Draw, type, or upload a signature and place resizable/rotatable copies across PDF pages; output flattened server-side with PyMuPDF. Visual electronic signature, not cryptographic. New interactive-sign display mode (pdf.js + Konva) and a custom docs-pool route.
* feat(analytics): upload web source maps to Sentry + tie release to build
Web crash reports were unusable: the bundle ships minified with no source
maps uploaded, and every build reported as the frozen APP_VERSION, so a
Sentry error showed an unreadable stack under a single release.
- Add @sentry/vite-plugin: emit hidden source maps and upload them by debug
id when SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN is present (published Docker build only), then
delete the maps so they never ship. No-op for dev and the source archive.
- Set the Sentry release from SENTRY_RELEASE / VITE_SENTRY_RELEASE (the Docker
build passes the release version), falling back to APP_VERSION.
- Relax beforeSend so app bundle frames keep a host-stripped path (Sentry needs
it to match the uploaded map) while the instance hostname, error message, and
PII stay stripped. Filesystem paths still collapse to the basename.
- Wire the Dockerfile (sentry_auth_token build secret + SENTRY_RELEASE arg/env)
and the release docker job.
* fix(analytics): point source map upload at the snapotter org (project node)
* fix(landing): correct PDF tool count to 28 in alternatives copy
The pdf section has 28 tools (section.test.ts asserts bySection('pdf')=28). PR #363 corrected the docs breakdown but the alternatives pages still said 40 PDF tools (the document-modality count, not the pdf section) with 200 for the rest. Update to 28 PDF tools and 212 for the non-PDF remainder.
* chore: use "200+ tools" for the tool-count claim across public surfaces
Replaces the exact '240 tools' count (which drifts as tools are added) with the stable '200+ tools' on README, the Docker Hub overview, landing pages, the docs site (meta, homepage, search), the API self-description, the demo OG tag, llms.txt, package.json, the branding readme, and the en/nl app strings. Per-modality breakdown tables stay exact. Leaves the architecture doc's technical 'tool routes' figure, an internal vitest comment, and a QA report line unchanged. Updates the two tests that assert the docs strings.
Seven correctness fixes in the admin settings dialog and settings API: AdminSecuritySettings save echoing read-only/redacted keys; the server persisting the ******** mask over real OIDC/SIEM secrets on a settings round trip; the Tools panel missing its settings:write gate; three swallowed errors (ToolsSection save, ApiKeys generate and delete); and generatePassword omitting a special char under passwordRequireSpecial. Adds an integration regression test for the secret-mask no-op.
Lands five integrated branches: pipeline templates (#355), analytics opt-out (#354), 83 conversion presets bringing the catalog to 240 tools (#356), self-hosted positioning (#353), and e2e modernization (#351).
Integration fixes: aligned stale web analytics tests with the opt-out/allow-list model, closed 3 CodeQL incomplete-sanitization alerts in the i18n generator, resolved settings/index/docs/format-matrix conflicts, and corrected tool counts to 240.
edit-metadata writes EXIF tags in place and streams the original bytes
back, but the response content-type defaulted to image/jpeg for any
format outside a small map. A BMP/PSD/PPM download then claimed to be a
JPEG, and the nightly tool-x-format matrix tried to Sharp-decode it and
threw "unsupported image format".
Map every format validateImageBuffer can report to its real MIME type,
and switch the matrix's pixel-decode gate from a fragile denylist to an
allowlist of formats this libvips build is guaranteed to decode. Niche
raster types streamed back untouched now carry an honest content-type
we simply don't pixel-verify.
Verified green across all 157 tools x 34 formats with FULL_MATRIX=1.
Third round - the prior fixes unblocked these deeper failures on the nightly:
- Docker E2E: the patches/ fix (#346) let the build finish, so tests now
run - and fail with 'spawnSync qpdf ENOENT'. Dockerfile.test installed
imagemagick/ghostscript/exiftool but never qpdf, which the PDF tools and
fixture-integrity checks need. Add it.
- NUL-byte 500 (real robustness bug Schemathesis found): a settings string
containing U+0000 hits the jobs.settings jsonb insert and Postgres rejects
it ('invalid byte sequence for encoding UTF8: 0x00'), 500ing tools like
html-to-image. Strip NUL bytes from settings before the insert (NUL is
never meaningful in tool settings). api typecheck passes.
