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3ccc723cd4
* feat(sandbox): throwaway per-agent Postgres/Redis sandbox containers
Orchestrator-provisioned sibling containers per agent spawn
(SandboxProvisioner, roboco/runtime/sandbox.py). Per-project opt-in via
projects.sandbox_services (migration 057); master switch
ROBOCO_SANDBOX_DB_ENABLED, default-off, armed in the NAS compose only.
When active, ROBOCO_TEST_DB_* / ROBOCO_TEST_REDIS_* point at the sandbox
and the prod-creds gate-env injection is suppressed (sandbox replaces,
never coexists). Sandbox lifetime tracks the agent container: teardown at
every removal path, orphan janitor at startup + each reaper tick with a
grace window for mid-flight spawns. The pre-spawn stale-clear spares the
just-provisioned sandbox; provision pre-clears stale same-named
containers from a crash-missed teardown.
Panel: per-project sandbox-service switches in the edit dialog + feature
flag card entry.
* docs: CLAUDE.md entry for the sandboxed dev DB/Redis subsystem
* feat(security): isolate prod Postgres/Redis from agent containers (roboco_data network)
Second user-defined bridge roboco_data carries postgres+redis only; the
orchestrator is multi-homed (default + data). Spawned agents and their
sandbox sidecars stay on roboco_default and can no longer resolve or
reach roboco-postgres:5432 / roboco-redis:6379 (redis has no auth —
membership is its only containment). Normal bridge, so host-published
ports (15432/16379) keep working. Applied to both build composes and
the registry compose; docker-compose.yml re-synced byte-identical with
docker-compose.yaml (it had drifted by the sandbox flag block).
ROBOCO_DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED (config default false, armed alongside the
topology) suppresses the legacy _append_gate_env prod-creds injection:
under isolation those creds dead-end, and unreachable creds are worse
than none. DB-needing projects opt into sandbox_services instead. The
flag is deliberately not a panel feature flag - it must travel with the
compose networks: stanzas.
Preserved by construction: agent<->agent A2A and orchestrator->agent SDK
polls on :9000, MCP->orchestrator on :8000, ollama reachability, docker
exec/inspect (daemon socket), host port publishing.
* feat(panel): full mobile responsiveness pass
Shared primitives: useIsMobile (useSyncExternalStore, hydration-safe,
memoized matchMedia subscribe), ResponsiveTable table->card switch below
md (single subtree mounted, no duplicated interactive rows), scrollable
snap TabsList in the base primitive (justify-center-safe so the first
tab stays reachable on overflow), persistent md:hidden bottom tab bar
(Overview/Tasks/Kanban/Chat, safe-area padded).
Applied: card lists for tasks/projects/products/work-sessions/sessions
+ the three raw metrics tables; CEO approval queue / release proposal /
playbook review action rows stack on narrow; command-center reorders
approvals above the fold on mobile; task-header metadata wraps;
Communications + A2A become URL-driven single-pane drill-downs below lg
(fixes the unconstrained-height ScrollArea bug) with dvh heights;
recharts label density/radius adapts via useIsMobile; git diff viewer
gets mobile font + wrap toggle; vh->dvh sweep; chat composers get
safe-area-inset padding; dashboard main p-4 md:p-6 + pb-20 for the bar.
Verified at 375px on the built app: bottom bar, drawer, approval-first
overview, swipeable kanban tab strip. All gates green (eslint, tsc,
vitest 249, next build 24/24 routes).
* feat(auth): cloud auth via FastAPI Users (default-off, single-user cookie session)
ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_ENABLED (default off) lets the panel/API be exposed
beyond localhost without changing the CEO's local no-login flow while
off — get_agent_context and the WS gate are byte-for-byte unchanged in
off-mode. On: header-trust dies for humans — any agent-role claim (ceo
or a privileged PM/board role) with no valid HMAC token or session
cookie is 401, closing the header-spoof hole on the host-published
:8000 port for every role. The agent-fleet HMAC path and the system
self-PATCH keep working unmodified in both modes.
