Files
roboco/roboco/api/middleware.py
T
0e9f21de69 fix(api): default event loop to asyncio + cancellation-safe commit — kills the CI segfault (#340)
* fix(api): default the event loop to asyncio + cancellation-safe commit

The recurring CI e2e segfault traced to uvloop: the harness's
uvicorn.run() auto-selected it while production's serve() path never
consulted Config.loop (stock asyncio, accidentally safe). Every launch
site now resolves ROBOCO_UVICORN_LOOP (default asyncio; uvloop opt-in),
and DbCommitMiddleware's commit-in-send can no longer be interrupted
mid-wire: on cancellation it gets a bounded grace to finish (committed
data survives the 504), else invalidate-and-reraise.

* feat(runtime): expected-stop breadcrumbs attribute container deaths

Two production exit-143s had no attributable source: every orchestrator
kill path now records a short reason breadcrumb, and the exit monitor
consumes it -- an expected stop logs its reason at info, a genuinely
unexpected one logs none_recorded plus docker-inspect diagnostics
(OOMKilled, timestamps) so the next mystery SIGTERM self-identifies.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-08 16:01:01 +02:00

703 lines
27 KiB
Python

"""
API Middleware
Request/response middleware for logging, error handling, and correlation IDs.
"""
import asyncio
import json
import time
import uuid
from collections.abc import Callable, Sequence
from contextlib import suppress
from typing import Any, cast
import structlog
from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException, Request, Response
from fastapi import status as http_status
from fastapi.encoders import jsonable_encoder
from fastapi.exceptions import RequestValidationError
from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
from starlette.types import ASGIApp, Receive, Scope, Send
from roboco.api.schemas.common import ErrorCode
from roboco.config import settings
from roboco.exceptions import (
AuthenticationError,
InvalidStateError,
NotFoundError,
PermissionDeniedError,
RobocoError,
ValidationError,
)
from roboco.foundation.policy.flow_timeouts import SLOW_VERBS as _SLOW_VERBS
from roboco.services.base import (
ConflictError as ServiceConflictError,
)
from roboco.services.base import (
NotFoundError as ServiceNotFoundError,
)
from roboco.services.base import (
ServiceError,
ServiceUnavailableError,
)
from roboco.services.base import (
UnauthorizedError as ServiceUnauthorizedError,
)
from roboco.services.base import (
ValidationError as ServiceValidationError,
)
from roboco.services.exceptions import RateLimitError
logger = structlog.get_logger()
# =============================================================================
# CORRELATION ID MIDDLEWARE
# =============================================================================
class CorrelationIdMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
"""
Adds a correlation ID to each request for tracing.
The correlation ID is:
- Extracted from X-Correlation-ID header if present
- Generated if not present
- Added to response headers
- Bound to the logger context
"""
async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Callable) -> Response:
# Get or generate correlation ID
correlation_id = request.headers.get("X-Correlation-ID")
if not correlation_id:
correlation_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
# Store in request state for access in handlers
request.state.correlation_id = correlation_id
# Bind to structlog context
structlog.contextvars.clear_contextvars()
structlog.contextvars.bind_contextvars(
correlation_id=correlation_id,
path=request.url.path,
method=request.method,
)
# Process request
response = cast("Response", await call_next(request))
# Add correlation ID to response
response.headers["X-Correlation-ID"] = correlation_id
return response
# =============================================================================
# REQUEST LOGGING MIDDLEWARE
# =============================================================================
class RequestLoggingMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
"""
Logs request/response details with timing.
