Files
npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67dandTyler Longwell 5e62ba8cb8 fix(workflow): scope workflow execution and approvals to their community
`workflows`, `workflow_runs`, and `workflow_approvals` are all keyed
`(community_id, id|token)`, so the same UUID/token is structurally allowed
in two communities — exactly like channels and events. But the execution
and approval spine still fetched, listed, mutated, and posted by bare id,
so a webhook/manual trigger or NIP-09 deletion in community B could load,
drive, or erase community A's colliding workflow, and workflow side effects
were published under the deployment/default tenant instead of the run's own
community. This threads the owning community through every request-scoped
and run-scoped path so each lookup, write, and side effect is confined to
its tenant.

- `ActionSink::send_message` now takes the run's `community_id` as its first
  parameter. `RelayActionSink` drops `bind_deployment_community(relay_url)` —
  the Issue-4 root cause — and instead resolves the run community's host via
  `lookup_community_host` to form a complete `TenantContext::resolved`, fail
  closed if the community is unmapped. A workflow in B now posts into B.

- Executor (`dispatch_action`, `execute_run`, `execute_from_step`,
  `execute_steps`) and engine (`finalize_run`, `on_event`) carry the run's
  community; every `get_workflow_run` / `get_workflow` / `send_message` and
  the post-store `on_event` call (from `dispatch_persistent_event`, which has
  the bound `tenant`) are scoped. The interval `last_fired` DashMap is keyed
  `(CommunityId, Uuid)` so duplicate workflow UUIDs across communities cannot
  cross-suppress in memory.

- Webhook `/hooks/{id}` now binds its community from the request Host before
  any lookup (`bind_community`), then `get_workflow(community, id)`. The host
  — not the workflow row — determines the tenant, so a request to A's host
  can only reach A's workflows; unmapped host and not-found both fail closed
  with the same generic 404.

- WS manual trigger and `create_workflow` use `tenant.community()` as the
  authoritative owner. `create_workflow` no longer resolves the community via
  the ambiguous `community_of_channel(channel_id)`; it verifies the channel
  exists *inside* the bound community via scoped `get_channel` (the same
  guarantee the composite FK enforces, surfaced as a clean rejection).

- Approval grant/deny/resume handlers and the `buzz-db` approval methods
  (`get_approval`, `get_approval_by_stored_hash`, `get_run_approvals`,
  `update_approval`, `update_approval_by_stored_hash`, `create_approval`)
  are scoped by community; `create_approval`'s INSERT now includes the
  `community_id` NOT-NULL column it previously omitted. NIP-09 a-tag workflow
  deletion (`delete_workflow`, `find_workflow_by_owner_and_name`) is scoped
  to the request tenant.

Adds three `#[ignore]` Postgres regressions in `buzz-db::workflow`, each
verified green against live PG and red when the `community_id` predicate is
dropped: `workflow_lookup_is_confined_to_its_community` (dup workflow+channel
UUID in A/B; scoped get/list resolve only the bound community's row, cross
lookup is NotFound), `workflow_delete_is_confined_to_its_community` (deleting
A/id leaves B/id intact), and `approval_is_confined_to_its_community` (same
token in A/B; granting A leaves B pending). Full `cargo test -p buzz-db
-p buzz-workflow -p buzz-relay` green, clippy clean on the trio.

Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz>
2026-06-27 14:42:30 -04:00
..