2020-10-05 17:52:08 -04:00
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# Name: K4YT3X Hardened sysctl Configuration
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# Author: K4YT3X
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2020-10-07 17:29:29 -04:00
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# Contributors: IceCodeNew
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2020-10-05 17:52:08 -04:00
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# Date Created: October 5, 2020
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2020-10-07 17:29:29 -04:00
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# Last Updated: October 7, 2020
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2020-10-05 17:52:08 -04:00
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# Licensed under the GNU General Public License Version 3 (GNU GPL v3),
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# available at: https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.txt
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# (C) 2020 K4YT3X
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# Multiple sources have been consulted while writing this configuration
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# file (e.g., nixCraft's sysctl.conf). Sources are not cited since this
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# is not an academic document. Please refer to Linux documentations
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# should you have any questions.
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########## Kernel ##########
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# enable ExecShield protection
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# 2 enables ExecShield by default unless applications bits are set to disabled
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# uncomment on systems without NX/XD protections
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# check with: dmesg | grep --color '[NX|DX]*protection'
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#kernel.exec-shield = 2
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# enable ASLR
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# turn on protection and randomize stack, vdso page and mmap + randomize brk base address
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kernel.randomize_va_space = 2
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# controls the System Request debugging functionality of the kernel
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kernel.sysrq = 0
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# controls whether core dumps will append the PID to the core filename
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# useful for debugging multi-threaded applications
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kernel.core_uses_pid = 1
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# restrict access to kernel address
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# kernel pointers printed using %pK will be replaced with 0’s regardless of privileges
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kernel.kptr_restrict = 2
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# Ptrace protection using Yama
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# - 1: only a parent process can be debugged
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# - 2: only admins canuse ptrace (CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability required)
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# - 3: disables ptrace completely, reboot is required to re-enable ptrace
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kernel.yama.ptrace_scope = 3
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2020-10-06 14:20:18 -04:00
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# restrict kernel logs to root only
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kernel.dmesg_restrict = 1
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# restrict BPF JIT compiler to root only
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kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled = 1
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# disables kexec as it can be used to livepatch the running kernel
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kernel.kexec_load_disabled = 1
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# disable unprivileged user namespaces to decrease attack surface
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kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone = 0
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2020-10-05 17:52:08 -04:00
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# allow for more PIDs
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2020-10-07 17:29:29 -04:00
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# this value can be up to:
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# - 32768 (2^15) on a 32-bit system
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# - 4194304 (2^22) on a 64-bit system
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kernel.pid_max = 4194304
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2020-10-05 17:52:08 -04:00
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# reboot machine after kernel panic
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#kernel.panic = 10
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########## File System ##########
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# disallow core dumping by SUID/SGID programs
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fs.suid_dumpable = 0
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# protect the creation of hard links
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# one of the following conditions must be fulfilled
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# - the user can only link to files that he or she owns
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# - the user must first have read and write access to a file, that he/she wants to link to
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fs.protected_hardlinks = 1
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# protect the creation of symbolic links
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# one of the following conditions must be fulfilled
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# - the process following the symbolic link is the owner of the symbolic link
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# - the owner of the directory is also the owner of the symbolic link
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fs.protected_symlinks = 1
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2020-10-06 14:20:18 -04:00
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# enable extended FIFO protection
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fs.protected_fifos = 2
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# similar to protected_fifos, but it avoids writes to an attacker-controlled regular file
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fs.protected_regular = 2
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2020-10-05 17:52:08 -04:00
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# increase system file descriptor limit
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2020-10-07 17:29:29 -04:00
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# this value can be up to:
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# - 2147483647 (0x7fffffff) on a 32-bit system
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# - 9223372036854775807 (0x7fffffffffffffff) on a 64-bit system
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fs.file-max = 9223372036854775807
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2020-10-05 17:52:08 -04:00
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2020-10-06 14:20:18 -04:00
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########## Virtualization ##########
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# improve mmap ASLR effectness
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vm.mmap_rnd_bits=32
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vm.mmap_rnd_compat_bits=16
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########## Networking ##########
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# increase the maximum length of processor input queues
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net.core.netdev_max_backlog = 250000
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# enable BPF JIT hardening for all users
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# this trades off performance, but can mitigate JIT spraying
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net.core.bpf_jit_harden = 2
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# increase TCP max buffer size setable using setsockopt()
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#net.core.rmem_max = 8388608
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#net.core.wmem_max = 8388608
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#net.core.rmem_default = 8388608
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#net.core.wmem_default = 8388608
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#net.core.optmem_max = 8388608
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2020-10-05 17:52:08 -04:00
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########## IPv4 Networking ##########
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# enable BBR congestion control
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net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control = bbr
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# disallow IPv4 packet forwarding
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net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0
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# enable SYN cookies for SYN flooding protection
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net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1
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# number of times SYNACKs for a passive TCP connection attempt will be retransmitted
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net.ipv4.tcp_synack_retries = 5
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# do not send redirects
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net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0
