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* feat(providers): Codex CLI provider — OpenAI via ModelProvider.OPENAI Mirrors the grok blueprint end to end: CodexCliProvider (RO ~/.codex mount, ANTHROPIC_* blanked), an orchestrator-side codex_auth.py refresher (JWT-exp staleness, atomic rewrite, lock-serialized single-use rotation, --check backstop; the CLI's own in-process refresh write no-ops on the RO mount by design — margins keep the orchestrator ahead of the CLI's 5-minute window), config.toml rendering with required=true gateway MCP servers, execpolicy deny rules (forbidden-only), per-role --sandbox (developer=workspace-write, review/doc roles read-only), codex exec --json with pinned ROBOCO_CODEX_CLI_MODEL (gpt-5.3-codex), usage summed from typed turn.completed events priced via the real 4-bucket split, dedicated image + entrypoint, registry/park/finalize/ compose/release wiring. V1 excludes interactive intake/secretary. Per adversarial review: migration 083 seeds the openai provider row enabled=True (without it every routing path 404'd — the whole feature was operationally dead code; grok needed the same seed in 039), the panel picker gained the OpenAI catalog group it silently lacked, and exit classification is structural — only stderr and error.message fields from error events are sniffed (word-boundaried patterns, exact auth phrases, bare 'login' dropped), so the model echoing on-topic words can never false-park the provider fleet-wide, proven by a benign-transcript test. Known open risk flagged, not claimed: whether codex's workspace-write OS sandbox excludes /app is unverified, and no hook mechanism exists to port the bash-guard defense-in-depth. * fix(providers): containment barrier on usage.json reads (code scanning) CodeQL flagged the codex usage read as path injection — correctly: os.path.basename does not neutralize '..', and the upstream segment validator isn't in CodeQL's taint model. The grok/codex reads collapse into one _read_usage_json_contained helper that resolves the built path and refuses anything outside the resolved usage root — a hostile id can never escape regardless of upstream drift. Traversal + containment regression tests added; a stray noqa in the test file replaced with a named constant per repo rule. * fix(providers): use realpath+startswith containment CodeQL recognizes The is_relative_to() guard was a real barrier but not in CodeQL's py/path-injection sanitizer model, so the alert persisted. Switch to the canonical os.path.realpath + startswith(root + os.sep) form, which CodeQL recognizes as a path-traversal barrier; behavior is identical (refuse any candidate resolving outside the usage root). * fix(providers): regexp-allowlist the usage-id segment (CodeQL barrier) Neither is_relative_to nor realpath+startswith was recognized by CodeQL's py/path-injection sanitizer model across the str->Path->open flow. Sanitize the tainted component at the source instead: the id must fullmatch a strict slug token ([A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*, no separators, no '..'), which CodeQL recognizes as a path-injection barrier; the realpath+startswith containment stays as defense-in-depth. * fix(providers): standalone regexp guard so CodeQL recognizes the barrier The sanitizer was one disjunct of a compound 'or' condition, which CodeQL's guard analysis does not trace as a barrier. Split the regexp fullmatch into its own single-condition guard (the redundant '..' check is dropped — the required alphanumeric first char already excludes it). --------- Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
163 lines
5.2 KiB
Python
163 lines
5.2 KiB
Python
"""Migration 083 tests — seed_openai_provider.
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Verifies the post-upgrade state and exercises the downgrade SQL ordering,
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mirroring ``test_migration_028_seed_self_hosted.py`` and
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``039_seed_grok_provider``'s own shape.
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NOT a real alembic round-trip — the suite builds the test DB via
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Base.metadata.create_all (see conftest). Migration 083's upgrade()/downgrade()
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bodies are reviewed here; the tests guard the resulting DB-level contract —
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in particular ``enabled=True`` at seed time, the one detail that diverges
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from GROK's own seed (see the migration's docstring for why: there is no
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``apply_mode="codex"`` write path to flip it later).
