Renn F 61c8faa8da docs(grok): document Grok's reduced guardrail posture (honest, not blocking) ...

Grok agents run on opencode, not Claude Code, so they do NOT have full
guardrail parity — claiming otherwise would be false. Document it truthfully
and keep them usable rather than blocking them.

- Panel routing card: an amber caveat shown in Grok/Mix mode — command/
  secret-exfil guard + cost cap apply to Grok, but the prompt-injection guard
  does NOT (opencode cannot block a turn); Anthropic/Ollama/Self-Hosted run
  through Claude Code with the full guard set; prefer those for agents that
  ingest untrusted or cross-agent content; Grok is safe for trusted work.
- docs/self/architecture/llm-provider-security.md: the reference — the two
  runtimes, which provider uses which, the per-guardrail parity matrix, why
  the injection/stop gaps exist (opencode hooks are observe-only), and the
  routing recommendation (delivery roles handling untrusted content → a
  Claude-Code-runtime provider).

Panel tsc + eslint clean.

2026-06-18 12:58:10 +02:00

..

llm-provider-security.md

docs(grok): document Grok's reduced guardrail posture (honest, not blocking)

2026-06-18 12:58:10 +02:00