Files
roboco/docker-compose.yml
T
3ccc723cd4 v0.17.0 — Wave 3: sandbox DB, DB isolation, mobile UI, cloud auth, X account, roadmap engine (#303)
* feat(sandbox): throwaway per-agent Postgres/Redis sandbox containers

Orchestrator-provisioned sibling containers per agent spawn
(SandboxProvisioner, roboco/runtime/sandbox.py). Per-project opt-in via
projects.sandbox_services (migration 057); master switch
ROBOCO_SANDBOX_DB_ENABLED, default-off, armed in the NAS compose only.

When active, ROBOCO_TEST_DB_* / ROBOCO_TEST_REDIS_* point at the sandbox
and the prod-creds gate-env injection is suppressed (sandbox replaces,
never coexists). Sandbox lifetime tracks the agent container: teardown at
every removal path, orphan janitor at startup + each reaper tick with a
grace window for mid-flight spawns. The pre-spawn stale-clear spares the
just-provisioned sandbox; provision pre-clears stale same-named
containers from a crash-missed teardown.

Panel: per-project sandbox-service switches in the edit dialog + feature
flag card entry.

* docs: CLAUDE.md entry for the sandboxed dev DB/Redis subsystem

* feat(security): isolate prod Postgres/Redis from agent containers (roboco_data network)

Second user-defined bridge roboco_data carries postgres+redis only; the
orchestrator is multi-homed (default + data). Spawned agents and their
sandbox sidecars stay on roboco_default and can no longer resolve or
reach roboco-postgres:5432 / roboco-redis:6379 (redis has no auth —
membership is its only containment). Normal bridge, so host-published
ports (15432/16379) keep working. Applied to both build composes and
the registry compose; docker-compose.yml re-synced byte-identical with
docker-compose.yaml (it had drifted by the sandbox flag block).

ROBOCO_DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED (config default false, armed alongside the
topology) suppresses the legacy _append_gate_env prod-creds injection:
under isolation those creds dead-end, and unreachable creds are worse
than none. DB-needing projects opt into sandbox_services instead. The
flag is deliberately not a panel feature flag - it must travel with the
compose networks: stanzas.

Preserved by construction: agent<->agent A2A and orchestrator->agent SDK
polls on :9000, MCP->orchestrator on :8000, ollama reachability, docker
exec/inspect (daemon socket), host port publishing.

* feat(panel): full mobile responsiveness pass

Shared primitives: useIsMobile (useSyncExternalStore, hydration-safe,
memoized matchMedia subscribe), ResponsiveTable table->card switch below
md (single subtree mounted, no duplicated interactive rows), scrollable
snap TabsList in the base primitive (justify-center-safe so the first
tab stays reachable on overflow), persistent md:hidden bottom tab bar
(Overview/Tasks/Kanban/Chat, safe-area padded).

Applied: card lists for tasks/projects/products/work-sessions/sessions
+ the three raw metrics tables; CEO approval queue / release proposal /
playbook review action rows stack on narrow; command-center reorders
approvals above the fold on mobile; task-header metadata wraps;
Communications + A2A become URL-driven single-pane drill-downs below lg
(fixes the unconstrained-height ScrollArea bug) with dvh heights;
recharts label density/radius adapts via useIsMobile; git diff viewer
gets mobile font + wrap toggle; vh->dvh sweep; chat composers get
safe-area-inset padding; dashboard main p-4 md:p-6 + pb-20 for the bar.

Verified at 375px on the built app: bottom bar, drawer, approval-first
overview, swipeable kanban tab strip. All gates green (eslint, tsc,
vitest 249, next build 24/24 routes).

* feat(auth): cloud auth via FastAPI Users (default-off, single-user cookie session)

ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_ENABLED (default off) lets the panel/API be exposed
beyond localhost without changing the CEO's local no-login flow while
off — get_agent_context and the WS gate are byte-for-byte unchanged in
off-mode. On: header-trust dies for humans — any agent-role claim (ceo
or a privileged PM/board role) with no valid HMAC token or session
cookie is 401, closing the header-spoof hole on the host-published
:8000 port for every role. The agent-fleet HMAC path and the system
self-PATCH keep working unmodified in both modes.

Single seeded CEO user (migration 058 users table, UserTable), no
registration router — idempotent env-driven upsert at startup by PK.
Cookie transport (httponly/secure/samesite=lax) + a JWTStrategy bound
to a fingerprint of the current password hash (rotating the password
invalidates every prior session). Sliding 30-day session: every
authenticated request re-mints the cookie, so an active session never
expires — no unexpected logouts.

Panel: (auth)/login page + proxy.ts (Next 16 rename of middleware; probes
/auth/status over the docker-internal URL, fails open to off) gate the
dashboard; client.ts gets withCredentials + 401->/login. nginx unchanged.

Review hardening: broadened the on-mode rejection from ceo-only to every
non-CEO role without a valid token (was only closed when
ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED was also armed); Next-16 proxy.ts rename to
clear the middleware deprecation warning.

