Merge branch 'worktree-agent-a5f4fa03'

This commit is contained in:
SnapOtter
2026-05-01 02:30:04 +08:00
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/**
* Adversarial security integration tests for the SnapOtter image API.
*
* Focuses on attack vectors not covered by existing adversarial test files:
* - Path traversal: Windows-style, URL-encoded, double-encoded, embedded
* - Null byte injection: truncation attacks via \x00
* - Extreme filename lengths: 1000-char, special-char-only filenames
* - Unicode filenames: additional edge cases
* - Concurrent request racing: data integrity verification, cross-contamination
*
* Complements:
* - adversarial.test.ts (corrupted images, injection, malformed settings)
* - adversarial-extended.test.ts (zero-byte, unicode, batch, pipeline, concurrent)
* - adversarial-matrix.test.ts (memory pressure, parameter boundaries, pipelines)
*/
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { buildTestApp, createMultipartPayload, loginAsAdmin, type TestApp } from "./test-server.js";
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Fixtures
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
const FIXTURES = join(__dirname, "..", "fixtures");
const PNG_200x150 = readFileSync(join(FIXTURES, "test-200x150.png"));
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Shared state
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
let testApp: TestApp;
let app: TestApp["app"];
let adminToken: string;
beforeAll(async () => {
testApp = await buildTestApp();
app = testApp.app;
adminToken = await loginAsAdmin(app);
}, 30_000);
afterAll(async () => {
await testApp.cleanup();
}, 10_000);
/** Helper to POST a multipart payload to a tool endpoint. */
function postTool(
toolId: string,
fields: Array<{
name: string;
filename?: string;
contentType?: string;
content: Buffer | string;
}>,
) {
const { body, contentType } = createMultipartPayload(fields);
return app.inject({
method: "POST",
url: `/api/v1/tools/${toolId}`,
headers: {
"content-type": contentType,
authorization: `Bearer ${adminToken}`,
},
body,
});
}
/** Helper to build an inject config for a tool request. */
function buildToolRequest(
toolId: string,
image: Buffer,
filename: string,
settings: Record<string, unknown>,
) {
const { body, contentType } = createMultipartPayload([
{ name: "file", filename, content: image, contentType: "image/png" },
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify(settings) },
]);
return {
method: "POST" as const,
url: `/api/v1/tools/${toolId}`,
headers: {
"content-type": contentType,
authorization: `Bearer ${adminToken}`,
},
body,
};
}
// ===========================================================================
// PATH TRAVERSAL ATTACKS
// ===========================================================================
describe("Path traversal attacks", () => {
it("sanitizes ../../etc/passwd as filename", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{
name: "file",
filename: "../../etc/passwd",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
// Must either reject (400) or succeed with sanitized path
expect([200, 400]).toContain(res.statusCode);
if (res.statusCode === 200) {
const json = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(json.downloadUrl).not.toContain("..");
expect(json.downloadUrl).not.toContain("etc/passwd");
}
});
it("sanitizes Windows-style traversal: ..\\..\\windows\\system32\\config\\sam", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{
name: "file",
filename: "..\\..\\windows\\system32\\config\\sam",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
expect([200, 400]).toContain(res.statusCode);
if (res.statusCode === 200) {
const json = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(json.downloadUrl).not.toContain("..");
expect(json.downloadUrl).not.toContain("\\");
expect(json.downloadUrl).not.toContain("system32");
}
});
it("sanitizes URL-encoded traversal: %2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{
name: "file",
filename: "%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
expect([200, 400]).toContain(res.statusCode);
if (res.statusCode === 200) {
const json = JSON.parse(res.body);
// Even if percent-encoded chars are kept literally, the output path
// must not resolve to a traversal
expect(json.downloadUrl).not.toContain("etc/passwd");
}
});
it("sanitizes double-encoded traversal: ....//....//etc/passwd", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{
name: "file",
filename: "....//....//etc/passwd",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
expect([200, 400]).toContain(res.statusCode);
if (res.statusCode === 200) {
const json = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(json.downloadUrl).not.toContain("..");
expect(json.downloadUrl).not.toContain("etc/passwd");
}
});
it("sanitizes embedded traversal: test/../../../etc/passwd.png", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{
name: "file",
