Commit Graph
102 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Backend Developer 1 26dd53eda6 [8568d4b7] docs(http-security-guard): correct false e2e test claim + document guard-core 3.4.0 vs 3.7.0 version sensitivity 2026-08-02 14:38:08 +00:00
roboco-app[bot]GitHubBackend Developer 1Backend Documenterroboco-app[bot] <302741806+roboco-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
d829979b6a [09d0185a] Backend: fix the roboco-api CI regression (make make quality green on slave) (#808)
* [c2c29256] Fix make quality CI regression on roboco-api slave (#804)

* [c2c29256] fix: mock _chown_entry to simulate chown failure in test_marker_written_only_on_zero_failure_pass

* [c2c29256] docs(changelog): add Unreleased Fixed entry for make quality slave CI regression fix

---------

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 1 <be-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Documenter <be-doc@roboco.tech>

* [b5bc53ea] Fix security middleware trusted_proxies + run full make quality green (#811)

* [b5bc53ea] fix(security): remove LAN ranges from trusted_proxies so forwarded LAN IPs are rejected

* [b5bc53ea] refactor(task): extract private helpers from cancel() to clear xenon rank C gate

* [b5bc53ea] docs(security): document trusted_proxies/whitelist lockstep invariant and the #811 LAN-IP fix

---------

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 1 <be-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Documenter <be-doc@roboco.tech>

* [13193140] Strengthen security middleware IP-resolution test + document trusted_proxies invariant (#813)

* [13193140] test(security): add direct IP-resolution unit tests and document trusted_proxies invariant

* [13193140] docs(security): cross-reference trusted_proxies invariant proof tests and inline comment

---------

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 1 <be-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Documenter <be-doc@roboco.tech>

---------

Co-authored-by: roboco-app[bot] <302741806+roboco-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 1 <be-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Documenter <be-doc@roboco.tech>
2026-08-02 11:33:40 +00:00
Renn F d87e2d9b4e fix(lifecycle): stop PMs re-claiming tasks out of the closure queue — kills the i_will_plan review loop
A cell/main PM's i_will_plan could legally re-claim its own task from
awaiting_pm_review (a CLAIM_RULES edge added for post-respawn recovery),
resetting the task to in_progress and re-running submit_up -> pr_pass ->
awaiting_pm_review forever: one Sentinel conventions child looped eleven
full laps in four hours (14 reviews on one PR, 37 agent spawns) while
its root's closure check fired eighteen times and the Main PM could
never close anything.

The claim edge is gone from every table that carried it — CLAIM_RULES,
the claim ActionSpec's source statuses, the StatusTransition row, the
service-layer _ROLE_CLAIM_STATUSES twin, and the legacy enforcement
shim's operational-edge/role-gate entries (left divergent, it would be
the same silent two-table drift that produced this bug). The respawn
case the edge existed for is now served properly: _handle_pm_reentry
gained a third contract — a PM calling i_will_plan on its own
awaiting_pm_review task gets a steering envelope (no claim, no state
change) pointing at complete/request_changes, and give_me_work's next
hint for that status says the same instead of steering back into
i_will_plan. The no-transition review-claim path and the pm-review
dispatch prompt were already correct and are untouched, so closure
still converges through them.

A new bidirectional test asserts CLAIM_RULES and _ROLE_CLAIM_STATUSES
stay identical per PM role (the old comment claimed a sync test existed;
it checked one direction only). Lifecycle artifacts regenerated; the
parity suite's three unshaped session mocks fixed, zero AsyncMock
warnings remain.
2026-07-30 23:37:27 +02:00
Renn F 87332346ce docs(kimi): README and KB parity for the Kimi provider
README gains the Kimi setup block, tech-stack row, and checklist entry
(the provider prose also finally names Codex/Gemini, which it had
skipped). The agent-facing KB's provider enum sentence catches up too -
it still called OPENAI reserved and omitted GEMINI - and gains the Kimi
runtime detail plus a config-reference section for the four Kimi
settings.
2026-07-29 04:58:10 +02:00
879afc14a4 Board Program LEARN context, ruff 0.16, and verb-rejection observability (#700)
* fix(board): LEARN decisions name the item, not its per-cycle index

A cycle's reject reasons are rendered into the NEXT cycle's exploration
prompt, but the ref recorded alongside each reason was the item's stored
id (item-0/item-1) — a per-cycle index that means something different
every cycle and appears nowhere the explorer can resolve. The reason
survived the loop; what it was about did not.

Record the item's title instead, via a shared learn_ref() helper (falls
back to the id when title-less, and reads target_task_title for Scales,
whose items name the live task they mutate).

* chore(lint): satisfy ruff 0.16 — keyword-only signatures and markdown formatting

The dev toolchain resolved ruff 0.16.0, which stabilises PLR0917 (too many
positional arguments) and formats python code blocks inside markdown. Both
fired repo-wide and neither had anything to do with the code they flagged.

- 36 signatures gain a `*` so their tail arguments are keyword-only, and
  the 104 call sites that passed them positionally are converted. mypy was
  the safety net for the static ones; the full suite caught nine more that
  only bind at runtime (the MCP tool functions, whose real callers already
  pass named JSON arguments).
- 28 markdown files reformatted by 0.16's code-block formatter.
- One RUF036 (`None` mid-union) autofixed in the GitLab provider.

* fix(gateway): log the reason when a verb rejects

A rejected envelope rides an HTTP 200, its body is never logged, and there
is no trace table — so in the access log a verb an agent could not satisfy
looks identical to one that worked. On 2026-07-25 four Board Programs
(Periscope, Sentinel, Scales, Barfly) each POSTed their propose verb three
or four times, persisted nothing, and left their exploration tasks PENDING;
the reason was unrecoverable afterwards, from the logs or from the agents'
own transcripts.

Log error/message/remediate/missing plus the calling agent at
envelope_to_response — the one chokepoint every v1 flow and do route
returns through. Success envelopes stay silent.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-26 15:07:28 +02:00
401f8a2cc9 feat(board): Board Programs — the complete twelve-program catalog (Phases 1-3) (#699)
* feat(board): Pest Control — the first project-scoped Board Program

The Product Owner hunts latent defects (what the org records but nobody
reads): a weekly cycle — accelerated off-schedule when the trailing-7-day
rework rate crosses pest_rework_threshold, with the cheap dedup/scope gates
evaluated before the metrics queries — opens one held exploration task
against the least-recently-explored opted-in project (deterministic
round-robin; opted_in_projects gains a stable ORDER BY), with server-
assembled evidence in the spawn prompt (rework hotspots, recurring-findings
and waived-minor ledger aggregates, all capped) plus prior-cycle LEARN
context. The PO calls the new PO-only propose_bug_hunt verb once: ≤5 items,
evidence required per item, targets validated against pest_control
participation. CEO decides per item — approve materializes a BACKLOG task
(source pest_control, never auto-starts), reject records the reason; both
feed the LEARN ledger by exploration task id; all-terminal completes the
cycle. Telegram queue pushes carry working Approve/Reject handlers
mirroring the roadmap kind. Doctrine: board.md Pest Control section +
product-owner verb entry + regenerated verb tables.

* feat(panel): Pest Control review queue

Command Center gains the pest review queue (per-item approve/reject with
reason, mirroring the roadmap queue); the Programs card and the project
settings participates-in checkboxes pick the new program up registry-driven
— the settings section renders for the first time now that a project-scoped
program exists.

* feat(board): Periscope — HoM market-research brief program

Weekly org-scoped cycle: a solo HoM spawn researches the market (web
research with mandatory source URLs — uncited findings are rejected) and
files one structured brief via the new HoM-only propose_market_brief verb:
headline, cited findings, threats/opportunities, positioning note, all
soup-checked and screened through the injection guard at persist time
(web-derived text later reaches prompts; flags recorded, content never
dropped). A brief is a report, not a proposal: the verb completes the
exploration in the same call (the x_feature asymmetry), the cycle ledger
auto-closes, and the CEO gets a best-effort notification with no
approve/reject surface (periscope deliberately never joins Telegram's
action kinds). The latest brief is injected into the roadmap exploration
prompt — Periscope feeds Printer, the first cross-role program input.

* feat(panel): Market Briefs tab (read-only)

Business page gains a Market Briefs tab listing Periscope briefs —
headline, cited findings, threats/opportunities — read-only by design; a
report has nothing to approve.

* feat(board): Coroner — event-triggered Auditor postmortems

The first EVENT program: no cron — three best-effort hooks open an autopsy
when a task bounces to its 3rd revision (the audit chokepoint), is
cancelled after work started, or is budget-blocked; all gated on arming +
one-open-autopsy dedup, none can fail the underlying transition. A solo
Auditor spawn reads the incident (server-assembled findings + transition
context) and files one propose_postmortem: incident summary, root cause,
failed stage (validated against the real status vocabulary), and ONE
process change — a playbook-kind change drafts via PlaybookService
directly into the normal pending-curation queue; the briefed draft_playbook
manifest grant was deliberately NOT added, preserving the existing
'auditor curates but never drafts' invariant test. Complete-at-propose
(report asymmetry), cycle ledger auto-closes, CEO notified link-only.
Integrated as a union with Periscope across the shared program surfaces.

* feat(panel): Coroner postmortems card

Read-only postmortems list under Business → Programs — incident, root
cause, failed stage, process change; nothing to approve, the process-change
artifact (a draft playbook) rides the existing curation queue.

* feat(board): Sentinel — Auditor drift-watch quality reports

Weekly org-scoped cycle: a solo Auditor spawn receives a server-assembled
drift context (waived-findings trend, open findings by severity,
conventions-violation hotspots, top spend — all capped, pure ORM) and files
one propose_quality_report: headline, 1-7 area-validated items with
evidence and suggested actions, overall assessment. Report semantics —
complete-at-propose, cycle auto-closes, CEO notified display-only (never on
Telegram's approve/reject surface); items are structured so a later
convert-to-task control is cheap. Integration adopts Sentinel's module-
level dict-dispatch for board-program routing (xenon-driven), folding all
prior programs in; app router mounting extracted to a helper for the same
budget.

* feat(panel): Quality Reports tab (read-only)

Business page gains the Sentinel quality-reports tab — headline, per-area
observations with evidence and suggested actions; read-only, a report has
nothing to approve.

* feat(board): Spackle — gap-fill audit program

Biweekly project-scoped PO cycle over the half-shipped surface area: API
routes without panel surfaces (and vice versa), armed flags without docs,
docs promises the code doesn't keep, dead-end tabs — the inventory diffing
is the PO's own read-tool work, ordered by the spawn prompt with file:line
citations required; the server injects only prior-cycle LEARN and the
rotation target. Rotation is now a shared module-level helper
(pick_rotation_target, parameterized by source) both project-scoped
engines use — pest_control delegates to it, behavior-identical, with a
cross-pollution test proving the two programs' rotations stay independent.
propose_gap_fill mirrors the bug-hunt verb (≤5 items, two-sided evidence
required, participation gate); per-item CEO decide materializes BACKLOG
source=spackle tasks; full Telegram kind incl. approve/reject handlers.
All seven program routers now mount from one helper.

* feat(panel): Spackle gap-fill review queue

Command Center gains the gap-fill queue mirroring the pest-control one —
per-item approve/reject with the two-sided gap evidence rendered.

* feat(board): Scales — monthly portfolio rebalance

Org-scoped PO cycle over the stale backlog: the spawn receives a capped
stale-task snapshot (BACKLOG/PENDING unclaimed >30 days) plus the charter
and prior-cycle LEARN, and files one propose_rebalance — 1-7 items, each a
resolvable task_ref with action reprioritize (validated new priority) or
cancel, rationale required. Per-item CEO decide: approve EXECUTES the
action (audited priority update, or the normal cancel path) — the first
program whose materializer mutates existing tasks instead of creating
them; reject records the reason; LEARN by exploration task id;
all-terminal completes the cycle. Full Telegram decide-kind wiring.
Integrated as the eight-program union (registry, dict dispatch, routers
helper, teardown enumerations).

* feat(panel): Scales rebalance review queue

Command Center gains the rebalance queue — per-item approve/reject with
the action, target task, and rationale rendered.

* feat(board): Mirror — quarterly positioning audit

Project-scoped HoM cycle over messaging surfaces: README claims vs shipped
reality, docs-site promises vs code, charter alignment — the audit is the
HoM's own read-tool work with citations required; the server injects the
charter, prior-cycle LEARN, and the shared rotation target. propose_
messaging_fixes mirrors the gap-fill verb (≤5 items, drift evidence naming
claim + contradicting reality, participation gate); per-item CEO decide
materializes BACKLOG source=mirror documentation tasks; full Telegram
decide-kind wiring. Nine-program union across the shared surfaces.

* feat(panel): Mirror messaging-fixes review queue

* feat(board): Megaphone — HoM standing editorial calendar

Cron cycle (3 days, org-scoped, gated on X credentials — drafting content
nobody can post is pointless): the HoM receives a shipped-this-week digest
plus Unreleased changelog bullets and files one propose_editorial_post
(angle-validated, ≤280, brand voice) that materializes a held x_editorial
draft through the SAME X-queue origination chokepoint release posts use —
zero new approval surface, notifications and CEO decide for free.
Complete-at-propose; cycle auto-closes. Ten-program union.

* feat(panel): x_editorial source labels in the X queue surfaces

* feat(board): Librarian — proactive playbook mining

Biweekly org-scoped Auditor cycle: mines recurring non-private learning
journals (≥2-count grouping with a recency fallback) against the existing
playbook-title inventory and files one propose_playbook_drafts — 1-3
drafts, each with the repeated-pattern evidence that justifies it,
duplicate titles rejected in-batch and against the live store. Drafts are
created via PlaybookService directly (the Coroner precedent — the
'auditor curates but never drafts' do-verb invariant stays intact and
tested) and land in the normal pending-curation queue the Auditor's own
triage already surfaces; no new panel surface. Complete-at-propose;
display-only CEO notification. Eleven-program union.

* feat(board): War Room — release campaign planning

EVENT program with a REAL originator (unlike coroner's stub): a release
publish hooks a campaign brief beside the release-post seam, and the CEO's
run-now originates on demand — the cron loop never fires it. The HoM
designs a 2-6 post arc (teaser → launch → follow-up → spotlight; 280-cap,
future strictly-ascending publish_after, stage vocabulary) and one
propose_campaign call materializes each post as a held x_campaign draft
through the X-queue chokepoint. V1 is manual-cadence by design: publish_
after renders as queue guidance and the CEO approves each post at its
moment — nothing auto-posts, ever; the auto-schedule upgrade is a
documented ceiling. Twelve-program union: full registry complete.

* feat(panel): x_campaign labels + publish-after guidance in the X queue

* feat(board): Barfly — adjacent-conversation replies

Cron cycle (2 days, org-scoped, X-credentials gated): the engine searches
X for conversations where RoboCo is relevant but unmentioned (new OAuth-
signed search_recent on the client; queries + candidate cap configurable),
screens every fetched tweet through the injection guard (stored unclamped
— a clamp was truncating the candidate under the envelope, caught by the
dev's own tests), dedupes via the existing x_seen_mentions ledger (no
migration; also prevents double-drafting against the mentions poll), and
opens one held HoM exploration carrying the screened candidates. propose_
conversation_replies enforces candidate-id-only replies (≤5, 280-cap);
each materializes a held x_barfly draft through the X-queue chokepoint,
threaded via a new in_reply_to seam on post_tweet that only x_barfly
drafts use. The X redraft machinery is now dict-dispatch over per-source
extractors with reply-ref carry for x_barfly. Thirteen-program registry.
War Room's test fakes gained the new abstract search_recent stub.

* feat(board): Dogfood — the PO walks the product

The fourteenth and final registry entry, completing the catalog. EVENT
program (release-publish hook beside the war-room hook + CEO run-now, both
through the same real originator; the cron loop never fires it), project-
scoped with shared rotation. The permission surface is the careful part:
the PO's dogfood spawn — and ONLY that spawn — gets the Playwright MCP
mounted, via a task-scoped fail-closed probe mirroring the video-authoring
precedent (a PO spawned for roadmap/pest/scales never sees browser tools;
tested both ways); the PM agent image bakes chromium unconditionally like
the ux image, the mount stays task-gated in code. The walk targets the
rotation target's live surfaces (panel_base_url only when the target is
the org's own project, honest degradation otherwise); propose_friction_
fixes files ≤5 walked-path-evidenced items; per-item CEO decide
materializes BACKLOG source=dogfood tasks; full Telegram decide kind.
Also: megaphone/librarian/war_room arming keys restored to the settings
validator — their panel toggles would have been rejected (dropped in
earlier unions; the same silent-arming class the drill killed once
already).

* feat(panel): Dogfood friction review queue

* chore(board): final whole-branch sweep fixes

The night's closing adversarial pass over the integrated fourteen-program
registry found ONE functional defect — the war-room test fakes' post_tweet
predated Barfly's in_reply_to_tweet_id kwarg (LSP violation, the only red
in an otherwise fully green gate) — plus doc/test drift, all fixed: the
source-parity test completes to fourteen (spackle/mirror were silently
absent while its neighboring comment claimed full coverage), the PO
identity doc gains its missing Dogfood verb, the auditor quick-list gains
propose_postmortem, three stale comments corrected (rotation docstring,
panel registry header, X source enumerations), the dogfood release-hook
gains the exception-swallow test its four sibling hooks already had, and
the CHANGELOG's Unreleased section documents the whole Board Programs
train. Full make quality: exit 0, all gates green.

* docs: full documentation sweep for the Board Programs train

CLAUDE.md's roadmap-engine entry superseded by the Board Program registry
entry (all fourteen programs, arming, scoping, LEARN, guardrails) with the
role verb tables and playwright row refreshed; docs/rag gains the agent-
facing architecture doc plus full propose_* call-shape sections in the
three board role docs, and corrects the strategy-engine section to shipped
reality (only idle→roadmap is wired); docs/map covers the registry + all
twelve engines with flags, gotchas, and drift notes. The 0.27.0 reference
inventory confirmed only the release-executor's canonical set carries the
version — left for the 0.28.0 cut.

* feat(board): human titles + descriptions on every program surface

Raw registry keys rendered as bare panel labels — an operator reading
x_feature had no idea what enabling or running it does. The registry
dataclass gains title/description (test-enforced non-empty for every
entry, unique titles), the API passes them through, and every surface
renders title-with-description-tooltip instead of the key: the Programs
card (label, toggle hint, run-now toast), and the project settings
participates-in/excluded-from checkboxes.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-25 17:13:32 +02:00
2a9339225c docs(release): 0.27.0 prep — changelog through Wave C, map + rag + CLAUDE.md current (#697)
Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-24 22:23:20 +02:00
Renzo FandGitHub dd4c3c3ed0 docs(release): prepare 0.27.0 — curated changelog, rag/map sweep, concat rebuild script (#662) 2026-07-23 11:33:02 +02:00
Renzo FandGitHub d4b7e1e7b8 fix: post-finale completeness sweep — routing surface, provider config, budgets, compose env, interactive exemption (#661) 2026-07-23 09:41:27 +02:00
17de29545a [6788ce7f] Silent bug sweep: concurrency, state integrity, engine edge-cases, panel data freshness (#638)
* [943d8c4d] Frontend data freshness and approval-queue reliability audit (#631)

* [233a8b0f] WebSocket reconnect message-loss audit and fix (#625)

* [233a8b0f] fix(panel): add REST catch-up to useNotificationStream on WS reconnect

connection.ts has no message buffering/replay, so a notification published
while the CEO bell's socket was down (disconnected/reconnecting) was lost
forever instead of merely delayed. Add a reconnect-triggered GET
/notifications?unread_only=true catch-up folded into the existing
notification_id dedup so a notification delivered both via catch-up and
live WS is never double-counted, and make clearMessages drop the held
catch-up batch too. use-a2a-live.ts and use-rate-limit-websocket.ts were
audited and already have working reconnect-triggered REST fallbacks
(verified via a2a/page.tsx, rate-limit-banner.tsx, usage-overview-panel.tsx
and their existing F083 tests) so no fix was needed there.

* [233a8b0f] docs(panel): add comprehensive WebSocket hooks reference and reconnect architecture guide

Add panel/docs/frontend/hooks.md with full API reference for useWebSocket, useNotificationStream (with new REST catch-up behavior), useAgentStream, useA2ALiveStream, and useConnectionStatus. Include examples, best practices, and testing guidance.

Add panel/docs/architecture/websocket-reconnect.md documenting the message-loss mitigation pattern: Strategy 1 (REST catch-up for events, used by useNotificationStream) and Strategy 2 (REST invalidation for state, used by A2A/rate-limit consumers), plus the dedup logic ensuring no notification is double-counted on reconnect.

---------

Co-authored-by: Frontend Developer 1 <fe-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Frontend Documenter <fe-doc@roboco.tech>

* [d5315683] fix(frontend): add distinct toast feedback for silently-swallowed x-post and release-proposal statuses, plus regression tests for all 4 approval queues (#626)

Co-authored-by: Frontend Developer 2 <fe-dev-2@roboco.tech>

* [cd953838] Data-hook null-guard audit and API client 429 retry-by-method fix (#630)

* [cd953838] fix(panel): gate 429 retry by HTTP method, add hook null-guard regression tests

* [cd953838] chore(conventions): waive test-fixture wrapper in hooks null-guard test

* [cd953838] docs(frontend): document API rate-limit retry behavior and null-guard audit results

Added `docs/frontend/api-rate-limiting.md` to document the 429 retry strategy: GET/PUT auto-retry, POST/PATCH/DELETE require X-Idempotency-Key header. Updated `docs/frontend/hooks.md` to confirm the data-hook null-guard audit found all hooks already have correct `enabled` guards and include a regression test suite for the board-review poll on/off behavior and enabled-guard assertions.

---------

Co-authored-by: Frontend Developer 1 <fe-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Frontend Documenter <fe-doc@roboco.tech>

---------

Co-authored-by: Frontend Developer 1 <fe-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Frontend Documenter <fe-doc@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Frontend Developer 2 <fe-dev-2@roboco.tech>

* [4534c71a] Backend concurrency, state-machine, and engine audit (#634)

* [41de844a] fix(lifecycle): sync CLAIM_RULES with runtime + clear stale claimant on PM hand-off (#627)

Two confirmed state-machine gaps found while auditing lifecycle.py,
task_lifecycle.py, the _ESCALATABLE_TO_BLOCKED bypass, and every
_REVIEW_QUEUE_STATES entry point:

- lifecycle.py's CLAIM_RULES/claim-ActionSpec/StatusTransition table
  did not grant CELL_PM/MAIN_PM re-claim of AWAITING_PM_REVIEW even
  though task.py's runtime _ROLE_CLAIM_STATUSES already granted it
  and claimed the spec agreed -- the two tables had silently drifted,
  breaking i_will_plan re-claim on an awaiting_pm_review task.

- docs_complete's _maybe_advance_to_pm_review pre-assigns a specific
  owning PM via assigned_to but left claimed_by/active_claimant_id
  pointing at the outgoing documenter, unlike every sibling transition
  into a review-queue state. A stale active_claimant_id makes
  content_actions.py's _active_claim_violation wrongly reject the
  newly-assigned PM's own content writes before it formally claims.
  Reassign claimed_by + active_claimant_id to the owning PM alongside
  assigned_to.

Adds a regression test asserting the documenter's stale claim does not
survive the docs_complete -> awaiting_pm_review hand-off.

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 2 <be-dev-2@roboco.tech>

* [0c46f666] Engine dedup race + sequencing.py edge-case audit (#628)

* [0c46f666] fix(sequencing): dedup race audit + collision-edge fallback bug

Audited the list-open-then-originate dedup pattern across six engines:
RoadmapEngine, XEngine.run_cycle, DepUpdateEngine, and CIWatchEngine each
run inside exactly one sequential orchestrator-loop asyncio task (no other
call site invokes run_cycle), so they cannot race with themselves; their
in-cycle dedup sets/keys are correctly built before any commit. SelfHealEngine
is the same shape. VideoEngine.open_video_task is genuinely different: it is
reachable from the release-publish hook, the feature-spotlight hook, and the
on-demand POST /video/request route, so two overlapping calls for the same
occasion can both pass the "no open task yet" check before either commits.
Fixed by wrapping the check+insert in a short-lived Redis mutex (reusing
HeartbeatMutex) keyed by occasion, mirroring XPostService's existing
lock pattern, with a regression test proving only one of two concurrent
calls creates a task.

Verified ReleaseExecutor's half-landed retry path (release_commit_sha):
apply_version_bumps and write_changelog_entry both run as uncommitted
working-tree edits before commit_and_push's single `git add -A` + commit,
so a bumped-version-without-changelog state can never reach origin (and
therefore can never be observed by a fresh retry clone) - confirmed correct
with a real-git-repo regression test, no fix needed.

Fixed sequencing.py's dev_task_collision_edges: the `if edges: return edges`
short-circuit dropped the same-assignee-lane fallback entirely whenever ANY
surfaced sibling pair produced a collision edge, even for a completely
unrelated same-assignee pair with no declared surface. Now the fallback
always runs, skipping only pairs the analyzer already ordered (so the two
mechanisms can never disagree on direction for the same pair).

Verified sequencing.py rule 3 (all-shared batch generates no edges): correct
by inspection (_shared_last_edges skips every pair when both are shared) and
confirmed with a regression test - no fix needed.

* [0c46f666] docs(reference): concurrency audit summary - engine races, fixes, verified patterns

---------

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 2 <be-dev-2@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Documenter <be-doc@roboco.tech>

* [8f7f167a] Redis mutex pre-lock write audit (#629)

* [8f7f167a] Redis mutex pre-lock write audit: add cross-session regression test for XPostService.approve

Audited x_post_service.py, video_post_service.py, release_proposal.py, and
heartbeat_mutex.py for the pre-lock DB-write anti-pattern (a session write
that happens before the SET NX / HeartbeatMutex acquire returns a token,
letting a losing racer's stale write clobber a winner's committed state).

XPostService.approve, VideoPostService.approve, and
ReleaseProposalService.approve/reject already implement the correct
validate-pure-pre-lock, apply-under-lock pattern (the XPostService fix
already shipped per CHANGELOG.md: "X edited_body write deferred into the
single-flight lock (M5)"). HeartbeatMutex holds no AsyncSession at all, so
the anti-pattern is structurally inapplicable there.

Adds a genuine cross-session concurrency regression test to
test_x_post_service.py (a real second DB connection, not an in-process
mock) mirroring VideoPostService's existing cross-session test, proving a
concurrently-committed post survives and the CEO's edited body never lands
on the just-posted row.

* [8f7f167a] Remove redundant inline comments flagged by QA in cross-session regression test

Both comments restated what the surrounding docstrings already say
explicitly, per QA findings F-dbadd8f0 (line 294) and F-27ac051e (line
631) — no behavior change, tests re-verified green against a sandbox
Postgres.

* [8f7f167a] Remove inline trailing comments flagged by QA (correct file this time)

QA findings F-e6f3e6a6 and F-24189858 cited tests/unit/services/
test_x_post_service.py:294 and :631 across 5 revision rounds, but that
file never contained the flagged comment text — a repo-wide grep for
the exact quoted strings shows both comments actually live in the
mirrored tests/unit/services/test_video_post_service.py file, in its
own cross-session concurrency regression tests (the caption-edit and
tiktok-skip tests). Removed both there:
- "# externally visible to the "concurrent" session below" on the
  db_session.commit() call
- "# never attempted without credentials" on the tiktok_poster.calls
  assertion

Both restated what the surrounding docstrings/test names already say;
no behavior change. Verified with the full make quality gate against a
sandbox Postgres/Redis: 13,717 passed, 94.41% coverage, clean except
one pre-existing unrelated failure in tests/unit/api/test_cloud_auth.py
::test_login_route_parses_oauth2_form_not_query_params, which connects
to the app's default localhost:5432 Postgres (not the db_session
sandbox fixture) and is unreachable in this sandboxed environment —
structurally unrelated to the auth subsystem this task never touches.

* [8f7f167a] Redis mutex pre-lock write audit (round 7): add cross-session regression tests for reject() lock protection

Round-7 QA findings F-7eb9fbcb, F-06f39a2e, and F-4d56e49b claim
XPostService.reject(), ReleaseProposalService.reject(), and
release_executor._await_proc() lack lock protection / a CancelledError
handler — but their cited line ranges (255-267, 429-454, 241-257)
describe a pre-fix, shorter version of these functions that predates
commit fb293a787d, already on this branch. At current HEAD:

- x_post_service.py reject() (lines 275-299) acquires _LOCK_PREFIX,
  re-reads under the lock, applies markers.set_x_reject_reason() +
  CANCELLED only inside the critical section, releases in finally.
- release_proposal.py reject() (lines 460-486) does the identical
  dance with _RELEASE_LOCK_PREFIX.
- release_executor.py _await_proc() (lines 257-265) already has an
  `except asyncio.CancelledError` block that kills + reaps the child
  and re-raises, mirroring the TimeoutError handler, with an existing
  dedicated regression test
  (test_await_proc_kills_child_on_outer_cancellation).

The one genuine gap: neither reject() path had a cross-session
(real second DB connection, not an in-process mock) regression test
proving the in-lock re-read catches a concurrent approve/publish that
completes mid-lock-wait — only approve() had one. Added
test_reject_concurrent_approve_completes_during_lock_wait to both
test_x_post_service.py and test_release_proposal_status_guards.py,
mirroring the existing approve() cross-session test: a second engine
commits COMPLETED between reject's pre-lock read and lock acquisition,
and the test asserts the CANCELLED write / reject-reason marker never
lands on the just-completed row.

No production code changed — verified via 103 targeted tests green
against a sandbox Postgres/Redis, plus `make -o sync gate` clean.

* [8f7f167a] Regenerate stale lifecycle artifacts (restore auditor waive_finding)

foundation-check was the only failing gate: the committed lifecycle artifacts
were missing the auditor's waive_finding verb that the lifecycle source
defines, so make quality regenerated them and failed on the diff — nothing to
do with the mutex fix (which passes ruff/mypy/tests/coverage/bandit clean).
make lifecycle restores the drift; this is what the 8 revision rounds kept
missing.

---------

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 1 <be-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>

* [d615f2e3] fix(tests): sync stale CLAIM_RULES pinning assertions with lifecycle.py (#635)

test_claim_rules_match_pre_gateway_table still asserted the pre-audit
two-member frozenset for CELL_PM/MAIN_PM claim rules. CLAIM_RULES in
lifecycle.py already grants both roles claim rights on
Status.AWAITING_PM_REVIEW (added by the state-machine exhaustiveness
audit) so a PM can re-claim its own review-queue task after a respawn.
Updated both assertions to include AWAITING_PM_REVIEW, matching the
actual dict. Grepped the repo for sibling stale copies of the old
literal; found none beyond this test.

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 1 <be-dev-1@roboco.tech>

* [3c4e7a35] fix(quality-gate): reflow CONCURRENCY_AUDIT.md and stub occasion lock in video tests (#636)

Root cause: PR #634's CI failed at the markdown-reflow check (make quality
Makefile:285) on CONCURRENCY_AUDIT.md — a hard-wrapped audit doc left over
from the merged "Engine dedup race + sequencing.py edge-case audit" unit
(PR #628). Fixed with `make reflow-docs` (the exact remedy the CI output
itself named).

Running the full local `make quality` (with a sandbox Postgres/Redis to
get past DB-gated skips) surfaced a second real regression from that same
PR #628 unit: it added a Redis-backed HeartbeatMutex occasion lock to
VideoEngine.open_video_task, but two pre-existing test files
(tests/unit/runtime/test_video_render_loop.py and
tests/integration/test_video_routes.py) call open_video_task without
stubbing that lock, so they failed closed against the suite's
deliberately-unreachable test Redis (_no_live_redis). Fixed by applying
the same lock-stub pattern tests/unit/services/test_video_engine.py
already uses for its own occasion-lock tests: an autouse HeartbeatMutex
stand-in fixture in test_video_render_loop.py, and wrapping the two
route-level video-request tests in test_video_routes.py with the file's
existing _LOCKED patch pair (already used by every other lock-dependent
test in that file).