* feat(x): RoboCo X account engine — HoM drafts, per-post CEO approval (default-off)

ROBOCO_X_ENGINE_ENABLED (default off, inert without creds). Mirrors the
ReleaseManagerEngine held-artifact shape: XEngine drafts a post when a
release publishes (via a draft_release_post seam on ReleaseProposalService
.approve) and drafts replies to meaningful mentions (dedicated poll loop,
x_seen_mentions dedup ledger, per-cycle/open caps). Drafting is
local-model-only, clamped to 280 chars. Nothing auto-posts — every tweet
is a held task (source x_post/x_reply, confirmed_by_human=False,
Secretary-owned, dispatcher-skipped) the CEO edits/approves/rejects in a
panel queue.

The four OAuth 1.0a secrets live Fernet-encrypted in a singleton
x_credentials row (migration 059, all-or-nothing, API returns only
has_credentials); decryption is server-side, agents never hold creds or
egress. Hand-rolled OAuth 1.0a HMAC-SHA1 signer, no new dependency;
NullXClient makes the unconfigured path a graceful no-op.

XPostService.approve (CEO-only) is the sole caller of post_tweet.

Review hardening: closed a double-post race — the approve path now
re-reads committed task state inside the Redis lock and commits COMPLETED
before releasing, so a concurrent approve that acquires the lock after the
winner released can't re-post (SET-NX is non-waiting, and the route-level
commit landed after the lock dropped). Added a regression test.

* feat(roadmap): board roadmap engine — PO proposes themed cycles, CEO approves per-item (default-off)

ROBOCO_ROADMAP_ENGINE_ENABLED (default off). Weekly, RoadmapEngine opens
ONE held exploration task (source=board_roadmap, confirmed_by_human=False,
Product-Owner-assigned), deduped to one open cycle. A dedicated one-shot
_dispatch_roadmap_exploration spawns the PO solo (not the two-reviewer
board path, which would also spawn HoM + fire Approve-&-Start). The PO
explores read-only (git/KB/metrics/releases/charter/web) and makes one
propose_roadmap call (PO-only content verb) authoring a themed cycle —
goal + 3-7 item drafts — persisted as a roadmap_cycle marker (no table,
no migration; head stays 059).

The CEO acts per-item in the panel roadmap queue: approve materializes a
BACKLOG task (source=roadmap, no assignee — never auto-starts), reject
records a reason; all-items-terminal completes the exploration task.
RoadmapService is idempotent per item. Dispatchers skip board_roadmap.

Includes a real SQLAlchemy dirty-check fix (deep-copy the JSON marker
before mutating, or the in-place edit + reassign compares equal to its
own baseline and the UPDATE is skipped).

Review hardening: create_task_from_draft now honors a draft-declared
source only from a {prompter, roadmap} whitelist — drafts are
LLM-authored, so an unbounded source could impersonate a privileged
origin (release_manager would even wedge that engine's dedup).

* chore(release): 0.17.0

Wave 3 — six default-off subsystems: sandboxed dev DB/Redis, prod
Postgres/Redis network isolation, full mobile UI pass, cloud auth
(FastAPI Users), the RoboCo X account engine, and the board roadmap
engine. Plus the waves 1+2 work already on master since 0.16.0.

Version bumped across the canonical set (config.py, __init__.py,
pyproject.toml, panel/package.json, uv.lock); CHANGELOG [Unreleased]
cut to [0.17.0]; docs/map delta added.

Compose: every optional feature armed :-true in the NAS composes, OFF
in the user-facing registry compose. Two opt-in exceptions default off
(CLOUD_AUTH — needs email/password/secret + TLS, would otherwise fail
startup; ROUTING_STRICT — fail-closed spawning). DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED
stays on in both (coupled to the roboco_data topology).

* chore(compose): arm cloud_auth + routing_strict ON in the NAS composes

Every feature defaults ON in the NAS composes per policy — these two
were wrongly left off. Both keep the ${VAR:-true} form so the operator
controls the real runtime via .env: cloud auth needs
ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_EMAIL/_PASSWORD/_SECRET + TLS set there before a boot
(else startup fails loud), and routing_strict is fail-closed. Registry
compose keeps both off.

* fix(ci): reflow board.md prose (quality gate) + document v0.17.0 env creds

The roadmap section added hard-wrapped prose that failed the markdown
prose gate; reflowed (token-invariant). Also brought .env.example
current: cloud auth (now armed — needs SECRET or startup fails), routing
strict, the X engine (panel-entered OAuth), and web research.

* fix(ci): reduce cyclomatic complexity of five wave-3 blocks (xenon gate)

The wave-3 subagents introduced C-rank functions the CI xenon gate
rejects (my per-item reviews ran ruff/mypy/pytest but not xenon):
- sandbox.janitor_sweep -> extract _list_labeled_sandboxes /
  _list_live_agent_containers / _prune_grace
- x_client.fetch_mentions -> extract _parse_mention_items
- x_engine.run_cycle -> extract _process_mentions
- orchestrator._dispatch_pm_work -> extract the source-skip into a
  MODULE-level _is_held_ceo_source (module, not method, so the
  wholesale-mocked dispatcher unit tests exercise the real logic)
- auth/seed.ensure_seed_user -> extract _apply_seed_updates (module avg -> A)

Behavior-preserving; full suite green (11902), xenon clean.

