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roboco/tests/unit/runtime/test_sandbox_provisioner.py
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3ccc723cd4 v0.17.0 — Wave 3: sandbox DB, DB isolation, mobile UI, cloud auth, X account, roadmap engine (#303)
* feat(sandbox): throwaway per-agent Postgres/Redis sandbox containers

Orchestrator-provisioned sibling containers per agent spawn
(SandboxProvisioner, roboco/runtime/sandbox.py). Per-project opt-in via
projects.sandbox_services (migration 057); master switch
ROBOCO_SANDBOX_DB_ENABLED, default-off, armed in the NAS compose only.

When active, ROBOCO_TEST_DB_* / ROBOCO_TEST_REDIS_* point at the sandbox
and the prod-creds gate-env injection is suppressed (sandbox replaces,
never coexists). Sandbox lifetime tracks the agent container: teardown at
every removal path, orphan janitor at startup + each reaper tick with a
grace window for mid-flight spawns. The pre-spawn stale-clear spares the
just-provisioned sandbox; provision pre-clears stale same-named
containers from a crash-missed teardown.

Panel: per-project sandbox-service switches in the edit dialog + feature
flag card entry.

* docs: CLAUDE.md entry for the sandboxed dev DB/Redis subsystem

* feat(security): isolate prod Postgres/Redis from agent containers (roboco_data network)

Second user-defined bridge roboco_data carries postgres+redis only; the
orchestrator is multi-homed (default + data). Spawned agents and their
sandbox sidecars stay on roboco_default and can no longer resolve or
reach roboco-postgres:5432 / roboco-redis:6379 (redis has no auth —
membership is its only containment). Normal bridge, so host-published
ports (15432/16379) keep working. Applied to both build composes and
the registry compose; docker-compose.yml re-synced byte-identical with
docker-compose.yaml (it had drifted by the sandbox flag block).

ROBOCO_DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED (config default false, armed alongside the
topology) suppresses the legacy _append_gate_env prod-creds injection:
under isolation those creds dead-end, and unreachable creds are worse
than none. DB-needing projects opt into sandbox_services instead. The
flag is deliberately not a panel feature flag - it must travel with the
compose networks: stanzas.

Preserved by construction: agent<->agent A2A and orchestrator->agent SDK
polls on :9000, MCP->orchestrator on :8000, ollama reachability, docker
exec/inspect (daemon socket), host port publishing.

* feat(panel): full mobile responsiveness pass

Shared primitives: useIsMobile (useSyncExternalStore, hydration-safe,
memoized matchMedia subscribe), ResponsiveTable table->card switch below
md (single subtree mounted, no duplicated interactive rows), scrollable
snap TabsList in the base primitive (justify-center-safe so the first
tab stays reachable on overflow), persistent md:hidden bottom tab bar
(Overview/Tasks/Kanban/Chat, safe-area padded).

Applied: card lists for tasks/projects/products/work-sessions/sessions
+ the three raw metrics tables; CEO approval queue / release proposal /
playbook review action rows stack on narrow; command-center reorders
approvals above the fold on mobile; task-header metadata wraps;
Communications + A2A become URL-driven single-pane drill-downs below lg
(fixes the unconstrained-height ScrollArea bug) with dvh heights;
recharts label density/radius adapts via useIsMobile; git diff viewer
gets mobile font + wrap toggle; vh->dvh sweep; chat composers get
safe-area-inset padding; dashboard main p-4 md:p-6 + pb-20 for the bar.

Verified at 375px on the built app: bottom bar, drawer, approval-first
overview, swipeable kanban tab strip. All gates green (eslint, tsc,
vitest 249, next build 24/24 routes).

* feat(auth): cloud auth via FastAPI Users (default-off, single-user cookie session)

ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_ENABLED (default off) lets the panel/API be exposed
beyond localhost without changing the CEO's local no-login flow while
off — get_agent_context and the WS gate are byte-for-byte unchanged in
off-mode. On: header-trust dies for humans — any agent-role claim (ceo
or a privileged PM/board role) with no valid HMAC token or session
cookie is 401, closing the header-spoof hole on the host-published
:8000 port for every role. The agent-fleet HMAC path and the system
self-PATCH keep working unmodified in both modes.

Single seeded CEO user (migration 058 users table, UserTable), no
registration router — idempotent env-driven upsert at startup by PK.
Cookie transport (httponly/secure/samesite=lax) + a JWTStrategy bound
to a fingerprint of the current password hash (rotating the password
invalidates every prior session). Sliding 30-day session: every
authenticated request re-mints the cookie, so an active session never
expires — no unexpected logouts.

