Files
roboco/tests/unit/llm/providers/test_codex_auth.py
T
c70ff3cf9a feat(providers): Codex CLI provider — OpenAI via ModelProvider.OPENAI (#659)
* feat(providers): Codex CLI provider — OpenAI via ModelProvider.OPENAI

Mirrors the grok blueprint end to end: CodexCliProvider (RO ~/.codex
mount, ANTHROPIC_* blanked), an orchestrator-side codex_auth.py
refresher (JWT-exp staleness, atomic rewrite, lock-serialized single-use
rotation, --check backstop; the CLI's own in-process refresh write
no-ops on the RO mount by design — margins keep the orchestrator ahead
of the CLI's 5-minute window), config.toml rendering with required=true
gateway MCP servers, execpolicy deny rules (forbidden-only), per-role
--sandbox (developer=workspace-write, review/doc roles read-only),
codex exec --json with pinned ROBOCO_CODEX_CLI_MODEL (gpt-5.3-codex),
usage summed from typed turn.completed events priced via the real
4-bucket split, dedicated image + entrypoint, registry/park/finalize/
compose/release wiring. V1 excludes interactive intake/secretary.

Per adversarial review: migration 083 seeds the openai provider row
enabled=True (without it every routing path 404'd — the whole feature
was operationally dead code; grok needed the same seed in 039), the
panel picker gained the OpenAI catalog group it silently lacked, and
exit classification is structural — only stderr and error.message
fields from error events are sniffed (word-boundaried patterns, exact
auth phrases, bare 'login' dropped), so the model echoing on-topic
words can never false-park the provider fleet-wide, proven by a
benign-transcript test. Known open risk flagged, not claimed: whether
codex's workspace-write OS sandbox excludes /app is unverified, and no
hook mechanism exists to port the bash-guard defense-in-depth.

* fix(providers): containment barrier on usage.json reads (code scanning)

CodeQL flagged the codex usage read as path injection — correctly:
os.path.basename does not neutralize '..', and the upstream segment
validator isn't in CodeQL's taint model. The grok/codex reads collapse
into one _read_usage_json_contained helper that resolves the built path
and refuses anything outside the resolved usage root — a hostile id can
never escape regardless of upstream drift. Traversal + containment
regression tests added; a stray noqa in the test file replaced with a
named constant per repo rule.

* fix(providers): use realpath+startswith containment CodeQL recognizes

The is_relative_to() guard was a real barrier but not in CodeQL's
py/path-injection sanitizer model, so the alert persisted. Switch to
the canonical os.path.realpath + startswith(root + os.sep) form, which
CodeQL recognizes as a path-traversal barrier; behavior is identical
(refuse any candidate resolving outside the usage root).

* fix(providers): regexp-allowlist the usage-id segment (CodeQL barrier)

Neither is_relative_to nor realpath+startswith was recognized by
CodeQL's py/path-injection sanitizer model across the str->Path->open
flow. Sanitize the tainted component at the source instead: the id must
fullmatch a strict slug token ([A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*, no
separators, no '..'), which CodeQL recognizes as a path-injection
barrier; the realpath+startswith containment stays as defense-in-depth.

* fix(providers): standalone regexp guard so CodeQL recognizes the barrier

The sanitizer was one disjunct of a compound 'or' condition, which
CodeQL's guard analysis does not trace as a barrier. Split the regexp
fullmatch into its own single-condition guard (the redundant '..' check
is dropped — the required alphanumeric first char already excludes it).