* fix(ci): declare pyjwt + fastapi-users-db-sqlalchemy as direct deps (deptry)

The cloud-auth code imports jwt and fastapi_users_db_sqlalchemy directly
but they were only transitive deps (via fastapi-users), which deptry
(quality gate, DEP003) rejects. Declared explicitly; deptry roboco/ clean.
Missed originally because local make quality stopped at earlier gates
before reaching deptry.

* feat(x): gate mention replies behind ROBOCO_X_REPLIES_ENABLED (default off)

Per CEO decision: the X engine should only post about releases by
default. Reading mentions needs a paid X API tier, so the mention-reply
half is now a deliberate opt-in on top of release posting.

New default-off flag x_replies_enabled gates the mentions poll loop
(_x_mentions_poll_loop) and XEngine.run_cycle; release-post drafting
(the release-proposal approve hook) is unaffected and still runs when
x_engine_enabled + credentials are set. Added to FEATURE_FLAGS + the
panel card. Tests: release posting works with replies off; run_cycle +
the poll loop are no-ops with replies off.

* fix: 401 only redirects to /login when cloud auth is on; panel-token strips .env quotes

Two bugs that together dead-ended login in secure mode:
- client.ts redirected to /login on ANY 401, so a mismatched panel
  token (header-trust/secure mode, cloud auth off) bounced the user to a
  login page whose backend route isn't mounted -> 404. Now it probes
  /auth/status (bare fetch, no interceptor re-entry) and only redirects
  when cloud_auth_enabled.
- make panel-token read the .env secret with grep|cut without stripping
  surrounding quotes, so a quoted ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET produced a
  token signed with the quotes included — which never verifies against
  the orchestrator (docker-compose/pydantic unquote the secret). Now
  strips surrounding single/double quotes.

* fix: git-log 500 on '|' in commit message; X queue shows an empty state

- GET /api/git/log 500'd (ValueError: Invalid isoformat) when a commit
  SUBJECT contained a '|' (e.g. the 'curl|sh' lockdown commit): the
  fixed '|' field delimiter let the subject's pipe shift the split so
  author+date collapsed into one field. Switched to \x1f (Unit
  Separator), which can't appear in commit content. Regression test with
  a piped subject.
- The X Post Queue returned null when empty, so there was no visible
  place for the X drafts. It now renders a discoverable empty state
  pointing at Settings -> X credentials.

* docs: bring docs/rag + docs/map current for v0.17.0 (waves 1-3)

Agent-facing RAG corpus and codebase map updated for every feature in
the 0.17.0 span, code-verified:
- wave 3: sandbox DB, DB network isolation, cloud auth, X engine
  (+ x_replies_enabled sub-flag), board roadmap engine — new RAG
  architecture pages + role/tool/config-reference updates; new symbols,
  migrations 057-059, panel surfaces, and the get_agent_context
  dual-path across the map slices.
- waves 1-2: A2A live view + switchboard, prompter memory
  (search_past_tasks), Secretary edit access + PM-lighter scope, the
  PR-gate auto-submit turn cut (ROBOCO_PR_GATE_AUTO_SUBMIT_ENABLED).
- correctness fix: api-routes-schemas.md no longer claims the A2A admin
  routes are reachable by any authenticated agent — they carry a
  _require_ceo gate (wave 2c).

docs/internal, _front.md deltas, and the frozen _complete_map.md
snapshot untouched.

* fix(rag): atomic upsert for indexed-doc tracking (kills e2e segfault)

The indexed-document tracking write used check-then-insert in two paths
(IndexedDocumentRepository.upsert_batch and the file-source
_upsert_doc_record). Under concurrent indexing both callers saw no row
and both inserted, so the second violated uq_indexed_doc_source and
poisoned its transaction — surfacing in CI as the intermittent
_checkin_failed SIGSEGV on the failed connection's pool checkin.

Both paths now use INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE against the
constraint: coalesce keeps an existing title/preview when the new value
is empty (matching the old guards) and metadata is jsonb-merged. The
batch dedupes within itself first (ON CONFLICT can't touch a row twice
in one statement). expire_all after the Core upsert keeps same-session
ORM reads consistent with the merged DB row.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-03 19:24:00 +02:00

