[cryptography]", # JWT
"passlib[bcrypt]", # Password hashing
"tenacity", # Retry logic
"structlog", # Structured logging
# Streaming
"sse-starlette", # Server-Sent Events for A2A streaming
# Direct imports (promoted from transitive)
"cryptography", # utils/crypto.py — Fernet-encrypted project git tokens
"packaging", # services/toolchain.py — PEP 440 requires-python resolution
"pyyaml", # foundation/policy/conventions — .roboco/conventions.yml parse
# Conventions validator (roboco.conventions) — tree-sitter ASTs, Python + TS
"tree-sitter",
"tree-sitter-python",
"tree-sitter-typescript",
"claude-agent-sdk",
"fastapi-guard", # HTTP security middleware + per-route decorators (import: guard)
"guard-core", # SecurityConfig/decorator models + request/response protocols
]
[project.optional-dependencies]
dev = [
# Testing
"pytest",
"pytest-asyncio",
"pytest-cov",
"pytest-xdist",
"httpx", # For TestClient
"factory-boy",
"faker",
# Code Quality
"ruff",
"mypy",
"vulture",
"bandit",
"pip-audit",
"radon",
"xenon",
"deptry",
"import-linter",
# Type Stubs
"types-passlib",
"types-python-jose",
"types-PyYAML",
# Development
"ipython",
"rich",
]
docs = [
"mkdocs",
"mkdocs-material",
"mkdocstrings[python]",
"pymarkdownlnt",
]
[project.scripts]
roboco = "roboco.cli:cli"
roboco-bootstrap = "roboco.bootstrap:cli"
[project.urls]
Homepage = "https://github.com/rennf93/roboco"
Documentation = "https://rennf93.github.io/roboco/"
Repository = "https://github.com/rennf93/roboco"
[build-system]
requires = ["hatchling"]
build-backend = "hatchling.build"
[tool.hatch.build.targets.wheel]
packages = ["roboco"]
[tool.hatch.metadata]
allow-direct-references = true
# =============================================================================
# uv: raise the floor on vulnerable transitive dependencies
# =============================================================================
# pyjwt is pulled in transitively (by mcp and msal). 2.12.1 carries four
# disclosed CVEs that are fixed in 2.13.0; constrain the floor so the resolver
# picks a patched release while leaving the direct dependents' own ranges intact.
[tool.uv]
constraint-dependencies = ["pyjwt>=2.13.0"]
# =============================================================================
# RUFF Configuration
# =============================================================================
[tool.ruff]
target-version = "py313"
src = ["src"]
exclude = ["vulture_whitelist.py", ".venv", "alembic"]
[tool.ruff.lint]
select = [
"E", # pycodestyle errors
"W", # pycodestyle warnings
"F", # Pyflakes
"I", # isort
"B", # flake8-bugbear
"C4", # flake8-comprehensions
"UP", # pyupgrade
"ARG", # flake8-unused-arguments
"SIM", # flake8-simplify
"TCH", # flake8-type-checking
"PTH", # flake8-use-pathlib
"PL", # Pylint
"RUF", # Ruff-specific
]
# Lazy imports to avoid circular dependencies
[tool.ruff.lint.per-file-ignores]
# MCP tool surfaces ARE the LLM-facing contract — every parameter must be
# top-level + typed so the SDK exposes it as a discrete schema field with
# enum constraints. Bundling into a dataclass would hide enum hints from
# the LLM and bring back invented values like nature='standard'.
"roboco/mcp/**/*.py" = ["PLC0415", "PLR0913"]
"roboco/services/*.py" = ["PLC0415"]
# Gateway methods are typed verb surfaces — agent-facing kwargs reflect the
# verb contract (session topic, channel, relationship type, etc.). Bundling
# into a dataclass hides the field-by-field schema the LLM needs at the
# tool layer; we accept the >5 kwarg signatures here for the same reason
# they're accepted in `roboco/mcp/**`.
"roboco/services/gateway/**/*.py" = ["PLC0415", "PLR0913"]
"roboco/api/routes/*.py" = ["PLC0415"]
# deps.py is the DI wiring hub; it defers a few service imports to call time
# to avoid import cycles with the modules it wires (same rationale as above).
"roboco/api/deps.py" = ["PLC0415"]
"roboco/runtime/*.py" = ["PLC0415"]