Panel: (auth)/login page + proxy.ts (Next 16 rename of middleware; probes
/auth/status over the docker-internal URL, fails open to off) gate the
dashboard; client.ts gets withCredentials + 401->/login. nginx unchanged.

Review hardening: broadened the on-mode rejection from ceo-only to every
non-CEO role without a valid token (was only closed when
ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED was also armed); Next-16 proxy.ts rename to
clear the middleware deprecation warning.

* feat(x): RoboCo X account engine — HoM drafts, per-post CEO approval (default-off)

ROBOCO_X_ENGINE_ENABLED (default off, inert without creds). Mirrors the
ReleaseManagerEngine held-artifact shape: XEngine drafts a post when a
release publishes (via a draft_release_post seam on ReleaseProposalService
.approve) and drafts replies to meaningful mentions (dedicated poll loop,
x_seen_mentions dedup ledger, per-cycle/open caps). Drafting is
local-model-only, clamped to 280 chars. Nothing auto-posts — every tweet
is a held task (source x_post/x_reply, confirmed_by_human=False,
Secretary-owned, dispatcher-skipped) the CEO edits/approves/rejects in a
panel queue.

The four OAuth 1.0a secrets live Fernet-encrypted in a singleton
x_credentials row (migration 059, all-or-nothing, API returns only
has_credentials); decryption is server-side, agents never hold creds or
egress. Hand-rolled OAuth 1.0a HMAC-SHA1 signer, no new dependency;
NullXClient makes the unconfigured path a graceful no-op.

XPostService.approve (CEO-only) is the sole caller of post_tweet.

Review hardening: closed a double-post race — the approve path now
re-reads committed task state inside the Redis lock and commits COMPLETED
before releasing, so a concurrent approve that acquires the lock after the
winner released can't re-post (SET-NX is non-waiting, and the route-level
commit landed after the lock dropped). Added a regression test.

* feat(roadmap): board roadmap engine — PO proposes themed cycles, CEO approves per-item (default-off)

ROBOCO_ROADMAP_ENGINE_ENABLED (default off). Weekly, RoadmapEngine opens
ONE held exploration task (source=board_roadmap, confirmed_by_human=False,
Product-Owner-assigned), deduped to one open cycle. A dedicated one-shot
_dispatch_roadmap_exploration spawns the PO solo (not the two-reviewer
board path, which would also spawn HoM + fire Approve-&-Start). The PO
explores read-only (git/KB/metrics/releases/charter/web) and makes one
propose_roadmap call (PO-only content verb) authoring a themed cycle —
goal + 3-7 item drafts — persisted as a roadmap_cycle marker (no table,
no migration; head stays 059).

The CEO acts per-item in the panel roadmap queue: approve materializes a
BACKLOG task (source=roadmap, no assignee — never auto-starts), reject
records a reason; all-items-terminal completes the exploration task.
RoadmapService is idempotent per item. Dispatchers skip board_roadmap.

Includes a real SQLAlchemy dirty-check fix (deep-copy the JSON marker
before mutating, or the in-place edit + reassign compares equal to its
own baseline and the UPDATE is skipped).

Review hardening: create_task_from_draft now honors a draft-declared
source only from a {prompter, roadmap} whitelist — drafts are
LLM-authored, so an unbounded source could impersonate a privileged
origin (release_manager would even wedge that engine's dedup).

* chore(release): 0.17.0

Wave 3 — six default-off subsystems: sandboxed dev DB/Redis, prod
Postgres/Redis network isolation, full mobile UI pass, cloud auth
(FastAPI Users), the RoboCo X account engine, and the board roadmap
engine. Plus the waves 1+2 work already on master since 0.16.0.

Version bumped across the canonical set (config.py, __init__.py,
pyproject.toml, panel/package.json, uv.lock); CHANGELOG [Unreleased]
cut to [0.17.0]; docs/map delta added.

Compose: every optional feature armed :-true in the NAS composes, OFF
in the user-facing registry compose. Two opt-in exceptions default off
(CLOUD_AUTH — needs email/password/secret + TLS, would otherwise fail
startup; ROUTING_STRICT — fail-closed spawning). DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED
stays on in both (coupled to the roboco_data topology).

* chore(compose): arm cloud_auth + routing_strict ON in the NAS composes

Every feature defaults ON in the NAS composes per policy — these two
were wrongly left off. Both keep the ${VAR:-true} form so the operator
controls the real runtime via .env: cloud auth needs
ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_EMAIL/_PASSWORD/_SECRET + TLS set there before a boot
(else startup fails loud), and routing_strict is fail-closed. Registry
compose keeps both off.

