Files
roboco/tests/unit/api/test_deps.py
T
3ccc723cd4 v0.17.0 — Wave 3: sandbox DB, DB isolation, mobile UI, cloud auth, X account, roadmap engine (#303)
* feat(sandbox): throwaway per-agent Postgres/Redis sandbox containers

Orchestrator-provisioned sibling containers per agent spawn
(SandboxProvisioner, roboco/runtime/sandbox.py). Per-project opt-in via
projects.sandbox_services (migration 057); master switch
ROBOCO_SANDBOX_DB_ENABLED, default-off, armed in the NAS compose only.

When active, ROBOCO_TEST_DB_* / ROBOCO_TEST_REDIS_* point at the sandbox
and the prod-creds gate-env injection is suppressed (sandbox replaces,
never coexists). Sandbox lifetime tracks the agent container: teardown at
every removal path, orphan janitor at startup + each reaper tick with a
grace window for mid-flight spawns. The pre-spawn stale-clear spares the
just-provisioned sandbox; provision pre-clears stale same-named
containers from a crash-missed teardown.

Panel: per-project sandbox-service switches in the edit dialog + feature
flag card entry.

* docs: CLAUDE.md entry for the sandboxed dev DB/Redis subsystem

* feat(security): isolate prod Postgres/Redis from agent containers (roboco_data network)

Second user-defined bridge roboco_data carries postgres+redis only; the
orchestrator is multi-homed (default + data). Spawned agents and their
sandbox sidecars stay on roboco_default and can no longer resolve or
reach roboco-postgres:5432 / roboco-redis:6379 (redis has no auth —
membership is its only containment). Normal bridge, so host-published
ports (15432/16379) keep working. Applied to both build composes and
the registry compose; docker-compose.yml re-synced byte-identical with
docker-compose.yaml (it had drifted by the sandbox flag block).

ROBOCO_DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED (config default false, armed alongside the
topology) suppresses the legacy _append_gate_env prod-creds injection:
under isolation those creds dead-end, and unreachable creds are worse
than none. DB-needing projects opt into sandbox_services instead. The
flag is deliberately not a panel feature flag - it must travel with the
compose networks: stanzas.

Preserved by construction: agent<->agent A2A and orchestrator->agent SDK
polls on :9000, MCP->orchestrator on :8000, ollama reachability, docker
exec/inspect (daemon socket), host port publishing.

* feat(panel): full mobile responsiveness pass

Shared primitives: useIsMobile (useSyncExternalStore, hydration-safe,
memoized matchMedia subscribe), ResponsiveTable table->card switch below
md (single subtree mounted, no duplicated interactive rows), scrollable
snap TabsList in the base primitive (justify-center-safe so the first
tab stays reachable on overflow), persistent md:hidden bottom tab bar
(Overview/Tasks/Kanban/Chat, safe-area padded).

Applied: card lists for tasks/projects/products/work-sessions/sessions
+ the three raw metrics tables; CEO approval queue / release proposal /
playbook review action rows stack on narrow; command-center reorders
approvals above the fold on mobile; task-header metadata wraps;
Communications + A2A become URL-driven single-pane drill-downs below lg
(fixes the unconstrained-height ScrollArea bug) with dvh heights;
recharts label density/radius adapts via useIsMobile; git diff viewer
gets mobile font + wrap toggle; vh->dvh sweep; chat composers get
safe-area-inset padding; dashboard main p-4 md:p-6 + pb-20 for the bar.

Verified at 375px on the built app: bottom bar, drawer, approval-first
overview, swipeable kanban tab strip. All gates green (eslint, tsc,
vitest 249, next build 24/24 routes).

* feat(auth): cloud auth via FastAPI Users (default-off, single-user cookie session)

ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_ENABLED (default off) lets the panel/API be exposed
beyond localhost without changing the CEO's local no-login flow while
off — get_agent_context and the WS gate are byte-for-byte unchanged in
off-mode. On: header-trust dies for humans — any agent-role claim (ceo
or a privileged PM/board role) with no valid HMAC token or session
cookie is 401, closing the header-spoof hole on the host-published
:8000 port for every role. The agent-fleet HMAC path and the system
self-PATCH keep working unmodified in both modes.

