mirror of
https://github.com/rennf93/roboco.git
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* [fastapi-guard] Phase 1a: gated config flags for the HTTP security layer Adds the ROBOCO_GUARD_* settings (all default-off / secure-default) for the upcoming fastapi-guard 7.2.0 hardening — guard_enabled (master switch), guard_fail_secure (fail-closed default; NAS overrides to false), guard_telemetry_enabled + guard_agent_api_key + guard_project_id (guard-agent telemetry, opt-in), guard_emergency + guard_emergency_whitelist (lockdown kill switch). Inert until consumed: nothing reads them yet, so the request path is unchanged. Foundation for v0.16.0. * [fastapi-guard] Phase 1b: security foundation module + gated wiring Add fastapi-guard 7.2.0 + guard-core 3.3.0 (bare, unpinned) and roboco/security.py: - build_security_config() from settings — behind-nginx real-IP (trusted_proxies + trust_x_forwarded_proto), HSTS/CSP headers, threat-ban + 404-sweep rules, redis-backed state, exclude_paths (/ws + health + docs), env-driven enforce_https, fail_secure (secure default), emergency lockdown, guard-agent telemetry (opt-in), passive-mode calibration switch. - guard_deco singleton (SecurityDecorator) for per-route decorators (Phase 2+). - Three custom content validators guard's WAF can't cover: prompt-injection / role-override, secret-exfil / credential-in-body, internal-SSRF. - apply_guard(app) + guarded_lifespan() wired into create_app AFTER settings. guard_passive_mode config flag added. Entirely gated by ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED (default off): create_app mounts nothing and returns the unchanged app when off (verified). make quality GREEN (cov 95.32%, pip-audit clean, import-linter 2/0). 12 new unit tests. * [fastapi-guard] Phase 2: critical-path decorators Apply guard decorators to the highest-value endpoints (metadata-only; enforced only when the middleware is mounted, so no-op while ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED is off): - provider keys (ollama/grok/self-hosted writes): strict rate_limit + max_request_size + block_clouds (no datacenter IP should touch secret writes). - settings write + release approve/reject (CEO-gated): strict rate_limit. - intake chat (prompter start/messages/events): rate_limit + max_request_size + custom_validation(prompt_injection_validator) — the prompt-facing free-text ingress gets the injection/role-override/secret-exfil content scan. make quality GREEN (cov 95.32%, contracts 2/0). App builds with guard off, decorators inert (verified). * [fastapi-guard] Phase 3: wide decorator coverage across ingress + sensitive routes Targeted-wide application (metadata-only; no-op until ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED). The global SecurityMiddleware already rate-limits + WAF-scans every request, so this adds the custom content validators on free-text ingress + tight limits on sensitive ops (not blanket per-route rate_limit on reads): - agent gateway do verbs (note/say/commit/dm/pitch/progress/draft_playbook/...): rate_limit + max_request_size + custom_validation(secret_exfil or prompt_injection). - a2a message/send + chat writes: rate_limit + size + prompt_injection. - optimal/RAG (kb/search, rag/query, mentor/ask, errors/decisions/standards/ learnings): prompt_injection on searches, secret_exfil on record writes; docs index → internal_ssrf. - tasks: create/update → prompt_injection; QA/doc/PM transitions → secret_exfil; CEO-gated verbs → tight rate_limit. - secretary chat → prompt_injection; research → internal_ssrf; orchestrator spawn/mutations → rate_limit; git ops + flow verbs → tight rate_limit. Pure GET/reads left to the global middleware. Applied via a Sonnet workflow, then verified: app builds with guard off (decorators inert), make quality GREEN (cov 95.37%, contracts 2/0). Decoy/honeypot-path surface deferred (needs verified guard ban-API integration — not rushed). * [fastapi-guard] Phase 5: arm the NAS composes in passive/log-only mode Arm ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED=true + ROBOCO_GUARD_PASSIVE_MODE=true + ROBOCO_GUARD_FAIL_SECURE=false on the two NAS composes (docker-compose.yaml + .yml). Passive = guard mounts and logs what it WOULD block but blocks nothing, so the next NAS deploy calibrates against real traffic; flip PASSIVE_MODE off after the false-positive review to enforce. fail_secure=false keeps a guard-internal error from 500ing the personal deploy. The registry (user-facing) compose is deliberately left unarmed so its published default stays conservative. Phase 4 (passive calibration) is the operational step this enables. * feat(security): Phase 3b — full-arsenal per-route guard enrichment Stack the applicable guard decorators per surface instead of the minimal rate_limit/max_request_size/custom_validation