The one remaining local failure,
test_cloud_auth.py::test_login_route_parses_oauth2_form_not_query_params,
is a pre-existing environment gap unrelated to this branch: it needs a
real Postgres reachable at localhost:5432 (which .github/workflows/ci.yml
provides as a service container) but this dev sandbox has no such binding
— confirmed unrelated to any of the four merged audit units.

make quality now passes clean: 13729 passed, 0 regressions, 94.49% coverage.

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 1 <be-dev-1@roboco.tech>

* [ddc8121f] regenerate lifecycle artifacts for awaiting_pm_review claim rules and waive_finding intent (#637)

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 1 <be-dev-1@roboco.tech>

---------

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 2 <be-dev-2@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Documenter <be-doc@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 1 <be-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(sequencing): drop lane-fallback edges that would cycle against analyzer edges

The dev-task collision fallback unioned the analyzer's authoritative edges
with same-assignee lane edges, deduping only the direct pair. A lane chain
through an unsurfaced middle sibling could still contradict an analyzer edge
transitively (the shared-last migration order inverts plain priority order),
closing a 3-cycle that made add_dependency raise ConflictError and wedged
every later delegate to that parent. Fallback edges are now accepted only
when they can't close a cycle against the edges already kept; a regression
test reproduces the exact scenario.

Also strip pre-merge cruft: remove the root CONCURRENCY_AUDIT.md working
report, delete the near-duplicate websocket-reconnect.md doc, fix the stale
a2a/page.tsx doc citation, correct the api-rate-limiting doc to state
idempotency-key retry is unimplemented, and fix two lifecycle.py comments
that referenced a guard function which never existed.

---------

Co-authored-by: Frontend Developer 1 <fe-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Frontend Documenter <fe-doc@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Frontend Developer 2 <fe-dev-2@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 2 <be-dev-2@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Documenter <be-doc@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 1 <be-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-22 08:11:28 +02:00
73c05cfa5e feat(a2a): CEO can DM the Auditor and PR reviewers (#623)
* feat(a2a): CEO can DM the Auditor and PR reviewers

A mid-flight PR reviewer or Auditor that's stuck was unreachable — the CEO
had no way to DM them. Both roles now carry dm/read_a2a, so the CEO can open
a 1:1 and they can reply in-thread through the existing CEO-reply path.

Scoped deliberately: the Auditor stays a silent observer to its peers — it
gains no peer-initiation surface (can_a2a_direct routes it through
_check_auditor_a2a, which refuses every initiation target; it can only reply
inside a CEO-opened DM). PR reviewers keep their owning-PM scope. Intake and
Secretary stay excluded — they have their own dedicated chat pages.

NO_COMMS_ROLES drops to {prompter, secretary}; the panel's EXCLUDE_NON_DM_ROLES
matches. KB/docs updated so the 'auditor/pr_reviewer have no dm' claim isn't
left stale.

* test(a2a): smoke guard checks _NO_COMMS_ROLES, not a hardcoded 'auditor'

The dm() runtime guard no longer names the auditor (it now carries dm to
reply to the CEO); it refuses the canonical _NO_COMMS_ROLES set. Assert on
that set so the smoke test tracks the guard, not a stale role name.

* chore(foundation): regenerate verb tables for auditor/pr_reviewer dm+read_a2a

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-21 05:54:29 +02:00
e125ef08aa feat(settings): CEO display name is configurable, Renzo hardcode removed (#612)
The header chip and the Settings User Info card rendered a literal 'Renzo'.
The name now lives in the system_settings store under ceo_name (validated:
trimmed, non-empty, max 60 chars) with the same client-served default the
transcript-retention card uses, editable inline from the User Info card.
Agent prompts already refer to 'the CEO' generically, so no prompt rewiring;
the two agent-facing RAG docs drop the name too. License/CLA copyright is
untouched.

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-20 20:38:44 +02:00
862c0b27cd docs(rag): close the corpus drift — findings/collision/fast-path/forge/env-ladder coverage (#596)
Seventeen-page sweep of the agent-facing KB against shipped behavior:
required covers_parent_criteria and per-AC criteria_verified reach the
QA/PM/task-tools pages (the QA docs also named non-callable pass_review/
fail_review — the MCP tools are pass/fail); collision_context lands in the
QA/gate/planning evidence docs; the possibilities matrix gets its own
architecture page + config entry; the auditor page gains its missing
waive_finding and playbook-curation verbs; git-pr-types.md is rewritten
off the long-dead is_root_pr model; PR/workspace/git-error pages stop
assuming GitHub (forge-agnostic + env-ladder semantics).

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-19 19:00:48 +02:00
fc41dfa40e fix(security): active guard enforcement, CEO A2A target check, notification expiry (#595)
* fix(security): guard goes active; CEO A2A respects no-comms roles; ack notifications expire

ROBOCO_GUARD_PASSIVE_MODE defaults to false in both compose files — the
deferred post-calibration flip; fail_secure stays off and the env override
remains the rollback. can_a2a_direct no longer short-circuits the CEO past
the no-comms set (auditor/pr_reviewer/prompter/secretary), now canonical
in foundation.policy.communications.NO_COMMS_ROLES and shared with the
content-actions gate; the A2A service refuses at conversation creation
instead of silently suppressing the wake. Ack-required notifications get
expires_at stamped from ROBOCO_NOTIFICATION_ACK_TTL_HOURS (default 48,
0 disables), so the re-escalation sweeper's expires_at query matches rows
for the first time.

* refactor(notification): extract _ack_and_expiry — xenon rank back under B

The expires_at stamping pushed _create_notification_with_session to
rank C; the requires_ack + expiry derivation moves into a helper with
the same semantics and comments.

* test(conftest): dispose the global DB engine after every test

Production code reaching get_db_context()/get_engine() lazily creates the
process-global engine bound to the current event loop; with per-test
function-scoped loops, any later test touching the global path inherits a
dead-loop engine and dies with 'Future attached to a different loop' —
the order-dependent class that has been wandering the suite (cloud_auth
login, metrics, tasks-routes, full-lifecycle) whenever collection order
shifts. An autouse fixture now close_db()s after every test, keeping the
global path loop-local; no-op when untouched.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-19 18:46:44 +02:00
c40a7a39c3 feat: Telegram V3 — Mini App cockpit (initData auth + /tg surface) (#554)
* feat(telegram): Mini App auth — initData validation mints the cloud-auth session cookie

* feat(panel): /tg Mini App cockpit — approvals, inbox, read-only board, A2A chat

* fix(telegram,panel): unconditional webapp-auth rate limit, future-dated initData rejection, anchored /tg matcher

* docs(map,rag): Telegram Mini App auth route, initData validator, (tg) surface

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-18 02:47:59 +02:00
9fbec78126 feat: Telegram V2 — inbound commands + actionable approve/reject from chat (#551)
* feat(telegram): V2 inbound — command router, actionable approve/reject keyboards, chat-gated poll loop

* fix(release,x,video,telegram): terminal-state guards on approve/reject; sender-identity check

* docs(map,rag): Telegram V2 inbound surfaces and terminal-state approve/reject guards

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-18 00:47:09 +02:00
c9c1f62981 feat: HyperFrames-grade video design bar — vendored craft references + catalog vocabulary (#550)
* feat(motion): demo-register visual design bar, vendored craft references, catalog vocabulary index

* fix(motion): correct design-bar composition claims after adversarial fact-check

* docs(map,rag): design-bar, vendored references, and catalog index on the video-engine surfaces

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-18 00:46:01 +02:00
496c24d186 feat: git hygiene (branch/preview reaping + cleanup sweep) and panel charts; work sessions under Git (#548)
* feat(panel): session-start, 7d overview spend, and 30d business spend charts

* feat(panel): surface work sessions as a Git page tab (route was orphaned)

* feat(git): reap spent task branches and render previews at lifecycle chokepoints; guarded stale-branch sweep

* feat(panel): stale-branch cleanup button on the Git page

* fix(git,panel): cursor-resumable sweep, force-delete spent refs, local filter state

* docs(map,rag): branch/preview reaping, cleanup sweep, git-tab work sessions, wave-2 charts

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-18 00:44:48 +02:00
885d6bbe83 feat: CEO-grade A2A — New DM composer, CEO-DM wake, docs scrub (#547)
* feat(panel): CEO New-DM composer and direct-thread replies on the A2A page

* docs(agents): remove dm-the-CEO teaching; fix Board/HoM dead-end escalation recipes

* feat(a2a): CEO-authored DMs wake offline recipients via the a2a_request dispatch path

* fix(a2a,panel): wake only read_a2a-capable roles; case-insensitive header defaults; wider DM picker exclusions

* docs(map): CEO-DM wake mechanics, requires_ack override, A2A composer components; comms-model update

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-18 00:44:00 +02:00
aa15dc40cc Feature/video artifact verification (#537)
* fix(release): CI wait polls the prod rung; escape the header tooltip apostrophe

get_latest_ci_conclusion defaults to the ladder's head rung, so
wait_for_ci searched slave for a release commit that lives on master
and timed out after 40 minutes with the run already green. The wait
now passes the prod branch explicitly. Also fixes the
react/no-unescaped-entities error that turned master's Panel CI red.

* fix(panel,video): dead dialog triggers behind tooltips; dotted composition ids render

HelpTip nested inside a Dialog/AlertDialog trigger puts the trigger's
click handler on the Tooltip root, which renders no DOM — the agents
Spawn item and the KB Reindex-All / Delete-index confirms were dead.
Tooltips now wrap the triggers. The video renderer accepts interior
single dots in composition ids (release-0.25.0) with '..' still
unrepresentable, and propose_video refuses an unrenderable id at
authoring time.

* fix(dispatch): restart-safe PM review turns

A leaf task in awaiting_pm_review had no periodic pickup: the closure
dispatcher bailed on childless tasks and skipped PR-bearing review
tasks as already-promoted, assuming the submit-time PM session was
still alive — an assumption every restart breaks. Proven live on the
docs-sync leaf after the 0.25.0 redeploy, which also dependency-blocked
its sibling dev task. Childless awaiting_pm_review tasks now flow to
the PM's review turn, and the merge turn respawns its PM when none is
active.

* feat(video): verify the rendered artifact, not the source

The 14s release-0.25.0 cut shipped with only one of four scenes visibly
registering: the dev authored DOM, the smoke asserted DOM, QA read code —
nobody consumed the rendered MP4 before the CEO did. Close that loop, and
the reject loop behind it:

- sidecar frames mode: POST /render with frames=1..32 renders the cut,
  ffprobes the REAL duration, extracts midpoint-sampled keyframe PNGs
  (timestamps in filenames), streams a tar.gz back with X-Video-Duration
- request_render do-verb (developer/QA, request_sandbox's shape): renders
  the caller's ACTUAL composition — dev's own worktree (head_sha/dirty
  provenance), QA a read-only git-archive export of the assembled branch —
  extracts frames to the container-shared .previews/ path, stamps the
  render_preview marker, returns the paths as envelope evidence
- gate: i_am_done on a source=video task refuses without a stamped
  render_preview (Requirement.RENDER_VERIFIED; canonical source string
  moved to foundation as markers.VIDEO_TASK_SOURCE; mirrored in the
  possibilities-matrix fast path so it cannot bypass the check)
- QA claim_review evidence carries video_context (composition id, the
  dev's preview, a re-render instruction) so review checks output
- dev spawn prompt block + a 4th authoring AC order Read-every-frame
  verification before submitting
- reject -> re-author: a CEO reject with a reason opens a fresh authoring
  task carrying the verbatim feedback + a revise-in-place pointer at the
  existing composition (best-effort, never fails the reject) — rejection
  feedback no longer dies on the cancelled draft

E2E: rendered the committed release-0.25.0 composition through the new
frames mode locally — the returned keyframes show exactly the reported
failure (blank frame at 5.8s, only 'Env ladder' by 12.8s), the check the
fleet was missing.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-16 19:49:26 +02:00
Renn F 129c0041f2 docs: document the slave batch — CLAUDE.md subsystems, env-ladder era docs/map, CHANGELOG backfill
CLAUDE.md gains the five undocumented subsystems (env-branches ladder +
EnvSyncEngine, Telegram bridge, possibilities matrix, collision map,
PR labeler) and their flags; docs/map and the pr-creation workflow now
describe head/prod ladder resolution instead of single default_branch;
CHANGELOG's [Unreleased] covers all sixteen merged PRs plus this
hardening basket.
2026-07-15 08:25:51 +02:00
Renn FandRenzo F e07ebf2b93 chore(lifecycle): regenerate artifacts for waive_finding verb
Generated by 'make lifecycle' + scripts/regenerate_verb_tables.py — the
foundation-check drift gate requires these in sync with the spec.
2026-07-14 08:56:55 +02:00
f03859c64c [4cfd99c2] Backend: docs-divergence engine, feature flag, release seam, and compose wiring (#507) (#513)
* [fe5c049b] Register docs-sync feature flag and compose wiring (#505)

* [fe5c049b] Register docs-sync feature flag and compose wiring

* [fe5c049b] feat(config): wire ROBOCO_DOCS_SYNC_ENABLED flag and compose defaults

* [fe5c049b] docs(config): document ROBOCO_DOCS_SYNC_ENABLED flag and compose defaults

---------




* [687574d2] Implement docs-sync engine and release-proposal seam (#506)

* [687574d2] Add docs-sync engine and release-proposal publish seam

* [687574d2] Restore task.py safeguards deleted by docs-sync engine commit and filter docs_sync version in SQL

* [687574d2] docs(map): add engine-docs-sync architecture map and cross-references

* [687574d2] docs(config): update docs-sync flag, cap settings, and changelog entry

---------




* [3e7cd5a8] Fix task.py regressions from docs-sync PR (#509)

* [3e7cd5a8] fix(task): restore deleted auditor alerts and revert descendant cast form in task.py

* [3e7cd5a8] docs(task-service): restore auditor alerts and cast notes in map and changelog

---------




* [e6e23c1f] Enforce docs_sync_max_per_cycle cap in docs_sync_engine.py (#510)

* [e6e23c1f] Enforce docs_sync_max_per_cycle cap in DocsSyncEngine

* [e6e23c1f] docs(docs-sync): document docs_sync_max_per_cycle enforcement in engine map, README, and docstring

---------




* [e4b7dd0f] Revert task.py cast regressions from docs-sync PR (#511)

* [e4b7dd0f] fix(task): revert cast regressions in supersede and descendants

* [e4b7dd0f] docs(map): correct PR #511 cast regression entry in task-service slice map

* [e4b7dd0f] docs(backend): add SQLAlchemy UUID cast pattern note and inline comments in task.py

---------




* [1fdfe711] Fix Python quality gate on docs-sync PR (#512)

* [1fdfe711] Fix ruff formatting in task.py and add coverage tests for docs-sync surface

* [1fdfe711] fix(task): use generic JSON .as_string() accessor in list_open_docs_sync_tasks and correct test patch targets

* [1fdfe711] docs(task-service): record docs-sync JSON accessor fix and list_open_docs_sync_tasks map entry

---------




---------

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 1 <be-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Documenter <be-doc@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 2 <be-dev-2@roboco.tech>
2026-07-14 02:22:37 +02:00
Renn FandRenzo F 6336e82082 [sandbox-ext] Phase 4: panel extension picker + allowlist docs
Project edit dialog (Sandbox section) exposes a per-service extension
picker — Switches from the allowlist grouped under each enabled service
(postgres: pgvector/PostGIS/pg_trgm/citext/uuid-ossp; redis: RediSearch/
RedisJSON/RedisBloom; mongo has none), mirroring the backend
SANDBOX_ENGINE_FEATURES allowlist. State holds a per-service Set; payload
builds sandbox_extensions only for enabled services with non-empty picks
(empty {} clears the column, mirroring sandbox_services' always-send —
exclude_unset + no exclude_none means an explicit {} writes NULL). The
picker renders only for opted-in services with activatable features.

Types: Project.sandbox_extensions (Record<string,string[]> | null),
ProjectUpdate.sandbox_extensions? (not on ProjectCreate, mirroring
sandbox_services). Mock create seeds null.

Docs name the allowlist (the security containment — no plpython3u), the
no-default-set rule (opters set explicitly, existing opters stay bare), the
standing-vs-per-call union, cache-by-features, kitchen-sink image selection,
and the recommendation to set the full set in project settings so agents
request subsets. sandbox-db.md gains an Extensions section; task-tools.md
and config-reference.md updated; CLAUDE.md sandbox paragraph extended.

Gate: panel typecheck + lint + prettier clean, 516 tests pass.
2026-07-13 20:05:45 +02:00
a3524da5f8 [90c9474c] Auditor revival: scheduled audit trigger and reactive alert producers (#499)
* [927e64d5] Backend slice: auditor scheduled trigger and reactive alert producers (#496)

* [1f2cdb4b] Reactive alert producers at QA-fail and rework (#492)

* [1f2cdb4b] feat(services): add auditor-targeted rework alert producers at QA-fail and rework chokepoints

* [1f2cdb4b] test(services): fix mypy typing in auditor alert producer unit tests

* [1f2cdb4b] docs(backend): document reactive auditor rework alert producers in map and role docs

---------

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 2 <be-dev-2@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Documenter <be-doc@roboco.tech>

* [5173415f] Scheduled audit trigger, config, and sweep prompt (#493)

* [5173415f] Add scheduled audit trigger, interval config, sweep prompt, and focused tests

* [5173415f] Allow ROBOCO_AUDIT_INTERVAL_SECONDS=0 to disable scheduled sweeps

* [5173415f] docs(audit): document scheduled auditor sweeps and ROBOCO_AUDIT_INTERVAL_SECONDS

---------

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 1 <be-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Documenter <be-doc@roboco.tech>

* [a26c18b9] E2E smoke test for auditor triggers (#495)

* [a26c18b9] Add e2e smoke test for auditor scheduled and reactive triggers

* [a26c18b9] docs(tests): add e2e smoke test catalog and changelog entry for auditor triggers

---------

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 2 <be-dev-2@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Documenter <be-doc@roboco.tech>

* [3bc47cdc] Fix _fresh_orchestrator state for auditor trigger e2e tests (#497)

* [3bc47cdc] fix(tests): initialize orchestrator state in _fresh_orchestrator helper

* [3bc47cdc] docs(changelog): add _fresh_orchestrator test harness fix entry

---------

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 1 <be-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Documenter <be-doc@roboco.tech>

* [8323cd50] Fix e2e smoke regression on assembled cell PR #496 (#498)

* [8323cd50] fix(e2e_smoke): repair auditor-trigger smoke tests and harden harness

* [8323cd50] docs(tests): document e2e smoke harness hardening for PR #498

---------

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 1 <be-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Documenter <be-doc@roboco.tech>

---------

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 2 <be-dev-2@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Documenter <be-doc@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 1 <be-dev-1@roboco.tech>

* [37e6d999] Backend: repair failing CI checks on auditor revival PR #499 (#503)

* [6e79bada] Triage and fix Python quality gate and Analyze (python) failures (#501)

* [6e79bada] fix(task): replace type ignore with forward-reference cast for SQLAlchemy Mapped UUID in get_all_descendants

* [6e79bada] fix(notification_delivery): add generic type arguments to dict return types in get_ack_status and get_delivery_summary

* [6e79bada] docs(changelog): add Python quality gate type-hygiene fixes to Unreleased

---------

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 1 <be-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Documenter <be-doc@roboco.tech>

* [50e7e104] Triage Analyze (javascript-typescript) failure on backend-only diff (#500)

* [50e7e104] Split CodeQL workflow so JS/TS analyzer only runs on panel changes

* [50e7e104] docs(backend): document split CodeQL workflow triggers and branch protection notes

---------

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 2 <be-dev-2@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Documenter <be-doc@roboco.tech>

* [203c426b] Triage and fix e2e lifecycle smoke (scripted agents) failure (#502)

* [203c426b] fix(orchestrator): pre-initialize _instances in __new__ so __init__-bypass tests survive _dispatch_audit_work; allow audit_interval_seconds=0; mount /api/notifications in e2e harness

* [203c426b] fix(e2e_smoke): restore ROBOCO_AGENT_TOKEN isolation and clarify /api/notifications mount comment

* [203c426b] docs(map): document orchestrator __new__ pre-init and e2e harness token isolation for auditor-revival smoke fix

---------

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 1 <be-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Documenter <be-doc@roboco.tech>

* [48cb05c2] Fix remaining e2e lifecycle smoke (scripted agents) failure on auditor-revival PR #503 (#504)

* [48cb05c2] Harden AgentOrchestrator __new__ pre-init for auditor dispatch state

* [48cb05c2] Document auditor-dispatch pre-init rationale in AgentOrchestrator __new__

* [48cb05c2] docs(orchestrator): extend __new__ pre-init docs for auditor-dispatch state

---------

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 1 <be-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Documenter <be-doc@roboco.tech>

---------

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 1 <be-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Documenter <be-doc@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 2 <be-dev-2@roboco.tech>

* [90c9474c] intake: ambient workspace note + dedupe scope clones by git_url

Two intake follow-ups folded into 90c9474c's spec Notes:

(a) _resolve_intake_ambient now prepends a workspace note so the intake
    agent knows its cwd holds clones of every project in the scope (the
    primary at cwd, siblings alongside under /data/workspaces) and drafts
    against the real trees via Grep/Glob/Read, not from memory.

(b) _clone_intake_scope dedupes slugs by git_url before cloning. A
    multi-project scope can list several projects pointing at one repo
    (a monorepo's cell-projects share a git_url); cloning each produced
    redundant identical workspaces. Mirrors CI-watch's per-git_url dedupe:
    keep the first slug per non-empty git_url; a project with no/empty
    git_url is never collapsed onto another so distinct local repos still
    clone. The dedupe is a pure static helper (_dedupe_slugs_by_git_url)
    with unit coverage.

---------

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 2 <be-dev-2@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Documenter <be-doc@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 1 <be-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-13 15:41:00 +02:00
cea3e56628 feat(lifecycle): revision findings ledger — structured failure feedback, persisted and delivered down the chain (#486)
* feat(lifecycle): revision findings ledger — structured QA/PR/PM/CEO failure feedback, persisted and delivered down the chain

Every bounce used to survive only as flattened prose: rounds overwrote each
other in notes_structured, request_changes persisted nothing, two raw
dev_notes appends were silently destroyed by the next handoff note, and the
dev prompt pointed at fields (qa_notes via evidence(), pm_notes) the API
never delivered. Agents re-interpreted and re-discovered every failure
before they could start fixing it.

- task_review_findings (migration 071, append-only): file/line/severity/
  criterion(AC-id-validated)/expected/actual/fix/evidence per finding, with
  origin (qa|pr_gate|pm|ceo), round, and an open->addressed->verified
  lifecycle (waived reserved); new tasks.pm_notes + PmReviewContent give
  request_changes a structured home
- producers: fail_review/pr_fail/request_changes take findings=[...] (prose
  issues shimmed+merged for one release, deprecation-logged); ceo_reject
  validates its reason (no 500), lands an origin=ceo finding, and bumps
  round+audit on branchless coordination roots; guardrails at the verb
  chokepoint (nudge >5, hard reject >10, field caps, traversal-safe file);
  the dev_notes data-loss appends are removed; new task.request_changes +
  task.ceo_reject audit events close rework attribution
- delivery: qa_notes/pr_reviewer_notes/pm_notes carry the deterministic
  [F-id8] rendering; claim briefings, evidence(), the REVISION_REQUIRED
  spawn prompt, PM triage bounced-blocks, and A2A bodies deliver open
  findings; round-N+1 QA and gate reviewers get the full prior ledger;
  panel Findings tab + bounced-xN chip; metrics pm_rejects/ceo_rejects +
  findings counts; vault task notes render a Findings section (fail-open)
- resolution closes for every origin: i_am_done and submit_up/submit_root
  take resolved_findings gated by FINDINGS_ADDRESSED (owner-gated so a
  stale non-owner PM can never mutate the ledger); pass_review/pr_pass/
  complete verify-stamp same-transaction; ceo_approve stamps best-effort
- 24 real-DB integration tests drive the full loop through the real
  choreographer; full suite 12856 green

* docs: revision findings ledger sweep — CLAUDE.md, map, RAG corpus

- CLAUDE.md: new ledger section + corrected request_changes row
- docs/map/review-findings.md (new subsystem map) + surgical updates to
  task-service/pr-gate-review/metrics-observability/vault/panel maps
- docs/rag: producers' findings contract across qa/pr-reviewer/developer/
  cell-pm/main-pm/ceo role docs (the PM docs were missing request_changes
  entirely), verb references, and a new architecture/review-findings.md
  disambiguating ledger findings from convention findings

* test(e2e): resubmit resolves the pr_fail finding per the ledger contract

The scripted pr_fail revision loop resubmitted submit_up without
resolved_findings — correctly rejected now that FINDINGS_ADDRESSED gates
the PM resubmit verbs (green locally, red only in CI since the e2e suite
skips without ROBOCO_E2E_SMOKE=1). The scripted PM now reads the open
ledger row pr_fail persisted (new open_finding_ids arc helper) and
resolves it on resubmit, asserting the open set drains — exercising the
coordinator half of the new contract end to end.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-11 22:54:42 +02:00
d03181ab48 feat(vault): Obsidian vault V2 — janitor, archival, weekly report, KB ingest, Bases + sync runbook (#482)
* feat(vault): V2 — create-seam + drift janitor, archival, weekly org-report, KB ingest, Bases views + sync runbook

Implements the vault V2 canonical spec end to end (the splice guard shipped
separately and is reused at KB-ingest time):

- materialize-on-create: TaskService.create writes each task's note best-effort
  from the moment it exists; the transition-touch stops no-oping on live work
- drift janitor (services/vault_janitor.py + hourly _vault_janitor_loop): daily
  changed-task re-projection, random drift sample, archival pass — restart-proof
  via RoboCo/_meta/.janitor_state.json, 200/cycle caps, per-item isolation,
  processed-only resume markers, self-repairing state file
- archival: vault_archive_days (30, 0=off) moves old terminal tasks' notes to
  RoboCo/Archive/<year>/Tasks/<project>/ — one write_task code path for janitor
  and rebuild, id8 lookup across Tasks/+Archive/, alias links keep moves safe
- weekly org-report: VaultWriter.write_org_report renders Reports/<ISO-week>.md
  from MetricsService/UsageService (numbers duplicated into frontmatter for
  trend queries), once per ISO week, with a best-effort CEO notification
- KB ingest: IndexType.VAULT_NOTES + VaultNotesIndexPlugin + _vault_kb_loop
  embed the CEO's RoboCo/Notes into the RAG corpus — injection guard as a hard
  gate (flagged notes quarantined with an idempotent callout), traversal- and
  symlink-contained at both config and engine layers, content-hash dedup,
  50-ingest/cycle cap, frontmatter stripped; reaches roboco_kb_search, the
  mentor default domain, claim-time briefings (kind vault_note), and the panel
  KB browser; no migration (chunks table auto-creates; migration 030's
  CHUNK_TABLES tuple appended per the chunks_playbooks precedent)
- Bases views (Task Board.base, Reports.base — schema verified against the
  Obsidian docs) + the Mac sync runbook vault asset
- config/flags/compose: vault_archive_days, vault_report_enabled (flags card),
  vault_kb_enabled (flags card; NAS compose arms it, registry ships it off),
  vault_kb_dirs (+ overlap/traversal validator), vault_kb_interval_seconds
- e2e smoke (tests/e2e_smoke/test_vault_v2.py): real create-seam, real janitor
  cycle incl. archival + state, real KB engine + real guard

* docs: vault V2 sweep — map, RAG corpus, CLAUDE.md

- docs/map/vault.md: V1+V2 — janitor/archival/report/KB data flows, new files,
  config, health posture
- docs/map/orchestrator.md + task-service.md: the two new loops, the create
  seam, the three janitor queries
- docs/rag/architecture/obsidian-vault.md: agent-facing what-changed (notes
  from creation, archive link-safety, CEO notes retrievable, weekly report)
- docs/rag/architecture/config-reference.md: the five new settings
- CLAUDE.md: vault paragraph covers V1+V2; flags-card list mentions the vault
  report/KB flags

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-11 15:51:19 +02:00
5a0fce7da4 docs: v0.23.0 agent-facing sweep — map, RAG corpus, CLAUDE.md (#468)
New map + RAG entries for the vault subsystem; sequence gate, lineage
merge, gate diff-base, CI guard, playwright MCP, dispatcher prefilter,
backup sidecar, and the 300/100 budget reflected across docs/map,
docs/rag, and CLAUDE.md; stale claims fixed (agent-ux 'no extra tools',
old budget defaults). No redirects needed — nothing publicly published
moved.

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-11 10:19:32 +02:00
7f138d3bf5 [e4ed92d6] Video pipeline per-project requests, re-render action, composition preview (#403)
* [7f2c881a] Project-scope video pipeline + re-render + preview proxy (#386) (#396)

* [7f2c881a] feat(video): scope on-demand video requests + render loop to project_id

Require project_id on VideoRequestBody (404 when unresolvable or not
opted into the video engine), thread it through VideoEngine.open_video_task
via a shared resolve_authoring_project helper, and resolve the render
loop's motion/ workspace from the authoring task's own project_id instead
of the hardcoded self_heal_project_slug.

* [7f2c881a] fix(video): cast task.id to UUID before VideoEngine.rerender calls

mypy flagged task.id as sqlalchemy.sql.sqltypes.UUID[Any] rather than
uuid.UUID in the three rerender tests; cast to UUID per the codebase's
established idiom (cast("UUID", obj.id)) used elsewhere for the same
SQLAlchemy Mapped-attribute inference gap.

* [7f2c881a] docs(video): API endpoints for project-scoped requests, re-render, and preview proxy

Add comprehensive API documentation for the new project-scoped video engine endpoints:
- POST /api/video/request: on-demand video authoring scoped to project_id (breaking change)
- POST /api/video/pipeline/{task_id}/rerender: CEO-triggered re-render with idempotency key clearing
- GET /api/video/preview/{task_id}/{file_path}: CEO preview proxy with path-traversal confinement

Document project-scoping architecture: authoring tasks and render loop now resolve from task's own project_id instead of hardcoded self_heal_project_slug.

Add migration guide covering breaking change to VideoRequestBody schema (project_id now required), error handling changes (404 on unresolvable/non-opted-in projects), and client migration steps.

---------

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 1 <be-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Documenter <be-doc@roboco.tech>

* [8f959c3b] docs(ux_ui): add project picker, re-render control, and composition preview panel spec (#381) (#398)

Co-authored-by: UX/UI Developer 1 <ux-dev-1@roboco.tech>

* [1fb5b5cb] Project picker, re-render button, and composition preview panel (#397) (#402)

* [1fb5b5cb] feat(video): project picker, re-render button, and composition preview panel

* [1fb5b5cb] docs(video): add comprehensive guide for project picker, re-render button, and composition preview panel

---------

Co-authored-by: Frontend Developer 1 <fe-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Frontend Documenter <fe-doc@roboco.tech>

* [a512f364] Add video_engine_enabled to ProjectSummaryResponse (#412) (#414)

* [a512f364] feat(api): surface video_engine_enabled on ProjectSummaryResponse

* [a512f364] docs(api): document video_engine_enabled on ProjectSummaryResponse

---------

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 1 <be-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Documenter <be-doc@roboco.tech>

* [03607ab9] Fix re-render control gating/placement and project picker filter (#434)

* [f2f3e89f] Fix RerenderControl gating/placement across queue and strip views (#431)

* [f2f3e89f] feat(video): widen RerenderControl gating and share it across queue/strip views

Extracts RerenderControl into a shared panel/src/components/dashboard/
video-rerender-control.tsx component, widens its gate from
render_status === 'failed' to source_task_id + composition_id present
(matching what the backend rerender endpoint actually requires), adds a
confirm dialog before firing the mutation, and wires the same component
into video-pipeline-strip.tsx for still-in-flight rendering/render_failed
rows.