filename: "test/../../../etc/passwd.png",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
expect([200, 400]).toContain(res.statusCode);
if (res.statusCode === 200) {
const json = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(json.downloadUrl).not.toContain("..");
expect(json.downloadUrl).not.toContain("etc/passwd");
}
});
it("sanitizes path traversal through compress tool", async () => {
const res = await postTool("compress", [
{
name: "file",
filename: "../../../tmp/evil.png",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ quality: 80 }) },
]);
expect([200, 400]).toContain(res.statusCode);
if (res.statusCode === 200) {
const json = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(json.downloadUrl).not.toContain("..");
expect(json.downloadUrl).not.toContain("tmp/evil");
}
});
it("sanitizes path traversal through rotate tool", async () => {
const res = await postTool("rotate", [
{
name: "file",
filename: "../../../../var/log/syslog.png",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ angle: 90 }) },
]);
expect([200, 400]).toContain(res.statusCode);
if (res.statusCode === 200) {
const json = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(json.downloadUrl).not.toContain("..");
expect(json.downloadUrl).not.toContain("var/log");
}
});
});
// ===========================================================================
// NULL BYTE INJECTION
// ===========================================================================
describe("Null byte injection", () => {
it("handles filename with null byte before extension: image\\x00.png", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{
name: "file",
filename: "image\x00.png",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
// Must not crash (500). Either processed (200) or rejected (400).
expect([200, 400]).toContain(res.statusCode);
if (res.statusCode === 200) {
const json = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(json.downloadUrl).not.toContain("\x00");
}
});
it("handles filename with embedded null bytes: te\\x00st\\x00.png", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{
name: "file",
filename: "te\x00st\x00.png",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
expect([200, 400]).toContain(res.statusCode);
if (res.statusCode === 200) {
const json = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(json.downloadUrl).not.toContain("\x00");
}
});
it("handles filename that is only null bytes", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{
name: "file",
filename: "\x00\x00\x00",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
// After stripping null bytes, the name becomes empty, which should
// fall back to the default "upload" name.
expect([200, 400]).toContain(res.statusCode);
if (res.statusCode === 200) {
const json = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(json.downloadUrl).toBeDefined();
expect(json.downloadUrl).not.toContain("\x00");
}
});
it("handles null byte combined with path traversal: ../\\x00../../etc/passwd.png", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{
name: "file",
filename: "../\x00../../etc/passwd.png",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
expect([200, 400]).toContain(res.statusCode);
if (res.statusCode === 200) {
const json = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(json.downloadUrl).not.toContain("\x00");
expect(json.downloadUrl).not.toContain("..");
expect(json.downloadUrl).not.toContain("etc/passwd");
}
});
});
// ===========================================================================
// EXTREME FILENAME LENGTHS
// ===========================================================================
describe("Extreme filename lengths", () => {
it("handles a 1000-character filename without crashing", async () => {
const longBase = "a".repeat(1000);
const longName = `${longBase}.png`;
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{
name: "file",
filename: longName,
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
// sanitizeFilename truncates to 200 bytes, so this should succeed
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
const json = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(json.downloadUrl).toBeDefined();
// The filename in the URL should be truncated (not the full 1000 chars)
expect(json.downloadUrl.length).toBeLessThan(1100);
});
it("handles a filename made entirely of special characters: !@#$%^&()+=.png", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{
name: "file",
filename: "!@#$%^&()+=.png",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
const json = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(json.downloadUrl).toBeDefined();
});
it("handles a filename with repeated dots: ....test....png", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{
name: "file",
filename: "....test....png",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
expect([200, 400]).toContain(res.statusCode);
if (res.statusCode === 200) {
const json = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(json.downloadUrl).toBeDefined();
