Files
roboco/tests/unit/api/test_cloud_auth.py
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3ccc723cd4 v0.17.0 — Wave 3: sandbox DB, DB isolation, mobile UI, cloud auth, X account, roadmap engine (#303)
* feat(sandbox): throwaway per-agent Postgres/Redis sandbox containers

Orchestrator-provisioned sibling containers per agent spawn
(SandboxProvisioner, roboco/runtime/sandbox.py). Per-project opt-in via
projects.sandbox_services (migration 057); master switch
ROBOCO_SANDBOX_DB_ENABLED, default-off, armed in the NAS compose only.

When active, ROBOCO_TEST_DB_* / ROBOCO_TEST_REDIS_* point at the sandbox
and the prod-creds gate-env injection is suppressed (sandbox replaces,
never coexists). Sandbox lifetime tracks the agent container: teardown at
every removal path, orphan janitor at startup + each reaper tick with a
grace window for mid-flight spawns. The pre-spawn stale-clear spares the
just-provisioned sandbox; provision pre-clears stale same-named
containers from a crash-missed teardown.

Panel: per-project sandbox-service switches in the edit dialog + feature
flag card entry.

* docs: CLAUDE.md entry for the sandboxed dev DB/Redis subsystem

* feat(security): isolate prod Postgres/Redis from agent containers (roboco_data network)

Second user-defined bridge roboco_data carries postgres+redis only; the
orchestrator is multi-homed (default + data). Spawned agents and their
sandbox sidecars stay on roboco_default and can no longer resolve or
reach roboco-postgres:5432 / roboco-redis:6379 (redis has no auth —
membership is its only containment). Normal bridge, so host-published
ports (15432/16379) keep working. Applied to both build composes and
the registry compose; docker-compose.yml re-synced byte-identical with
docker-compose.yaml (it had drifted by the sandbox flag block).

ROBOCO_DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED (config default false, armed alongside the
topology) suppresses the legacy _append_gate_env prod-creds injection:
under isolation those creds dead-end, and unreachable creds are worse
than none. DB-needing projects opt into sandbox_services instead. The
flag is deliberately not a panel feature flag - it must travel with the
compose networks: stanzas.

Preserved by construction: agent<->agent A2A and orchestrator->agent SDK
polls on :9000, MCP->orchestrator on :8000, ollama reachability, docker
exec/inspect (daemon socket), host port publishing.

* feat(panel): full mobile responsiveness pass

Shared primitives: useIsMobile (useSyncExternalStore, hydration-safe,
memoized matchMedia subscribe), ResponsiveTable table->card switch below
md (single subtree mounted, no duplicated interactive rows), scrollable
snap TabsList in the base primitive (justify-center-safe so the first
tab stays reachable on overflow), persistent md:hidden bottom tab bar
(Overview/Tasks/Kanban/Chat, safe-area padded).

Applied: card lists for tasks/projects/products/work-sessions/sessions
+ the three raw metrics tables; CEO approval queue / release proposal /
playbook review action rows stack on narrow; command-center reorders
approvals above the fold on mobile; task-header metadata wraps;
Communications + A2A become URL-driven single-pane drill-downs below lg
(fixes the unconstrained-height ScrollArea bug) with dvh heights;
recharts label density/radius adapts via useIsMobile; git diff viewer
gets mobile font + wrap toggle; vh->dvh sweep; chat composers get
safe-area-inset padding; dashboard main p-4 md:p-6 + pb-20 for the bar.

Verified at 375px on the built app: bottom bar, drawer, approval-first
overview, swipeable kanban tab strip. All gates green (eslint, tsc,
vitest 249, next build 24/24 routes).

* feat(auth): cloud auth via FastAPI Users (default-off, single-user cookie session)

ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_ENABLED (default off) lets the panel/API be exposed
beyond localhost without changing the CEO's local no-login flow while
off — get_agent_context and the WS gate are byte-for-byte unchanged in
off-mode. On: header-trust dies for humans — any agent-role claim (ceo
or a privileged PM/board role) with no valid HMAC token or session
cookie is 401, closing the header-spoof hole on the host-published
:8000 port for every role. The agent-fleet HMAC path and the system
self-PATCH keep working unmodified in both modes.

