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06682f33c6
* fix(gateway): push the branch before QA handoff so reviewers see the latest commits The commit content tool commits locally without pushing; only open_pr pushed the branch. On the first submission that was fine, but a fix committed while addressing needs_revision never reached origin (open_pr is skipped once the PR exists), so QA — which reviews the remote PR branch — re-reviewed the stale remote and re-failed the task on every cycle, a loop that never converged. i_am_done now pushes the task branch (idempotent; a no-op when nothing is unpushed) as part of the shared submit gate, covering both the normal and resume-from-verifying paths. A push failure blocks the handoff with a clear remediation rather than parking the task in awaiting_qa with commits that exist only in the developer's local workspace. * fix(orchestrator): don't reap a stale claim while the agent's container is alive The stale-claim reaper released any claimed/in_progress task whose last_heartbeat_at exceeded the TTL. The heartbeat only updates on certain gateway calls, so a developer deep in a long edit/test cycle outran the TTL and had its claim reaped mid-work — churning the task and risking a double spawn against the still-running container. The reaper now skips a task whose assignee still holds a live (ACTIVE) agent instance, trusting container liveness — the ground truth — over the heartbeat proxy. The check is defensive on missing fields so a heartbeat-only caller (and the reaper's existing unit tests) behave exactly as before. * fix(gateway): refuse to unblock a task while a dependency is unfinished A PM unblock on a dependency-gated task moved it straight to in_progress, overriding the dependency — letting a dependent proceed without its upstream's work (e.g. a frontend task built before its UX design lands). A dependency block is meant to clear on its own via _unblock_dependents the moment the upstream reaches a terminal state. unblock now refuses while any dependency is still non-terminal, returning a clear remediation that the block resolves automatically. Manual unblock remains available for genuine, non-dependency blockers. * fix(gateway): release a dependency-blocked claim to pending instead of looping A task that reached claimed/in_progress with an unfinished dependency was left in that state when the claim guard rejected, so the orchestrator's respawn loop kept reviving its assignee — which could make no progress — burning work for nothing. The claim guard now releases such a task back to pending. claimed -> blocked is not a legal transition, so pending — held by the dispatch dependency filter — is the lifecycle-correct resting state: the respawn loop ignores pending tasks, and _unblock_dependents re-dispatches it once the upstream reaches a terminal state. release_dependency_blocked_claim shares a _force_unclaim_to_pending core with unclaim_for_reaper so both record a truthful work-session abandon reason. * feat(security): warn at startup in header-trust mode + document the auth posture When ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED is not enabled the API accepts the X-Agent-Id / X-Agent-Role headers without a signed token, so any client that can reach it may act as any role (including 'ceo'). The API now logs a clear warning at startup in this mode, and the README gains a Security section documenting the auth posture and how to harden it. Acceptable only on a trusted private network — do not expose the API to untrusted networks. * fix(workspace): scope the refresh fetch to current + default branch ensure_workspace's healthy short-circuit ran an all-refs 'git fetch origin' to keep every origin/<branch> ref current. On a monorepo with many accumulated feature/* branches that exceeds the refresh timeout, the fetch silently fails, and the workspace keeps a stale base — so an agent builds on an out-of-date branch. The refresh now fetches only the workspace's current branch and the repo's default branch (resolved via origin/HEAD), with --no-tags --prune: it transfers near-nothing and can't time out. Readers need their own branch and the default; the integration branch is refreshed at branch-creation time. * fix(git): refresh a dependency-blocked task's branch off the current integration tip A cross-cell dependent (e.g. a frontend task waiting on the UX design) was branched off a base captured before its upstream merged into the integration branch, and the branch was never re-synced — so the agent built on a stale snapshot with none of the upstream's work. Two changes close the gap: - release_dependency_blocked_claim now clears branch_name, so the re-claim (after the dependency clears) re-runs branch creation. - create_branch, when the branch is already on disk with no commits of its own, resets it onto the freshly-pulled base — the dependent now builds on the current integration tip. A branch carrying real commits is left untouched, so no work is discarded; the cell->leaf cascade carries the upstream down to the dev branch automatically. * refactor(gateway): drop the sibling-sequence claim guard Sibling sequence no longer gates a claim. Cross-cell ordering is enforced by task dependencies — a cell task that depends on another is held until its upstream reaches a terminal state, a stronger, status-aware gate than the sequence-number check. That check was dormant in practice anyway: every fan-out child carries sequence 0, on