* fix(ci): reflow board.md prose (quality gate) + document v0.17.0 env creds

The roadmap section added hard-wrapped prose that failed the markdown
prose gate; reflowed (token-invariant). Also brought .env.example
current: cloud auth (now armed — needs SECRET or startup fails), routing
strict, the X engine (panel-entered OAuth), and web research.

* fix(ci): reduce cyclomatic complexity of five wave-3 blocks (xenon gate)

The wave-3 subagents introduced C-rank functions the CI xenon gate
rejects (my per-item reviews ran ruff/mypy/pytest but not xenon):
- sandbox.janitor_sweep -> extract _list_labeled_sandboxes /
  _list_live_agent_containers / _prune_grace
- x_client.fetch_mentions -> extract _parse_mention_items
- x_engine.run_cycle -> extract _process_mentions
- orchestrator._dispatch_pm_work -> extract the source-skip into a
  MODULE-level _is_held_ceo_source (module, not method, so the
  wholesale-mocked dispatcher unit tests exercise the real logic)
- auth/seed.ensure_seed_user -> extract _apply_seed_updates (module avg -> A)

Behavior-preserving; full suite green (11902), xenon clean.

* fix(ci): declare pyjwt + fastapi-users-db-sqlalchemy as direct deps (deptry)

The cloud-auth code imports jwt and fastapi_users_db_sqlalchemy directly
but they were only transitive deps (via fastapi-users), which deptry
(quality gate, DEP003) rejects. Declared explicitly; deptry roboco/ clean.
Missed originally because local make quality stopped at earlier gates
before reaching deptry.

* feat(x): gate mention replies behind ROBOCO_X_REPLIES_ENABLED (default off)

Per CEO decision: the X engine should only post about releases by
default. Reading mentions needs a paid X API tier, so the mention-reply
half is now a deliberate opt-in on top of release posting.

New default-off flag x_replies_enabled gates the mentions poll loop
(_x_mentions_poll_loop) and XEngine.run_cycle; release-post drafting
(the release-proposal approve hook) is unaffected and still runs when
x_engine_enabled + credentials are set. Added to FEATURE_FLAGS + the
panel card. Tests: release posting works with replies off; run_cycle +
the poll loop are no-ops with replies off.

* fix: 401 only redirects to /login when cloud auth is on; panel-token strips .env quotes

Two bugs that together dead-ended login in secure mode:
- client.ts redirected to /login on ANY 401, so a mismatched panel
  token (header-trust/secure mode, cloud auth off) bounced the user to a
  login page whose backend route isn't mounted -> 404. Now it probes
  /auth/status (bare fetch, no interceptor re-entry) and only redirects
  when cloud_auth_enabled.
- make panel-token read the .env secret with grep|cut without stripping
  surrounding quotes, so a quoted ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET produced a
  token signed with the quotes included — which never verifies against
  the orchestrator (docker-compose/pydantic unquote the secret). Now
  strips surrounding single/double quotes.

* fix: git-log 500 on '|' in commit message; X queue shows an empty state

- GET /api/git/log 500'd (ValueError: Invalid isoformat) when a commit
  SUBJECT contained a '|' (e.g. the 'curl|sh' lockdown commit): the
  fixed '|' field delimiter let the subject's pipe shift the split so
  author+date collapsed into one field. Switched to \x1f (Unit
  Separator), which can't appear in commit content. Regression test with
  a piped subject.
- The X Post Queue returned null when empty, so there was no visible
  place for the X drafts. It now renders a discoverable empty state
  pointing at Settings -> X credentials.

* docs: bring docs/rag + docs/map current for v0.17.0 (waves 1-3)

Agent-facing RAG corpus and codebase map updated for every feature in
the 0.17.0 span, code-verified:
- wave 3: sandbox DB, DB network isolation, cloud auth, X engine
  (+ x_replies_enabled sub-flag), board roadmap engine — new RAG
  architecture pages + role/tool/config-reference updates; new symbols,
  migrations 057-059, panel surfaces, and the get_agent_context
  dual-path across the map slices.
- waves 1-2: A2A live view + switchboard, prompter memory
  (search_past_tasks), Secretary edit access + PM-lighter scope, the
  PR-gate auto-submit turn cut (ROBOCO_PR_GATE_AUTO_SUBMIT_ENABLED).
- correctness fix: api-routes-schemas.md no longer claims the A2A admin
  routes are reachable by any authenticated agent — they carry a
  _require_ceo gate (wave 2c).

docs/internal, _front.md deltas, and the frozen _complete_map.md
snapshot untouched.

