Smoke-12: be-dev-1 (minimax-m2.7) bypassed the entire MCP boundary by
running `uv run python3 -c "import os;
os.environ['ROBOCO_AGENT_ID']='...'; from roboco.mcp.flow_server
import open_pr; open_pr(...)"` from the Bash tool. This voided the
per-role tool manifest (role-scoping is meaningless if the agent can
import any server module in-process), forged agent identity via an
env-var rewrite, and ran choreographer code outside the gateway's
tracing + auth.
bash-guard-hook.sh now adds two deny rules:
1. Any python/uv/poetry/pipenv/pdm/hatch invocation that imports or
`-m`-runs roboco.* internals (mcp/services/runtime/foundation/
api/enforcement). The whole command string — heredoc body
included — is matched, so quoting/heredoc forms are covered.
2. Any assignment or export of ROBOCO_AGENT_ID (identity forgery).
Reading roboco source for context (cat/grep) is still allowed — the
block is on *executing* internals, not viewing them. Normal python
one-liners without roboco imports still pass.
19 bash-guard tests pass (10 prior + 9 new). Note: takes effect on
agent-image rebuild (hook ships in the agent container).
Smoke run 3 showed the bash-guard hook emitting 8+ lines on every
blocked shell-git op — enumerating every alternative MCP verb across
roboco-flow / roboco-do / roboco-git-readonly. That's repeated token
spend on every refused retry; the LLM doesn't need the full alt-list
inline, it has the role prompt + the MCP tool schema for that.
Trimmed to 2 lines: denial reason + a one-line pointer to the role's
State→Verb table. Test asserts <= 3 echo lines in any denial block.
Spec ref: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-12-post-smoke-3-fixes-design.md
section B5.
Previous regex used a greedy [^|]* and required at least one / before
the host, so 'curl roboco-orchestrator:8000/api' (no scheme, no slash)
slipped through. Split into two simpler checks: (a) line starts with
curl/wget/http/https/httpie, AND (b) line contains a forbidden host.
Probe-verified: scheme-ful, scheme-less, and protocol-relative forms
all denied; external URLs still allowed; GitHub-specific deny still
fires first.
Prompts told agents internal API calls were denied; the guard only
denied GitHub. Combined with task 4 (X-Agent-Role enforcement) this
closes the manifest-bypass loophole.
Renn F