feat(relay/audio): community rides RegisterPeer; structural-only Hello (OPTION 1)

Implements the ratified owner-side community-derivation contract for the
cross-pod huddle join path (PLANS/MESH_GREENFIELD_DESIGN.md § "Owner-Side
Community Derivation, FINAL 2026-07-08"). The mesh dispatcher callback is
community-agnostic — Hello and the fenced header carry no community — yet the
owner's Redis fence key is (community_id, session_id). Rather than a shared
community-of-session registry, the community rides the wire on the first
stateful frame and is self-verified by the fence.

Hello is now structural-only: authenticated sender == from, HuddleControl
Session role, owner_runtime_id == local. It admits nothing and touches no room,
so it is deliberately NOT Redis-fenced (community unknown at Hello time). The
prior accept-time validate() call is dropped.

RegisterPeer carries community_id (as a raw Uuid — CommunityId is deliberately
non-deserializable so it can never be minted from client input; this is a
server-to-server mesh frame and the owner reconstitutes the CommunityId via
from_uuid before fencing). The serve loop latches the community on first receipt
and rejects any later frame naming a different one (tenant-boundary guard).

Validate-before-admit: the Redis fence keyed by the asserted community must pass
before room.add_peer. A wrong community keys a lease the owner never wrote →
typed no_active_lease → nothing mutates. The per-frame `f != fenced` check stays
(a lease that moves mid-stream rejects subsequent frames); a fence rejection now
returns RegisterRejected(Fenced(..)) and keeps the stream alive, while a
non-fence validate error (Redis unreachable, decode) still tears it down —
classified via the existing FenceRejection::from_mesh_error. UnregisterPeer
needs no fence (touches only this stream's registered map).

accept_inbound / serve_control_loop drop their community_id parameter to match
the dispatcher callback shape (from, hello, stream). dial_remote_owner gains a
community_id param; the handler passes tenant.community().

Adds two handshake round-trip tests over the public MeshStream::new seam with an
in-memory channel-backed stream pair: one asserting PeerRegistered on a valid
fence, one asserting RegisterRejected(Fenced) on a fence failure with no peer
admitted. fmt + clippy clean; 12 join tests pass.

Scoped out (Perci's increment, Wren-gated): the renew loop + teardown on
Lost/NotOwner. The huddle-side reaction (room teardown + floor.forget) is a
future seam to be agreed in-thread before coding.

Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz>
This commit is contained in:
npub1cc3ha7z055mu0rwwu7806t2wt8mj3pvu0uv5mfp2c50dahaqhczshdalg6
2026-07-08 14:17:44 -04:00
co-authored by Tyler Longwell
parent 4e6de9ea2e
commit 748e65f46f
2 changed files with 281 additions and 31 deletions
+2 -3
View File
@@ -435,6 +435,7 @@ async fn handle_audio_connection(
mesh.local_runtime_id,
owner_runtime_id,
fenced,
tenant.community(),
pubkey_hex.clone(),
requested_version,
)
@@ -621,9 +622,7 @@ async fn handle_audio_connection(
/// Map an owner's registration rejection to the client-facing WS error, using
/// the same `code`s a same-pod join produces so a cross-pod client handles them
/// identically. Fence rejections carry their taxonomy code for observability.
fn remote_rejection_ws_error(
reason: &crate::audio::join::RegisterRejection,
) -> serde_json::Value {
fn remote_rejection_ws_error(reason: &crate::audio::join::RegisterRejection) -> serde_json::Value {
use crate::audio::join::RegisterRejection;
match reason {
RegisterRejection::RoomFull => serde_json::json!({
+279 -28
View File
@@ -273,6 +273,20 @@ pub enum HuddleControlMsg {
/// Non-owner → owner: register a local client as a remote peer in the
/// owner's room. The owner allocates the `peer_index`.
