 Guillaume Meyer (The Opinionated Man)
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fa81cbc23a
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fix: harden writes, HTTP client, CI supply chain, and resource caps
Security hardening from deep assessment:
- Writes: atomic temp+rename via safe_write_bytes/text (no symlink
following, no partial in-place loss); backup_path for --in-place;
umask-default modes; symlink destinations refused.
- rewrite_text: refuse redirects (no Authorization/key re-send to
unvalidated hosts), default-deny loopback allowlist with explicit
--allow-remote / WATERMARKS_REWRITE_ALLOW_REMOTE opt-in, http(s)-only
schemes, --api-key argv flag removed (env-only).
- CI: SHA-pin actions (checkout v7.0.1, setup-python v7.0.0, codeql),
permissions: contents: read, pinned requirements-dev.txt, pip-audit
step; new CodeQL workflow.
- Scorer deps: bump Pillow 10.4.0 -> 12.3.0 (24 known CVEs); pip pinned
in Dockerfile and setup_synthid.sh; Docker runs as unprivileged user.
- Resource caps: MAX_INPUT_BYTES 1GiB -> 256MiB, 64MiB stdin cap,
zip budget 512MiB -> 128MiB, RLIMIT_AS/FSIZE on child processes.
- Tests: 18 new security regression tests (60 total, all passing).
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2026-08-12 21:13:53 -07:00 |
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