Single seeded CEO user (migration 058 users table, UserTable), no
registration router — idempotent env-driven upsert at startup by PK.
Cookie transport (httponly/secure/samesite=lax) + a JWTStrategy bound
to a fingerprint of the current password hash (rotating the password
invalidates every prior session). Sliding 30-day session: every
authenticated request re-mints the cookie, so an active session never
expires — no unexpected logouts.
Panel: (auth)/login page + proxy.ts (Next 16 rename of middleware; probes
/auth/status over the docker-internal URL, fails open to off) gate the
dashboard; client.ts gets withCredentials + 401->/login. nginx unchanged.
Review hardening: broadened the on-mode rejection from ceo-only to every
non-CEO role without a valid token (was only closed when
ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED was also armed); Next-16 proxy.ts rename to
clear the middleware deprecation warning.
* feat(x): RoboCo X account engine — HoM drafts, per-post CEO approval (default-off)
ROBOCO_X_ENGINE_ENABLED (default off, inert without creds). Mirrors the
ReleaseManagerEngine held-artifact shape: XEngine drafts a post when a
release publishes (via a draft_release_post seam on ReleaseProposalService
.approve) and drafts replies to meaningful mentions (dedicated poll loop,
x_seen_mentions dedup ledger, per-cycle/open caps). Drafting is
local-model-only, clamped to 280 chars. Nothing auto-posts — every tweet
is a held task (source x_post/x_reply, confirmed_by_human=False,
Secretary-owned, dispatcher-skipped) the CEO edits/approves/rejects in a
panel queue.
The four OAuth 1.0a secrets live Fernet-encrypted in a singleton
x_credentials row (migration 059, all-or-nothing, API returns only
has_credentials); decryption is server-side, agents never hold creds or
egress. Hand-rolled OAuth 1.0a HMAC-SHA1 signer, no new dependency;
NullXClient makes the unconfigured path a graceful no-op.
XPostService.approve (CEO-only) is the sole caller of post_tweet.
Review hardening: closed a double-post race — the approve path now
re-reads committed task state inside the Redis lock and commits COMPLETED
before releasing, so a concurrent approve that acquires the lock after the
winner released can't re-post (SET-NX is non-waiting, and the route-level
commit landed after the lock dropped). Added a regression test.
* feat(roadmap): board roadmap engine — PO proposes themed cycles, CEO approves per-item (default-off)
ROBOCO_ROADMAP_ENGINE_ENABLED (default off). Weekly, RoadmapEngine opens
ONE held exploration task (source=board_roadmap, confirmed_by_human=False,
Product-Owner-assigned), deduped to one open cycle. A dedicated one-shot
_dispatch_roadmap_exploration spawns the PO solo (not the two-reviewer
board path, which would also spawn HoM + fire Approve-&-Start). The PO
explores read-only (git/KB/metrics/releases/charter/web) and makes one
propose_roadmap call (PO-only content verb) authoring a themed cycle —
goal + 3-7 item drafts — persisted as a roadmap_cycle marker (no table,
no migration; head stays 059).
The CEO acts per-item in the panel roadmap queue: approve materializes a
BACKLOG task (source=roadmap, no assignee — never auto-starts), reject
records a reason; all-items-terminal completes the exploration task.
RoadmapService is idempotent per item. Dispatchers skip board_roadmap.
Includes a real SQLAlchemy dirty-check fix (deep-copy the JSON marker
before mutating, or the in-place edit + reassign compares equal to its
own baseline and the UPDATE is skipped).
Review hardening: create_task_from_draft now honors a draft-declared
source only from a {prompter, roadmap} whitelist — drafts are
LLM-authored, so an unbounded source could impersonate a privileged
origin (release_manager would even wedge that engine's dedup).