Single seeded CEO user (migration 058 users table, UserTable), no
registration router — idempotent env-driven upsert at startup by PK.
Cookie transport (httponly/secure/samesite=lax) + a JWTStrategy bound
to a fingerprint of the current password hash (rotating the password
invalidates every prior session). Sliding 30-day session: every
authenticated request re-mints the cookie, so an active session never
expires — no unexpected logouts.

Panel: (auth)/login page + proxy.ts (Next 16 rename of middleware; probes
/auth/status over the docker-internal URL, fails open to off) gate the
dashboard; client.ts gets withCredentials + 401->/login. nginx unchanged.

Review hardening: broadened the on-mode rejection from ceo-only to every
non-CEO role without a valid token (was only closed when
ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED was also armed); Next-16 proxy.ts rename to
clear the middleware deprecation warning.

* feat(x): RoboCo X account engine — HoM drafts, per-post CEO approval (default-off)

ROBOCO_X_ENGINE_ENABLED (default off, inert without creds). Mirrors the
ReleaseManagerEngine held-artifact shape: XEngine drafts a post when a
release publishes (via a draft_release_post seam on ReleaseProposalService
.approve) and drafts replies to meaningful mentions (dedicated poll loop,
x_seen_mentions dedup ledger, per-cycle/open caps). Drafting is
local-model-only, clamped to 280 chars. Nothing auto-posts — every tweet
is a held task (source x_post/x_reply, confirmed_by_human=False,
Secretary-owned, dispatcher-skipped) the CEO edits/approves/rejects in a
panel queue.

The four OAuth 1.0a secrets live Fernet-encrypted in a singleton
x_credentials row (migration 059, all-or-nothing, API returns only
has_credentials); decryption is server-side, agents never hold creds or
egress. Hand-rolled OAuth 1.0a HMAC-SHA1 signer, no new dependency;
NullXClient makes the unconfigured path a graceful no-op.

XPostService.approve (CEO-only) is the sole caller of post_tweet.

Review hardening: closed a double-post race — the approve path now
re-reads committed task state inside the Redis lock and commits COMPLETED
before releasing, so a concurrent approve that acquires the lock after the
winner released can't re-post (SET-NX is non-waiting, and the route-level
commit landed after the lock dropped). Added a regression test.

* feat(roadmap): board roadmap engine — PO proposes themed cycles, CEO approves per-item (default-off)

ROBOCO_ROADMAP_ENGINE_ENABLED (default off). Weekly, RoadmapEngine opens
ONE held exploration task (source=board_roadmap, confirmed_by_human=False,
Product-Owner-assigned), deduped to one open cycle. A dedicated one-shot
_dispatch_roadmap_exploration spawns the PO solo (not the two-reviewer
board path, which would also spawn HoM + fire Approve-&-Start). The PO
explores read-only (git/KB/metrics/releases/charter/web) and makes one
propose_roadmap call (PO-only content verb) authoring a themed cycle —
goal + 3-7 item drafts — persisted as a roadmap_cycle marker (no table,
no migration; head stays 059).

The CEO acts per-item in the panel roadmap queue: approve materializes a
BACKLOG task (source=roadmap, no assignee — never auto-starts), reject
records a reason; all-items-terminal completes the exploration task.
RoadmapService is idempotent per item. Dispatchers skip board_roadmap.

Includes a real SQLAlchemy dirty-check fix (deep-copy the JSON marker
before mutating, or the in-place edit + reassign compares equal to its
own baseline and the UPDATE is skipped).

Review hardening: create_task_from_draft now honors a draft-declared
source only from a {prompter, roadmap} whitelist — drafts are
LLM-authored, so an unbounded source could impersonate a privileged
origin (release_manager would even wedge that engine's dedup).