# PTH119: _grok_usage_json sanitizes the agent id with os.path.basename — the
# path-injection sanitizer CodeQL's query models; the pathlib equivalent
# (Path(...).name) is not recognized by that query, so we keep os.path here.
"roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py" = ["PTH119"]
# The intake driver/entrypoint lazily import the heavy `claude-agent-sdk` (and
# uvicorn) so the modules import without those installed and don't pay the cost
# until a live container runs them — same rationale as the dirs above.
"roboco/agent_sdk/*.py" = ["PLC0415"]
# Lifecycle validators: foundation/_validate_lifecycle is imported from the
# bottom of policy/lifecycle.py at module-load time, so the validators must
# defer their inverse imports until call time to avoid a cycle.
"roboco/foundation/_validate_lifecycle.py" = ["PLC0415"]
# The conventions validator loads tree-sitter grammars lazily, per language, so
# the package imports without tree-sitter present and a missing grammar fails
# loud at call time (GrammarUnavailable) instead of crashing the import.
"roboco/conventions/grammars.py" = ["PLC0415"]
# The conventions ambient-layer resolver defers its config + ConventionsService
# imports so the prompt-composition utility stays decoupled from the heavy
# service graph (it loads at every agent spawn).
"roboco/agents/factories/_base.py" = ["PLC0415"]
# Test fixtures that reload modules to test env-var-at-import-time behavior.
# ARG002: ApiClient-subclassing fakes must keep the superclass parameter names
# for mypy's override check, so unused override-stub args can't be renamed.
"tests/unit/mcp_servers/*.py" = ["PLC0415", "ARG002"]
# Abstract-method stubs in test helpers: parameters must match the superclass
# signature for keyword-argument compatibility (mypy override check), but the
# stub bodies are empty — ARG002 would require renaming them, which breaks mypy.
"tests/unit/services/test_optimal_grounding.py" = ["ARG002"]
# =============================================================================
# MyPy Configuration
# =============================================================================
[tool.mypy]
python_version = "3.13"
warn_return_any = true
warn_unused_configs = true
disallow_untyped_defs = true
disallow_incomplete_defs = true
check_untyped_defs = true
disallow_untyped_decorators = true
no_implicit_optional = true
strict_optional = true
warn_redundant_casts = true
warn_unused_ignores = true
warn_no_return = true
warn_unreachable = true
exclude = ["vulture_whitelist.py", ".venv", "alembic"]
plugins = ["pydantic.mypy"]
[[tool.mypy.overrides]]
module = [
"redis.*",
"anthropic.*",
"toon.*",
"sse_starlette.*",
"asyncpg.*",
"claude_agent_sdk.*", # third-party SDK, ships no type stubs
]
ignore_missing_imports = true
[tool.pydantic-mypy]
init_forbid_extra = true
init_typed = true
warn_required_dynamic_aliases = true
# =============================================================================
# Pytest Configuration
# =============================================================================
[tool.pytest.ini_options]
asyncio_mode = "auto"
testpaths = ["tests"]
python_files = ["test_*.py"]
asyncio_default_fixture_loop_scope = "function"
addopts = "--cov=roboco --cov-report=term-missing"
markers = [
"asyncio: mark tests as async",
"slow: marks tests as slow",
"integration: marks tests as integration tests",
"unit: marks tests as unit tests",
]
[tool.coverage.run]
# Coverage core. Python 3.12+ supports sys.monitoring; the legacy `pytrace`
# core loses trace events across `await` boundaries on 3.13, under-counting
# every async route by ~30%. `sysmon` is the only core that gives accurate
# coverage for async route handlers.
core = "sysmon"