* chore(release): 0.17.0
Wave 3 — six default-off subsystems: sandboxed dev DB/Redis, prod
Postgres/Redis network isolation, full mobile UI pass, cloud auth
(FastAPI Users), the RoboCo X account engine, and the board roadmap
engine. Plus the waves 1+2 work already on master since 0.16.0.
Version bumped across the canonical set (config.py, __init__.py,
pyproject.toml, panel/package.json, uv.lock); CHANGELOG [Unreleased]
cut to [0.17.0]; docs/map delta added.
Compose: every optional feature armed :-true in the NAS composes, OFF
in the user-facing registry compose. Two opt-in exceptions default off
(CLOUD_AUTH — needs email/password/secret + TLS, would otherwise fail
startup; ROUTING_STRICT — fail-closed spawning). DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED
stays on in both (coupled to the roboco_data topology).
* chore(compose): arm cloud_auth + routing_strict ON in the NAS composes
Every feature defaults ON in the NAS composes per policy — these two
were wrongly left off. Both keep the ${VAR:-true} form so the operator
controls the real runtime via .env: cloud auth needs
ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_EMAIL/_PASSWORD/_SECRET + TLS set there before a boot
(else startup fails loud), and routing_strict is fail-closed. Registry
compose keeps both off.
* fix(ci): reflow board.md prose (quality gate) + document v0.17.0 env creds
The roadmap section added hard-wrapped prose that failed the markdown
prose gate; reflowed (token-invariant). Also brought .env.example
current: cloud auth (now armed — needs SECRET or startup fails), routing
strict, the X engine (panel-entered OAuth), and web research.
* fix(ci): reduce cyclomatic complexity of five wave-3 blocks (xenon gate)
The wave-3 subagents introduced C-rank functions the CI xenon gate
rejects (my per-item reviews ran ruff/mypy/pytest but not xenon):
- sandbox.janitor_sweep -> extract _list_labeled_sandboxes /
_list_live_agent_containers / _prune_grace
- x_client.fetch_mentions -> extract _parse_mention_items
- x_engine.run_cycle -> extract _process_mentions
- orchestrator._dispatch_pm_work -> extract the source-skip into a
MODULE-level _is_held_ceo_source (module, not method, so the
wholesale-mocked dispatcher unit tests exercise the real logic)
- auth/seed.ensure_seed_user -> extract _apply_seed_updates (module avg -> A)
Behavior-preserving; full suite green (11902), xenon clean.
* fix(ci): declare pyjwt + fastapi-users-db-sqlalchemy as direct deps (deptry)
The cloud-auth code imports jwt and fastapi_users_db_sqlalchemy directly
but they were only transitive deps (via fastapi-users), which deptry
(quality gate, DEP003) rejects. Declared explicitly; deptry roboco/ clean.
Missed originally because local make quality stopped at earlier gates
before reaching deptry.
* feat(x): gate mention replies behind ROBOCO_X_REPLIES_ENABLED (default off)
Per CEO decision: the X engine should only post about releases by
default. Reading mentions needs a paid X API tier, so the mention-reply
half is now a deliberate opt-in on top of release posting.
New default-off flag x_replies_enabled gates the mentions poll loop
(_x_mentions_poll_loop) and XEngine.run_cycle; release-post drafting
(the release-proposal approve hook) is unaffected and still runs when
x_engine_enabled + credentials are set. Added to FEATURE_FLAGS + the
panel card. Tests: release posting works with replies off; run_cycle +
the poll loop are no-ops with replies off.
* fix: 401 only redirects to /login when cloud auth is on; panel-token strips .env quotes
Two bugs that together dead-ended login in secure mode:
- client.ts redirected to /login on ANY 401, so a mismatched panel
token (header-trust/secure mode, cloud auth off) bounced the user to a
login page whose backend route isn't mounted -> 404. Now it probes
/auth/status (bare fetch, no interceptor re-entry) and only redirects
when cloud_auth_enabled.