- Schemathesis: the AI exclude (#346) only anchored on the tool id at the
path end, so AI sub-endpoints like /passport-photo/analyze were still
fuzzed and 501'd. Extend the regex to allow an optional sub-path.
* fix(enterprise): ship enterprise pkg in prod image, full license features, tracing key fallback
docker/Dockerfile: COPY packages/enterprise manifest+src into the production stage.
Without it, apps/api's workspace link to @snapotter/enterprise dangles and every
import() throws (silently caught), so all 19 enterprise features failed closed
(enterprise.active=false) regardless of a valid license.
scripts/generate-license.mjs: sync PLAN_FEATURES with packages/enterprise/src/license.ts
so a --plan enterprise license unlocks all 19 features (was 8) and team unlocks 8.
apps/api/src/tracing.ts: accept SNAPOTTER_LICENSE_KEY as a fallback to LICENSE_KEY so
distributed_tracing activates with the same key as the rest of the app.
* fix(docker): keep scripts/bake-analytics.mjs in build context
.dockerignore excluded the whole scripts/ dir (PR #82, V1 hardening), but
docker/Dockerfile later added 'COPY scripts/bake-analytics.mjs' for the analytics
bake step. A clean production image build therefore fails with
'scripts/bake-analytics.mjs: not found'. The published image build is gated off in
CI so this latent break went unnoticed. Exclude scripts/* but re-include the one
file the Dockerfile needs.
* fix: S3 upload stream, analytics bake reaches API, dedupe retention field, reconcile orphan jobs
storage-s3.ts: wrap the upload AsyncIterable in Readable.from() so @aws-sdk/lib-storage
accepts it. STORAGE_MODE=s3 file uploads failed with 'Body Data is unsupported format'
for every tool because a bare async generator is not a Readable.
docker/Dockerfile: COPY the builder-baked analytics baked.ts into the API runtime stage.
The API re-copied the committed (off) baked.ts from the build context, so the
SNAPOTTER_ANALYTICS build arg had no effect on the API -- and since the SPA reads
/api/v1/config/analytics, analytics was off everywhere regardless of the arg.
settings-dialog.tsx: remove the duplicate tempFileMaxAgeHours control under Data
Retention; it bound the same setting key as the File Management control with a different
default, so editing either silently overwrote the other.
apps/api/src/index.ts: reconcile orphaned job rows (empty tool_id, never enqueued to
BullMQ) at boot so they don't sit in processing/queued forever and inflate the per-user
concurrent-job count and the upgrade-check in-flight gate.
* fix(web): style the SSO login buttons (they referenced undefined theme tokens)
The OIDC/SAML 'Sign in with <provider>' buttons used bg-secondary /
text-secondary-foreground, which the web theme never defines (it has primary,
background, foreground, muted, border, card, primary-subtle). Those classes resolved
to nothing, so the buttons rendered as bare unstyled text on the login page.
Restyle: the optional (non-enforced) buttons become white-card outline buttons with a
key icon and an orange hover tint, secondary to the primary Login button; the
SSO-enforced buttons become solid primary with the icon.
* fix: gate S3 behind license, custom-role enterprise perms, wire retention UI, cleanup
S3 is a licensed feature, but shipping packages/enterprise in every image removed the
implicit gate, so STORAGE_MODE=s3 worked without a license. Enforce
isFeatureEnabled('s3_storage') at boot and fail fast if unlicensed.
Custom roles can now be granted security:manage / compliance:manage / webhooks:manage
(roles.ts ALL_PERMISSIONS + the Roles UI) so admins can build least-privilege
compliance/security roles instead of only the built-in admin role.
retentionSweep now reads the jobsRetentionDays / auditRetentionDays DB settings the
System Settings UI writes (env vars become the fallback default), mirroring how the
temp-file sweep reads tempFileMaxAgeHours. Previously those two UI controls were no-ops.
Cleanup: drop the never-set snapotter_storage_bytes gauge and the unused
MAX_WORKSPACE_SIZE_GB env var; emit tool_client_error to PostHog from the web
ErrorBoundary (client crashes were not reaching analytics); add the Python
OpenTelemetry packages so the innermost sidecar.<script> span exports; fix the stale
'only local storage' line in the docs; delete two e2e-analytics specs that tested the
removed consent UI.