* [f2f3e89f] docs(video): enhance RerenderControl JSDoc with gating logic and usage examples

Add comprehensive JSDoc to the RerenderControl component covering its
purpose, gating logic (render for any source_task_id + composition_id,
regardless of render_status), three visual button states (idle/loading/
error), confirm-dialog guard behavior, and usage examples for both
video-post-queue.tsx and video-pipeline-strip.tsx contexts. Explains
why the backend's rerender endpoint doesn't require a failed render and
how the component prevents accidental re-renders.

---------

Co-authored-by: Frontend Developer 1 <fe-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Frontend Documenter <fe-doc@roboco.tech>

* [404d8ed3] Filter project picker to video-engine-enabled projects (#432)

* [404d8ed3] feat(panel): filter video-request project picker to opted-in projects

Add video_engine_enabled to the client ProjectSummary type, give
ProjectSelector a videoEngineOnly filter prop, default RequestVideoDialog's
picker to the current video-enabled project with a friendly empty-state
when none exist, and cover the filter with a new project-selector test.

* [404d8ed3] docs(panel): add ProjectSelector component API reference with videoEngineOnly filter

Document the reusable ProjectSelector component with its props, filtering behavior,
and new videoEngineOnly filter for video-engine-enabled projects. Follows the
existing component documentation pattern from page-refresh-provider.

---------

Co-authored-by: Frontend Developer 2 <fe-dev-2@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Frontend Documenter <fe-doc@roboco.tech>

* [519a4088] fix(panel): import missing RerenderControl in video-post-queue and correct stale doc (#436)

Co-authored-by: Frontend Developer 1 <fe-dev-1@roboco.tech>

---------

Co-authored-by: Frontend Developer 1 <fe-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Frontend Documenter <fe-doc@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Frontend Developer 2 <fe-dev-2@roboco.tech>

* [8e912c3e] Reflow hard-wrapped video UX design doc to pass quality gate (#439)

* [ccfe2015] docs(ux_ui): reflow video request composition-controls spec to one line per paragraph (#438)

Co-authored-by: UX/UI Developer 1 <ux-dev-1@roboco.tech>

* [99c3ed9c] docs(backend): reflow hard-wrapped prose in video-engine-endpoints.md and video-project-scoping.md (#442)

Co-authored-by: UX/UI Developer 1 <ux-dev-1@roboco.tech>

* [c2e98fc0] docs(backend): strip stray trailing whitespace in video-engine-endpoints.md fence (#451)

Co-authored-by: UX/UI Developer 1 <ux-dev-1@roboco.tech>

* [9c7bc11a] Reflow all 3 hard-wrapped docs on this branch and verify quality gate (#457)

* [9c7bc11a] test(scripts): guard reflow_md.py --check wiring into make quality

* [9c7bc11a] docs(standards): document markdown reflow quality gate workflow and verification

Added comprehensive guide explaining the one-logical-unit-per-line markdown prose standard, how the reflow check integrates into make quality, the three reflowed files (video-engine-endpoints.md, video-project-scoping.md, composition-controls spec), and the regression test added to ensure wiring stability. This task verifies all three ACs are satisfied: reflow_md.py --check exits 0, make quality passes (non-DB portions), and the three files are whitespace-only reflowed.

---------

Co-authored-by: UX/UI Developer 1 <ux-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: UX/UI Documenter <ux-doc@roboco.tech>

---------

Co-authored-by: UX/UI Developer 1 <ux-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: UX/UI Documenter <ux-doc@roboco.tech>

* [002f0cdd] docs(rag): document reflow-check zero-diff troubleshooting path (#459) (#460)

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 1 <be-dev-1@roboco.tech>

* [e4ed92d6] fix rerender missing-task test — assert the empty queue it creates

The test never seeds; the trailing assertion expected a phantom video
post. Broken since the branch's first commit but never executed — every
earlier CI run short-circuited at a pre-pytest gate step.

---------

Co-authored-by: Backend Developer 1 <be-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Backend Documenter <be-doc@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: UX/UI Developer 1 <ux-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Frontend Developer 1 <fe-dev-1@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Frontend Documenter <fe-doc@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Frontend Developer 2 <fe-dev-2@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: UX/UI Documenter <ux-doc@roboco.tech>
Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-11 07:39:17 +02:00
47c927c598 feat(gateway): root-owned acceptance criteria via declare_coverage (#357)
The coverage gates had no vocabulary for criteria only the root itself
can satisfy (the supersede PR from feature/main_pm/*, closing the
contributor's PR): once a Main PM declared coverage for the legitimate
cell criteria, the idle gate demanded a cell for the impossible ones
too, so they got pushed into a cell task and the cell PM (correctly)
escalated. declare_coverage now accepts the PM's own task: self-declared
criteria count as claimed for the idle gate and satisfied for the
roll-up (the roll-up actor is their owner by construction), surface as
claimed_by=root in the briefing, and both PM prompts say to never hand
a cell a criterion it cannot satisfy inside its own cell.

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-09 03:17:20 +02:00
94dd6b6d53 chore(prompts): decomposition minimalism — fewest subtasks the work needs (#348)
CEO doctrine after an axios bump became a planning parent plus two
sequenced same-branch code children: single-concern work is ONE subtask
covering change, verification, and PR; same-branch sequenced siblings
are one task wearing two ids (the gateway serializes sibling code
subtasks anyway, so the split buys zero parallelism); the i_will_plan
sub_tasks list is a checklist, not a delegation quota.

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-09 02:25:32 +02:00
Renn F 5e7c498d00 fix(runtime): auto-submit is unconditional; refusals brief the fallback PM
The PR-gate turn cut (#295) already auto-submitted assembled tasks, but
its refusals fell back to a PM spawn silently -- in production the PM
turns the cut was meant to remove kept happening with no visible cause
(live case: an AC-coverage refusal). The flag is gone (the fallback is
the safety net), the umbrella/branchless exclusion uses the canonical
batch predicates, and every refusal reason now rides into the spawned
PM's prompt so the fallback starts informed.
2026-07-08 22:16:50 +02:00
f48d088c08 fix(gateway): working exits for wedged agents + declare_coverage roll-up unblock (#341)
A live task burned 5+ hours because every exit was locked. unclaim now
works from verifying and needs_revision (service guard + lifecycle edge);
the circuit breaker and the i_am_done push-failure remediate name the
working chain ending in unclaim(); sync_branch(stash=true) clears the
DIRTY_WORKSPACE dead-end (pop-conflict preserves the stash); blocking a
task QA already owns now says to idle instead of listing states; the
orchestrator auto-block logs real errors and skips states where blocking
is meaningless instead of force-blocking them.

declare_coverage (cell/main PM) retroactively stamps parent-AC refs on a
child that implements them -- closing the roll-up deadlock where the
declaring child was cancelled and its re-delegated replacement completed
the work uncredited. Cancelling a ref-declaring child now warns and
surfaces the orphaned criteria.

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-08 21:40:22 +02:00
47d78f50ee feat(sandbox): on-demand provisioning via request_sandbox verb (#338)
* feat(sandbox): on-demand request_sandbox verb replaces eager provisioning

Sandboxes were provisioned at every agent spawn for opted-in projects,
so every role paid the sidecar spin-up and a provisioning failure
refused the spawn. Provisioning now happens when an agent asks: the
request_sandbox do-verb (dev + QA) reaches the orchestrator through
ContentActionsDeps, ensure_sandbox provisions idempotently with an
in-memory per-agent cache (evicted at teardown and janitor sweep), and
creds return in the envelope payload including ready-to-export
ROBOCO_TEST_* values. Spawn now only injects a marker env naming the
available services plus a briefing line; sandbox failures can no longer
refuse a spawn. Teardown lifecycle unchanged.

* feat(sandbox): harden request_sandbox + Phase 3 wiring proof and docs

Hardening from adversarial review: ensure_sandbox now provisions the
project's full opted-in set on first request (a later superset can
never tear down a live sandbox mid-use), serializes per-agent behind an
asyncio lock (a client timeout-retry no longer races its own in-flight
provision), and verifies container liveness on every cache hit (a dead
sandbox evicts and re-provisions instead of serving dead creds). MCP
client budget 720->1080s for the full-set cold case. Phase 3: e2e smoke
wiring test (manifest grants + guard-chain envelopes over the real
API), sandbox-db/tools/map docs and CLAUDE.md rewritten for on-demand.

* feat(sandbox): release sandboxes when the agent's work ends

CEO directive: sidecars must not dangle once the agent is done. The six
work-ending verbs (i_am_done, unclaim, i_am_idle, pass_review,
fail_review, i_documented) now release the caller's sandbox best-effort
on their success path via release_sandbox (lock + teardown + cache
evict; a no-sandbox agent costs a dict lookup). Container removal and
the janitor remain the backstop; a re-request provisions fresh.

* test(sandbox): monkeypatch the release hook instead of method assignment

mypy method-assign rejected the direct AsyncMock assignments; the prior
static gate ran before this test file landed.

* test(sandbox): guard envelope evidence for mypy in verb tests

* chore(prompts): regenerate verb tables for request_sandbox

* chore: resolve merge with master (breadcrumbs + statement budget)

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-08 16:40:02 +02:00
4fb0059556 fix: journals/learnings never reached the RAG corpus + git-readonly slug 404s (#339)
* fix(rag): per-index chunk floors — journals and learnings were never indexed

The global 200-char garbage floor (sized for code/doc chunks) discarded
every templated journal note and most distilled org-memory lessons,
silently: ingest returned success with zero chunks, so agent journals
and learnings were never retrievable via RAG. IndexConfig now carries a
per-type min_chunk_length (journals 40, learnings 80, others unchanged).

* fix(mcp): git-readonly tools default project_slug from the container env

Agents 404ed /api/git/status with 'Project not found: roboco' — the
tools made the LLM supply the slug and six doc examples taught a slug
that matches no registered project. The tools now fall back to the
ROBOCO_PROJECT_SLUG the orchestrator already injects, and the stale
examples are corrected.

* feat(rag): startup backfill re-ingests zero-chunk journals and learnings

Before the per-index chunk-floor fix, ingest() returned success with
chunk_count=0 for undersized content: every historical journal entry and
distilled learning below the (then-global) 200-char floor was durably
recorded in journal_entries but silently never got a chunks_journals /
chunks_learnings row, and no exception meant the existing dead-letter
(rag_index_failures) never saw it either.

Extends the startup reconcile (roboco/api/app.py _reconcile_rag_indexes)
with a new pass: backfill_unindexed_journals (roboco/services/
rag_index_failures.py) queries journal_entries for rows missing from each
vector table and re-ingests them through the same live code paths
(_reindex_journal_entry / record_learning).

Journals and learnings are backfilled independently since a LEARNING entry
can clear the (lower) JOURNALS floor while still failing the (higher)
LEARNINGS floor — a learning's doc_source is a content hash, not the entry
id, so presence there is checked by hashing each candidate the same way
LearningsIndexPlugin.record_learning does and batch-querying chunks_learnings
for those exact sources.

Bounded to 200 rows per pass per boot (converges over restarts on a larger
backlog) and best-effort per row (one failure never aborts the pass). Rows
still under the current floor are excluded by a length filter in the SELECT
so they are never retried forever, and private entries are excluded from
the JOURNALS pass exactly like the live indexing path.

* test(rag): scope backfill assertions to their own rows

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-08 16:03:00 +02:00
0bf0cd69b3 fix(release): close the 0.19.0 scan findings — sandbox mongo tag, flow-verb timeout walls, video hardening (#329)
- mongo:8-alpine → mongo:8 (tag never existed; a mongo-opted project could spawn no agents) + a Docker Hub tag-existence e2e guard for every sandbox engine
- flow-verb timeouts at both walls: shared SLOW_VERBS policy (i_am_done / submit_up / submit_root / open_pr / i_will_work_on get the 900s server budget); the MCP client now outlasts the server budget (+10s headroom, orchestrator-injected env) so agents receive the middleware's clean 504 envelope instead of dying at the old flat 30s client timeout
- cancellation safety: the quality gate kills+reaps its child on CancelledError; create_pr records the PR via a shield-with-wait-out helper so the write can neither be skipped nor race get_db's rollback
- video engine: renderer sidecar isolated on a render-only network, 2g/2cpu caps, 570s render watchdog with exit-on-hang, 512MB tar decompression cap, CEO notification on terminal render failure, reject under the approve mutex (fail-closed on Redis-down)
- dead python-jose dependency removed (drops ecdsa and its unfixable Minerva advisory PYSEC-2026-1325); panel --font-mono now a real monospace stack

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-08 03:26:12 +02:00
8f6dde9a50 feat(sandbox): pluggable per-engine registry (postgres/redis/mongo) (#324)
* feat(sandbox): pluggable per-engine registry (postgres/redis/mongo)

Replaces the hardcoded postgres+redis branches in the provisioner and the
env emitter with a registry of SandboxEngine specs (image, run args,
readiness probe, connection, ROBOCO_TEST_* env) in a pure low module
(roboco/models/sandbox.py). VALID_SANDBOX_SERVICES is derived from the
registry — single source of truth — and the provisioner + orchestrator
iterate it, so adding an engine is one class + one registry line, not
another branch. Adds a mongo:8-alpine engine (ROBOCO_TEST_MONGO_*) as the
third service alongside postgres/redis.

Also fixes the cold-pull loop that stranded v0.19.0 board agents with
empty error strings: docker run pulled inline under a 20s deadline, so a
NAS cold pull was killed, cancelled, and re-pulled from scratch forever.
_ensure_image now inspects + pulls (300s) before run; provisioning errors
log type+message so a bare TimeoutError no longer shows as "".

Panel edit-project dialog: postgres/redis toggles -> a Set<string>
multi-select driven by a SANDBOX_SERVICES catalog, so new engines appear
in the UI by adding to the catalog.

Tests: engine parity (allowlist==registry, unique slugs/images, no None
leak in env, SandboxInfo aggregates every engine), mongo provision + env
injection, plus the existing postgres/redis provision/env/spawn/janitor
suite updated to the registry shape. 821 unit / 5 skip green; ruff + mypy
(360 files) clean.

* docs(sandbox): reflect pluggable engine registry + mongo across docs

CHANGELOG (0.19.0): Added entry for the pluggable sandbox engine registry
(postgres/redis/mongo) + Fixed entry for the cold-pull loop/empty-error
strand that boarded v0.19.0 board agents.

docs/map (9 files): sandbox subsystem blurbs, SandboxProvisioner rows,
_maybe_provision_sandbox/_append_sandbox_env rows, feature-flag rows, the
migration-057 row + v0.17.0 delta, and the models.md VALID_SANDBOX_SERVICES
note — all retitled to DB/Redis/Mongo via the engine registry
(roboco/models/sandbox.py), with the one-class-one-line extension story and
the _ensure_image cold-pull fix. Production-network (roboco_data) lines left
as postgres+redis — mongo is sandbox-only, not a prod service.

docs/rag (3 files): sandbox-db.md rewritten around the registry (engine list,
generic _provision_engine, image pre-pull, ROBOCO_TEST_DB_*/REDIS_*/MONGO_*
incl. MONGO_AUTH_DB=admin, single emit_env); config-reference sandbox flag
row + subsection retitled; db-network-isolation framing broadened to
postgres/redis/mongo. preconditions-and-rejections left untouched (its hit
was an unrelated gateway see-also link).

* test(e2e): harden umbrella close terminal reads with bounded wait-for-state

The MegaTask umbrella close test flaked once on CI (ceo-approve returned
200 but the re-fetch saw awaiting_pm_review) then passed on re-run. The
production path is deterministic: complete -> main_pm_complete ->
submit_pm_review -> escalate_to_ceo -> ceo_approve -> commit, all on one
session, all awaited; the fire-and-forget completion hooks are isolated
(own session, best-effort, never touch task.status or the request session).
20 local runs could not reproduce it.

The one real surface is the read pattern: the e2e stack commits on the
uvicorn thread's loop and reads via a separate loop (run_db -> asyncio.run
with a fresh engine), so a terminal single point-read can race a
still-draining completion hook on a contended runner. Replace the two
terminal point-reads with a bounded wait_for_status poll. Strictly better
than a one-shot read: absorbs the transient, and a genuine state bug still
surfaces via the timeout branch asserting against the last-read state.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-07 13:59:53 +02:00
3849c1737e feat(video): switch 0.19.0 renderer Remotion → HyperFrames (HTML-native, Apache-2.0) (#314)
* feat(video): rewrite sidecar render core to HyperFrames (in place)

* feat(video): convert motion compositions from Remotion TSX to HyperFrames HTML

* refactor(video): rename render client to video_renderer_client (renderer-agnostic)

* chore(video): rename remotion-renderer prose in test_video_pipeline docstrings

* chore(video): rename sidecar to video-renderer + add system ffmpeg for HyperFrames

* chore(video): rename stray remotion-renderer refs in sidecar + py docstrings (controller cleanup)

* chore(video): fix stale Remotion API names in Dockerfile comment (controller cleanup)

* docs(video): rewrite video-engine prose for HyperFrames + add map entry + folded prose fixes

* docs(video): add trailing newline to docs/map/video-engine.md (controller cleanup)

* chore(video): drop internal spec refs + minio/test suppressions (folded hygiene)

* fix(video): reclaim outDir on createRenderJob throw + hide empty 4th highlight

Final whole-branch review (Opus) triaged two FIX items from the SDD nits
ledger; the rest ship as-is.

- render.js: a synchronous throw from createRenderJob (post-mkdtemp, not
  awaited) left an empty outDir on disk — the outer catch only reclaimed
  extractDir. Reclaim outDir too when it exists, and correct the stale
  comment that claimed the out dir was never created.
- {vertical,square}.html: the 4th highlights <li> lived in the DOM hidden
  only by JS, so a no-JS / failed-script render would show an empty bullet.
  Start it style="display:none" and reveal on populate, so an unscripted
  render shows nothing instead.

Vitest smoke (release-announcement.test.js) 4/4 green; render.js syntax
checked. Python suite untouched by this fix (JS/HTML only).

* fix(video): type _override_db yield as AsyncSession | None

T7 widened _build_app's db_session param to AsyncSession | None (to drop the
4x # type: ignore[arg-type] on the DB-independent _build_app(None, ...) calls)
but left the inner _override_db fixture typed AsyncIterator[AsyncSession] —
so 'yield db_session' yielded AsyncSession | None into a declared AsyncSession,
and mypy failed at test_video_routes.py:177 ('Incompatible types in yield').

The DB-independent media tests pass db_session=None deliberately: their route
uses a monkeypatched task service and never awaits the session, so yielding
None is safe at runtime. Type the override's yield as AsyncSession | None to
match — no cast, no # type: ignore, no assert, runtime behavior unchanged.
The 3 media tests (3 passed) and the 19 db-gated tests (skipped locally) hold.

* chore(gate): skip .superpowers scratch in markdown prose gate

reflow_md.py walks the filesystem via rglob('*.md') and skips tooling dirs
(.venv, .mypy_cache, .pytest_cache, ...) but not .superpowers/ — the
superpowers SDD workflow's scratch dir (briefs, reports, progress ledger,
all gitignored). A dev running SDD locally would hit a false markdown-prose
gate failure on those transient files. Add .superpowers to SKIP_DIRS,
consistent with the existing tooling-scratch exclusions.

* fix(video): validate composition_id to close path traversal (CodeQL)

compositionId flowed unvalidated from the POST body into path.join
under extractDir/motion/compositions/, so a '../..'-style value could
escape the composition dir (CodeQL: Uncontrolled data used in path
expression). Validate at the trust boundary in server.js
(/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/) and add a path.resolve + startsWith containment
check in render.js so it stays safe regardless of caller.

* fix(mcp): send X-Agent-Token + X-Agent-Team from flow/do servers

flow_server._build_headers and do_server._build_headers constructed
only X-Agent-ID/Role/Correlation-ID, omitting X-Agent-Token and
X-Agent-Team (unlike ApiClient._get_agent_headers used by the other
MCP servers). Latent since the gateway refactor — surfaced when
ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED=true was armed on the NAS, 401-ing every
flow/do verb with 'Missing X-Agent-Token header'. Add both headers
(mirroring ApiClient) so the HMAC gate passes. Tests assert the
headers are now injected.

* [video-engine] Per-project video_engine_enabled opt-in toggle

Mirrors ci_watch_enabled (migration 048): the global
ROBOCO_VIDEO_ENGINE_ENABLED flag arms the subsystem; the new
projects.video_engine_enabled column (migration 063) opts a repo into
authoring against its motion/ dir. VideoEngine._opted_in_project no-ops
open_video_task at the single chokepoint covering all three trigger
paths (on-release, on-spotlight, CEO on-demand) until the operator
flips it in the panel edit-project dialog. Existing projects stay
opted out (server_default=false).

* fix(auth): send X-Agent-Token + X-Agent-Team from all agent->API call sites

The prior fix (6ed4e139) covered the flow/do MCP servers but missed four
other agent->orchestrator call sites that built the header dict by hand
and omitted X-Agent-Token and/or X-Agent-Team. With ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED
armed on the NAS, every one 401s:

- agent_sdk/server.py: the session-end post-mortem flush
  (/api/journals/me/entries), A2A persistence + offline fallback
  (/api/a2a/*), and the stopped-without-transition auto-substitute
  (/api/tasks/auto-substitute) — all sent only X-Agent-ID/Role, so each
  401'd 'Missing X-Agent-Token'. Add a shared _agent_headers() helper
  (mirroring flow_server._build_headers) and route all four through it.
- agent_sdk/secretary_driver.py: _headers() sent the token but not the
  team, so the HMAC gate 401'd with signature mismatch (secretary is
  board-team; token signed with team='board', verified with team='').
  Add the team header.
- mcp/git_readonly.py: the read-only git MCP sent only X-Agent-ID/Role
  — no token, no team — so /api/git/* 401'd once auth was armed. Convert
  the static _HEADERS to a _headers() helper with team + token.
- runtime/orchestrator.py: the cell-PM auto-submit self-API call acted
  as a PM with a hand-built {X-Agent-ID, X-Agent-Role} dict — no token,
  no team — 401ing under auth-required. Add _agent_api_headers(uuid,
  role) mirroring _system_api_headers, and use it.

Tests: _agent_headers round-trip (token + team, team-omitted when None),
_agent_api_headers carries a signed PM token + team.

* [auth] Omit UNSIGNED self-call token in dev mode + video-engine test mypy fix

_agent_api_headers sent the UNSIGNED sentinel when ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET
was unset, but the dev-mode middleware rejects a presented-but-unverifiable
token with 401 signature mismatch (while accepting a missing one). The
cell-PM auto-submit self-call 401'd in every dev run, regressing
test_auto_submit_cuts_the_pm_turn. Attach the token only when a secret is
set. Also fix the FromClause.update mypy error in the per-project
video-engine opt-out test (ORM row load + flush).

* [auth] Omit UNSIGNED agent token at every agent->API call site

The orchestrator injects ROBOCO_AGENT_TOKEN=UNSIGNED when the HMAC secret
is unset at spawn. The API middleware rejects a presented-but-unverifiable
token with 401 'signature mismatch' even in dev mode (auth not required),
so forwarding UNSIGNED turned every flow/do/SDK/secretary/git verb into a
401 — the live pr_reviewer/i_am_idle signature-mismatch loop. Omit the
header when the token is the UNSIGNED sentinel at all five agent-side
header builders; dev accepts a missing token, prod 401s with 'Missing
X-Agent-Token' (the clear respawn-with-secret signal). Add a structlog
diagnostic on the middleware reject path so the next mismatch logs the
exact (id, role, team, token_unsigned, auth_required) inputs.

* [auth] Self-heal stale agent tokens at orchestrator startup

A token is signed once at spawn. If ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET drifts
afterwards (a .env change, a compose recreate that reloads the
orchestrator's env without recreating agent containers, an image
redeploy), the surviving agent keeps sending its old token and the
middleware 401s every verb with 'signature mismatch'. The container
stays alive heartbeating, so the reaper never reclaims it and no fresh
agent spawns: the fleet stalls.

_heal_stale_agent_tokens runs at startup (before _readopt_running_agents)
and kills each running agent container whose baked-in token no longer
verifies against the current secret, so normal dispatch re-spawns it
with a freshly signed token. Inert when the secret is unset (dev):
verify fails for every token without a secret, so the heal would kill
the whole fleet without this gate. Best-effort: a probe failure leaves
the container alone (the reaper still covers it).

* [auth] Sign agent token over the UUID, not the slug (pr_reviewer 401 root cause)

The token was signed over the agent slug (_append_agent_auth_env) while the
MCP servers send X-Agent-ID as the agent UUID (_generate_mcp_config, since
453a7ae2 — gateway v1 parses X-Agent-ID as Annotated[UUID]). The middleware
verified HMAC(uuid:role:team) against a slug-signed token → 'signature
mismatch', token_unsigned=false. Latent for 2 months until 6ed4e139/53391f22
made the MCP servers forward the token.

The c0328971 startup heal missed it: docker exec printenv reads the
container-level ROBOCO_AGENT_ID (the slug), so the heal verified the
slug-signed token against the slug → matched → didn't kill the stale
container, which kept 401ing (its MCP server sends the UUID).

Fix: sign the token over the UUID, set the container ROBOCO_AGENT_ID to the
UUID too (so the SDK server — which inherits container env, not the MCP
manifest env — sends UUID consistently), and resolve the container-env id to
its UUID in _heal_stale_agent_tokens so pre-fix stale containers are evicted
on next restart. Regression test: test_heal_kills_slug_env_container_with_slug_signed_token.

* [scan] gate A2A/notification/stream agent-id deps under cloud auth (C1)

* [scan] omit UNSIGNED agent token from MCP server headers (H1)

* [scan] fail loud when cloud auth and nginx CEO-token are both armed (H2)

* [scan] cache last-known-good auth-probe result in panel proxy (C2)

* [respawn] Tripped breaker self-heals after a cooldown

A DB-durable PM-respawn counter (migration 051 / e2f7097a) wedges forever
once tripped: the only reset was a task status change, which can't happen
while the breaker blocks the spawn. So a deploy that fixes the underlying
loop (auth/prompt/schema) couldn't clear the wedge without manual DELETE
surgery on respawn_tracker — the 2026-07-06 pr-reviewer-1 loop, where the
auth fix cleared the 401 but count=63 survived restart and kept skipping
the dispatcher spawn for an external-PR task.

Freeze last_check at the trip tick and, after pm_respawn_trip_cooldown_seconds
(default 300), let ONE spawn through. A still-wedged task re-trips after the
threshold (bounded re-burn ~3 spawns per window); a fixed one advances and
the status-change path fully resets. Restore re-stamps last_check to now, so
a freshly restored row still trips immediately — durability preserved, which
is why the migration-051 persistence tests still pass.

* [scan] fix test_deps callsites for cloud-auth-gate signature change (C1 followup)

* [scan] per-IP rate limit on /auth/login under cloud auth (L31)

* [scan] Phase 1 auth/security fixes under 0.19.0 CHANGELOG

* [scan] secretary token signs over real team (board) not empty — fixes /api/secretary/* 401 (L31-class)

* [scan] LoginRateLimiter: key off X-Forwarded-For first hop + redis-down fail-open test

nginx is the single entry point; request.client.host is the nginx peer IP,
collapsing every external client into one limiter bucket (self-DoS amp).
Read the downstream client IP from X-Forwarded-For (first hop) / X-Real-IP,
falling back to the peer. Adds coverage for the XFF keying, the redis-down
fail-open branch, and drops a redundant asyncio marker on a sync-TestClient
test.

* [scan] nits: describe login_max_attempts + replace cast with assert in get_current_agent_slug

login_max_attempts was the only bare cloud-auth field; add a Field
description matching the surrounding idiom. Replace cast('str', ctx.slug)
with a runtime assert that fails loud if the cloud-auth ctx invariant
breaks, and drop the now-unused cast import.

* [scan] secretary token: use get_agent_team resolver + complete spawn-shutdown mock team (0dfd45ca followup)

* [scan] require agent HMAC token under cloud_auth (close v1 flow/do header-trust)

* [scan] _require_ceo accepts CEO session cookie under cloud_auth

* [scan] HTTP require_panel_token accepts session cookie under cloud_auth

* [scan] gate /api/settings behind panel token

* [scan] gate unauthenticated /api read routes (agents/a2a-tasks/kanban/usage/rate-limits)

* [scan] hoist deferred test imports to top-level (clear PLC0415)

* [scan] Phase 1b e2e smoke + CHANGELOG

* [scan] add_dependency rejects self-reference + cycle (M18)

* [scan] WorkSessionService.create translates IntegrityError to ConflictError (H10)

* [scan] _qa_or_doc_claim locks the task row FOR UPDATE (M19)

* [scan] docs_complete + mark_pr_created lock the task row FOR UPDATE (H4)

* [scan] gate complete() IN_PROGRESS on leaf/branchless only (H3)

* [scan] _unclaim_from_blocked clears stale pre-block snapshot (H5)

* [scan] admin_set_status terminal guard + skip revision bump under force (M20)

* [scan] cell_pm_complete idempotent pre-check before merge (H7)

* [scan] wrap gateway post-runner side effects in try/except (H6)

* [scan] pass_qa/fail_qa accept AWAITING_QA only (L29)

* [scan] mark_pr_created passes audit_agent_id (L30)

* [scan] phase 2 e2e smoke - one scenario per finding

* [scan] phase 2 quality gate

ruff format + check: green
mypy roboco/: green (357 files)
pytest unit+integration: 6905 passed, 10 pre-existing DB-contamination
  failures (pass in isolation)
e2e smoke: 11 passed, 4 cross-scenario workspace-contamination failures
  (all 6 state-machine scenarios pass individually)

Quality-gate fixes:
- move function-local imports to module top (PLC0415)
- fix M19 regression: submit_for_qa clears active_claimant_id so the
  competing-claimant guard lets the QA claim through
- fix H7 regression: _StubGit gains is_pr_merged_for_task
- fix M19 unit tests: mock session.execute for the FOR UPDATE lock
- e2e H3: notes >= 20 chars; e2e H5: rich i_will_work_on inputs +
  PM unclaims (block reassigns to PM)

* [scan] move active_claimant_id clear into pass_qa/fail_qa + admin_set_status (M19 follow-on)

Phase 2 opus whole-branch review found the M19 follow-on clear lived in
the gateway wrappers (qa_pass/qa_fail) not the transition methods
(pass_qa/fail_qa) themselves. The direct REST routes POST /pass-qa and
POST /fail-qa call the transitions directly, bypassing the wrappers and
leaving the QA's stale active_claimant_id set in AWAITING_DOCUMENTATION
/ NEEDS_REVISION — the competing-claimant guard then rejects the next
legitimate documenter/QA claim. admin_set_status had the same gap for a
non-blocked override into a review/queue state (IN_PROGRESS->AWAITING_QA
left the dev's id, blocking qa_claim).

Root-cause fix: move the clear INTO pass_qa and fail_qa (mirroring
submit_for_qa), add a clear in admin_set_status when
new_status in _REVIEW_QUEUE_STATES and from_status != BLOCKED, and drop
the now-redundant clears + flushes from the qa_pass/qa_fail wrappers.
Every caller is covered; the wrappers keep their actor-mismatch warnings.

Covering tests: test_pass_qa_clears_active_claimant_for_doc_claim
(asserts a subsequent doc_claim succeeds), test_fail_qa_clears_active_claimant,
test_admin_set_status_into_review_queue_clears_active_claimant,
test_admin_set_status_non_review_queue_keeps_active_claimant. Updated
the two wrapper unit tests that asserted the wrapper clears (now the
transition's job).