"""
async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Callable) -> Response:
start_time = time.perf_counter()
# Log request
logger.info(
"Request started",
path=request.url.path,
method=request.method,
query_params=dict(request.query_params),
)
try:
response = cast("Response", await call_next(request))
duration_ms = (time.perf_counter() - start_time) * 1000
# Log response
logger.info(
"Request completed",
status_code=response.status_code,
duration_ms=round(duration_ms, 2),
)
# Add timing header
response.headers["X-Response-Time-Ms"] = str(round(duration_ms, 2))
return response
except Exception as e:
duration_ms = (time.perf_counter() - start_time) * 1000
logger.exception(
"Request failed",
duration_ms=round(duration_ms, 2),
error=str(e),
)
raise
# =============================================================================
# EXCEPTION HANDLERS
# =============================================================================
def get_status_code(exc: RobocoError) -> int:
"""Map exception type to HTTP status code."""
status_map = {
NotFoundError: 404,
ValidationError: 422,
InvalidStateError: 409,
PermissionDeniedError: 403,
AuthenticationError: 401,
}
for exc_type, status in status_map.items():
if isinstance(exc, exc_type):
return status
# Default for other RobocoError subclasses
return 400
async def roboco_exception_handler(request: Request, exc: Exception) -> JSONResponse:
"""Handle RobocoError exceptions."""
roboco_exc = cast("RobocoError", exc)
status_code = get_status_code(roboco_exc)
# Add correlation ID to error details
correlation_id = getattr(request.state, "correlation_id", None)
if correlation_id:
roboco_exc.details["correlation_id"] = correlation_id
logger.warning(
"Handled exception",
error_code=roboco_exc.code,
error_message=roboco_exc.message,
status_code=status_code,
)
return JSONResponse(
status_code=status_code,
content=roboco_exc.to_dict(),
)
# `roboco.services.base.ServiceError` is a parallel exception hierarchy that
# does NOT inherit from `RobocoError` (it extends `Exception` directly), so
# `roboco_exception_handler` never sees it and the requests fall through to
# `generic_exception_handler` as 500s. Map its subclasses to the same status
# codes used in the RobocoError handler so route-layer try/except blocks can
# surface clean 4xx codes whether the service raises from `roboco.exceptions`
# or `roboco.services.base`.
_SERVICE_ERROR_STATUS: dict[type[ServiceError], int] = {
ServiceNotFoundError: 404,
ServiceValidationError: 422,
ServiceConflictError: 409,
ServiceUnauthorizedError: 403,
ServiceUnavailableError: 503,
}
async def service_exception_handler(request: Request, exc: Exception) -> JSONResponse:
"""Handle `roboco.services.base.ServiceError` and subclasses."""
svc_exc = cast("ServiceError", exc)
status_code = 500
for exc_type, mapped_status in _SERVICE_ERROR_STATUS.items():
if isinstance(svc_exc, exc_type):
status_code = mapped_status
break
correlation_id = getattr(request.state, "correlation_id", None)
details = dict(svc_exc.details)
if correlation_id:
details["correlation_id"] = correlation_id
logger.warning(
"Handled exception",
error_type=type(svc_exc).__name__,
error_message=svc_exc.message,
status_code=status_code,
)
return JSONResponse(
status_code=status_code,
content={
"error": type(svc_exc).__name__,
"message": svc_exc.message,
"details": details,
},
)
async def rate_limit_exception_handler(
request: Request, exc: Exception
) -> JSONResponse:
"""Handle :class:`~roboco.services.exceptions.RateLimitError`.
Returns HTTP 429 with a ``Retry-After`` response header (when available)
and a structured JSON body so API consumers can back off gracefully.
"""
rl_exc = cast("RateLimitError", exc)
correlation_id = getattr(request.state, "correlation_id", None)
logger.warning(
"LLM rate limit exhausted",
provider=rl_exc.provider,
retry_after=rl_exc.retry_after,
)
content: dict = {
"error": "rate_limit_exceeded",
"provider": rl_exc.provider,
"message": str(rl_exc),
}
if correlation_id:
content["correlation_id"] = correlation_id
headers: dict[str, str] = {}
if rl_exc.retry_after is not None:
headers["Retry-After"] = str(int(rl_exc.retry_after))
return JSONResponse(
status_code=429,
content=content,
headers=headers,
)
async def generic_exception_handler(request: Request, exc: Exception) -> JSONResponse:
"""Handle unexpected exceptions."""
