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11
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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8bfe6e14d1 |
fix(workflows,extensions): tolerate non-list catalog tags in search/info display (#3770)
`workflow search`, `workflow info`, `extension search` and `extension info`
crashed with `TypeError: 'int' object is not iterable` when a catalog entry
carried a scalar `tags:` value (e.g. `tags: 5`). Catalog payloads are
user-editable YAML/JSON, so this shape reaches the display unvalidated.
Both backends already guard their tag *filter* with
`isinstance(raw_tags, list)` — `WorkflowCatalog.search` and
`ExtensionCatalog.search` skip a non-list `tags` cleanly. Only the display
paths were unguarded: they tested truthiness (`if info.get("tags"):`) and
then iterated. A scalar is truthy but not iterable, so `--tag` filtering
survived while plain `search`/`info` rendering blew up.
Note this is distinct from the non-string *element* handling added in
#3746/#3747: coercing elements with `str(t) for t in ...` does not help when
`tags` is not a sequence at all. The fix is the guard the sibling
integration commands already use — `integrations/_query_commands.py:332,402`
gate on `isinstance(tags, list) and tags`. This aligns workflows and
extensions with that reference pattern, leaving all four tag-join display
sites in these modules consistent.
Regression tests drive the full CLI via CliRunner and cover search + info in
one case per module; both fail before the fix with the exact TypeError.
Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Pascal THUETandGitHub
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118062eac4 |
harden: secure extension and preset archive downloads (#3141)
* harden: secure extension and preset archive downloads Adopt the shared download-security primitives from #3140 across extension and preset catalog, package, direct-URL, and ZIP-install flows: - bound catalog, package, and inline manifest reads; - verify catalog SHA-256 values when present; - replace path-only extraction with bounded traversal/symlink-safe extraction; - validate malformed hosts and ports before opening download URLs; - handle normalized trailing-backslash directory entries consistently. Redirect enforcement and checksum verification remain owned by the shared helpers already on main; this commit wires them into extension and preset behavior. Assisted-by: OpenAI Codex (model: GPT-5, autonomous) * harden: close archive and catalog download edge cases Preflight ZIP central directories before ZipFile allocates them, bound both declared and actual payload sizes, and reject ambiguous or non-portable archive paths before extraction. Keep extension update manifest selection consistent with extraction, reject unsafe catalog-derived output filenames and malformed URL types, and escape untrusted values in download errors. Add regression coverage for parser differentials, collisions, platform-specific filenames, bounded call sites, and failure ordering. Assisted-by: OpenAI Codex (model: GPT-5, autonomous) * harden: address download security review feedback Assisted-by: OpenAI Codex (model: GPT-5, autonomous) * harden: close ZIP preflight review gaps Assisted-by: OpenAI Codex (model: GPT-5, autonomous) * fix: harden extension update preflight and rollback Assisted-by: OpenAI Codex (model: GPT-5, autonomous) * fix: harden extension update rollback Assisted-by: OpenAI Codex (model: GPT-5, autonomous) |
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98c9e67ce2 |
fix(extensions): tolerate non-string catalog name in display-name lookup (#3747)
* fix(extensions): tolerate non-string catalog name in display-name lookup
_resolve_catalog_extension() filters catalog search results by display
name with `ext["name"].lower() == argument.lower()`. Extension catalog
JSON is user-editable, so a hand-authored non-string name (e.g.
`name: 123`) crashes the filter with `AttributeError: 'int' object has
no attribute 'lower'`, taking down `extension info <name>` and
`extension add <name>`. A missing `name` key would likewise KeyError.
Coerce defensively with `str(ext.get("name", "")).lower()`, matching the
ambiguous-match display block just below (which already str()-coerces
name for the same reason). A bad-named entry simply doesn't match,
yielding a clean not-found error instead of a traceback.