* fix(rag): atomic upsert for indexed-doc tracking (kills e2e segfault)

The indexed-document tracking write used check-then-insert in two paths
(IndexedDocumentRepository.upsert_batch and the file-source
_upsert_doc_record). Under concurrent indexing both callers saw no row
and both inserted, so the second violated uq_indexed_doc_source and
poisoned its transaction — surfacing in CI as the intermittent
_checkin_failed SIGSEGV on the failed connection's pool checkin.

Both paths now use INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE against the
constraint: coalesce keeps an existing title/preview when the new value
is empty (matching the old guards) and metadata is jsonb-merged. The
batch dedupes within itself first (ON CONFLICT can't touch a row twice
in one statement). expire_all after the Core upsert keeps same-session
ORM reads consistent with the merged DB row.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-03 19:24:00 +02:00

225 lines
8.2 KiB
Python

"""SandboxProvisioner: throwaway per-spawn Postgres/Redis sibling containers.
All docker calls are mocked — no real docker in unit tests. Readiness
deadlines are monkeypatched down so the timeout path runs in milliseconds.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import time
import pytest
from roboco.runtime import sandbox as sandbox_module
from roboco.runtime.sandbox import SandboxProvisioner, SandboxProvisionError
_NETWORK = "roboco_default"
_PG_PORT = 5432
_REDIS_PORT = 6379
class _FakeRunner:
"""Records every docker invocation; behavior configured per test."""
def __init__(
self,
*,
run_rc: int = 0,
exec_rc: int = 0,
teardown_rc: int = 0,
ps_output: bytes = b"",
ps_live_output: bytes = b"",
) -> None:
self.calls: list[list[str]] = []
self.run_rc = run_rc
self.exec_rc = exec_rc
self.teardown_rc = teardown_rc
self.ps_output = ps_output
self.ps_live_output = ps_live_output
self._ps_call_count = 0
async def __call__(
self, args: list[str], _timeout: float
) -> tuple[int, bytes, bytes]:
self.calls.append(args)
verb = args[0]
if verb == "run":
return self.run_rc, b"container-id\n", b""
if verb == "exec":
return self.exec_rc, b"", b""
if verb in ("stop", "kill", "rm"):
return self.teardown_rc, b"", b""
if verb == "ps":
self._ps_call_count += 1
# First ps call = the sandbox-labeled listing; second = live agents.
if self._ps_call_count == 1:
return 0, self.ps_output, b""
return 0, self.ps_live_output, b""
raise AssertionError(f"unexpected docker verb: {verb}")
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _fast_readiness_deadlines(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
"""Shrink the polling deadlines so the timeout path is fast in tests."""
monkeypatch.setattr(sandbox_module, "_PG_READY_DEADLINE_SECONDS", 0.05)
monkeypatch.setattr(sandbox_module, "_REDIS_READY_DEADLINE_SECONDS", 0.05)
monkeypatch.setattr(sandbox_module, "_READY_POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS", 0.01)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_provision_both_services_happy_path() -> None:
runner = _FakeRunner(run_rc=0, exec_rc=0)
provisioner = SandboxProvisioner(network=_NETWORK, runner=runner)
info = await provisioner.provision("dev-1", ["postgres", "redis"])
assert info.postgres is not None
assert info.postgres.host == "roboco-sandbox-pg-dev-1"
assert info.postgres.port == _PG_PORT
assert info.postgres.user == "sandbox"
assert info.postgres.database == "sandbox"
assert info.redis is not None
assert info.redis.host == "roboco-sandbox-redis-dev-1"
assert info.redis.port == _REDIS_PORT
# Passwords are per-sandbox random tokens, not equal to each other.
assert info.postgres.password != info.redis.password
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_provision_labels_are_correct() -> None:
runner = _FakeRunner(run_rc=0, exec_rc=0)
provisioner = SandboxProvisioner(network=_NETWORK, runner=runner)
await provisioner.provision("dev-2", ["postgres"])
run_call = next(c for c in runner.calls if c[0] == "run")
assert "--network" in run_call
assert run_call[run_call.index("--network") + 1] == _NETWORK
label_indices = [i for i, a in enumerate(run_call) if a == "--label"]
labels = [run_call[i + 1] for i in label_indices]
assert sandbox_module.SANDBOX_LABEL in labels
assert "roboco.sandbox.owner=roboco-agent-dev-2" in labels
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_provision_readiness_timeout_tears_down_and_raises() -> None:
runner = _FakeRunner(run_rc=0, exec_rc=1) # container starts, never ready