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YAML

services:
# ==========================================================================
# PostgreSQL - Primary Database with pgvector for RAG
# ==========================================================================
postgres:
image: pgvector/pgvector:pg16
container_name: roboco-postgres
restart: unless-stopped
# data-only network: agent containers (on roboco_default) cannot reach
# the production DB; only the multi-homed orchestrator can. Host port
# publishing (15432) is unaffected — roboco_data is a normal bridge.
networks:
- data
environment:
POSTGRES_USER: roboco
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: roboco
POSTGRES_DB: roboco
ports:
- "15432:5432"
volumes:
- ${ROBOCO_DATA_DIR:-./data}/postgres:/var/lib/postgresql/data
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U roboco -d roboco"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
# ==========================================================================
# Redis - Cache, Sessions, Event Bus
# ==========================================================================
redis:
image: redis:8-alpine
container_name: roboco-redis
restart: unless-stopped
# data-only network — see postgres. Redis has no auth, so network
# membership is its ONLY containment against agent containers.
networks:
- data
command: redis-server --appendonly yes
ports:
- "16379:6379"
volumes:
- ${ROBOCO_DATA_DIR:-./data}/redis:/data
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "redis-cli", "ping"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
# ==========================================================================
# Ollama - Local LLM and Embedding Server
# ==========================================================================
ollama:
image: ollama/ollama:latest
container_name: roboco-ollama
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
OLLAMA_API_KEY: ${OLLAMA_API_KEY}
ports:
- "11435:11434"
volumes:
- ${ROBOCO_DATA_DIR:-./data}/ollama:/root/.ollama
healthcheck:
# Use ollama CLI (guaranteed available) to check if server is responding
test: ["CMD", "ollama", "list"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
start_period: 10s
# Ollama model puller - pulls required models on startup
# Uses streaming curl to wait for full model download
ollama-init:
image: curlimages/curl:latest
container_name: roboco-ollama-init
depends_on:
ollama:
condition: service_healthy
restart: "no"
entrypoint: ["/bin/sh", "-c"]
command:
- |
# NO `set -e`: pulls are best-effort. Cached models persist in the ollama
# volume and MUST survive a slow/unreachable ollama registry — a manifest
# re-check failure there must never down a fully-cached deployment (it
# used to: a degraded registry made `ollama pull` fail under set -e, which
# blocked the orchestrator's service_completed_successfully gate). Success
# is gated on the models being PRESENT (verify step), not on the pull.
# Note: $$ escapes $ for docker-compose variable substitution.
echo "=== Pulling embedding model (qwen3-embedding:0.6b) — best-effort ==="
curl -sN http://ollama:11434/api/pull -d '{"name":"qwen3-embedding:0.6b"}' | while read -r line; do
status=$$(echo "$$line" | grep -o '"status":"[^"]*"' | cut -d'"' -f4)
[ -n "$$status" ] && echo " $$status"
done || echo " (pull failed — relying on the cached model)"
echo "=== Pulling LLM model (glm-5.2:cloud) — best-effort ==="
curl -sN http://ollama:11434/api/pull -d '{"name":"glm-5.2:cloud"}' | while read -r line; do
status=$$(echo "$$line" | grep -o '"status":"[^"]*"' | cut -d'"' -f4)
[ -n "$$status" ] && echo " $$status"
done || echo " (pull failed — relying on the cached model)"
echo "=== Verifying models are present (the real success gate) ==="
curl -sf http://ollama:11434/api/tags | grep -q "qwen3-embedding" || { echo "FATAL: qwen3-embedding missing and could not be pulled"; exit 1; }
curl -sf http://ollama:11434/api/tags | grep -q "glm-5.2" || { echo "FATAL: glm-5.2 missing and could not be pulled"; exit 1; }
echo "=== All models ready! ==="
# ==========================================================================
# Agent Base Image Builder (specialized images built on-demand by orchestrator)
# ==========================================================================
agent-base-image:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: docker/agent-base.Dockerfile
image: roboco-agent-base
container_name: roboco-agent-base-builder
entrypoint: ["/bin/sh", "-c", "echo 'Agent base image built successfully'"]
restart: "no"
# ==========================================================================
# Agent PM Image Builder (specialized image built on-demand by orchestrator)
# ==========================================================================
agent-pm-image:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: docker/agent-pm.Dockerfile
image: roboco-agent-pm
entrypoint: ["/bin/sh", "-c", "echo 'Agent PM image built'"]
restart: "no"
depends_on:
- agent-base-image
# ==========================================================================
# Agent Backend Dev Image Builder (specialized image built on-demand by orchestrator)
# ==========================================================================
agent-dev-be-image:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: docker/agent-dev-be.Dockerfile
