added raw request handling, enanched attack detection for GET and POSTS, templatized suspicioius activity to fetch from wordlists.json, aligned helm to load new wordlist config, added migration scripts from 1.0.0 to new krawl versions, removed old and unused functions, added test scripts
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README.md
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README.md
@@ -264,35 +264,51 @@ Below is a complete overview of the Krawl honeypot’s capabilities
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The actual (juicy) robots.txt configuration [is the following](src/templates/html/robots.txt).
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## Honeypot pages
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### Common Login Attempts
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Requests to common admin endpoints (`/admin/`, `/wp-admin/`, `/phpMyAdmin/`) return a fake login page. Any login attempt triggers a 1-second delay to simulate real processing and is fully logged in the dashboard (credentials, IP, headers, timing).
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### Common Misconfiguration Paths
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Requests to paths like `/backup/`, `/config/`, `/database/`, `/private/`, or `/uploads/` return a fake directory listing populated with “interesting” files, each assigned a random file size to look realistic.
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The `.env` endpoint exposes fake database connection strings, **AWS API keys**, and **Stripe secrets**. It intentionally returns an error due to the `Content-Type` being `application/json` instead of plain text, mimicking a “juicy” misconfiguration that crawlers and scanners often flag as information leakage.
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### Environment File Leakage
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The `.env` endpoint exposes fake database connection strings, **AWS API keys**, and **Stripe secrets**. It intentionally returns an error due to the `Content-Type` being `application/json` instead of plain text, mimicking a "juicy" misconfiguration that crawlers and scanners often flag as information leakage.
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### Server Error Information
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The `/server` page displays randomly generated fake error information for each known server.
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### API Endpoints with Sensitive Data
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The pages `/api/v1/users` and `/api/v2/secrets` show fake users and random secrets in JSON format
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### Exposed Credential Files
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The pages `/credentials.txt` and `/passwords.txt` show fake users and random secrets
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### SQL Injection and XSS Detection
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Pages such as `/users`, `/search`, `/contact`, `/info`, `/input`, and `/feedback`, along with APIs like `/api/sql` and `/api/database`, are designed to lure attackers into performing attacks such as **SQL injection** or **XSS**.
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Automated tools like **SQLMap** will receive a different randomized database error on each request, increasing scan noise and confusing the attacker. All detected attacks are logged and displayed in the dashboard.
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### Path Traversal Detection
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Krawl detects and responds to **path traversal** attempts targeting common system files like `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/shadow`, or Windows system paths. When an attacker tries to access sensitive files using patterns like `../../../etc/passwd` or encoded variants (`%2e%2e/`, `%252e`), Krawl returns convincing fake file contents with realistic system users, UIDs, GIDs, and shell configurations. This wastes attacker time while logging the full attack pattern.
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### XXE (XML External Entity) Injection
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The `/api/xml` and `/api/parser` endpoints accept XML input and are designed to detect **XXE injection** attempts. When attackers try to exploit external entity declarations (`<!ENTITY`, `<!DOCTYPE`, `SYSTEM`) or reference entities to access local files, Krawl responds with realistic XML responses that appear to process the entities successfully. The honeypot returns fake file contents, simulated entity values (like `admin_credentials` or `database_connection`), or realistic error messages, making the attack appear successful while fully logging the payload.
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### Command Injection Detection
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Pages like `/api/exec`, `/api/run`, and `/api/system` simulate command execution endpoints vulnerable to **command injection**. When attackers attempt to inject shell commands using patterns like `; whoami`, `| cat /etc/passwd`, or backticks, Krawl responds with realistic command outputs. For example, `whoami` returns fake usernames like `www-data` or `nginx`, while `uname` returns fake Linux kernel versions. Network commands like `wget` or `curl` simulate downloads or return "command not found" errors, creating believable responses that delay and confuse automated exploitation tools.
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## Customizing the Canary Token
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To create a custom canary token, visit https://canarytokens.org
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