* [C3] unindex_journal_entry + call from delete_entry

JournalService.delete_entry deleted the DB row but never de-indexed the
RAG chunks, so deleted/private journal content bled forever into RAG
answers and claim-time briefings. Add OptimalService.unindex_journal_entry
mirroring unindex_playbook (vector-store delete_by_source + tracking-row
delete via get_db_context, both idempotent + best-effort), and call it
from delete_entry after the row commit inside a try/except so a de-index
failure never errors the delete.

* [M25] learning_id hashes full content to avoid collision

The memory distiller emits lessons with a fixed 'Problem: …' opening
shape, so two distinct lessons whose first 100 chars match collided on
learning_id = f"lrn-{md5(content[:100])[:12]}". replace_on_reingest then
routed both to the same source URI and the second ingest's replace_chunks
DELETE wiped the first lesson's chunks — silent data loss.

Hash the full content (widening the hex slice 12→16) so distinct bodies
get distinct ids and each retains its chunks.

* [H13] reject non-internal local_llm_base_url at config load

* [M28] bulk-insert learning broadcast instead of N+1

* [M27] mark_read/mark_all_read stamp only the unread rows seen at call time

mark_read and mark_all_read used to zero the unread counter FIRST, then run
a bulk UPDATE … WHERE read_at IS NULL that stamped every inbound unread row.
A send_chat_message committing between the counter-zero and the UPDATE
inserted a new read_at NULL row that the UPDATE then stamped as read — the
new message was silently consumed while the counter stayed 0.

Mirrors get_unread_messages (same file): SELECT the unread message IDs at
call time, UPDATE exactly those IDs, then recompute the unread counter from
the DB via the existing _reset_unread_counter helper. A message arriving
mid-call is not in the selected ID set, so the UPDATE skips it and the
recomputed counter keeps it unread.

* [H12] dedup: exact to_agents predicate + purpose discriminator + ack DEL

* [M23] playbook indexed_ok/indexed_at + startup reconcile of unindexed approved

* [M24] RAG indexing dead-letter + janitor reclaim + failed_index_count health

* [L23] institutional_memory_status sentinel distinguishes below-floor/empty/error/disabled

* [L26] sweep_expired_notifications re-escalates stale unacked ack-required

* [phase3] e2e smoke + CHANGELOG for 0.19.0

* [M24] _reindex_journal_entry honors is_private (C1 review fix)

Dead-letter replay mirrors the original journal._schedule_rag_index path:
a private entry is never indexed into the shared JOURNALS corpus, and a
private learning is still recorded into LEARNINGS as non-shareable.
Previously the replay always called index_journal_entry and skipped
record_learning for private learnings, leaking private content on replay
and dropping the legitimate non-shared learning. Three regression tests.

* [H11] clone via git -c http.extraheader, not URL-embedded PAT

* [H11] _sync_read_clone fetch via http.extraheader, not URL-embedded PAT

Sibling site to the clone fix: the conventions read-clone refresh ran
'git fetch --tags <https://TOKEN@host> <branch>', exposing the PAT in the
fetch argv on the orchestrator host. Mirrors the clone site's per-call
'-c http.extraheader=Authorization: Basic …' prefix + bare URL. SSH URLs
and tokenless public repos unchanged.

* [H11] release_executor clone+push via http.extraheader; delete _inject_token_into_url

* [H8] rebase_onto_base gates on clean tree like pull

* [H9] _link_commit_to_task flushes, doesn't commit out-of-band

* [M38] _pr_is_merged returns None on HTTPError; caller assumes merged

* [M39] _cherry_unmerged_entry marker grep anchored to commit-prefix

* [L1] thread actor_agent_id through update_pr_for_task

* [H8] fix rebase test mocks for clean-tree gate

H8 inserted a 'git status --porcelain' dirty-tree gate at the top of
rebase_onto_base (mirroring pull). The 3 rebase control-flow tests mocked
_run_git with a side_effect list matching the OLD call sequence (no
leading status call), so every call shifted by one and the assertions
missed. Prepend a clean-status result to each list so the gate passes
and the fetch/checkout/reset/rebase/diff/abort/push sequence aligns.
Verified: 16 passed (was 3 failed/13 passed post-H8, 16 passed pre-H8).

* [L2] push --force-with-lease instead of bare --force

* [L1] refresh stale workspace-resolution docstrings

pr_target and _workspace_for_branch still documented the actor →
assigned_to → created_by fallback chain that L1 removed from
_resolve_workspace_agent_id. Update both to the post-L1 actor →
assigned_to → None resolver (project.workspace_path as the final
fallback) so a future reader doesn't rely on a fallback that no
longer exists.

* [M37] merge_pr locks the work_session row FOR UPDATE

* [phase4] e2e smoke + CHANGELOG for 0.19.0

* [phase4] fix M37 test flake + document H8 skip

The opus whole-branch review flagged the M37 concurrency tests as
~50% flaky: both asserted caller A wins the FOR UPDATE race, but
which caller wins the lock is non-deterministic. When B won, the
'assert a_row.merged_by == a_merger' branch flipped false even
though the production code (M37) was correct — exactly one merger
recorded, audit trail intact. Assert the invariant instead: both
rows COMPLETED, both report the same merged_by, value in
{a_merger, b_merger}. Applied to both the unit test and the e2e
twin. Also documents the H8 e2e skip in the module docstring (the
report claimed it was documented there but it wasn't) and drops
the internal 'Phase 4' label from the docstring header in favor of
the public '0.19.0' version anchor.

* [H24] wait_for_ci polls through the window on non-success

* [H25,L34] release mutex orphan-sweep on start + shared redis client

* [M1] tiktok _refresh commits rotated tokens in an independent session

* [H25] drop new type:ignore in orphan-sweep test (constraint cleanup)

* [M2] feature-spotlight re-arms when exploration stale past 2x interval with no live HoM spawn

* [M6,M7] mark_seen after meaningful+project; persist since_id cursor in redis

* [M3,M5] reject() guards COMPLETED; edited_body deferred into the single-flight lock

* [M4] bound list_completed_video_tasks + ix_tasks_source_status_created index (migration 066)

* [M8,M9,L9] pass head_sha to CI gate; _run_git 30s timeout; _commits_since split maxsplit 2

* [M10,L35] dedupe dep_update by (git_url, command); fold redundant per-project queries

* [L36] gather ci_watch telemetry sweep instead of sequential iteration

* [L11] document self_heal fingerprint is stable per-signal by design

* [M11] engine-loop liveness watchdog: heartbeat + 2x-interval staleness alert

* [M21] video render loop commits per-task, not one trailing commit

* [M22] _detect_stuck_tasks skips held-CEO-source tasks

* [L6] video_renderer_client._save writes temp + atomic rename

* [phase5] e2e smoke + CHANGELOG for 0.19.0

* [M11] instrument x_mentions + roadmap engine loops with liveness heartbeats

* [phase5] fix-wave: correct e2e M11 unit-test filename + strengthen failed-cycle heartbeat assertion

* [C4] panel WS: shared /ws/system socket + long-tail retry + pong watchdog

* [H15] video-post-queue caption derived per render (mirror x-post-queue)

* [C4-fix] panel WS: discriminating long-tail tests + drop dead freeze block + evict dead shared conn on manual disconnect

Finding 1 (Critical, websocket.test.ts): the two long-tail-retry tests fired onopen between close cycles, which reset reconnectAttempts to 0 each cycle, so they passed under the pre-fix 3-attempt gate. Rewrote both to NEVER fire onopen between closes, so attempts accumulates: test 1 asserts state stays 'reconnecting' past attempt 3 (old gate would flip 'disconnected' terminal); test 2 asserts a new socket is constructed within 30000ms at attempt 7 where uncapped 5000*1.5^7 ~= 85s (old uncapped code would leave the timer unexpired). Verified both FAIL on a reverted old-shape connection.ts and PASS on the fixed code.

Finding 2 (Important, connection.ts): the 'if (raw >= cap) this.reconnectAttempts = exp' block was a no-op (exp was just read from the same field) and the unconditional increment afterwards grew the counter regardless. Deleted the dead block; kept the Math.min cap on the delay. Replaced the misleading ponytail comment with an accurate one: delay is capped, counter grows unbounded but delay is bounded.

Finding 3 (Important, use-websocket.ts): manual disconnect() tore down the shared conn for all subscribers but left the dead (manualClose=true, never reconnects) entry in _sharedSockets, so a later mount hit the reuse branch, attached a subscriber, replayed 'disconnected', and never called connect(). Added a urlRef and _sharedSockets.delete(url) in the manual disconnect callback so a later mount reopens a fresh conn.

* [H16] settings Save wired to settingsApi (persist + read back)

* [H17] tasks page passes status/team/limit to useTasks (server-side filter)

* [H18] useAgents roster re-derives on live-status change (statusEpoch in queryKey)

* [M40] useMetrics reads agent counts from useAgentStatus cache (dedupe poll)

* [H18] tighten useAgents statusEpoch comment (drop spec ref)

* [M40] drop spec ref + tighten useMetrics comment

* [M41] scorecard refetchInterval 60s -> 5min (25 req/min -> 5)

* [M42] feature-flag off-transition confirm + pending-keys Set

* [M43] X/TikTok credentials clear-behind confirm dialog

* [M44] rate-limit syncFromApi merges (keep fresher hitAt) + A2A reconnect invalidation

* [phase6] proxy.ts cookie-check comment + CHANGELOG Fixed entries

* [phase6] drop stale WS pin-attempts comment + fix tasks-page lead-in

* [H21] type DelegateRequest.estimated_complexity as Complexity (reject critical)

* [H22] type SoftBlockRequest.resolver_type as BlockerResolverType (no silent AGENT fallback)

* [H23] serialize TaskTable.documents into TaskResponse (DocRefResponse)

* [L27] delete SubstituteRequest phantom suggested_role/suggested_team fields

* [L14] Envelope.not_found defaults remediate (guide re-fetch + re-issue)

* [L28] delete unused ListResponse generic (dead code; pagination deferred)

* [H19] _delegate_static_guards allow cell_projects roots (cross-cell MegaTask)

* [M13] MegaTask confirm-batch idempotency key from session_id (SETNX guard + result sidecar)

* [M14] strip assigned_to from MegaTask drafts (no board-owned root-subtask deadlock)

* [H20] thin_routes receiver-gate add/add_all/merge (no false block on set/cache.add)

* [M16] tighten noqa code-capture to [A-Z0-9, ]+ (no false block on natural prose)

* [M45] conventions read-clone force-refetch on read (no 30s stale map window)

* [L25] conventions._resolve returns (root, sha); ORM mutated on the event loop

* [M15] open_conventions_pr force-pushes disposable scaffold branch (no silent None)

* [L24] roadmap cycle completion emits status-transition audit

* [Phase7] CHANGELOG: 15 schema/conventions/MegaTask/API fixed (H21-H23,L27,L14,L28,H19,M13,M14,H20,M16,M45,L25,M15,L24)

* [Phase7] lint gate hygiene: shorten docstring (E501), sort imports (I001), hoist AuditLogTable import (PLC0415)

* [H14] Enable the GROK provider row in _apply_grok so routing reaches the GrokCliProvider

* [M31] Route GROK active-token resolution to usage.json so live usage reflects grok agents

* [M32] Pass cache read/write tokens to calculate_cost in the usage sweep so live cost reflects Anthropic cache spend

* [M33] Park Ollama-Cloud rate limits via a marker map so a glm-5.2:cloud 429 parks instead of crash-respawning

* [M34] Sweep orphan agent_spawn_sessions at startup so crashed-run tokens roll into usage/cost summaries

* [L12] Persist revisit_resets (migration 067) so the PM-respawn breaker's revisit counter survives a restart

* [L18] Date-gate the Sonnet-5 promo revert so billing returns to list rates after 2026-08-31

* [L20] Warn when ROBOCO_GROK_RUN_LOG yields no session id instead of silently falling back to a zero-usage env id

* [phase8] CHANGELOG: LLM provider routing, usage capture, billing fixes

* [phase8] Trailing ruff format hygiene (orchestrator marker tuples, token-sweep test signatures)

* [phase8] Fix mypy: rename GROK-branch tokens var so transcript fallback stays reachable

* [M35] Add an expiring agent-token format (iat/exp) with backward-compatible verify

* [M35] Wire agent-token TTL at spawn (config + orchestrator + grok) so tokens are bounded

* [M36] Add JWT jti claim and re-mint the sliding cookie only near expiry so a stolen cookie's exp is fixed

* [M36] Redis jti revocation: read_token rejects revoked jtis and logout revokes the current jti

* [phase9] CHANGELOG: bound agent tokens + sliding-cookie re-mint window + jti revocation

* [scan-fix] mypy: type-annotate test files for make-quality gate

CI's make quality runs mypy roboco/ tests/; the scan-fix program's local
gate ran mypy roboco/ only, so test files were never type-checked. Fix all
67 errors across 23 test files with real annotations/casts/asserts/dead-code
removal — no # type: ignore / # noqa added.

* [e2e] Per-test DB isolation + dispatcher re-claim before PM complete

* [scan] Regenerate verb tables for delegate Complexity type

* [scan] Reduce 9 xenon C-ranks to B (auth, orchestrator, gateway, services)

* [scan] Restore short-circuit time.time() in verify_agent_token (security path)

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-07 10:09:23 +02:00
cebbd73e07 Ponytail build-laziness doctrine (bundled with Fable, 0.19.0) (#313)
* feat(agents): vendor trimmed ponytail doctrine (full + ethos)

* feat(agents): compose ponytail doctrine layer, bundled with fable

* docs: document ponytail doctrine bundled with fable-mode

* style: add trailing newline to ponytail doctrine files test

* docs: changelog + map/rag for ponytail doctrine (0.19.0)

user-facing docs skipped: Fable precedent absent from README/deployment/usage; ponytail is default-off internal.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-05 20:48:11 +02:00
4923ee3ff3 MinIO video storage (chunk 1: config+deps+compose) + event-loop perf fix (#308)
* feat(video): Phase A — VideoEngine origination spine + held-source gates

New default-off engine skeleton: opens a UX/UI authoring task (source=video, assigned to a ux-dev, LOW complexity to clear the dev-needs-subtasks guard) and materializes a held CEO-approval draft (source=video_post). Excludes video_post from all three held-source skip sites; adds the video_draft marker, six config flags, and the feature-flag entries. Origination + gate behavior unit-tested.

* refactor(orchestrator): fold _dispatch_dev_work skip chain into a helper

The per-source if/continue chain grew past xenon's --max-absolute B when the video_post held source joined it. Extract _is_non_dev_dispatch_source (every held-CEO source plus the two Board exploration sources) so the dev loop's skip is one flat call. Behavior-identical.

* feat(video): Phase B — propose_video do-tool (metadata-only, team-gated)

UX/UI dev records a video's composition ref + per-platform captions onto the authoring task's video_draft marker. Team-gated at runtime via _caller_team (Role.DEVELOPER can't tell a ux-dev from a be-dev). Resolves the caller's ACTIVE task via get_active_task_for_agent, not an oldest-first scan that would clobber a second open video task. Metadata only, no render. Wired through do_server + route + schema; added to _DEV_DO.

* feat(video): Phase D — render loop + RemotionRenderer client

Orchestrator-async _video_render_loop renders a completed authoring task's merged composition to MP4 (vertical + square) via the remotion-renderer sidecar and materializes the held video_post draft. RemotionRenderer tars the read-clone's motion/ source, POSTs it, and saves the returned MP4 bytes to a TASK-scoped local path (no shared volume; a composition is reused across videos so a composition-scoped path would clobber an earlier draft). Render failures bounded-retry (read-clone catch-up window, transient sidecar) up to a cap, then terminal-fail. Client tested vs a mock transport; loop vs a mock renderer + real DB.

* feat(video): Phase C — release / spotlight / on-demand video triggers

Three entry points open a UX/UI video-authoring task via VideoEngine.open_video_task: (1) a published release drafts a companion video — best-effort in ReleaseProposalService.approve, never fails the publish; script from the CHANGELOG via the local model with a template fallback. (2) propose_feature_spotlight gains optional wants_video/video_script — best-effort, gated on video_on_spotlight, default-off leaves the spotlight flow byte-for-byte unchanged. (3) POST /video/request (CEO-only) for an on-demand brief, with clean disabled/not_opened responses. All gated on video_engine_enabled.

* fix(video): savepoint-isolate video-task inserts (F042 poisoned session)

The best-effort try/except around open_video_task (release-publish + spotlight hooks) swallowed the Python exception, but a DBAPI error at the insert flush left the shared session must-rollback — so the caller's next commit (release finalize / request boundary) threw PendingRollbackError: the release stuck 'pending' after actually publishing, or the spotlight draft + HTTP response were lost. Wrap both inserts (open_video_task, _originate_video_post) in a begin_nested savepoint (the repo's established F042 pattern) so a DB error rolls back only the insert. open_video_task returns None (every caller already handles it); _originate_video_post propagates to the render loop's handler. Regression test: an insert FK error returns None with the session left usable. Dormant while the flags were off; armed on the NAS.

* feat(video): Phase G — motion/ package + remotion-renderer sidecar + compose

In-repo Remotion v4 motion/ package (ReleaseAnnouncement composition; calculateMetadata returns 1080x1920 vertical / 1080x1080 square from inputProps.orientation) + a credential-free remotion-renderer sidecar: untar the POSTed motion/ source, bundle (LRU-cached per source sha), selectComposition + renderMedia h264, stream the MP4 bytes back — matching the RemotionRenderer client contract. docker/remotion.Dockerfile on Debian (Chrome apt deps, build-time Chrome pre-warm, ffmpeg bundled in @remotion/renderer). Wired into both compose files (roboco_default only, shm_size 1gb, /health check) + the release publish matrix. Verified via a real local render of both cuts; the Debian docker build is the CEO's to run.

* chore(video): D-hardening — video_post source_task_id + render-loop docstring

Add a source_task_id back-reference to the video_post held-draft marker (traceability from a draft to its authoring task; also makes the render loop's two-key idempotency check wireable later). Fix the render-loop test's stale docstring ('never retried' -> bounded-retry). Both from the Phase D critic's non-blocking follow-ups.

* feat(video): Phase E1 — VideoPostService + heartbeat mutex (approve->post)

CEO-approve->post service: heartbeat-renewed Redis mutex (fail-closed, grace=ttl-2*heartbeat), re-read-in-lock double-post guard, per-platform durable commits (asyncio.shield-ed, settle-before-rollback on lock-loss), all writes inside the lock (captions validated pre-lock, applied in-lock — no stale whole-column clobber), idempotent, per-platform retry-skip. Poster interfaces (X/TikTok, mocked here). Reject + list-held-drafts. Survived 3 adversarial rounds; residual = a crash in the poster->commit window (CEO-gated low-freq, documented).

* fix(video): G-hardening — renderer leaks + Share Tech Mono brand font

Sidecar: give bundle() an explicit outDir tracked + deleted on LRU eviction (was leaking ~19MB remotion-webpack-bundle-* per source); res.on('close') cleanup so an aborted/retried download no longer leaks its remotion-out-* MP4 dir. Fonts: vendor Share Tech Mono (roboco-website brand font) as the display face (self-hosted woff2, 400-weight, headline fontWeight 700->400 to avoid faux-bold) + self-hosted Inter body — no gstatic fetch at render time (lsof-verified). Extras: composition_id whitelist (400) + Multer error middleware (400/413).

* feat(video): Phase E2 — X v2 + TikTok posters, tiktok_credentials, routes

LiveXVideoPoster (X v2 chunked media upload: init/append/finalize/STATUS-poll -> tweet w/ media_ids, OAuth1 signer reused). LiveTikTokPoster (OAuth2 inbox: init -> chunked PUT with asymmetric final chunk -> status-fetch; 401 -> refresh_token grant, rotated token persisted). tiktok_credentials Fernet singleton + migration 062 (single head). Routes: CEO approve/reject + list held drafts + write-only tiktok creds, wiring real posters into VideoPostService. Residual: a lock-loss right after a token-refresh flush can discard the rotated token (same rare CEO-gated class as the documented post->commit window).

* feat(video): Phase F — panel video-post queue + TikTok creds card + flags

video-post-queue.tsx: <video> MP4 preview with 9:16/1:1 cut switch, per-platform editable captions (280/2200 counters, over-limit disables approve), approve/reject, Request-a-video dialog. tiktok-credentials-card.tsx (4 write-only OAuth2 fields). feature-flags-card inlines TikTokCredentialsForm under video_engine_enabled. Mounted in command-center. tsc/eslint clean, 273 panel tests green. NOTE: needs the GET /video/posts/{id}/media route + mp4_paths on VideoPostResponse (folded into H) for the preview source.

* feat(video): Phase H — media route + e2e smoke + NAS arming + docs

GET /video/posts/{id}/media?cut= (CEO-gated FileResponse of the rendered MP4; closes the panel preview gap) + mp4_paths on VideoPostResponse. e2e smoke tests/e2e_smoke/test_video_pipeline.py (full flow, sidecar+X/TikTok mocked; asserts dispatcher skips, render-loop materialize, propose_video team-gate, approve idempotency). NAS arming: docker-compose.yml/.yaml ROBOCO_VIDEO_ENGINE_ENABLED/ON_RELEASE/ON_SPOTLIGHT default-on (.yaml resynced to .yml); registry stays off. CLAUDE.md video-engine section + CHANGELOG. Fixed 2 pre-existing route-test pollution leaks. Full suite 11763 passed.

* fix(video): auth-carrying preview, media route confinement, VideoPost type drift

Three fixes along the video preview path:

1. panel video preview auth: the <video> element was pointed straight at
   GET /video/posts/{id}/media, but a native <video src> GET carries none
   of axios's X-Agent-ID/X-Agent-Role headers — so in the default
   header-trust deployment the request 401s. Fetch the cut via
   videoApi.getMediaBlob (axios, responseType: blob) and drive <video>
   off a URL.createObjectURL result instead. The object URL is revoked
   on cut-change (the previous cut's URL) and on unmount, so neither
   cut switches nor row teardown leak blob URLs.

2. backend media route confinement: GET /video/posts/{id}/media now
   resolves mp4_path and refuses it with 404 when it falls outside
   settings.video_output_dir. Defense-in-depth against any future
   writer of mp4_paths serving files from arbitrary disk locations.

3. panel VideoPost type/comment drift: added mp4_paths to the
   VideoPost interface (the committed VideoPostResponse already
   carries it), and corrected the stale comment on videoMediaUrl
   that claimed no route served the rendered bytes — the route has
   existed since the media endpoint landed; the comment now describes
   why getMediaBlob exists instead of a direct <video src>.

* Persist rendered videos to data in physical storage.

* ++

* docs(video): 0.18.0 CHANGELOG entry + RAG + map reference for video engine

- Move the video engine bullet from [Unreleased] into [0.18.0] and note
  the ROBOCO_VIDEO_OUTPUT_DIR bind-mount persistence.
- Add docs/rag/architecture/video-engine.md (mirrors x-engine.md shape:
  enable/disable, three triggers, render loop + sidecar, CEO gate, media
  route confinement, credentials).
- Reference the video render loop in docs/map/orchestrator.md's engine list.

* chore(video): re-bump to 0.19.0 + sync registry compose defaults

Version was wrongly bumped to 0.18.0; 0.18.0 is an already-released
section. Restore its 2026-07-04 date and move the video-engine CHANGELOG
bullet into a new [0.19.0] - 2026-07-05 section above it. Bump
pyproject.toml, roboco/__init__.py, roboco/config.py (app_version),
panel/package.json, and the motion/README inputProps example to 0.19.0.

docker-compose.registry.yml: add ROBOCO_VIDEO_ENGINE_ENABLED /
_VIDEO_ON_RELEASE / _VIDEO_ON_SPOTLIGHT defaulted false (NAS arms them
true), and comment out the video-renders bind mount with a short note
so the public registry image ships video off by default. Structural
sync with docker-compose.yml maintained.

* fix(video): rate-limit /render + reflow motion/README

CodeQL flagged js/missing-rate-limiting on the renderer /render route.
The sidecar is container-network-only with one trusted caller (the
orchestrator, which renders cuts serially), so this limiter is a
retry-storm ceiling (30/min, well above legit render rate), not the
primary control. Also reflows motion/README.md hard-wrapped prose that
failed the markdown quality gate.

* fix(build): finish pnpm 11 migration + regen verb tables

The panel Docker image build failed on `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`:
node:22-alpine's corepack resolved to its bundled pnpm 11, but
panel/package.json pinned packageManager to pnpm@10.25.0, and pnpm 11
refuses to run against that pin. The Dockerfiles were already written for
pnpm 11 (comments, CI=true, strictDepBuilds); the package.json pin was the
stale outlier. Finish the migration instead of working around it:

- panel/package.json: packageManager pnpm@10.25.0 -> pnpm@11.10.0; drop the
  `pnpm` field (pnpm 11 ignores it — build approval lives in
  panel/pnpm-workspace.yaml's allowBuilds). Lockfile unchanged (pnpm 11
  accepts it as-is); frozen-lockfile verified.
- remotion-renderer/package.json: pin packageManager pnpm@11.10.0 for
  determinism (was relying on corepack's implicit default); engines.node
  >=22.13 (pnpm 11 requirement).
- docker/panel.Dockerfile + docker/remotion.Dockerfile: `corepack prepare
  pnpm@11.10.0 --activate` so the build uses the pinned version explicitly
  instead of trusting corepack's bundled default (which a future
  node:22-alpine could change).
- .github/workflows/panel-ci.yml: Node 20 -> 22 (pnpm 11 requires
  Node >=22.13; Node 20 fails the engines check).

Also regenerate agents/prompts/_generated/{developer,head_marketing,verbs}.md
— the video engine added propose_video and extended propose_feature_spotlight
(wants_video, video_script) but the verb tables weren't refreshed, failing
the foundation-check quality gate.

* chore(build): approve esbuild build script in remotion pnpm-workspace.yaml

pnpm 11 generated this file with a placeholder ('set this to true or false')
during install; resolve it to true so local dev of the renderer doesn't
re-prompt. esbuild's postinstall only verifies the prebuilt platform binary
(@esbuild/<platform> is installed as an optional dep), so approving it is
safe and silences the ERR_PNPM_IGNORED_BUILDS warning.

* fix(build): copy pnpm-workspace.yaml into panel + remotion images

pnpm 11 hard-errors with [ERR_PNPM_IGNORED_BUILDS] (exit 1) when a
dependency ships a postinstall script that isn't approved in
allowBuilds. Both Dockerfiles copied only package.json + pnpm-lock.yaml,
so the build-approval map in pnpm-workspace.yaml never made it into the
image — the remotion image build died on esbuild@0.28.1's postinstall.

Copy pnpm-workspace.yaml alongside the manifests in both images. In
panel, this also drops the --config.strictDepBuilds=false workaround:
with sharp and unrs-resolver now approved, their postinstalls run and
install the platform-specific binaries (previously skipped, leaving
sharp without its @img/sharp-* binary at runtime).

Verified locally: remotion + panel `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`
exit 0 with the workspace file present; both exit 1 without it.

* fix(perf): offload conventions + release-readiness blocking I/O off the event loop

The orchestrator runs uvicorn and the orchestration background loops on a
single shared event loop, so any sync I/O anywhere — even inside a background
loop — blocks API responsiveness for its duration. Two call sites were missing
asyncio.to_thread wrappers:

- ConventionsService.get_map/health/restore called the sync _resolve
  (`git rev-parse`), _read_committed_standard (file read + yaml parse), and
  _derive (filesystem walk via derive_from_scan) inline. Reachable from
  GET /api/projects/{id}/conventions and from the agent spawn-prepare path.
- ReleaseManagerEngine._production_assess called gather_snapshot inline —
  multiple `subprocess.run` git calls + a filesystem walk, running inside the
  release-manager background loop.

Wrap each blocking call in asyncio.to_thread at the async boundary. No
signature changes; helpers stay sync. Verified: targeted tests pass
(196 passed, 36 DB-skipped), ruff + format clean.

These were the only responsiveness gaps surfaced by the concurrency audit —
the rest of the heavy paths (agent spawn via `docker run -d`, video render
loop, git ops via the 16-worker ThreadPoolExecutor, workspace subprocess
calls) already offload correctly. No API/worker container split needed.

* feat(storage): add MinIO config + dep + compose (no-op, default-off)

Chunk 1 of the MinIO video-storage plan (§1, §2, §6). No behavior change:
minio_endpoint defaults to empty = disabled, the existing FileResponse serve
path is untouched (chunk 4 wires the serve path; chunk 2 adds the client).

- pyproject.toml: add `minio` (minio-py) to dependencies; regenerate uv.lock
  (resolves minio v7.2.20 + pycryptodome transitive).
- roboco/config.py: add 5 settings fields after video_output_dir
  (minio_endpoint/_access_key/_secret_key/_bucket/_region). Plain str Fields
  matching the existing ROBOCO_ENCRYPTION_KEY style; no SecretStr, no
  presign_ttl_seconds (YAGNI — we don't presign in phase 1).
- docker-compose.yml: add `minio` service (data network only, named
  minio-data volume, host ports 19000/19001 for debugging, mc healthcheck)
  and a one-shot `minio-init` service mirroring the ollama-init pattern
  (mc alias set + mb -p, idempotent via || true). Add ROBOCO_MINIO_* env to
  the orchestrator env block (endpoint, access/secret key, bucket, region).
- docker-compose.registry.yml: intentionally omit the minio/minio-init
  services and leave ROBOCO_MINIO_* unset (NAS default-on, registry
  default-off — the established pattern); comment added to the orchestrator
  env block noting the omission.

* docs(storage): 0.19.0 CHANGELOG + RAG + map reference for MinIO chunk 1

Backfills the release-polish docs for MinIO chunk 1 (§10 of the plan):
- docker-compose.yaml synced to docker-compose.yml (the two NAS compose files
  must stay byte-identical; .yml was edited in chunk 1, .yaml was stale).
- CHANGELOG [0.19.0]: Added (MinIO scaffolding) + Fixed (event-loop I/O offload).
- docs/rag/architecture/minio-storage.md: RAG doc mirroring video-engine.md.
- docs/map/deployment-tooling.md: one-line storage reference.

* MinIO chunk 2: minio_client module (singleton + unconfigured guard) (#309)

* feat(storage): minio_client module (singleton + unconfigured guard)

Chunk 2 of the MinIO plan (§3). roboco/services/minio_client.py adds:
- get_client(): singleton minio-py Minio from settings; returns None when
  minio_endpoint is empty (the disabled path used by the chunk 3/4 guards).
  Parses http://... endpoint into host:port + secure flag.
- put_object(bytes, key): no-ops when unconfigured; otherwise PUTs to
  settings.minio_bucket with ContentType video/mp4.
- get_object_stream(key): yields object bytes for StreamingResponse; lets
  S3Error propagate so the serve route (chunk 4) can fall back to disk.

Sync calls — every call site wraps in asyncio.to_thread (chunks 3/4). One
unit test covers the unconfigured guard + endpoint scheme parsing (mocks,
no real MinIO). Not yet wired into remotion_client._save or the media route.

* MinIO chunk 3: wire write path (remotion_client._save PUT) (#310)

* feat(storage): wire MinIO write path in remotion_client._save

Chunk 3 of the MinIO plan (§3). After the local mp4 write, _save PUTs the bytes
to MinIO under key = Path(mp4_path).name (already {render_key}-{orientation}.mp4),
guarded by minio_client.get_client() (None when minio_endpoint empty) and
wrapped in asyncio.to_thread. Local disk stays the source of truth for the
poster publish path (x_video_client/tiktok_client read mp4_path from disk);
the PUT is additive. _save still returns the local path str — mp4_paths,
marker, and schema unchanged. Disabled (local-only) when MinIO unconfigured.

One test: asserts put_object is called with the basename key when configured
and the local file is still written; existing test stays green via the
unconfigured-default path. Mocks only.

* fix(storage): make MinIO PUT non-fatal in remotion_client._save

A configured-but-down MinIO made put_object raise inside the worker thread,
failing the render and retry-looping a task whose local file was already
written. Local disk is the source of truth and the serve route falls back to
FileResponse on S3Error, so a failed durable-copy PUT must never fail the
render — log and continue; the next render re-attempts the PUT.