* fix(env): restore MAX_WORKSPACE_SIZE_GB default
security-auth-hardening.test.ts asserts env.MAX_WORKSPACE_SIZE_GB defaults to 10, so
the var is an intentional (tested) default, not dead code. Removing it in the cleanup
commit broke that unit test. Keep the declaration.
The nightly Schemathesis job failed with a schema-loading error:
'unacceptable character #x0080: control characters are not allowed'. The
served openapi.yaml contained 215 em dashes (U+2014) and box-drawing
section dividers (U+2500); Schemathesis's strict YAML parser mis-decodes
those multi-byte UTF-8 sequences as C1 control chars and refuses to load
the schema, so no fuzz checks ran. (PyYAML is lenient, which is why the
local yaml.safe_load check passed.)
Replace every non-ASCII char with ASCII '-'. This also clears an
em-dash style-rule violation. Add a docs.test.ts guard asserting the
served spec is ASCII-only, with a clear message, so this can't regress.
Pre-existing issue (the dashes predate this branch); surfaced while
verifying CI is green.
* fix(test): repair integration suite after analytics column/endpoint removal
#336 moved analytics to a build-time bake: migration 0005 dropped the
users.analytics_enabled and analytics_consent_* columns and removed the
PUT /api/v1/user/analytics endpoint. Two integration tests were left
referencing the old shape and went red on main (13 failures):
- migrate-from-sqlite.test.ts built 1.x SQLite fixtures whose users table
declared the analytics columns. The generic SELECT *-based importer then
tried to INSERT them into the 2.0 target, which no longer has those
columns, failing with Postgres 42703 and rolling back the whole import
(cascading to all 12 assertions). 1.x never had analytics columns, so the
fixtures are corrected to drop them. Also removed the now-dead analytics
entries from the importer's TS/BOOL conversion sets.
- analytics.test.ts asserted the removed PUT endpoint returns 404 but sent
the request unauthenticated, so the global auth preHandler answered 401
first. It now authenticates, reaching Fastify's not-found handler (404).
Also removed the stale /api/v1/user/analytics path from openapi.yaml.
Verified locally: full platform integration bucket 1029 passed / 0 failed;
monorepo typecheck clean.
* test(e2e): drop orphaned analytics-consent dismissal calls
#336 deleted the entire analytics consent system (consent page, consent
module, and PUT /api/v1/user/analytics), but six tests/e2e files still
PUT to that removed endpoint to 'dismiss analytics consent.' The calls
were silent no-ops (Playwright request.put / fetch don't throw on 4xx),
so they passed while hitting a dead route.
There is no consent prompt to dismiss anymore, so remove the calls:
- auth.setup.ts / qa-auth.setup.ts: keep the waitForFunction that syncs on
login completion, drop the now-unused token capture, the dead PUT, and
the stale 'consent guard' comments.
- rbac / rbac-full / gui-settings-rbac / gui-settings-expanded specs: the
re-login blocks existed solely to obtain a token for the PUT (reLoginData
was used nowhere else and the block was the tail of each helper), so
remove the whole block. The meaningful create-user/login/change-password
work is untouched.
Verified: no /api/v1/user/analytics refs remain in tests/e2e; biome clean
(no unused vars).
* fix(docker): pin CUDA base to 12.6 so the GPU image starts on R560+ drivers
The amd64 base nvidia/cuda:12.9.2-cudnn-runtime bakes a cuda>=12.9 driver gate enforced by nvidia-container-toolkit at container start, so the image fails to launch on common production drivers (e.g. 570.x / CUDA 12.8). The AI bundles are all cu126 wheels and the image installs libcublas-12-6, so 12.9 was misaligned with the workload. Pin to nvidia/cuda:12.6.3-cudnn-runtime-ubuntu24.04 to match the wheels and lower the driver floor to R560+.
* fix(ai): broaden OOM detection so the rembg lighter-model fallback fires
onnxruntime/CUDA allocation failures surface as 'Failed to allocate memory for requested buffer', CUBLAS_STATUS_ALLOC_FAILED, or bad_alloc, not just 'out of memory'. The background-removal and transparency-fixer fallback-to-lighter-model paths only matched the literal 'out of memory', so the fallback was dead code and transparency-fixer (default birefnet-hr-matting) always failed with an allocation error. Add isMemoryAllocError() and use it in both checks.
