mirror of
https://github.com/rennf93/roboco.git
synced 2026-08-03 07:23:24 +02:00
* fix(gateway): push the branch before QA handoff so reviewers see the latest commits The commit content tool commits locally without pushing; only open_pr pushed the branch. On the first submission that was fine, but a fix committed while addressing needs_revision never reached origin (open_pr is skipped once the PR exists), so QA — which reviews the remote PR branch — re-reviewed the stale remote and re-failed the task on every cycle, a loop that never converged. i_am_done now pushes the task branch (idempotent; a no-op when nothing is unpushed) as part of the shared submit gate, covering both the normal and resume-from-verifying paths. A push failure blocks the handoff with a clear remediation rather than parking the task in awaiting_qa with commits that exist only in the developer's local workspace. * fix(orchestrator): don't reap a stale claim while the agent's container is alive The stale-claim reaper released any claimed/in_progress task whose last_heartbeat_at exceeded the TTL. The heartbeat only updates on certain gateway calls, so a developer deep in a long edit/test cycle outran the TTL and had its claim reaped mid-work — churning the task and risking a double spawn against the still-running container. The reaper now skips a task whose assignee still holds a live (ACTIVE) agent instance, trusting container liveness — the ground truth — over the heartbeat proxy. The check is defensive on missing fields so a heartbeat-only caller (and the reaper's existing unit tests) behave exactly as before. * fix(gateway): refuse to unblock a task while a dependency is unfinished A PM unblock on a dependency-gated task moved it straight to in_progress, overriding the dependency — letting a dependent proceed without its upstream's work (e.g. a frontend task built before its UX design lands). A dependency block is meant to clear on its own via _unblock_dependents the moment the upstream reaches a terminal state. unblock now refuses while any dependency is still non-terminal, returning a clear remediation that the block resolves automatically. Manual unblock remains available for genuine, non-dependency blockers. * fix(gateway): release a dependency-blocked claim to pending instead of looping A task that reached claimed/in_progress with an unfinished dependency was left in that state when the claim guard rejected, so the orchestrator's respawn loop kept reviving its assignee — which could make no progress — burning work for nothing. The claim guard now releases such a task back to pending. claimed -> blocked is not a legal transition, so pending — held by the dispatch dependency filter — is the lifecycle-correct resting state: the respawn loop ignores pending tasks, and _unblock_dependents re-dispatches it once the upstream reaches a terminal state. release_dependency_blocked_claim shares a _force_unclaim_to_pending core with unclaim_for_reaper so both record a truthful work-session abandon reason. * feat(security): warn at startup in header-trust mode + document the auth posture When ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED is not enabled the API accepts the X-Agent-Id / X-Agent-Role headers without a signed token, so any client that can reach it may act as any role (including 'ceo'). The API now logs a clear warning at startup in this mode, and the README gains a Security section documenting the auth posture and how to harden it. Acceptable only on a trusted private network — do not expose the API to untrusted networks. * fix(workspace): scope the refresh fetch to current + default branch ensure_workspace's healthy short-circuit ran an all-refs 'git fetch origin' to keep every origin/<branch> ref current. On a monorepo with many accumulated feature/* branches that exceeds the refresh timeout, the fetch silently fails, and the workspace keeps a stale base — so an agent builds on an out-of-date branch. The refresh now fetches only the workspace's current branch and the repo's default branch (resolved via origin/HEAD), with --no-tags --prune: it transfers near-nothing and can't time out. Readers need their own branch and the default; the integration branch is refreshed at branch-creation time. * fix(git): refresh a dependency-blocked task's branch off the current integration tip A cross-cell dependent (e.g. a frontend task waiting on the UX design) was branched off a base captured before its upstream merged into the integration branch, and the branch was never re-synced — so the agent built on a stale snapshot with none of the upstream's work. Two changes close the gap: - release_dependency_blocked_claim now clears branch_name, so the re-claim (after the dependency clears) re-runs branch creation. - create_branch, when the branch is already on disk with no commits of its own, resets it onto the freshly-pulled base — the dependent now builds on the current integration tip. A branch carrying real commits is left untouched, so no work is discarded; the cell->leaf cascade carries the upstream down to the dev branch automatically. * refactor(gateway): drop the sibling-sequence claim guard Sibling sequence no longer gates a claim. Cross-cell ordering is enforced by task dependencies — a cell task that depends on another is held until its upstream reaches a terminal state, a stronger, status-aware gate than the sequence-number check. That check was dormant in practice anyway: every fan-out child carries sequence 0, on which the guard short-circuited. `sequence` stays a sibling-ordering / dispatch-priority field (list_pending ordering and the panel). Removes sibling_sequence_guard and its _earlier_blocking_sibling helper, the now-unused skip_sequence parameter threaded through the claim verbs, and the sibling