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* feat(providers): Codex CLI provider — OpenAI via ModelProvider.OPENAI Mirrors the grok blueprint end to end: CodexCliProvider (RO ~/.codex mount, ANTHROPIC_* blanked), an orchestrator-side codex_auth.py refresher (JWT-exp staleness, atomic rewrite, lock-serialized single-use rotation, --check backstop; the CLI's own in-process refresh write no-ops on the RO mount by design — margins keep the orchestrator ahead of the CLI's 5-minute window), config.toml rendering with required=true gateway MCP servers, execpolicy deny rules (forbidden-only), per-role --sandbox (developer=workspace-write, review/doc roles read-only), codex exec --json with pinned ROBOCO_CODEX_CLI_MODEL (gpt-5.3-codex), usage summed from typed turn.completed events priced via the real 4-bucket split, dedicated image + entrypoint, registry/park/finalize/ compose/release wiring. V1 excludes interactive intake/secretary. Per adversarial review: migration 083 seeds the openai provider row enabled=True (without it every routing path 404'd — the whole feature was operationally dead code; grok needed the same seed in 039), the panel picker gained the OpenAI catalog group it silently lacked, and exit classification is structural — only stderr and error.message fields from error events are sniffed (word-boundaried patterns, exact auth phrases, bare 'login' dropped), so the model echoing on-topic words can never false-park the provider fleet-wide, proven by a benign-transcript test. Known open risk flagged, not claimed: whether codex's workspace-write OS sandbox excludes /app is unverified, and no hook mechanism exists to port the bash-guard defense-in-depth. * fix(providers): containment barrier on usage.json reads (code scanning) CodeQL flagged the codex usage read as path injection — correctly: os.path.basename does not neutralize '..', and the upstream segment validator isn't in CodeQL's taint model. The grok/codex reads collapse into one _read_usage_json_contained helper that resolves the built path and refuses anything outside the resolved usage root — a hostile id can never escape regardless of upstream drift. Traversal + containment regression tests added; a stray noqa in the test file replaced with a named constant per repo rule. * fix(providers): use realpath+startswith containment CodeQL recognizes The is_relative_to() guard was a real barrier but not in CodeQL's py/path-injection sanitizer model, so the alert persisted. Switch to the canonical os.path.realpath + startswith(root + os.sep) form, which CodeQL recognizes as a path-traversal barrier; behavior is identical (refuse any candidate resolving outside the usage root). * fix(providers): regexp-allowlist the usage-id segment (CodeQL barrier) Neither is_relative_to nor realpath+startswith was recognized by CodeQL's py/path-injection sanitizer model across the str->Path->open flow. Sanitize the tainted component at the source instead: the id must fullmatch a strict slug token ([A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*, no separators, no '..'), which CodeQL recognizes as a path-injection barrier; the realpath+startswith containment stays as defense-in-depth. * fix(providers): standalone regexp guard so CodeQL recognizes the barrier The sanitizer was one disjunct of a compound 'or' condition, which CodeQL's guard analysis does not trace as a barrier. Split the regexp fullmatch into its own single-condition guard (the redundant '..' check is dropped — the required alphanumeric first char already excludes it). --------- Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
231 lines
8.0 KiB
Python
231 lines
8.0 KiB
Python
"""codex_auth — keep the Codex CLI credential live via the OAuth refresh grant.
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Unlike grok's bundle (keyed by ``<issuer>::<client_id>``, carrying its own
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``expires_at``), the Codex auth.json is flat — ``{tokens: {access_token,
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refresh_token, ...}}`` — and staleness is decided purely by decoding the
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access token's JWT ``exp`` claim.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import base64
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import json
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import pathlib
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import threading
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import time
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from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
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from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
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from roboco.llm.providers import codex_auth as ca
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if TYPE_CHECKING:
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from pathlib import Path
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import pytest
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def _jwt(exp_unix: int) -> str:
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"""Build a minimal JWT (header.payload.signature) carrying an ``exp`` claim."""
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payload = (
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base64.urlsafe_b64encode(json.dumps({"exp": exp_unix}).encode())
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.rstrip(b"=")
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.decode()
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)
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header = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(b'{"alg":"RS256"}').rstrip(b"=").decode()
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return f"{header}.{payload}.sig"
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def _bundle(access_token: str, *, refresh_token: str = "rt") -> dict[str, Any]:
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return {
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"auth_mode": "chatgpt",
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"tokens": {
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"id_token": "id-tok",
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"access_token": access_token,
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"refresh_token": refresh_token,
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"account_id": "acct-1",
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},
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"last_refresh": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
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}
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def _write(path: Path, bundle: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
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path.write_text(json.dumps(bundle), encoding="utf-8")
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def _exp(delta: timedelta) -> int:
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return int((datetime.now(UTC) + delta).timestamp())
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def test_seconds_until_expiry_and_is_valid(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
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path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
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token = _jwt(_exp(timedelta(minutes=54)))
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_write(path, _bundle(token))
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remaining = ca.seconds_until_expiry(path)
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assert remaining is not None
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assert 3100 < remaining < 3300 # noqa: PLR2004 — ~54 minutes
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assert ca.is_valid(path)
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assert not ca.is_valid(path, skew_seconds=3600) # <1h left, 1h skew fails
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def test_seconds_until_expiry_none_for_missing_or_entryless(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
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assert ca.seconds_until_expiry(tmp_path / "nope.json") is None
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path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
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_write(path, {"tokens": {"account_id": "x"}}) # no access_token
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assert ca.seconds_until_expiry(path) is None
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def test_seconds_until_expiry_none_for_non_jwt_access_token(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
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path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
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_write(path, _bundle("api-key-not-a-jwt"))
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assert ca.seconds_until_expiry(path) is None
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def test_refresh_skips_when_fresh(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
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path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
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_write(path, _bundle(_jwt(_exp(timedelta(hours=6)))))
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calls: list[str] = []
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def _post(url: str, _form: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
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calls.append(url)
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return {}
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assert ca.refresh_if_stale(path, post=_post) == "fresh"
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assert not calls # no network call when the token is still valid
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def test_refresh_mints_new_token_when_stale(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
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path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