Single seeded CEO user (migration 058 users table, UserTable), no
registration router — idempotent env-driven upsert at startup by PK.
Cookie transport (httponly/secure/samesite=lax) + a JWTStrategy bound
to a fingerprint of the current password hash (rotating the password
invalidates every prior session). Sliding 30-day session: every
authenticated request re-mints the cookie, so an active session never
expires — no unexpected logouts.

Panel: (auth)/login page + proxy.ts (Next 16 rename of middleware; probes
/auth/status over the docker-internal URL, fails open to off) gate the
dashboard; client.ts gets withCredentials + 401->/login. nginx unchanged.

Review hardening: broadened the on-mode rejection from ceo-only to every
non-CEO role without a valid token (was only closed when
ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED was also armed); Next-16 proxy.ts rename to
clear the middleware deprecation warning.

* feat(x): RoboCo X account engine — HoM drafts, per-post CEO approval (default-off)

ROBOCO_X_ENGINE_ENABLED (default off, inert without creds). Mirrors the
ReleaseManagerEngine held-artifact shape: XEngine drafts a post when a
release publishes (via a draft_release_post seam on ReleaseProposalService
.approve) and drafts replies to meaningful mentions (dedicated poll loop,
x_seen_mentions dedup ledger, per-cycle/open caps). Drafting is
local-model-only, clamped to 280 chars. Nothing auto-posts — every tweet
is a held task (source x_post/x_reply, confirmed_by_human=False,
Secretary-owned, dispatcher-skipped) the CEO edits/approves/rejects in a
panel queue.

The four OAuth 1.0a secrets live Fernet-encrypted in a singleton
x_credentials row (migration 059, all-or-nothing, API returns only
has_credentials); decryption is server-side, agents never hold creds or
egress. Hand-rolled OAuth 1.0a HMAC-SHA1 signer, no new dependency;
NullXClient makes the unconfigured path a graceful no-op.

XPostService.approve (CEO-only) is the sole caller of post_tweet.

Review hardening: closed a double-post race — the approve path now
re-reads committed task state inside the Redis lock and commits COMPLETED
before releasing, so a concurrent approve that acquires the lock after the
winner released can't re-post (SET-NX is non-waiting, and the route-level
commit landed after the lock dropped). Added a regression test.

* feat(roadmap): board roadmap engine — PO proposes themed cycles, CEO approves per-item (default-off)

ROBOCO_ROADMAP_ENGINE_ENABLED (default off). Weekly, RoadmapEngine opens
ONE held exploration task (source=board_roadmap, confirmed_by_human=False,
Product-Owner-assigned), deduped to one open cycle. A dedicated one-shot
_dispatch_roadmap_exploration spawns the PO solo (not the two-reviewer
board path, which would also spawn HoM + fire Approve-&-Start). The PO
explores read-only (git/KB/metrics/releases/charter/web) and makes one
propose_roadmap call (PO-only content verb) authoring a themed cycle —
goal + 3-7 item drafts — persisted as a roadmap_cycle marker (no table,
no migration; head stays 059).

The CEO acts per-item in the panel roadmap queue: approve materializes a
BACKLOG task (source=roadmap, no assignee — never auto-starts), reject
records a reason; all-items-terminal completes the exploration task.
RoadmapService is idempotent per item. Dispatchers skip board_roadmap.

Includes a real SQLAlchemy dirty-check fix (deep-copy the JSON marker
before mutating, or the in-place edit + reassign compares equal to its
own baseline and the UPDATE is skipped).

Review hardening: create_task_from_draft now honors a draft-declared
source only from a {prompter, roadmap} whitelist — drafts are
LLM-authored, so an unbounded source could impersonate a privileged
origin (release_manager would even wedge that engine's dedup).

* chore(release): 0.17.0

Wave 3 — six default-off subsystems: sandboxed dev DB/Redis, prod
Postgres/Redis network isolation, full mobile UI pass, cloud auth
(FastAPI Users), the RoboCo X account engine, and the board roadmap
engine. Plus the waves 1+2 work already on master since 0.16.0.

Version bumped across the canonical set (config.py, __init__.py,
pyproject.toml, panel/package.json, uv.lock); CHANGELOG [Unreleased]
cut to [0.17.0]; docs/map delta added.

Compose: every optional feature armed :-true in the NAS composes, OFF
in the user-facing registry compose. Two opt-in exceptions default off
(CLOUD_AUTH — needs email/password/secret + TLS, would otherwise fail
startup; ROUTING_STRICT — fail-closed spawning). DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED
stays on in both (coupled to the roboco_data topology).