RegisterPeer {
/// The community the huddle belongs to, as its raw UUID. Rides the
/// control frame because the mesh dispatch layer is community-agnostic —
/// `Hello` and the fenced header carry no community — yet the owner's
/// Redis fence key is `(community_id, session_id)`. Carried as a `Uuid`,
/// not a [`CommunityId`], on purpose: `CommunityId` is deliberately
/// non-deserializable so it can never be minted from client input. This
/// mesh frame is server-to-server, and the owner reconstitutes the
/// `CommunityId` explicitly via `from_uuid` before fencing. The
/// assertion is self-verifying, not trusted: `validate` looks up the key
/// the owner's own `acquire` created, so a wrong community finds no lease
/// and is rejected (`no_active_lease`) *before* any room mutation. The
/// owner latches the community from the first frame and rejects any
/// later frame on the same stream that names a different one.
community_id: Uuid,
/// Nostr pubkey hex of the joining client.
pubkey: String,
/// Huddle audio protocol version the client negotiated; the owner's
@@ -400,8 +414,9 @@ pub const HUDDLE_CONTROL_PROFILE: Profile = Profile::HuddleControl;
/// One instance per relay; the boot-seam dispatcher routes every
/// `Profile::HuddleControl` session stream to [`Self::accept_inbound`]. It is
/// the counterpart to Perci's reliable-stream acceptor — same
/// `accept_inbound(community_id, from, hello, stream)` shape, different profile
/// and body.
/// `accept_inbound(from, hello, stream)` shape, different profile and body.
/// The community is not a handshake parameter: it rides the first stateful
/// frame and is self-verified by the fence (see [`Self::serve_control_loop`]).
pub struct HuddleControlAcceptor<D: HuddleDirectory + ?Sized> {
rooms: Arc<AudioRoomManager>,
transport: Arc<dyn RelayPeerTransport>,
@@ -430,14 +445,18 @@ impl<D: HuddleDirectory + ?Sized> HuddleControlAcceptor<D> {
/// Accept and validate an inbound `HuddleControl` stream, then serve its
/// register/unregister control loop until the stream closes.
///
/// Validation mirrors the reliable-stream acceptor and enforces the fencing
/// law on receipt: the claimed sender must be the authenticated peer, the
/// profile must be `HuddleControl`, the fence must pass Redis, and this pod
/// must be the fenced owner. Any of these failing rejects the stream before
/// a single peer is admitted.
/// The `Hello` is validated **structurally only** — it admits no peer and
/// touches no room, so it is deliberately not Redis-fenced: the fence key is
/// `(community_id, session_id)` and the community is not known until the
/// first `RegisterPeer` frame carries it. Structural checks are: the claimed
/// sender is the authenticated peer, the role is a `HuddleControl` session,
/// and this pod is the header's named owner. The first *stateful* operation
/// (`RegisterPeer`) is where the Redis fence runs, before `room.add_peer` —
/// see [`Self::serve_control_loop`]. Matches the dispatcher callback shape
/// `(from, hello, stream)`; no `community_id` param — community rides the
/// wire and is self-verified by the fence.
pub async fn accept_inbound(
&self,
community_id: CommunityId,
from: RuntimeId,
hello: StreamHello,
stream: MeshStream,
@@ -458,9 +477,10 @@ impl<D: HuddleDirectory + ?Sized> HuddleControlAcceptor<D> {
"huddle-control acceptor got profile {profile:?}"
)));
}
// Fence at every hop: the origin validated before dialing; the owner
// re-validates on receipt so a lease that moved in between is caught.
self.directory.validate(community_id, &fenced).await?;
// Structural owner check: reject an obviously-misrouted stream cheaply,
// before serving any frame. This is not the fence — the authoritative
// Redis re-validation happens per control frame in the loop, keyed by
// the community the frame carries.
if fenced.owner_runtime_id != self.local_runtime_id {
return Err(MeshError::OwnerMismatch {
session_id: fenced.session_id,
@@ -470,31 +490,44 @@ impl<D: HuddleDirectory + ?Sized> HuddleControlAcceptor<D> {
});
}
self.serve_control_loop(community_id, from, fenced, stream)
.await
self.serve_control_loop(from, fenced, stream).await
}
/// Serve register/unregister frames for one non-owner pod's stream.