- make panel-token read the .env secret with grep|cut without stripping
surrounding quotes, so a quoted ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET produced a
token signed with the quotes included — which never verifies against
the orchestrator (docker-compose/pydantic unquote the secret). Now
strips surrounding single/double quotes.
* fix: git-log 500 on '|' in commit message; X queue shows an empty state
- GET /api/git/log 500'd (ValueError: Invalid isoformat) when a commit
SUBJECT contained a '|' (e.g. the 'curl|sh' lockdown commit): the
fixed '|' field delimiter let the subject's pipe shift the split so
author+date collapsed into one field. Switched to \x1f (Unit
Separator), which can't appear in commit content. Regression test with
a piped subject.
- The X Post Queue returned null when empty, so there was no visible
place for the X drafts. It now renders a discoverable empty state
pointing at Settings -> X credentials.
* docs: bring docs/rag + docs/map current for v0.17.0 (waves 1-3)
Agent-facing RAG corpus and codebase map updated for every feature in
the 0.17.0 span, code-verified:
- wave 3: sandbox DB, DB network isolation, cloud auth, X engine
(+ x_replies_enabled sub-flag), board roadmap engine — new RAG
architecture pages + role/tool/config-reference updates; new symbols,
migrations 057-059, panel surfaces, and the get_agent_context
dual-path across the map slices.
- waves 1-2: A2A live view + switchboard, prompter memory
(search_past_tasks), Secretary edit access + PM-lighter scope, the
PR-gate auto-submit turn cut (ROBOCO_PR_GATE_AUTO_SUBMIT_ENABLED).
- correctness fix: api-routes-schemas.md no longer claims the A2A admin
routes are reachable by any authenticated agent — they carry a
_require_ceo gate (wave 2c).
docs/internal, _front.md deltas, and the frozen _complete_map.md
snapshot untouched.
* fix(rag): atomic upsert for indexed-doc tracking (kills e2e segfault)
The indexed-document tracking write used check-then-insert in two paths
(IndexedDocumentRepository.upsert_batch and the file-source
_upsert_doc_record). Under concurrent indexing both callers saw no row
and both inserted, so the second violated uq_indexed_doc_source and
poisoned its transaction — surfacing in CI as the intermittent
_checkin_failed SIGSEGV on the failed connection's pool checkin.
Both paths now use INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE against the
constraint: coalesce keeps an existing title/preview when the new value
is empty (matching the old guards) and metadata is jsonb-merged. The
batch dedupes within itself first (ON CONFLICT can't touch a row twice
in one statement). expire_all after the Core upsert keeps same-session
ORM reads consistent with the merged DB row.
---------
Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
199 lines
9.7 KiB
Bash
199 lines
9.7 KiB
Bash
# =============================================================================
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# RoboCo Environment Configuration
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# =============================================================================
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# Copy this file to .env
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#
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# NOTE: No API keys needed for agents - they use your Claude Code authentication.
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# Run `claude` on the host to authenticate before starting RoboCo.
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# =============================================================================
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# Docker Deployment (NAS/Server)
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# =============================================================================
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# These are REQUIRED when running via docker compose on a NAS/server.
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# They tell the orchestrator container where to find files on the HOST.
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# Path to the project on the host (absolute path)
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# ROBOCO_HOST_PROJECT_DIR=/volume1/roboco
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# Path to Claude Code auth directory on the host
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# ROBOCO_HOST_CLAUDE_DIR=/root/.claude
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# Claude auth directory to mount into orchestrator
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# CLAUDE_AUTH_DIR=~/.claude
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# =============================================================================
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# Container Images (docker-compose.registry.yml — pre-built deployment)
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# =============================================================================
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# Only used by docker-compose.registry.yml, which runs the published images
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# instead of building from source. Defaults shown.