* chore(compose): arm cloud_auth + routing_strict ON in the NAS composes

Every feature defaults ON in the NAS composes per policy — these two
were wrongly left off. Both keep the ${VAR:-true} form so the operator
controls the real runtime via .env: cloud auth needs
ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_EMAIL/_PASSWORD/_SECRET + TLS set there before a boot
(else startup fails loud), and routing_strict is fail-closed. Registry
compose keeps both off.

* fix(ci): reflow board.md prose (quality gate) + document v0.17.0 env creds

The roadmap section added hard-wrapped prose that failed the markdown
prose gate; reflowed (token-invariant). Also brought .env.example
current: cloud auth (now armed — needs SECRET or startup fails), routing
strict, the X engine (panel-entered OAuth), and web research.

* fix(ci): reduce cyclomatic complexity of five wave-3 blocks (xenon gate)

The wave-3 subagents introduced C-rank functions the CI xenon gate
rejects (my per-item reviews ran ruff/mypy/pytest but not xenon):
- sandbox.janitor_sweep -> extract _list_labeled_sandboxes /
  _list_live_agent_containers / _prune_grace
- x_client.fetch_mentions -> extract _parse_mention_items
- x_engine.run_cycle -> extract _process_mentions
- orchestrator._dispatch_pm_work -> extract the source-skip into a
  MODULE-level _is_held_ceo_source (module, not method, so the
  wholesale-mocked dispatcher unit tests exercise the real logic)
- auth/seed.ensure_seed_user -> extract _apply_seed_updates (module avg -> A)

Behavior-preserving; full suite green (11902), xenon clean.

* fix(ci): declare pyjwt + fastapi-users-db-sqlalchemy as direct deps (deptry)

The cloud-auth code imports jwt and fastapi_users_db_sqlalchemy directly
but they were only transitive deps (via fastapi-users), which deptry
(quality gate, DEP003) rejects. Declared explicitly; deptry roboco/ clean.
Missed originally because local make quality stopped at earlier gates
before reaching deptry.

* feat(x): gate mention replies behind ROBOCO_X_REPLIES_ENABLED (default off)

Per CEO decision: the X engine should only post about releases by
default. Reading mentions needs a paid X API tier, so the mention-reply
half is now a deliberate opt-in on top of release posting.

New default-off flag x_replies_enabled gates the mentions poll loop
(_x_mentions_poll_loop) and XEngine.run_cycle; release-post drafting
(the release-proposal approve hook) is unaffected and still runs when
x_engine_enabled + credentials are set. Added to FEATURE_FLAGS + the
panel card. Tests: release posting works with replies off; run_cycle +
the poll loop are no-ops with replies off.

* fix: 401 only redirects to /login when cloud auth is on; panel-token strips .env quotes

Two bugs that together dead-ended login in secure mode:
- client.ts redirected to /login on ANY 401, so a mismatched panel
  token (header-trust/secure mode, cloud auth off) bounced the user to a
  login page whose backend route isn't mounted -> 404. Now it probes
  /auth/status (bare fetch, no interceptor re-entry) and only redirects
  when cloud_auth_enabled.
- make panel-token read the .env secret with grep|cut without stripping
  surrounding quotes, so a quoted ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET produced a
  token signed with the quotes included — which never verifies against
  the orchestrator (docker-compose/pydantic unquote the secret). Now
  strips surrounding single/double quotes.

* fix: git-log 500 on '|' in commit message; X queue shows an empty state

- GET /api/git/log 500'd (ValueError: Invalid isoformat) when a commit
  SUBJECT contained a '|' (e.g. the 'curl|sh' lockdown commit): the
  fixed '|' field delimiter let the subject's pipe shift the split so
  author+date collapsed into one field. Switched to \x1f (Unit
  Separator), which can't appear in commit content. Regression test with
  a piped subject.
- The X Post Queue returned null when empty, so there was no visible
  place for the X drafts. It now renders a discoverable empty state
  pointing at Settings -> X credentials.

