bastille-jail-provisioning: add FreeBSD-adapted script safety patterns

Merge in a checklist-style "provisioning script safety" section, adapted
from wshobson/agents' bash-defensive-patterns skill (fetched directly
from GitHub, MIT licensed) rather than trusted from its catalog summary.

Covers: shell-choice caution (#!/bin/bash isn't guaranteed on FreeBSD;
bash is a package at /usr/local/bin/bash, not base), a contextual
error-handling philosophy instead of a blanket `set -Eeuo pipefail`,
trap-based cleanup/logging for scripts interrupted mid-jail-creation
(without auto-rollback, which can worsen the known destroy/create IP
churn issue), jail-name/IP input validation before destructive `bastille`
commands, and FreeBSD `mktemp`/`sed -i`/`date` syntax differences from
GNU. Deliberately dropped the upstream's interactive `rm -rI` cleanup
pattern (wrong for unattended SSH automation) and did not import
retry/locking/ShellCheck-gate advice that wasn't actually present in the
real upstream files. Cross-references remote-shell-quoting-safety instead
of duplicating its nested-shell-quoting content.

Also documents the /usr/local/bastille vs /www/bastille bastille_prefix
split already present across this fleet's hosts (gringo/staging vs
granja), which the new script-safety guidance assumes readers already
know not to hardcode.

Full worked patterns and code examples live in the new
references/script-safety.md; SKILL.md keeps the load-bearing summary.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-15 21:28:05 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Sonnet 5
parent 6fa011a9a6
commit 251498ad58
2 changed files with 301 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -265,3 +265,63 @@ exist under that name in the FreeBSD ports tree) — and remember Valkey's
ACL means any code connecting to it needs an explicit `AUTH` step, not just
`connect()`; a `connect()`-only implementation will silently fail every
subsequent command with `NOAUTH` against this fleet's standard Valkey setup.
## Bastille filesystem prefix varies by host — check before hardcoding a path
Don't assume `/usr/local/bastille/jails/<name>/root/...` — that's only
the convention where `bastille.conf` uses the default `bastille_prefix`
(confirmed on gringo and staging). A host with a custom
`bastille_prefix` (e.g. `granja`, where storage was repointed at a
dedicated `wwwpool` with `bastille_prefix=/www/bastille`) puts jails
under `/www/bastille/jails/<name>/root/...` instead — writing to the
`/usr/local/bastille/...` path on that host silently succeeds (creates a
new, wrong directory) rather than erroring, since nothing stops you from
writing to an arbitrary path. **Check the host's actual
`bastille_prefix`** (`grep bastille_prefix /etc/rc.conf` or
`bastille.conf`) before hardcoding either path in a script.
## Provisioning script safety
Applies to any shell script written to automate part of this
provisioning flow (not the one-off interactive commands above). Full
worked patterns, including FreeBSD-specific `mktemp`/`sed`/`date` syntax,
a trap-based cleanup template, and jail-name/IP input validation, live in
`references/script-safety.md` — read that before writing a new
provisioning script. Summary of the load-bearing points:
- **Don't assume `#!/bin/bash` exists.** FreeBSD base ships `/bin/sh`
(POSIX-ish ash), not bash — bash is a package that installs to
`/usr/local/bin/bash`, never `/bin/bash`, and many freshly cloned jails
won't have it installed at all. Default to `#!/bin/sh` and POSIX
constructs unless bash-only features are genuinely needed and you've
confirmed bash is present on the target.
- **Error handling is contextual, not a blanket `set -Eeuo pipefail`.**
Turn on `set -eu` for the whole script, but explicitly tolerate steps
that are allowed to fail (e.g. an already-installed package, an
optional service restart) with a commented `|| true` rather than either
aborting the whole provisioning run on a non-fatal hiccup or suppressing
errors wholesale. `-o pipefail`/`-E` are bash-only and unavailable under
`/bin/sh`.
- **Trap cleanup, don't trap auto-rollback.** A script that dies partway
through jail creation should log exactly which step it reached (jail
created? DB granted? vhost written?) so a human can clean up — see the
create/destroy IP-alias churn gotcha above for why an automatic
`bastille destroy` inside a failure-path trap can make things worse, not
better.