///
/// The community is learned from the first `RegisterPeer` frame and latched
/// for the life of the stream — a stream is one non-owner pod's view of one
/// huddle, so exactly one community applies. Later frames naming a different
/// community are rejected. The Redis fence runs on `RegisterPeer` *before*
/// `room.add_peer` (validate-before-admit): a frame asserting the wrong
/// community keys a lease that does not exist and is rejected before any
/// state mutation. `UnregisterPeer` only removes entries from this stream's
/// own `registered` map, so it needs no fence — it cannot mutate another
/// community's room.
///
/// Peers this stream registers are tracked so a stream close (the non-owner
/// pod went away) tears them all down — no leaked remote peers holding
/// index slots in the owner's room.
async fn serve_control_loop(
&self,
community_id: CommunityId,
from: RuntimeId,
fenced: FencedHeader,
mut stream: MeshStream,
) -> Result<(), MeshError> {
let session_id = fenced.session_id;
// pubkey -> peer_id, for UnregisterPeer and teardown on stream close.
let mut registered: std::collections::HashMap<String, Uuid> = std::collections::HashMap::new();
let mut registered: std::collections::HashMap<String, Uuid> =
std::collections::HashMap::new();
// Community (raw UUID) latched from the first RegisterPeer; every later
// frame must agree. `None` until the first register arrives.
let mut stream_community: Option<Uuid> = None;
let result = loop {
let msg = match stream.recv_frame().await {
Ok(Some(MeshStreamFrame::Data { fenced: f, payload })) => {
// Re-fence every control frame, not just the Hello: a lease
// that moves mid-stream must reject subsequent registers.
// Every control frame must carry the same fenced header the
// Hello did: a lease that moves mid-stream (owner or
// generation change) rejects subsequent frames.
if f != fenced {
break Err(MeshError::OwnerMismatch {
session_id,
@@ -503,9 +536,6 @@ impl<D: HuddleDirectory + ?Sized> HuddleControlAcceptor<D> {
current_owner_runtime_id: self.local_runtime_id,
});
}
if let Err(e) = self.directory.validate(community_id, &f).await {
break Err(e);
}
match decode_control(&payload) {
Ok(m) => m,
Err(e) => break Err(e),
@@ -522,17 +552,49 @@ impl<D: HuddleDirectory + ?Sized> HuddleControlAcceptor<D> {
match msg {
HuddleControlMsg::RegisterPeer {
community_id,
pubkey,
protocol_version,
} => {
let reply = self.register_remote_peer(
session_id,
fenced,
from,
&pubkey,
protocol_version,
&mut registered,
);
// Latch the community on first receipt; reject any later
// frame that names a different one (tenant-boundary guard).
match stream_community {
None => stream_community = Some(community_id),
Some(latched) if latched != community_id => {
break Err(MeshError::Transport(format!(
"huddle-control stream community changed {latched} -> {community_id}"
)));
}
Some(_) => {}
}
// Reconstitute the server-trusted `CommunityId` from the wire
// UUID — explicit and localized, honoring `CommunityId`'s
// no-client-input invariant — then fence.
let community = CommunityId::from_uuid(community_id);
// Validate-before-admit: the Redis fence keyed by the
// asserted community must pass before any room mutation. A
// wrong community keys a lease the owner never wrote → a
// typed fence rejection, so no peer is admitted and the
// client sees the same taxonomy a same-pod join would. A
// *non-fence* validate error (Redis unreachable, decode) is
// not a clean rejection — it tears the stream down.