correlation_id = getattr(request.state, "correlation_id", None)
logger.exception(
"Unhandled exception",
error=str(exc),
error_type=type(exc).__name__,
)
return JSONResponse(
status_code=http_status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
content={
"error": {
"code": ErrorCode.INTERNAL_ERROR,
"message": "An internal error occurred",
"details": {
"correlation_id": correlation_id,
},
}
},
)
# Map HTTP status codes to string error codes
_HTTP_TO_ERROR_CODE: dict[int, str] = {
400: ErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT,
401: ErrorCode.NOT_AUTHORIZED,
403: ErrorCode.ACCESS_DENIED,
404: ErrorCode.NOT_FOUND,
409: ErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT, # Conflict
422: ErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT, # Validation error
500: ErrorCode.INTERNAL_ERROR,
}
async def http_exception_handler(request: Request, exc: Exception) -> JSONResponse:
"""
Handle FastAPI HTTPException with standardized error format.
Converts HTTP status codes to string error codes for consistency with MCP.
"""
http_exc = cast("HTTPException", exc)
correlation_id = getattr(request.state, "correlation_id", None)
# Map status code to error code
error_code = _HTTP_TO_ERROR_CODE.get(http_exc.status_code, ErrorCode.INTERNAL_ERROR)
logger.warning(
"HTTP exception",
status_code=http_exc.status_code,
error_code=error_code,
detail=http_exc.detail,
)
response_content: dict = {
"error": {
"code": error_code,
"message": str(http_exc.detail),
}
}
if correlation_id:
response_content["error"]["details"] = {"correlation_id": correlation_id}
return JSONResponse(
status_code=http_exc.status_code,
content=response_content,
)
# =============================================================================
# SETUP FUNCTION
# =============================================================================
def _uuid_field_remediation(errors: Sequence[Any]) -> str | None:
"""Spell out the fix when a truncated id is sent where a UUID is required.
Agents routinely copy the 8-character task prefix the system shows them
(e.g. the ``[cee99ecc]`` commit prefix) and send it as ``task_id``, which
fails UUID validation with an opaque "invalid length" message and wastes a
call. Detect that case and hand back an actionable remediation instead.
"""
for err in errors:
if not isinstance(err, dict):
continue
loc = err.get("loc") or ()
field = loc[-1] if loc else None
if field == "task_id" and "uuid" in str(err.get("type", "")).lower():
return (
"Use the FULL 36-character task UUID, not the 8-character short "
"form shown in commit prefixes or summaries. The full id is in "
"the `task_id` field of the envelope returned by give_me_work "
"or your most recent verb."
)
return None
# Credential-bearing request fields. A 422 on a secret-bearing request
# would otherwise dump the plaintext GitHub PAT / provider API key / bearer
# token into structlog output before the route ever encrypts it. The per-field
# ``errors`` carry only field names and types (never values), so they stay
# logged unchanged. Match by exact key name so a renamed secret field is
# caught by the next audit pass rather than silently leaking.
_SECRET_FIELD_NAMES: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
{
"git_token",
"api_key",
"auth_token",
"token",
"password",
"secret",
"client_secret",
"access_token",
"refresh_token",
}
)
_REDACTED = "***REDACTED***"
def _scrub_secrets(value: Any) -> Any:
"""Return a deep copy of ``value`` with known secret fields redacted.
Recurses into nested dicts and lists so a secret inside ``nested: {...}``
or a list element is also scrubbed. Non-secret fields are preserved so ops
can still see which field broke. The original ``rve.body`` is not mutated
(the 422 response body echoes the client's own submission unscrubbed).
"""
if isinstance(value, dict):
return {
k: (_REDACTED if k in _SECRET_FIELD_NAMES else _scrub_secrets(v))
for k, v in value.items()
}
if isinstance(value, list):
return [_scrub_secrets(v) for v in value]
return value
async def request_validation_handler(request: Request, exc: Exception) -> JSONResponse:
"""Log the rejected body before returning the standard 422 response.