}
});
it("handles a filename with only spaces: ' .png'", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{
name: "file",
filename: " .png",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
expect([200, 400]).toContain(res.statusCode);
});
it("handles a 5000-character filename", async () => {
const hugeBase = "x".repeat(5000);
const hugeName = `${hugeBase}.png`;
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{
name: "file",
filename: hugeName,
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
// Must not crash; sanitizeFilename truncates to 200 bytes
expect([200, 400]).toContain(res.statusCode);
if (res.statusCode === 200) {
const json = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(json.downloadUrl).toBeDefined();
}
});
});
// ===========================================================================
// UNICODE FILENAMES -- ADDITIONAL EDGE CASES
// ===========================================================================
describe("Unicode filenames -- additional security edge cases", () => {
it("handles filename with Arabic (RTL) text only: صورة.png", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{
name: "file",
filename: "صورة.png",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
const json = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(json.downloadUrl).toBeDefined();
});
it("handles filename with Korean hangul: 사진.png", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{
name: "file",
filename: "사진.png",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
});
it("handles filename with Devanagari script: चित्र.png", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{
name: "file",
filename: "चित्र.png",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
});
it("handles filename with mixed emoji sequence: \u{1F1FA}\u{1F1F8}\u{1F4F8}\u{1F3DE}\u{FE0F}.png", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{
name: "file",
filename: "\u{1F1FA}\u{1F1F8}\u{1F4F8}\u{1F3DE}\u{FE0F}.png",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
const json = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(json.downloadUrl).toBeDefined();
});
it("handles filename with right-to-left override character (U+202E)", async () => {
// This Unicode control char can visually reverse text -- used in social
// engineering attacks to disguise file extensions
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{
name: "file",
filename: "photognp.exe",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
// Should succeed but the output URL must not contain the RTLO character
// in a way that hides the real extension
expect([200, 400]).toContain(res.statusCode);
});
it("handles filename with zero-width joiner and variation selectors", async () => {
// Family emoji composed via ZWJ: technically a single glyph
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{
name: "file",
filename: "\u{1F468}\u{1F469}\u{1F467}\u{1F466}.png",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
});
it("handles filename with tab characters: file\\tname\\t.png", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{
name: "file",
filename: "file\tname\t.png",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
expect([200, 400]).toContain(res.statusCode);
});
});
// ===========================================================================
// CONCURRENT REQUEST RACING
// ===========================================================================
describe("Concurrent requests -- data integrity verification", () => {
it("fires 10 simultaneous resize requests with different widths -- all return correct results", async () => {
const widths = [20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120, 140, 160, 180, 200];
const results = await Promise.all(
widths.map((width, i) =>
app.inject(
buildToolRequest("resize", PNG_200x150, `concurrent-${i}.png`, {
width,
}),
),
),
);
// All 10 must return 200
for (const res of results) {
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
const json = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(json.jobId).toBeDefined();
expect(json.downloadUrl).toBeDefined();
}
// All 10 must produce unique job IDs (no race condition)
const jobIds = results.map((r) => JSON.parse(r.body).jobId);
expect(new Set(jobIds).size).toBe(10);
// All 10 must produce unique download URLs
const urls = results.map((r) => JSON.parse(r.body).downloadUrl);
expect(new Set(urls).size).toBe(10);
// Processed sizes should vary since widths differ -- verify no cross-contamination
const processedSizes = results.map((r) => JSON.parse(r.body).processedSize);
// At minimum, the smallest width (20) should produce a smaller file than the largest (200)
expect(processedSizes[0]).toBeLessThan(processedSizes[9]);
}, 120_000);
it("fires batch and single request simultaneously -- no cross-contamination", async () => {
// Single resize to 50px width
const singleReq = app.inject(
buildToolRequest("resize", PNG_200x150, "single-only.png", {