- **Validate jail names and IPs before they reach a destructive `bastille`
command.** `bastille destroy <name>` has no confirmation prompt.
Validate with plain POSIX `case`/`[` pattern matching (works under both
`/bin/sh` and bash) before any value — especially one derived from
outside the script — is interpolated into a command.
For quoting content through nested shell layers (`ssh` → `bastille cmd`
→ `su`), use the separate `remote-shell-quoting-safety` skill — that
problem is not duplicated here.
Provenance: the script-safety patterns above are adapted from
wshobson/agents' `bash-defensive-patterns` skill
(https://github.com/wshobson/agents,
`plugins/shell-scripting/skills/bash-defensive-patterns`, MIT licensed,
fetched 2026-08-15) — rewritten for FreeBSD/Bastille where upstream
assumed GNU/Linux; see `references/script-safety.md` for exactly what was
kept, rewritten, or dropped.
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
# Provisioning script safety — FreeBSD/Bastille worked patterns
Deeper worked examples for the "Provisioning script safety" section of
`SKILL.md`. Read this when the summary there isn't enough to actually
write the script.
**Provenance**: adapted from wshobson/agents' `bash-defensive-patterns`
skill (https://github.com/wshobson/agents,
`plugins/shell-scripting/skills/bash-defensive-patterns/{SKILL.md,references/details.md}`,
MIT licensed, fetched 2026-08-15). That upstream skill is written for
Linux/GNU and knows nothing about FreeBSD base tools, `/usr/local/bin/bash`,
Bastille, rc.d, ZFS, or PF. Every pattern below was checked against FreeBSD
15.1-RELEASE behavior and either kept, rewritten, or explicitly dropped —
see "What was deliberately left out" at the end. Nothing here was copied
from the upstream examples unchanged.
For shell-quoting-through-multiple-hops (`ssh``bastille cmd``su`),
see the `remote-shell-quoting-safety` skill instead — not duplicated here.
## Shell choice: don't assume `#!/bin/bash` exists
FreeBSD base's `/bin/sh` is a modified `ash` (POSIX-ish), not bash. Bash
is **not** part of FreeBSD base — it's a package (`pkg install bash`)
that installs to `/usr/local/bin/bash`, **never** `/bin/bash`. A
`#!/bin/bash` shebang written for a Linux-oriented example fails
immediately with "No such file or directory" on a bare FreeBSD host or a
freshly cloned jail — many base jail images don't have bash installed at
all.
- If bash-only features are genuinely needed (arrays, `[[ ]]`, `mapfile`,
process substitution `< <(...)`), use `#!/usr/bin/env bash` **and**
verify bash is actually present on the target first —
`bastille cmd <jail> which bash` or `pkg info bash` on the host. Don't
assume.
- For anything that runs early in provisioning (before you know what's on
the target) or where plain POSIX does the job, prefer `#!/bin/sh` — it's
guaranteed present on both the host and every jail, no package
dependency. Drop arrays, `[[ ]]`, `mapfile`/`readarray`, and process
substitution; use `case`, `$( )`, and POSIX `[ ]` test instead.
## Error-handling philosophy: contextual, not a blanket `set -Eeuo pipefail`
The upstream checklist's rule #1 is "always use strict mode." Treating
that as an absolute is wrong for provisioning scripts:
- `set -e` (and `set -u`) are genuinely valuable for early validation —
bad jail name, IP already taken, missing base release — where any
failure should hard-stop before anything destructive happens.
- Once a script is deep into a multi-step provisioning sequence, some
steps are legitimately allowed to fail without aborting the whole run —
e.g. `pkg install -y arp-scan` when it may already be installed, or
restarting an optional service that doesn't exist on every base image
yet. Blanket `-e` turns those into full-script aborts, which is exactly
how you get the half-created-jail mess this skill warns about elsewhere.