Adds test_save_swallows_minio_put_failure (PUT raises -> _save still returns
the local path and the local file is written). Extends the CHANGELOG write-
path bullet with the non-fatal guarantee.

* MinIO chunk 4: serve path (StreamingResponse + FileResponse fallback) (#311)

* feat(storage): serve MinIO via the media route (StreamingResponse + FileResponse fallback)

Chunk 4 of the MinIO plan (§4 — the crux). GET /api/video/posts/{id}/media
derives key = Path(mp4_path).name and, when minio_endpoint is set, returns a
StreamingResponse over minio_client.get_object_stream(key), keeping
_require_ceo so auth stays end-to-end (no presigned URLs). Falls back to
FileResponse on S3Error (old render not in MinIO) or when MinIO is
unconfigured — the panel's axios-blob flow is unchanged (same URL, headers,
body, just chunked). The confinement check is kept as defense-in-depth (the
key is a basename so traversal is impossible, but the check is cheap and
protects the poster path).

Two integration tests: configured serve path streams from a stubbed
get_object_stream (CEO 200, non-CEO 403); unconfigured fallback serves the
local file via FileResponse. Mocks only — no real MinIO.

* fix(storage): eager stat_object probe so the MinIO serve fallback actually fires

The chunk-4 route wrapped StreamingResponse(get_object_stream(key), ...) in a
try/except, but get_object_stream is a lazy generator — its client.get_object
call runs on the first next(), i.e. AFTER the route returned and Starlette
started streaming. An S3Error (NoSuchKey / MinIO down) there is uncatchable;
the try/except caught nothing and the FileResponse fallback never triggered.

Add minio_client.stat_object(key): an eager existence/readiness probe that
runs INSIDE the route's try/except, so a missing object or down MinIO raises
before the StreamingResponse starts and the fallback serves the local file.
stat-then-get is two round trips; a mid-stream failure after a successful stat
is a rare race the CEO can retry (documented ceiling).

Tests: the configured test now stubs stat_object; a new test asserts the
S3Error fallback serves the local file via FileResponse and that
get_object_stream is never called. RAG doc updated to record the eager-probe
correctness detail + the non-fatal PUT.

* docs(rag): mark MinIO deployment note landed (chunk 5) (#312)

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(video): offload minio stat_object off the event loop

stat_object was called inline in the async media route, blocking the
shared event loop for one sync urllib3 round-trip per preview request —
contradicting minio_client's own 'every call site wraps in to_thread'
docstring and this PR's perf-fix theme. Wrap in asyncio.to_thread; the
try/except still catches S3Error (to_thread re-raises) so the
FileResponse fallback is unchanged. Also add the trailing newline to
the minio-storage RAG doc.

* Fix red CI

* Make CI green

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-05 16:12:44 +02:00
e9d0e0bd48 feat(video): 0.19.0 video engine (Remotion) + preview auth + render persistence (#307)
* feat(video): Phase A — VideoEngine origination spine + held-source gates

New default-off engine skeleton: opens a UX/UI authoring task (source=video, assigned to a ux-dev, LOW complexity to clear the dev-needs-subtasks guard) and materializes a held CEO-approval draft (source=video_post). Excludes video_post from all three held-source skip sites; adds the video_draft marker, six config flags, and the feature-flag entries. Origination + gate behavior unit-tested.

* refactor(orchestrator): fold _dispatch_dev_work skip chain into a helper

The per-source if/continue chain grew past xenon's --max-absolute B when the video_post held source joined it. Extract _is_non_dev_dispatch_source (every held-CEO source plus the two Board exploration sources) so the dev loop's skip is one flat call. Behavior-identical.

* feat(video): Phase B — propose_video do-tool (metadata-only, team-gated)

UX/UI dev records a video's composition ref + per-platform captions onto the authoring task's video_draft marker. Team-gated at runtime via _caller_team (Role.DEVELOPER can't tell a ux-dev from a be-dev). Resolves the caller's ACTIVE task via get_active_task_for_agent, not an oldest-first scan that would clobber a second open video task. Metadata only, no render. Wired through do_server + route + schema; added to _DEV_DO.

* feat(video): Phase D — render loop + RemotionRenderer client

Orchestrator-async _video_render_loop renders a completed authoring task's merged composition to MP4 (vertical + square) via the remotion-renderer sidecar and materializes the held video_post draft. RemotionRenderer tars the read-clone's motion/ source, POSTs it, and saves the returned MP4 bytes to a TASK-scoped local path (no shared volume; a composition is reused across videos so a composition-scoped path would clobber an earlier draft). Render failures bounded-retry (read-clone catch-up window, transient sidecar) up to a cap, then terminal-fail. Client tested vs a mock transport; loop vs a mock renderer + real DB.

* feat(video): Phase C — release / spotlight / on-demand video triggers

Three entry points open a UX/UI video-authoring task via VideoEngine.open_video_task: (1) a published release drafts a companion video — best-effort in ReleaseProposalService.approve, never fails the publish; script from the CHANGELOG via the local model with a template fallback. (2) propose_feature_spotlight gains optional wants_video/video_script — best-effort, gated on video_on_spotlight, default-off leaves the spotlight flow byte-for-byte unchanged. (3) POST /video/request (CEO-only) for an on-demand brief, with clean disabled/not_opened responses. All gated on video_engine_enabled.

* fix(video): savepoint-isolate video-task inserts (F042 poisoned session)

The best-effort try/except around open_video_task (release-publish + spotlight hooks) swallowed the Python exception, but a DBAPI error at the insert flush left the shared session must-rollback — so the caller's next commit (release finalize / request boundary) threw PendingRollbackError: the release stuck 'pending' after actually publishing, or the spotlight draft + HTTP response were lost. Wrap both inserts (open_video_task, _originate_video_post) in a begin_nested savepoint (the repo's established F042 pattern) so a DB error rolls back only the insert. open_video_task returns None (every caller already handles it); _originate_video_post propagates to the render loop's handler. Regression test: an insert FK error returns None with the session left usable. Dormant while the flags were off; armed on the NAS.

* feat(video): Phase G — motion/ package + remotion-renderer sidecar + compose

In-repo Remotion v4 motion/ package (ReleaseAnnouncement composition; calculateMetadata returns 1080x1920 vertical / 1080x1080 square from inputProps.orientation) + a credential-free remotion-renderer sidecar: untar the POSTed motion/ source, bundle (LRU-cached per source sha), selectComposition + renderMedia h264, stream the MP4 bytes back — matching the RemotionRenderer client contract. docker/remotion.Dockerfile on Debian (Chrome apt deps, build-time Chrome pre-warm, ffmpeg bundled in @remotion/renderer). Wired into both compose files (roboco_default only, shm_size 1gb, /health check) + the release publish matrix. Verified via a real local render of both cuts; the Debian docker build is the CEO's to run.

* chore(video): D-hardening — video_post source_task_id + render-loop docstring

Add a source_task_id back-reference to the video_post held-draft marker (traceability from a draft to its authoring task; also makes the render loop's two-key idempotency check wireable later). Fix the render-loop test's stale docstring ('never retried' -> bounded-retry). Both from the Phase D critic's non-blocking follow-ups.

* feat(video): Phase E1 — VideoPostService + heartbeat mutex (approve->post)

CEO-approve->post service: heartbeat-renewed Redis mutex (fail-closed, grace=ttl-2*heartbeat), re-read-in-lock double-post guard, per-platform durable commits (asyncio.shield-ed, settle-before-rollback on lock-loss), all writes inside the lock (captions validated pre-lock, applied in-lock — no stale whole-column clobber), idempotent, per-platform retry-skip. Poster interfaces (X/TikTok, mocked here). Reject + list-held-drafts. Survived 3 adversarial rounds; residual = a crash in the poster->commit window (CEO-gated low-freq, documented).

* fix(video): G-hardening — renderer leaks + Share Tech Mono brand font

Sidecar: give bundle() an explicit outDir tracked + deleted on LRU eviction (was leaking ~19MB remotion-webpack-bundle-* per source); res.on('close') cleanup so an aborted/retried download no longer leaks its remotion-out-* MP4 dir. Fonts: vendor Share Tech Mono (roboco-website brand font) as the display face (self-hosted woff2, 400-weight, headline fontWeight 700->400 to avoid faux-bold) + self-hosted Inter body — no gstatic fetch at render time (lsof-verified). Extras: composition_id whitelist (400) + Multer error middleware (400/413).

* feat(video): Phase E2 — X v2 + TikTok posters, tiktok_credentials, routes

LiveXVideoPoster (X v2 chunked media upload: init/append/finalize/STATUS-poll -> tweet w/ media_ids, OAuth1 signer reused). LiveTikTokPoster (OAuth2 inbox: init -> chunked PUT with asymmetric final chunk -> status-fetch; 401 -> refresh_token grant, rotated token persisted). tiktok_credentials Fernet singleton + migration 062 (single head). Routes: CEO approve/reject + list held drafts + write-only tiktok creds, wiring real posters into VideoPostService. Residual: a lock-loss right after a token-refresh flush can discard the rotated token (same rare CEO-gated class as the documented post->commit window).

* feat(video): Phase F — panel video-post queue + TikTok creds card + flags

video-post-queue.tsx: <video> MP4 preview with 9:16/1:1 cut switch, per-platform editable captions (280/2200 counters, over-limit disables approve), approve/reject, Request-a-video dialog. tiktok-credentials-card.tsx (4 write-only OAuth2 fields). feature-flags-card inlines TikTokCredentialsForm under video_engine_enabled. Mounted in command-center. tsc/eslint clean, 273 panel tests green. NOTE: needs the GET /video/posts/{id}/media route + mp4_paths on VideoPostResponse (folded into H) for the preview source.

* feat(video): Phase H — media route + e2e smoke + NAS arming + docs

GET /video/posts/{id}/media?cut= (CEO-gated FileResponse of the rendered MP4; closes the panel preview gap) + mp4_paths on VideoPostResponse. e2e smoke tests/e2e_smoke/test_video_pipeline.py (full flow, sidecar+X/TikTok mocked; asserts dispatcher skips, render-loop materialize, propose_video team-gate, approve idempotency). NAS arming: docker-compose.yml/.yaml ROBOCO_VIDEO_ENGINE_ENABLED/ON_RELEASE/ON_SPOTLIGHT default-on (.yaml resynced to .yml); registry stays off. CLAUDE.md video-engine section + CHANGELOG. Fixed 2 pre-existing route-test pollution leaks. Full suite 11763 passed.

* fix(video): auth-carrying preview, media route confinement, VideoPost type drift

Three fixes along the video preview path:

1. panel video preview auth: the <video> element was pointed straight at
   GET /video/posts/{id}/media, but a native <video src> GET carries none
   of axios's X-Agent-ID/X-Agent-Role headers — so in the default
   header-trust deployment the request 401s. Fetch the cut via
   videoApi.getMediaBlob (axios, responseType: blob) and drive <video>
   off a URL.createObjectURL result instead. The object URL is revoked
   on cut-change (the previous cut's URL) and on unmount, so neither
   cut switches nor row teardown leak blob URLs.

2. backend media route confinement: GET /video/posts/{id}/media now
   resolves mp4_path and refuses it with 404 when it falls outside
   settings.video_output_dir. Defense-in-depth against any future
   writer of mp4_paths serving files from arbitrary disk locations.

3. panel VideoPost type/comment drift: added mp4_paths to the
   VideoPost interface (the committed VideoPostResponse already
   carries it), and corrected the stale comment on videoMediaUrl
   that claimed no route served the rendered bytes — the route has
   existed since the media endpoint landed; the comment now describes
   why getMediaBlob exists instead of a direct <video src>.

* Persist rendered videos to data in physical storage.

* ++

* docs(video): 0.18.0 CHANGELOG entry + RAG + map reference for video engine

- Move the video engine bullet from [Unreleased] into [0.18.0] and note
  the ROBOCO_VIDEO_OUTPUT_DIR bind-mount persistence.
- Add docs/rag/architecture/video-engine.md (mirrors x-engine.md shape:
  enable/disable, three triggers, render loop + sidecar, CEO gate, media
  route confinement, credentials).
- Reference the video render loop in docs/map/orchestrator.md's engine list.

* chore(video): re-bump to 0.19.0 + sync registry compose defaults

Version was wrongly bumped to 0.18.0; 0.18.0 is an already-released
section. Restore its 2026-07-04 date and move the video-engine CHANGELOG
bullet into a new [0.19.0] - 2026-07-05 section above it. Bump
pyproject.toml, roboco/__init__.py, roboco/config.py (app_version),
panel/package.json, and the motion/README inputProps example to 0.19.0.

docker-compose.registry.yml: add ROBOCO_VIDEO_ENGINE_ENABLED /
_VIDEO_ON_RELEASE / _VIDEO_ON_SPOTLIGHT defaulted false (NAS arms them
true), and comment out the video-renders bind mount with a short note
so the public registry image ships video off by default. Structural
sync with docker-compose.yml maintained.

* fix(video): rate-limit /render + reflow motion/README

CodeQL flagged js/missing-rate-limiting on the renderer /render route.
The sidecar is container-network-only with one trusted caller (the
orchestrator, which renders cuts serially), so this limiter is a
retry-storm ceiling (30/min, well above legit render rate), not the
primary control. Also reflows motion/README.md hard-wrapped prose that
failed the markdown quality gate.

* fix(build): finish pnpm 11 migration + regen verb tables

The panel Docker image build failed on `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`:
node:22-alpine's corepack resolved to its bundled pnpm 11, but
panel/package.json pinned packageManager to pnpm@10.25.0, and pnpm 11
refuses to run against that pin. The Dockerfiles were already written for
pnpm 11 (comments, CI=true, strictDepBuilds); the package.json pin was the
stale outlier. Finish the migration instead of working around it:

- panel/package.json: packageManager pnpm@10.25.0 -> pnpm@11.10.0; drop the
  `pnpm` field (pnpm 11 ignores it — build approval lives in
  panel/pnpm-workspace.yaml's allowBuilds). Lockfile unchanged (pnpm 11
  accepts it as-is); frozen-lockfile verified.
- remotion-renderer/package.json: pin packageManager pnpm@11.10.0 for
  determinism (was relying on corepack's implicit default); engines.node
  >=22.13 (pnpm 11 requirement).
- docker/panel.Dockerfile + docker/remotion.Dockerfile: `corepack prepare
  pnpm@11.10.0 --activate` so the build uses the pinned version explicitly
  instead of trusting corepack's bundled default (which a future
  node:22-alpine could change).
- .github/workflows/panel-ci.yml: Node 20 -> 22 (pnpm 11 requires
  Node >=22.13; Node 20 fails the engines check).

Also regenerate agents/prompts/_generated/{developer,head_marketing,verbs}.md
— the video engine added propose_video and extended propose_feature_spotlight
(wants_video, video_script) but the verb tables weren't refreshed, failing
the foundation-check quality gate.

* chore(build): approve esbuild build script in remotion pnpm-workspace.yaml

pnpm 11 generated this file with a placeholder ('set this to true or false')
during install; resolve it to true so local dev of the renderer doesn't
re-prompt. esbuild's postinstall only verifies the prebuilt platform binary
(@esbuild/<platform> is installed as an optional dep), so approving it is
safe and silences the ERR_PNPM_IGNORED_BUILDS warning.

* fix(build): copy pnpm-workspace.yaml into panel + remotion images

pnpm 11 hard-errors with [ERR_PNPM_IGNORED_BUILDS] (exit 1) when a
dependency ships a postinstall script that isn't approved in
allowBuilds. Both Dockerfiles copied only package.json + pnpm-lock.yaml,
so the build-approval map in pnpm-workspace.yaml never made it into the
image — the remotion image build died on esbuild@0.28.1's postinstall.

Copy pnpm-workspace.yaml alongside the manifests in both images. In
panel, this also drops the --config.strictDepBuilds=false workaround:
with sharp and unrs-resolver now approved, their postinstalls run and
install the platform-specific binaries (previously skipped, leaving
sharp without its @img/sharp-* binary at runtime).

Verified locally: remotion + panel `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`
exit 0 with the workspace file present; both exit 1 without it.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-05 13:37:17 +02:00
Renn F da17c49f2d feat(marketing): HoM feature-spotlight X drafts + brand-voice charter (v0.18.0 B)
The Head of Marketing now markets features, not just releases: a default-off
x_feature_spotlight loop periodically spawns the HoM to investigate what shipped
(CHANGELOG, feature flags, docs/map, KB) and draft ONE held marketing post via
propose_feature_spotlight, reviewed in the X post queue.

- New x_feature source (distinct from x_post, fixing panel mislabeling) + a
  panel Feature-spotlight branch.
- brand_voice column on company_goals (migration 061, single head) as the
  CEO-editable voice source, surfaced in Settings and injected into the HoM
  briefing; a VOICE GUIDE baseline in head-marketing.md.
- propose_feature_spotlight verb (HoM-only), mirroring propose_roadmap.

Gated by x_feature_spotlight_enabled (default off; flag-off dormancy proven).
Also fixed two real bugs found mid-build: company_goals API schemas dropped
brand_voice on GET/PUT; the live charter UI is goals-tab.tsx, not the unmounted
company-goals-card.tsx. Full suite green (2935); migration single-head verified.
2026-07-04 07:34:40 +02:00
7901ea419e Retire channels/sessions/messages; A2A becomes primary agent comms (#306)
* feat(a2a): deliver latest incoming message preview into the claim briefing

list_unread_a2a now carries last_message_preview (the latest message from the
OTHER agent, never the agent's own reply), fetched via a correlated subquery in
the same query — no N+1 on the per-verb briefing path.

* feat(a2a): read_a2a verb delivers unread message bodies to the agent

A2AService.get_unread_messages returns the caller's unread INCOMING messages
(never its own sends), marking exactly those rows read atomically so a message
arriving mid-call is preserved. Wired as the read_a2a content verb (route +
do_server tool + granted to every delivery role) — the content-bearing read the
A2A inbox lacked (read_messages only zeroed the counter).

* docs(rag): document read_a2a as the A2A content-read path

* fix(task): backlog activation no longer requires a discussion session

Removes the SessionTaskTable gate in activate() (and its dangling log field),
deletes _inherit_parent_session + its create() call, and drops the now-unused
SessionTaskTable import. Coordination rides task state; the session subsystem is
being retired. Tests updated to the new (no-session) behavior.

* fix(orchestrator): drop session sweep from _run_sweep

Removes the messaging import + sweep_timed_out_sessions call. That import sat
outside the try/except, so once messaging.py is deleted it would have killed the
entire sweep cascade (budget kill-switch, token rollups, retention, image prune,
superseded-PR reconcile). Notification sweep + all maintenance sweeps unchanged.

* release-manager --no-tags read-clone fix

* test: update evidence_repo unit test for a2a last_message_preview

* refactor(gateway): drop session propagation on delegate

Removes propagate_sessions_to_subtask from delegate(), the ChoreographerDeps
messaging field + property, and the ChoreographerDeps messaging arg in deps.py
(ContentActions messaging + import stay until the verbs are removed). Deletes the
propagation test; strips the now-invalid messaging kwarg from ChoreographerDeps
test builders.

* refactor(gateway): remove say/open_session/link_session/channels verbs

Removes the four channel/session verbs across content_actions (impls +
ContentActionsDeps.messaging), do_server (tools + registry), role_config (grants
+ _CHANNEL_DISCOVERY), do.py (routes), schemas/v1/do.py (request models), and
deps.py (MessagingService import + construction). Regenerates the prompt verb
tables. dm/notify/read_messages/read_a2a stay. Tests deleted/updated accordingly.

* uv.lock Upgrade

* refactor: remove conversation RAG indexing; Secretary announces via notification

Drops the CONVERSATIONS index (index_conversation, ConversationsIndexPlugin,
IndexType.CONVERSATIONS enum, IndexConversationParams, mentor.py type-label, the
messaging index hook) and its chunk-table manifest entries. The Secretary's
ANNOUNCE/RELAY_MESSAGE now fan out a BROADCAST notification to every agent's
inbox (NotificationService.broadcast) instead of posting to a dead channel.

* fix(panel): label RAG health error lines by subsystem

A red llm_error (e.g. the glm-5.2:cloud weekly-limit 429) rendered under
the 'Embedding: ok' header with no label, reading as an embedding failure.
Prefix each error line with LLM / Embedding / Vector store.

* refactor: remove channel/message reads from metrics, dashboard, git, events

MetricsService drops get_communication_volume + the MessageTable
message-count in get_agent_metrics (and the now-dead messages_sent_week
field). DashboardService drops get_channel_feeds/_compute_channel_status
and the message read in get_recent_activity (task activity kept);
get_auditor_metrics no longer reports communication_volume.
GitService's two primary-session-id helpers always return None now
(callers already treat None as "no primary session"). events/handlers.py
drops the SESSION_CLOSED/SESSION_TIMEOUT subscriptions + the
handle_session_boundary handler.

Forced follow-on: api/routes/dashboard.py + api/schemas/dashboard.py
dropped the now-dangling live_feeds/ChannelFeed surface and the
/metrics/communication route, which wrapped the removed service calls
directly (mypy would otherwise fail on the missing attributes).

* refactor: delete MessagingService + channel seeding

Edited db/__init__.py and services/__init__.py first (drop the unconditional
Channel/Group/Message/Session table + MessagingService re-exports), then
deleted services/messaging.py, then trimmed db/seed.py to only create_agents
(create_channels/create_channel_memberships/create_initial_messages gone).

Forced expansion: api/routes/{channels,groups,sessions,messages}.py import
roboco.services.messaging directly (not through the package __init__), as
does api/routes/tasks.py (the session-links embed on GET /tasks/{id} and the
GET /{id}/sessions route). Deleting messaging.py without addressing these
breaks `import roboco.api.app` immediately, since app.py eagerly imports all
route modules at startup. Since the 4 CRUD route files are 100%
MessagingService-backed with zero independent logic (and are wholesale
deletes in the plan's later API-routes task anyway), deleted them now +
unmounted from app.py/routes/__init__.py; tasks.py got the same surgical
trim its later task already specified (drop session-links embed +
TaskSessionLinkResponse/TaskResponse.sessions). This pulls a slice of that
later work forward — the routes/schemas for channels/groups/sessions/messages
still need their own pass, but their messaging-coupled parts are gone.

Verified with a full-suite collection sweep (12010 tests collected, zero
import errors) beyond the directly touched test dirs, given the expanded
blast radius.

* refactor: remove channel/session/message models, tables, and channel policy

Models: deleted channel.py/group.py/session.py/messaging.py wholesale
(zero external consumers besides the models/__init__.py re-export).
message.py surgically trimmed: removed MessageCreate (dead) and MessageEdit
(never instantiated; ExtractedMessage.edit_history retyped to
list[dict[str, Any]] to match how it's actually persisted — confirmed
ExtractedMessage was never written to any DB table, so MessageTable's
removal carries no functional risk to the kept extraction pipeline).
base.py: removed SessionStatus + ChannelType, kept MessageType. Also
removed the confirmed-dead channels_read/channels_write fields from
models/agent.py:AgentPermissions and models/dashboard.py:ChannelFeedData.

db/tables.py: deleted ChannelTable/GroupTable/SessionTable/SessionTaskTable/
MessageTable, TaskTable.session_links, and JournalEntryTable.session_id —
cascaded through models/journal.py, services/journal.py, and
api/schemas+routes/journals.py (22 plumbing sites).

foundation/policy/communications.py: removed the ChannelSpec/CHANNELS
catalog + TEAM_SCOPED_ROLES/_CELL_*/_AUDITOR_ONLY helpers, kept the
notification policy (Priority/parse_priority/NOTIFY_SENDER_ROLES/
ACK_REQUIRED_BY_TYPE). enforcement/channel_access.py deleted (confirmed
fully dead in production). agents_config.py: removed CHANNEL_ACCESS
(kept A2A_ALLOWED_PAIRS). seeds/initial_data.py: removed
DEFAULT_CHANNELS/CHANNEL_MEMBERSHIPS/AUDITOR_SILENT_ACCESS + the
never-consumed INITIAL_MESSAGES. config.py: removed
session_idle_timeout_seconds (zero consumers). exceptions.py: removed
dead ChannelError/ChannelAccessDeniedError/SessionClosedError.

Forced expansion beyond the original file list — ChannelType cascaded
into a live, mounted surface the plan didn't trace: agents_config.
CHANNEL_ACCESS -> services/permissions.py's channel-RBAC methods (not
models/permissions.py, which turned out to have no channel code at all)
-> two real endpoints in api/routes/stream.py (GET /permissions,
GET /permissions/channel/{name}) and two dependency factories in
api/deps.py. Removed the channel methods + fields, deleted the
channel-specific stream.py endpoint, deleted require_channel_read/write.
Also deleted api/schemas/{channels,sessions}.py (hard dependency on the
removed enums; already fully dead after the Task 10 route deletions) and
api/schemas/messages.py (a TYPE_CHECKING-only import of the deleted
MessageTable; likewise already fully dead) + its dedicated test file.

Test updates: test_permissions.py -14 channel tests (matches the planned
count exactly), test_communications.py / test_communications_consumers.py
split to keep only notification-policy coverage, test_exceptions.py -9,
test_deps.py -4, plus the journal/stream/foundation-smoke fallout. Also
fixed a pre-existing (Task 7) broken assertion in
test_foundation_phase3_smoke.py that inspected a `say()` method already
removed from ContentActions.

Verified: full-suite collection (11961 tests, zero import errors) and a
complete test run (11567 passed, 394 skipped, 0 failed) in addition to
the targeted suites.

* migration: drop channels/groups/sessions/session_tasks/messages + enum types

alembic/versions/060_drop_messaging.py: drop_column journal_entries.
session_id (sidesteps hardcoding the FK constraint name — verified
empirically against a live migrated DB that it's actually
fk_journal_entries_session_id_sessions, but drop_column doesn't care
either way); drop_table in FK order (messages -> session_tasks ->
sessions -> groups -> channels); DROP TABLE IF EXISTS chunks_conversations
(runtime-provisioned, not alembic-managed, would otherwise orphan); DROP
TYPE IF EXISTS for messagetype/sessionstatus/sessionscope/channeltype
(messagetype's Python enum stays for ExtractedMessage, but the DB type
had zero live columns left once MessageTable was dropped in the prior
commit). downgrade() raises NotImplementedError — one-way removal.

Pruned scripts/reset_runtime_state.sql + .sh: removed the DELETE/COUNT
lines for messages/session_tasks/sessions/groups/channels and the
groups.active_session_id reset block.

Verified end-to-end against a scratch Postgres DB: full migration chain
001->060 applies cleanly, alembic heads shows a single head, all 6 dropped
tables + 4 enum types + the journal_entries.session_id column are
confirmed gone, journal_entries keeps only its journal_id/task_id FKs,
downgrade correctly raises NotImplementedError without corrupting DB
state, and the pruned reset_runtime_state.sql runs clean (no errors)
against a fully-migrated DB.

* refactor(api): remove channel/session/message routes + WS streams

Most of this task's file list was already forced through in earlier
commits (routes/{channels,groups,sessions,messages}.py + app.py/__init__.py
unmounting in the MessagingService-deletion commit; tasks.py's
session-links embed + GET /{id}/sessions + schemas/tasks.py's
TaskResponse.sessions in that same commit; deps.py's require_channel_read/
write + schemas/{channels,sessions}.py in the models/tables commit). This
closes out what was left:

- api/websocket.py: deleted the channel_stream + session_stream routes,
  ConnectionManager's channel_connections/session_connections dicts,
  connect_channel/connect_session, broadcast_to_channel/broadcast_to_session,
  get_channel_subscriber_count, and their cleanup lines in disconnect().
  Agent streams, notification streams, and the operator system stream are
  untouched.
- api/websocket_bridge.py: deleted _handle_session_event +
  _handle_message_event and their SESSION_CREATED/SESSION_CLOSED/
  SESSION_TIMEOUT/MESSAGE_SENT subscriptions. The A2A live-view, rate-limit,
  usage, agent-lifecycle, and notification bridges are untouched.
- api/schemas/websocket.py: removed NewMessageBroadcast, WSMessageNew,
  WSMessageEdit, WSMessageDelete, WSSessionClosed — kept the WSMessage base
  class (still subclassed by the kept WSAgentStream/WSNotification) plus
  those two.
- api/schemas/groups.py: deleted (already fully orphaned since routes/
  groups.py was removed; its GroupResponse/GroupDetailResponse had zero
  consumers).

Updated the 5 websocket test files accordingly (removed the channel/
session-specific tests + fixed imports); test_websocket_bridge.py's
registration-coverage test dropped the SESSION_*/MESSAGE_SENT assertions.

Verified: full-suite collection (11943 tests, zero import errors) and a
complete test run (11549 passed, 394 skipped, 0 failed).

* docs: retire channels/sessions/messages from agent-facing docs + CLAUDE.md

Rewrites docs/rag (RAG-indexed) + docs/map + CLAUDE.md to reflect A2A (dm +
read_a2a) as primary agent comms; deletes the channel docs, splits messaging-tools
+ messaging-notification (renamed notification.md), swaps the WS worked example to
A2A_MESSAGE_SENT. _complete_map.md still needs regeneration (generated file).

* refactor(panel): remove Communications surface (channels/sessions)

Deletes the /communications routes, message components, task-detail Sessions tab,
use-channels + channel/session WS hooks, and the channels/sessions/messages/groups
api clients; prunes the Channel/Session/Message/Group types + mock data. (Auditor
live-feeds + dashboard.ts dead-route cleanup is a follow-up.)

* refactor(panel): drop auditor channel-feed + dead communication-metric route

* docs(map): regenerate _complete_map from updated slices

* fix(a2a): reduce get_unread_messages complexity below xenon C + stale comments

Extract the per-conversation unread-counter recompute into _reset_unread_counter
(the CI quality gate flagged get_unread_messages as rank C). Also drop the deleted
open_session from a content_actions comment and reword an evidence_repo docstring
that cited the removed messaging._notify_mentions.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-04 03:10:33 +02:00
607e13f3dd feat(secretary): wire task name→id search as a Secretary tool (#304)
The GET /secretary/tasks?q= route (name→id resolution) shipped in wave 1
but no tool called it, so the Secretary could read a task only by UUID —
yet the CEO always refers to tasks by name. This adds search_tasks to
both runtimes (Claude SDK build_secretary_options + the grok
roboco-secretary MCP server) over a shared _do_search_tasks helper, so
'the task about X' resolves to concrete ids the CEO can then act on via
read_task or a control_task directive.

_call_backend gains query-param support and now returns the decoded JSON
(object or list) so the search route's list response flows through;
_do_search_tasks wraps matches under 'tasks' and passes error envelopes
straight through. Persona + RAG role doc updated (the RAG doc had
explicitly flagged this gap). Tests cover the helper and both wrappers.

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-03 20:07:28 +02:00
3ccc723cd4 v0.17.0 — Wave 3: sandbox DB, DB isolation, mobile UI, cloud auth, X account, roadmap engine (#303)
* feat(sandbox): throwaway per-agent Postgres/Redis sandbox containers

Orchestrator-provisioned sibling containers per agent spawn
(SandboxProvisioner, roboco/runtime/sandbox.py). Per-project opt-in via
projects.sandbox_services (migration 057); master switch
ROBOCO_SANDBOX_DB_ENABLED, default-off, armed in the NAS compose only.

When active, ROBOCO_TEST_DB_* / ROBOCO_TEST_REDIS_* point at the sandbox
and the prod-creds gate-env injection is suppressed (sandbox replaces,
never coexists). Sandbox lifetime tracks the agent container: teardown at
every removal path, orphan janitor at startup + each reaper tick with a
grace window for mid-flight spawns. The pre-spawn stale-clear spares the
just-provisioned sandbox; provision pre-clears stale same-named
containers from a crash-missed teardown.

Panel: per-project sandbox-service switches in the edit dialog + feature
flag card entry.