* chore(release): 0.17.0

Wave 3 — six default-off subsystems: sandboxed dev DB/Redis, prod
Postgres/Redis network isolation, full mobile UI pass, cloud auth
(FastAPI Users), the RoboCo X account engine, and the board roadmap
engine. Plus the waves 1+2 work already on master since 0.16.0.

Version bumped across the canonical set (config.py, __init__.py,
pyproject.toml, panel/package.json, uv.lock); CHANGELOG [Unreleased]
cut to [0.17.0]; docs/map delta added.

Compose: every optional feature armed :-true in the NAS composes, OFF
in the user-facing registry compose. Two opt-in exceptions default off
(CLOUD_AUTH — needs email/password/secret + TLS, would otherwise fail
startup; ROUTING_STRICT — fail-closed spawning). DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED
stays on in both (coupled to the roboco_data topology).

* chore(compose): arm cloud_auth + routing_strict ON in the NAS composes

Every feature defaults ON in the NAS composes per policy — these two
were wrongly left off. Both keep the ${VAR:-true} form so the operator
controls the real runtime via .env: cloud auth needs
ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_EMAIL/_PASSWORD/_SECRET + TLS set there before a boot
(else startup fails loud), and routing_strict is fail-closed. Registry
compose keeps both off.

* fix(ci): reflow board.md prose (quality gate) + document v0.17.0 env creds

The roadmap section added hard-wrapped prose that failed the markdown
prose gate; reflowed (token-invariant). Also brought .env.example
current: cloud auth (now armed — needs SECRET or startup fails), routing
strict, the X engine (panel-entered OAuth), and web research.

* fix(ci): reduce cyclomatic complexity of five wave-3 blocks (xenon gate)

The wave-3 subagents introduced C-rank functions the CI xenon gate
rejects (my per-item reviews ran ruff/mypy/pytest but not xenon):
- sandbox.janitor_sweep -> extract _list_labeled_sandboxes /
  _list_live_agent_containers / _prune_grace
- x_client.fetch_mentions -> extract _parse_mention_items
- x_engine.run_cycle -> extract _process_mentions
- orchestrator._dispatch_pm_work -> extract the source-skip into a
  MODULE-level _is_held_ceo_source (module, not method, so the
  wholesale-mocked dispatcher unit tests exercise the real logic)
- auth/seed.ensure_seed_user -> extract _apply_seed_updates (module avg -> A)

Behavior-preserving; full suite green (11902), xenon clean.

* fix(ci): declare pyjwt + fastapi-users-db-sqlalchemy as direct deps (deptry)

The cloud-auth code imports jwt and fastapi_users_db_sqlalchemy directly
but they were only transitive deps (via fastapi-users), which deptry
(quality gate, DEP003) rejects. Declared explicitly; deptry roboco/ clean.
Missed originally because local make quality stopped at earlier gates
before reaching deptry.

* feat(x): gate mention replies behind ROBOCO_X_REPLIES_ENABLED (default off)

Per CEO decision: the X engine should only post about releases by
default. Reading mentions needs a paid X API tier, so the mention-reply
half is now a deliberate opt-in on top of release posting.

New default-off flag x_replies_enabled gates the mentions poll loop
(_x_mentions_poll_loop) and XEngine.run_cycle; release-post drafting
(the release-proposal approve hook) is unaffected and still runs when
x_engine_enabled + credentials are set. Added to FEATURE_FLAGS + the
panel card. Tests: release posting works with replies off; run_cycle +
the poll loop are no-ops with replies off.

* fix: 401 only redirects to /login when cloud auth is on; panel-token strips .env quotes

Two bugs that together dead-ended login in secure mode:
- client.ts redirected to /login on ANY 401, so a mismatched panel
  token (header-trust/secure mode, cloud auth off) bounced the user to a
  login page whose backend route isn't mounted -> 404. Now it probes
  /auth/status (bare fetch, no interceptor re-entry) and only redirects
  when cloud_auth_enabled.
- make panel-token read the .env secret with grep|cut without stripping
  surrounding quotes, so a quoted ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET produced a
  token signed with the quotes included — which never verifies against
  the orchestrator (docker-compose/pydantic unquote the secret). Now
  strips surrounding single/double quotes.