* fix(ai): use bundled PaddleOCR models so OCR runs offline
ocr.py passed no model dirs to PaddleOCR, so PaddleX resolved models from ~/.paddlex and downloaded them from HuggingFace at runtime (slow first use, broken air-gapped), ignoring the models the OCR bundle ships in MODELS_PATH; it also pulled doc-orientation/unwarping models that are not bundled. Pin detection, recognition and textline models to the bundled dirs in MODELS_PATH (per language) and disable use_doc_orientation_classify / use_doc_unwarping, with per-component fallback when a model is absent. Verified: OCR runs with zero HuggingFace requests.
* fix(docker): add CAP_KILL so container shutdown is graceful
cap_drop: ALL without re-adding KILL meant tini (PID 1, root) could not forward SIGTERM to the gosu-dropped snapotter process (root minus CAP_KILL cannot signal a different UID). docker stop logged '[FATAL tini] forwarding signal: Operation not permitted', never delivered the signal, and fell back to SIGKILL after the 10s timeout. Add KILL to cap_add in both compose files. Verified: docker stop completes in 0s with SIGTERM delivered (exit 143) and no FATAL tini.
* fix(ai): serialize bundle installs against AI jobs to prevent sidecar segfault
A feature bundle install rewrites the shared Python venv (pip + copytree of site-packages/*.so) as a background subprocess, with no coordination against AI tool jobs that dlopen native libs (torch / onnxruntime CUDA) from the same venv; a job loading a shared object while it is overwritten segfaults the sidecar. Add a process-wide async mutex (venv-lock.ts): bridge.run() acquires it before every AI script and the install route holds it across the installer subprocess. Both run in the same Node process so a module-level lock suffices. Verified: concurrent install + AI job produces zero segfaults and the job serializes behind the install.
* fix(ai): make the venv lock read/write so concurrent AI jobs are not serialized
The first cut used an exclusive mutex, which (a) deferred the dispatcher spawn by a microtask and broke unit tests that synchronously drive the mocked spawn, and (b) serialized AI jobs against each other, removing the dispatcher's by-id request multiplexing. Make it a writer-preferring read/write lock: AI jobs are shared readers (with a synchronous fast path so spawn still happens in-tick) and a bundle install is the exclusive writer. Verified: all 764 AI unit tests pass.
* fix(ai): degrade OCR to Tesseract on CPU-only hosts instead of segfaulting
The amd64 AI bundle ships paddlepaddle-gpu, whose native libs dlopen
libcuda.so.1 at import and segfault on a host without a GPU (libcuda is the
driver lib, injected only by nvidia-container-toolkit on GPU hosts). The
segfault crashed the shared long-lived AI dispatcher and, after a few attempts,
tripped the bridge crash-recovery permanent-disable, wedging all AI until a
container restart. The standalone ocr tool defaults to quality=balanced
(PaddleOCR), so it hit this on every CPU-only deployment; ocr-pdf already
hardcoded Tesseract and was unaffected.
ocr.py now gates the PaddleOCR tiers on gpu_available(): balanced/best
transparently fall back to fast (Tesseract, CPU-capable) when no usable GPU is
present, and run_paddleocr_v5/run_paddleocr_vl refuse before importing paddle so
the GPU build is never dlopen'd on CPU. GPU hosts are unchanged.
Verified on a CPU-only Windows/WSL2 box: ocr returns Tesseract text across
repeated runs with the dispatcher staying healthy (no wedge).
* fix(passport-photo): require the face-detection bundle, not just background-removal
Passport Photo runs face-landmark detection (face_landmarks.py, gated to the
face-detection bundle) before background removal (background-removal bundle),
but it was only declared under and guarded against background-removal. A user
who installed only Background Removal passed every JS-side check, then hit a
late "feature_not_installed" from the Python dispatcher gate when the analyze
step ran face landmarks, and the UI never told them Face Detection was needed.