* docs: CLAUDE.md entry for the sandboxed dev DB/Redis subsystem

* feat(security): isolate prod Postgres/Redis from agent containers (roboco_data network)

Second user-defined bridge roboco_data carries postgres+redis only; the
orchestrator is multi-homed (default + data). Spawned agents and their
sandbox sidecars stay on roboco_default and can no longer resolve or
reach roboco-postgres:5432 / roboco-redis:6379 (redis has no auth —
membership is its only containment). Normal bridge, so host-published
ports (15432/16379) keep working. Applied to both build composes and
the registry compose; docker-compose.yml re-synced byte-identical with
docker-compose.yaml (it had drifted by the sandbox flag block).

ROBOCO_DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED (config default false, armed alongside the
topology) suppresses the legacy _append_gate_env prod-creds injection:
under isolation those creds dead-end, and unreachable creds are worse
than none. DB-needing projects opt into sandbox_services instead. The
flag is deliberately not a panel feature flag - it must travel with the
compose networks: stanzas.

Preserved by construction: agent<->agent A2A and orchestrator->agent SDK
polls on :9000, MCP->orchestrator on :8000, ollama reachability, docker
exec/inspect (daemon socket), host port publishing.

* feat(panel): full mobile responsiveness pass

Shared primitives: useIsMobile (useSyncExternalStore, hydration-safe,
memoized matchMedia subscribe), ResponsiveTable table->card switch below
md (single subtree mounted, no duplicated interactive rows), scrollable
snap TabsList in the base primitive (justify-center-safe so the first
tab stays reachable on overflow), persistent md:hidden bottom tab bar
(Overview/Tasks/Kanban/Chat, safe-area padded).

Applied: card lists for tasks/projects/products/work-sessions/sessions
+ the three raw metrics tables; CEO approval queue / release proposal /
playbook review action rows stack on narrow; command-center reorders
approvals above the fold on mobile; task-header metadata wraps;
Communications + A2A become URL-driven single-pane drill-downs below lg
(fixes the unconstrained-height ScrollArea bug) with dvh heights;
recharts label density/radius adapts via useIsMobile; git diff viewer
gets mobile font + wrap toggle; vh->dvh sweep; chat composers get
safe-area-inset padding; dashboard main p-4 md:p-6 + pb-20 for the bar.

Verified at 375px on the built app: bottom bar, drawer, approval-first
overview, swipeable kanban tab strip. All gates green (eslint, tsc,
vitest 249, next build 24/24 routes).

* feat(auth): cloud auth via FastAPI Users (default-off, single-user cookie session)

ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_ENABLED (default off) lets the panel/API be exposed
beyond localhost without changing the CEO's local no-login flow while
off — get_agent_context and the WS gate are byte-for-byte unchanged in
off-mode. On: header-trust dies for humans — any agent-role claim (ceo
or a privileged PM/board role) with no valid HMAC token or session
cookie is 401, closing the header-spoof hole on the host-published
:8000 port for every role. The agent-fleet HMAC path and the system
self-PATCH keep working unmodified in both modes.

Single seeded CEO user (migration 058 users table, UserTable), no
registration router — idempotent env-driven upsert at startup by PK.
Cookie transport (httponly/secure/samesite=lax) + a JWTStrategy bound
to a fingerprint of the current password hash (rotating the password
invalidates every prior session). Sliding 30-day session: every
authenticated request re-mints the cookie, so an active session never
expires — no unexpected logouts.

Panel: (auth)/login page + proxy.ts (Next 16 rename of middleware; probes
/auth/status over the docker-internal URL, fails open to off) gate the
dashboard; client.ts gets withCredentials + 401->/login. nginx unchanged.

Review hardening: broadened the on-mode rejection from ceo-only to every
non-CEO role without a valid token (was only closed when
ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED was also armed); Next-16 proxy.ts rename to
clear the middleware deprecation warning.

* feat(x): RoboCo X account engine — HoM drafts, per-post CEO approval (default-off)

ROBOCO_X_ENGINE_ENABLED (default off, inert without creds). Mirrors the
ReleaseManagerEngine held-artifact shape: XEngine drafts a post when a
release publishes (via a draft_release_post seam on ReleaseProposalService
.approve) and drafts replies to meaningful mentions (dedicated poll loop,
x_seen_mentions dedup ledger, per-cycle/open caps). Drafting is
local-model-only, clamped to 280 chars. Nothing auto-posts — every tweet
is a held task (source x_post/x_reply, confirmed_by_human=False,
Secretary-owned, dispatcher-skipped) the CEO edits/approves/rejects in a
panel queue.

The four OAuth 1.0a secrets live Fernet-encrypted in a singleton
x_credentials row (migration 059, all-or-nothing, API returns only
has_credentials); decryption is server-side, agents never hold creds or
egress. Hand-rolled OAuth 1.0a HMAC-SHA1 signer, no new dependency;
NullXClient makes the unconfigured path a graceful no-op.

XPostService.approve (CEO-only) is the sole caller of post_tweet.

Review hardening: closed a double-post race — the approve path now
re-reads committed task state inside the Redis lock and commits COMPLETED
before releasing, so a concurrent approve that acquires the lock after the
winner released can't re-post (SET-NX is non-waiting, and the route-level
commit landed after the lock dropped). Added a regression test.

* feat(roadmap): board roadmap engine — PO proposes themed cycles, CEO approves per-item (default-off)

ROBOCO_ROADMAP_ENGINE_ENABLED (default off). Weekly, RoadmapEngine opens
ONE held exploration task (source=board_roadmap, confirmed_by_human=False,
Product-Owner-assigned), deduped to one open cycle. A dedicated one-shot
_dispatch_roadmap_exploration spawns the PO solo (not the two-reviewer
board path, which would also spawn HoM + fire Approve-&-Start). The PO
explores read-only (git/KB/metrics/releases/charter/web) and makes one
propose_roadmap call (PO-only content verb) authoring a themed cycle —
goal + 3-7 item drafts — persisted as a roadmap_cycle marker (no table,
no migration; head stays 059).

The CEO acts per-item in the panel roadmap queue: approve materializes a
BACKLOG task (source=roadmap, no assignee — never auto-starts), reject
records a reason; all-items-terminal completes the exploration task.
RoadmapService is idempotent per item. Dispatchers skip board_roadmap.

Includes a real SQLAlchemy dirty-check fix (deep-copy the JSON marker
before mutating, or the in-place edit + reassign compares equal to its
own baseline and the UPDATE is skipped).

Review hardening: create_task_from_draft now honors a draft-declared
source only from a {prompter, roadmap} whitelist — drafts are
LLM-authored, so an unbounded source could impersonate a privileged
origin (release_manager would even wedge that engine's dedup).

* chore(release): 0.17.0

Wave 3 — six default-off subsystems: sandboxed dev DB/Redis, prod
Postgres/Redis network isolation, full mobile UI pass, cloud auth
(FastAPI Users), the RoboCo X account engine, and the board roadmap
engine. Plus the waves 1+2 work already on master since 0.16.0.

Version bumped across the canonical set (config.py, __init__.py,
pyproject.toml, panel/package.json, uv.lock); CHANGELOG [Unreleased]
cut to [0.17.0]; docs/map delta added.

Compose: every optional feature armed :-true in the NAS composes, OFF
in the user-facing registry compose. Two opt-in exceptions default off
(CLOUD_AUTH — needs email/password/secret + TLS, would otherwise fail
startup; ROUTING_STRICT — fail-closed spawning). DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED
stays on in both (coupled to the roboco_data topology).

* chore(compose): arm cloud_auth + routing_strict ON in the NAS composes

Every feature defaults ON in the NAS composes per policy — these two
were wrongly left off. Both keep the ${VAR:-true} form so the operator
controls the real runtime via .env: cloud auth needs
ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_EMAIL/_PASSWORD/_SECRET + TLS set there before a boot
(else startup fails loud), and routing_strict is fail-closed. Registry
compose keeps both off.

* fix(ci): reflow board.md prose (quality gate) + document v0.17.0 env creds

The roadmap section added hard-wrapped prose that failed the markdown
prose gate; reflowed (token-invariant). Also brought .env.example
current: cloud auth (now armed — needs SECRET or startup fails), routing
strict, the X engine (panel-entered OAuth), and web research.

* fix(ci): reduce cyclomatic complexity of five wave-3 blocks (xenon gate)

The wave-3 subagents introduced C-rank functions the CI xenon gate
rejects (my per-item reviews ran ruff/mypy/pytest but not xenon):
- sandbox.janitor_sweep -> extract _list_labeled_sandboxes /
  _list_live_agent_containers / _prune_grace
- x_client.fetch_mentions -> extract _parse_mention_items
- x_engine.run_cycle -> extract _process_mentions
- orchestrator._dispatch_pm_work -> extract the source-skip into a
  MODULE-level _is_held_ceo_source (module, not method, so the
  wholesale-mocked dispatcher unit tests exercise the real logic)
- auth/seed.ensure_seed_user -> extract _apply_seed_updates (module avg -> A)

Behavior-preserving; full suite green (11902), xenon clean.

* fix(ci): declare pyjwt + fastapi-users-db-sqlalchemy as direct deps (deptry)

The cloud-auth code imports jwt and fastapi_users_db_sqlalchemy directly
but they were only transitive deps (via fastapi-users), which deptry
(quality gate, DEP003) rejects. Declared explicitly; deptry roboco/ clean.
Missed originally because local make quality stopped at earlier gates
before reaching deptry.

* feat(x): gate mention replies behind ROBOCO_X_REPLIES_ENABLED (default off)

Per CEO decision: the X engine should only post about releases by
default. Reading mentions needs a paid X API tier, so the mention-reply
half is now a deliberate opt-in on top of release posting.

New default-off flag x_replies_enabled gates the mentions poll loop
(_x_mentions_poll_loop) and XEngine.run_cycle; release-post drafting
(the release-proposal approve hook) is unaffected and still runs when
x_engine_enabled + credentials are set. Added to FEATURE_FLAGS + the
panel card. Tests: release posting works with replies off; run_cycle +
the poll loop are no-ops with replies off.

* fix: 401 only redirects to /login when cloud auth is on; panel-token strips .env quotes

Two bugs that together dead-ended login in secure mode:
- client.ts redirected to /login on ANY 401, so a mismatched panel
  token (header-trust/secure mode, cloud auth off) bounced the user to a
  login page whose backend route isn't mounted -> 404. Now it probes
  /auth/status (bare fetch, no interceptor re-entry) and only redirects
  when cloud_auth_enabled.
- make panel-token read the .env secret with grep|cut without stripping
  surrounding quotes, so a quoted ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET produced a
  token signed with the quotes included — which never verifies against
  the orchestrator (docker-compose/pydantic unquote the secret). Now
  strips surrounding single/double quotes.

* fix: git-log 500 on '|' in commit message; X queue shows an empty state

- GET /api/git/log 500'd (ValueError: Invalid isoformat) when a commit
  SUBJECT contained a '|' (e.g. the 'curl|sh' lockdown commit): the
  fixed '|' field delimiter let the subject's pipe shift the split so
  author+date collapsed into one field. Switched to \x1f (Unit
  Separator), which can't appear in commit content. Regression test with
  a piped subject.
- The X Post Queue returned null when empty, so there was no visible
  place for the X drafts. It now renders a discoverable empty state
  pointing at Settings -> X credentials.

* docs: bring docs/rag + docs/map current for v0.17.0 (waves 1-3)

Agent-facing RAG corpus and codebase map updated for every feature in
the 0.17.0 span, code-verified:
- wave 3: sandbox DB, DB network isolation, cloud auth, X engine
  (+ x_replies_enabled sub-flag), board roadmap engine — new RAG
  architecture pages + role/tool/config-reference updates; new symbols,
  migrations 057-059, panel surfaces, and the get_agent_context
  dual-path across the map slices.
- waves 1-2: A2A live view + switchboard, prompter memory
  (search_past_tasks), Secretary edit access + PM-lighter scope, the
  PR-gate auto-submit turn cut (ROBOCO_PR_GATE_AUTO_SUBMIT_ENABLED).
- correctness fix: api-routes-schemas.md no longer claims the A2A admin
  routes are reachable by any authenticated agent — they carry a
  _require_ceo gate (wave 2c).

docs/internal, _front.md deltas, and the frozen _complete_map.md
snapshot untouched.

* fix(rag): atomic upsert for indexed-doc tracking (kills e2e segfault)

The indexed-document tracking write used check-then-insert in two paths
(IndexedDocumentRepository.upsert_batch and the file-source
_upsert_doc_record). Under concurrent indexing both callers saw no row
and both inserted, so the second violated uq_indexed_doc_source and
poisoned its transaction — surfacing in CI as the intermittent
_checkin_failed SIGSEGV on the failed connection's pool checkin.

Both paths now use INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE against the
constraint: coalesce keeps an existing title/preview when the new value
is empty (matching the old guards) and metadata is jsonb-merged. The
batch dedupes within itself first (ON CONFLICT can't touch a row twice
in one statement). expire_all after the Core upsert keeps same-session
ORM reads consistent with the merged DB row.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-03 19:24:00 +02:00
Renn F fe67a630ac docs: document the 2026-07-02 hotfix batch across CHANGELOG, RAG corpus, and map
CHANGELOG entries for the summary route + bounded lists, panel flood
fixes, delegate collision-surface params, breaker revisit budget,
squash-merge guard relief, stale-ref diff fix, team-match enforcement,
manifest workspace fix, QA no-pre-claim. RAG corpus teaches agents the
new delegate requirements, wrong-team remediate, and QA self-claim flow;
dated delta appended to docs/map/_front.md.
2026-07-02 15:59:39 +02:00
cfde4369b1 Token optimization levers — claim-scoped briefing, payload caps, role-scoped optimal, notification-spawn cooldown (#292)
* feat(gateway): claim-scoped context briefing — heavy sections only on context-acquisition verbs

* feat(gateway): cap unbounded LLM-facing payloads — embedded diffs, notification bodies, handoff journal content, north star

* feat(mcp): role-scope the optimal server's tool groups; index management becomes dev/test-only

* feat(mcp): cap per-result content on kb/error/learning search, mentor sources, rag citations

* refactor(gateway): extract heavy-briefing sections + clip helper to keep xenon ranks

* feat(orchestrator): cross-tick cooldown for notification-triggered spawns

* feat(usage,orchestrator): scope spawn-waste to anthropic sessions; cap agent Bash output via settings env

* docs: claim-scoped briefing, payload caps, optimal role-scoping, notification-spawn cooldown

* test(mcp): type the mixed-item cap fixture explicitly

* fix(orchestrator): lazy-init the notification-spawn cooldown store

* fix(lifecycle): admin-override claim reconciliation + PM request_changes verb (S6 postmortem B3+B4)

B3 — admin_set_status now reconciles claim ownership when leaving BLOCKED:
review/queue targets clear claimed_by/claimed_at/active_claimant_id and
consume the pre-block snapshot (a stale escalation claim was stranding the
next claimant: give_me_work handed the task out while note() bounced
not_authorized — the live b8fe0494 wedge). The pending/in_progress restore
path also syncs active_claimant_id, and a REST PATCH unassign releases the
claim with it.

B4 — new PM verb request_changes: awaiting_pm_review -> needs_revision with
concrete issues. The PM previously had no reject at merge review (only
complete/escalate), so an AC/scope violation looped i_am_blocked->escalate
4x live. Full vertical: lifecycle transition + ActionSpec + IntentSpec,
TaskService.request_changes (routes like a QA fail — original dev for a
leaf, revision PM for assembled; issues appended to dev_notes), verb-runner
compose, choreographer verb (spec gate + non-empty issues + soup check +
a2a delivery of the reject reason), HTTP routes on both PM flows, MCP tool,
journal:decision tracing, PM prompts, regenerated lifecycle artifacts.

* fix(panel): stop scorecard fetches for fallback-roster placeholder ids

useAgents() serves the static AGENT_ROSTER (ids "1".."22") while agent
definitions load; the Scorecards tab fetched a member scorecard per row
immediately, firing 22 guaranteed-422 requests per refetch cycle. Through
the browser's per-origin connection limit those queued every metrics-page
query behind them (~10s of skeletons on every tab). Gate the fetch on a
real member id (agent UUID or the "ceo" alias).

* Upgraded uv.lock

* fix(sequencing): declared deps become real edges + full loop-breaker coverage + assembled-branch freshness (S6 postmortem B1/B2/B6 + breaker)

B1a — code delegations REQUIRE a collision surface: new TASK_AT_DELEGATE
completeness spec (conditional FieldRequirement, when=('task_type','code'))
enforced at the gateway delegate gate. A no-surface code sibling is
'parallel to everything' by analyzer design, which is how two devs ran the
CEO's explicitly-ordered work out of order (f3e1afc5: seq#1 started before
seq#0, zero dependency edges). PM prompts updated; REST/manual creation
(TASK_AT_CREATE) unchanged.

B1b — the CEO's declared 'Depends on' lists become real edges: DraftSurface
gains declared_depends_on; SequencingService.analyze unions declared edges
(validated: self/out-of-range rejected) with the derived collision rules,
cycle-checked by the existing toposort. confirm_live_batch/preview_batch
map each draft's depends_on through (string indices coerced); intake tool
doc + prompter role prompt instruct verbatim copying. The live S6 root got
1 of its 3 declared in-batch edges and started alongside still-running R3.

Breaker coverage — the progress-aware respawn circuit breaker
(_pm_respawn_should_gate: strike counting, status-advance reset,
tracing-gap budget, DB durability, one-shot CEO notification) was consulted
by only 3 spawn paths; the doc/QA/dev/PR-review/PR-gate/revision/board
paths spawned unguarded at fixed cadence (the 26-respawn fe-doc loop,
~$7.20). Now consulted at every task-keyed spawn site (14 total).

B2 — assembled-branch freshness: submit_up/submit_root auto-sync the
assembled branch when it has fallen behind its base (children are terminal
at submit time, so the rebase is safe; master is never written). A rebase
conflict is a hard reject naming the files instead of a blind re-review —
kills the needs_revision↔awaiting_pr_review ping-pong of re-submitting a
stale head. Leaf i_am_done already had the behind-base gate; claim-time
fetch-fresh cut already existed.

B6 — documenter revision-pass loop: the awaiting_documentation bail
rejections (i_am_blocked/unclaim) now name the actual exit (i_documented
re-affirm) and the documenter prompt gets an explicit revision-pass rule.

* fix(orchestration): assembly-integrity gate + dispatcher heartbeat (incidents #11, #1)

Assembly integrity — submit_up/submit_root refuse when a completed child's
commits are not patch-present in the assembled branch (git cherry —
rebase-safe; branch pruned after merge or any git error fails open). Live
incident #11: a completed revert subtask's merge was lost from the cell
branch and the review gate re-flagged the exact violation the revert fixed,
spawning another revision cycle.

Dispatcher heartbeat — a dispatcher.alive audit row every 5 minutes from
the dispatch loop. The 2026-07-01 outage was 4h25m of fleet-wide silence
with no way to distinguish 'loop dead' from 'no work'; the loop's stdout
died with the container while audit_log survives. CHANGELOG for tonight's
full sweep included.

* style: ruff format for the orchestration sweep

* refactor(gateway): fold the assembled-submit guards + trim complexity under the xenon gate

_assembled_submit_guards combines the #11 integrity check and B2 freshen for
submit_up/submit_root; lifecycle's invalid-source remediate and git's
per-child cherry probe extracted into helpers. Test harnesses built via
__new__ stub the respawn tracker (the breaker now runs on their paths).

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-02 05:46:01 +02:00
0ca9d91b72 v0.16.0: fastapi-guard HTTP security layer — calibrated + scanner honeytrap (#290)
* [fastapi-guard] Phase 1a: gated config flags for the HTTP security layer

Adds the ROBOCO_GUARD_* settings (all default-off / secure-default) for the
upcoming fastapi-guard 7.2.0 hardening — guard_enabled (master switch),
guard_fail_secure (fail-closed default; NAS overrides to false),
guard_telemetry_enabled + guard_agent_api_key + guard_project_id (guard-agent
telemetry, opt-in), guard_emergency + guard_emergency_whitelist (lockdown kill
switch). Inert until consumed: nothing reads them yet, so the request path is
unchanged. Foundation for v0.16.0.

* [fastapi-guard] Phase 1b: security foundation module + gated wiring

Add fastapi-guard 7.2.0 + guard-core 3.3.0 (bare, unpinned) and roboco/security.py:
- build_security_config() from settings — behind-nginx real-IP (trusted_proxies +
  trust_x_forwarded_proto), HSTS/CSP headers, threat-ban + 404-sweep rules,
  redis-backed state, exclude_paths (/ws + health + docs), env-driven
  enforce_https, fail_secure (secure default), emergency lockdown, guard-agent
  telemetry (opt-in), passive-mode calibration switch.
- guard_deco singleton (SecurityDecorator) for per-route decorators (Phase 2+).
- Three custom content validators guard's WAF can't cover: prompt-injection /
  role-override, secret-exfil / credential-in-body, internal-SSRF.
- apply_guard(app) + guarded_lifespan() wired into create_app AFTER settings.
  guard_passive_mode config flag added.

Entirely gated by ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED (default off): create_app mounts nothing
and returns the unchanged app when off (verified). make quality GREEN
(cov 95.32%, pip-audit clean, import-linter 2/0). 12 new unit tests.

* [fastapi-guard] Phase 2: critical-path decorators

Apply guard decorators to the highest-value endpoints (metadata-only; enforced
only when the middleware is mounted, so no-op while ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED is off):
- provider keys (ollama/grok/self-hosted writes): strict rate_limit +
  max_request_size + block_clouds (no datacenter IP should touch secret writes).
- settings write + release approve/reject (CEO-gated): strict rate_limit.
- intake chat (prompter start/messages/events): rate_limit + max_request_size +
  custom_validation(prompt_injection_validator) — the prompt-facing free-text
  ingress gets the injection/role-override/secret-exfil content scan.

make quality GREEN (cov 95.32%, contracts 2/0). App builds with guard off,
decorators inert (verified).

* [fastapi-guard] Phase 3: wide decorator coverage across ingress + sensitive routes

Targeted-wide application (metadata-only; no-op until ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED). The
global SecurityMiddleware already rate-limits + WAF-scans every request, so this
adds the custom content validators on free-text ingress + tight limits on
sensitive ops (not blanket per-route rate_limit on reads):

- agent gateway do verbs (note/say/commit/dm/pitch/progress/draft_playbook/...):
  rate_limit + max_request_size + custom_validation(secret_exfil or prompt_injection).
- a2a message/send + chat writes: rate_limit + size + prompt_injection.
- optimal/RAG (kb/search, rag/query, mentor/ask, errors/decisions/standards/
  learnings): prompt_injection on searches, secret_exfil on record writes; docs
  index → internal_ssrf.
- tasks: create/update → prompt_injection; QA/doc/PM transitions → secret_exfil;
  CEO-gated verbs → tight rate_limit.
- secretary chat → prompt_injection; research → internal_ssrf; orchestrator
  spawn/mutations → rate_limit; git ops + flow verbs → tight rate_limit.
Pure GET/reads left to the global middleware. Applied via a Sonnet workflow,
then verified: app builds with guard off (decorators inert), make quality GREEN
(cov 95.37%, contracts 2/0). Decoy/honeypot-path surface deferred (needs verified
guard ban-API integration — not rushed).

* [fastapi-guard] Phase 5: arm the NAS composes in passive/log-only mode

Arm ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED=true + ROBOCO_GUARD_PASSIVE_MODE=true +
ROBOCO_GUARD_FAIL_SECURE=false on the two NAS composes (docker-compose.yaml +
.yml). Passive = guard mounts and logs what it WOULD block but blocks nothing,
so the next NAS deploy calibrates against real traffic; flip PASSIVE_MODE off
after the false-positive review to enforce. fail_secure=false keeps a
guard-internal error from 500ing the personal deploy. The registry (user-facing)
compose is deliberately left unarmed so its published default stays conservative.
Phase 4 (passive calibration) is the operational step this enables.

* feat(security): Phase 3b — full-arsenal per-route guard enrichment

Stack the applicable guard decorators per surface instead of the minimal
rate_limit/max_request_size/custom_validation triad: content_type_filter on
every JSON-body write, honeypot_detection form-traps on human-facing POSTs,
block_clouds on key-writes + CEO release ops, behavior_analysis runaway-rate
rules on the agent flow/do verbs, suspicious_detection + usage_monitor on the
sensitive surfaces. Nine distinct decorators now applied thoughtfully per
endpoint. All metadata-only — no-op while ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED is off.

* fix(a2a): permit PR reviewer to deliver gate verdicts to the owning PM

can_a2a_direct had no pr_reviewer rule, so a reviewer (team=board, or a cell
team) fell through to the cell-member path and was cross-cell-denied when the
in-path gate delivered a pr_fail change-request to main-pm (or a cross-cell
cell-pm): "Cannot A2A main-pm ... Ask None to coordinate with None". The
delivery is best-effort, so pr_fail still transitioned but the verdict never
reached the owning PM — the blind-re-submit signal-gap the pr_fail fix closes.

Add an explicit pr_reviewer handler: it may A2A only cell_pm / main_pm (its
sole comms surface — everything else it posts on the PR itself), with a matching
route hint. The cell reviewers kept same-team access by coincidence; this scopes
every reviewer to PM-only, the correct model, with no other A2A caller affected.

Refresh uv.lock to the current resolution.

* feat(models): adopt Claude Sonnet 5 as the sonnet tier

Point the 'sonnet' alias at claude-sonnet-5 (MODEL_MAP) and give pr_reviewer
its own opus tier in ROLE_MODEL_MAP — it was falling through to the sonnet
default, and the role gates untrusted external/fork PRs plus root→master, which
warrants opus.

Price claude-sonnet-5 at the promotional 33% off Sonnet 4.6 ($2.01 / $10.05,
cache 0.201 / 0.5025) through 2026-08-31 via a dedicated pricing fragment that
beats the bare 'sonnet' alias; revert to full rate when the promo ends. Bare
'sonnet' stays full-rate as a conservative fallback (prod prices the resolved
claude-sonnet-5 id from the transcript).

Update the model docs and the billing / usage / manifest / spawn tests.

* feat(security): calibrate the guard WAF for RoboCo traffic + document the layer

The first end-to-end run of the fastapi-guard layer showed active enforcement
would block ~50% of legitimate agent traffic — RoboCo request bodies are code,
SQL, diffs, file paths, HTML, and URLs, which the stock signature WAF reads as
attacks. build_security_config now excludes RoboCo's free-text top-level body
fields (derived from the real request models, including the free-form container
fields whose nested prose is stringified and scanned) from WAF scanning,
dropping the active-mode false-positive rate to zero while keeping the WAF on
every non-excluded (id/enum/slug/branch) field and leaving the
prompt-injection / secret-exfil / internal-SSRF validators — which run
independently of the exclusion — fully in force. enable_penetration_detection
is made explicit.

Only excluded_detection_body_fields is reliable on guard 7.2.1: the per-route
categories knob is bypassed for JSON bodies, and the body scanner excludes
top-level keys only (scanning str(value) of every non-excluded field), so
free-form container fields must be excluded wholesale.

Adds tests/unit/test_security_middleware.py — the first end-to-end exercise of
the middleware (mounts it, drives guard's lifespan, fires real requests):
proves passive mode is log-only, active mode does not false-positive on
realistic agent payloads, threats are still blocked inside excluded fields, and
the WAF still fires on non-excluded fields.

Docs: CHANGELOG (Unreleased); a user-facing Optional-subsystems page + nav +
env reference for the HTTP security layer; the agent-facing RAG corpus
(what it is + why a request could be blocked); and the roboco mapping
(api-core-websocket / deployment-tooling / _complete_map).

* feat(security): Surface N — scanner honeytrap (guard /api auto-ban + nginx edge-drop)

Turns scanner probes against the scanner, in two layers matched to where
traffic lands. Behind nginx only /api, /ws, /health, /ready reach the
orchestrator, so guard can only see (and ban) scanner probes on those paths;
the classic root probes (/.env, /wp-login.php, /phpmyadmin, /.git/config) hit
the panel. So:

- build_security_config's threat_ban_config gains recon / sensitive_file /
  cms_probing categories. A scanner probing those fingerprints on an /api path
  is detected on the URL-path scan; repeated probes from one IP trip an adaptive
  per-IP auto-ban (redis-backed, 24h). Only bans in active mode (passive logs
  the recon hit) and needs redis (the 24h ban exceeds the in-memory cap). The
  spec's decoy-route file is redundant — the WAF url-path scan bans regardless
  of a registered route — so it is intentionally omitted.
- docker/nginx.conf drops the classic root scanner paths at the edge with 444
  (connection closed, no response) before they reach the panel, anchored to
  known scanner fingerprints so /.well-known and every real panel/API route are
  untouched. Always on, independent of ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED.

Tests: 2 unit (the exclusion set + the scanner-ban categories are present) and
2 integration (a decoy path is blocked in active mode, passes in passive). The
nginx regex was validated against 15 scanner + 19 legit paths (0 false
positives). Docs: CHANGELOG, the HTTP-security page, the roboco mapping, and the
agent-facing RAG corpus.

* Token optimization — per-role observability, compute policy, spawn preflight (#291)

* test(models): lock the sonnet→claude-sonnet-5 MODEL_MAP invariant

* feat(usage): surface cache tokens + cache_hit_rate in usage breakdowns

* feat(usage): add per-role usage breakdown endpoint

* feat(usage): add spawn-waste signal (per-role unproductive rate + respawn strikes)

* feat(panel): surface per-role cost/cache + spawn-waste on the metrics page

* feat(routing): Phase 2 per-role compute policy — qa→haiku, main_pm→sonnet, per-role effort env mechanism (default-inert)

* feat(orchestrator): Phase 3 flag-gated spawn preflight — refuse non-gateway delivery roles (respawn-forever guard)

* chore(compose): arm ROBOCO_SPAWN_PREFLIGHT_ENABLED on the NAS composes

* docs: per-role usage observability, per-role compute policy, and spawn preflight

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(panel): pin outputFileTracingRoot so the standalone build isn't broken by stray lockfiles

* feat(routing): populate ROLE_EFFORT_MAP + wire the verified --effort flag (cell_pm/board/auditor to medium)

* feat(gateway): omit empty context_briefing sections (Phase 4 payload compaction)

* refactor(orchestrator): extract spawn chokepoint guards to restore xenon rank B on spawn_agent

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-01 23:54:48 +02:00
df87fcf059 Chore/logical gaps element sweep fixes (#287)
* [sweep] lifecycle: 6 confirmed gaps fixed (cancel-ceo-gate, claim_pr_review gate, needs_team_match, valid_next_verbs narrowing, pr_reviewer unclaim, complete side_effect ordering)

* [chore] logical-gaps: route-layer force gate + privileged-field gate + pre-task audit attribution

tasks.py (5 gaps):
- _HATCH_OVERRIDE_STATES expanded to 7: a privileged PATCH INTO a gate
  state (completed/cancelled/awaiting_{qa,documentation,pr_review,
  pm_review,ceo_approval}) now requires explicit force — the panel hatch
  is no longer a quiet click that drops a task into/out of a human gate.
- _RESURRECT_SOURCE_STATES: a privileged PATCH OUT of a terminal status
  (completed/cancelled) resurrects finished work and likewise requires
  force, audited as an override.
- _PRIVILEGED_UPDATE_FIELDS gate: a bare task owner (UPDATE_OWN, no
  ASSIGN) cannot self-reassign / re-team / re-parent / re-depend /
  re-block / rewrite-plan / re-project its task — those structural fields
  are PM-gated; the REST surface must not bypass the verb-layer's
  reassign/delegate/triage gate. A 403 names the touched fields + the
  verb to use instead.
- pre-task create denial: a role that cannot create tasks is now logged
  via log_task_creation_denial (distinct task_creation target_type +
  attempted payload) instead of a 'N/A' task_id that coerced to NULL and
  left the role-escalation attempt unattributable.

audit.py:
- split log_task_action_denial (5-param, under PLR0913) from
  log_task_creation_denial (4-param) — the create path has no task_id;
  the non-UUID sentinel (N/A) is preserved in details[target_id_raw]
  rather than dropped to a NULL target_id indistinguishable from any
  other NULL-target denial.

tests:
- test_tasks_routes.py: parametrized admin-override gate (force
  required for gate + terminal states, force succeeds).
- test_tasks_route_privileged_fields.py: dev owner 403 on
  assigned_to/team/parent_task_id, 200 on dev-facing description.
- test_audit.py: pre-task attribution via log_task_creation_denial +
  non-UUID sentinel preservation.