* fix: git-log 500 on '|' in commit message; X queue shows an empty state

- GET /api/git/log 500'd (ValueError: Invalid isoformat) when a commit
  SUBJECT contained a '|' (e.g. the 'curl|sh' lockdown commit): the
  fixed '|' field delimiter let the subject's pipe shift the split so
  author+date collapsed into one field. Switched to \x1f (Unit
  Separator), which can't appear in commit content. Regression test with
  a piped subject.
- The X Post Queue returned null when empty, so there was no visible
  place for the X drafts. It now renders a discoverable empty state
  pointing at Settings -> X credentials.

* docs: bring docs/rag + docs/map current for v0.17.0 (waves 1-3)

Agent-facing RAG corpus and codebase map updated for every feature in
the 0.17.0 span, code-verified:
- wave 3: sandbox DB, DB network isolation, cloud auth, X engine
  (+ x_replies_enabled sub-flag), board roadmap engine — new RAG
  architecture pages + role/tool/config-reference updates; new symbols,
  migrations 057-059, panel surfaces, and the get_agent_context
  dual-path across the map slices.
- waves 1-2: A2A live view + switchboard, prompter memory
  (search_past_tasks), Secretary edit access + PM-lighter scope, the
  PR-gate auto-submit turn cut (ROBOCO_PR_GATE_AUTO_SUBMIT_ENABLED).
- correctness fix: api-routes-schemas.md no longer claims the A2A admin
  routes are reachable by any authenticated agent — they carry a
  _require_ceo gate (wave 2c).

docs/internal, _front.md deltas, and the frozen _complete_map.md
snapshot untouched.

* fix(rag): atomic upsert for indexed-doc tracking (kills e2e segfault)

The indexed-document tracking write used check-then-insert in two paths
(IndexedDocumentRepository.upsert_batch and the file-source
_upsert_doc_record). Under concurrent indexing both callers saw no row
and both inserted, so the second violated uq_indexed_doc_source and
poisoned its transaction — surfacing in CI as the intermittent
_checkin_failed SIGSEGV on the failed connection's pool checkin.

Both paths now use INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE against the
constraint: coalesce keeps an existing title/preview when the new value
is empty (matching the old guards) and metadata is jsonb-merged. The
batch dedupes within itself first (ON CONFLICT can't touch a row twice
in one statement). expire_all after the Core upsert keeps same-session
ORM reads consistent with the merged DB row.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-03 19:24:00 +02:00

