Files
roboco/tests/integration/test_migration_083_seed_openai_provider.py
T
c70ff3cf9a feat(providers): Codex CLI provider — OpenAI via ModelProvider.OPENAI (#659)
* feat(providers): Codex CLI provider — OpenAI via ModelProvider.OPENAI

Mirrors the grok blueprint end to end: CodexCliProvider (RO ~/.codex
mount, ANTHROPIC_* blanked), an orchestrator-side codex_auth.py
refresher (JWT-exp staleness, atomic rewrite, lock-serialized single-use
rotation, --check backstop; the CLI's own in-process refresh write
no-ops on the RO mount by design — margins keep the orchestrator ahead
of the CLI's 5-minute window), config.toml rendering with required=true
gateway MCP servers, execpolicy deny rules (forbidden-only), per-role
--sandbox (developer=workspace-write, review/doc roles read-only),
codex exec --json with pinned ROBOCO_CODEX_CLI_MODEL (gpt-5.3-codex),
usage summed from typed turn.completed events priced via the real
4-bucket split, dedicated image + entrypoint, registry/park/finalize/
compose/release wiring. V1 excludes interactive intake/secretary.

Per adversarial review: migration 083 seeds the openai provider row
enabled=True (without it every routing path 404'd — the whole feature
was operationally dead code; grok needed the same seed in 039), the
panel picker gained the OpenAI catalog group it silently lacked, and
exit classification is structural — only stderr and error.message
fields from error events are sniffed (word-boundaried patterns, exact
auth phrases, bare 'login' dropped), so the model echoing on-topic
words can never false-park the provider fleet-wide, proven by a
benign-transcript test. Known open risk flagged, not claimed: whether
codex's workspace-write OS sandbox excludes /app is unverified, and no
hook mechanism exists to port the bash-guard defense-in-depth.

* fix(providers): containment barrier on usage.json reads (code scanning)

CodeQL flagged the codex usage read as path injection — correctly:
os.path.basename does not neutralize '..', and the upstream segment
validator isn't in CodeQL's taint model. The grok/codex reads collapse
into one _read_usage_json_contained helper that resolves the built path
and refuses anything outside the resolved usage root — a hostile id can
never escape regardless of upstream drift. Traversal + containment
regression tests added; a stray noqa in the test file replaced with a
named constant per repo rule.

* fix(providers): use realpath+startswith containment CodeQL recognizes

The is_relative_to() guard was a real barrier but not in CodeQL's
py/path-injection sanitizer model, so the alert persisted. Switch to
the canonical os.path.realpath + startswith(root + os.sep) form, which
CodeQL recognizes as a path-traversal barrier; behavior is identical
(refuse any candidate resolving outside the usage root).

* fix(providers): regexp-allowlist the usage-id segment (CodeQL barrier)

Neither is_relative_to nor realpath+startswith was recognized by
CodeQL's py/path-injection sanitizer model across the str->Path->open
flow. Sanitize the tainted component at the source instead: the id must
fullmatch a strict slug token ([A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*, no
separators, no '..'), which CodeQL recognizes as a path-injection
barrier; the realpath+startswith containment stays as defense-in-depth.

* fix(providers): standalone regexp guard so CodeQL recognizes the barrier

The sanitizer was one disjunct of a compound 'or' condition, which
CodeQL's guard analysis does not trace as a barrier. Split the regexp
fullmatch into its own single-condition guard (the redundant '..' check
is dropped — the required alphanumeric first char already excludes it).