provisioner = SandboxProvisioner(network=_NETWORK, runner=runner)
with pytest.raises(SandboxProvisionError):
await provisioner.provision("dev-3", ["postgres"])
# Teardown attempted for the container that failed readiness.
teardown_verbs = {c[0] for c in runner.calls if c[0] in ("stop", "kill", "rm")}
assert "stop" in teardown_verbs or "rm" in teardown_verbs
rm_calls = [c for c in runner.calls if c[0] == "rm"]
assert any("roboco-sandbox-pg-dev-3" in c for c in rm_calls)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_provision_run_failure_tears_down_and_raises() -> None:
runner = _FakeRunner(run_rc=1) # docker run itself fails
provisioner = SandboxProvisioner(network=_NETWORK, runner=runner)
with pytest.raises(SandboxProvisionError):
await provisioner.provision("dev-4", ["redis"])
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_provision_rejects_unknown_service() -> None:
runner = _FakeRunner()
provisioner = SandboxProvisioner(network=_NETWORK, runner=runner)
with pytest.raises(SandboxProvisionError):
await provisioner.provision("dev-5", ["mysql"])
# Nothing was ever run for an unknown service.
assert runner.calls == []
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_teardown_idempotent_on_missing_container() -> None:
runner = _FakeRunner(teardown_rc=1) # "no such container" for every verb
provisioner = SandboxProvisioner(network=_NETWORK, runner=runner)
# Must not raise even though every teardown call reports failure.
await provisioner.teardown("never-provisioned")
verbs = [c[0] for c in runner.calls]
assert "rm" in verbs
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_janitor_removes_orphaned_sandbox_only() -> None:
# Two sandboxes on the host: one owned by a still-live agent, one orphaned.
ps_output = (
b"roboco-sandbox-pg-alive\troboco-agent-alive\n"
b"roboco-sandbox-pg-orphan\troboco-agent-orphan\n"
)
live_output = b"roboco-agent-alive\n"
runner = _FakeRunner(ps_output=ps_output, ps_live_output=live_output)
provisioner = SandboxProvisioner(network=_NETWORK, runner=runner)
await provisioner.janitor_sweep()
rm_calls = [c for c in runner.calls if c[0] == "rm"]
torn_down = {c[-1] for c in rm_calls}
assert "roboco-sandbox-pg-orphan" in torn_down
assert "roboco-sandbox-pg-alive" not in torn_down
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_janitor_noop_when_no_sandboxes() -> None:
runner = _FakeRunner(ps_output=b"")
provisioner = SandboxProvisioner(network=_NETWORK, runner=runner)
await provisioner.janitor_sweep()
assert all(c[0] != "rm" for c in runner.calls)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_provision_preclears_stale_sandboxes_before_run() -> None:
"""A crash-missed teardown leaves same-named containers; provision must
clear them first or `docker run` fails on the name conflict."""
runner = _FakeRunner(run_rc=0, exec_rc=0)
provisioner = SandboxProvisioner(network=_NETWORK, runner=runner)
await provisioner.provision("dev-6", ["postgres"])
first_run = next(i for i, c in enumerate(runner.calls) if c[0] == "run")
preclear_rms = [
c for c in runner.calls[:first_run] if c[0] == "rm" and c[-1].endswith("dev-6")
]
assert any("roboco-sandbox-pg-dev-6" in c for c in preclear_rms)
assert any("roboco-sandbox-redis-dev-6" in c for c in preclear_rms)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_janitor_grace_skips_freshly_provisioned_owner() -> None:
"""A sandbox is provisioned before its agent container exists — a sweep
racing that mid-flight spawn must not reap the fresh sandbox."""
ps_output = b"roboco-sandbox-pg-fresh\troboco-agent-fresh\n"
runner = _FakeRunner(ps_output=ps_output, ps_live_output=b"")
provisioner = SandboxProvisioner(network=_NETWORK, runner=runner)
provisioner._provisioned_at = {"roboco-agent-fresh": time.monotonic()}
await provisioner.janitor_sweep()
assert all(c[0] != "rm" for c in runner.calls)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_janitor_reaps_after_grace_expiry() -> None:
ps_output = b"roboco-sandbox-pg-old\troboco-agent-old\n"
runner = _FakeRunner(ps_output=ps_output, ps_live_output=b"")
provisioner = SandboxProvisioner(network=_NETWORK, runner=runner)
provisioner._provisioned_at = {
"roboco-agent-old": time.monotonic()
- 10 * sandbox_module._JANITOR_GRACE_SECONDS
}
await provisioner.janitor_sweep()
rm_calls = [c for c in runner.calls if c[0] == "rm"]
assert any("roboco-sandbox-pg-old" in c for c in rm_calls)
assert provisioner._provisioned_at == {}