Files
pmg/sandbox/profiles/pypi-restrictive.yml
T
Claude d60a558579 feat(sandbox): scrub sensitive environment variables from package managers
Implements process-level environment variable protection per the spec.
When the sandbox is enabled, credential-bearing variables are removed from
the package manager child process before it is spawned, defending against
supply chain attacks that harvest secrets from the environment.

- DANGEROUS_ENV_VARS: curated default deny list of known secret names (no
  generic *_TOKEN/*_SECRET catch-alls); ScrubEnv matcher supports case-
  insensitive globs so profiles can opt into broader denies.
- EnvironmentPolicy (environment.allow / environment.deny) on sandbox
  profiles, merged under inheritance; deep-copied on resolve.
- npm/pypi profiles re-allow their own ecosystem's auth vars so package
  managers keep working; other ecosystems' and cloud creds stay scrubbed.
- New 'env' --sandbox-allow type (and overlay support via the same path):
  allow-only, value kept verbatim (not path-resolved), governed by lockdown.
- Enforced in executor.ApplySandbox as the last step before launch, after
  overlay and runtime overrides merge; scrubbed names logged for audit.

https://claude.ai/code/session_017Da1sAYLYpeEgogm6f9VYW
2026-06-10 07:17:14 +00:00

105 lines
3.1 KiB
YAML

name: pypi-restrictive
description: Restrictive sandbox policy for PyPI ecosystem (pip, poetry, uv)
package_managers:
- pip
- pip3
- poetry
- uv
# Optional security settings (uncomment to enable)
# allow_git_config: false # Allow package managers to modify .git/config (default: false, blocks for security)
# Allow interactive terminal (PTY) operations (default: false)
allow_pty: true
filesystem:
allow_read:
# Root read is required for shims (e.g., asdf, pyenv) that traverse the filesystem.
# This is safe because deny rules have higher precedence and dangerous files
# (.env, .ssh, .aws, .gnupg, etc.) are blocked by mandatory deny patterns.
- /
- ${CWD}/**
- ${HOME}/.config/pip/**
- ${HOME}/.pip/**
- ${HOME}/.poetry/**
- ${HOME}/.cache/pip/**
- ${HOME}/.cache/pypoetry/**
- ${HOME}/.cache/poetry/**
- ${HOME}/.cache/uv/**
- /usr/local/**
- /Library/**
- /System/Library/**
allow_write:
# Note: ${TMPDIR} is automatically allowed when write restrictions are enabled (macOS)
# Note: Patterns ending with /** automatically allow creating the parent directory.
# For example, ${CWD}/.venv/** allows both:
# 1. Creating the .venv directory itself
# 2. Writing any files/directories inside it
# Temporary directories for shell scripts and package managers
# Note: On macOS, /tmp is a symlink to /private/tmp, so we need both
- /tmp/**
- /private/tmp/**
- /var/tmp/**
- ${CWD}/.venv/**
- ${CWD}/venv/**
- ${HOME}/.cache/pip/**
- ${HOME}/.cache/pypoetry/**
- ${HOME}/.cache/poetry/**
- ${HOME}/.cache/uv/**
- ${HOME}/Library/Caches/pip/**
- ${HOME}/.local/lib/python*/**
# Additional deny rules (optional - credentials are automatically blocked)
# Automatically blocked for security:
# - .env, .env.*, .ssh/, .aws/, .gcloud/, .kube/, .gnupg/, .docker/config.json
# - .git/hooks/ (always blocked)
# - .git/config (blocked unless allow_git_config: true)
deny_read: []
deny_write:
# Additional system directories to protect
- /etc/**
- /usr/**
network:
allow_outbound:
- pypi.org:443
- files.pythonhosted.org:443
- github.com:443
deny_outbound:
- "*:*"
environment:
# Credential-bearing variables are scrubbed by default (see the built-in
# DANGEROUS_ENV_VARS list). Re-allow only the variables the PyPI ecosystem
# legitimately needs for index auth, publishing, and TLS.
#
# Accepted trade-off: a malicious Python package executed during install can
# read the PyPI publishing credentials below, but NOT npm tokens, AWS keys, or
# other cloud/secret-manager credentials, which remain scrubbed.
allow:
- TWINE_USERNAME
- TWINE_PASSWORD
- TWINE_REPOSITORY*
- PIP_*
- UV_*
- POETRY_*
process:
allow_exec:
- /usr/bin/python*
- /usr/local/bin/python*
- /usr/bin/gcc
- /usr/bin/clang
- /usr/bin/git
# Required for shims (e.g., asdf) that use #!/usr/bin/env bash
- /bin/bash
- /bin/sh
- /usr/bin/env
deny_exec:
- /usr/bin/curl
- /usr/bin/wget