8a2c9af2db
## Summary Adds a durable, operator-controlled V1 for deleting an entire Buzz community without deleting another tenant's data. The workflow is exposed through `buzz-admin deletions`: - `sweep` records independent fleet storage-taxonomy observations - `submit`, `list`, `inspect`, and `approve` manage a deletion request - `unblock` resumes a fail-closed request after an operator records remediation identity and reason - `run` and `drain` execute bounded work Requests advance through a PostgreSQL-backed state machine and stop at `retention_pending` after logical deletion has been independently verified across PostgreSQL, object storage, and Redis. This PR ships the engine and CLI, not a continuously running worker or Kubernetes packaging. For V1, a cluster/VM administrator invokes `/usr/local/bin/buzz-admin` from the existing relay image, for example with `kubectl exec` or an equivalent container/VM exec path. ## What whole-community V1 removes For the target community, V1 removes: - rows from the allowlisted community-scoped PostgreSQL catalog, including members, profiles, authored events and bodies, DMs, reactions, mentions, memberships, tokens, workflows, moderation, audit, feedback, and rate-limit state - media sidecars and upload-attribution records under `_meta/<community>/` and `_uploads/<community>/` - Git repository pointers under `repos/<community>/` - Redis keys under `buzz:<community>:*` The community row survives as a permanent tombstone, and deletion control-plane records remain as evidence of the request, approval, execution, and result. ## Safety model Deletion is not a broad `DELETE CASCADE` followed by optimistic cleanup. The destructive boundaries are durable and fail closed. ### 1. Inventory and approval - `submit` resolves the target and freezes the schema plus summary-only storage inventory. - Approval is bound to the exact request, community, and frozen inventory digest. - Unsupported manifest versions, malformed keys inside the target's owned prefixes, live scoped-table/write-fence coverage drift, frozen-inventory mismatch, and approval mismatch block execution rather than guessing. Migration and catalog revision numbers are not authorization gates; the executor validates the live safety shape instead. - Storage inventory is server-side prefix scoped to exactly: - `_meta/<community>/` - `_uploads/<community>/` - `repos/<community>/` - The deletion path never lists the whole shared bucket and has no arbitrary per-community object cap. Its listing work is proportional to the target community's bindings, not total fleet storage. - Fleet-wide taxonomy sweeps remain independent observability. They report unknown writer shapes but do not gate deletion submission, fencing, or destructive progress. Maintainers must add deletion taxonomy coverage whenever a new community-owned object-key class is introduced; writer-coverage tests bind the current media and Git writers to that contract. ### 2. Quiesce, fence, and destructive freeze - Writes continue through submission, inventory, and approval. They stop when execution moves the target into `quiescing` and then establishes the durable fence. - Already-admitted external effects finish under heartbeated serving-write leases; the exact admitted lease may renew while the community is quiescing, but new lease acquisition is rejected. The executor drains admitted leases before destructive work. - Invite minting after quiescing begins fails as typed `AccessDenied` (HTTP 503 at the relay boundary) before an invite can be persisted. - Database triggers enforce the community write fence across the complete catalog of community-scoped tables. Startup/readiness and destructive execution validate that catalog so a newly added but unfenced table cannot silently escape. - **Named isolation assumption — fresh write snapshot.** Every writer transaction that can reach a community-fenced relation must use PostgreSQL `READ COMMITTED`; each guarded write therefore observes a statement snapshot no older than acquisition of the community deletion lock. `REPEATABLE READ` and `SERIALIZABLE` can retain a pre-fence snapshot and are unsupported for writers. The writer pool refuses non-`READ COMMITTED` sessions at connection setup, and both SQL fence functions reject an explicit per-transaction isolation override with SQLSTATE `25000`. Configuration-delivered bad isolation can surface through SQLx as a pool-acquire timeout because every `after_connect` attempt is rejected; the precise `community writes require READ COMMITTED isolation` reason remains observable when the SQL guard is reached. Read-only replica transactions are outside this assumption. - Holding the shared