fetch that fed it. * feat(gateway): sort a cross-cell dependent after its upstream When the frontend cell task is wired to depend on its UX/UI sibling, set its sequence to the upstream's sequence + 1 so it sorts after the design it waits on — list_pending ordering and the panel now show UX ahead of the implementation it gates, in either delegation order. Adds TaskService.set_sequence (the sibling-ordering field is a service write; it carries no claim-gating semantics — dependencies gate claims). * feat(gateway): make the backend cell depend on UX too UX/UI design defines the screens and API contracts both implementation cells build against, so the backend cell — not just the frontend — waits on the UX/UI cell task in a product fan-out and sorts after it. Wires in either delegation order: a backend task delegated after UX gets the dependency directly; a UX task delegated after a still-pending backend sibling retro-wires it. Mirrors the existing frontend wiring (_depend_backend_on_ux and _depend_pending_backends_on_ux). Backend is held by the same dependency gate, so it costs no extra dispatch churn. * fix(websocket): forward notification acks instead of logging them incomplete The bridge handler serves both notification.sent and notification.acked, but acked events carry `agent_id` (the acking agent) rather than `recipient_id`, so every acknowledgement tripped the missing-field guard and logged "Incomplete notification event" instead of reaching the panel. Accept either field as the recipient. * feat(api): hint the full UUID when a truncated task id fails validation Agents copy the 8-character task prefix the system shows them (the commit prefix, task summaries) and send it as task_id, which fails UUID validation with an opaque "invalid length" 422 and wastes a call. The request-validation handler now detects a task_id UUID error and attaches a `remediate` hint telling the agent to retry with the full 36-character UUID from its task envelope. * fix(audit): record the blocked transition when a task is escalated Escalation sets a task to blocked by writing task.status directly, which bypassed the validated transition helper and so never emitted a task.blocked audit row — the lifecycle moved but the Auditor saw nothing. Extract the audit emit from the central transition helper into _emit_status_transition_audit and call it from the escalate path, capturing the prior status and outgoing owner before reassignment so the row is attributed correctly. * fix(docs): stop doubling the docs path so design specs index into RAG The documenter sometimes hands a doc path already rooted at docs/, and joining it onto DOCS_BASE_PATH (/app/docs) produced /app/docs/docs/..., so the file was never found and the spec never indexed — the frontend cell could not retrieve the UX design over RAG. Normalize the path before joining: trust an absolute path, otherwise strip a single redundant leading docs/ segment. * feat(security): let the control panel authenticate in secure mode With ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED=true every request must carry a valid HMAC token, which locked the human control panel out — it sends role headers but no token. nginx, the only trusted hop between the browser and the API, now injects the CEO token on /api and /ws, so the browser never holds the signing secret. The injected value is just the existing per-agent token issued for the CEO identity (issue_panel_token), so the token-verification path is unchanged. An empty value (dev/header-trust mode) renders to no header. `make panel-token` prints the value; set it as ROBOCO_PANEL_AGENT_TOKEN in .env before enabling secure mode. .env.example and the README Security section document the flow. * chore(compose): consolidate the two compose files into one docker-compose.yml and docker-compose.yaml had diverged: .yml — the file Docker actually uses — carried ROBOCO_PUBLIC_BASE_URL but was missing the /app/manifests bind-mount, while .yaml had the manifests mount but not the base URL. Merge the union into docker-compose.yml and delete the duplicate so there is one source of truth and no "multiple config files" warning. This activates the manifests mount in the deployed file: without it the orchestrator writes per-agent tool manifests to its ephemeral container fs, they never reach the host for the daemon to bind-mount, and agents fall back to all-verbs registration. Drop the stale .yaml reference from the config.py docstring, the labeler, and the CI path filters. --------- Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
422 lines
13 KiB
Python
422 lines
13 KiB
Python
"""agents_config coverage — pure-function role/team resolution."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
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from roboco.agents_config import (
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can_a2a_direct,
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can_assign_tasks,
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can_cancel_tasks,
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can_create_tasks,
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can_send_notifications,
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get_a2a_route_hint,
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get_agent_cell,
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get_agent_role,
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get_agent_skills,
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get_agent_team,
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get_cell_members,
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get_escalation_target,
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get_pm_for_agent,
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get_pm_for_team,