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# Registry namespace: ghcr.io/rennf93 (GHCR) or docker.io/renzof93 (Docker Hub)
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# ROBOCO_REGISTRY=ghcr.io/rennf93
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# Image tag: latest, or a pinned release such as 0.5.0
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# ROBOCO_VERSION=latest
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# =============================================================================
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# Data Persistence
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# =============================================================================
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# Set to a path on your NAS RAID array for durability
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# Path to data directory on the host (MUST be absolute for Docker-in-Docker)
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# ROBOCO_DATA_DIR=/volume1/roboco/data
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# =============================================================================
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# Application
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# =============================================================================
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ROBOCO_ENVIRONMENT=development
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ROBOCO_DEBUG=true
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# =============================================================================
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# API Server
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# =============================================================================
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ROBOCO_HOST=0.0.0.0
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ROBOCO_PORT=8000
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# =============================================================================
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# Database (PostgreSQL)
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# =============================================================================
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# For docker compose deployment, use container name:
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# ROBOCO_DATABASE_HOST=roboco-postgres
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# For local development:
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ROBOCO_DATABASE_HOST=localhost
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ROBOCO_DATABASE_PORT=5432
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ROBOCO_DATABASE_USER=roboco
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ROBOCO_DATABASE_PASSWORD=roboco
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ROBOCO_DATABASE_NAME=roboco
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ROBOCO_DATABASE_ECHO=false
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# =============================================================================
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# Redis
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# =============================================================================
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# For docker compose deployment, use container name:
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# ROBOCO_REDIS_HOST=roboco-redis
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# For local development:
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ROBOCO_REDIS_HOST=localhost
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ROBOCO_REDIS_PORT=6379
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ROBOCO_REDIS_DB=0
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# ROBOCO_REDIS_PASSWORD=
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# =============================================================================
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# RAG / Local LLM (Ollama + in-house pgvector engine)
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# =============================================================================
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# For docker compose use the container name (roboco-ollama); locally, localhost.
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ROBOCO_OLLAMA_BASE_URL=http://localhost:11434
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ROBOCO_LOCAL_LLM_BASE_URL=http://localhost:11434/v1
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ROBOCO_LOCAL_LLM_MODEL=glm-5.2:cloud
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ROBOCO_DEFAULT_EMBEDDING_MODEL=qwen3-embedding:0.6b
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# =============================================================================
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# Grok (xAI) Provider — optional
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# =============================================================================
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# RoboCo can run agents on Grok Build (xAI) via xAI's official `grok` CLI on the
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# SuperGrok subscription, instead of Claude Code. No metered xAI API key is used:
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# the CLI authenticates from a mounted ~/.grok/auth.json — run `grok login` once
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# on the host (auth.json auto-refreshes). Every var below is optional.
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# Host dir holding the SuperGrok auth (one canonical var). The compose mounts it
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# into the orchestrator at the same path, and the orchestrator hands that path to
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# each Grok agent's auth.json bind — so it must be the real host ~/.grok.
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# ROBOCO_HOST_GROK_DIR=/home/youruser/.grok
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# Image the orchestrator spawns for Grok agents, and the CLI model id.
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# ROBOCO_GROK_AGENT_IMAGE=roboco-agent-grok:latest
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# ROBOCO_GROK_CLI_MODEL=grok-build
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# Per-role tool permissions are computed as native grok flags (subagents off
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# except intake; edit/shell removed for non-coding roles; git network/branch/
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# history mutation + rm -rf denied for coding roles; web search off for all —
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# gated web is via the roboco-search MCP). Credential-exfil / identity-forgery /
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# internal-API shell patterns are blocked by the same bash-guard the Claude path
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# runs, wired as a grok PreToolUse hook. Nothing to set here.
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# Reasoning effort for ALL Grok agents: low | medium | high | xhigh | max. Empty
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# keeps grok's model default for every role (parity with Claude — no per-role
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# cut); set this to trade quality for cost across the whole fleet.
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# ROBOCO_GROK_REASONING_EFFORT=
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# Hard ceiling on agentic turns per run (loop guard).
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# ROBOCO_GROK_MAX_TURNS=200
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# Kill a Grok agent container after this many seconds idle (no model call /
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# stream) to reclaim a wedged one. Minimum 120.
