roboco

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Renn F 8e728bdf9d feat(grok): scope opencode edit/bash/external-dir permissions per role

Grok wrote ONE global permission block, so a Grok pr_reviewer (or qa / PM /
auditor) ran with edit=allow + bash=allow on untrusted PR content. Now the
permissions are derived per role, mirroring orchestrator._get_role_permissions
on the Claude path:

- edit  — allow only roles that write code (role_config.allows_write:
  developer / documenter); everyone else edit=deny.
- bash  — allow only roles that legitimately run a shell (developer /
  documenter / cell_pm / main_pm); the read-only reviewers (qa / pr_reviewer /
  auditor) and the board get bash=deny. secret-scrub still guards the rest.
- external_directory — only the pr_reviewer reads scratch outside its cwd (the
  /tmp diff); delivery roles get deny.

One-shot roles resolve these in GrokProvider._append_grok_env; the interactive
intake/secretary set edit=deny + bash=deny in the orchestrator (intake keeps
external-dir reads for sibling product repos, the secretary does not). The
Claude path is untouched — the permission env is a GROK-only contract.

Targeted gate green (ruff/mypy/xenon + provider + interactive-spawn tests).

2026-06-18 20:03:10 +02:00

fixtures

Feature: lifecycle canonical spec (#14 )

2026-05-11 02:15:47 +02:00

foundation

feat(roles): add the read-only pr_reviewer role end-to-end

2026-06-16 10:37:06 +02:00

integration

feat(grok): first-class xAI/Grok routing mode (UI + backend)

2026-06-18 10:13:14 +02:00

property

Chore: reduce analytics complexity (#100 )