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-23 03:20:29 +02:00

231 lines
8.0 KiB
Python

"""codex_auth — keep the Codex CLI credential live via the OAuth refresh grant.
Unlike grok's bundle (keyed by ``<issuer>::<client_id>``, carrying its own
``expires_at``), the Codex auth.json is flat — ``{tokens: {access_token,
refresh_token, ...}}`` — and staleness is decided purely by decoding the
access token's JWT ``exp`` claim.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import json
import pathlib
import threading
import time
from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
from roboco.llm.providers import codex_auth as ca
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
def _jwt(exp_unix: int) -> str:
"""Build a minimal JWT (header.payload.signature) carrying an ``exp`` claim."""
payload = (
base64.urlsafe_b64encode(json.dumps({"exp": exp_unix}).encode())
.rstrip(b"=")
.decode()
)
header = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(b'{"alg":"RS256"}').rstrip(b"=").decode()
return f"{header}.{payload}.sig"
def _bundle(access_token: str, *, refresh_token: str = "rt") -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"auth_mode": "chatgpt",
"tokens": {
"id_token": "id-tok",
"access_token": access_token,
"refresh_token": refresh_token,
"account_id": "acct-1",
},
"last_refresh": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
}
def _write(path: Path, bundle: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
path.write_text(json.dumps(bundle), encoding="utf-8")
def _exp(delta: timedelta) -> int:
return int((datetime.now(UTC) + delta).timestamp())
def test_seconds_until_expiry_and_is_valid(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
token = _jwt(_exp(timedelta(minutes=54)))
_write(path, _bundle(token))
remaining = ca.seconds_until_expiry(path)
assert remaining is not None
assert 3100 < remaining < 3300 # noqa: PLR2004 — ~54 minutes
assert ca.is_valid(path)
assert not ca.is_valid(path, skew_seconds=3600) # <1h left, 1h skew fails
def test_seconds_until_expiry_none_for_missing_or_entryless(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
assert ca.seconds_until_expiry(tmp_path / "nope.json") is None
path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
_write(path, {"tokens": {"account_id": "x"}}) # no access_token
assert ca.seconds_until_expiry(path) is None
def test_seconds_until_expiry_none_for_non_jwt_access_token(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
_write(path, _bundle("api-key-not-a-jwt"))
assert ca.seconds_until_expiry(path) is None
def test_refresh_skips_when_fresh(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
_write(path, _bundle(_jwt(_exp(timedelta(hours=6)))))
calls: list[str] = []
def _post(url: str, _form: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
calls.append(url)
return {}
assert ca.refresh_if_stale(path, post=_post) == "fresh"
assert not calls # no network call when the token is still valid
def test_refresh_mints_new_token_when_stale(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
_write(path, _bundle(_jwt(_exp(timedelta(minutes=-5)))))
new_access = _jwt(_exp(timedelta(hours=6)))
def _post(url: str, form: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
assert url == "https://auth.openai.com/oauth/token"
assert form["grant_type"] == "refresh_token"
assert form["refresh_token"] == "rt"
assert form["client_id"]
return {
"access_token": new_access,
"refresh_token": "new-rt",
"id_token": "new-id",
}
assert ca.refresh_if_stale(path, post=_post) == "refreshed"
bundle = json.loads(path.read_text())
assert bundle["tokens"]["access_token"] == new_access
assert bundle["tokens"]["refresh_token"] == "new-rt" # rotated
assert bundle["tokens"]["id_token"] == "new-id"
assert bundle["last_refresh"] != "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"
assert ca.is_valid(path)
def test_refresh_keeps_old_refresh_token_when_response_omits_it(
tmp_path: Path,
) -> None:
path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
_write(path, _bundle(_jwt(_exp(timedelta(minutes=-1)))))
def _post(_url: str, _form: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {"access_token": _jwt(_exp(timedelta(hours=6)))} # no refresh_token
assert ca.refresh_if_stale(path, post=_post) == "refreshed"
assert json.loads(path.read_text())["tokens"]["refresh_token"] == "rt"
def test_refresh_missing_file(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
assert ca.refresh_if_stale(tmp_path / "nope.json") == "missing"
def test_refresh_no_refresh_token_api_key_mode(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
# auth_mode=apikey has no tokens/refresh_token — refresh is a graceful no-op.
path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
_write(path, {"auth_mode": "apikey", "OPENAI_API_KEY": "sk-x"})
assert ca.refresh_if_stale(path) == "no_refresh_token"
def test_refresh_failed_on_post_error_leaves_file_untouched(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
stale = _jwt(_exp(timedelta(minutes=-1)))
_write(path, _bundle(stale))
def _boom(_url: str, _form: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
raise RuntimeError("network down")
assert ca.refresh_if_stale(path, post=_boom) == "failed"
assert json.loads(path.read_text())["tokens"]["access_token"] == stale
def test_refresh_failed_when_no_access_token(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
_write(path, _bundle(_jwt(_exp(timedelta(minutes=-1)))))
assert ca.refresh_if_stale(path, post=lambda _u, _f: {}) == "failed"
def test_refresh_persists_rotated_token_when_atomic_write_fails(
tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
) -> None:
"""A rotated refresh_token is single-use; if the atomic write fails after
rotation, the direct-write fallback must still land it on disk."""
path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
_write(path, _bundle(_jwt(_exp(timedelta(minutes=-1)))))
new_access = _jwt(_exp(timedelta(hours=6)))
def _post(_url: str, _form: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {"access_token": new_access, "refresh_token": "rotated-rt"}
def _boom_replace(_self: pathlib.Path, _target: pathlib.Path) -> pathlib.Path:
raise OSError("replace failed (simulated)")
monkeypatch.setattr(pathlib.Path, "replace", _boom_replace)
assert ca.refresh_if_stale(path, post=_post) == "refreshed"
tokens = json.loads(path.read_text())["tokens"]
assert tokens["refresh_token"] == "rotated-rt"
assert tokens["access_token"] == new_access
def test_main_check_exit_codes(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
home = tmp_path / ".codex"
home.mkdir()
monkeypatch.setenv("HOME", str(tmp_path))
_write(home / "auth.json", _bundle(_jwt(_exp(timedelta(hours=6)))))
assert ca.main(["--check"]) == 0
_write(home / "auth.json", _bundle(_jwt(_exp(timedelta(minutes=-1)))))
assert ca.main(["--check"]) == 1
def test_concurrent_refresh_does_not_double_rotate_single_use_token(
tmp_path: Path,
) -> None:
"""Two near-simultaneous ``refresh_if_stale`` calls must POST the
refresh-token grant ONCE — a process-wide lock + re-load inside it makes
the loser see the winner's refreshed token and return "fresh" instead of
re-rotating (mirrors grok_auth's #94 fix)."""
path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
_write(path, _bundle(_jwt(_exp(timedelta(minutes=-1)))))
posted: list[str] = []
post_lock = threading.Lock()
def _post(_url: str, form: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
with post_lock:
posted.append(form["refresh_token"])
time.sleep(0.1)
return {
"access_token": _jwt(_exp(timedelta(hours=6))),
"refresh_token": "new-rt",
}
results: list[str] = []
def _run() -> None:
results.append(ca.refresh_if_stale(path, post=_post))
threads = [threading.Thread(target=_run) for _ in range(2)]
for t in threads:
t.start()
for t in threads:
t.join()
assert len(posted) == 1 # exactly one grant POST — no double rotation
assert all(r in ("refreshed", "fresh") for r in results)
assert "refreshed" in results