504 lines
16 KiB
Python

"""roboco.api.deps coverage — agent identity / context / role gate helpers.
Covers the slug→UUID resolution, header-based agent ID/context dependencies,
HMAC token enforcement, role coercion fallbacks, channel/notification/task
permission factories, and the choreographer + content-actions wiring.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch
from uuid import uuid4
import pytest
from fastapi import HTTPException
from roboco.api.deps import (
_auth_required,
_check_agent_auth_token,
_coerce_agent_role,
_coerce_agent_team,
_resolve_agent_identity,
_ServiceHolder,
get_agent_context,
get_choreographer,
get_content_actions,
get_current_agent_id,
get_current_agent_slug,
get_optional_agent_id,
get_orchestrator,
get_pagination,
get_permission_service,
require_channel_read,
require_channel_write,
require_notification_permission,
require_task_action,
resolve_agent_id,
set_orchestrator,
)
from roboco.models import AgentRole, Team
from roboco.models.permissions import AgentContext
_HTTP_400 = 400
_HTTP_401 = 401
_HTTP_403 = 403
_HTTP_503 = 503
_LIMIT_HIGH = 200
_LIMIT_NEG = -5
_OFFSET_NEG = -1
_LIMIT_CAP = 100
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# resolve_agent_id
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_resolve_agent_id_returns_uuid_when_found() -> None:
expected = uuid4()
fake_db = MagicMock()
with patch(
"roboco.api.deps.resolve_agent_uuid",
new=AsyncMock(return_value=expected),
):
out = await resolve_agent_id("be-dev-1", fake_db)
assert out == expected
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_resolve_agent_id_raises_when_missing() -> None:
with (
patch("roboco.api.deps.resolve_agent_uuid", new=AsyncMock(return_value=None)),
pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc,
):
await resolve_agent_id("ghost", MagicMock())
assert exc.value.status_code == _HTTP_400
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Service holder & orchestrator setters
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_get_permission_service_caches() -> None:
_ServiceHolder.permission_service = None
a = get_permission_service()
b = get_permission_service()
assert a is b
def test_set_orchestrator_and_get_orchestrator() -> None:
fake = MagicMock()
set_orchestrator(fake)
out = get_orchestrator()
assert out is fake
_ServiceHolder.orchestrator = None
def test_get_orchestrator_raises_503_when_unset() -> None:
_ServiceHolder.orchestrator = None
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
get_orchestrator()
assert exc.value.status_code == _HTTP_503
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# get_current_agent_id / get_current_agent_slug
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_get_current_agent_id_raises_when_header_missing() -> None:
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
await get_current_agent_id(MagicMock(), x_agent_id=None)
assert exc.value.status_code == _HTTP_401
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_get_current_agent_id_returns_uuid() -> None:
expected = uuid4()
with patch(
"roboco.api.deps.resolve_agent_uuid",
new=AsyncMock(return_value=expected),
):
out = await get_current_agent_id(MagicMock(), x_agent_id="be-dev-1")
assert out == expected
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_get_current_agent_slug_raises_when_header_missing() -> None:
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
await get_current_agent_slug(x_agent_id=None)
assert exc.value.status_code == _HTTP_401
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_get_current_agent_slug_returns_header() -> None:
out = await get_current_agent_slug(x_agent_id="be-dev-1")
assert out == "be-dev-1"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# get_optional_agent_id
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_get_optional_agent_id_returns_none_when_absent() -> None:
out = await get_optional_agent_id(MagicMock(), x_agent_id=None)
assert out is None
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_get_optional_agent_id_returns_uuid_when_present() -> None:
expected = uuid4()
with patch(
"roboco.api.deps.resolve_agent_uuid",
new=AsyncMock(return_value=expected),
):
out = await get_optional_agent_id(MagicMock(), x_agent_id="be-dev-1")
assert out == expected
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_get_optional_agent_id_returns_none_on_lookup_failure() -> None:
"""When resolve_agent_id raises HTTPException, return None instead."""
with patch("roboco.api.deps.resolve_agent_uuid", new=AsyncMock(return_value=None)):
out = await get_optional_agent_id(MagicMock(), x_agent_id="ghost")
assert out is None
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Auth helpers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_auth_required_truthy_values(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
for v in ("1", "true", "yes", "TRUE", "Yes"):
monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED", v)
assert _auth_required() is True