triad: content_type_filter on every JSON-body write, honeypot_detection form-traps on human-facing POSTs, block_clouds on key-writes + CEO release ops, behavior_analysis runaway-rate rules on the agent flow/do verbs, suspicious_detection + usage_monitor on the sensitive surfaces. Nine distinct decorators now applied thoughtfully per endpoint. All metadata-only — no-op while ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED is off. * fix(a2a): permit PR reviewer to deliver gate verdicts to the owning PM can_a2a_direct had no pr_reviewer rule, so a reviewer (team=board, or a cell team) fell through to the cell-member path and was cross-cell-denied when the in-path gate delivered a pr_fail change-request to main-pm (or a cross-cell cell-pm): "Cannot A2A main-pm ... Ask None to coordinate with None". The delivery is best-effort, so pr_fail still transitioned but the verdict never reached the owning PM — the blind-re-submit signal-gap the pr_fail fix closes. Add an explicit pr_reviewer handler: it may A2A only cell_pm / main_pm (its sole comms surface — everything else it posts on the PR itself), with a matching route hint. The cell reviewers kept same-team access by coincidence; this scopes every reviewer to PM-only, the correct model, with no other A2A caller affected. Refresh uv.lock to the current resolution. * feat(models): adopt Claude Sonnet 5 as the sonnet tier Point the 'sonnet' alias at claude-sonnet-5 (MODEL_MAP) and give pr_reviewer its own opus tier in ROLE_MODEL_MAP — it was falling through to the sonnet default, and the role gates untrusted external/fork PRs plus root→master, which warrants opus. Price claude-sonnet-5 at the promotional 33% off Sonnet 4.6 ($2.01 / $10.05, cache 0.201 / 0.5025) through 2026-08-31 via a dedicated pricing fragment that beats the bare 'sonnet' alias; revert to full rate when the promo ends. Bare 'sonnet' stays full-rate as a conservative fallback (prod prices the resolved claude-sonnet-5 id from the transcript). Update the model docs and the billing / usage / manifest / spawn tests. * feat(security): calibrate the guard WAF for RoboCo traffic + document the layer The first end-to-end run of the fastapi-guard layer showed active enforcement would block ~50% of legitimate agent traffic — RoboCo request bodies are code, SQL, diffs, file paths, HTML, and URLs, which the stock signature WAF reads as attacks. build_security_config now excludes RoboCo's free-text top-level body fields (derived from the real request models, including the free-form container fields whose nested prose is stringified and scanned) from WAF scanning, dropping the active-mode false-positive rate to zero while keeping the WAF on every non-excluded (id/enum/slug/branch) field and leaving the prompt-injection / secret-exfil / internal-SSRF validators — which run independently of the exclusion — fully in force. enable_penetration_detection is made explicit. Only excluded_detection_body_fields is reliable on guard 7.2.1: the per-route categories knob is bypassed for JSON bodies, and the body scanner excludes top-level keys only (scanning str(value) of every non-excluded field), so free-form container fields must be excluded wholesale. Adds tests/unit/test_security_middleware.py — the first end-to-end exercise of the middleware (mounts it, drives guard's lifespan, fires real requests): proves passive mode is log-only, active mode does not false-positive on realistic agent payloads, threats are still blocked inside excluded fields, and the WAF still fires on non-excluded fields. Docs: CHANGELOG (Unreleased); a user-facing Optional-subsystems page + nav + env reference for the HTTP security layer; the agent-facing RAG corpus (what it is + why a request could be blocked); and the roboco mapping (api-core-websocket / deployment-tooling / _complete_map). * feat(security): Surface N — scanner honeytrap (guard /api auto-ban + nginx edge-drop) Turns scanner probes against the scanner, in two layers matched to where traffic lands. Behind nginx only /api, /ws, /health, /ready reach the orchestrator, so guard can only see (and ban) scanner probes on those paths; the classic root probes (/.env, /wp-login.php, /phpmyadmin, /.git/config) hit the panel. So: - build_security_config's threat_ban_config gains recon / sensitive_file / cms_probing categories. A scanner probing those fingerprints on an /api path is detected on the URL-path scan; repeated probes from one IP trip an adaptive per-IP auto-ban (redis-backed, 24h). Only bans in active mode (passive logs the recon hit) and needs redis (the 24h ban exceeds the in-memory cap). The spec's decoy-route file is redundant — the WAF url-path scan bans regardless of a registered route — so it is intentionally omitted. - docker/nginx.conf drops the classic root scanner