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* feat(providers): Codex CLI provider — OpenAI via ModelProvider.OPENAI Mirrors the grok blueprint end to end: CodexCliProvider (RO ~/.codex mount, ANTHROPIC_* blanked), an orchestrator-side codex_auth.py refresher (JWT-exp staleness, atomic rewrite, lock-serialized single-use rotation, --check backstop; the CLI's own in-process refresh write no-ops on the RO mount by design — margins keep the orchestrator ahead of the CLI's 5-minute window), config.toml rendering with required=true gateway MCP servers, execpolicy deny rules (forbidden-only), per-role --sandbox (developer=workspace-write, review/doc roles read-only), codex exec --json with pinned ROBOCO_CODEX_CLI_MODEL (gpt-5.3-codex), usage summed from typed turn.completed events priced via the real 4-bucket split, dedicated image + entrypoint, registry/park/finalize/ compose/release wiring. V1 excludes interactive intake/secretary. Per adversarial review: migration 083 seeds the openai provider row enabled=True (without it every routing path 404'd — the whole feature was operationally dead code; grok needed the same seed in 039), the panel picker gained the OpenAI catalog group it silently lacked, and exit classification is structural — only stderr and error.message fields from error events are sniffed (word-boundaried patterns, exact auth phrases, bare 'login' dropped), so the model echoing on-topic words can never false-park the provider fleet-wide, proven by a benign-transcript test. Known open risk flagged, not claimed: whether codex's workspace-write OS sandbox excludes /app is unverified, and no hook mechanism exists to port the bash-guard defense-in-depth. * fix(providers): containment barrier on usage.json reads (code scanning) CodeQL flagged the codex usage read as path injection — correctly: os.path.basename does not neutralize '..', and the upstream segment validator isn't in CodeQL's taint model. The grok/codex reads collapse into one _read_usage_json_contained helper that resolves the built path and refuses anything outside the resolved usage root — a hostile id can never escape regardless of upstream drift. Traversal + containment regression tests added; a stray noqa in the test file replaced with a named constant per repo rule. * fix(providers): use realpath+startswith containment CodeQL recognizes The is_relative_to() guard was a real barrier but not in CodeQL's py/path-injection sanitizer model, so the alert persisted. Switch to the canonical os.path.realpath + startswith(root + os.sep) form, which CodeQL recognizes as a path-traversal barrier; behavior is identical (refuse any candidate resolving outside the usage root). * fix(providers): regexp-allowlist the usage-id segment (CodeQL barrier) Neither is_relative_to nor realpath+startswith was recognized by CodeQL's py/path-injection sanitizer model across the str->Path->open flow. Sanitize the tainted component at the source instead: the id must fullmatch a strict slug token ([A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*, no separators, no '..'), which CodeQL recognizes as a path-injection barrier; the realpath+startswith containment stays as defense-in-depth. * fix(providers): standalone regexp guard so CodeQL recognizes the barrier The sanitizer was one disjunct of a compound 'or' condition, which CodeQL's guard analysis does not trace as a barrier. Split the regexp fullmatch into its own single-condition guard (the redundant '..' check is dropped — the required alphanumeric first char already excludes it). --------- Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
34 lines
1.4 KiB
Python
34 lines
1.4 KiB
Python
"""LLM agent providers.
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Each provider implements the :class:`AgentProvider` lifecycle for one backend.
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The :class:`ProviderRegistry` maps :class:`~roboco.models.base.ModelProvider`
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values to provider instances; the orchestrator looks a provider up at spawn time
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and falls back to its built-in Claude Code spawn when none is registered.
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Backends:
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- :class:`ClaudeCodeProvider` — Anthropic-protocol Claude Code container (default;
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also serves Ollama Cloud / self-hosted via ``ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`` injection).
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- :class:`GrokCliProvider` — xAI Grok Build via the official ``grok`` CLI on the
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SuperGrok subscription (mounted ``~/.grok`` auth, parity with the Claude path).
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- :class:`CodexCliProvider` — OpenAI via the official ``codex`` CLI on a ChatGPT
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subscription (mounted ``~/.codex`` auth, same shape). One-shot delivery roles
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only in V1 — no interactive intake/secretary support.
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"""
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from roboco.llm.providers.base import AgentProvider, ProviderError, SpawnResult
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from roboco.llm.providers.claude_code import ClaudeCodeProvider
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from roboco.llm.providers.codex import CodexCliProvider
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from roboco.llm.providers.grok import GrokCliProvider
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from roboco.llm.providers.registry import ProviderNotRegisteredError, ProviderRegistry
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__all__ = [
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"AgentProvider",
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"ClaudeCodeProvider",
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"CodexCliProvider",
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"GrokCliProvider",
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"ProviderError",
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"ProviderNotRegisteredError",
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"ProviderRegistry",
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"SpawnResult",
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]
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