- Practical rule for this fleet: turn strict mode on for the whole script
(`set -eu`; add `-o pipefail` only if it's genuinely running under
bash), but explicitly wrap any step that's allowed to fail —
`cmd || true` or `if ! cmd; then log_warn "..."; fi` — with a comment
saying *why* it's non-fatal. Silent blanket suppression (`set +e`
everywhere) is worse than blanket strict mode; the goal is a script
where every deliberately-tolerated failure is visible in a diff, not one
with no error handling at all.
- `-o pipefail` and `-E` (ERR trap inherited into functions) are bash
extensions, unavailable under POSIX `/bin/sh`. If the script is
`/bin/sh`, restructure instead of relying on them — e.g. write a
pipeline's output to a temp file and check that command's own exit
status, rather than depending on an upstream stage's exit code surviving
a pipe.
## Trap-based cleanup for interrupted provisioning
A half-created jail is a real mess: `bastille create` partway through, a
DB created but no grant, an nginx vhost written but not enabled, a pf
table entry added but the jail never started. A script that dies partway
(Ctrl-C, a dropped SSH session, a later step's genuine failure) should at
minimum log exactly how far it got — automatically rolling back a jail
creation from inside a trap is its own risk (see this skill's
create/destroy-churn IP-alias gotcha; automating teardown under failure
conditions can make the mess worse, not better).
```sh
# POSIX-compatible: /bin/sh, no bash-only trap features needed
PROVISION_LOG="/tmp/provision-${JAIL_NAME}.log"
CREATED_JAIL=""
CREATED_DB=""
CURRENT_STEP=""
cleanup() {
status=$?
if [ "$status" -ne 0 ]; then
{
echo "FAILED at step: ${CURRENT_STEP:-unknown} (exit $status)"
echo "Partial state: jail=${CREATED_JAIL:-none} db=${CREATED_DB:-none}"
echo "Manual cleanup needed before retrying with the same name/IP."
} >> "$PROVISION_LOG"
echo "Provisioning failed — see $PROVISION_LOG" >&2
fi
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
CURRENT_STEP="bastille create"
bastille create "$JAIL_NAME" 15.1-RELEASE "$JAIL_IP" vtnet0
CREATED_JAIL="$JAIL_NAME"
CURRENT_STEP="db grant"
# ... etc, set CURRENT_STEP before each major step
```
Set `CURRENT_STEP` before each major step so the log names the actual
failed step, not just "something failed."
## Input validation before jail names/IPs reach a destructive command
Bastille commands take a jail name and/or IP as a bare positional
argument with no confirmation prompt — `bastille destroy <name>` is
irreversible. Validate **before** the value is interpolated into any
`bastille` command, especially if it ever originates from outside the
script (a ticket description, a generated name, pasted text):
```sh
validate_jail_name() {
name="$1"
case "$name" in
''|*[!a-zA-Z0-9_-]*)
echo "ERROR: invalid jail name: '$name' (letters, digits, - and _ only)" >&2
return 1
;;
esac
if bastille list all 2>/dev/null | grep -qx "$name"; then
echo "NOTE: jail '$name' already exists" >&2
fi
}
validate_ipv4() {
ip="$1"
case "$ip" in
*[!0-9.]*|'') echo "ERROR: not an IPv4 literal: '$ip'" >&2; return 1 ;;
esac
IFS=. read -r o1 o2 o3 o4 <<EOF
$ip
EOF
for o in "$o1" "$o2" "$o3" "$o4"; do
[ -n "$o" ] && [ "$o" -le 255 ] 2>/dev/null || {
echo "ERROR: octet out of range in '$ip'" >&2
return 1
}
done
}
```
This is intentionally plain `case`/`[` pattern matching, not a regex
call — it works identically under `/bin/sh` and bash, and avoids needing
`[[ =~ ]]` (bash-only) or GNU `grep -P`. Run `arp-scan` (see the main
SKILL.md's IP-conflict section) only **after** `validate_ipv4` passes, not
before.
## Safe temporary files: FreeBSD `mktemp` syntax
FreeBSD's base `mktemp` is BSD mktemp, not GNU coreutils mktemp —
long options like `--tmpdir=DIR` or `--suffix=` don't exist there.