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net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0
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# do not accept packets with SRR option
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net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0
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net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0
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# enable reverse path source validation
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# refer to RFC1812
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net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
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net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1
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# log packets with impossible addresses to kernel log
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net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians = 1
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2020-10-06 14:20:18 -04:00
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net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1
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2020-10-05 17:52:08 -04:00
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# do not accept ICMP redirect messages
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net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0
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net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = 0
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net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
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2020-10-05 17:52:08 -04:00
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net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = 0
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# disable sending and receiving of shared media redirects
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# this setting overwrites net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects
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# refer to RFC1620
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net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media = 0
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net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media = 0
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# always use the best local address for announcing local IP via ARP
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2020-10-06 14:20:18 -04:00
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net.ipv4.conf.default.arp_announce = 2
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2020-10-05 17:52:08 -04:00
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net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_announce = 2
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# reply only if the target IP address is local address configured on the incoming interface
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2020-10-06 14:20:18 -04:00
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net.ipv4.conf.default.arp_ignore = 1
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2020-10-05 17:52:08 -04:00
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net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore = 1
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2020-10-06 14:20:18 -04:00
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# drop Gratuitous ARP frames to prevent ARP poisoning
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# this can cause issues when ARP proxies are used in the network
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net.ipv4.conf.default.drop_gratuitous_arp = 1
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net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp = 1
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# ignore all ICMP echo requests
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#net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_all = 1
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# ignore all ICMP echo and timestamp requests sent to broadcast/multicast
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net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1
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# ignore bad ICMP errors
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net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1
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2020-10-05 17:52:08 -04:00
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# mitigate TIME-WAIT Assassination hazards in TCP
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# refer to RFC1337
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net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 = 1
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# disable TCP window scaling
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# this makes the host less susceptible to TCP RST DoS attacks
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net.ipv4.tcp_window_scaling = 0
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# increase system IP port limits
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2020-10-07 23:56:31 +08:00
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net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range = 2000 64999
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2020-10-05 17:52:08 -04:00
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# disable TCP timestamps for better CPU utilization
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net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps = 0
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2020-10-06 14:20:18 -04:00
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# enabling SACK can increase the throughput
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# but SACK is commonly exploited and rarely used
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net.ipv4.tcp_sack = 0
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2020-10-05 17:52:08 -04:00
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# divide socket buffer evenly between TCP window size and application
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net.ipv4.tcp_adv_win_scale = 1
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# increase memory thresholds to prevent packet dropping
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#net.ipv4.tcp_rmem = 4096 87380 8388608
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#net.ipv4.tcp_wmem = 4096 87380 8388608
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########## IPv6 Networking ##########
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# disallow IPv6 packet forwarding
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net.ipv6.conf.default.forwarding = 0
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net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding = 0
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# number of Router Solicitations to send until assuming no routers are present
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net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations = 0
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net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations = 0
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2020-10-05 17:52:08 -04:00
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# do not accept Router Preference from RA
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net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref = 0
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net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref = 0
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2020-10-05 17:52:08 -04:00
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# learn prefix information in router advertisement
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net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo = 0
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net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo = 0
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2020-10-05 17:52:08 -04:00
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# setting controls whether the system will accept Hop Limit settings from a router advertisement
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net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr = 0
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net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr = 0
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2020-10-05 17:52:08 -04:00
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# router advertisements can cause the system to assign a global unicast address to an interface
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net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf = 0
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net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf = 0
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2020-10-05 17:52:08 -04:00
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# number of neighbor solicitations to send out per address
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net.ipv6.conf.default.dad_transmits = 0
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net.ipv6.conf.all.dad_transmits = 0
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# number of global unicast IPv6 addresses can be assigned to each interface
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net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses = 1
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net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses = 1
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# enable IPv6 Privacy Extensions (RFC3041) and prefer the temporary address
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net.ipv6.conf.default.use_tempaddr = 2
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net.ipv6.conf.all.use_tempaddr = 2
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# ignore all ICMPv6 echo requests
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#net.ipv6.icmp.echo_ignore_all = 1
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#net.ipv6.icmp.echo_ignore_anycast = 1
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#net.ipv6.icmp.echo_ignore_multicast = 1
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