* docs: bring docs/rag + docs/map current for v0.17.0 (waves 1-3)

Agent-facing RAG corpus and codebase map updated for every feature in
the 0.17.0 span, code-verified:
- wave 3: sandbox DB, DB network isolation, cloud auth, X engine
  (+ x_replies_enabled sub-flag), board roadmap engine — new RAG
  architecture pages + role/tool/config-reference updates; new symbols,
  migrations 057-059, panel surfaces, and the get_agent_context
  dual-path across the map slices.
- waves 1-2: A2A live view + switchboard, prompter memory
  (search_past_tasks), Secretary edit access + PM-lighter scope, the
  PR-gate auto-submit turn cut (ROBOCO_PR_GATE_AUTO_SUBMIT_ENABLED).
- correctness fix: api-routes-schemas.md no longer claims the A2A admin
  routes are reachable by any authenticated agent — they carry a
  _require_ceo gate (wave 2c).

docs/internal, _front.md deltas, and the frozen _complete_map.md
snapshot untouched.

* fix(rag): atomic upsert for indexed-doc tracking (kills e2e segfault)

The indexed-document tracking write used check-then-insert in two paths
(IndexedDocumentRepository.upsert_batch and the file-source
_upsert_doc_record). Under concurrent indexing both callers saw no row
and both inserted, so the second violated uq_indexed_doc_source and
poisoned its transaction — surfacing in CI as the intermittent
_checkin_failed SIGSEGV on the failed connection's pool checkin.

Both paths now use INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE against the
constraint: coalesce keeps an existing title/preview when the new value
is empty (matching the old guards) and metadata is jsonb-merged. The
batch dedupes within itself first (ON CONFLICT can't touch a row twice
in one statement). expire_all after the Core upsert keeps same-session
ORM reads consistent with the merged DB row.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-03 19:24:00 +02:00