FastAPI's default 422 returns validation details to the client but
nothing lands in server logs. During smoke tests this leaves us
blind to which field actually broke. Log the body + the per-field
errors so the next 422 is debuggable in one log scan.
When the failure is a truncated ``task_id`` (the recurring agent mistake),
add a ``remediate`` hint so the agent knows to retry with the full UUID.
F022: the log line scrubs known credential-bearing fields
(``git_token`` / ``api_key`` / ``auth_token`` / …) from the body before
logging. The 422 *response* body is unchanged — the client sent those
values, only the server's own log is redacted.
"""
rve = cast("RequestValidationError", exc)
body = rve.body if isinstance(rve.body, str | bytes | dict | list) else None
errors = rve.errors()
body_for_log = _scrub_secrets(body) if isinstance(body, dict | list) else body
logger.warning(
"Request validation failed",
path=request.url.path,
method=request.method,
body=body_for_log,
errors=errors,
)
# jsonable_encoder is mandatory: Pydantic v2 stashes the raw exception
# object under error['ctx']['error'] for any validator that raises
# ValueError (e.g. blocker_type), and a raw Exception is not JSON
# serializable — without this json.dumps crashes the 422 render into a
# 500. FastAPI's own default validation handler encodes for the same reason.
content: dict[str, Any] = {
"detail": jsonable_encoder(errors),
"body": jsonable_encoder(body),
}
remediate = _uuid_field_remediation(errors)
if remediate is not None:
content["remediate"] = remediate
return JSONResponse(
status_code=http_status.HTTP_422_UNPROCESSABLE_CONTENT,
content=content,
)
def setup_middleware(app: FastAPI) -> None:
"""
Setup all middleware for the application.
Order matters:
1. CorrelationIdMiddleware - first to set correlation ID
2. RequestLoggingMiddleware - logs with correlation ID
Exception handler priority:
1. RequestValidationError - 422s; log body + per-field errors
2. HTTPException - most common, converts to string error codes
3. RobocoError - custom domain exceptions
4. Exception - catch-all for unexpected errors
"""
# Exception handlers (order: specific to general)
app.add_exception_handler(RequestValidationError, request_validation_handler)
app.add_exception_handler(HTTPException, http_exception_handler)
app.add_exception_handler(RobocoError, roboco_exception_handler)
app.add_exception_handler(ServiceError, service_exception_handler)
app.add_exception_handler(RateLimitError, rate_limit_exception_handler)
app.add_exception_handler(Exception, generic_exception_handler)
# Middleware (added in reverse order due to LIFO): the LAST add_middleware
# call is the OUTERMOST. DbCommitMiddleware is added FIRST so it is the
# INNERMOST of all four — closest to the routes, right next to CORS —
# and, critically, INSIDE FlowVerbTimeoutMiddleware: a hanging commit on a
# flow-verb request stays bounded by Flow's asyncio.timeout, and Flow's
# own synthesized 504 (sent via its own upstream `send`, never re-entering
# `self.app`) never reaches DbCommitMiddleware at all. FlowVerbTimeoutMiddleware
# is added next so correlation + logging still wrap the 504 it returns,
# AND its asyncio.timeout cancels the route coroutine + its get_db
# dependency directly (same task, reliable cancel).
app.add_middleware(DbCommitMiddleware)
app.add_middleware(FlowVerbTimeoutMiddleware)
app.add_middleware(RequestLoggingMiddleware)
app.add_middleware(CorrelationIdMiddleware)
class FlowVerbTimeoutMiddleware:
"""Pure-ASGI server-side timeout on gateway intent-verb requests.
