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* fix(security): screen engine-ingested external text for prompt injection The X mentions poll and the vault inbox both fed attacker-writable text (tweets, tagged notes incl. meeting-bridge output) raw into local-model prompts and CEO-facing draft payloads. The agent-sdk prompt guard's detection moves to a pure roboco/foundation/policy/injection_guard.py (prompt_guard re-exports it — grok path byte-identical) and gains screen_external_text: per-line detection where a matched line is flagged in place, never dropped, and the whole text rides an explicit untrusted-content envelope. Both engines screen once at ingestion and use the screened rendering for the model prompt AND the persisted marker/description — including the vault engine's deterministic LLM-failure fallback, which previously used the raw body verbatim. * chore(docs): reflow hard-wrapped prose inherited from the six-PR merge train * chore(foundation): regenerate lifecycle artifacts; reflow inherited prose --------- Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>