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-23 03:20:29 +02:00

163 lines
5.2 KiB
Python

"""Migration 083 tests — seed_openai_provider.
Verifies the post-upgrade state and exercises the downgrade SQL ordering,
mirroring ``test_migration_028_seed_self_hosted.py`` and
``039_seed_grok_provider``'s own shape.
NOT a real alembic round-trip — the suite builds the test DB via
Base.metadata.create_all (see conftest). Migration 083's upgrade()/downgrade()
bodies are reviewed here; the tests guard the resulting DB-level contract —
in particular ``enabled=True`` at seed time, the one detail that diverges
from GROK's own seed (see the migration's docstring for why: there is no
``apply_mode="codex"`` write path to flip it later).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
from uuid import uuid4
import pytest
from roboco.db.tables import ModelAssignmentTable, ProviderConfigTable
from roboco.models.base import AssignmentScope, ModelProvider
from sqlalchemy import text
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
_INSERT_SQL = text(
"""
INSERT INTO provider_configs
(id, name, type, base_url, auth_token_encrypted, enabled, created_at)
VALUES
(
gen_random_uuid(),
'Codex (OpenAI)',
'openai',
'https://api.openai.com/v1',
NULL,
true,
now()
)
ON CONFLICT (name) DO NOTHING
"""
)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_migration_083_upgrade_insert_contract(
db_session: AsyncSession,
) -> None:
"""The upgrade INSERT SQL seeds the Codex row ENABLED (unlike GROK's
seed, which starts disabled) and is idempotent."""
# --- First run: the row should be inserted.
await db_session.execute(_INSERT_SQL)
await db_session.flush()
result = await db_session.execute(
text(
"SELECT name, type, enabled, base_url "
"FROM provider_configs "
"WHERE name = 'Codex (OpenAI)'"
)
)
rows = list(result)
assert len(rows) == 1
name, ptype, enabled, base_url = rows[0]
assert name == "Codex (OpenAI)"
assert ptype == "openai"
# The load-bearing assertion: enabled=True at seed time. Seeding False
# (GROK's convention) would leave resolve_for_agent silently falling back
# to Anthropic forever, since no apply_mode="codex" write path exists to
# flip it — the exact "unreachable" failure this migration fixes.
assert enabled is True
assert base_url == "https://api.openai.com/v1"
# --- Second run: ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING must not create a duplicate.
await db_session.execute(_INSERT_SQL)
await db_session.flush()
result = await db_session.execute(
text("SELECT id FROM provider_configs WHERE name = 'Codex (OpenAI)'")
)
assert len(list(result)) == 1, (
"Expected exactly one 'Codex (OpenAI)' row after two INSERT "
"executions; ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING must prevent duplicates."
)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_migration_083_downgrade_deletes_assignments_before_config(
db_session: AsyncSession,
) -> None:
"""Downgrade SQL deletes model_assignments before provider_configs.
A FK RESTRICT constraint on model_assignments.provider_config_id means
deleting provider_configs first would raise an IntegrityError.
"""
suffix = uuid4().hex[:8]
openai = ProviderConfigTable(
name=f"Codex (OpenAI)-test-{suffix}",
type=ModelProvider.OPENAI,
enabled=True,
)
db_session.add(openai)
await db_session.flush()
assignment = ModelAssignmentTable(
scope=AssignmentScope.AGENT_SLUG,
scope_value=f"test-agent-{suffix}",
provider_config_id=openai.id,
model_name="gpt-5.3-codex",
)
db_session.add(assignment)
await db_session.flush()
result = await db_session.execute(
text("SELECT id FROM provider_configs WHERE name = :name").bindparams(
name=openai.name
)
)
assert result.scalar_one_or_none() is not None
result = await db_session.execute(
text("SELECT id FROM model_assignments WHERE scope_value = :sv").bindparams(
sv=assignment.scope_value
)
)
assert result.scalar_one_or_none() is not None
# Step 1: delete referencing model_assignments first.
await db_session.execute(
text(
"DELETE FROM model_assignments "
"WHERE provider_config_id IN ("
" SELECT id FROM provider_configs WHERE name = :name"
")"
).bindparams(name=openai.name)
)
# Step 2: now safe to delete the provider row.
await db_session.execute(
text("DELETE FROM provider_configs WHERE name = :name").bindparams(
name=openai.name
)
)
result = await db_session.execute(
text("SELECT id FROM provider_configs WHERE name = :name").bindparams(
name=openai.name
)
)
assert result.scalar_one_or_none() is None, (
"provider_configs row should be deleted by downgrade"
)
result = await db_session.execute(
text("SELECT id FROM model_assignments WHERE scope_value = :sv").bindparams(
sv=assignment.scope_value
)
)
assert result.scalar_one_or_none() is None, (
"model_assignments row should be deleted before provider_configs"
)