image: roboco-agent-dev-be
entrypoint: ["/bin/sh", "-c", "echo 'Agent Backend Dev image built'"]
restart: "no"
depends_on:
- agent-base-image
# ==========================================================================
# Agent Frontend Dev Image Builder (specialized image built on-demand by orchestrator)
# ==========================================================================
agent-dev-fe-image:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: docker/agent-dev-fe.Dockerfile
image: roboco-agent-dev-fe
entrypoint: ["/bin/sh", "-c", "echo 'Agent Frontend Dev image built'"]
restart: "no"
depends_on:
- agent-base-image
# ==========================================================================
# Agent Backend QA Image Builder (specialized image built on-demand by orchestrator)
# ==========================================================================
agent-qa-be-image:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: docker/agent-qa-be.Dockerfile
image: roboco-agent-qa-be
entrypoint: ["/bin/sh", "-c", 'echo "Agent Backend QA image built"']
restart: "no"
depends_on:
- agent-base-image
# ==========================================================================
# Agent Frontend QA Image Builder (specialized image built on-demand by orchestrator)
# ==========================================================================
agent-qa-fe-image:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: docker/agent-qa-fe.Dockerfile
image: roboco-agent-qa-fe
entrypoint: ["/bin/sh", "-c", 'echo "Agent Frontend QA image built"']
restart: "no"
depends_on:
- agent-base-image
# ==========================================================================
# Agent UX/UI Dev Image Builder (specialized image built on-demand by orchestrator)
# ==========================================================================
agent-ux-image:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: docker/agent-ux.Dockerfile
image: roboco-agent-ux
entrypoint: ["/bin/sh", "-c", 'echo "Agent UX/UI image built"']
restart: "no"
depends_on:
- agent-base-image
# ==========================================================================
# Agent Documenter Image Builder (specialized image built on-demand by orchestrator)
# ==========================================================================
agent-doc-image:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: docker/agent-doc.Dockerfile
image: roboco-agent-doc
entrypoint: ["/bin/sh", "-c", 'echo "Agent Documenter image built"']
restart: "no"
depends_on:
- agent-base-image
# ==========================================================================
# Agent Intake (Prompter) Image Builder (persistent Agent-SDK driver the CEO
# chats with; not a one-shot `claude -p`)
# ==========================================================================
agent-prompter-image:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: docker/agent-prompter.Dockerfile
image: roboco-agent-prompter
entrypoint: ["/bin/sh", "-c", 'echo "Agent Intake image built"']
restart: "no"
depends_on:
- agent-base-image
agent-secretary-image:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: docker/agent-secretary.Dockerfile
image: roboco-agent-secretary
entrypoint: ["/bin/sh", "-c", 'echo "Agent Secretary image built"']
restart: "no"
depends_on:
- agent-base-image
# ==========================================================================
# Agent PR Reviewer Image Builder (read-only reviewer of inbound external PRs)
# ==========================================================================
agent-pr-reviewer-image:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: docker/agent-pr-reviewer.Dockerfile
image: roboco-agent-pr-reviewer
entrypoint: ["/bin/sh", "-c", 'echo "Agent PR Reviewer image built"']
restart: "no"
depends_on:
- agent-base-image
# ==========================================================================
# Agent Grok Image Builder (xAI Grok Build via the official grok CLI)
# ==========================================================================
agent-grok-image:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: docker/agent-grok.Dockerfile
image: roboco-agent-grok
entrypoint: ["/bin/sh", "-c", 'echo "Agent Grok image built"']
restart: "no"
depends_on:
- agent-base-image
# Interactive Grok roles (intake/secretary) — panel-driven grok-CLI sessions;
# built FROM roboco-agent-grok, so they depend on the Grok runtime image.
agent-grok-prompter-image:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: docker/agent-grok-prompter.Dockerfile
image: roboco-agent-grok-prompter
entrypoint: ["/bin/sh", "-c", 'echo "Agent Grok Prompter image built"']
restart: "no"
depends_on:
- agent-grok-image
agent-grok-secretary-image:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: docker/agent-grok-secretary.Dockerfile
image: roboco-agent-grok-secretary
entrypoint: ["/bin/sh", "-c", 'echo "Agent Grok Secretary image built"']
restart: "no"
depends_on:
- agent-grok-image
# ==========================================================================
# Orchestrator - API Server + Agent Spawner
# ==========================================================================
orchestrator:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: docker/orchestrator.Dockerfile