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# ROBOCO_GROK_IDLE_KILL_SECONDS=900
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# Per-agent cost ceiling (USD) before the orchestrator kills the container;
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# 0 disables. Backstops runaway-loop token burn.
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# ROBOCO_GROK_MAX_COST_USD=0.0
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# =============================================================================
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# Security
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# =============================================================================
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# Encryption key for git tokens at rest (Fernet). REQUIRED — the orchestrator
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# refuses to start without it. Generate with:
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# python -c 'from cryptography.fernet import Fernet; print(Fernet.generate_key().decode())'
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ROBOCO_ENCRYPTION_KEY=
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# Agent auth: HMAC secret that signs X-Agent-Token. REQUIRED for docker compose.
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# Generate with: python -c 'import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))'
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ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET=
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# Secure mode. On a trusted LAN you can leave this false (header-trust mode).
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# Set true to require every request to carry a valid token so an agent cannot
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# spoof another agent's role. When true you MUST also set ROBOCO_PANEL_AGENT_TOKEN.
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ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED=false
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# The control panel's CEO token, injected by nginx in secure mode so the human
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# UI keeps working without the browser holding the signing secret. Generate it
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# (after setting ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET above) with: make panel-token
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# NOTE: leave this UNSET if you arm cloud auth (below) for real remote exposure —
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# it is itself a valid CEO credential that would bypass the login page.
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ROBOCO_PANEL_AGENT_TOKEN=
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# =============================================================================
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# Cloud auth (panel login) — ARMED ON in the NAS compose (v0.17.0)
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# =============================================================================
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# ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_ENABLED defaults ON in docker-compose.yaml. When on, the
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# orchestrator REFUSES TO START unless ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_SECRET is set, the
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# panel requires a login, and the session cookie is secure-only (needs TLS).
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#
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# To TEST-DEPLOY before you've set up creds + TLS, turn it off for that run:
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# ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_ENABLED=false
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#
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# To ARM it: set all three below + terminate TLS in front of nginx + leave
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# ROBOCO_PANEL_AGENT_TOKEN unset.
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# ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_SECRET — session-signing key. REQUIRED when enabled.
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# Generate: python -c 'import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))'
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# ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_EMAIL / _PASSWORD — the single seeded login (no signup).
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# ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_SECRET=
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# ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_EMAIL=
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# ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_PASSWORD=
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# =============================================================================
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# Model routing strictness — ARMED ON in the NAS compose (v0.17.0)
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# =============================================================================
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# Fail-closed routing: a spawn whose configured provider is disabled RAISES
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# instead of degrading to the legacy Claude path. Audit the model_assignments
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# table first (a stale row pointing at a disabled provider crashes that spawn).
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# To restore graceful degradation: ROBOCO_ROUTING_STRICT=false
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# =============================================================================
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# X (Twitter) engine — ARMED ON in the NAS compose (v0.17.0)
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# =============================================================================
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# The engine drafts release posts + mention replies HELD for per-post CEO
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# approval; it is INERT until you store the four OAuth 1.0a secrets. Those are
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# NOT env vars — enter them in the panel (Settings -> X credentials, stored
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# Fernet-encrypted): API key, API secret, access token, access token secret,
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# from an X developer app with read+write user-context access.
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# Optional: pin the account's numeric user id (else it's resolved via /users/me).
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# ROBOCO_X_ACCOUNT_USER_ID=
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# =============================================================================
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# Web research — ARMED ON in the NAS compose (v0.17.0)
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# =============================================================================
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# Gives Board/PM roles web_search + web_fetch. INERT (empty results) without a
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# provider key — set one to make it live (Tavily / Brave / Exa, per your config).
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# ROBOCO_RESEARCH_API_KEY=
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# =============================================================================
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# CORS (comma-separated origins)
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# =============================================================================
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ROBOCO_CORS_ORIGINS=["http://localhost:3000","http://localhost:5173"]
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