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https://github.com/BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills.git
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454 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
454 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: audit-logging
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description: Implement centralized audit logging and SIEM integration. Configure log retention and security monitoring. Use when implementing audit trail requirements.
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license: MIT
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metadata:
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author: devops-skills
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version: "1.0"
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---
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# Audit Logging
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Implement comprehensive audit logging for compliance, security monitoring, and forensic analysis across infrastructure and applications.
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## When to Use
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- Setting up centralized logging for compliance frameworks (SOC 2, HIPAA, PCI DSS)
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- Implementing security event monitoring and alerting
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- Building audit trails for regulatory requirements
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- Configuring log retention and tamper-proof storage
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- Integrating application logs with SIEM platforms
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## Log Categories
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```yaml
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audit_events:
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authentication:
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- Login attempts (success and failure)
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- MFA enrollment and verification events
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- Session creation, renewal, and termination
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- Password changes and resets
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- API key and token generation
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authorization:
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- Access grants and denials
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- Permission changes and role assignments
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- Privilege escalation events
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- Resource sharing modifications
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- Policy evaluation results
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data_access:
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- Read operations on sensitive data
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- Write and update operations
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- Delete and purge operations
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- Bulk export and download events
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- Data classification changes
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administrative:
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- Configuration changes
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- User and group management
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- System startup and shutdown
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- Backup and restore operations
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- Network and firewall rule changes
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system:
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- Service health state changes
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- Resource provisioning and deprovisioning
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- Certificate and key rotation events
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- Scheduled job execution results
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- Integration and webhook events
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```
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## Rsyslog Configuration for Centralized Logging
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```bash
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# /etc/rsyslog.d/50-audit.conf
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# Load imfile module to read application logs
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module(load="imfile")
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# Forward auth logs
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input(type="imfile"
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File="/var/log/auth.log"
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Tag="auth"
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Severity="info"
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Facility="auth"
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)
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# Forward application audit logs
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input(type="imfile"
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File="/var/log/app/audit.log"
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Tag="app-audit"
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Severity="info"
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Facility="local0"
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)
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# Structured JSON template
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template(name="json-audit" type="list") {
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constant(value="{")
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constant(value="\"@timestamp\":\"") property(name="timereported" dateFormat="rfc3339")
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constant(value="\",\"host\":\"") property(name="hostname")
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constant(value="\",\"severity\":\"") property(name="syslogseverity-text")
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constant(value="\",\"facility\":\"") property(name="syslogfacility-text")
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constant(value="\",\"tag\":\"") property(name="syslogtag" format="json")
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constant(value="\",\"message\":\"") property(name="msg" format="json")
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constant(value="\"}\n")
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}
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# Forward to central syslog server over TLS
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action(
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type="omfwd"
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target="syslog.internal.example.com"
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port="6514"
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protocol="tcp"
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StreamDriver="gtls"
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StreamDriverMode="1"
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StreamDriverAuthMode="x509/name"
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template="json-audit"
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queue.type="LinkedList"
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queue.size="50000"
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queue.filename="fwd_audit"
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queue.saveonshutdown="on"
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action.resumeRetryCount="-1"
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)
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```
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## Journald Configuration for Persistent Logging
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```ini
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# /etc/systemd/journald.conf
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[Journal]
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Storage=persistent
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Compress=yes
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Seal=yes
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SplitMode=uid
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MaxRetentionSec=365d
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MaxFileSec=30d
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SystemMaxUse=10G
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SystemKeepFree=2G
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ForwardToSyslog=yes
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```
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```bash
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# Query journald for audit events
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journalctl _TRANSPORT=audit --since "24 hours ago" --output json-pretty
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# Filter by specific audit types
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journalctl _AUDIT_TYPE=1112 --since today # user login events
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journalctl _AUDIT_TYPE=1100 --since today # user auth events
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# Export for offline analysis
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journalctl --since "7 days ago" --output export > /backup/journal-export.bin
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```
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## Application Logging with Structured JSON
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```python
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import logging
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import json
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import hashlib
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from datetime import datetime, timezone