image: roboco-orchestrator
container_name: roboco-orchestrator
restart: unless-stopped
# Multi-homed: the agent mesh (default) for spawned agents / panel /
# ollama, plus the data network for postgres/redis.
networks:
- default
- data
ports:
- "8000:8000"
environment:
# Database (use container name, not localhost)
ROBOCO_DATABASE_HOST: roboco-postgres
ROBOCO_DATABASE_PORT: 5432
ROBOCO_DATABASE_USER: roboco
ROBOCO_DATABASE_PASSWORD: roboco
ROBOCO_DATABASE_NAME: roboco
# Redis (use container name)
ROBOCO_REDIS_HOST: roboco-redis
ROBOCO_REDIS_PORT: 6379
# API
ROBOCO_HOST: 0.0.0.0
ROBOCO_PORT: 8000
ROBOCO_ENCRYPTION_KEY: ${ROBOCO_ENCRYPTION_KEY:?ROBOCO_ENCRYPTION_KEY is required}
# HMAC secret for agent auth tokens. Orchestrator signs tokens
# per-agent at spawn; API middleware verifies them. Generate with:
# python -c 'import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))'
ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET: ${ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET:?ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET is required}
# Set to "true" to require tokens on every API call (fail-closed).
# Leave unset/false during rollout so the panel + curl still work.
ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED: ${ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED:-false}
# Ollama (use container name)
ROBOCO_LOCAL_LLM_BASE_URL: http://roboco-ollama:11434/v1
ROBOCO_LOCAL_LLM_MODEL: glm-5.2:cloud
ROBOCO_DEFAULT_EMBEDDING_MODEL: qwen3-embedding:0.6b
ROBOCO_OLLAMA_BASE_URL: http://roboco-ollama:11434
# Host paths for spawning agent containers (required for Docker-in-Docker)
# IMPORTANT: These must be ABSOLUTE paths on the host filesystem
ROBOCO_HOST_PROJECT_DIR: ${ROBOCO_HOST_PROJECT_DIR:-/volume1/roboco}
ROBOCO_HOST_CLAUDE_DIR: ${ROBOCO_HOST_CLAUDE_DIR:-/home/renzof/.claude}
# SuperGrok auth (host ~/.grok) for Grok-CLI agents — the orchestrator
# mounts <dir>/auth.json into each Grok agent. Run `grok login` on the host.
ROBOCO_HOST_GROK_DIR: ${ROBOCO_HOST_GROK_DIR:-/home/renzof/.grok}
ROBOCO_HOST_DATA_DIR: ${ROBOCO_HOST_DATA_DIR:-/volume1/roboco/data}
# Public base URL for commit-trailer links. Default 127.0.0.1 produces
# unusable links in commit message bodies; set to NAS LAN IP so
# f"{api_base}/tasks/{task_id}" renders a reachable URL.
ROBOCO_PUBLIC_BASE_URL: "http://192.168.50.111:8000"
# Production environment selects structlog's JSONRenderer (machine-
# parseable logs) over the dev ConsoleRenderer.
ROBOCO_ENVIRONMENT: production
# Reaper timeouts raised to 30 min so a long agent task isn't reaped
# mid-work. ROBOCO_CLAIM_STALE_SECONDS is the heartbeat-staleness window
# _reap_stale_claims uses (the one that was killing in-progress work).
ROBOCO_CLAIM_STALE_SECONDS: "1800"
ROBOCO_STALE_CLAIM_REAP_SECONDS: "1800"
# External-PR review. When on, the org discovers inbound external/fork PRs
# and the PR reviewer posts one change-request — READ-ONLY (it never runs
# contributor code). The supersede that fetches + builds their code is
# separately CEO-triggered and stays gated by require_human_confirm.
# Override either via .env. (Config default is off; this enables it here.)
ROBOCO_EXTERNAL_PR_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_EXTERNAL_PR_ENABLED:-true}
ROBOCO_EXTERNAL_PR_REQUIRE_HUMAN_CONFIRM: ${ROBOCO_EXTERNAL_PR_REQUIRE_HUMAN_CONFIRM:-true}
# ROBOCO_EXTERNAL_PR_POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS: "300"
# ROBOCO_EXTERNAL_PR_AUTHOR_ALLOWLIST: '["corey"]' # empty = every external PR
# Production self-healing ("engine 4"). RoboCo watches its OWN repo CI and,
# when red, notifies the CEO and (with originate on) opens a PENDING fix
# task that STOPS for the CEO's Approve-&-Start — it never self-deploys.
# Both toggles default OFF (arm from Settings -> Feature Flags). Set
# PROJECT_SLUG to the registered project that IS RoboCo; CI_WORKFLOW scopes
# the signal to the real CI workflow (RoboCo has several workflows, so the
# unscoped "latest run" would be unreliable).
ROBOCO_SELF_HEAL_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_SELF_HEAL_ENABLED:-true}
ROBOCO_SELF_HEAL_ORIGINATE_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_SELF_HEAL_ORIGINATE_ENABLED:-true}
ROBOCO_SELF_HEAL_PROJECT_SLUG: ${ROBOCO_SELF_HEAL_PROJECT_SLUG:-roboco-api}
ROBOCO_SELF_HEAL_CI_WORKFLOW: ${ROBOCO_SELF_HEAL_CI_WORKFLOW:-ci.yml}
# Agent runtime toolchain matching: provision each agent workspace with
# the TARGET project's Python (uv resolves requires-python) and block a
# delivery gate when the suite can't be executed instead of passing on a
# source read. Config default is OFF; enabled HERE (personal deploy) but
# deliberately left OFF in docker-compose.registry.yml so the published
# default stays conservative until it's verified on a live run.
ROBOCO_TOOLCHAIN_MATCH_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_TOOLCHAIN_MATCH_ENABLED:-true}
# Architectural conventions standard: gate where code lives (placement,
# hygiene, modularity) via each project's .roboco/conventions.yml. Config
# default is OFF; enabled HERE (personal deploy), deliberately left OFF in
# docker-compose.registry.yml so the published default stays conservative.
ROBOCO_CONVENTIONS_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_CONVENTIONS_ENABLED:-true}