466 lines
16 KiB
Python

"""Cloud auth dual-path coverage (ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_ENABLED, default off).
Proves the survival guarantee — off mode is byte-for-byte today's
header-trust behavior — and the on-mode enforcement: header-trust dies for
the CEO/human identity, the agent HMAC path (incl. the orchestrator's
`system` self-PATCH) is untouched in both modes, a valid session cookie
authenticates as CEO, the cookie slides on every authenticated request, and
the seeded user is upserted idempotently.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch
from uuid import UUID, uuid4
import pytest
from fastapi import HTTPException, Response
from fastapi_users.password import PasswordHelper
from roboco.agents_config import CEO_AGENT_ID, issue_agent_token
from roboco.api import websocket as ws_module
from roboco.api.auth.backend import SESSION_COOKIE_NAME, get_jwt_strategy
from roboco.api.auth.routes import auth_status
from roboco.api.auth.seed import ensure_seed_user
from roboco.api.deps import get_agent_context
from roboco.config import settings
from roboco.db.tables import UserTable
from roboco.models import AgentRole
from sqlalchemy import select
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from collections.abc import AsyncGenerator
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
_HTTP_401 = 401
_SECRET = "test-secret-for-cloud-auth-padded-32b"
_SYSTEM_AGENT_ID = "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"
_password_helper = PasswordHelper()
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _cloud_auth_secret(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
"""Every test in this module gets a signing secret, flag on or off."""
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_secret", _SECRET)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OFF mode — byte-for-byte header-trust, even for a "ceo" role header.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_off_mode_ceo_header_spoof_still_works(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
"""The survival guarantee: flag off, a bare X-Agent-Role: ceo header
(no token, no session) authenticates exactly like it does today."""
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_enabled", False)
monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED", "false")
aid = UUID(CEO_AGENT_ID)
with patch(
"roboco.api.deps.resolve_agent_identity",
new=AsyncMock(return_value=(aid, "ceo")),
):
ctx = await get_agent_context(
MagicMock(),
MagicMock(),
x_agent_id=CEO_AGENT_ID,
x_agent_role="ceo",
)
assert ctx.agent_id == aid
assert ctx.role == AgentRole.CEO
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_off_mode_developer_header_trust_unchanged(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_enabled", False)
monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED", "false")
aid = uuid4()
with patch(
"roboco.api.deps.resolve_agent_identity",
new=AsyncMock(return_value=(aid, "be-dev-1")),
):
ctx = await get_agent_context(
MagicMock(),
MagicMock(),
x_agent_id="be-dev-1",
x_agent_role="developer",
x_agent_team="backend",
)
assert ctx.agent_id == aid
assert ctx.role == AgentRole.DEVELOPER
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# ON mode — header-trust kill for the CEO identity.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_on_mode_spoofed_ceo_header_without_token_or_session_401(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_enabled", True)
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
await get_agent_context(
MagicMock(),
MagicMock(),
x_agent_id=CEO_AGENT_ID,
x_agent_role="ceo",
)
assert exc.value.status_code == _HTTP_401
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_on_mode_no_headers_no_cookie_401(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
"""No X-Agent-* headers at all also falls into the CEO/cookie path and
401s without a valid session — never silently falls back to anything."""
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_enabled", True)
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
await get_agent_context(MagicMock(), MagicMock())
assert exc.value.status_code == _HTTP_401
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_on_mode_valid_session_yields_ceo_context_and_slides_cookie(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
db_session: AsyncSession,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_enabled", True)
user = UserTable(
email="ceo@example.com",
hashed_password=_password_helper.hash("hunter2"),
is_active=True,
is_superuser=True,
is_verified=True,
)
db_session.add(user)
await db_session.flush()
token = await get_jwt_strategy().write_token(user)
response = Response()
ctx = await get_agent_context(
db_session,
response,
roboco_session=token,
)
assert ctx.role == AgentRole.CEO
assert ctx.agent_id == UUID(CEO_AGENT_ID)
# The sliding-session mechanism: a fresh Set-Cookie is re-issued.
set_cookie = response.headers.get("set-cookie")
assert set_cookie is not None
assert SESSION_COOKIE_NAME in set_cookie
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_on_mode_invalid_session_cookie_401(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
db_session: AsyncSession,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_enabled", True)
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
await get_agent_context(db_session, Response(), roboco_session="not-a-real-jwt")
assert exc.value.status_code == _HTTP_401
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_on_mode_agent_hmac_still_works(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
"""The agent-fleet HMAC path is untouched by the cloud-auth flag."""
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_enabled", True)
monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", _SECRET)
aid = uuid4()
token = issue_agent_token(str(aid), "developer", "backend")
with patch(
"roboco.api.deps.resolve_agent_identity",
new=AsyncMock(return_value=(aid, "be-dev-1")),
):
ctx = await get_agent_context(
MagicMock(),
MagicMock(),
x_agent_id=str(aid),
x_agent_role="developer",
x_agent_team="backend",
x_agent_token=token,
)
assert ctx.agent_id == aid
assert ctx.role == AgentRole.DEVELOPER
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_on_mode_system_self_patch_still_works(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
"""The orchestrator's own `system` self-PATCH identity is untouched."""
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_enabled", True)
monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", _SECRET)
token = issue_agent_token(_SYSTEM_AGENT_ID, "system", "")
ctx = await get_agent_context(
MagicMock(),
MagicMock(),
x_agent_id=_SYSTEM_AGENT_ID,
x_agent_role="system",
x_agent_token=token,
)
assert ctx.agent_id == UUID(_SYSTEM_AGENT_ID)
assert ctx.slug == "system"
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_on_mode_forged_agent_token_401(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_enabled", True)
monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", _SECRET)
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
await get_agent_context(
MagicMock(),
MagicMock(),
x_agent_id="be-dev-1",
x_agent_role="developer",
x_agent_token="forged",
)
assert exc.value.status_code == _HTTP_401
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_on_mode_spoofed_non_ceo_role_without_token_401(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
"""Header-trust is dead in cloud-auth mode for EVERY privileged role, not
just ceo: a bare X-Agent-Role: main_pm with no token is a spoof and 401s