- shared: add TOOL_EXTRA_BUNDLES + getRequiredBundlesForTool so a tool can
declare more than one required bundle (passport-photo needs background-removal
and face-detection). enablesTools is untouched, so the one-tool-per-bundle
invariant still holds.
- api: isToolInstalled() now checks every required bundle; add
getFirstMissingBundleForTool() so the analyze and base routes, pipeline (both
guards) and batch report the bundle the user actually still needs.
- web: the proactive install prompt (tool-page) and features-store treat a tool
as installed only when all required bundles are present, and point the prompt
at the first missing one (sequential install, no new UI).
Refs #327
* test(passport-photo): deterministic integration coverage for the two-bundle guard
Boots the real API with an isolated DATA_DIR and controls installed.json to
prove the HTTP route behavior end-to-end:
- nothing installed -> 501 naming background-removal
- only background-removal installed -> 501 naming face-detection (issue #327)
- both installed -> guard passes (not 501)
- base route reports face-detection too
Refs #327
Three production crashes from the snapotter/node Sentry project.
feature-status (NODE-12): a valid-JSON-but-wrong-shape installed.json
crashed boot via Object.keys(data.bundles). readInstalled() now
normalizes any unusable shape to { bundles: {} }, and the boot recovery
call is wrapped so cleanup can never fatal startup.
image-viewer (NODE-15/17/18): drag-to-pan read .x off an undefined
use-gesture memo on pointerUp or a pinch-into-pan. A guarded pure helper
(resolvePanStart) now falls back to the live pan offset.
Fastify (NODE-14): raised pluginTimeout to 60s so slow self-hosted boots
do not fatal at @fastify/static.
The entrypoint only fixed volume permissions when started as root (chown +
gosu-drop to snapotter). Launched under a non-root/foreign UID (TrueNAS app
user, Kubernetes runAsUser, OpenShift) it did no permission setup, so /data and
/tmp/workspace -- owned by uid 999 from the image -- were not writable by the
running user. Uploads and processing then failed with a cryptic EACCES
("workspace folder is not writable") and AI bundle installs failed the same way,
while health checks still reported the container healthy.
- entrypoint: source new entrypoint-lib.sh; verify writability up front when
non-root, and as snapotter after chown when root (catches root-squashed
mounts), failing fast with an actionable message (which dir, uid/gid, how to
fix) instead of a late, cryptic EACCES
- Dockerfile: own /data and /tmp/workspace as snapotter:0, group-writable with
setgid, so an arbitrary UID with the root supplementary group (OpenShift /
Kubernetes fsGroup) can write; keep /opt/venv world-readable for the AI venv
bootstrap under arbitrary UIDs
- api: assert storage writability at boot (lib/storage-writable.ts), failing
fast with the same guidance even when the entrypoint is bypassed
- docs: add a Storage permissions section (named volumes, bind mounts, TrueNAS,
Kubernetes/OpenShift) and cross-link it from the security guide
Fixes#230
RAW (DNG) processing crashed on ImageMagick's deprecated ufraw-batch
delegate, which fails on modern formats such as iPhone ProRAW DNG.
Root cause: the dcraw_emu (LibRaw) decode tier read the wrong output path.
dcraw_emu APPENDS the output extension (raw-in-X.dng -> raw-in-X.dng.tiff)
but the code looked for raw-in-X.tiff (replaced extension), so readFile threw
on every RAW, the tier silently fell through to ufraw, and the 24MB TIFF
leaked into the temp dir on each attempt.
- Repair the dcraw_emu output path; clean it up in finally (fixes the leak)
- Prefer LibRaw full decode over embedded-preview extraction so a
full-resolution RAW is never silently returned as a reduced-size preview
(sample DNG: was 1024x683 preview, now 3474x2314 full)
- Add RAW decode regression tests (DNG full-resolution + all 6 RAW formats);
these were absent, which let the bug ship
- Install libraw-bin on CI test runners so dcraw_emu is actually exercised
Tool endpoints (/api/v1/tools/*) now honor the RATE_LIMIT_PER_MIN env var instead of a hardcoded 60/min: `0` disables per-tool limiting, `>0` uses the configured value, and unset falls back to 60. Merged on top of the section-based route refactor (#280).
Fixes#271.