which the guard short-circuited. `sequence` stays a sibling-ordering / dispatch-priority field (list_pending ordering and the panel). Removes sibling_sequence_guard and its _earlier_blocking_sibling helper, the now-unused skip_sequence parameter threaded through the claim verbs, and the sibling fetch that fed it. * feat(gateway): sort a cross-cell dependent after its upstream When the frontend cell task is wired to depend on its UX/UI sibling, set its sequence to the upstream's sequence + 1 so it sorts after the design it waits on — list_pending ordering and the panel now show UX ahead of the implementation it gates, in either delegation order. Adds TaskService.set_sequence (the sibling-ordering field is a service write; it carries no claim-gating semantics — dependencies gate claims). * feat(gateway): make the backend cell depend on UX too UX/UI design defines the screens and API contracts both implementation cells build against, so the backend cell — not just the frontend — waits on the UX/UI cell task in a product fan-out and sorts after it. Wires in either delegation order: a backend task delegated after UX gets the dependency directly; a UX task delegated after a still-pending backend sibling retro-wires it. Mirrors the existing frontend wiring (_depend_backend_on_ux and _depend_pending_backends_on_ux). Backend is held by the same dependency gate, so it costs no extra dispatch churn. * fix(websocket): forward notification acks instead of logging them incomplete The bridge handler serves both notification.sent and notification.acked, but acked events carry `agent_id` (the acking agent) rather than `recipient_id`, so every acknowledgement tripped the missing-field guard and logged "Incomplete notification event" instead of reaching the panel. Accept either field as the recipient. * feat(api): hint the full UUID when a truncated task id fails validation Agents copy the 8-character task prefix the system shows them (the commit prefix, task summaries) and send it as task_id, which fails UUID validation with an opaque "invalid length" 422 and wastes a call. The request-validation handler now detects a task_id UUID error and attaches a `remediate` hint telling the agent to retry with the full 36-character UUID from its task envelope. * fix(audit): record the blocked transition when a task is escalated Escalation sets a task to blocked by writing task.status directly, which bypassed the validated transition helper and so never emitted a task.blocked audit row — the lifecycle moved but the Auditor saw nothing. Extract the audit emit from the central transition helper into _emit_status_transition_audit and call it from the escalate path, capturing the prior status and outgoing owner before reassignment so the row is attributed correctly. * fix(docs): stop doubling the docs path so design specs index into RAG The documenter sometimes hands a doc path already rooted at docs/, and joining it onto DOCS_BASE_PATH (/app/docs) produced /app/docs/docs/..., so the file was never found and the spec never indexed — the frontend cell could not retrieve the UX design over RAG. Normalize the path before joining: trust an absolute path, otherwise strip a single redundant leading docs/ segment. * feat(security): let the control panel authenticate in secure mode With ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED=true every request must carry a valid HMAC token, which locked the human control panel out — it sends role headers but no token. nginx, the only trusted hop between the browser and the API, now injects the CEO token on /api and /ws, so the browser never holds the signing secret. The injected value is just the existing per-agent token issued for the CEO identity (issue_panel_token), so the token-verification path is unchanged. An empty value (dev/header-trust mode) renders to no header. `make panel-token` prints the value; set it as ROBOCO_PANEL_AGENT_TOKEN in .env before enabling secure mode. .env.example and the README Security section document the flow. * chore(compose): consolidate the two compose files into one docker-compose.yml and docker-compose.yaml had diverged: .yml — the file Docker actually uses — carried ROBOCO_PUBLIC_BASE_URL but was missing the /app/manifests bind-mount, while .yaml had the manifests mount but not the base URL. Merge the union into docker-compose.yml and delete the duplicate so there is one source of truth and no "multiple config files" warning. This activates the manifests mount in the deployed file: without it the orchestrator writes per-agent tool manifests to its ephemeral container fs, they never reach the host for the daemon to bind-mount, and agents fall back to all-verbs registration. Drop the stale .yaml reference from the config.py docstring, the labeler, and the CI path filters. --------- Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
99 lines
4.1 KiB
Bash
99 lines
4.1 KiB
Bash
# =============================================================================
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# RoboCo Environment Configuration
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# =============================================================================
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# Copy this file to .env
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#
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# NOTE: No API keys needed for agents - they use your Claude Code authentication.