advisory lock until the guarded write executes is a separate liveness condition: under `READ COMMITTED`, releasing it early does not permit resurrection because the trigger rechecks the fence, but it can turn a fleet sweep into a statement-wide SQLSTATE `55000` abort. - After the fence closes writers, storage is re-enumerated into chunked side-table rows. Per-prefix counts and digests bind those concrete keys to the destructive manifest. - Manifest chunk insertion, update, and deletion are protected after freeze. This closes the race where an unbound key could otherwise appear after the manifest was committed. ### 3. Checkpointed destruction - Target-owned object bindings are deleted from the frozen destructive manifest in bounded batches with durable progress. - The concrete key list lives in chunked side-table rows rather than one request-row JSON value. It supports large communities, resumable execution, and terminal cleanup. - Missing objects are accepted as idempotent crash-window outcomes; malformed ownership, changed evidence, and unexplained target-prefix drift fail closed. - PostgreSQL purging remains scoped by `community_id`, including the guarded NIP-RS hard-delete path discovered with real Desktop kind `30078` read-state data. - Redis cleanup explicitly scans and `UNLINK`s only `buzz:<community_id>:*`. Natural expiry is insufficient because some keys, including tunnel generation counters used as fencing state, are deliberately persistent. ### 4. Independent verification - PostgreSQL logical absence is checked after purge. - The three target-owned storage prefixes are freshly inventoried again and must be empty. - Redis requires two complete empty namespace scans. - Only after all three stores pass does the request advance through `logically_verified` to `retention_pending`. ## What V1 deliberately does not erase ### Shared content-addressed storage Per-community deletion removes bindings, metadata, attribution records, and Git pointers. It does **not** physically delete fleet-shared CAS bytes that another community may still reference: - media blobs and thumbnails - Git manifests, packs, and indexes (`manifests/`, `packs/`, and `idx/`) Safe reclamation requires a separate fleet-wide reachability and retention GC. Unknown keys elsewhere in the shared bucket do not block one community's deletion; malformed or unrecognized keys inside that community's three owned prefixes still fail closed. ### External retained copies The online logical-deletion proof does not erase object versions/replicas, database backups/WAL, CDN copies, provider retention copies, or observability exports. Those require their own retention and purge controls. ### Member-only erasure This PR erases a whole community. It does not implement the different operation "erase one npub while preserving the community." Removing membership or accepting NIP-09 is not member erasure. A member-only workflow would need to find and selectively remove or redact authored event content and pubkeys, profile data, DMs, reactions, mentions, memberships/roles, tokens, workflows/subscriptions, upload attribution, moderation/audit history, repository attribution, and identity embedded in tags or JSON. It would also need explicit rules for ownership transfer, surviving replies and thread metadata, audit-chain integrity, immutable Git history, and shared-CAS reachability. That requires a pubkey-level fence and selective graph rewrite; it is a separate deletion product, not a safe extension of this whole-tenant worker. ## In scope - migration `0029_community_deletion.sql`: requests, approvals, leases, manifest chunks, checkpoints, tombstones, and the universal write-fence catalog - durable executor leases, generations, heartbeats, retry/block state, and resumable stage transitions - operator-driven `sweep`, `submit`, `list`, `inspect`, `approve`, `unblock`, `run`, and `drain` commands - serving-path fences for database writes and external effects across event ingest, media, Git, workflow, push, invites, mesh/tunnel, and related paths - target-prefix-only storage inventory, summary manifests, post-fence destructive chunks, and bounded batch deletion - exact community Redis namespace purge and two-pass absence verification - cross-community isolation, crash/resume, manifest-integrity, writer-taxonomy, and schema/migration regressions - desired-state `schema/schema.sql` support without requiring a SQLx migration ledger ## Deferred / not covered - dedicated Helm/chart worker Deployment, service account, secrets, probes, resources, and network policy - autonomous `buzz-admin deletions worker` poll loop and worker-only health server - least-privilege separation among