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_write(path, _bundle(_jwt(_exp(timedelta(minutes=-5)))))
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new_access = _jwt(_exp(timedelta(hours=6)))
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def _post(url: str, form: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
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assert url == "https://auth.openai.com/oauth/token"
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assert form["grant_type"] == "refresh_token"
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assert form["refresh_token"] == "rt"
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assert form["client_id"]
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return {
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"access_token": new_access,
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"refresh_token": "new-rt",
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"id_token": "new-id",
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}
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assert ca.refresh_if_stale(path, post=_post) == "refreshed"
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bundle = json.loads(path.read_text())
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assert bundle["tokens"]["access_token"] == new_access
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assert bundle["tokens"]["refresh_token"] == "new-rt" # rotated
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assert bundle["tokens"]["id_token"] == "new-id"
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assert bundle["last_refresh"] != "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"
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assert ca.is_valid(path)
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def test_refresh_keeps_old_refresh_token_when_response_omits_it(
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tmp_path: Path,
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) -> None:
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path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
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_write(path, _bundle(_jwt(_exp(timedelta(minutes=-1)))))
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def _post(_url: str, _form: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
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return {"access_token": _jwt(_exp(timedelta(hours=6)))} # no refresh_token
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assert ca.refresh_if_stale(path, post=_post) == "refreshed"
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assert json.loads(path.read_text())["tokens"]["refresh_token"] == "rt"
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def test_refresh_missing_file(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
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assert ca.refresh_if_stale(tmp_path / "nope.json") == "missing"
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def test_refresh_no_refresh_token_api_key_mode(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
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# auth_mode=apikey has no tokens/refresh_token — refresh is a graceful no-op.
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path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
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_write(path, {"auth_mode": "apikey", "OPENAI_API_KEY": "sk-x"})
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assert ca.refresh_if_stale(path) == "no_refresh_token"
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def test_refresh_failed_on_post_error_leaves_file_untouched(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
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path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
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stale = _jwt(_exp(timedelta(minutes=-1)))
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_write(path, _bundle(stale))
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def _boom(_url: str, _form: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
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raise RuntimeError("network down")
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assert ca.refresh_if_stale(path, post=_boom) == "failed"
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assert json.loads(path.read_text())["tokens"]["access_token"] == stale
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def test_refresh_failed_when_no_access_token(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
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path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
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_write(path, _bundle(_jwt(_exp(timedelta(minutes=-1)))))
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assert ca.refresh_if_stale(path, post=lambda _u, _f: {}) == "failed"
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def test_refresh_persists_rotated_token_when_atomic_write_fails(
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tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
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) -> None:
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"""A rotated refresh_token is single-use; if the atomic write fails after
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rotation, the direct-write fallback must still land it on disk."""
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path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
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_write(path, _bundle(_jwt(_exp(timedelta(minutes=-1)))))
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new_access = _jwt(_exp(timedelta(hours=6)))
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def _post(_url: str, _form: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
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return {"access_token": new_access, "refresh_token": "rotated-rt"}
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def _boom_replace(_self: pathlib.Path, _target: pathlib.Path) -> pathlib.Path:
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raise OSError("replace failed (simulated)")
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monkeypatch.setattr(pathlib.Path, "replace", _boom_replace)
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assert ca.refresh_if_stale(path, post=_post) == "refreshed"
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tokens = json.loads(path.read_text())["tokens"]
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assert tokens["refresh_token"] == "rotated-rt"
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assert tokens["access_token"] == new_access
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def test_main_check_exit_codes(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
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home = tmp_path / ".codex"
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home.mkdir()
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monkeypatch.setenv("HOME", str(tmp_path))
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_write(home / "auth.json", _bundle(_jwt(_exp(timedelta(hours=6)))))
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assert ca.main(["--check"]) == 0
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_write(home / "auth.json", _bundle(_jwt(_exp(timedelta(minutes=-1)))))
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assert ca.main(["--check"]) == 1
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def test_concurrent_refresh_does_not_double_rotate_single_use_token(
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tmp_path: Path,
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) -> None:
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"""Two near-simultaneous ``refresh_if_stale`` calls must POST the
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refresh-token grant ONCE — a process-wide lock + re-load inside it makes
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the loser see the winner's refreshed token and return "fresh" instead of
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re-rotating (mirrors grok_auth's #94 fix)."""
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path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
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_write(path, _bundle(_jwt(_exp(timedelta(minutes=-1)))))
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posted: list[str] = []
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post_lock = threading.Lock()
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def _post(_url: str, form: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
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with post_lock:
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posted.append(form["refresh_token"])
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time.sleep(0.1)
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return {
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"access_token": _jwt(_exp(timedelta(hours=6))),
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"refresh_token": "new-rt",
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}
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results: list[str] = []
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def _run() -> None:
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results.append(ca.refresh_if_stale(path, post=_post))
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threads = [threading.Thread(target=_run) for _ in range(2)]
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for t in threads:
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t.start()
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for t in threads:
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t.join()
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assert len(posted) == 1 # exactly one grant POST — no double rotation
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assert all(r in ("refreshed", "fresh") for r in results)
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assert "refreshed" in results
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