Adds a regression test invoking `extension info <name>` against a
mocked catalog whose search result has `name: 123`; it fails pre-fix
with AttributeError.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Potential fix for pull request finding
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* Potential fix for pull request finding
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
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Quratulain-bilalandGitHub
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e6a3ccfb27 |
fix(extensions): hyphenate command names in 'extension info' listing (#3744)
The 'Commands:' section of 'specify extension info' for a locally installed extension printed each command in its manifest dotted form (e.g. speckit.jira.sync). Cline and Forge register hyphenated command names (/speckit-jira-sync), so on those projects the displayed names did not match what the user actually invokes. Format each name through the active agent's command-name formatter, mirroring the parity 'extension add' already applies to its 'Provided commands' listing (#3669) and completing the Forge/Cline command-name parity from #3641/#3642. Adds a regression test asserting the hyphenated form appears (and the dotted form does not) for a Forge project. |
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c1028e5506 |
fix(extensions): guard non-numeric catalog downloads in search/info rendering (#3710)
* fix(extensions): guard non-numeric catalog downloads in search/info rendering `specify extension search` and `specify extension info <id>` format a catalog entry's `downloads` field with the `:,` thousands separator, guarded only by `is not None`. Catalog payloads are only shape-validated -- individual fields are never type-checked and `_get_merged_extensions` returns raw catalog dicts -- so an entry with a non-numeric `downloads` (e.g. the JSON string "1500", realistic from a community / SPECKIT_CATALOG_URL / project catalog) makes the `:,` format raise `ValueError: Cannot specify ',' with 's'`, aborting the whole command with an uncaught traceback. Group-format `downloads` only when it is actually numeric; otherwise render it as-is. Numeric values (int/float, incl. bool) format identically, so correct catalogs are byte-for-byte unchanged. Every other field in these two renderers is already `str()`-wrapped; this closes the one unguarded field. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(extensions): escape the non-numeric downloads fallback for Rich markup Address review feedback: the fallback interpolated the untrusted catalog value straight into a Rich-rendered string, so guarding the ``:,`` ValueError just traded it for a MarkupError -- a catalog entry with downloads "[/red]foo" still aborted `extension search`/`info`, and balanced tags could restyle the output. Wrap the fallback in _escape_markup(str(...)) at both sites, matching how every other catalog field in these renderers is already escaped. Numeric values keep the identical ``:,`` branch, so correct catalogs are unchanged. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(extensions): escape 'stars' too, in the same stats string Follow-up to the downloads escaping: `stars` is the other catalog-controlled value joined into the same Rich-rendered stats line, and it was still raw -- verified that stars "[/red]x" raises the same MarkupError and aborts `extension info`/`search`. Hardening one of the two adjacent values would have left the reported defect reachable through the sibling field. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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cce47f6900 |
fix(cli): guard lazy .hostname ValueError in extension/preset add --from (#3651)
* fix(cli): guard lazy .hostname ValueError in extension/preset add --from `extension add --from <url>` and `preset add --from <url>` validated the URL by reading `parsed.hostname` OUTSIDE their `try/except ValueError` guards. A bracketed-but-invalid IPv6 authority (e.g. "https://[not-an-ip]/x.zip") parses cleanly under urlparse() on Python < 3.14 and only raises ValueError lazily on the first .hostname access. On the interpreters spec-kit supports (>=3.11) that raw ValueError leaked past the CLI, printing an uncaught traceback instead of the clean "Invalid URL" error. (The raise moved eager into urlparse() only in 3.14.) Same bug class as the catalog/download fixes #3433/#3435/#3437/#3577. - extensions/_commands.py: read parsed.hostname inside the existing try and reuse it for the localhost check. - presets/_commands.py: guard the up-front `urlparse(from_url).hostname` read (preserves the "Invalid URL" message), and harden the nested `_is_allowed_download_url` to take a URL string and parse+read .hostname inside its own try/except -> returns False on malformed input. This also covers the redirect-validator and final-URL (post-redirect) checks, where the URL is server-controlled. Regression tests for each command: a bracketed-non-IP URL, plus a monkeypatched lazy-.hostname raiser that reproduces the pre-3.14 shape independently of the running interpreter (fails with a raw ValueError before the fix, verified via test-the-test). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(cli): address Copilot review on --from URL guard comments/tests Copilot's review on #3651 flagged two accuracy problems: 1. The guard comments asserted a specific (and incorrect) CPython version history -- that "https://[not-an-ip]/..." parses cleanly under urlparse() on Python < 3.14 and only raises ValueError lazily on the first .hostname access. In fact the eager bracketed-host check (gh-103848, CVE-2024-11168) was backported to the 3.11 branch and shipped in 3.11.4, so on every interpreter spec-kit supports (>=3.11) that URL is rejected eagerly at urlparse(). Reworded the three source comments to state the guard as a defensive policy (parsing OR the .hostname read can raise ValueError, guard both) without asserting version history. 2. The two monkeypatched lazy-.hostname tests were described as reproducing "the exact production path" / "the Python < 3.14 shape". They are synthetic defensive cases. Relabeled them as synthetic defensive coverage that does not reproduce any specific CPython behavior, and dropped the version-history claims from the bracketed-non-IP test docstrings. The second-round suggestion (_is_allowed_download_url(final_url) instead of _is_allowed_download_url(_urlparse(final_url))) was already applied in the original commit. Behavior unchanged; comments/docstrings only. URL-guard tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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88b3230e2e |
fix(extensions): hyphenate command names in the Forge post-install listing (#3669)
After `specify extension add`, the "Provided commands" summary hyphenated command names only for Cline. For a Forge project the names were printed in dotted form (e.g. `speckit.test-ext.hello`), but Forge registers them hyphenated (`speckit-test-ext-hello`), so the printed names didn't match what the user actually invokes in Forge. Extend the existing Cline handling to Forge via `format_forge_command_name`, completing the Forge command-name parity already fixed for hook invocations (#3641) and the init next-steps panel (#3642). 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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903d707d21 |
fix(extensions): set-priority repairs corrupted boolean priority (#3268)
The set-priority skip guard 'isinstance(raw_priority, int) and raw_priority == priority' treats a stored boolean as a match because isinstance(True, int) is True and True == 1 (False == 0). So a corrupted boolean priority short-circuits to 'already has priority N' and is never rewritten to a real int — contradicting the adjacent comment that promises corrupted values get repaired. Exclude bools explicitly, mirroring normalize_priority's own bool guard. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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882e1e90d0 |
fix(cli): exit cleanly on malformed IPv6 URLs in extension/preset/workflow add (#3369)
* fix(cli): exit cleanly on malformed IPv6 URLs in extension/preset/workflow add extension add --from, preset add --from, and workflow add <url> parsed the user-supplied URL with a bare urlparse before their HTTPS/host validation, so an unclosed IPv6 bracket escaped as a raw ValueError traceback. Wrap each parse and emit the surrounding validation's clean error style + typer.Exit(1) instead. Fixes #3368 Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(cli): convert malformed redirect URLs to URLError in shared redirect handler Parse the redirect target once in _StripAuthOnRedirect.redirect_request before the validator and stdlib handler run, converting ValueError into URLError which every download path already catches. Also escape from_url in the preset install message so IPv6 brackets don't break Rich markup. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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bbc5f176e3 |
fix(extensions): apply GHES auth and resolve release assets for extension add --from (#3217)
* fix(extensions): apply GHES auth and resolve release assets for --from The 'specify extension add --from <url>' path fetched ZIPs via a bare open_url with no GitHub release-asset resolution and no Accept header, diverging from the catalog download path. Against GHES it received an HTML login page and failed obscurely with zipfile.BadZipFile. Route --from through ExtensionCatalog so configured GHES credentials apply and release-download URLs resolve via /api/v3, and reject non-ZIP content with a clear error pointing at auth.json. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(extensions): use zipfile.is_zipfile for --from content guard Replace the weak zip_data.startswith(b"PK") prefix check with zipfile.is_zipfile() on a BytesIO so any non-ZIP payload (not just those lacking the PK magic) is rejected with the friendly error before install_from_zip can raise BadZipFile. Addresses PR review feedback. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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826e193cee |
refactor: move extension command handlers to extensions/_commands.py (PR-7/8) (#3014)