let reply = match self.directory.validate(community, &fenced).await {
Ok(()) => self.register_remote_peer(
session_id,
fenced,
from,
&pubkey,
protocol_version,
&mut registered,
),
Err(e) => match FenceRejection::from_mesh_error(&e) {
Some(reason) => HuddleControlMsg::RegisterRejected {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
reason: RegisterRejection::Fenced(reason),
},
None => break Err(e),
},
};
if let Err(e) = stream
.send_frame(MeshStreamFrame::Data {
fenced,
@@ -684,6 +746,7 @@ pub async fn dial_remote_owner(
local_runtime_id: RuntimeId,
owner: RuntimeId,
fenced: FencedHeader,
community_id: CommunityId,
pubkey: String,
protocol_version: u8,
) -> Result<RemoteHuddleSession, DialError> {
@@ -701,6 +764,7 @@ pub async fn dial_remote_owner(
.send_frame(MeshStreamFrame::Data {
fenced,
payload: encode_control(&HuddleControlMsg::RegisterPeer {
community_id: *community_id.as_uuid(),
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
protocol_version,
})?,
@@ -955,6 +1019,7 @@ mod tests {
fn control_msg_roundtrips() {
for msg in [
HuddleControlMsg::RegisterPeer {
community_id: *community().as_uuid(),
pubkey: "abc123".into(),
protocol_version: 2,
},
@@ -982,6 +1047,192 @@ mod tests {
}
}
// ── In-memory MeshStream pair for handshake round-trip tests ─────────────
//
// A channel-backed `StreamSendHalf`/`StreamRecvHalf` pair drives
// `accept_inbound` end-to-end without iroh: what the owner side sends, the
// client side receives, and vice versa. Uses only the public
// `MeshStream::new` seam plus the public half traits.
use buzz_relay_mesh::{BoxFuture, StreamRecvHalf, StreamSendHalf};
use tokio::sync::mpsc as tmpsc;
struct ChanSend(tmpsc::UnboundedSender<MeshStreamFrame>);
struct ChanRecv(tmpsc::UnboundedReceiver<MeshStreamFrame>);
impl StreamSendHalf for ChanSend {
fn send_frame(&mut self, frame: MeshStreamFrame) -> BoxFuture<'_, Result<(), MeshError>> {
let r = self
.0
.send(frame)
.map_err(|_| MeshError::Transport("peer closed".into()));
Box::pin(async move { r })
}
fn finish(&mut self) -> Result<(), MeshError> {
Ok(())
}
}
impl StreamRecvHalf for ChanRecv {
fn recv_frame(&mut self) -> BoxFuture<'_, Result<Option<MeshStreamFrame>, MeshError>> {
Box::pin(async move { Ok(self.0.recv().await) })
}
}
/// A connected `(owner_side, client_side)` `MeshStream` pair.
fn stream_pair() -> (MeshStream, MeshStream) {
let (a_tx, a_rx) = tmpsc::unbounded_channel();
let (b_tx, b_rx) = tmpsc::unbounded_channel();
// owner sends on a_tx (client reads a_rx); client sends on b_tx (owner
// reads b_rx).
let owner = MeshStream::new(Box::new(ChanSend(a_tx)), Box::new(ChanRecv(b_rx)));
let client = MeshStream::new(Box::new(ChanSend(b_tx)), Box::new(ChanRecv(a_rx)));
(owner, client)
}
/// Transport whose only exercised method is a no-op `send_datagram` (the
/// remote-peer sink fires into it). `open_session_stream`/`set_inbound` are
/// not reached on the accept path.
struct NullTransport;
impl RelayPeerTransport for NullTransport {
fn send_datagram(&self, _to: RuntimeId, _d: MeshDatagram) -> Result<(), MeshError> {
Ok(())
}
fn open_session_stream(
&self,
_to: RuntimeId,
_hello: StreamHello,
) -> BoxFuture<'_, Result<MeshStream, MeshError>> {
Box::pin(async { Err(MeshError::Transport("unused".into())) })
}
fn set_inbound(&self, _handler: Box<dyn buzz_relay_mesh::InboundHandler>) {}
}
fn fenced_owned_by(owner: RuntimeId, session_id: Uuid) -> FencedHeader {
FencedHeader {
session_id,
generation: 7,
owner_runtime_id: owner,
}
}
fn huddle_hello(sender: RuntimeId, fenced: FencedHeader) -> StreamHello {
StreamHello {
sender,
role: StreamRole::Session {
fenced,
profile: Profile::HuddleControl,
},
}
}
/// Full accept-side handshake: a structural `Hello`, then a
/// community-bearing `RegisterPeer` whose fence passes, yields
/// `PeerRegistered`. Exercises the public `MeshStream::new` seam and the
/// validate-before-admit path end-to-end.
