mirror of
https://github.com/rennf93/roboco.git
synced 2026-08-03 07:23:24 +02:00
94 lines
4.3 KiB
Bash
94 lines
4.3 KiB
Bash
#!/bin/bash
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# PreToolUse guard for Bash.
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#
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# Deny-listed patterns in base_deny (permissions.deny) only match the first
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# binary in a Bash command. Compound commands like
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# bash -c "cd /workspace && git fetch origin"
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# slip through because the first token is `cd`. This hook inspects the full
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# command string and rejects any shell-level git network/auth op, redirecting
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# the agent to the MCP equivalent.
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#
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# Claude Code passes the PreToolUse event on stdin as JSON:
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# { "tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": { "command": "...", "description": "..." } }
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# Exit 0 = allow. Exit 2 = deny with message on stdout.
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#
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# Deny categories:
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# - Network git ops (require token injection only done by the MCP layer)
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# - Shell-level PR / merge that bypass the PM hierarchy
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# - Credential exfiltration vectors the existing deny list doesn't catch
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# (compound cat/env/curl/wget)
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set -u
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input=$(cat 2>/dev/null || true)
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[[ -z "$input" ]] && exit 0
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cmd=$(printf '%s' "$input" | python3 -c '
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import json, sys
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try:
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d = json.loads(sys.stdin.read())
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ti = d.get("tool_input", {}) or {}
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print(ti.get("command", ""))
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except Exception:
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print("")
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' 2>/dev/null)
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[[ -z "$cmd" ]] && exit 0
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low=$(printf '%s' "$cmd" | tr "[:upper:]" "[:lower:]")
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# --- git network / auth ops ---------------------------------------------------
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if echo "$low" | grep -qE '(^|[[:space:];&|])git[[:space:]]+(fetch|pull|push|clone|remote|ls-remote|checkout|commit|merge|rebase|reset|cherry-pick|revert|tag[[:space:]]+-d|update-ref|reflog[[:space:]]+delete)'; then
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cat <<'EOF' >&2
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Denied: shell git for network / auth / branch-mutating ops is blocked.
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Use the roboco-git MCP tools instead:
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- roboco_git_status / _log / _diff / _branch_list (read-only local)
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- roboco_git_commit / _push / _create_pr (write ops)
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They route through the orchestrator which injects the GitHub PAT and
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tracks commits against the task. Raw `git fetch` etc. don't have auth
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and will fail with "could not read Username for 'https://github.com'".
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EOF
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exit 2
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fi
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# --- credential / secret exfil ------------------------------------------------
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# Block ANY bash command that references a credential file path — catches
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# `cat .git/config`, `python -c "open('.git/config')..."`, `grep token .git/
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# config`, `strings ~/.netrc`, etc. The token is scrubbed from .git/config
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# post-clone so the file is uninteresting, but a leaked PAT is unrecoverable
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# so belt + suspenders applies.
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if echo "$low" | grep -qE '(\.git/config|\.gitconfig|\.git-credentials|\.netrc|\.ssh/|id_rsa|id_ed25519|id_ecdsa|known_hosts)'; then
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echo "Denied: command references a credential file or SSH key. Use roboco_git_* MCP tools — the PAT is injected subprocess-side and never lands in these files." >&2
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exit 2
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fi
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if echo "$low" | grep -qE '(^|[[:space:];&|])(curl|wget|http|https)[[:space:]][^|]*(github\.com|api\.github\.com)'; then
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echo "Denied: direct GitHub HTTP calls bypass the PAT handler. Use roboco_git_* MCP tools." >&2
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exit 2
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fi
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if echo "$low" | grep -qE '(^|[[:space:];&|])(env|printenv)([[:space:]]|$)' && ! echo "$low" | grep -qE '(^|[[:space:];&|])env[[:space:]]+-i'; then
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# allow `env VAR=val cmd` style prefixes (`env ` followed by `NAME=`)
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if ! echo "$low" | grep -qE '(^|[[:space:];&|])env[[:space:]]+[a-z_][a-z0-9_]*='; then
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echo "Denied: env / printenv can leak secrets. Ask for the specific value you need via the task description." >&2
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exit 2
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fi
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fi
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# --- destructive ops on system paths ------------------------------------------
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# Agents should only rm -rf inside their own workspace. Block system paths
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# outright. Cross-workspace rm isn't regex-decidable here (we don't know the
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# agent's slug at hook time) — defer that to the Write(workspace/**) allow
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# list + file-ownership at the OS level.
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if echo "$low" | grep -qE '(^|[[:space:];&|])rm[[:space:]]+[^|;&]*-[[:alpha:]]*[rRf][[:alpha:]]*[[:space:]]'; then
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if echo "$low" | grep -qE '(^|[[:space:];&|])rm[[:space:]]+[^|;&]*(/app($|[[:space:]/])|/root|/etc|/var|/usr|/bin|/sbin|/lib|/home)'; then
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echo "Denied: rm on a system path. Operate inside your own workspace only." >&2
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exit 2
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fi
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if echo "$low" | grep -qE '(^|[[:space:];&|])rm[[:space:]]+[^|;&]*[[:space:]]/[[:space:]]*(;|\||&|$)'; then
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echo "Denied: rm on root filesystem." >&2
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exit 2
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fi
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fi
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exit 0
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