# Autonomy engines shipped in 0.12.0 / 0.13.0 — all default-OFF in config;
# ARMED here for the NAS deploy (our live test bed). Each is bounded +
# CEO-gated by construction and overridable via .env. Left OFF in
# docker-compose.registry.yml so the published default stays conservative.
# - CI-watch: opens a fix task when a watched project's default-branch CI
# goes red — only for projects with the per-project ci_watch_enabled
# column set; never auto-merges (rides the PR-review gate).
# - Dep-update bot: weekly lockfile-diff probe -> "update dependencies"
# task — only for projects with a dep_update_command set; never merges.
# - Release manager: deterministic readiness sweep -> ONE release proposal
# HELD for the CEO; the executor publishes only on CEO approval + green
# CI (reuses SELF_HEAL_PROJECT_SLUG as the RoboCo repo).
# - Org-memory loop: distils a completion lesson + auto-injects relevant
# past lessons/playbooks into each claim's briefing (local model only).
# - X engine: drafts release-announcement + mention-reply posts, ALL
# held for per-post CEO approval in the panel; inert without stored
# X credentials (Settings -> the X card) regardless of this flag.
ROBOCO_CI_WATCH_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_CI_WATCH_ENABLED:-true}
ROBOCO_DEP_UPDATE_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_DEP_UPDATE_ENABLED:-true}
ROBOCO_RELEASE_MANAGER_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_RELEASE_MANAGER_ENABLED:-true}
ROBOCO_ORG_MEMORY_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_ORG_MEMORY_ENABLED:-true}
ROBOCO_X_ENGINE_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_X_ENGINE_ENABLED:-true}
# - Board roadmap engine: weekly, opens ONE held exploration task for
# the Product Owner, who proposes a themed cycle of roadmap items;
# the CEO approves each item individually into the backlog.
ROBOCO_ROADMAP_ENGINE_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_ROADMAP_ENGINE_ENABLED:-true}
# Sandboxed per-agent test DB/Redis: orchestrator-provisioned throwaway
# sibling containers per spawn, replacing the prod-creds gate-env
# injection for an opted-in project (its `sandbox_services` column set).
# Config default is OFF; enabled HERE (personal deploy), deliberately
# left OFF in docker-compose.registry.yml so the published default
# stays conservative until verified on a live run.
ROBOCO_SANDBOX_DB_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_SANDBOX_DB_ENABLED:-true}
# DB network isolation is LIVE in this file (postgres/redis on the
# data-only network): suppress the legacy prod-creds gate-env
# injection — agents can't reach roboco-postgres anyway, and handing
# out creds that dead-end in a connect timeout is worse than none.
# This flag must always travel with the networks: topology above.
ROBOCO_DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED: ${ROBOCO_DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED:-true}
# Strategy engine (proactive strategy signals) + internal PR review — both
# default-OFF in config; ARMED here for the NAS deploy like the rest. Left
# OFF in docker-compose.registry.yml so the published default stays conservative.
ROBOCO_STRATEGY_ENGINE_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_STRATEGY_ENGINE_ENABLED:-true}
ROBOCO_INTERNAL_PR_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_INTERNAL_PR_ENABLED:-true}
# Remaining default-OFF capabilities, ARMED here (personal deploy): web
# research (inert without ROBOCO_RESEARCH_API_KEY → empty results), pitch
# auto-provisioning (inert until a pitch is approved + a git token is set),
# and transcript pruning (retention maintenance). All left OFF in the
# registry compose. Override any via .env.
ROBOCO_RESEARCH_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_RESEARCH_ENABLED:-true}
ROBOCO_PROVISIONING_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_PROVISIONING_ENABLED:-true}
ROBOCO_TRANSCRIPT_PRUNE_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_TRANSCRIPT_PRUNE_ENABLED:-true}
# Two knobs that also default ON here (like every feature), but change
# FAILURE / AUTH behavior — the .env must be set up for each before a real
# boot, which the operator owns:
# - CLOUD_AUTH: exposes the panel behind a login. Set
# ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_EMAIL / _PASSWORD / _SECRET in .env (startup fails
# loud without the secret) and terminate TLS (the session cookie is
# secure-only); leave ROBOCO_PANEL_AGENT_TOKEN unset (it bypasses
# login). To test-deploy before the creds exist, set
# ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_ENABLED=false in .env for that run.
# - ROUTING_STRICT: fail-closed model routing — a spawn whose provider is
# disabled RAISES instead of degrading. Audit model_assignments first
# (a stale row pointing at a disabled provider would crash that spawn).
ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_ENABLED:-true}
ROBOCO_ROUTING_STRICT: ${ROBOCO_ROUTING_STRICT:-true}