def test_auth_required_falsy_values(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
for v in ("0", "no", "false", ""):
monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED", v)
assert _auth_required() is False
def test_check_agent_auth_token_no_token_in_dev_passes(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED", "false")
# No raise.
_check_agent_auth_token("a", "developer", "backend", x_agent_token=None)
def test_check_agent_auth_token_missing_when_required_raises(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED", "true")
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
_check_agent_auth_token("a", "developer", "backend", x_agent_token=None)
assert exc.value.status_code == _HTTP_401
def test_check_agent_auth_token_invalid_token_raises() -> None:
"""Even in dev, an INVALID token is still rejected."""
with (
patch("roboco.api.deps.verify_agent_token", return_value=False),
pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc,
):
_check_agent_auth_token("a", "developer", "backend", x_agent_token="bad")
assert exc.value.status_code == _HTTP_401
def test_check_agent_auth_token_valid_passes() -> None:
with patch("roboco.api.deps.verify_agent_token", return_value=True):
_check_agent_auth_token("a", "developer", "backend", x_agent_token="good")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# _resolve_agent_identity
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_resolve_agent_identity_system_role() -> None:
aid = uuid4()
out_id, out_slug = await _resolve_agent_identity(MagicMock(), str(aid), "system")
assert out_id == aid
assert out_slug == "system"
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_resolve_agent_identity_system_invalid_uuid_raises() -> None:
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
await _resolve_agent_identity(MagicMock(), "not-a-uuid", "system")
assert exc.value.status_code == _HTTP_400
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_resolve_agent_identity_normal_path() -> None:
expected = (uuid4(), "be-dev-1")
with patch(
"roboco.api.deps.resolve_agent_identity",
new=AsyncMock(return_value=expected),
):
out = await _resolve_agent_identity(MagicMock(), "be-dev-1", "developer")
assert out == expected
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_resolve_agent_identity_normal_path_not_found_raises() -> None:
with (
patch(
"roboco.api.deps.resolve_agent_identity",
new=AsyncMock(return_value=None),
),
pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc,
):
await _resolve_agent_identity(MagicMock(), "ghost", "developer")
assert exc.value.status_code == _HTTP_400
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# _coerce_agent_role
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_coerce_agent_role_valid_enum_value() -> None:
out = await _coerce_agent_role(MagicMock(), "developer", uuid4(), "be-dev-1")
assert out == AgentRole.DEVELOPER
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_coerce_agent_role_falls_back_to_db_when_invalid() -> None:
"""Slug-as-role like 'main-pm' coerces via DB lookup."""
fake_db = MagicMock()
fake_result = MagicMock()
fake_result.scalar_one_or_none.return_value = AgentRole.MAIN_PM
fake_db.execute = AsyncMock(return_value=fake_result)
out = await _coerce_agent_role(fake_db, "main-pm", uuid4(), "main-pm")
assert out == AgentRole.MAIN_PM
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_coerce_agent_role_no_db_record_raises() -> None:
fake_db = MagicMock()
fake_result = MagicMock()
fake_result.scalar_one_or_none.return_value = None
fake_db.execute = AsyncMock(return_value=fake_result)
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
await _coerce_agent_role(fake_db, "garbage", uuid4(), "be-dev-1")
assert exc.value.status_code == _HTTP_400
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# _coerce_agent_team
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_coerce_agent_team_valid() -> None:
assert _coerce_agent_team("backend") == Team.BACKEND
def test_coerce_agent_team_uppercase() -> None:
assert _coerce_agent_team("BACKEND") == Team.BACKEND
def test_coerce_agent_team_none_returns_none() -> None:
assert _coerce_agent_team(None) is None
def test_coerce_agent_team_invalid_returns_none() -> None:
assert _coerce_agent_team("not-a-team") is None
def test_coerce_agent_team_empty_returns_none() -> None:
assert _coerce_agent_team("") is None
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# get_agent_context
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_get_agent_context_missing_id_raises() -> None:
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
await get_agent_context(
MagicMock(),
MagicMock(),
x_agent_id=None,
x_agent_role="developer",
)
assert exc.value.status_code == _HTTP_401
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_get_agent_context_missing_role_raises() -> None:
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
await get_agent_context(
MagicMock(),
MagicMock(),