# Modules excluded from the coverage gate because they require live
# infrastructure (Ollama, real audio/video stacks, real workspaces,
# Docker daemon, Claude Code CLI) that the unit-coverage gate does not
# provision. They're covered by dedicated integration runs (smoke tests
# on the NAS) rather than the unit-coverage threshold.
omit = [
# RAG / proactive context — needs Ollama + real embedding model.
"roboco/services/proactive.py",
"roboco/services/optimal.py",
"roboco/services/optimal_brain/*",
# Audio transcription — needs Whisper-class model.
"roboco/services/transcription.py",
# Agent classes — instantiated by the orchestrator when spawning
# Docker containers running the Claude CLI. No usable unit-test
# surface; integration coverage is the smoke run.
"roboco/agents/*",
"roboco/agent_sdk/*",
# Container orchestration — drives Docker daemon, agent spawning,
# health/dispatch loops. Covered by smoke runs.
"roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py",
# MCP server entry points — modeled around the Claude CLI's STDIO
# MCP transport and only meaningful when running inside an agent
# container with the orchestrator reachable. Their _post() bridges
# ARE unit-tested separately (test_envelope_on_4xx, test_flow_server,
# test_do_server) — just not via direct module import here.
"roboco/mcp/*",
# WebSocket route — needs a running ASGI app + WS client.
"roboco/api/websocket.py",
# Event stream bus — wraps Redis Streams; tested via integration only.
"roboco/events/stream_bus.py",
# GitService — runs `git` subprocesses against per-agent workspaces.
# Unit-testable surface is < 5% of the module; covered via the
# _StubGit-based real-DB integration test + live smoke runs.
"roboco/services/git.py",
"roboco/services/workspace.py",
# Notification delivery — Redis Streams + push to MCP transport.
"roboco/services/notification_delivery.py",
# CLI entry point.
"roboco/cli.py",
# Auto-generated migrations.
"alembic/*",
]
# =============================================================================
# Vulture Configuration
# =============================================================================
[tool.vulture]
paths = ["roboco", "tests", "vulture_whitelist.py"]
exclude = ["**/conftest.py", ".venv", "alembic"]
min_confidence = 100
ignore_decorators = [
"@app.route",
"@app.get",
"@app.post",
"@app.put",
"@app.delete",
"@app.patch",
"@pytest.fixture",
"@pytest.mark.*",
"@validator",
"@root_validator",
"@field_validator",
"@model_validator",
]
ignore_names = [
"test_*",
"Test*",
"cleanup_*",
"mock_*",
"expected_*",
"exc_*",
"__*__",
"Config",
"Field",
]
sort_by_size = true
# =============================================================================
# Bandit Configuration
# =============================================================================
[tool.bandit]
skips = []
exclude_dirs = ["tests", ".venv", "vulture_whitelist.py", "alembic"]
severity = "medium"
# =============================================================================
# Radon Configuration
# =============================================================================
[tool.radon]
exclude = "tests/*,.venv/*,vulture_whitelist.py,alembic/*"
cc_min = "C"
mi_min = "A"
no_assert = false
show_closures = true
total_average = true
# =============================================================================
# Xenon Configuration
# =============================================================================
[tool.xenon]
max_absolute = "B"
max_modules = "A"
max_average = "A"
exclude = ["tests/*", ".venv/*", "vulture_whitelist.py", "alembic/*"]
ignore = []
# =============================================================================
# Deptry Configuration
# =============================================================================
[tool.deptry]
exclude = ["tests", ".venv", "vulture_whitelist.py", "alembic"]
extend_exclude = ["conftest.py", "setup.py"]
known_first_party = ["roboco"]
[tool.deptry.per_rule_ignores]
# DEP002: Dependencies not directly imported but used at runtime or via CLI
DEP002 = [
# Runtime server/driver dependencies (used by frameworks, not imported)
"uvicorn",
"websockets",
"asyncpg",
"hiredis",
"python-multipart",
# Database migrations (CLI tool)
"alembic",
# Auth libraries (used via passlib[bcrypt], python-jose[cryptography])
"python-jose",
"passlib",
# LLM utilities (embeddings/token counting)
"openai",
"tiktoken",
# Retry logic (used in production services)
"tenacity",
# Dev tools (CLI, not imported)
"pytest",
"pytest-asyncio",
"pytest-cov",
"pytest-xdist",
"factory-boy",
"faker",
"ruff",
"mypy",
"vulture",
"bandit",
"pip-audit",
"radon",
"xenon",
"deptry",
# CLI tool — invoked as `lint-imports` from the Makefile / quality gate
"import-linter",
"ipython",
"rich",
# Type stubs (used by mypy)
"types-passlib",
"types-python-jose",
"types-PyYAML",
# Documentation (CLI tools)
"mkdocs",
"mkdocs-material",
"mkdocstrings",
"pymarkdownlnt",
]
# DEP003: Starlette is a transitive dep of FastAPI, but BaseHTTPMiddleware is needed
DEP003 = ["starlette"]
[dependency-groups]
dev = [
"pytest",
"pytest-asyncio",
"pytest-cov",
]
# =============================================================================
# Import Linter (architectural boundaries)
# =============================================================================
[tool.importlinter]
root_package = "roboco"
[[tool.importlinter.contracts]]
name = "Gateway layer must not import from API routes or MCP servers"
type = "forbidden"
source_modules = ["roboco.services.gateway"]
forbidden_modules = ["roboco.api.routes", "roboco.mcp"]
[[tool.importlinter.contracts]]
name = "Services must not import from API routes"
type = "forbidden"
source_modules = ["roboco.services"]
forbidden_modules = ["roboco.api.routes"]
# =============================================================================
# Roboco Commit Validator
# =============================================================================
[tool.roboco.commits]
subject_min_chars = 20
banned_words = ["wip", "tmp", "asdf", "oops", "fix", "update", "change", "stuff", "things"]
prefer_conventional = true