```sh
# Portable on FreeBSD and Linux: bare mktemp / mktemp -d, no custom template
TMPFILE=$(mktemp) || { echo "ERROR: mktemp failed" >&2; exit 1; }
TMPDIR=$(mktemp -d) || { echo "ERROR: mktemp -d failed" >&2; exit 1; }
# A custom prefix/path needs an explicit trailing run of X's on BOTH
# platforms — a prefix alone (no X's) is not enough on either:
TMPFILE=$(mktemp "/tmp/provision-${JAIL_NAME}.XXXXXX") || exit 1
```
Clean up with a trap (see above), and always quote and use `--`:
`rm -rf -- "$TMPDIR"` — the `--` guards against a temp path that could
otherwise be parsed as an option if it somehow started with `-`.
## `sed -i` and `date`: don't copy GNU-only invocations into jail.conf/pf.conf edits
Two gotchas that bite specifically because provisioning steps edit
`jail.conf` and `pf.conf` in place:
- **`sed -i`**: FreeBSD/BSD sed requires an explicit (possibly empty)
backup-suffix argument as its own token:
`sed -i '' -e 's/old/new/' file`. GNU sed's `-i` only takes the suffix
glued to the flag (`-i.bak` or bare `-i`) — passing `-i ''` as two
separate arguments to GNU sed does **not** mean "no backup"; it's
parsed differently and can silently do the wrong thing. These two forms
are not cross-compatible. Use the BSD form on this fleet's FreeBSD
hosts, don't copy a Linux-written example verbatim.
- **`date`**: FreeBSD date has no GNU-style free-text parsing
(`date -d "1 day ago"` doesn't work). Use `-v` adjustments
(`date -v-1d +%F`) or `-j -f <informat> <string> +<outformat>` to parse
a fixed format. A script that only timestamps a log line
(`date +'%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S'`, fixed format, no relative math) is fine
as-is on both platforms — the trap is only when a script tries to
compute a relative date.
## Structured logging (portable as written)
The upstream timestamped-log-level pattern is fine to reuse as-is —
fixed-format `date`, no relative parsing, identical under FreeBSD and GNU
date:
```sh
log_info() { echo "[$(date +'%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')] INFO: $*" >&2; }
log_warn() { echo "[$(date +'%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')] WARN: $*" >&2; }
log_error() { echo "[$(date +'%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')] ERROR: $*" >&2; }
```
## What was deliberately left out
- **Arrays, `mapfile`/`readarray`, `[[ ]]`, process substitution
(`< <(...)`)** — all bash-only, and bash isn't guaranteed present on a
freshly cloned jail. Only reach for them once you've confirmed the
target will always run under a real installed bash; default to POSIX
`/bin/sh` constructs for anything that has to run early or on an
unknown target.
- **The upstream `rm -rI` "safe cleanup" pattern** — `-I` prompts for
interactive confirmation, which is the opposite of what an unattended
provisioning script run over SSH (often with no TTY) needs; a script
waiting on a prompt that can never be answered just hangs. Validate
inputs hard (see above) instead, then remove non-interactively
(`rm -rf --`).
- **Retry/backoff and file-locking patterns** from the general upstream
checklist — not reproduced here because the fetched upstream content
(`SKILL.md` + `references/details.md`, both fetched directly from
GitHub) doesn't actually contain a worked retry or locking pattern
specific enough to adapt; those topics only appear as chapter-title-level
mentions in secondhand catalog summaries, not in the real file. If a
real retry-needing case shows up in provisioning (a flaky `pkg install`
in a fresh jail before DNS is confirmed working — see this skill's
resolver-failure-after-destroy/create-churn gotcha), write a
fleet-specific pattern then, rather than importing a generic one now on
spec.
- **ShellCheck as a hard gate** — worth running locally before landing a
new provisioning script (`pkg install shellcheck`; point it at a
`/bin/sh` script with `# shellcheck shell=sh` since its default dialect
guess is bash), but not made mandatory here since this fleet has no CI
wired to enforce it on these scripts yet.
- **The upstream "always use `[[ ]]`" advice as a blanket rule** — true
only once bash is confirmed present; POSIX `[ ]` is required, not just
"more portable," for any `/bin/sh` script.