Files
spec-kit/src/specify_cli/authentication/config.py
T
71e6201790 fix(auth): normalize whitespace in auth-config env-var/id references at store time (#3691)
* fix(auth): normalize whitespace in auth-config env-var/id references at store time

token_env, client_secret_env, tenant_id, and client_id were VALIDATED on
their .strip()ed form but STORED raw, so an accidentally padded value passed
validation yet silently broke the downstream verbatim os.environ.get(name) /
OAuth-URL lookups — load_auth_config succeeded but resolve_token returned
None and the request quietly downgraded to unauthenticated (401/403) with no
diagnostic.

Normalize these whitespace-insignificant string references with a _norm
helper at store time, mirroring how `hosts` is already normalized
(h.strip().lower()). `token` is unchanged (already stripped at resolve time).

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(auth): cover tenant_id/client_id/client_secret_env normalization

Address review: the regression test only covered token_env, but the fix also
normalizes tenant_id, client_id, and client_secret_env. Add a padded
azure-ad entry asserting all three are stored stripped.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-24 11:03:06 -05:00

232 lines
8.7 KiB
Python

"""Authentication configuration loader.
Reads ``~/.specify/auth.json`` to determine which hosts receive credentials
and which provider/auth-scheme to use. No credentials are sent without
an explicit opt-in via this file.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import stat
from dataclasses import dataclass
from fnmatch import fnmatch
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
from urllib.parse import urlparse
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class AuthConfigEntry:
"""A single provider entry from ``auth.json``."""
hosts: tuple[str, ...]
provider: str
auth: str
token: str | None = None
token_env: str | None = None
# Azure AD service-principal fields
tenant_id: str | None = None
client_id: str | None = None
client_secret_env: str | None = None
def _default_config_path() -> Path:
"""Return ``~/.specify/auth.json``."""
return Path.home() / ".specify" / "auth.json"
def _is_valid_host_pattern(pattern: str) -> bool:
"""Return True for safe host patterns: exact hostnames or ``*.suffix`` only.
Rejects patterns like ``*github.com`` (which would match
``github.com.evil.com``) or multi-wildcard forms. Only these two
forms are accepted:
* ``example.com`` — exact hostname
* ``*.example.com`` — leading ``*.`` wildcard; matches subdomains
such as ``myorg.example.com`` but not ``example.com`` itself
"""
if "*" not in pattern:
return True # exact hostname — already validated as non-empty
# Only *.suffix is allowed; no other wildcard positions
return pattern.startswith("*.") and "*" not in pattern[2:]
def _norm(value: Any) -> Any:
"""Strip surrounding whitespace from a whitespace-insignificant string
config reference (env-var names, tenant/client ids) before it is stored.
These fields are validated on their ``.strip()``ed form, so an accidentally
padded value passes validation but then silently breaks the verbatim
``os.environ.get(...)`` / URL lookups downstream. Normalizing at store time
mirrors how ``hosts`` is already handled (``h.strip().lower()``). Non-string
values (e.g. ``None``) pass through unchanged.
"""
return value.strip() if isinstance(value, str) else value
def load_auth_config(
path: Path | None = None,
) -> list[AuthConfigEntry]:
"""Load and validate ``auth.json``, returning configured entries.
Returns an empty list when the file does not exist — this means
all HTTP requests will be unauthenticated (opt-in model).
Raises ``ValueError`` on schema violations. Callers that want
misconfigurations to fail fast can allow this exception to
propagate; higher-level HTTP helpers may instead catch it,
warn, and continue with unauthenticated requests.
"""
config_path = path or _default_config_path()
if not config_path.is_file():
return []
# Warn (but don't fail) if the file is world-readable (POSIX only).
if os.name != "nt":
try:
mode = config_path.stat().st_mode
if mode & (stat.S_IRGRP | stat.S_IROTH):
import warnings
warnings.warn(
f"{config_path} is readable by group/others. "
"Consider restricting with: chmod 600 "
f"{config_path}",