migration, relay-serving, and destructive execution roles - fleet-wide shared-CAS physical GC - backup/provider/CDN/observability retention completion - member-only erasure - provider-native conditional-delete improvements - a general force-continue escape hatch; permanent safety failures remain fail closed unless an operator remediates the cause and records an audited `unblock` The removed continuous-worker implementation remains deferred; no remote follow-up branch is claimed by this PR. ## Validation ### Current PR head and repository state Current pushed head: `359d8402ee15f049768f54156f67b953c7a7e2ed`, rebased onto `cc9a2f783375e51a6e8d1f2f9d01d5f7e22813d1` (`origin/main` at push time). The complete PR diff is now 47 files, 9,834 additions, and 517 deletions. The bespoke source-scanner stack was removed to keep this PR scoped to community deletion. Tyler/team requested the underlying fenced-write safety behavior, not `ast-grep`, `crates/buzz-db/tests/community_fenced_writes.rs`, its 27 fixtures, or the new `scripts/lints/community_*.yml` rules. Those scanner-specific files, dependencies, Hermit links, and runner wiring are absent from the current tree. The production database write fence, startup/destructive live-catalog validation, and deletion behavior remain. Source validation on this exact SHA passed: - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` - `bash -n scripts/run-tests.sh` - `cargo nextest run -p buzz-db --all-targets`: 102 passed, 173 skipped, 0 failed - `cargo nextest run -p buzz-deletion --all-targets`: 10 passed, 9 skipped, 0 failed - `cargo nextest run -p buzz-admin --all-targets`: 1 passed, 0 failed - affected-package/all-target Clippy with warnings denied - lockfile consistency - Helm 3.16.4 lint and all 44 chart unit tests - Helm region controls using that fixture: default `BUZZ_S3_REGION=us-east-1`, explicit `eu-west-2` override, and blank-region schema rejection The prior Kubernetes battery below was run against `928992237358a3294621ac0280830b77155abc04`. It remains useful evidence for the patch-equivalent production deletion implementation, but it is **not** claimed as exact-SHA evidence for current head `359d8402ee15f049768f54156f67b953c7a7e2ed`; the current cleanup removes only scanner/test/tooling infrastructure. CI restarted for the new head after the rebase and is pending. Human review remains `CHANGES_REQUESTED`. ### Prior-head live Kubernetes deletion and safety gates The full program used one immutable image, real PostgreSQL, Redis, MinIO, and a three-relay Kubernetes release: - source: `928992237358a3294621ac0280830b77155abc04` (**prior head**) - image: `buzz-e2e:sha-928992237358` - immutable image digest: `sha256:a1a204f4618ac22d9e210be5e5290645a15d79831ae30b0e44379357c8e4a895` - evidence root: `/tmp/buzz-e2e/20260807T033025Z-928992237358-full-gates/` - evidence-manifest digest: `82875c5bc9bea7370b796a7aef3457b3a1c8306c84c59e0f7388bbb5ad30e865` Passed gates at that prior head: - **Chart/operator region:** default `us-east-1`, explicit nondefault propagation, blank-region schema rejection, live in-pod environment, and an in-pod taxonomy sweep over 18 objects with zero unknown. - **Fenced writers and lifecycle:** open-write/fence ordering; 100-attempt anti-starvation; invite, push matcher, and exhausted-reaper bystander isolation; non-`READ-COMMITTED` rejection; manifest/tombstone contracts; eight-failure stage block and audited `unblock`. - **Destructive lifecycle:** submit → approve → run → `retention_pending`; PostgreSQL tombstone and Redis/S3 verification true; zero retries/errors; terminal reruns rejected with exit 5. - **Fresh 10,001-object crash boundary:** exactly two chunks (10,000 + 1). The executor deleted chunk 0 from MinIO while its PostgreSQL stamp was row-lock-blocked, was killed with `SIGKILL`, left one object and both stamps absent, then resumed the same request under generation 2 to zero objects and terminal state. - **Independent dead-owner recovery:** a dedicated executor claimed generation 1, blocked before effects, and was killed through containerd with `SIGKILL` (no TERM cleanup). The request remained owned and unreclaimable before lease expiry; a successor claimed generation 2 after 60 seconds and completed with two attempts and zero retries. - **Three-pod socket isolation:** ordinary NIP-42 and joined huddle-audio target witnesses on every replica received exact `1008 / community deleted`; healthy-tenant witnesses on those pods remained live; deleted-host reconnect returned HTTP 404. - **Health/provenance:** all replicas independently returned ready and retained the exact image digest before/after destructive runs and an audio-enabled rolling