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# Run `claude` on the host to authenticate before starting RoboCo.
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# =============================================================================
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# Docker Deployment (NAS/Server)
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# =============================================================================
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# These are REQUIRED when running via docker compose on a NAS/server.
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# They tell the orchestrator container where to find files on the HOST.
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# Path to the project on the host (absolute path)
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# ROBOCO_HOST_PROJECT_DIR=/volume1/roboco
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# Path to Claude Code auth directory on the host
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# ROBOCO_HOST_CLAUDE_DIR=/root/.claude
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# Claude auth directory to mount into orchestrator
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# CLAUDE_AUTH_DIR=~/.claude
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# =============================================================================
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# Data Persistence
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# =============================================================================
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# Set to a path on your NAS RAID array for durability
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# Path to data directory on the host (MUST be absolute for Docker-in-Docker)
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# ROBOCO_DATA_DIR=/volume1/roboco/data
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# =============================================================================
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# Application
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# =============================================================================
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ROBOCO_ENVIRONMENT=development
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ROBOCO_DEBUG=true
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# =============================================================================
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# API Server
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# =============================================================================
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ROBOCO_HOST=0.0.0.0
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ROBOCO_PORT=8000
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# =============================================================================
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# Database (PostgreSQL)
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# =============================================================================
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# For docker compose deployment, use container name:
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# ROBOCO_DATABASE_HOST=roboco-postgres
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# For local development:
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ROBOCO_DATABASE_HOST=localhost
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ROBOCO_DATABASE_PORT=5432
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ROBOCO_DATABASE_USER=roboco
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ROBOCO_DATABASE_PASSWORD=roboco
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ROBOCO_DATABASE_NAME=roboco
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ROBOCO_DATABASE_ECHO=false
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# =============================================================================
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# Redis
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# =============================================================================
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# For docker compose deployment, use container name:
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# ROBOCO_REDIS_HOST=roboco-redis
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# For local development:
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ROBOCO_REDIS_HOST=localhost
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ROBOCO_REDIS_PORT=6379
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ROBOCO_REDIS_DB=0
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# ROBOCO_REDIS_PASSWORD=
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# =============================================================================
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# Qdrant (Vector DB) - Optional
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# =============================================================================
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ROBOCO_QDRANT_HOST=localhost
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ROBOCO_QDRANT_PORT=6333
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# ROBOCO_QDRANT_API_KEY=
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# =============================================================================
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# OpenAI (optional, for embeddings)
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# =============================================================================
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# =============================================================================
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# Security
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# =============================================================================
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# Agent auth: HMAC secret that signs X-Agent-Token. REQUIRED for docker compose.
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# Generate with: python -c 'import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))'
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ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET=
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# Secure mode. On a trusted LAN you can leave this false (header-trust mode).
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# Set true to require every request to carry a valid token so an agent cannot
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# spoof another agent's role. When true you MUST also set ROBOCO_PANEL_AGENT_TOKEN.
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ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED=false
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# The control panel's CEO token, injected by nginx in secure mode so the human
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# UI keeps working without the browser holding the signing secret. Generate it
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# (after setting ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET above) with: make panel-token
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ROBOCO_PANEL_AGENT_TOKEN=
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# =============================================================================
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# CORS (comma-separated origins)
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# =============================================================================
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ROBOCO_CORS_ORIGINS=["http://localhost:3000","http://localhost:5173"]
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