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
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from uuid import uuid4
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import pytest
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from roboco.db.tables import ModelAssignmentTable, ProviderConfigTable
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from roboco.models.base import AssignmentScope, ModelProvider
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from sqlalchemy import text
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if TYPE_CHECKING:
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from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
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_INSERT_SQL = text(
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"""
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INSERT INTO provider_configs
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(id, name, type, base_url, auth_token_encrypted, enabled, created_at)
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VALUES
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(
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gen_random_uuid(),
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'Codex (OpenAI)',
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'openai',
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'https://api.openai.com/v1',
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NULL,
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true,
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now()
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)
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ON CONFLICT (name) DO NOTHING
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"""
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)
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_migration_083_upgrade_insert_contract(
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db_session: AsyncSession,
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) -> None:
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"""The upgrade INSERT SQL seeds the Codex row ENABLED (unlike GROK's
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seed, which starts disabled) and is idempotent."""
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# --- First run: the row should be inserted.
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await db_session.execute(_INSERT_SQL)
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await db_session.flush()
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result = await db_session.execute(
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text(
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"SELECT name, type, enabled, base_url "
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"FROM provider_configs "
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"WHERE name = 'Codex (OpenAI)'"
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)
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)
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rows = list(result)
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assert len(rows) == 1
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name, ptype, enabled, base_url = rows[0]
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assert name == "Codex (OpenAI)"
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assert ptype == "openai"
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# The load-bearing assertion: enabled=True at seed time. Seeding False
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# (GROK's convention) would leave resolve_for_agent silently falling back
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# to Anthropic forever, since no apply_mode="codex" write path exists to
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# flip it — the exact "unreachable" failure this migration fixes.
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assert enabled is True
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assert base_url == "https://api.openai.com/v1"
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# --- Second run: ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING must not create a duplicate.
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await db_session.execute(_INSERT_SQL)
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await db_session.flush()
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result = await db_session.execute(
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text("SELECT id FROM provider_configs WHERE name = 'Codex (OpenAI)'")
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)
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assert len(list(result)) == 1, (
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"Expected exactly one 'Codex (OpenAI)' row after two INSERT "
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"executions; ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING must prevent duplicates."
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)
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_migration_083_downgrade_deletes_assignments_before_config(
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db_session: AsyncSession,
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) -> None:
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"""Downgrade SQL deletes model_assignments before provider_configs.
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A FK RESTRICT constraint on model_assignments.provider_config_id means
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deleting provider_configs first would raise an IntegrityError.
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"""
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suffix = uuid4().hex[:8]
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openai = ProviderConfigTable(
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name=f"Codex (OpenAI)-test-{suffix}",
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type=ModelProvider.OPENAI,
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enabled=True,
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)
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db_session.add(openai)
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await db_session.flush()
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assignment = ModelAssignmentTable(
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scope=AssignmentScope.AGENT_SLUG,
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scope_value=f"test-agent-{suffix}",
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provider_config_id=openai.id,
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model_name="gpt-5.3-codex",
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)
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db_session.add(assignment)
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await db_session.flush()
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result = await db_session.execute(
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text("SELECT id FROM provider_configs WHERE name = :name").bindparams(
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name=openai.name
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)
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)
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assert result.scalar_one_or_none() is not None
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result = await db_session.execute(
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text("SELECT id FROM model_assignments WHERE scope_value = :sv").bindparams(
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sv=assignment.scope_value
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)
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)
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assert result.scalar_one_or_none() is not None
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# Step 1: delete referencing model_assignments first.
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await db_session.execute(
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text(
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"DELETE FROM model_assignments "
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"WHERE provider_config_id IN ("
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" SELECT id FROM provider_configs WHERE name = :name"
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")"
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).bindparams(name=openai.name)
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)
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# Step 2: now safe to delete the provider row.
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await db_session.execute(
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text("DELETE FROM provider_configs WHERE name = :name").bindparams(
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name=openai.name
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)
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)
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result = await db_session.execute(
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text("SELECT id FROM provider_configs WHERE name = :name").bindparams(
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name=openai.name
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)
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)
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assert result.scalar_one_or_none() is None, (
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"provider_configs row should be deleted by downgrade"
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)
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result = await db_session.execute(
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text("SELECT id FROM model_assignments WHERE scope_value = :sv").bindparams(
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sv=assignment.scope_value
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)
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)
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assert result.scalar_one_or_none() is None, (
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"model_assignments row should be deleted before provider_configs"
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)
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