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73c05cfa5e
* feat(a2a): CEO can DM the Auditor and PR reviewers
A mid-flight PR reviewer or Auditor that's stuck was unreachable — the CEO
had no way to DM them. Both roles now carry dm/read_a2a, so the CEO can open
a 1:1 and they can reply in-thread through the existing CEO-reply path.
Scoped deliberately: the Auditor stays a silent observer to its peers — it
gains no peer-initiation surface (can_a2a_direct routes it through
_check_auditor_a2a, which refuses every initiation target; it can only reply
inside a CEO-opened DM). PR reviewers keep their owning-PM scope. Intake and
Secretary stay excluded — they have their own dedicated chat pages.
NO_COMMS_ROLES drops to {prompter, secretary}; the panel's EXCLUDE_NON_DM_ROLES
matches. KB/docs updated so the 'auditor/pr_reviewer have no dm' claim isn't
left stale.
* test(a2a): smoke guard checks _NO_COMMS_ROLES, not a hardcoded 'auditor'
The dm() runtime guard no longer names the auditor (it now carries dm to
reply to the CEO); it refuses the canonical _NO_COMMS_ROLES set. Assert on
that set so the smoke test tracks the guard, not a stale role name.
* chore(foundation): regenerate verb tables for auditor/pr_reviewer dm+read_a2a
---------
Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
131 lines
4.8 KiB
Python
131 lines
4.8 KiB
Python
"""enforcement.a2a_access coverage."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import pytest
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from roboco.agents_config import can_a2a_direct
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from roboco.enforcement.a2a_access import (
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A2AAccessDeniedError,
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get_a2a_allowed_targets,
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validate_a2a_access,
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)
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from roboco.foundation.policy.communications import NO_COMMS_ROLES
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def test_validate_a2a_self_a2a_denied() -> None:
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with pytest.raises(A2AAccessDeniedError, match="cannot A2A yourself"):
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validate_a2a_access("be-dev-1", "be-dev-1")
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def test_validate_a2a_to_ceo_denied() -> None:
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with pytest.raises(A2AAccessDeniedError):
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validate_a2a_access("be-dev-1", "ceo")
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def test_validate_a2a_within_cell() -> None:
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"""Cell members can A2A within their cell."""
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result = validate_a2a_access("be-dev-1", "be-qa")
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assert result is True
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def test_a2a_access_denied_error_has_attributes() -> None:
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err = A2AAccessDeniedError(
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from_agent="be-dev-1",
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to_agent="ceo",
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reason="CEO is human",
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)
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assert err.from_agent == "be-dev-1"
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assert err.to_agent == "ceo"
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def test_get_a2a_allowed_targets_returns_list() -> None:
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targets = get_a2a_allowed_targets("be-dev-1", ["be-qa", "be-pm", "fe-dev-1", "ceo"])
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assert isinstance(targets, list)
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def test_get_a2a_allowed_targets_excludes_ceo() -> None:
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targets = get_a2a_allowed_targets("be-dev-1", ["ceo"])
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assert "ceo" not in targets
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def test_get_a2a_allowed_targets_excludes_self() -> None:
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targets = get_a2a_allowed_targets("be-dev-1", ["be-dev-1", "be-qa"])
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# Self should be filtered.
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assert "be-dev-1" not in targets or "be-qa" in targets
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# CEO-initiated A2A — the one asymmetric rule: CEO may send, nobody may
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# target CEO (the block above must still hold).
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_validate_a2a_access_ceo_to_agent_allowed() -> None:
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result = validate_a2a_access("ceo", "be-dev-1")
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assert result is True
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def test_can_a2a_direct_ceo_to_main_pm() -> None:
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assert can_a2a_direct("ceo", "main-pm") == (True, None)
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def test_can_a2a_direct_ceo_to_board_member() -> None:
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"""Board members are normally unreachable via direct A2A for everyone
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else (routed through main-pm) — CEO is exempt from that restriction."""
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assert can_a2a_direct("ceo", "product-owner") == (True, None)
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def test_validate_a2a_to_ceo_still_denied_with_ceo_send_rule() -> None:
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"""Regression: allowing CEO-initiated A2A must not loosen the inbound
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block — nobody may target the CEO."""
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with pytest.raises(A2AAccessDeniedError):
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validate_a2a_access("be-dev-1", "ceo")
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def test_get_a2a_allowed_targets_ceo_includes_all_roles() -> None:
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targets = get_a2a_allowed_targets("ceo", ["be-dev-1", "be-qa", "main-pm"])
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assert set(targets) == {"be-dev-1", "be-qa", "main-pm"}
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def test_can_a2a_direct_to_ceo_message_explains_reply_only() -> None:
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"""An agent can never INITIATE with the CEO (only reply inside a
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conversation the CEO opened) — the matrix denial message must say so,
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not point at the old blanket 'use notify()' framing."""
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allowed, reason = can_a2a_direct("be-dev-1", "ceo")
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assert allowed is False
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assert reason is not None
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assert "reply" in reason.lower()
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"target_slug",
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["intake-1", "secretary-1"],
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)
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def test_can_a2a_direct_ceo_to_no_comms_role_denied(target_slug: str) -> None:
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"""The CEO's asymmetric reach still can't target a role with no dm/
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read_a2a on its manifest (prompter, secretary — human-only, own chat
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pages) — nothing on the other end could ever read or answer the DM."""
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allowed, reason = can_a2a_direct("ceo", target_slug)
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assert allowed is False
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assert reason is not None
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assert "comms" in reason.lower()
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("target_slug", ["auditor", "pr-reviewer-1"])
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def test_can_a2a_direct_ceo_to_auditor_or_pr_reviewer_allowed(target_slug: str) -> None:
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"""The CEO can now DM a mid-flight auditor or PR reviewer — both carry
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dm/read_a2a so they can read and reply in-thread, even though neither
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gains a peer-initiation surface (auditor stays silent via
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can_a2a_direct; the PR reviewer stays scoped to its owning PM)."""
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allowed, reason = can_a2a_direct("ceo", target_slug)
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assert allowed is True
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assert reason is None
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def test_can_a2a_direct_ceo_to_no_comms_role_reuses_canonical_set() -> None:
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"""The refusal set must be exactly foundation.policy.communications'
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NO_COMMS_ROLES — the same set services.gateway.content_actions uses to
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gate the dm() sender side — so the two never drift apart."""
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expected = {"prompter", "secretary"}
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assert {role.value for role in NO_COMMS_ROLES} == expected
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