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from functools import wraps
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class AuditLogger:
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def __init__(self, service_name, logger_name="audit"):
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self.service = service_name
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self.logger = logging.getLogger(logger_name)
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handler = logging.FileHandler("/var/log/app/audit.log")
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handler.setFormatter(logging.Formatter("%(message)s"))
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self.logger.addHandler(handler)
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self.logger.setLevel(logging.INFO)
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self._prev_hash = None
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def log_event(self, event_type, user, resource, action, result,
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metadata=None, source_ip=None):
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log_entry = {
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"timestamp": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
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"service": self.service,
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"event_type": event_type,
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"user": user,
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"resource": resource,
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"action": action,
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"result": result,
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"source_ip": source_ip,
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"metadata": metadata or {},
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}
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# Chain hash for tamper detection
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raw = json.dumps(log_entry, sort_keys=True)
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log_entry["prev_hash"] = self._prev_hash
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log_entry["hash"] = hashlib.sha256(
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f"{self._prev_hash}:{raw}".encode()
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).hexdigest()
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self._prev_hash = log_entry["hash"]
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self.logger.info(json.dumps(log_entry))
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def log_auth(self, user, action, success, source_ip=None, mfa=False):
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self.log_event(
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event_type="authentication",
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user=user,
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resource="auth-service",
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action=action,
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result="success" if success else "failure",
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metadata={"mfa_used": mfa},
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source_ip=source_ip,
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)
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def log_data_access(self, user, resource, operation, record_count=0,
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source_ip=None):
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self.log_event(
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event_type="data_access",
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user=user,
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resource=resource,
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action=operation,
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result="success",
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metadata={"record_count": record_count},
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source_ip=source_ip,
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)
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def audit_trail(audit_logger, resource_name):
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"""Decorator to automatically audit function calls."""
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def decorator(func):
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@wraps(func)
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def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
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user = kwargs.get("current_user", "system")
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try:
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result = func(*args, **kwargs)
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audit_logger.log_event(
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event_type="operation",
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user=user,
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resource=resource_name,
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action=func.__name__,
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result="success",
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)
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return result
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except Exception as e:
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audit_logger.log_event(
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event_type="operation",
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user=user,
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resource=resource_name,
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action=func.__name__,
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result="failure",
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metadata={"error": str(e)},
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)
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raise
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return wrapper
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return decorator
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```
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## Fluentd / Fluent Bit Log Aggregation
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```yaml
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# fluent-bit.conf - lightweight agent on each node
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[SERVICE]
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Flush 5
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Daemon Off
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Log_Level info
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Parsers_File parsers.conf
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[INPUT]
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Name tail
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Path /var/log/app/audit.log
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Parser json
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Tag audit.app
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Refresh_Interval 5
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Rotate_Wait 30
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[INPUT]
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Name systemd
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Tag audit.system
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Systemd_Filter _TRANSPORT=audit
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[FILTER]
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Name modify
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Match audit.*
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Add cluster ${CLUSTER_NAME}
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Add node ${NODE_NAME}
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[OUTPUT]
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Name es
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Match audit.*
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Host elasticsearch.internal.example.com
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Port 9200
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Index audit-logs
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Type _doc
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tls On
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tls.verify On
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Retry_Limit 5
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[OUTPUT]
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Name s3
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Match audit.*
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region us-east-1
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bucket audit-logs-archive
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total_file_size 50M
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upload_timeout 10m
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s3_key_format /logs/%Y/%m/%d/$TAG/%H_%M_%S.gz
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compression gzip
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```
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## Elasticsearch Index Lifecycle for Retention
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```json
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{
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"policy": {
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"phases": {
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"hot": {
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"min_age": "0ms",
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"actions": {
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"rollover": {
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"max_size": "50gb",
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"max_age": "1d"
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},
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"set_priority": { "priority": 100 }
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}
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},