* refactor: move extension command handlers to extensions/_commands.py (PR-7/8) Convert the flat extensions.py module into an extensions/ package and extract all extension_app and catalog_app command handlers plus their private helpers (_resolve_installed_extension, _resolve_catalog_extension, _print_extension_info) out of __init__.py into the new extensions/_commands.py, mirroring the domain-dir layout used for presets/_commands.py (PR-6) and integrations/_commands.py (PR-5). - extensions.py -> extensions/__init__.py (pure rename, 99%); intra-module relative imports bumped from `.x` to `..x` since they reference root siblings. - Root helpers (_require_specify_project, _locate_bundled_extension, load_init_options, _display_project_path) are reached through thin shims that re-fetch from the parent package at call time, so test monkeypatching of specify_cli.<helper> keeps working unchanged. - __init__.py drops ~1444 lines (3511 -> 2067); CLI surface preserved via register(app). No behavior change. Full suite failure set is identical before/after (82 pre-existing env failures, 0 new). * fix(extensions): preserve per-command path in update backup for skills agents Skills agents (extension == "/SKILL.md") name every command file SKILL.md, each in its own per-command subdir (e.g. speckit-plan/SKILL.md). The update backup keyed the backup path on cmd_file.name alone, so all of an agent's skill files collided onto a single backup path — each shutil.copy2 overwrote the previous one, and rollback restored one skill's content over all the others, corrupting or losing the rest. Mirror the real on-disk layout by using cmd_file.relative_to(commands_dir), keeping each backup path unique. This also makes backed_up_command_files values unique so restore copies the correct content back to each command. Add a regression test asserting two distinct skill files survive a backup -> failed-update -> rollback cycle with their own content. * style(extensions): use yaml.safe_dump when writing catalog config The catalog add/remove handlers wrote the integration catalog config with yaml.dump. Switch to yaml.safe_dump to align with the SafeDumper used by the presets commands and to refuse emitting !!python/object tags if a non-basic value ever reaches the config dict. Output is unchanged for the current basic-type payload (str/int/bool/dict/ list) — this is a defensive/consistency change, not a behavioral fix. * fix(extensions): correct _print_cli_warning import path in skill registration register_enabled_extensions_for_agent imported _print_cli_warning from `.` (the extensions package), but the helper lives in the parent specify_cli package. The wrong level raised ImportError inside the error handlers, aborting extension/skill registration on the first failure instead of warning and continuing. Use `..` to match the other parent-package imports. * fix(extensions): escape untrusted values in Rich markup output User-provided arguments and extension/catalog metadata (names, descriptions, versions, IDs, paths) were interpolated into Rich markup strings without escaping. Values containing markup sequences (e.g. [red]...) would be parsed as markup, allowing output injection that could corrupt or mislead CLI messages. Wrap all such interpolations with rich.markup.escape across the extension/catalog command handlers: list, search, info (_print_extension_info), add (including --dev paths), remove, enable, disable, set-priority, update, and the ambiguous-match resolvers (error strings and Table rows). Reuse the already-computed safe_extension where available. Escaping is a no-op for benign strings, so normal output is unchanged. * Prevent Rich markup injection in extension CLI output User-controlled catalog URLs and extension IDs are rendered through Rich-enabled console paths, so every remaining output-only interpolation now escapes markup while leaving stored values and filesystem behavior unchanged. Regression tests cover catalog add, install hints, remove hints, and state command messages with bracketed markup-like values. * Prevent markup injection from exception text Rich markup remains enabled for styled CLI messages, so exception text and config path labels must be escaped before rendering. YAML parser errors, URL validation failures, download errors, and extension validation errors can include user-controlled catalog or manifest values. Constraint: Preserve existing exception handling and user-facing error paths Rejected: Disable Rich markup for these messages | existing output intentionally uses markup for labels and styling Confidence: high Scope-risk: narrow Directive: Escape user-controlled exception text before interpolating into Rich-rendered strings Tested: .venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_extensions.py -q Co-authored-by: OmX <omx@oh-my-codex.dev> * Prevent path and manifest review regressions Catalog path labels are rendered through Rich markup and downloaded update manifests are trusted long enough to validate extension IDs. Escape displayed project paths before rendering, and reject non-mapping extension.yml payloads before ID validation so bad archives fail with a clear rollback reason. --------- Co-authored-by: OmX <omx@oh-my-codex.dev> |