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* fix(security): lock down shared Claude Code credential mount + curl|sh RCE Audit of Claude Code capabilities reachable inside a spawned agent container turned up two live gaps against the shared harness state: - Every agent container bind-mounts the host's ~/.claude (OAuth store) and ~/.claude.json read-write (_build_mount_args) — the shared subscription auth used by the whole fleet. Nothing denied the native Read tool or the bash-guard hook from reading .credentials.json / .claude.json, so any role could exfiltrate the harness's own Claude Code auth. Deny both at the settings.json layer (absolute // form, per the #167 gotcha) and in the bash-guard hook's credential-exfil checks (cat/grep/source/base64/ interpreter one-liners), mirroring the existing .netrc/.git-credentials treatment. - The bash-guard hook only blocked curl/wget to github.com or internal hosts; `curl <any other host>/install.sh | bash` (or `bash <(curl ...)`, `eval "$(curl ...)"`) executed untrusted remote code unchecked. New checks deny piping a fetch into an actual shell (sh/bash/zsh/dash/ksh) while leaving non-executing consumers (tar, jq, -o file) untouched. Also add --disable-slash-commands to every container agent spawn: skills resolve independently of the --tools allowlist, so a contaminated shared ~/.claude could otherwise leak host skills/plugins into an agent session. No RoboCo role's workflow uses a Claude Code skill. 64 -> 78 shell bash-guard cases, 54 -> 71 pytest bash-guard cases, plus a new 5-case settings/CLI test module. ruff/mypy/xenon B clean. * docs: changelog for the CC capability lockdown --------- Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
126 lines
4.9 KiB
Python
126 lines
4.9 KiB
Python
"""Claude Code capability lockdown.
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Two independent tightenings against the shared Claude Code harness state:
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1. The host's ~/.claude (OAuth credential store) and ~/.claude.json are
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bind-mounted read-write into EVERY agent container (the shared
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subscription auth every spawned agent uses — see
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AgentOrchestrator._build_mount_args). No role's job requires the LLM to
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read its own harness's credentials, so the generated settings.json must
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deny the native Read tool from the two files that carry them.
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2. `--disable-slash-commands` must accompany every container spawn: skills
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resolve independently of the `--tools` built-in allowlist (Anthropic's
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own `--bare` docs note skills still resolve via `/skill-name` even with
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everything else disabled), so if the shared `~/.claude` mount ever
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carries personal skills/plugins they must not become callable inside an
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agent's session.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import json
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from pathlib import Path
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from unittest.mock import patch
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from roboco.models.runtime import OrchestratorAgentConfig, SpawnGitContext
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from roboco.runtime.orchestrator import AgentOrchestrator
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_WS = "/data/workspaces/roboco-api/backend/be-dev-1"
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_CELL = "/data/workspaces/roboco-api/backend"
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def _orch() -> AgentOrchestrator:
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with patch.object(AgentOrchestrator, "__init__", return_value=None):
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return AgentOrchestrator.__new__(AgentOrchestrator)
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def _make_dev_config() -> OrchestratorAgentConfig:
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return OrchestratorAgentConfig(
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agent_id="be-dev-1",
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blueprint_path=Path("/app/agents/blueprints/be-dev-1.md"),
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model="sonnet",
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mcp_config_path=Path("/app/mcp-config.json"),
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git_context=SpawnGitContext(
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project_slug="roboco-api",
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branch_name="feature/backend/TASK0001",
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),
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)
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def _build_image_args() -> list[str]:
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cmd: list[str] = []
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with patch(
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"roboco.runtime.orchestrator._resolve_agent_cli_model",
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return_value="claude-sonnet-5",
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):
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AgentOrchestrator._append_image_and_claude_args(cmd, _make_dev_config(), None)
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return cmd
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class TestSharedClaudeCredentialsDenied:
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"""Every role's generated settings.json blocks the Read tool from the
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shared ~/.claude OAuth credential store."""
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def test_developer_settings_deny_claude_credentials(self) -> None:
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orch = _orch()
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path = orch._generate_agent_settings(
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agent_id="be-dev-1",
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role="developer",
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workspace_path=_WS,
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cell_workspace_path=_CELL,
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)
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deny = json.loads(Path(path).read_text())["permissions"]["deny"]
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assert "Read(//home/agent/.claude/.credentials.json)" in deny, deny
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assert "Read(//home/agent/.claude.json)" in deny, deny
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def test_qa_settings_also_deny_claude_credentials(self) -> None:
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"""Not just the writer roles — a read-only role gets the same base_deny."""
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orch = _orch()
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path = orch._generate_agent_settings(
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agent_id="be-qa",
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role="qa",
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workspace_path=_WS,
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cell_workspace_path=_CELL,
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)
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deny = json.loads(Path(path).read_text())["permissions"]["deny"]
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assert "Read(//home/agent/.claude/.credentials.json)" in deny, deny
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assert "Read(//home/agent/.claude.json)" in deny, deny
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def test_deny_uses_absolute_double_slash_form(self) -> None:
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"""Per the #167 gotcha: a single leading / resolves against the
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settings.json project root, not the container filesystem root — an
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absolute container path deny needs the // form or it silently never
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matches."""
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orch = _orch()
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path = orch._generate_agent_settings(
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agent_id="be-dev-1",
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role="developer",
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workspace_path=_WS,
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cell_workspace_path=_CELL,
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)
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deny = json.loads(Path(path).read_text())["permissions"]["deny"]
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claude_denies = [d for d in deny if d.startswith("Read(") and ".claude" in d]
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assert claude_denies, deny
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for entry in claude_denies:
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inner = entry[entry.index("(") + 1 :]
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assert inner.startswith("//"), f"must use // absolute form: {entry}"
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class TestSlashCommandsDisabled:
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"""--disable-slash-commands accompanies every container agent spawn."""
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def test_cmd_contains_disable_slash_commands_flag(self) -> None:
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cmd = _build_image_args()
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assert "--disable-slash-commands" in cmd, (
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f"--disable-slash-commands missing from spawn cmd — skills resolve "
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f"independently of --tools, so a contaminated shared ~/.claude mount "
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f"could still expose host skills/plugins. Full cmd: {cmd}"
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)
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def test_tools_flag_still_present(self) -> None:
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"""The new flag must not crowd out or replace the existing --tools cap."""
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cmd = _build_image_args()
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assert "--tools" in cmd
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idx = cmd.index("--tools")
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assert cmd[idx + 1] == "Read,Write,Edit,Bash,Grep,Glob,TodoWrite"
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