Files
roboco/tests/unit/runtime/test_cc_lockdown.py
T
12745352aa CC capability lockdown: shared credential mount + curl|sh RCE closed (+5 hardenings spec'd) (#302)
* fix(security): lock down shared Claude Code credential mount + curl|sh RCE

Audit of Claude Code capabilities reachable inside a spawned agent
container turned up two live gaps against the shared harness state:

- Every agent container bind-mounts the host's ~/.claude (OAuth store) and
  ~/.claude.json read-write (_build_mount_args) — the shared subscription
  auth used by the whole fleet. Nothing denied the native Read tool or the
  bash-guard hook from reading .credentials.json / .claude.json, so any
  role could exfiltrate the harness's own Claude Code auth. Deny both at
  the settings.json layer (absolute // form, per the #167 gotcha) and in
  the bash-guard hook's credential-exfil checks (cat/grep/source/base64/
  interpreter one-liners), mirroring the existing .netrc/.git-credentials
  treatment.
- The bash-guard hook only blocked curl/wget to github.com or internal
  hosts; `curl <any other host>/install.sh | bash` (or `bash <(curl ...)`,
  `eval "$(curl ...)"`) executed untrusted remote code unchecked. New
  checks deny piping a fetch into an actual shell (sh/bash/zsh/dash/ksh)
  while leaving non-executing consumers (tar, jq, -o file) untouched.

Also add --disable-slash-commands to every container agent spawn: skills
resolve independently of the --tools allowlist, so a contaminated shared
~/.claude could otherwise leak host skills/plugins into an agent session.
No RoboCo role's workflow uses a Claude Code skill.

64 -> 78 shell bash-guard cases, 54 -> 71 pytest bash-guard cases, plus a
new 5-case settings/CLI test module. ruff/mypy/xenon B clean.

* docs: changelog for the CC capability lockdown

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-03 03:05:37 +02:00

126 lines
4.9 KiB
Python

"""Claude Code capability lockdown.
Two independent tightenings against the shared Claude Code harness state:
1. The host's ~/.claude (OAuth credential store) and ~/.claude.json are
bind-mounted read-write into EVERY agent container (the shared
subscription auth every spawned agent uses — see
AgentOrchestrator._build_mount_args). No role's job requires the LLM to
read its own harness's credentials, so the generated settings.json must
deny the native Read tool from the two files that carry them.
2. `--disable-slash-commands` must accompany every container spawn: skills
resolve independently of the `--tools` built-in allowlist (Anthropic's
own `--bare` docs note skills still resolve via `/skill-name` even with
everything else disabled), so if the shared `~/.claude` mount ever
carries personal skills/plugins they must not become callable inside an
agent's session.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import patch
from roboco.models.runtime import OrchestratorAgentConfig, SpawnGitContext
from roboco.runtime.orchestrator import AgentOrchestrator
_WS = "/data/workspaces/roboco-api/backend/be-dev-1"
_CELL = "/data/workspaces/roboco-api/backend"
def _orch() -> AgentOrchestrator:
with patch.object(AgentOrchestrator, "__init__", return_value=None):
return AgentOrchestrator.__new__(AgentOrchestrator)
def _make_dev_config() -> OrchestratorAgentConfig:
return OrchestratorAgentConfig(
agent_id="be-dev-1",
blueprint_path=Path("/app/agents/blueprints/be-dev-1.md"),
model="sonnet",
mcp_config_path=Path("/app/mcp-config.json"),
git_context=SpawnGitContext(
project_slug="roboco-api",
branch_name="feature/backend/TASK0001",
),
)
def _build_image_args() -> list[str]:
cmd: list[str] = []
with patch(
"roboco.runtime.orchestrator._resolve_agent_cli_model",
return_value="claude-sonnet-5",
):
AgentOrchestrator._append_image_and_claude_args(cmd, _make_dev_config(), None)
return cmd
class TestSharedClaudeCredentialsDenied:
"""Every role's generated settings.json blocks the Read tool from the
shared ~/.claude OAuth credential store."""
def test_developer_settings_deny_claude_credentials(self) -> None:
orch = _orch()
path = orch._generate_agent_settings(
agent_id="be-dev-1",
role="developer",
workspace_path=_WS,
cell_workspace_path=_CELL,
)
deny = json.loads(Path(path).read_text())["permissions"]["deny"]
assert "Read(//home/agent/.claude/.credentials.json)" in deny, deny
assert "Read(//home/agent/.claude.json)" in deny, deny
def test_qa_settings_also_deny_claude_credentials(self) -> None:
"""Not just the writer roles — a read-only role gets the same base_deny."""
orch = _orch()
path = orch._generate_agent_settings(
agent_id="be-qa",
role="qa",
workspace_path=_WS,
cell_workspace_path=_CELL,
)
deny = json.loads(Path(path).read_text())["permissions"]["deny"]
assert "Read(//home/agent/.claude/.credentials.json)" in deny, deny
assert "Read(//home/agent/.claude.json)" in deny, deny
def test_deny_uses_absolute_double_slash_form(self) -> None:
"""Per the #167 gotcha: a single leading / resolves against the
settings.json project root, not the container filesystem root — an
absolute container path deny needs the // form or it silently never
matches."""
orch = _orch()
path = orch._generate_agent_settings(
agent_id="be-dev-1",
role="developer",
workspace_path=_WS,
cell_workspace_path=_CELL,
)
deny = json.loads(Path(path).read_text())["permissions"]["deny"]
claude_denies = [d for d in deny if d.startswith("Read(") and ".claude" in d]
assert claude_denies, deny
for entry in claude_denies:
inner = entry[entry.index("(") + 1 :]
assert inner.startswith("//"), f"must use // absolute form: {entry}"
class TestSlashCommandsDisabled:
"""--disable-slash-commands accompanies every container agent spawn."""
def test_cmd_contains_disable_slash_commands_flag(self) -> None:
cmd = _build_image_args()
assert "--disable-slash-commands" in cmd, (
f"--disable-slash-commands missing from spawn cmd — skills resolve "
f"independently of --tools, so a contaminated shared ~/.claude mount "
f"could still expose host skills/plugins. Full cmd: {cmd}"
)
def test_tools_flag_still_present(self) -> None:
"""The new flag must not crowd out or replace the existing --tools cap."""
cmd = _build_image_args()
assert "--tools" in cmd
idx = cmd.index("--tools")
assert cmd[idx + 1] == "Read,Write,Edit,Bash,Grep,Glob,TodoWrite"