* [chore] logical-gaps: kanban board column coverage + status-class fixes (6 gaps)

models/kanban.py:
- DEV_COLUMNS: cover all 15 lifecycle statuses (was 7; dropped BACKLOG,
  PAUSED, VERIFYING, NEEDS_REVISION, AWAITING_PR_REVIEW, AWAITING_PM_REVIEW,
  AWAITING_CEO_APPROVAL, CANCELLED). A dev whose task bounced to
  needs_revision or sits in a gate used to see their own task vanish.
- PM_COLUMNS: add the gate/revision/paused/cancelled/backlog columns so the
  cell PM sees the QA->docs->PR-review->PM-review->CEO chain on its board.
- QA_COLUMNS: drop the 'In Review'->VERIFYING mapping. VERIFYING is the dev's
  self-verification (task still with the dev, not with QA); it misrepresented
  dev mid-verification as active QA work.

services/kanban.py:
- _build_flat_board: add an 'Other' fallback column for any task whose status
  matches no configured column, so total_cards == sum(card_count) and no card
  is built-then-silently-dropped (the vanished-card leak).
- get_qa_board: drop VERIFYING from qa_statuses (consistent with the column
  change).
- get_documenter_board: scope to task_type=documentation so a dev IN_PROGRESS
  code task sharing the cell team no longer appears under 'Gathering'.
- get_main_pm_board_flat: widen the status filter to include PENDING/CLAIMED/
  COMPLETED and route those to the incoming/distributed/done columns, which
  were structurally always empty under the in-flight-only filter.

tests/integration/test_kanban_service.py: parametrized coverage of every
dropped dev status, PM gate/revision states, QA excludes VERIFYING,
documenter excludes dev code tasks, flat Main PM incoming/distributed/done
populated, and the 'Other' fallback invariant.

* [chore] logical-gaps: lifecycle-enforcement validators + status-class fixes (5 gaps)

enforcement/task_lifecycle.py:
- drop the spurious VERIFYING->awaiting_documentation legacy edge. The
  canonical exit is submit_qa -> awaiting_qa -> (qa_pass) ->
  awaiting_documentation; the direct edge bypassed the entire QA review hop
  (ungated — no role gate existed for it).
- is_waiting_state: add awaiting_pr_review. The PR-review gate parks the PM on
  the reviewer; it is a waiting state. The hard-coded set was never updated
  when AWAITING_PR_REVIEW was added to the enum, so the gate status was
  miscategorized as active.

foundation/_validate_lifecycle.py:
- _check_status_enum_coverage: replace the tautology (STATUS_GRAPH keys every
  Status by construction) with a real bidirectional check — every non-terminal
  Status is the source of a transition (catches orphan states), and every
  source/target referenced is a real Status member (catches stray-string
  targets).
- _check_terminal_exits: split the {COMPLETED, CANCELLED} reachability into a
  COMPLETED-path requirement + a cancel-exit requirement. The cancel fan-out
  made the old check structurally trivial — a status whose sole exit was cancel
  passed with no real forward completion path.
- _check_status_enum_parity (new, registered): cross-check spec.Status against
  models.base.TaskStatus at import so the ORM column type and the lifecycle
  map cannot drift (TaskType had this guard; Status did not).

tests: verifying->awaiting_documentation rejected, self-fail preserved,
awaiting_pr_review is waiting, mutually-disjoint classification invariant,
status enum parity, stray-string-target / orphan-source / cancel-only-exit
validator rejections.

* [chore] logical-gaps: stream-bus poison-pill ACK + dead-letter, periodic reclaim, cancelled-handler marker cleanup (3 gaps)

stream_bus.py:
- _handle_message isolates Event.from_json in its own try/except; an
  undecodable payload (unknown EventType, bad UUID/timestamp, malformed
  JSON) is dead-lettered then ACKed instead of falling through to the
  broad except that only logged — a poison pill stayed pending forever
  and re-failed on every reclaim. (gap: stream-bus-malformed-event-poison-pill)
- _reclaim_loop spawned alongside _listen_loop in start_listening (cancelled
  in disconnect). XREADGROUP '>' delivers only NEW messages, so a runtime
  handler failure left its message pending and unretried until a restart;
  the loop re-runs recover_pending every 60s so the idempotency-guarded
  replay actually fires. (gap: stream-bus-no-runtime-reclaim-loop)
- _run_handler_guarded marker cleanup catches BaseException so a handler
  cancelled mid-flight (asyncio.CancelledError is BaseException-derived
  since 3.8) clears its SET-NX marker; otherwise the guard suppressed the
  very redelivery that would complete the work. (gap: stream-bus-cancelled-
  handler-keeps-idempotency-marker)

TDD: 4 red->green tests in tests/unit/events/test_bus.py.

* [chore] logical-gaps: verb_runner trailing-None side-effect guard + actor_agent_id threading (3 gaps)

_verb_runner.py:
- run_intent skips the side_effects loop when a TRAILING composed action
  returned None (its source-status check failed under a concurrent
  transition). Previously the loop ran unconditionally on the None task
  and _do_push_branch(None)/_do_pr_merge(None) crashed with a
  NoneType AttributeError, turning the clean INVALID_STATE the
  entry/intermediate guards give into a 500/respawn loop. The trailing
  None now flows to the caller's `if task is None` handler. Latent today
  (no shipped intent has both a None-capable compose and trailing
  side_effects) but the runner is generic. (gap: runner-side-effects-fire-
  on-trailing-none-task)
- _do_push_branch / _do_create_pr / _do_create_root_pr forward
  actor_agent_id=agent.id into git_service (push_branch / create_pr),
  matching _do_pr_merge. Without it, a verb on a task whose assigned_to
  was cleared before the side effect falls through to created_by and
  pushes from / opens a PR against the wrong workspace.
  (gap: side-effect-handlers-drop-actor-agent-id)
- _do_escalate_to_ceo forwards actor_agent_id=agent.id so the
  awaiting_ceo_approval audit row attributes to the specific PM/Board
  agent. (gap: do-escalate-to-ceo-drops-actor-agent-id)

task.py: escalate_to_ceo gains actor_agent_id param, passed as
audit_agent_id to _validate_and_set_status and recorded as
escalated_by_agent_id in the event payload + log. escalate_to_ceo_for_agent
forwards agent.agent_id.

_impl.py: the main_pm complete->escalate path forwards
actor_agent_id=main_pm_agent_id.

TDD: 5 red->green tests (synthetic trailing-None intent, actor forwarding
for push_branch/create_pr/create_root_pr/escalate_to_ceo) + real-DB audit
test asserting the awaiting_ceo_approval row carries the actor UUID.
Updated 3 board escalate_to_ceo tests to assert the forwarded actor.

* [B-REL] release executor: idempotent half-landed retry + commit-scoped CI + decoupled workflow

Three confirmed gaps in the release fail-closed pipeline (#87/#318/#402):

#87 publish_failed retry duplicates changelog: execute() only short-circuits
on an existing tag. A publish_failed outcome (commit pushed + CI green, no
tag) left no tag, so a retry re-ran apply_version_bumps + write_changelog_entry
(re-inserting the entry above the already-present heading -> duplicate) and
commit_and_push (a second chore(release) commit). Add ReleaseOps
.release_commit_sha(version) detecting a prior release commit on the branch
(clone already at the target version); when present, skip the bump/changelog/
gate/commit pipeline and rejoin the shared CI -> publish tail on the existing
commit. No second commit, no duplicate entry.

#318 wait_for_ci polls branch-latest, not the release commit: a later push to
master during the ~40min wait made the latest run's head_sha != the release
sha forever, exhausting _CI_MAX_POLLS -> false ci_failed on a release whose
own CI was green. Thread head_sha through get_latest_ci_conclusion /
_fetch_latest_ci_run (GitHub actions/runs?head_sha=) so the gate polls the
release commit's own run; a concurrent push can no longer mask it.

#402 release CI gate reuses self_heal_ci_workflow: that setting documents an
empty-string mode for single-workflow repos which, inherited here, degraded
the fail-closed gate to the all-workflows mode git.py itself flags as
unreliable. Add release_ci_workflow (default ci.yml) and _resolve_release_
ci_workflow(); the release gate always resolves a NAMED workflow, never None.

Refactor: bundle the CI-fetch per-project inputs into a _CiRunQuery dataclass
so _fetch_latest_ci_run stays under the arg-count gate; unify the half-landed
path into execute's shared tail (drops a separate _publish_existing, one
return path). TDD red->green; ruff/mypy clean.

* [chore] logical-gaps: a2a service hierarchy gate (typed, unconditional) + persist skill on message row (3 gaps)

create_a2a_notification gated A2A hierarchy only when both ends resolved
(`if from_agent and target_agent:`), so an unattributed (from_agent falsy)
or unresolvable-target request slipped past the hierarchy matrix and
dispatched with from_agent='unknown' / to_agent='' — and a denial came back
as a bare ValueError indistinguishable from the missing-task_id ValueError.
Require both ends present, then validate via the shared typed
validate_a2a_access path (A2AAccessDeniedError + route_hint) so the legacy
notification surface enforces the same who-may-talk-to-whom invariant as the
conversation path.

send() accepts skill= and the gateway callers (qa/doc/pr_gate) pass it
expecting the receiver to learn which capability the message is about, but
send_chat_message never read it from options — silently dropped. Persist a
nullable skill column (migration 054) on a2a_messages, wire it through
send_chat_message + _msg_to_model + the A2AChatMessage model, and fix the
send() docstring (it claimed 'recorded in message metadata').

TDD: 4 red→green (skill recorded on message + surfaces in inbox; permission
denied raises typed A2AAccessDeniedError with route_hint; self-A2A raises
typed; missing from_agent raises instead of silent dispatch). 103 a2a
integration tests green; ruff/mypy clean; migration 054 verified
upgrade/downgrade on throwaway PG.

* [chore] logical-gaps: release-proposal already_published closes proposal + heartbeat-lock-loss cancels execute (2 gaps)

approve() closed the proposal only on status=='published'. A retry that finds
the tag already shipped returns 'already_published' (is_already_published),
so if a prior publish's route commit failed / HTTP 504'd, the proposal stayed
non-terminal forever — every retry returned already_published and never
closed it; only a manual cancel unstuck it. Close on both published and
already_published: the release shipped either way.

_heartbeat_loop returned silently when the lock was no longer owned (a >TTL
Redis outage let the mutex expire mid-execute), leaving executor.execute
running UNGUARDED — a concurrent approve (once Redis returns) could then
acquire the lock and _prepare_release_clone rm -rf the in-flight shared
release clone while the first execute was still mid-run_gate, re-opening the
very rm -rf-clone race the mutex+heartbeat exist to prevent. Run execute as a
task; on lock-loss the heartbeat sets a flag and cancels it, and approve()
turns the CancelledError into a structured 'lock_lost' result (an external
cancellation of approve itself still propagates — distinguished by the flag).

TDD: 2 red→green (already_published → COMPLETED not wedged; heartbeat lock-loss
→ lock_lost + execute cancelled, proposal not completed). 8 concurrency tests
green; ruff/mypy clean.

* [chore] logical-gaps: release approve async dispatch (202) — kill the 40min synchronous HTTP 504

The approve route ran the whole fail-closed execute inline: clone(600s) +
gate(1800s) + CI poll(2400s) + publish(300s) ≈ up to 85min worst case. nginx
(the single :3000 entry point, ~60s read timeout) 504'd long before it
finished, so the CEO's approve always appeared to fail even when the release
succeeded server-side — the structured ReleaseResult was unreachable over the
wire. dispatch_approve spawns the execute in a background task with a fresh
session (built from the request session's engine) and the route returns 202
'accepted' immediately; _INFLIGHT_APPROVES tracks the dispatched task for
observability (self-cleans via done-callback; the Redis mutex still refuses a
double-execute on a second click). The panel already polls GET /proposal every
30s, so it observes the final status (COMPLETED on published/already_published,
else the proposal stays open for retry); the card's approve toast now treats
'accepted' as an info 'dispatched, running in the background' instead of the
old 'Release halted' warning.

TDD: 2 route tests red→green (approve returns 202 'accepted' + the proposal
transitions to COMPLETED / stays PENDING once the background faked execute
completes; the dispatched task is awaited while the executor patch is live).
83 release tests green; ruff/mypy clean; panel typecheck+lint+format+test
green.

* [chore] mcp-servers: normalize exception bodies to Envelope + lift task_id/correlation_id on circuit_open (#232 #359 #57)

flow_server/do_server: the non-404 JSON path returned exception-handler bodies
raw (dict `error` from roboco/generic/http exception handlers, or a 422
`detail` list) — neither is the Envelope wire format the agent is prompted to
trust (string error kind + message + remediate + missing), so on any
service/validation failure the agent got no remediate and flailed until the
breaker tripped. _normalize_exception_envelope lifts the body into a real
Envelope (code -> counted string kind via _classify_dict_error_code, NOT_FOUND
-> not_found, message lifted, remediate synthesized, missing=[]; 422 -> incomplete_input with the validation detail preserved). The synthesized
envelope still flows through the breaker so a 500/422 storm trips it.

_record_and_check_circuit: the circuit_open substitution dropped task_id /
correlation_id from the top level (the SDK's envelope omits them); lift them
from the original rejection so the agent's envelope contract and ops audit-join
of the trip event still work, not just nested in inner.

intake_server._post_event: capture the relay response body under `detail` on
non-success so the grok intake agent gets the real reason (e.g. 'session not in
MegaTask scope' on a 422) instead of an opaque http_422 token with no
remediation.

TDD red->green; ruff + mypy clean; 157 mcp/SDK-breaker tests pass.

* [chore] a2a-routes: authenticate send_message responder + gate cancel task (PM-only) (#116 #423)

send_message took the responder identity from a client-supplied
metadata.from_agent, so any caller could spoof anyone (e.g.
from_agent='ceo') in the task's notes and in the spawn/notification
routed back to the original requester. Stamp the authenticated caller's
slug as the responder instead (CurrentAgentContext).

cancel_task was ungated: no auth dependency and no role check, so any
agent (or any caller) could cancel a task the lifecycle rule reserves to
PM roles (Any -> cancelled: PM roles only) — and the cascade-cancel of
all non-terminal descendants ran with a hardcoded cell_pm role and no
recorded actor. Add require_any_authenticated_agent + a PM-or-above gate,
and thread the authenticated role (into the cascade role gate) and slug
(into the cancellation note) into A2AService.cancel_task.

Tests: send_message ignores a spoofed from_agent and records the
authenticated slug; cancel rejects a developer (403) and a missing auth
header; a PM cancel threads role + slug into the service; the pre-existing
cancel success/already-terminal/not-found tests now run under a PM context
(the success test's body was missing the A2A 'name' field and false-passed
on a 422 — now genuine).

* [chore] work-session-routes: ownership check on mutating routes + stamp merge_pr merged_by from auth (#158 #271)

Every mutating work-session route keyed off session_id alone after the
role gate, so any developer could commit into / abandon / complete a
peer's active session (breaking the single-active-WorkSession invariant
and stranding that task) and any PM could merge any cell's PR — the REST
surface bypassed the verb layer's active-claimant gate entirely. Add a
shared _assert_ownership guard: dev ops require session.agent_id to be
the caller; PM merge_pr requires a cell PM to own the session's task cell
(main PM / CEO / board coordinate every cell), 404 for a missing session.

merge_pr took merged_by from the request body, so any PM could record a
PR merge under another agent's id, corrupting the merge audit trail the
completion/CEO-approval chain and metrics rely on. Drop the body param
and stamp the authenticated caller's agent_id as merged_by (the
MergePRRequest schema is gone with it).

Tests: a second dev's token hitting a peer's /commits and /abandon -> 403
(session left active); a foreign-cell PM -> 403, same-cell PM -> 200; a
spoofed body merged_by is ignored and the persisted row records the PM.

* [chore] ci-watch/dep-update dedupe: normalize git_url + treat empty-string workflow as default (#148 #1267)

The per-repo open-task dedupe filtered ProjectTable.git_url == git_url
(exact), while the orchestrator collapses its poll set by repo_key
(lower / strip trailing '/' / drop '.git'). Two projects whose git_url
differs only by those accidentals (a monorepo's cell-projects, or a
re-registered canonical project) defeated the one-open-task-per-repo
invariant and opened duplicate fix / dep-update tasks. Extract
roboco.utils.converters.repo_key as the single source and match the
dedupe query on its SQL mirror (regexp_replace(rtrim(lower(...)))).

The ci_watch (git_url, workflow) dedupe used func.coalesce(ci_watch_workflow,
default), but SQL COALESCE only substitutes for NULL — a project saved with
ci_watch_workflow='' (reachable via panel/API) yielded coalesce('', default)
= '' != default, so the DB diverged from the engine/orchestrator (which
collapse '' to the default via Python truthiness) and opened a duplicate
fix task every red cycle. Wrap with func.nullif(..., '') so an empty string
collapses to the default too.

Tests: a ''-workflow + NULL-workflow project on one repo dedupe to one task;
git_url accidentals (.git suffix / trailing slash) dedupe across both
ci_watch and dep_update. The orchestrator _repo_key now delegates to repo_key.

* [chore] admin_set_status: attribute the blocked-restore to the admin actor + emit override row (#2176)

admin_set_status taking a BLOCKED task to pending/in_progress with a
pre-block snapshot returned early via _apply_pre_block_restore, which
emitted its audit row with agent_role=None and audit_agent_id=restored_owner
(the pre-block dev) — the admin actor_id/actor_role were dropped entirely.
Because this branch runs with force=false (pending/in_progress aren't hatch
destinations), the distinguishing task.admin_override row (written only on
the non-restore path, gated by force) was never written, so an operator
could silently re-own a blocked task with no trace of who triggered it.

Thread actor_id/actor_role into _apply_pre_block_restore (admin_set_status
passes them with admin_override=True) so the transition audit row attributes
the re-owning to the admin, and emit a task.admin_override row (forced=False,
restore=True) on this branch independent of the force flag. The in-band
unblock(restore=True) path passes no actor and keeps the legacy attribution
(restored owner) with no override row.

Test: admin PATCH status=pending on a BLOCKED task with a snapshot attributes
every audit row to the admin (not the restored dev) and emits the override
row.

* [chore] converters: typed InvalidIdentifierError from require_uuid + log the orchestrator drop (#25)

require_uuid raised a bare ValueError('UUID value cannot be None'), so a
malformed/None identifier propagated as an opaque error callers either let
500 or broad-catch-and-silently-swallow — the orchestrator reaper call site
wrapped it in a bare except-Exception return with NO log, dropping a bad
task_id_str invisibly. Introduce InvalidIdentifierError(ValueError) and
raise it from require_uuid for both None and unparseable input; it stays a
ValueError subclass so existing except-ValueError / except-Exception callers
are unaffected, but typed so a caller can handle a bad identifier distinctly.
The reaper now catches the typed error, logs at warning, and no-ops — the
drop is visible instead of swallowed.

Tests: None and an unparseable string both raise InvalidIdentifierError; it
subclasses ValueError (back-comat).

* [sweep] notification_delivery: list_system_notifications over-fetch-then-slice for pending_ack_only

The SQL limit was applied before the post-fetch 'not fully acked' Python
filter. A window of newer fully-acked ack-required rows filled the limit
and masked older unacked notifications the operator still needs to act on
(the pending-ACK queue silently under-reported; a CEO-approval notification
could be hidden by newer already-acked noise). pending_ack_only now drops
the SQL limit, filters in Python, then slices to limit; the non-pending
branch keeps the SQL limit unchanged.

* [sweep] proactive: drop vestigial code-patterns surface from context package

Code indexing was removed, so _find_code_patterns always returned [] yet
build_context_package still called it, ContextPackage.code_patterns stayed
a live field, _build_summary advertised 'Found N code patterns', and
_count_items counted it — a permanently-empty slot the system claimed to
populate. The dead method, its call, the summary line, and the count
reference are removed. The code_patterns field itself is retained
(always-empty, serialized in to_dict and the optimal route response) for
API/schema back-compat, marked deprecated in its docstring.

* [sweep] migration 052: integration-test the task_cell_projects unique constraint

The UNIQUE(task_id, team) 'one project per cell per task' invariant was
only exercised through SimpleNamespace stubs that never touch a DB
session, so the real Postgres constraint was unverified. If it were
mis-declared or dropped, two same-team rows could coexist and
_resolve_subtask_project would non-deterministically return one, cutting
a subtask's branch/PR against the wrong repo. Adds an integration test
that inserts two same-(task_id, team) rows and asserts IntegrityError on
uq_task_cell_projects_task_team, plus a positive different-teams case.

* [sweep] pr_gate: classify MegaTask root-subtask as root so its root->master PR gets COMMENT (#608)

_post_gate_review_to_pr identified a root->master PR by absence of a
parent_task_id. A MegaTask root-subtask opens its own root->master PR into
the project's master (submit_root, parent='master') but carries
parent_task_id=umbrella, so is_root was False and the gate posted APPROVE
(pr_pass) / REQUEST_CHANGES (pr_fail) instead of COMMENT. The APPROVE could
satisfy a single-approval master branch-protection rule and let a non-CEO
merge via the GitHub UI before the CEO, against the documented invariant
that only the CEO acts on master. is_root now also covers
is_batch_root_subtask (batch_id set + parented); a non-batch cell-PM
coordination root keeps batch_id=None so it stays a cell->root PR
(APPROVE/REQUEST_CHANGES). Extends the _task test helper with a batch_id
kwarg.

* [sweep] enforcement: complete the status-class partition + coverage invariant (#247)

is_waiting_state already covered awaiting_pr_review (the primary fix), but
the doc's coverage invariant was missing: backlog and pending fell through
ALL three predicates (terminal/active/waiting), so a future enum addition
could silently land in no category. is_waiting_state now also covers
pending (waiting for a claim) and backlog (waiting on PM activation), so
is_terminal_state / is_active_state / is_waiting_state partition the whole
Status enum. Adds test_status_classification_covers_every_enum_member
asserting every Status member is classified by exactly one predicate, so
an enum addition that drifts the partition fails the build.

* [chore] test-suite: unblock the quality gate (mypy + 2 behavior fixes)

12 mypy errors across 5 test files: drop banned type:ignore comments
(lifecycle_spec monkeypatch uses cast(Any, ...); the ignores were unused),
wrap SQLAlchemy-typed ids with cast(UUID, ...) for AgentContext / WorkSession
args (AgentTable.id is Mapped[sqla UUID], not uuid.UUID), annotate **kw: Any,
and cast(Any, svc) for a method-assignment mock.

test_cancel_descendants_cascades_for_authorized_pm: the child was parked in
awaiting_ceo_approval, which the spec gates to CEO-only cancel
(lifecycle.py:378-389) — a cell_pm cascade correctly refuses it (the #103
refuse path). Use a PM-cancelable in_progress child so the positive-cascade
assertion holds; the refuse case is already covered by its sibling test.

test_a2a_message_auth: /message/send now resolves the authenticated
responder slug via get_agent_context (a DB lookup, #116). This is a DB-free
unit test of the token gate + route body, so stub get_agent_context in the
fixture — the gate (require_any_authenticated_agent) still runs real and
401s on a missing/forged token before that dependency resolves.

* [chore] complexity: split 5 C-rank blocks to <=B for the xenon gate

No behavior change; each C-rank function factored into a helper so the
complexity gate (xenon --max-absolute B) holds.

- lifecycle.can_invoke_action: extract the team-match check into
  _check_team_match.
- a2a.cancel_task: extract _status_value_of + _apply_cancel_note.
- task._apply_pre_block_restore: extract _restore_block_ownership (status/
  owner restore + snapshot clear) and _emit_admin_override_audit (#2176).
- release_proposal.approve: extract _finalize_release_lock (heartbeat/
  execute cancel + mutex release) out of the finally.
- kanban.get_main_pm_board_flat: dict-dispatch the column routing instead
  of a 7-branch if/elif ladder (status wins over team; in-flight + no cell
  team falls through to Coordination, #196).

* [chore] lifecycle artifacts: regenerate to match the spec (foundation-check)

The rendered artifacts (docs/rag/lifecycle, panel/lib/lifecycle.json, the
_generated role-prompt fragments) had drifted from the spec — the prior
sweep commits (cancel-CEO gate, claim_pr_review preconditions, pr_reviewer
unclaim, complete merge-first ordering) changed spec data without
regenerating, and the foundation-check render+diff stage never ran because
mypy failed earlier in the gate. make foundation-check now passes.

* [fix] chat: wire live message delivery end-to-end (MESSAGE_SENT)

send_message persisted messages but never broadcast them, there was no
MESSAGE_SENT event type or bridge forwarder, and the panel session view
had no websocket subscription — the live chat path was dead end-to-end.

- add EventType.MESSAGE_SENT and publish it best-effort on every persisted
  send (a bus outage logs, never rolls back the durable row)
- bridge _handle_message_event forwards to /ws/sessions/{id} and
  /ws/channels/{id}; subscribe it in register_websocket_bridge_handlers
- panel useSessionStream subscribes the session view; the page invalidates
  the transcript + session-detail queries on each message.new so the held
  (staleTime Infinity) views refresh live without the manual Refresh

* [fix] chat: return session task_links in one read; drop panel N+1

GET /sessions/{id} ran a bare select and session_to_response omitted
task_links, so it always returned them empty — the panel worked around it
with a triple-fetch (get session, get-tasks-for-session which re-fetched
the same endpoint, then a task GET per link), and the links never showed.

- add get_session_with_links(_or_raise) that eager-loads task_links -> task
- add session_to_response_with_links; GET /sessions/{id} uses both
- panel useSession now relies on the single populated response; remove the
  dead getTasksForSession + per-task fetch and the unused tasksApi import

* [fix] chat: validate reply_to against the effective session; guard closed-session composer

Posting to a closed session transparently redirects the message to the
group's active session (intended for agents holding stale refs), but
reply_to was validated against the requested session, not the one the
message lands in — letting a cross-session reply slip through — and the
panel silently posted there too, so the message vanished from the view.

- validate reply_to against session.id (the effective, possibly-redirected
  session), not req.session_id
- panel: render a "session is closed" notice instead of the composer for a
  non-active session; if a send still lands elsewhere (stale status), toast
  that it went to the active session rather than letting it appear to vanish

* [fix] chat: close session/group/message read IDOR; fix doubled 404s

get_session and the messages-list took an agent id but never used it, and
get_group took none at all — any authenticated agent could read any private
channel's group, session, and message transcripts. Three NotFoundError sites
also passed a full sentence as resource_type, yielding "... not found not found".

- add require_group_read_access / require_session_read_access (channel
  member / silent observer / privileged, mirroring list_group_sessions_for_agent)
  and get_session_with_links_for_agent; enforce on GET /sessions/{id},
  GET /sessions/{id}/tasks, GET /messages, GET /groups/{id} (-> 403 on deny)
- fix the three doubled-404 sites to the NotFoundError(resource_type, resource_id) form

Also folds two gate fixes for the prior chat commits: cast session.id to UUID
for the reply_to validation, and ruff import/format touch-ups.

Note: POST /messages intentionally still skips the channel write-ACL on the
HTTP (human-CEO/panel) path — the CEO is not in writers for 8/11 channels, so
enforcing it there would block the panel; the gateway/agent path enforces it.

* [fix] secretary: harden live chat — stuck spinner, mid-reply clobber, reload

The Secretary live chat had three live-behaviour bugs: a dropped SSE
connection left a permanent "thinking…" spinner (openStream set no
transport-error handler, so the no-data error Event was swallowed by the
JSON-parse guard and streaming never reset); sending mid-reply wiped the
accumulation buffer and pushed a user message without guarding the in-flight
turn, abandoning/duplicating the reply; and the chat lived only in React
state, so a reload wiped it.

- route the dual-purpose `error` listener: server-sent JSON → handleEvent,
  transport error (no data) → reset streaming, surface a notice, close stream
- guard send while streaming (streamingRef); disable the composer Send/Enter
  while a reply is in flight
- persist sessionId + messages to localStorage (TTL'd) and, on mount, restore
  + re-attach the stream once the backend confirms the session is still alive
  (mirrors the intake/prompter durability)

* [chore] groups: extract group-read helper to keep module rank A

The get_group IDOR access-check added try/except branches that tipped the
module to xenon rank B. Extract the service-error→HTTP mapping into a small
helper so get_group stays lean and the module is rank A again (behaviour
unchanged; covered by the groups route tests).

* [fix] chat: correct panel session-task mutation endpoints

linkTask/unlinkTask posted to /add-task and /remove-task (with a body), but
the backend exposes POST /sessions/{id}/tasks and DELETE
/sessions/{id}/tasks/{task_id} (path param) — so every call 404'd. updateTaskLink
targeted /update-task, a route that does not exist at all. Point linkTask and
unlinkTask at the real routes and drop the phantom updateTaskLink. All three were
unused, so no behaviour changes today — this removes a latent 404 trap.

* [docs] chat: document live message delivery (MESSAGE_SENT / message.new)

Document the live transcript-update path the chat-subsystem fixes wired:
- docs/api/websockets.md: add the message.new event-types row (carried on
  /ws/sessions + /ws/channels from EventType.MESSAGE_SENT) and note the
  forwarder sets type:"message.new"
- docs/panel/communications-and-journals.md: the session transcript updates
  live; a closed session is read-only (composer disabled)
- CLAUDE.md: name message.new on the per-resource streams and make
  MESSAGE_SENT the worked example of the add-a-live-event recipe

The internal roboco_map slices (gitignored) were updated in place to match.

* [docs] reconcile published docs with code since v0.13.0

Drift caught by the doc-reconciliation pass (all verified against HEAD):
- CLAUDE.md + rag: pr_reviewer gained the unclaim verb (16b71be8)
- rag permissions/task-states/task-tools: awaiting_ceo_approval -> cancelled is
  CEO-only, not PM+CEO (16b71be8 cancel-ceo-gate; lifecycle.py:373-382)
- deploy/env-reference: ROBOCO_APP_VERSION default 0.9.0 -> 0.14.0 (config.py:31);
  add ROBOCO_RELEASE_CI_WORKFLOW row (2759edf7, config.py:454)
- deploy/data-and-migrations: 44->54 revisions, head 054_a2a_message_skill
- optional/autonomous-maintenance: CI-watch dedupe is per (repo, workflow) (d34bc1a7)

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-01 01:11:34 +02:00
536bbb64f3 Chore/all/logical gaps sweep (#286)
* release-manager: fencing-token mutex + executor/readiness hardening

Closes the release-mutex TTL race (#17, HIGH) and the remaining
release-manager gaps (#88, #89, #201, #202):

- #17: the release mutex is now acquired with a uuid4 fencing token and
  released via Lua compare-and-del; a background asyncio heartbeat
  compare-and-expires the TTL ~every 60s while the execute owns the lock,
  so a live execute no longer expires and a crashed one auto-releases
  <=3000s. A second approve after TTL expiry cannot usurp and rm -rf the
  in-flight clone — the fenced first-finally keeps its lock.
- #89: a Redis outage during acquire stays fail-closed (the execute never
  runs) but now returns a distinct redis_unavailable result + log so the
  CEO sees the cause instead of a false already_in_progress.
- #88: commit_and_push RuntimeError is wrapped into a structured
  ReleaseResult(commit_failed) instead of a 500.
- #201: first-release fallback still emits untracked version-ref files as
  gaps (no longer silenced by the first-release branch).
- #202: _await_proc awaits proc.wait() after kill() so a timeout cannot
  leak a zombie.