UserWarning,
stacklevel=2,
)
except OSError:
pass # stat failed — skip permission check
raw = json.loads(config_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
raise ValueError(f"auth.json must be a JSON object, got {type(raw).__name__}")
providers_raw = raw.get("providers")
if not isinstance(providers_raw, list):
raise ValueError("auth.json must contain a 'providers' array")
entries: list[AuthConfigEntry] = []
for i, entry_raw in enumerate(providers_raw):
if not isinstance(entry_raw, dict):
raise ValueError(f"providers[{i}]: must be a JSON object")
hosts = entry_raw.get("hosts")
if not isinstance(hosts, list) or not hosts:
raise ValueError(f"providers[{i}]: 'hosts' must be a non-empty array")
if not all(isinstance(h, str) and h.strip() for h in hosts):
raise ValueError(f"providers[{i}]: each host must be a non-empty string")
# Normalize hosts: strip whitespace and lowercase
hosts = [h.strip().lower() for h in hosts]
# Reject dangerous wildcard forms (e.g. *github.com matches github.com.evil.com)
for h in hosts:
if not _is_valid_host_pattern(h):
raise ValueError(
f"providers[{i}]: invalid host pattern {h!r}. "
"Only exact hostnames or '*.suffix' forms are allowed "
"(e.g. 'github.com' or '*.visualstudio.com')."
)
provider = entry_raw.get("provider", "")
if not isinstance(provider, str) or not provider:
raise ValueError(f"providers[{i}]: 'provider' must be a non-empty string")
auth = entry_raw.get("auth", "")
if not isinstance(auth, str) or not auth:
raise ValueError(f"providers[{i}]: 'auth' must be a non-empty string")
token = entry_raw.get("token")
token_env = entry_raw.get("token_env")
# Validate token/token_env types
if token is not None and (not isinstance(token, str) or not token.strip()):
raise ValueError(f"providers[{i}]: 'token' must be a non-empty string")
if token_env is not None and (not isinstance(token_env, str) or not token_env.strip()):
raise ValueError(f"providers[{i}]: 'token_env' must be a non-empty string")
# Validate provider+scheme compatibility
from . import get_provider as _get_provider
_prov = _get_provider(provider)
if _prov is None:
from . import AUTH_REGISTRY
raise ValueError(
f"providers[{i}]: unknown provider {provider!r}; "
f"registered: {sorted(AUTH_REGISTRY.keys())}"
)
if auth not in _prov.supported_auth_schemes:
raise ValueError(
f"providers[{i}]: provider {provider!r} does not support "
f"auth scheme {auth!r}; supported: {list(_prov.supported_auth_schemes)}"
)
# Validate token source based on auth scheme
if auth in ("bearer", "basic-pat"):
if not token and not token_env:
raise ValueError(
f"providers[{i}]: auth={auth!r} requires 'token' or 'token_env'"
)
elif auth == "azure-ad":
tenant_id = entry_raw.get("tenant_id")
client_id = entry_raw.get("client_id")
client_secret_env = entry_raw.get("client_secret_env")
if not all([tenant_id, client_id, client_secret_env]):
raise ValueError(
f"providers[{i}]: auth='azure-ad' requires "
"'tenant_id', 'client_id', and 'client_secret_env'"
)
for field_name, field_val in [
("tenant_id", tenant_id),
("client_id", client_id),
("client_secret_env", client_secret_env),
]:
if not isinstance(field_val, str) or not field_val.strip():
raise ValueError(
f"providers[{i}]: '{field_name}' must be a non-empty string"
)
# azure-cli needs no extra fields
entries.append(
AuthConfigEntry(
hosts=tuple(hosts),
provider=provider,
auth=auth,
token=token,
token_env=_norm(token_env),
tenant_id=_norm(entry_raw.get("tenant_id")),
client_id=_norm(entry_raw.get("client_id")),
client_secret_env=_norm(entry_raw.get("client_secret_env")),
)
)
return entries
def find_entries_for_url(
url: str, entries: list[AuthConfigEntry]
) -> list[AuthConfigEntry]:
"""Return entries whose ``hosts`` match the hostname of *url*."""
# A malformed authority (e.g. an unterminated IPv6 bracket "https://[::1")
# makes urlparse/hostname raise ValueError. Treat that the same as a
# host-less URL: no entry can match, so return no matches rather than
# leaking a raw ValueError out of the shared HTTP client (build_request /
# open_url call this before any URL validation).
try:
hostname = (urlparse(url).hostname or "").lower()
except ValueError:
return []
if not hostname:
return []
return [
e
for e in entries
if any(
pattern == hostname or fnmatch(hostname, pattern)
for pattern in e.hosts
)
]