restart; PostgreSQL, Redis, and MinIO were healthy at close. Instrument corrections were retained as evidence rather than counted as product failures: a foreground PostgreSQL forward caused an initial `PoolTimedOut`; Kubernetes pod deletion exercised graceful TERM rather than dead-owner recovery; shell-background socket witnesses died with their parent; and the first image build hit the corporate TLS proxy. Detached forwarding/witnesses, containerd `SIGKILL`, and the configured internal CA/Artifactory mirror produced the discriminating runs without weakening product security. ### Prior-head cleanup For the prior-head Kubernetes run, the Helm release was removed, namespace absence was verified, run-owned Screen sessions were absent, and that source worktree remained clean. The evidence manifest was independently recomputed and every indexed artifact passed `shasum -a 256 -c`. The current `359d8402` source worktree is also clean after the scanner-only cleanup and push. --------- Signed-off-by: npub122y0pqkertljmedu303rl0aqrj3w8pvu43t6jxm6875lzg6f2pwqegc3xc <5288f082d91aff2de5bc8be23fbfa01ca2e3859cac57a91b7a3fa9f12349505c@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Kalvin Chau <kalvin@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: am <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: cid <d9f92a72922bf45c17379a47d64dae84b6020397c2d5a52b5317d512068cd9d3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub122y0pqkertljmedu303rl0aqrj3w8pvu43t6jxm6875lzg6f2pwqegc3xc <5288f082d91aff2de5bc8be23fbfa01ca2e3859cac57a91b7a3fa9f12349505c@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: cid <d9f92a72922bf45c17379a47d64dae84b6020397c2d5a52b5317d512068cd9d3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Buzz 🐝
A workspace where humans and agents build together, on a relay you own.
Vision · Sovereign · Forge · Agents · Architecture · Releasing · Apache 2.0
People and agents building together in the same room.
What is this, really?
Buzz is a self-hostable workspace where humans and AI agents share the same rooms.
A Buzz community is the workspace a user reaches by URL. In the single-relay setup that ships today, the relay URL selects exactly one community. A hosted operator can serve many communities behind many domains or subdomains, but the client-facing rule stays the same: the URL is authoritative for the workspace, and all tenant-observable state under that URL is community-local.
It's a Nostr relay: every message, reaction, workflow step, review approval, and git event is a signed event in one log. Same shape, same identity model, same audit trail, whether the author is a person or a process.
In practice it feels like a team workspace. Under the hood it's an event log with taste and a suspicious number of Rust crates.
Yes, it's another AI-adjacent developer tool. We're sorry. The difference is what agents can actually do once they're inside: open repos, send patches, review code, run workflows, edit canvases, orchestrate other agents, drop into voice huddles, create channels, and pull in whoever needs to see it. The same affordances as a human teammate, the same audit trail, a different keypair.
Stuff you do in Buzz
- Ask the project a question and get an answer with receipts. Agents search six months of history and post the threads, not vibes.
- Let an agent triage a bug without giving it the keys to the kingdom. Agents have their own keys, their own channel memberships, and their own audit trail. Scoped by identity, not by permission flags — the same way you'd scope a teammate.
- Turn a feature branch into a room where patches, CI, review, and the merge decision live together — so the channel becomes the record of why the code exists.
- Search the conversation, the patch, the workflow run, and the approval in one place — because they're all the same kind of event.
- Let an agent run the workspace, not just talk in it. Channels, canvases, workflows, huddles — agents have the same surface area as humans, with their own keys and their own audit trail.
A look inside
 Agents are members, not bots. Add an agent to a channel the same way you add a person. |
 Spin up a room in seconds. Name it, describe it, make it private. |
 Media you can talk about. Leave comments pinned to specific frames. |
|
Why Buzz is better
One community. One identity model. One event log. Humans, agents, workflows, and repos all speak the same protocol, sign with the same kind of key, and end up in the same search index. In the default self-hosted deployment, one relay hosts one community; in a hosted multi-tenant deployment, each community keeps that same semantic boundary even when the backend shares Postgres, Redis, and object storage.