width: 50,
}),
);
// Batch resize of 3 images to 150px width
const batchPayload = createMultipartPayload([
{
name: "file",
filename: "batch-1.png",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{
name: "file",
filename: "batch-2.png",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{
name: "file",
filename: "batch-3.png",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 150 }) },
]);
const batchReq = app.inject({
method: "POST",
url: "/api/v1/tools/resize/batch",
headers: {
"content-type": batchPayload.contentType,
authorization: `Bearer ${adminToken}`,
},
body: batchPayload.body,
});
const [singleRes, batchRes] = await Promise.all([singleReq, batchReq]);
// Single request must succeed
expect(singleRes.statusCode).toBe(200);
const singleBody = JSON.parse(singleRes.body);
expect(singleBody.jobId).toBeDefined();
expect(singleBody.downloadUrl).toBeDefined();
// Single was 50px width, so it should be smaller than the 200px original
expect(singleBody.processedSize).toBeLessThan(singleBody.originalSize);
// Batch request must succeed
expect(batchRes.statusCode).toBe(200);
expect(batchRes.headers["content-type"]).toBe("application/zip");
const fileResults = JSON.parse(batchRes.headers["x-file-results"] as string);
expect(Object.keys(fileResults).length).toBe(3);
// The single request's job ID must not appear in the batch results
for (const name of Object.keys(fileResults)) {
expect(name).not.toContain("single");
}
}, 120_000);
it("fires 10 simultaneous requests across 5 different tools -- all isolated", async () => {
const requests = [
buildToolRequest("resize", PNG_200x150, "r1.png", { width: 80 }),
buildToolRequest("resize", PNG_200x150, "r2.png", { width: 120 }),
buildToolRequest("rotate", PNG_200x150, "rot1.png", { angle: 90 }),
buildToolRequest("rotate", PNG_200x150, "rot2.png", { angle: 180 }),
buildToolRequest("compress", PNG_200x150, "c1.png", { quality: 30 }),
buildToolRequest("compress", PNG_200x150, "c2.png", { quality: 90 }),
buildToolRequest("border", PNG_200x150, "b1.png", { borderWidth: 5 }),
buildToolRequest("border", PNG_200x150, "b2.png", { borderWidth: 20 }),
buildToolRequest("convert", PNG_200x150, "cv1.png", { format: "webp" }),
buildToolRequest("convert", PNG_200x150, "cv2.png", { format: "jpg" }),
];
const results = await Promise.all(requests.map((req) => app.inject(req)));
// All must return 200
for (const res of results) {
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
}
// All must have unique job IDs
const jobIds = results.map((r) => JSON.parse(r.body).jobId);
expect(new Set(jobIds).size).toBe(10);
// All must have unique download URLs
const urls = results.map((r) => JSON.parse(r.body).downloadUrl);
expect(new Set(urls).size).toBe(10);
}, 120_000);
it("fires adversarial filename requests concurrently with valid requests", async () => {
const [valid1, traversal, valid2, nullByte, valid3] = await Promise.all([
app.inject(
buildToolRequest("resize", PNG_200x150, "normal-1.png", {
width: 100,
}),
),
app.inject(
buildToolRequest("resize", PNG_200x150, "../../../etc/shadow.png", {
width: 100,
}),
),
app.inject(
buildToolRequest("resize", PNG_200x150, "normal-2.png", {
width: 100,
}),
),
app.inject(
buildToolRequest("resize", PNG_200x150, "evil\x00.png", {
width: 100,
}),
),
app.inject(
buildToolRequest("resize", PNG_200x150, "normal-3.png", {
width: 100,
}),
),
]);
// Valid requests must succeed
expect(valid1.statusCode).toBe(200);
expect(valid2.statusCode).toBe(200);
expect(valid3.statusCode).toBe(200);
// Adversarial requests must not crash the server
expect([200, 400]).toContain(traversal.statusCode);
expect([200, 400]).toContain(nullByte.statusCode);
// If traversal succeeded, verify sanitization
if (traversal.statusCode === 200) {
const json = JSON.parse(traversal.body);
expect(json.downloadUrl).not.toContain("..");
expect(json.downloadUrl).not.toContain("etc/shadow");
}
// Valid request job IDs must be unique
const validIds = [valid1, valid2, valid3].map((r) => JSON.parse(r.body).jobId);
expect(new Set(validIds).size).toBe(3);
}, 120_000);
});
// ===========================================================================
// SERVER STABILITY AFTER SECURITY BARRAGE
// ===========================================================================
describe("Server stability -- health check after security tests", () => {
it("server remains responsive after all security tests", async () => {
const healthRes = await app.inject({
method: "GET",
url: "/api/v1/health",
});
expect(healthRes.statusCode).toBe(200);
const json = JSON.parse(healthRes.body);
expect(json.status).toBe("healthy");
// Verify a normal request still works
const normalRes = await postTool("resize", [
{
name: "file",
filename: "sanity-check.png",
content: PNG_200x150,
contentType: "image/png",
},
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
expect(normalRes.statusCode).toBe(200);
expect(JSON.parse(normalRes.body).jobId).toBeDefined();
});
});