(this closes the LAN hole for PM/board roles too, independent of
ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED)."""
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_enabled", True)
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
await get_agent_context(
MagicMock(),
MagicMock(),
x_agent_id="main-pm",
x_agent_role="main_pm",
)
assert exc.value.status_code == _HTTP_401
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# /api/auth/status — always public, shape-checked both ways.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_auth_status_reports_off(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_enabled", False)
assert await auth_status() == {"cloud_auth_enabled": False}
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_auth_status_reports_on(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_enabled", True)
assert await auth_status() == {"cloud_auth_enabled": True}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Seeded-user idempotent upsert
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_ensure_seed_user_noop_when_disabled(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
db_session: AsyncSession,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_enabled", False)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_email", "ceo@example.com")
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_password", "hunter2")
await ensure_seed_user(db_session)
await db_session.flush()
rows = (await db_session.execute(select(UserTable))).scalars().all()
assert rows == []
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_ensure_seed_user_creates_exactly_one_row(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
db_session: AsyncSession,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_enabled", True)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_email", "ceo@example.com")
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_password", "hunter2")
await ensure_seed_user(db_session)
await db_session.flush()
rows = (await db_session.execute(select(UserTable))).scalars().all()
assert len(rows) == 1
assert rows[0].email == "ceo@example.com"
assert rows[0].hashed_password != "hunter2"
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_ensure_seed_user_idempotent_same_password(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
db_session: AsyncSession,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_enabled", True)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_email", "ceo@example.com")
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_password", "hunter2")
await ensure_seed_user(db_session)
await db_session.flush()
first_hash = (
(await db_session.execute(select(UserTable))).scalar_one().hashed_password
)
await ensure_seed_user(db_session)
await db_session.flush()
rows = (await db_session.execute(select(UserTable))).scalars().all()
assert len(rows) == 1
assert rows[0].hashed_password == first_hash
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_ensure_seed_user_rotates_password_and_invalidates_hash(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
db_session: AsyncSession,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_enabled", True)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_email", "ceo@example.com")
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_password", "hunter2")
await ensure_seed_user(db_session)
await db_session.flush()
first_hash = (
(await db_session.execute(select(UserTable))).scalar_one().hashed_password
)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_password", "a-new-password")
await ensure_seed_user(db_session)
await db_session.flush()
rows = (await db_session.execute(select(UserTable))).scalars().all()
assert len(rows) == 1
assert rows[0].hashed_password != first_hash
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_ensure_seed_user_email_change_renames_the_single_row(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
db_session: AsyncSession,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_enabled", True)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_email", "ceo@example.com")
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_password", "hunter2")
await ensure_seed_user(db_session)
await db_session.flush()
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_email", "renzo@example.com")
await ensure_seed_user(db_session)
await db_session.flush()
rows = (await db_session.execute(select(UserTable))).scalars().all()
assert len(rows) == 1
assert rows[0].email == "renzo@example.com"
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_ensure_seed_user_warns_without_email_or_password(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
db_session: AsyncSession,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_enabled", True)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_email", None)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_password", None)
await ensure_seed_user(db_session)
await db_session.flush()
rows = (await db_session.execute(select(UserTable))).scalars().all()
assert rows == []
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# WS panel-token gate — dual path
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _mock_ws(
headers: dict[str, str] | None = None, cookies: dict[str, str] | None = None
) -> MagicMock:
ws = MagicMock()
ws.headers = headers or {}
ws.cookies = cookies or {}
return ws
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_ws_off_mode_unaffected(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_enabled", False)
monkeypatch.delenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED", raising=False)
ws = _mock_ws()
assert await ws_module._require_panel_token(ws) is True
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_ws_on_mode_valid_hmac_token_accepted(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_enabled", True)
monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", _SECRET)
token = issue_agent_token(CEO_AGENT_ID, "ceo", "")
ws = _mock_ws(headers={"x-agent-token": token})
assert await ws_module._require_panel_token(ws) is True
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_ws_on_mode_forged_hmac_token_rejected(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_enabled", True)
monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", _SECRET)
ws = _mock_ws(headers={"x-agent-token": "forged"})
assert await ws_module._require_panel_token(ws) is False
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_ws_on_mode_valid_session_cookie_accepted(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
db_session: AsyncSession,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_enabled", True)
async def _stub_get_db() -> AsyncGenerator[AsyncSession]:
yield db_session
monkeypatch.setattr(ws_module, "get_db", _stub_get_db)
user = UserTable(
email="ceo@example.com",
hashed_password=_password_helper.hash("hunter2"),
is_active=True,
is_superuser=True,
is_verified=True,
)
db_session.add(user)
await db_session.flush()
token = await get_jwt_strategy().write_token(user)
ws = _mock_ws(cookies={SESSION_COOKIE_NAME: token})
assert await ws_module._require_panel_token(ws) is True
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_ws_on_mode_no_token_no_cookie_rejected(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
db_session: AsyncSession,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cloud_auth_enabled", True)
async def _stub_get_db() -> AsyncGenerator[AsyncSession]:
yield db_session
monkeypatch.setattr(ws_module, "get_db", _stub_get_db)
ws = _mock_ws()
assert await ws_module._require_panel_token(ws) is False