# Spawn preflight (token-opt Phase 3) — refuse a non-gateway delivery role
# that would respawn forever. Default-OFF in config; ARMED here (inert in
# practice: every real delivery role is gateway-enabled). OFF in registry.
ROBOCO_SPAWN_PREFLIGHT_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_SPAWN_PREFLIGHT_ENABLED:-true}
# fastapi-guard HTTP security layer (v0.16.0). ARMED here in PASSIVE /
# log-only calibration mode: guard mounts + observes + logs what it WOULD
# block, but blocks nothing until PASSIVE_MODE is flipped off after the
# false-positive review. FAIL_SECURE=false so a guard-internal error never
# 500s this personal deploy. Left OFF entirely in the registry compose.
# enforce_https follows ROBOCO_ENVIRONMENT (dev on the NAS → not enforced).
ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED:-true}
ROBOCO_GUARD_PASSIVE_MODE: ${ROBOCO_GUARD_PASSIVE_MODE:-true}
ROBOCO_GUARD_FAIL_SECURE: ${ROBOCO_GUARD_FAIL_SECURE:-false}
volumes:
# Docker socket - allows spawning agent containers
- /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock
# Claude Code auth - mount your ~/.claude directory
- ${CLAUDE_AUTH_DIR:-/home/renzof/.claude}:/root/.claude
# SuperGrok auth — mount the host ~/.grok at the SAME host path the
# orchestrator passes to each Grok agent's `-v`, so its auth.json exists()
# check passes here AND the agent bind resolves on the host. One canonical
# var for source AND target (they must be equal in docker-in-docker).
# Read-WRITE: the orchestrator auto-refreshes the ~6h token in place
# (grok_auth.refresh_if_stale) so agents never mount a dead credential;
# each agent's own auth.json mount stays read-only.
- ${ROBOCO_HOST_GROK_DIR:-/home/renzof/.grok}:${ROBOCO_HOST_GROK_DIR:-/home/renzof/.grok}
# Shared config directory for MCP configs (writable)
- ${ROBOCO_DATA_DIR:-./data}/mcp-configs:/app/mcp-configs
# Generated prompts directory - composed at runtime from layers
- ${ROBOCO_DATA_DIR:-./data}/prompts-generated:/app/prompts-generated
# Per-agent Claude settings (generated at spawn time)
- ${ROBOCO_DATA_DIR:-./data}/agent-settings:/app/agent-settings
# Agent workspaces (git clones) - persisted across restarts
- ${ROBOCO_DATA_DIR:-./data}/workspaces:/data/workspaces
# Per-agent GROK usage capture: each Grok agent writes usage.json under
# <agent_id>/; the finalizer reads the captured tokens/cost back here.
- ${ROBOCO_DATA_DIR:-./data}/grok-usage:/data/grok-usage
# Persistent logs — survive `docker compose down/up`. Orchestrator and
# each spawned agent write structured logs here so we can audit past
# runs instead of relying on ephemeral `docker logs`.
- ${ROBOCO_DATA_DIR:-./data}/logs:/data/logs
# Per-agent SessionStart briefings (pre-rendered task context)
- ${ROBOCO_DATA_DIR:-./data}/briefings:/app/briefings
# Per-agent spawn manifests (role-scoped tool list) — written by the
# orchestrator to /app/manifests, bind-mounted into each agent container
# as /app/tool-manifest.json. Without this mount the file is written to
# the orchestrator's ephemeral fs, never reaches the host, and agents
# fall back to all-verbs registration.
- ${ROBOCO_DATA_DIR:-./data}/manifests:/app/manifests
depends_on:
postgres:
condition: service_healthy
redis:
condition: service_healthy
ollama:
condition: service_healthy
ollama-init:
condition: service_completed_successfully
agent-base-image:
condition: service_completed_successfully
# Default agents to spawn (override in .env or command line)
# command: ["--spawn", "main-pm", "be-dev-1", "be-qa"]
# ==========================================================================
# Next.js Control Panel (Frontend)
# ==========================================================================
# Not exposed directly - nginx is the single entry point (port 3000).
# API/WS traffic is proxied to the orchestrator, everything else to panel.
panel:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: docker/panel.Dockerfile
image: roboco-panel
container_name: roboco-panel
restart: unless-stopped
expose:
- "3000"
depends_on:
- orchestrator
# ==========================================================================
# Nginx - Reverse proxy fronting panel + orchestrator
# ==========================================================================
# Single entry point on port 3000 so the browser hits one origin and we
# don't need CORS. /api/* and /ws/* go to the orchestrator, everything
# else goes to the Next.js panel.
nginx:
image: nginx:alpine
container_name: roboco-nginx
restart: unless-stopped
ports:
- "3000:80"
environment:
# Rendered into the proxy config by the nginx image's envsubst
# entrypoint so the human panel authenticates in secure mode. The
# filter limits substitution to ROBOCO_* vars, leaving nginx's own
# $host / $remote_addr runtime variables untouched. Get the value
# with `make panel-token`.
ROBOCO_PANEL_AGENT_TOKEN: ${ROBOCO_PANEL_AGENT_TOKEN:-}
NGINX_ENVSUBST_FILTER: "^ROBOCO_"
volumes:
- ./docker/nginx.conf:/etc/nginx/templates/default.conf.template:ro
depends_on:
- panel
- orchestrator
networks:
default:
name: roboco_default
# DB isolation: postgres/redis live ONLY here; the orchestrator is the
# only service homed on both. Spawned agent containers + sandbox sidecars
# join roboco_default (AGENT_NETWORK) and cannot resolve or reach the
# production DB/Redis. Normal bridge (not internal) so host-published
# ports keep working.
data:
name: roboco_data