A hung flow verb — e.g. ``claim()`` blocked on a ``SELECT ... FOR
UPDATE`` row lock held by a prior stuck transaction — would otherwise hold
its request transaction open indefinitely. uvicorn does not cancel the
endpoint coroutine on client disconnect, and ``get_db`` only rolled back
on ``Exception``, so the row lock was never released and every later
task-row write on that task wedged (the 2026-07-07
``kimi-k2.7-code:cloud`` agent on task 79d686f0). This wraps each
``/api/v1/flow/*`` request in ``asyncio.timeout``; on expiry the inner
app is cancelled (CancelledError propagates through ``get_db``, which now
invalidates the session — releasing the lock and discarding a connection
that may be mid-protocol rather than reusing it via a rollback, see
``get_db``) and a clean retryable 504 envelope is returned. Pure ASGI (not
BaseHTTPMiddleware) so cancellation propagates into the route coroutine
without the spawned-task gap.
Reads (``evidence``) and journal writes (``note``) don't touch the task
row, so they are unaffected; only task-row writes route through ``claim``.
``_SLOW_VERBS`` (from ``roboco.foundation.policy.flow_timeouts`` — git
push + quality gate, a multi-step PR-create chain, workspace clone, or
planning writes) get the longer ``flow_verb_slow_timeout_seconds`` budget
instead of the default — routine calls to those verbs otherwise exceed
120s. The same set drives the agent-side MCP client's timeout
(``roboco/mcp/flow_server.py``) so the two walls can't drift apart.
"""
def __init__(self, app: ASGIApp) -> None:
self.app = app
async def __call__(self, scope: Scope, receive: Receive, send: Send) -> None:
if scope["type"] != "http" or not scope["path"].startswith("/api/v1/flow/"):
await self.app(scope, receive, send)
return
verb = scope["path"].rstrip("/").rsplit("/", 1)[-1]
timeout = (
settings.flow_verb_slow_timeout_seconds
if verb in _SLOW_VERBS
else settings.flow_verb_timeout_seconds
)
started = False
async def send_wrapper(message: Any) -> None:
nonlocal started
if message["type"] == "http.response.start":
started = True
await send(message)
try:
async with asyncio.timeout(timeout):
await self.app(scope, receive, send_wrapper)
except TimeoutError:
# The inner app was cancelled mid-verb; get_db has already
# invalidated the session (releasing the FOR UPDATE lock and
# discarding the connection) by the time we get here.
if started:
# The route had already begun a response before the timeout
# fired — the client owns whatever was sent; we cannot start
# a new one. Rare for a hung verb (it hangs before responding).
return
body = json.dumps(
{
"status": None,
"task_id": None,
"next": None,
"evidence": {},
"context_briefing": {},
"error": "gateway_timeout",
"message": (
f"verb exceeded the {timeout:.0f}s server-side timeout; "
"the request transaction was rolled back"
),
"remediate": (
"retry the verb; if it persists the underlying task "
"may be wedged — escalate"
),
}
).encode()
headers = [
(b"content-type", b"application/json"),
(b"content-length", str(len(body)).encode()),
]
try:
await send(
{"type": "http.response.start", "status": 504, "headers": headers}
)
await send({"type": "http.response.body", "body": body})
except Exception:
# Client may have already disconnected (the original trigger);
# the lock is released regardless. Nothing to do.
pass
class DbCommitMiddleware:
"""Commits the request's DB session before the response reaches the client.
FastAPI resolves ``Depends(get_db)`` on the request-scoped ``AsyncExitStack``
and sends the response (``fastapi/routing.py``'s ``request_response``,
``await response(scope, receive, send)``) BEFORE that stack unwinds and
runs ``get_db``'s post-yield ``await session.commit()``. So every write
endpoint that relies on it returns 200 while its commit is still pending —
a follow-up request (or a fresh connection) can read pre-commit state —
and a commit that later FAILS leaves the client told "ok" with nothing
persisted.
``get_db_committed`` (``roboco/db/base.py`` — the ``roboco.api.deps.DbSession``
target every route depends on) stashes the live session on
``request.state.db_session`` before yielding. This middleware wraps
``send``: on the FIRST ``http.response.start`` it commits that session
BEFORE forwarding the event, so the client only ever sees the response
after the commit lands. A commit failure rolls back and re-raises — the
response hasn't started, so the surrounding exception-handling machinery
(FastAPI's handlers / Starlette's ``ServerErrorMiddleware``) turns it into
a clean 500 instead of the silent post-200 loss. ``session.in_transaction()``
makes the check idempotent and skips the exception path for free: an
exception rolls back (and closes) the session inside ``get_db`` before
its error response is built, so by the time THAT response's
``http.response.start`` reaches here there is no open transaction left
to commit.