The csv-json integration test intermittently timed out at 30000ms on
the first worker-backed job in a fork. Root cause: waitForJob() creates
the BullMQ QueueEvents consumer lazily on first use, and a fresh consumer
reads the Redis events stream from "$" (the tail at the moment its run
loop starts). A trivial tool can publish its completed:<id> event before
the brand-new consumer positions itself, so waitUntilFinished() never
sees the event and blocks for the full sync-wait window. In tests
SYNC_WAIT_MS is floored at 30000ms, exactly the vitest per-test budget,
so the stall surfaces as an opaque timeout instead of a 202 fallback.
This is also a latent production latency bug: the first synchronous tool
request after each boot could hang up to the 8s prod window.
Fix: warmQueueEvents() eagerly constructs and connects every pool's
consumer at spine startup, before any job is enqueued, so each consumer
is positioned at the stream tail up front and never misses a completion.
Awaited in the test spine (deterministic for the first request) and fired
non-blocking at prod boot (a slow Redis must not stall startup).
Adds a regression guard in job-spine.test.ts that drops the cached
consumers, warms explicitly, and asserts a fast job's completion is
captured on the first sync-wait.
Verified: 3 parallel stress runs (276 file-runs across all pools), zero
timeouts; targeted job-spine + csv-json suites green; typecheck clean.
Replace textual prefix matching in isPrivateIPv6() with numeric bit-prefix matching via ipaddr.js. Closes reachable classifier bypasses for IPv4-compatible IPv6 (::a.b.c.d), site-local fec0::/10, and the full fe80::/10 link-local span, on top of the IPv4-mapped forms. Embedded IPv4 (mapped and compatible) is run through the full isPrivateIPv4 classifier; unparseable input fails closed.
Follow-up hardening to f64cbdda.
Reported-by: tonghuaroot
The resolve()+startsWith containment check was correct but CodeQL did not
recognize it. Apply path.basename() to the name in resolveWithinPreviewDir -- a
sanitizer CodeQL recognizes -- so every id-derived preview path is provably a
single filename inside the preview dir. Behaviour is unchanged for valid ids
(already charset-validated); containment check kept as a backstop.
- svg-sanitize.ts: strip each dangerous element repeatedly until stable with
whitespace-tolerant end tags, defeating nested/overlapping tags (closes 5
incomplete-multi-character-sanitization + 1 bad-tag-filter; the prior
single-pass regex could leave a residual <script>/<iframe>).
- file-preview.ts: add a resolve()+containment barrier (the path-traversal
guard CodeQL recognizes) on top of the id charset check (closes 9
path-injection).
- metadata.ts: bound the XMP namespace:name key segments so parseXmp cannot
backtrack polynomially (closes js/polynomial-redos).
- analytics-disabled.spec.ts: match analytics by URL host, not substring
(closes 4 incomplete-url-substring-sanitization).
typecheck + lint green; svg (119), preview (22), metadata (164) tests pass.
All /api/ routes are already covered by the global @fastify/rate-limit
(index.ts:283), but CodeQL doesn't model the global registration and flagged
every route without an explicit per-route limit. Added tuned config.rateLimit
to 45 routes: stricter on auth/credential routes (mfa/saml/oidc/api-keys,
15-30/min), moderate on writes (60/min), generous on reads/polls (300/min =
the global default). Real defense-in-depth on sensitive routes. 3 alerts on
non-route code (a preHandler hook, the rate-limiter's own DB lookup, a test
helper) are documented false-positives covered by the global limiter.
- file-preview.ts: validate the :id URL param against a safe charset and
restrict the original-name extension to alphanumerics before they feed
filesystem paths (closes 9 CodeQL js/path-injection; defense-in-depth on
top of the existing DB lookup).
- media-input.ts: require the SRT/VTT timecode structure to detect a subtitle
rather than a bare '-->' (closes CodeQL js/bad-tag-filter; also rejects
non-subtitle files that merely contain '-->').
#280 left 10 section-prefixed custom-route files mis-indented and one
unsorted import block in the new landing section-index page. Fixed via
biome formatter (api) and manual import sort (landing). No config change
(biome.json is hook-protected); no suppression. pnpm lint + typecheck
now exit 0.