#[tokio::test]
async fn register_peer_handshake_admits_on_valid_fence() {
let owner_rt = rt(1);
let from = rt(2);
let session_id = Uuid::new_v4();
let fenced = fenced_owned_by(owner_rt, session_id);
let acceptor = HuddleControlAcceptor::new(
Arc::new(AudioRoomManager::new()),
Arc::new(NullTransport) as Arc<dyn RelayPeerTransport>,
Arc::new(FakeDir::default()), // validate() succeeds by default
owner_rt,
);
let (owner_stream, mut client) = stream_pair();
let hello = huddle_hello(from, fenced);
let served =
tokio::spawn(async move { acceptor.accept_inbound(from, hello, owner_stream).await });
// Client registers, carrying its community as the wire UUID.
client
.send_frame(MeshStreamFrame::Data {
fenced,
payload: encode_control(&HuddleControlMsg::RegisterPeer {
community_id: *community().as_uuid(),
pubkey: "client-a".into(),
protocol_version: 2,
})
.unwrap(),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let reply = match client.recv_frame().await.unwrap().unwrap() {
MeshStreamFrame::Data { payload, .. } => decode_control(&payload).unwrap(),
other => panic!("expected Data reply, got {other:?}"),
};
assert!(
matches!(reply, HuddleControlMsg::PeerRegistered { ref pubkey, .. } if pubkey == "client-a"),
"expected PeerRegistered for client-a, got {reply:?}"
);
// Closing the client stream ends the serve loop cleanly.
client.finish().unwrap();
drop(client);
served.await.unwrap().unwrap();
}
/// A `RegisterPeer` whose fence is rejected (wrong community keys a lease
/// Redis never wrote) yields a `RegisterRejected(Fenced(..))` reply — no
/// peer admitted — and the stream stays alive for the client to close.
#[tokio::test]
async fn register_peer_handshake_rejects_on_fence_failure() {
let owner_rt = rt(1);
let from = rt(2);
let session_id = Uuid::new_v4();
let fenced = fenced_owned_by(owner_rt, session_id);
let dir = FakeDir::default();
*dir.validate_fails.lock().unwrap() = true;
let acceptor = HuddleControlAcceptor::new(
Arc::new(AudioRoomManager::new()),
Arc::new(NullTransport) as Arc<dyn RelayPeerTransport>,
Arc::new(dir),
owner_rt,
);
let (owner_stream, mut client) = stream_pair();
let hello = huddle_hello(from, fenced);
let served =
tokio::spawn(async move { acceptor.accept_inbound(from, hello, owner_stream).await });
client
.send_frame(MeshStreamFrame::Data {
fenced,
payload: encode_control(&HuddleControlMsg::RegisterPeer {
community_id: *community().as_uuid(),
pubkey: "client-a".into(),
protocol_version: 2,
})
.unwrap(),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let reply = match client.recv_frame().await.unwrap().unwrap() {
MeshStreamFrame::Data { payload, .. } => decode_control(&payload).unwrap(),
other => panic!("expected Data reply, got {other:?}"),
};
assert!(
matches!(
reply,
HuddleControlMsg::RegisterRejected {
reason: RegisterRejection::Fenced(_),
..
}
),
"expected fence rejection, got {reply:?}"
);
drop(client);
served.await.unwrap().unwrap();
}
#[test]
fn fence_rejection_classifies_only_fence_errors() {
assert_eq!(