x_agent_id="be-dev-1",
x_agent_role=None,
)
assert exc.value.status_code == _HTTP_401
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_get_agent_context_happy_path(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED", "false")
aid = uuid4()
with patch(
"roboco.api.deps.resolve_agent_identity",
new=AsyncMock(return_value=(aid, "be-dev-1")),
):
ctx = await get_agent_context(
MagicMock(),
MagicMock(),
x_agent_id="be-dev-1",
x_agent_role="developer",
x_agent_team="backend",
)
assert ctx.agent_id == aid
assert ctx.role == AgentRole.DEVELOPER
assert ctx.team == Team.BACKEND
assert ctx.slug == "be-dev-1"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Permission factories — exercise the inner closure on both pass and fail.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_require_channel_read_passes_when_allowed() -> None:
fake_perms = MagicMock()
fake_perms.can_read_channel = MagicMock(return_value=True)
agent = AgentContext(agent_id=uuid4(), role=AgentRole.DEVELOPER, team=Team.BACKEND)
dep = require_channel_read("backend-cell")
# No raise.
await dep(agent, fake_perms)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_require_channel_read_raises_when_denied() -> None:
fake_perms = MagicMock()
fake_perms.can_read_channel = MagicMock(return_value=False)
agent = AgentContext(agent_id=uuid4(), role=AgentRole.DEVELOPER, team=Team.BACKEND)
dep = require_channel_read("frontend-cell")
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
await dep(agent, fake_perms)
assert exc.value.status_code == _HTTP_403
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_require_channel_write_passes_when_allowed() -> None:
fake_perms = MagicMock()
fake_perms.can_write_channel = MagicMock(return_value=True)
agent = AgentContext(agent_id=uuid4(), role=AgentRole.DEVELOPER, team=Team.BACKEND)
dep = require_channel_write("backend-cell")
await dep(agent, fake_perms)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_require_channel_write_raises_when_denied() -> None:
fake_perms = MagicMock()
fake_perms.can_write_channel = MagicMock(return_value=False)
agent = AgentContext(agent_id=uuid4(), role=AgentRole.DEVELOPER, team=Team.BACKEND)
dep = require_channel_write("frontend-cell")
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
await dep(agent, fake_perms)
assert exc.value.status_code == _HTTP_403
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_require_notification_permission_passes_when_allowed() -> None:
fake_perms = MagicMock()
fake_perms.can_send_notifications = MagicMock(return_value=True)
agent = AgentContext(agent_id=uuid4(), role=AgentRole.MAIN_PM)
dep = require_notification_permission()
await dep(agent, fake_perms)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_require_notification_permission_raises_when_denied() -> None:
fake_perms = MagicMock()
fake_perms.can_send_notifications = MagicMock(return_value=False)
agent = AgentContext(agent_id=uuid4(), role=AgentRole.DEVELOPER, team=Team.BACKEND)
dep = require_notification_permission()
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
await dep(agent, fake_perms)
assert exc.value.status_code == _HTTP_403
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_require_task_action_passes_when_allowed() -> None:
fake_perms = MagicMock()
fake_perms.can_perform_task_action = MagicMock(return_value=True)
agent = AgentContext(agent_id=uuid4(), role=AgentRole.MAIN_PM)
dep = require_task_action("create")
await dep(agent, fake_perms)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_require_task_action_raises_when_denied() -> None:
fake_perms = MagicMock()
fake_perms.can_perform_task_action = MagicMock(return_value=False)
agent = AgentContext(agent_id=uuid4(), role=AgentRole.DEVELOPER, team=Team.BACKEND)
dep = require_task_action("close")
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
await dep(agent, fake_perms)
assert exc.value.status_code == _HTTP_403
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Choreographer / ContentActions wiring
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_get_choreographer_returns_instance() -> None:
fake_db = MagicMock()
chor = await get_choreographer(fake_db)
assert chor is not None
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_get_content_actions_returns_instance() -> None:
fake_db = MagicMock()
ca = await get_content_actions(fake_db)
assert ca is not None
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Pagination
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_pagination_defaults() -> None:
p = get_pagination()
assert p.limit > 0
assert p.offset == 0
def test_pagination_clamps_high_limit() -> None:
p = get_pagination(limit=_LIMIT_HIGH)
# Limit is capped at the documented maximum.
assert p.limit <= _LIMIT_CAP
def test_pagination_clamps_negative_limit() -> None:
p = get_pagination(limit=_LIMIT_NEG)
assert p.limit >= 1
def test_pagination_clamps_negative_offset() -> None:
p = get_pagination(offset=_OFFSET_NEG)
assert p.offset >= 0