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"warm": {
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"min_age": "7d",
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"actions": {
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"shrink": { "number_of_shards": 1 },
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"forcemerge": { "max_num_segments": 1 },
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"set_priority": { "priority": 50 }
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}
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},
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"cold": {
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"min_age": "30d",
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"actions": {
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"freeze": {},
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"set_priority": { "priority": 0 }
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}
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},
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"delete": {
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"min_age": "365d",
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"actions": { "delete": {} }
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}
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}
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}
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}
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```
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## Retention Policy by Compliance Framework
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```yaml
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retention_requirements:
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soc2:
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minimum: 1 year
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recommended: 3 years
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notes: "Based on audit period and report requirements"
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hipaa:
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minimum: 6 years
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notes: "From date of creation or last effective date"
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pci_dss:
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minimum: 1 year
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immediately_available: 3 months
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notes: "Req 10.7 - retain for at least one year, 3 months immediately available"
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gdpr:
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minimum: "As long as necessary for processing purpose"
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notes: "Apply data minimization; delete when no longer needed"
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fedramp:
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minimum: 3 years
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notes: "AU-11 control requirement"
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iso27001:
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minimum: "Defined by organization policy"
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recommended: 3 years
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notes: "A.12.4.1 - retention period must be defined"
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```
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## Log Integrity Verification Script
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```bash
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# verify-log-integrity.sh - Verify log file checksums against stored hashes
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LOG_DIR="/var/log/app"
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HASH_FILE="/var/log/app/.checksums"
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ALERT_WEBHOOK="${ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL}"
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verify_logs() {
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local failures=0
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while IFS=' ' read -r stored_hash filename; do
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if [ -f "$filename" ]; then
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current_hash=$(sha256sum "$filename" | awk '{print $1}')
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if [ "$stored_hash" != "$current_hash" ]; then
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echo "TAMPER DETECTED: $filename"
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failures=$((failures + 1))
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curl -s -X POST "$ALERT_WEBHOOK" \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d "{\"text\":\"ALERT: Audit log tamper detected on $(hostname): $filename\"}"
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fi
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else
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echo "MISSING: $filename"
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failures=$((failures + 1))
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fi
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done < "$HASH_FILE"
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return $failures
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}
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update_checksums() {
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find "$LOG_DIR" -name "*.log" -type f -exec sha256sum {} \; > "$HASH_FILE"
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chmod 440 "$HASH_FILE"
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}
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case "${1:-verify}" in
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verify) verify_logs ;;
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update) update_checksums ;;
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*) echo "Usage: $0 {verify|update}" ;;
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esac
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```
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## SIEM Integration Checklist
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```yaml
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siem_integration:
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log_sources:
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- [ ] Operating system auth logs (syslog, journald)
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- [ ] Application audit logs (structured JSON)
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- [ ] Cloud provider audit trails (CloudTrail, Activity Log, Audit Logs)
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- [ ] Database query and access logs
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- [ ] Network flow logs and firewall logs
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- [ ] Container and orchestrator logs (Kubernetes audit)
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- [ ] WAF and CDN access logs
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- [ ] VPN and remote access logs
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normalization:
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- [ ] Common event format (CEF) or OCSF schema
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- [ ] Consistent timestamp format (ISO 8601 / UTC)
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- [ ] Unified user identity fields
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- [ ] Standardized severity levels
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alerting_rules:
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- [ ] Multiple failed login attempts (brute force)
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- [ ] Login from unusual location or device
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- [ ] Privilege escalation events
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- [ ] Sensitive data bulk export
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- [ ] Administrative action outside change window
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- [ ] Service account anomalous activity
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- [ ] Log forwarding gap or interruption
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operational:
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- [ ] Log pipeline health monitoring
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- [ ] Storage capacity alerting
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- [ ] Retention policy enforcement verified
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- [ ] Backup of log archives confirmed
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- [ ] Access to log systems restricted and audited
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```
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## Best Practices
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- Use structured logging (JSON) with consistent field names across all services
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- Ship logs to a centralized platform with write-once storage for tamper protection
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- Implement hash chaining or digital signatures for log integrity verification
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- Define and enforce retention policies per compliance framework requirements
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- Set up real-time alerting for high-severity security events
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- Separate audit logs from application debug logs to reduce noise
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- Never log sensitive data (passwords, tokens, PII) in audit entries
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- Monitor the logging pipeline itself to detect gaps in coverage
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- Regularly test log restoration from archives to verify recoverability
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- Rotate and compress logs to manage storage while meeting retention windows
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