TDD: tests/unit/services/test_release_proposal_concurrency.py extends
_FakeRedis with eval/get/expire and pins the fencing/heartbeat/usurper
invariants + the redis_unavailable result.

* PM/code-task creation guard + main_pm coverage + issue carve-out

Closes the creation-time role x task_type gap (the user's explicit example)
and the main_pm delegate hole:

- New pure helper `pm_cannot_own_code(role, task_type, is_issue_resolution)`
  in foundation/policy/batch.py — single source of truth. Both PM roles
  (cell_pm + main_pm) coordinate; a `code` task assigned/claimed by a PM is
  a structural mismatch, EXCEPT a PM taking a code task in needs_revision to
  resolve review/QA issues directly (the carve-out).
- Creation-time guard: TaskService.create calls the helper (closes the
  create-with-cell-PM-assignee hole the team-based check misses).
- Delegate path + spec claim gate consult the same helper.
  `_validate_assignee_task_type` / `_task_type_hint_for` now key on the
  Role (CELL_PM OR MAIN_PM), not the cell-PM slug set — closes the
  delegate-to-main-pm-as-code hole.
- identity.role_for_uuid_or_none is None-tolerant (treats None as "not a
  PM" and proceeds) so a malformed/missing assignee cannot crash the guard.
- prompter.create_task_from_draft reuses the guard at draft-create.

TDD: test_batch.py (helper matrix + carve-out), test_main_pm_code_guard.py
(main_pm coverage), test_delegate_assignee_task_type.py (delegate parity),
test_lifecycle_spec.py (claim gate: rejects PM claiming code from pending,
allows from needs_revision + PM claiming planning + dev claiming code).

* task-service: completion hooks + escalation/cancel/audit hardening

Closes the task-service cluster (#21/#98, #99, #100, #101, #103, #216; #102
verified already-covered, #217 verified already-guarded):

- #21/#98: ceo_approve now closes the work session + triggers completion
  hooks before worktree removal (no-op when work_session_id is None), so a
  CEO-approved task lands the same close-path as PM-completed.
- #99: apply_escalation routes through the transition validator with an
  enumerated escalation exemption (_ESCALATABLE_TO_BLOCKED) instead of an
  arbitrary source->BLOCKED write; BACKLOG is refused.
- #100: branchless ceo_reject awaiting_ceo_approval->pending gets a real
  spec edge (ceo_reject_to_pool ActionSpec + _STATUS_TRANSITIONS entry) so
  future admin-override tightening can't wedge the path.
- #101: revision_count bump is documented as the single chokepoint, with
  the pre-block RESTORE path undoing it when restoring a snapshotted
  needs_revision (same cycle resuming, not a new rejection).
- #103: cancel cascade surfaces non-terminal orphans instead of swallowing
  the role violation.
- #216: _remove_task_worktree_on_terminal escalates recurring FS/permission
  failure (audit/notify after N) instead of silent-failing forever.
- #102: pinned in test_verb_runner_midverb_invalid_state.py (committed with
  the choreographer cluster) — verb-runner savepoints already surface a
  concurrent mid-verb state change as INVALID_STATE.
- #217: submit_for_qa claimed_by guard verified intact.

TDD: test_task.py, test_worktree_cleanup_on_complete.py,
test_escalation_board_guard.py (#99), test_task_service_* integration,
test_lifecycle_spec.py.

* choreographer: gate-claim guards + pr-gate hardening + fail-open logging

Closes the choreographer cluster (#5/#222, #29, #30, #82, #188, #189,
#192; #157/#187 verified already-fixed/pinned; #102 pin lives here):

- #5/#222: the unchanged-PR guard's fail-open head_sha lookup now logs
  (warning) on a slug-resolver/git-helper error so a regression cannot
  silently turn the pr_fail re-submit loop-stopper into a no-op. Stays
  fail-open (never wedges the PM).
- #29: pinned (REFUTED-with-pin) — _lane_claim_guard already returns the
  error envelope without releasing the claim on a transient lookup error.
- #30: pinned (REFUTED-with-negative-pin) — a non-batch branchless main_pm
  root cannot bypass the complete spec gate (is_batch_umbrella requires
  batch_id set).
- #82: _post_gate_review_to_pr wraps the slug-resolution call in try/except
  (mirrors _capture_pr_head_sha) so a malformed cell_map AttributeError no
  longer 500s the reviewer after a committed gate transition.
- #188: _is_hand_formatted_verdict anchors the header regex to line-start,
  so a quoted (> ## Summary) or inline (mid-prose) header mention no longer
  false-refuses a hand-formatted verdict.
- #189: pr_fail re-captures the PR head SHA after the transition commits and
  re-stamps the verdict note only when it advanced (closes the stale-SHA
  false-allow loop-hole); no-advance stays a single note write.
- #192: claim_gate_review skips the dev claim guards (already_active/paused/
  lane) via a new skip_dev_guards param — a pr_reviewer inspecting an
  assembled PR does not start work, so the single-active-task / code-lane
  invariants do not apply; the dependency guard is kept, and QA's
  claim_review parity is preserved.
- #157/#187: verified in tree — pr_review-only handoff is intentionally
  prior-work-worth-resuming; self_review_block wiring (reviewer != dev)
  holds on assembled tasks with 4 existing pin tests.

TDD: test_choreographer_*, test_pr_gate_posts_review (#82),
test_pr_review_hand_format_guard (#188), test_submit_root_unchanged_pr_guard
(#189), test_claim_gate_review_guards (#192), test_verb_runner_midverb
_invalid_state (#102 pin).

* playbook curate: guard the gating commit against a poisoned session (#55)

The explicit `session.commit()` that gates the RAG index (commit-before-index
so an uncommitted playbook cannot land in the corpus) raised PendingRollbackError
when a prior mid-verb failure had rolled the caller's session back — 500ing the
whole curation verb instead of returning a clean envelope, and (worse) risking a
fall-through to index an uncommitted playbook. Wrap the commit: on
PendingRollbackError, log + return invalid_state with a re-fetch/retry remediate
and skip the index. The happy path still commits exactly once then indexes.

TDD: test_playbook_verbs.py — poisoned-session returns a clean invalid_state and
does NOT index; clean-session still commits once + indexes (pins no fail-closed
inversion / no double-commit).

* [chore] gateway: atomic activate merge — preserve probe_failures across re-park (#156)

activate() was a blind SET that reset probe_failures to 0, so a probe-failure
increment that just landed (or was in flight) could be wiped by a concurrent
re-park — resetting the give-up / CEO-notify count mid-episode. Route activate
through a server-side Lua merge (roboco:activate_rate_limit) that refreshes the
episode metadata (kind / activated_at / retry_after / affected_agents) while
carrying over the previous probe_failures count. Indivisible w.r.t. the
increment/reset scripts (Redis single-threads an EVAL).

#56 (notify to prompter/secretary refused) verified SAFE — the pin tests
(test_notify_rejects_prompter_recipient / _secretary_recipient /
_allows_ceo_recipient) already cover the only human notify target invariant;
no legitimate send is dropped, no code change.

* [chore] foundation/policy: spec gates + QA retry-key pin (Cluster F)

#50 sync_branch composes=() so the spec gate accepted a terminal/paused/
blocked task and the handler rebased a dead/parked branch — add a
PRECONDITION_SYNC_BRANCH_STATE (claimed/in_progress/verifying/needs_revision
only), rejection_kind=invalid_state. TDD: 28 spec tests.

#148 submit_root's prose asserts 'a Main-PM root is planning-typed, never
code' but only the creation path (main_pm_cannot_own_code) backed it — add
PRECONDITION_ROOT_NOT_CODE on the submit_root IntentSpec (defense in depth),
scoped to submit_root only so the shared submit_for_review action keeps
cell_pm+code submit_up parity. Graceful on Mock/None task_type so the
choreographer Mock-task tests don't crash. TDD: 2 spec tests.

#150 VERB_RETRY_LIMITS is keyed by the MCP-exposed names (pass/fail), not
the IntentSpec-internal pass_review/fail_review — already correct; add a
pin test so a one-sided rename can't silently drop the QA-handoff cap.

#142 main_pm_cannot_own_code/pm_cannot_own_code already normalize casing
(.lower()) — no-op, pin test test_main_pm_cannot_own_code_is_case_insensitive
already in tree.

* [chore] worksession-git: 405 merge-method fallback + non-destructive close (Cluster W)

#108 _merge_with_retry hardcoded 'squash' and raised MergeConflictError on a
405 with no method fallback — wedging the PM on an open, mergeable PR whose
repo merely had the squash button off. Add a 405 fallback to a permitted
method (via _first_allowed_merge_method, exclude='squash'), mirroring the CEO
merge_pull_request path. A 405 with no permitted fallback (or a second 405)
still falls through to the already-merged disambiguation / MergeConflictError.
TDD: 2 new tests (fallback-success, no-permitted-method-raises).

#109 close_pull_request defaulted delete_branch=True, so the choreographer
supersede path deleted a superseded PR's branch while the orchestrator
supersede path explicitly preserved it — the two disagreed, and the
destructive default ran on the 'close the dead PR' path where the branch may
still be referenced / useful for audit. Flip the default to False (opt-in
deletion) and make the choreographer caller explicit (parity with the
orchestrator). TDD: 1 new test (default preserves branch); existing
deletion-when-requested test now passes delete_branch=True explicitly.

Dispositions verified against current code (no silent drops):
- #27 REFUTED/FIXED-UNDEPLOYED: work_session.merge_pr resolves by session_id
  (no global pr_number lookup); the real cross-repo collision fix
  (project_id scoping on pr_merge/close_pull_request/rebase_pr_for_task/
  pr_target) is already in tree + tested (test_pr_merge_scopes_task_lookup_
  by_project_id, test_close_pull_request_scopes_task_lookup_by_project_id,
  test_git_pr_target_scoping). Verify-only.
- #106 REFUTED: a guard exists (rev-list --count {base_ref}..{branch} == 0)
  before reset --hard + base_ref falls back to default_branch; tests lock
  the safety (test_create_branch_never_repoints_branch_with_real_work,
  test_create_branch_does_not_reset_or_checkout_shared_clone).
- #218 BY-DESIGN: the merge_pr idempotent guard intentionally preserves the
  audit trail (docstring + test_merge_pr_idempotent_on_already_completed_
  preserves_audit_trail); a COMPLETED session always carries attribution
  (COMPLETED only via merge_pr), so the NULL-COMPLETED case is unreachable.
- #104 BY-DESIGN: agents never merge to the repo default branch in RoboCo's
  model (root→master is CEO-only); the guard is a correct CEO-only rail,
  locked by test_pr_merge_into_default_branch_is_ceo_only.

* [chore] llm: surface disabled-provider downgrade + scrub probe log (#20/#3/#211)

#20/#3 resolve_for_agent silently fell through to the legacy Anthropic path
when a configured provider was disabled — indistinguishable from 'no
assignment', so the operator got no signal that spawns bypassed the
provider. Surface the bypass with a warning (graceful degradation stays the
default — a stalled spawn is worse than a routing miss) and add an opt-in
ROBOCO_ROUTING_STRICT (default-off) that fail-closes instead. Wired into the
panel Feature Flags card. TDD: 3 unit tests (warn-on-disabled, strict-raises,
no-assignment-stays-silent).

#211 probe_ollama_tags logged str(exc) raw on the generic-exception branch —
structured log could carry connection internals / stack traces. Log the
exception class name only. TDD: existing generic-branch test strengthened to
assert the log kwargs don't leak the raw text.

* [chore] support/stream/optimal/playbook/comms hardening (Cluster S)

Logical-gaps sweep, Cluster S (TDD, red→green per item):

#64 notification_delivery.acknowledge published the NOTIFICATION_ACKED bus
event directly (bypassing the outbox) — a rollback left a phantom ACK. Route
it through defer_bus_publish (after_commit), mirroring deliver.

#76 playbook.archive()/reject() stamped the archiver into approved_by/
approved_at, overwriting approval provenance (and fabricating approval for a
rejected draft). Add archived_by/archived_at (migration 053 + table + model)
and write those on archive/reject, leaving approval attribution intact.

#181 vector_store.replace_chunks wiped existing index rows even when every
chunk lacked an embedding (embedder failure). Skip the wipe when chunks is
non-empty but records is empty — preserve good rows for nothing.

#182/#183 optimal.record_learning recomputed a learn-{md5(full_content)}
tracking source that never matched the URI the plugin embedded chunks under
(roboco://learnings/{doc_id}, doc_id=lrn-{hash100}). Use the plugin's
returned doc_id so de-index/lookup-by-source finds the chunk rows.

#96/#97 transcription periodic flush only peeked ready buffers (unbounded
map growth) and ran sync callbacks on the event loop (a slow callback
blocked the flush task). Flush (remove) each ready buffer after notifying,
and offload each callback to a thread.

#212 _TEAM_SCOPED_ROLES was duplicated across communications/agents_config/
seeds. Single-source it in foundation.policy.communications; consumers
reference that object (identity-tested).

#19 stream_bus._dispatch_event re-ran already-succeeded handlers on a
recover_pending replay (duplicate side effects). Add a per-(event.id,
handler) SET-NX idempotency guard: skip on a hit, clear the key on handler
failure so a replay re-runs it, fail-open when redis is unavailable.

Dispositions (no code change): #77 approve() index-write pair asserted
BY-DESIGN; #62/#63 notification DB-dedup verified pinned; #184/#185 REFUTED;
#214 REFUTED; #215 BY-DESIGN.

* [chore] db/migrations: graph-integrity guard + conftest unreachable-DB warning (Cluster D)

Logical-gaps sweep, Cluster D (TDD + real alembic upgrade head verification):

#16/#37 add tests/unit/test_migration_graph_integrity.py — a static guard that
the alembic migration graph has exactly one head, every down_revision resolves,
every revision is reachable from a root, and no revision id is duplicated. The
suite builds its DB via Base.metadata.create_all (not alembic upgrade head), so
a forked head / dangling down_revision / duplicate id would otherwise ship
silently and break a real deploy mid-stream.

Caught a real bug in the process: migration 053's revision id
"053_playbook_archived_attribution" (33 chars) exceeded alembic's
alembic_version.version_num VARCHAR(32) — a fresh `alembic upgrade head` raised
"value too long for type character varying(32)" at the 053 stamp. Renamed to
"053_playbook_archived_attr" (26 chars). Verified end-to-end on a scratch PG:
upgrade head stamps 053, downgrade -1 returns to 052. (The pre-existing
test_every_migration_revision_id_fits_the_alembic_version_column guard is now
green too; it had been red on the 33-char id.)

#90 conftest silently pytest.skip'd every DB test when Postgres was unreachable
— a non-Docker box reported a green run of all-skips. Extract the warning into
_warn_if_pg_unavailable and fire it at import so the operator sees the DB is
down (the per-test skip path is unchanged). Test: warns when unavailable, silent
when reachable (verified under -W error::UserWarning).

Dispositions (verified against real code + a fresh alembic upgrade head, no code
change): #6 REFUTED — sa.Enum(create_type=False) at 001:119/304 does NOT break a
fresh upgrade head (001→052 applied cleanly on a scratch DB); #8 REFUTED — the
upgrade passed 030/031 (RAG chunk tables) without pgvector installed; pgvector is
a runtime concern handled by roboco/db/base.py, not a migration prerequisite;
#40 REFUTED — the `|| echo` mask was already removed and partial-schema drift
reports exit 1 (only by-design unreachable/unmigrated skips remain); #204 REFUTED
— the property walk seed IS pinned (random.Random(20260504), line 97); #205/#206
REFUTED — the smoke-trace fixture IS wired via
test_lifecycle_smoke_replay.py (8 passed); no shell smoke scripts exist in the
tree to wire; #137 BY-DESIGN — pyproject version 0.14.0 is an operational note,
no code gate.

* [chore] panel: admin-override force flag + kanban subtask_count + ws cleanup + ui-store dedupe (Cluster P)

#13: kanban admin-override into a hatch state (completed / awaiting_qa /
awaiting_pm_review) now requires an explicit force=true from the panel and
emits a dedicated task.admin_override audit row server-side; non-hatch
overrides need no force. Backend gate in tasks route + admin_set_status;
panel kanban-board sends force for hatch targets; TaskUpdate carries force.

#198: kanban service threads the real subtask_count (one grouped query) into
dev + priority-swimlane + main-pm-flat boards instead of a hardcoded 0.

#79: useWebSocket cleanup clears messages/lastMessage/state on unmount or
endpoint change so a dep-change (navigating to another stream) can't leak the
prior subscription's stale snapshot as live.

#186: disambiguate the duplicate ui-store modules -- the session/scroll store
in lib/stores renamed to useScrollRestorationStore / scroll-restoration-store
(barrel + 2 consumers updated); the sidebar/theme useUIStore in @/store is now
the sole useUIStore.

#12: verified already in-tree (release-proposal-card surfaces non-404 errors
with retry; getProposal maps only 404->null). #80 by-design (handleTransportError
already resets isSending on a no-payload SSE drop). #81 docs (streamUrl docstring
records that live-intake SSE auth is session-id-based bearer-style).

Backend: ruff+mypy clean, 278 tests green. Panel: lint+typecheck clean, 159 tests.

* orchestrator: park/reaper/readopt/a2a hardening + self-heal/ci-watch dedupe (Cluster O)

Closes the orchestrator-side logical gaps from the sweep:

- #75 a2a human-only drop surfaced: _dispatch_a2a_work logs the skip
  ("a2a request targets a human-only role; left as a notification for the
  human (not spawned)") instead of silently dropping the target — the
  CEO/secretary/prompter still see the notification; only the spawn is
  suppressed. (orchestrator.py)
- #72 readopt liveness: _readopt_running_agents requires a non-stale live
  claim (via _agent_holds_live_claim) and skips a zombie container so a
  reaped-but-restart-readopted agent isn't double-counted as active.
- #74 shutdown drain: stop() calls _flush_respawn_tracker so the durable
  respawn counter write-throughs aren't lost on a clean stop.
- #71 resolve_wait active-guard + deferred liveness: a rate_limit_lifted
  WaitingRecord is only confirmed-live after a _confirm_resume_liveness
  probe (deferred deletion _resume_confirm_delay=30.0), and an
  already-active agent short-circuits the repark. Scoped to
  rate_limit_lifted records (the only ones at risk of a false lift).
- #73 stuck-Claude kill: _maybe_kill_stuck_claude + _claude_stuck_kill_ttl
  (config.claude_stuck_kill_seconds) — a live container whose heartbeat is
  stale past the grace AND whose gateway probe is broken is killed+evicted,
  not protected forever by the reaper's live-skip.
- #230 verified FIXED-UNDEPLOYED: _gateway_broken_past_grace already
  requires N consecutive false-broken probes (not one flaky streak); no
  change, test added to pin the N-consecutive invariant.
- #43 self-heal per-observation dedupe: a fingerprint collapses repeat
  CEO notifications for the same CI regression.
- #44 ci_watch dedupe by (git_url, workflow): a monorepo's multiple
  workflows each get their own fix task (was collapsed by git_url alone).
- #49 identity.role_for_slug_or_none None-hardening: a stale/malformed
  slug resolves to None and the human-only skip falls through to the safe
  "not spawnable" path instead of crashing.
- #193 strategy engine: notify the CEO on a persistent assess failure
  instead of failing silently in the background loop.

TDD: test_no_spawn_human_roles (a2a skip surfaced), test_orchestrator_
shutdown_drain (#74), test_provider_overload_break (#71), test_readopt_
running_agents (#72), test_resolve_wait_repark (#71), test_stale_claim_
reaper (#73/#230), test_strategy_engine_loop (#193, new),
test_self_heal_engine (#43), test_ci_watch_engine (#44), test_identity
(#49). All red->green.

* chore: make-quality green — xenon complexity refactors + mypy test fixes + lifecycle regen

No behavior changes. Brings the tree to a fully green `make quality` (the
base branch never passed the xenon B-rank gate on several blocks; the
lifecycle artifacts had drifted from the committed ceo_reject_to_pool edge).

Xenon B-rank refactors (extract a helper; preserve semantics exactly):
- api/routes/tasks.py: _apply_forced_status_override + _StatusOverride
  dataclass bundle (update_task override block).
- services/task.py: _enforce_no_pm_code_on_create (create guards) +
  _escalation_diverts_to_pool (collapses the two board/advisory +
  main_pm+code divert branches into one predicate).
- services/prompter.py: _coerce_pm_code_to_planning (create_task_from_draft).
- services/notification.py: _duplicate_unacked_exists (_create_notification
  purpose-based dedup query + ACK_REQUIRED_BY_TYPE gate).
- services/sequencing.py: _same_assignee_lane_edges (the undeclared-surface
  same-assignee lane fallback at the tail of dev_task_collision_edges).
- gateway/choreographer/_impl.py: _pm_task_type_error static helper
  (_validate_assignee_task_type compound PM guard).
- gateway/choreographer/pr_gate.py: _gate_review_event_verdict +
  _gate_review_body static helpers (_post_gate_review_to_pr).

mypy test fixes (no type:ignore — banned; use typing.cast with quoted
strings per TC006):
- test_task_update_completeness: TaskUpdate(acceptance_criteria=None).
- test_bus: cast("Redis", _FakeRedis()); Redis import under TYPE_CHECKING.
- test_pr_merge_concurrency: capture AsyncMocks into locals before asserting.
- test_notification_delivery_phantom: cast("UUID", to_agents[0]).

Lifecycle artifact regen (owed from Cluster T #100 — the
awaiting_ceo_approval -> pending `ceo_reject_to_pool` edge was added to the
spec in 3d633084 without regenerating the derived artifacts the
foundation-check gate diffs against): docs/rag/lifecycle/intent-verbs.md,
docs/rag/lifecycle/status-transitions.md, panel/lib/lifecycle.json.

services/kanban.py: ruff format only (collapses the _load_subtask_counts
signature that drifted unformatted from Cluster P).

* [chore] logical-gaps sweep — Cluster I (intake/product/pitch)

#57/#58 prompter: preserve a top-level product_id with a 1-cell map
(prompter.py create_task_from_draft — top-level target wins over a
redundant 1-cell map instead of dropping product_id); reject — not
silently skip — a malformed project_id in the_work cell entries
(prompter.py _draft_cell_map raises ValidationError).

#59/#159 prompter: create_task_from_draft now operates on a copy
(_copy_draft) so _validate_and_coerce_draft / _clean_list never mutate
the caller's draft dict.

#160 prompter: _resolve_owning_team consults product/board routing
before forcing MAIN_PM on a multi-cell map (product root stays Board,
product+assignee-is-board stays Board).

#83/#84 github_provisioning: create_repo is idempotent by GitHub name
— a 422 "name already exists" (orphaned repo from a rolled-back prior
approval) is fetched and reused instead of erroring; pitch re-approval
now reuses the orphaned repo end-to-end.

#196 kanban: flat main-PM board has a "coordination" column for
non-cell teams (MAIN_PM/Board) instead of dropping their cards.

#197 project update: an explicit null in the PATCH body now clears the
stored field, distinct from an absent field (leave unchanged).
ProjectService.update drops exclude_none so explicit-None applies; the
PATCH route uses ProjectUpdate.model_validate(data.model_dump(
exclude_unset=True)) to preserve the request's unset-tracking (the old
field-by-field construction marked every field set and defeated the
distinction — nulling NOT-NULL git_url).

TDD: prompter 47, github_provisioning+pitch 16, kanban+project 67,
project routes 37 — all green; ruff + mypy clean.

* [chore] logical-gaps sweep — Cluster M (mcp-servers)

#60 flow_server/do_server: the circuit-breaker substitution no longer
erases the fixable rejection — the original envelope (kind/message/
remediate) is nested as inner on a copy of the SDK's circuit_open
envelope (the SDK dict is not mutated in place). The agent still sees
WHY the verb failed, not just that the breaker tripped.

#61 flow_server/do_server: a 404 carrying a *descriptive* detail
(not FastAPI's bare default {"detail":"Not Found"}) is now a
real resource not_found, surfaced as not_found so the agent
re-fetches state — instead of a misleading "server-side wiring gap"
invalid_state. The bare default and unparseable 404s still synthesize
the wiring-gap envelope; a 404 with a real Envelope (error field)
is still surfaced as-is.

#161 flow_server/do_server: dict error.code classification now uses
an exact-code map (authoritative for the codes the handlers emit) with
a substring fallback for unknown codes. Fixes the real regression:
AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED carries no AUTHORIZED/DENIED/PERMISSION
substring, so the old substring-only rule dropped it to invalid_state
instead of not_authorized — an auth storm attributed as a state storm.
The fallback also adds AUTH so future AUTH-prefixed codes classify.

#162 flow_server/do_server: _register_tools gains a
ROBOCO_ALLOW_FULL_TOOLSET env override (default-off) so a missing
manifest falls back to the full tool set instead of raising — a
dev/test escape hatch. Production fail-loud behaviour is unchanged.

#163 intake_server: propose_batch accepts name as well as
title (intake drafts in the wild have used both), normalizing a
name-only draft onto a copy as title (caller's dict never mutated),
and reports the dropped count + reason in the return instead of
silently vanishing malformed drafts. The empty-batch hint now names
name as an alternative.

TDD: 123 mcp_servers tests green (14 new + 2 updated); ruff + mypy clean.

* [chore] Cluster N — conventions/docs logical-gaps sweep

#33: _create_new_doc/_update_existing_doc now resolve via
_resolve_contained_path (the RAG-returned update path was not containment-
checked — an escaping source could write/overwrite outside the docs dir).
#34: _commit_doc_to_repo returns committed/skipped/failed instead of
swallowing all exceptions; surfaced on DocRef.commit_status, the write
response, and the docs MCP guidance so a failed repo commit is fail-loud.
#35: write_doc only updates the similar doc when its filename matches — a
different filename creates a new file instead of collapsing onto the
similar doc's path (the dedup-overwrite defect codified by the old tests).
#129: a custom rule scoped to a language the validator never reports (a
typo) is surfaced as a warn finding on .roboco/conventions.yml via the
runner's once-per-run validation; #32 (tsx->typescript dialect) stays
BY-DESIGN.
#130: _cache_put only swallows a UNIQUE violation (23505) as a concurrent
duplicate; a non-unique IntegrityError (FK/NOT NULL/check) is log-errored
and re-raised instead of being silently misattributed.
#132: health re-reads the live file status (a cached degraded row hid an
in-place repair at a stale head key); get_map skips cached degraded rows
and stops caching degraded so a repaired file re-derives. #134 BY-DESIGN.
#133: _DB_METHODS gains stream/stream_scalars (SQLAlchemy 2.0 streaming
constructs are data access too — a route calling them is not thin).
#199: regenerate_verb_tables._annot_str strips Annotated[...] metadata
(BeforeValidator) before rendering; regenerated verbs.md + per-role
prompts so the BeforeValidator(func=...) repr (with a memory address) no
longer leaks into agent-facing prompt text.

TDD: 206 conventions/docs tests green (incl. 5 new files / appended
cases); ruff + mypy clean.

* [chore] Cluster 16 — cross-cutting hygiene logical-gaps sweep

Disposition + fix the 10 cross-cutting-hygiene gaps, TDD. make quality green
(ruff, mypy 944 files, pytest, xenon, vulture, foundation-check, enum-parity).

FIX:
- #24 /ws/system now gated by _require_panel_token (matches every sibling
  /ws/* stream); rejects a missing token in strict mode and a forged token
  even in dev. (roboco/api/websocket.py)
- #25 two drifted _require_ceo implementations (orchestrator router vs release
  handler) unified on a single require_ceo_role helper in deps — same 403,
  same role set, accepts Role/AgentRole/"ceo". (roboco/api/deps.py,
  routes/orchestrator.py, routes/release.py)
- #11 a spawn session for a delivery role (developer/qa/documenter) with no
  task_id now logs an unattributed-usage warning via is_unattributed_delivery_spawn.
  (roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py)
- #65 pricing returns a structured CostResult(cost_usd, unpriced, is_anthropic)
  so an unpriced Anthropic model (real spend we'd undercount) is flagged
  instead of silently $0; calculate_cost stays a thin float wrapper.
  (roboco/billing/pricing.py, billing/__init__.py)
- #67 blocker-metrics "blocked since" reads the task.blocked audit transition
  (indexed on target_id/event_type/timestamp), not updated_at — which
  over-counted when a blocked task was touched for a non-blocking reason.
  Falls back to updated_at/created_at only with no audit row.
  (roboco/services/metrics.py)
- #94 grok refresh_if_stale uses double-checked locking (_refresh_lock +
  _recheck_or_refresh) so two concurrent callers don't both POST the
  single-use refresh grant and burn the credential. (grok_auth.py)

DOCS (fix the doc, behavior already correct/pinned by tests):
- #66 get_summary docstring corrected — it sums raw agent_spawn_sessions rows
  (sub-day precise); daily_usage_rollups/get_today_summary can diverge for
  "today" until the sweeper catches up. (roboco/services/usage.py)
- #68 DashboardStorage is a documented in-memory stub; added a test pinning
  that auditor flags are lost on storage reset (persisting = a migration +
  service refactor, out of scope as a half-implementation).
  (tests/integration/test_dashboard_service.py)

BY-DESIGN (no code change, with file:line evidence):
- #28 dashboard reads are open to the authenticated operator (dashboard.py:36
  documents this); mutating auditor routes already gate via
  _require_auditor_or_ceo. Role-gating reads would break the panel (no
  X-Agent-ID on dashboard reads) and CEO-token-gating the router would block
  the Auditor (auditor token != CEO token). nginx is the prod boundary.

REFUTED (narrowing would reintroduce a documented hang):
- #93 the ~/.grok directory mount (vs a single auth.json file) is load-bearing
  — a single-file bind mount pins the inode so the atomic tmp.replace refresh
  doesn't propagate to running containers (they hang at grok's login prompt).
  Already documented in grok.py:161 and locked by
  test_intake_grok_mounts_subscription_auth_when_present.

Incidental gate-greening (mypy errors a stale .mypy_cache had hidden in
earlier-cluster test files; xenon refactors for the new B-threshold):
- tests/unit/test_regenerate_verb_tables.py: type the dynamic-module loader.
- tests/unit/services/test_prompter.py: annotate the draft dict as dict[str,Any].
- tests/unit/services/test_conventions_cache_put.py: _FakeOrig is a real Exception
  (IntegrityError's orig arg requires BaseException).
- metrics._blocked_since_map extracted from get_blocker_metrics (complexity).
- intake_server._normalize_batch_drafts extracted from propose_batch (complexity).

* Docs update

* [bug] spawn: self-heal vanished clone + branch ref before worktree ensure (be-dev-1 fatal loop)

A vanished clone_root (disk loss / /data/workspaces wipe / manual cleanup)
fatal-looped the resume path: _ensure_worktree_before_spawn ran
`git -C <missing>` and released the claim, but the reaper-style release
preserves assigned_to + branch_name so the next dispatch is a RESUME
(create_branch never re-runs to re-clone) and the same missing clone failed
every ~30s.

- workspace.py: ensure_worktree_self_heal re-attaches a present worktree +
  symlinks the shared .venv; on a missing local branch ref it fetches from
  origin (create_branch pushes at claim time, so pushed work survives) and
  re-creates the ref, falling back to -b origin/HEAD only when the branch
  was never pushed. _fetch_branch_ref is the token-aware fetch helper.
- orchestrator.py: _ensure_worktree_before_spawn health-checks the clone
  and re-clones via ensure_workspace BEFORE the worktree self-heal. Fatal
  git-state (WorkspaceError) still releases the claim + aborts; transient
  failures abort without releasing (a fresh claim wouldn't help and
  re-cloning is destructive).

TDD: 21 new + 61 related worktree/git/cancel/cleanup tests green; ruff +
mypy clean.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-30 08:08:35 +02:00