- Lower LOGIN_ATTEMPT_LIMIT default from 30 to 10 (brute-force protection)
- Lower RATE_LIMIT_PER_MIN default from 1000 to 300
- Add Redis authentication (requirepass) with REDIS_PASSWORD env var
- Add Redis maxmemory 512mb cap to prevent unbounded growth
- Add mem_limit: 1g to Postgres and Redis containers
- Strip internal file paths from all error responses (defense-in-depth)
- Add startup warnings for default admin/Postgres/Redis credentials
- Update security test expectations for new defaults
Bump all workspace package versions and APP_VERSION to 2.0.0, marking the
official 2.0 release. Removes the stale 1.x .release-notes.md artifact
(semantic-release regenerates release notes). The 2.0/multimodality docs
and rebrand already landed on main via #254 and #261, so this carries only
the version designation forward from the rebrand branch.
BREAKING CHANGE: SnapOtter 2.0 - the platform re-architecture (Postgres 17 +
Redis 8 + BullMQ durable jobs, 157 tools across five modalities) is the 2.0
release line, replacing the 1.x SQLite single-container architecture.
The tool factory created its per-request validation scratch dir at tmpdir()/snapotter-scratch/<jobId> -- the same path the BullMQ worker uses for job processing (worker.ts scratchRoot()/<jobId>) whenever SCRATCH_PATH is unset. For sync tools this is harmless because the factory blocks on the worker before its finally cleanup runs. For "long" tools the factory returns 202 immediately and then rm's that dir, racing the worker that is writing the job's input there -- so tools that stage input in the worker scratch dir (epub-convert, to-epub) intermittently failed with ENOENT. Production never hit this because it sets SCRATCH_PATH, diverging the two paths. Give the factory's validation dir a -prep suffix so its cleanup can never touch the worker's job dir.
acceptedInputs is [.pdf], but pdf-to-image validated by calling mupdf.openDocument(buf, 'application/pdf'); mupdf sniffs the real format and opens JPEGs/PNGs/etc. as 1-page image-documents, returning 200. So non-PDF (incl. truncated/hostile) inputs were accepted, violating the contract and the hostile-input robustness check -- the one pre-existing failure surfaced by the full integration run. Gate all three endpoints (convert/info/preview) on the %PDF- magic bytes. Verified: truncated.jpg -> 400, valid PDF -> 200; the hostile-inputs test passes.
The earlier worker error-logging change logged every job failure at error level, including expected InputValidationErrors (e.g. 'needs at least two audio files') -- flooding error logs with non-actionable user-input rejections (visible across the integration run). Skip validation errors (matched by name, which survives the BullMQ boundary); genuine faults still log at error, and all failures still reach the OTel span.
The full unit suite surfaced two issues from earlier commits on this branch. (1) Importing the app logger into media-input.ts pulled logger.ts -- which builds its pino file transport at module load via join(env.LOG_DIR, ...) -- into the unit-test import graph, throwing at collection time wherever LOG_DIR is unset (integration tests set it; unit tests do not). A low-level modality handler should not depend on the app logger, and a corrupt upload is an expected user error, so drop the import and keep the clean validation message. (2) tool-factory-route.test.ts mocked errors.js without the new friendlyError export; add it.
The raw-dump detector matched broad content keywords ('conversion failed', 'pixel format', bare 'ffprobe') that appear in legitimate validation messages (e.g. 'SVG conversion failed'), which would wrongly collapse them to the generic error. Narrow it to the unambiguous 'ffmpeg/ffprobe exited N:' prefix, python tracebacks, and crashes; longer/multi-line raw dumps are still caught by the length/line-count check. Found during self-review.
Main already reuses the per-modality input handlers in batch and pipeline
(#244), so the modality-aware reuse from the video QA sweep was redundant.
Port only the remaining unique piece: pass lenient: skipStructuralValidation
to the handler so batched/pipelined PDF tools that opt out of structural
validation behave like the single-file factory path. Keeps main's safer
explicit image-decode chain (HEIC/RAW/SVG/autoOrient) and AI fileId threading.
An unrecognized/corrupt media upload threw an InputValidationError whose message embedded the raw ffprobe stderr ('ffprobe exited 1: ...'). Return a clean 'Unrecognized <kind> file' message to the client and log the raw probe failure via logger.warn instead. Found via the round-2 hostile-input gap test.
SnapOtter