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is_board_member,
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is_ceo,
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is_management,
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is_pm,
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issue_agent_token,
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issue_panel_token,
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verify_agent_token,
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)
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from roboco.seeds.initial_data import CEO_AGENT_ID
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if TYPE_CHECKING:
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import pytest
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# get_agent_role / get_agent_team / get_agent_cell
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_get_agent_role_known() -> None:
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assert get_agent_role("be-dev-1") == "developer"
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def test_get_agent_role_main_pm() -> None:
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assert get_agent_role("main-pm") == "main_pm"
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def test_get_agent_role_unknown() -> None:
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assert get_agent_role("ghost-agent") == "unknown"
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def test_get_agent_team_known() -> None:
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assert get_agent_team("be-dev-1") == "backend"
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def test_get_agent_team_for_main_pm_returns_value() -> None:
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"""main-pm has team 'main_pm' or None depending on config."""
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result = get_agent_team("main-pm")
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assert result is None or isinstance(result, str)
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def test_get_agent_team_for_unknown() -> None:
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assert get_agent_team("ghost-agent") is None
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def test_get_agent_cell_alias_for_team() -> None:
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assert get_agent_cell("be-dev-1") == "backend"
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Role predicates
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_is_pm_for_cell_pm() -> None:
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assert is_pm("be-pm") is True
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def test_is_pm_for_main_pm() -> None:
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assert is_pm("main-pm") is True
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def test_is_pm_for_developer() -> None:
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assert is_pm("be-dev-1") is False
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def test_is_management_for_main_pm() -> None:
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assert is_management("main-pm") is True
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def test_is_management_for_developer() -> None:
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assert is_management("be-dev-1") is False
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def test_is_ceo_for_ceo() -> None:
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assert is_ceo("ceo") is True
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def test_is_ceo_for_developer() -> None:
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assert is_ceo("be-dev-1") is False
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def test_is_board_member() -> None:
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# Whatever the actual board members are, the function should return bool.
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assert isinstance(is_board_member("auditor"), bool)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Permission predicates
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_can_send_notifications_main_pm() -> None:
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assert can_send_notifications("main-pm") is True
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def test_can_send_notifications_developer() -> None:
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assert can_send_notifications("be-dev-1") is False
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def test_can_create_tasks_main_pm() -> None:
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assert can_create_tasks("main-pm") is True
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def test_can_create_tasks_developer() -> None:
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assert can_create_tasks("be-dev-1") is False
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def test_can_assign_tasks_main_pm() -> None:
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assert can_assign_tasks("main-pm") is True
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def test_can_assign_tasks_developer() -> None:
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assert can_assign_tasks("be-dev-1") is False
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def test_can_cancel_tasks_pm() -> None:
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assert can_cancel_tasks("main-pm") is True
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def test_can_cancel_tasks_ceo() -> None:
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"""CEO cannot cancel — they observe only."""