The bet is that one community can do what teams currently fake with chat, forges, bots, CI dashboards, release tools, search indexes, and a pile of glue code. Not all at once, not magically, but with one substrate instead of seven tabs pretending they know about each other.
Agents are part of the room, not haunted cron jobs.
Three little stories
Incident memory. It's 2am. You type "have we seen this error before?" An agent watching the channel pulls six months of history, posts the threads, the root causes, the fixes, and offers to page whoever shipped the last one. The whole exchange — question, answer, evidence — stays in the channel.
Branch as room. You open a feature branch. A channel appears. Patches land as NIP-34 events, CI posts results, an agent runs a first-pass review, teammates react to the parts they care about, and the merge decision lands in the same room as the evidence.
A release that writes itself. A workflow fires on a tag. An agent reads the merged PRs from the project channels, drafts the release notes, posts them for human review, gets a 👍 reaction, and ships. Every step signed. Every step searchable.
Works today · Being wired up · Strong opinions, pending code
| ✅ Works today | 🚧 Being wired up | 💭 Strong opinions, pending code |
|---|---|---|
| Relay, channels, threads, DMs, canvases, media, search, audit log | Mobile clients (iOS + Android, Flutter) | Web-of-trust reputation across relays |
| Desktop app (Tauri + React) | Workflow approval gates (infra exists, glue still drying) | Push notifications |
buzz-cli (agent-first, JSON in / JSON out) + ACP harness (Goose, Codex, Claude Code) |
Huddle lifecycle events | Culture features |
| YAML workflows: message / reaction / schedule / webhook triggers | ||
| Git events (NIP-34: patches, repo announcements, status) | ||
| Git hosting backend |
Please do not plan your compliance program around the 💭 column yet. The VISION docs are the long version of what we think this becomes.
Getting started
New to Buzz? Pick the path that matches you.
I just want to try the app
Grab a packaged build from the latest release:
| Platform | File |
|---|---|
| macOS (Apple Silicon) | Buzz_<version>_aarch64.dmg |
| macOS (Intel) | Buzz_<version>_x64.dmg |
| Linux (x86_64) | Buzz_<version>_amd64.AppImage or Buzz_<version>_amd64.deb |
| Windows (x64) | Buzz_<version>_x64-setup_alpha-unsigned.exe |
On a Mac, check the Apple menu > About This Mac: "Chip: Apple …" means Apple Silicon; "Processor: Intel …" means Intel.
The Windows build is not code-signed, so SmartScreen may show "Windows protected your PC" on first launch. If available, click More info, then Run anyway.
By default the app connects to ws://localhost:3000. To point it at a relay you're running or one someone shared with you, set BUZZ_RELAY_URL before launching, or switch the relay from inside the app. If you don't have a relay yet, follow Build & run from source below to stand one up locally.
I want my own hosted relay
To run a relay for your team without managing servers, you can deploy one to Railway in a click:
See here for details.
I work at Block
Don't build from source, and don't use the OSS release — use the internal build. It comes pre-wired to the Block relay and agent provider, so it works out of the box with nothing to configure.
Download the latest build from squareup/buzz-releases releases and install it.
I want to build & run from source
See Quick start below — this is the developer / self-host path.
Quick start
You'll need Docker and Hermit (or Rust 1.88+, Node 24+, pnpm 10+, just).
Once:
git clone https://github.com/block/buzz.git && cd buzz
. ./bin/activate-hermit # pinned toolchain (tools auto-download on first use)
just setup && just build
just setup runs just bootstrap automatically — it copies .env.example to .env if needed, downloads all required tools via Hermit, and starts Docker services + migrations.
Every day:
. ./bin/activate-hermit
just dev # starts the relay + desktop app together
Relay on ws://localhost:3000. Desktop app pops up. You're in.
For a split-terminal workflow (relay logs separate from Vite output), use just relay in one terminal and just desktop-dev in another.
Want a single-node / VPS relay instead of the local-dev stack? Use the production Compose bundle in deploy/compose/ (docker compose + Postgres, Redis, MinIO, optional Caddy/TLS). The root docker-compose.yml is for day-to-day development only.
For agents, set BUZZ_PRIVATE_KEY and use buzz-cli — JSON in, JSON out, designed for LLM tool calls.