Added INSIDE (closer to the routes than) ``FlowVerbTimeoutMiddleware`` —
see ``setup_middleware`` — so a hanging commit on a flow-verb request
stays bounded by Flow's ``asyncio.timeout``. That timeout is scoped to
the WHOLE ``self.app(...)`` call including this middleware, so its
deadline can fire while the commit below is itself in flight (not just
while a route handler hangs before responding) — ``started`` in the
outer middleware is still ``False`` at that point (its own wrapped
``send`` hasn't been called yet), so it sends its 504 normally once the
``CancelledError`` below propagates.
The commit itself (``_commit_shielded``) runs cancellation-safe: a bare
``await session.commit()`` cancelled mid-wire abandons the asyncpg
connection in an undefined protocol state, and the pool's own recovery —
``invalidate()`` forcing the driver's ``terminate()`` — is itself
implicated in a uvloop/asyncpg segfault class observed on CI (uvloop
0.22 + asyncpg 0.31 + Python 3.13; see ``ROBOCO_UVICORN_LOOP``). So the
commit runs as its own task, shielded from this request's cancellation,
and gets a short grace (``settings.db_commit_cancel_grace_seconds``) to
finish naturally instead of being severed on the spot. Only a commit
that actually fails, or one still stuck past the grace, gets invalidated
— and re-raising the original ``CancelledError`` afterward still
propagates up through FastAPI's dependency ``AsyncExitStack`` (still
open here — ``response(scope, receive, send)`` is called from inside it,
see ``get_db_committed``'s docstring) into ``get_db``'s own
``except asyncio.CancelledError``, which invalidates the session again —
a safe no-op (SQLAlchemy's ``Session.invalidate()`` only touches the
connection once; a session with no open transaction left skips it) that
keeps the two layers independent rather than coupled.
"""
def __init__(self, app: ASGIApp) -> None:
self.app = app
async def __call__(self, scope: Scope, receive: Receive, send: Send) -> None:
if scope["type"] != "http":
await self.app(scope, receive, send)
return
async def send_wrapper(message: Any) -> None:
if message["type"] == "http.response.start":
session = scope.get("state", {}).get("db_session")
if session is not None and session.in_transaction():
await _commit_shielded(session)
await send(message)
await self.app(scope, receive, send_wrapper)
async def _commit_shielded(session: Any) -> None:
"""Commit ``session`` without abandoning it mid-wire on cancellation.
Runs the commit as an independent task and shields the wait on it from
this request's own cancellation (a plain ``await session.commit()``
would otherwise hand the request task's cancel straight to the commit
task, since awaiting a Task makes it the awaiter's ``_fut_waiter``).
On cancel, the commit keeps running in the background for up to
``settings.db_commit_cancel_grace_seconds``:
- finishes successfully -> nothing to undo, just re-raise the cancel
(the client's retry is idempotent-safe; data is already durable).
- finishes with an error, or is still stuck past the grace -> the
connection is in a state worth discarding; invalidate() then re-raise.
A non-cancellation commit failure (shield propagates it unchanged)
takes the plain rollback path, unchanged from before.
"""
commit_task = asyncio.ensure_future(session.commit())
try:
await asyncio.shield(commit_task)
except asyncio.CancelledError:
done, _pending = await asyncio.wait(
{commit_task}, timeout=settings.db_commit_cancel_grace_seconds
)
if commit_task not in done:
commit_task.cancel()
with suppress(BaseException):
await commit_task
if not commit_task.cancelled() and commit_task.exception() is None:
raise # committed despite the cancel — nothing to undo
await session.invalidate()
raise
except Exception:
await session.rollback()
raise