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assert can_cancel_tasks("ceo") is False
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def test_can_cancel_tasks_auditor() -> None:
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assert can_cancel_tasks("auditor") is False
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Escalation + PM resolution
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_get_escalation_target() -> None:
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target = get_escalation_target("be-dev-1")
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assert target is None or isinstance(target, str)
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def test_get_pm_for_team_known() -> None:
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assert get_pm_for_team("backend") == "be-pm"
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def test_get_pm_for_team_unknown() -> None:
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assert get_pm_for_team("mars") is None
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def test_get_pm_for_agent_cell_pm_returns_main_pm() -> None:
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assert get_pm_for_agent("be-pm") == "main-pm"
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def test_get_pm_for_agent_developer() -> None:
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pm = get_pm_for_agent("be-dev-1")
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# Cell members' PM is their cell PM.
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assert pm == "be-pm" or pm is None
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# A2A policy
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_can_a2a_direct_to_ceo_denied() -> None:
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allowed, reason = can_a2a_direct("be-dev-1", "ceo")
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assert allowed is False
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assert reason is not None
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def test_can_a2a_direct_within_cell() -> None:
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allowed, _ = can_a2a_direct("be-dev-1", "be-qa")
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assert isinstance(allowed, bool)
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def test_get_a2a_route_hint_returns_string() -> None:
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hint = get_a2a_route_hint("be-dev-1", "fe-dev-1")
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assert isinstance(hint, str)
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def test_get_a2a_route_hint_for_ceo() -> None:
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hint = get_a2a_route_hint("be-dev-1", "ceo")
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assert "CEO" in hint
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# get_cell_members
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_get_cell_members_backend() -> None:
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members = get_cell_members("backend")
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assert isinstance(members, list)
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def test_get_cell_members_unknown() -> None:
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assert get_cell_members("mars") == []
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# get_agent_skills
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_get_agent_skills_returns_list() -> None:
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skills = get_agent_skills("be-dev-1")
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assert isinstance(skills, list)
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def test_get_agent_skills_unknown_agent() -> None:
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skills = get_agent_skills("ghost-agent")
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assert isinstance(skills, list)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Token issuance + verification (lines 45-46, 67-72, 83-89)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_issue_agent_token_returns_unsigned_when_secret_missing(
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monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
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) -> None:
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monkeypatch.delenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", raising=False)
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assert issue_agent_token("be-dev-1", "developer", "backend") == "UNSIGNED"
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_SHA256_HEX_LEN = 64
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def test_issue_agent_token_signs_when_secret_present(
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monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
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) -> None:
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monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", "test-secret")
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tok = issue_agent_token("be-dev-1", "developer", "backend")
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assert tok != "UNSIGNED"
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# 64 hex chars from sha256
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assert len(tok) == _SHA256_HEX_LEN
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def test_verify_agent_token_round_trips(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
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monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", "rt-secret")
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tok = issue_agent_token("be-dev-1", "developer", "backend")
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assert verify_agent_token(tok, "be-dev-1", "developer", "backend") is True
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def test_verify_agent_token_rejects_when_secret_missing(
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monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
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) -> None:
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monkeypatch.delenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", raising=False)
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assert verify_agent_token("anything", "be-dev-1", "developer", "backend") is False
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def test_verify_agent_token_rejects_unsigned_sentinel(
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monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
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) -> None:
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monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", "any-secret")
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assert verify_agent_token("UNSIGNED", "be-dev-1", "developer", "backend") is False
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def test_verify_agent_token_rejects_empty_token(
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monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
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) -> None:
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monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", "any-secret")
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assert verify_agent_token("", "be-dev-1", "developer", "backend") is False
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def test_verify_agent_token_rejects_mismatched_signature(
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monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
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) -> None:
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monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", "real-secret")
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tok = issue_agent_token("be-dev-1", "developer", "backend")
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# Verify with different role → mismatch.
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assert verify_agent_token(tok, "be-dev-1", "qa", "backend") is False
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# issue_panel_token — the panel's CEO credential for secure mode
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_issue_panel_token_verifies_under_panel_headers(
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monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
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) -> None:
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"""The panel token must verify under the EXACT headers the panel sends:
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X-Agent-Id = CEO uuid, X-Agent-Role = ceo, and NO team (empty)."""