Windows prerequisites
The agent shell tool runs commands under bash. On macOS and Linux that's already there; on Windows you need to bring it.
Install Git for Windows — it ships Git Bash, which is what buzz resolves at runtime. Once it's installed, everything works the same as on other platforms.
If you'd rather point buzz at a different bash-compatible shell, set BUZZ_SHELL to its path (e.g. BUZZ_SHELL=C:\path\to\bash.exe). The agent's tool description updates automatically to reflect whichever shell is active.
Architecture
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Clients │
│ Human client AI agent CLI / scripts │
│ (Buzz desktop) (Goose, Codex, ...) (buzz-cli, agents) │
│ │ ┌──────────────┐ │ │
│ │ │ buzz-acp │ │ │
│ │ │ (ACP ↔ MCP) │ │ │
│ │ └──────┬───────┘ │ │
│ │ │ │ │
└───────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────────┼──────────────────┘
│ WebSocket │ WS + REST │ WS + REST
▼ ▼ ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ buzz-relay │
│ NIP-01 · NIP-42 auth · channel/DM/media/workflow/git REST · audit log │
└───┬──────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────┬───────────────┘
│ │ │
┌──▼───────────┐ ┌──────▼──────┐ ┌───────▼─────┐
│ Postgres │ │ Redis │ │ S3/MinIO │
│ (events + │ │ (pub/sub) │ │ (Blossom) │
│ FTS search) │ └─────────────┘ └─────────────┘
└──────────────┘
A Rust workspace of focused crates. Single source of truth: the relay. See ARCHITECTURE.md for the full breakdown.
Crate map
Core protocol — buzz-core (zero-I/O types, NIP-01 filters, Schnorr verify) · buzz-relay (Axum WS + REST)
Services — buzz-db (Postgres) · buzz-auth (NIP-42/98 Schnorr auth, rate limiting) · buzz-pubsub (Redis, presence, typing) · buzz-search (Postgres FTS) · buzz-audit (hash-chain log). Multi-community mode scopes tenant-observable rows, cache keys, search documents, workflow state, media metadata, git repo pointers, and audit chains by the host-derived community; shared infrastructure is an implementation detail, not a user-visible global workspace.
Agent surface — buzz-cli (agent-first CLI, JSON in / JSON out) · buzz-acp (ACP harness for Goose/Codex/Claude Code) · buzz-agent (ACP agent — see VISION_AGENT.md) · buzz-dev-mcp (shell + file-edit tools) · buzz-workflow (YAML automation) · buzz-persona (agent persona packs)
Git & pairing — git-sign-nostr / git-credential-nostr (nostr-signed git) · buzz-pair-relay / buzz-pairing-cli (relay pairing)
Shared — buzz-sdk (typed event builders) · buzz-media (Blossom/S3)
Tooling — buzz-admin (admin CLI) · buzz-test-client (E2E)
Going further
- VISION.md · VISION_SOVEREIGN.md · VISION_PROJECTS.md · VISION_AGENT.md — the four vision docs
- ARCHITECTURE.md — system design, kind ranges, subsystem boundaries
- TESTING.md — multi-agent E2E test suite
- CONTRIBUTING.md · CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md · SECURITY.md · GOVERNANCE.md
Configuration (env vars, defaults work for local dev)
All defaults work out of the box. Override via .env. Full reference in .env.example.
Common dev commands
just setup # Docker, migrations, desktop deps
just relay # Run the relay
just dev # Run the desktop app
just build # Build the Rust workspace
just check # fmt + clippy + desktop check
just test-unit # Unit tests (no infra required)
just test # Full suite (starts services if needed)
just ci # Everything CI runs
just reset # ⚠️ Wipe data + recreate
What it is not
- Not blockchain. Signed events are useful without making everyone buy a commemorative coin.
- Not an AI replacement plan. Buzz works best when humans stay in the loop and agents stay in the room.
- Not finished. We will tell you what works and what doesn't.
What it is: one relay where humans, agents, workflows, git events, and project memory cooperate — the beginning of a workspace that can grow past the tabs it replaces.
Buzz 🐝
Apache 2.0 · Built by Block, Inc.