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monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", "panel-secret")
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tok = issue_panel_token()
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assert verify_agent_token(tok, CEO_AGENT_ID, "ceo", "") is True
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def test_issue_panel_token_unsigned_without_secret(
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monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
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) -> None:
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monkeypatch.delenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", raising=False)
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assert issue_panel_token() == "UNSIGNED"
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def test_panel_token_does_not_grant_other_roles_or_identities(
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monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
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) -> None:
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"""The panel token is bound to the CEO identity — it cannot be replayed to
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claim a different role or agent id."""
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monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", "panel-secret")
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tok = issue_panel_token()
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assert verify_agent_token(tok, CEO_AGENT_ID, "developer", "") is False
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assert verify_agent_token(tok, "be-dev-1", "ceo", "") is False
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# get_pm_for_agent main_pm escalation (line 360)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_get_pm_for_agent_main_pm_returns_product_owner() -> None:
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assert get_pm_for_agent("main-pm") == "product-owner"
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# A2A check branches: cell PM rejects board (line 682), cell-member without
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# team falls through to management route (line 704), board successful path
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# (732), main_pm dispatch (744), cell-member outbound to no-team (771-772).
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_can_a2a_direct_cell_pm_to_board_denied() -> None:
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allowed, reason = can_a2a_direct("be-pm", "product-owner")
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assert allowed is False
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assert reason is not None
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assert "main-pm" in reason
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def test_can_a2a_direct_cell_member_to_unknown_management() -> None:
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"""Cell dev → CEO routes through CEO branch, not management."""
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# Dev → main-pm: management → falls into cell_member branch's else case.
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allowed, reason = can_a2a_direct("be-dev-1", "main-pm")
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# Either path works; just ensure structured output.
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assert isinstance(allowed, bool)
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assert reason is None or isinstance(reason, str)
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def test_can_a2a_direct_main_pm_to_developer_denied() -> None:
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allowed, reason = can_a2a_direct("main-pm", "be-dev-1")
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# main-pm to a developer routed via cell PM.
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assert allowed is False
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assert reason is not None
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def test_can_a2a_direct_main_pm_to_cell_pm_allowed() -> None:
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allowed, _ = can_a2a_direct("main-pm", "be-pm")
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assert allowed is True
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def test_can_a2a_direct_board_to_main_pm_allowed() -> None:
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allowed, _ = can_a2a_direct("product-owner", "main-pm")
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assert allowed is True
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def test_can_a2a_direct_board_to_developer_denied() -> None:
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allowed, reason = can_a2a_direct("product-owner", "be-dev-1")
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assert allowed is False
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assert reason is not None
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def test_get_a2a_route_hint_cell_member_to_management() -> None:
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"""Non-CEO cell-member → management agent (no team) routes via cell PM."""
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hint = get_a2a_route_hint("be-dev-1", "main-pm")
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# main-pm has team None → falls through to management branch (771-772).
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assert "be-pm" in hint or "main-pm" in hint or "Use" in hint
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def test_can_a2a_direct_cell_member_to_unknown_returns_management_hint() -> None:
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"""Cell-member → agent with unresolvable team hits management branch (704)."""
|
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allowed, reason = can_a2a_direct("be-dev-1", "ghost-agent")
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assert allowed is False
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assert reason is not None
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assert "be-pm" in reason or "main-pm" in reason
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def test_can_a2a_direct_unknown_from_agent_falls_through() -> None:
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"""An agent with no team hits the final fallback (line 750)."""
|
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allowed, reason = can_a2a_direct("ghost", "be-dev-1")
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assert allowed is False
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assert reason is not None
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assert "not permitted" in reason
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def test_get_a2a_route_hint_cell_member_to_unknown_routes_via_cell_pm() -> None:
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"""Cell-member → unknown agent (no team) hits lines 770-772."""
|
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hint = get_a2a_route_hint("be-dev-1", "ghost-agent")
|
|
assert "be-pm" in hint
|
|
assert "main-pm" in hint
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def test_get_a2a_route_hint_unknown_from_agent_falls_through() -> None:
|
|
"""from_agent with no team falls through to escalate fallback (line 774)."""
|
|
hint = get_a2a_route_hint("ghost", "be-dev-1")
|
|
assert "escalate" in hint.lower()
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