paths at the edge with 444 (connection closed, no response) before they reach the panel, anchored to known scanner fingerprints so /.well-known and every real panel/API route are untouched. Always on, independent of ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED. Tests: 2 unit (the exclusion set + the scanner-ban categories are present) and 2 integration (a decoy path is blocked in active mode, passes in passive). The nginx regex was validated against 15 scanner + 19 legit paths (0 false positives). Docs: CHANGELOG, the HTTP-security page, the roboco mapping, and the agent-facing RAG corpus. * Token optimization — per-role observability, compute policy, spawn preflight (#291) * test(models): lock the sonnet→claude-sonnet-5 MODEL_MAP invariant * feat(usage): surface cache tokens + cache_hit_rate in usage breakdowns * feat(usage): add per-role usage breakdown endpoint * feat(usage): add spawn-waste signal (per-role unproductive rate + respawn strikes) * feat(panel): surface per-role cost/cache + spawn-waste on the metrics page * feat(routing): Phase 2 per-role compute policy — qa→haiku, main_pm→sonnet, per-role effort env mechanism (default-inert) * feat(orchestrator): Phase 3 flag-gated spawn preflight — refuse non-gateway delivery roles (respawn-forever guard) * chore(compose): arm ROBOCO_SPAWN_PREFLIGHT_ENABLED on the NAS composes * docs: per-role usage observability, per-role compute policy, and spawn preflight --------- Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(panel): pin outputFileTracingRoot so the standalone build isn't broken by stray lockfiles * feat(routing): populate ROLE_EFFORT_MAP + wire the verified --effort flag (cell_pm/board/auditor to medium) * feat(gateway): omit empty context_briefing sections (Phase 4 payload compaction) * refactor(orchestrator): extract spawn chokepoint guards to restore xenon rank B on spawn_agent --------- Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
444 lines
14 KiB
Python
444 lines
14 KiB
Python
"""agents_config coverage — pure-function role/team resolution."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
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from roboco.agents_config import (
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can_a2a_direct,
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can_assign_tasks,
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can_cancel_tasks,
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can_create_tasks,
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can_send_notifications,
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get_a2a_route_hint,
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get_agent_cell,
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get_agent_role,
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get_agent_skills,
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get_agent_team,
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get_cell_members,
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get_escalation_target,
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get_pm_for_agent,
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get_pm_for_team,
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is_board_member,
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is_ceo,
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is_management,
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is_pm,
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issue_agent_token,
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issue_panel_token,
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verify_agent_token,
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)
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from roboco.seeds.initial_data import CEO_AGENT_ID
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if TYPE_CHECKING:
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import pytest
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# get_agent_role / get_agent_team / get_agent_cell
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_get_agent_role_known() -> None:
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assert get_agent_role("be-dev-1") == "developer"
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def test_get_agent_role_main_pm() -> None:
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assert get_agent_role("main-pm") == "main_pm"
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def test_get_agent_role_unknown() -> None:
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assert get_agent_role("ghost-agent") == "unknown"
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def test_get_agent_team_known() -> None:
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assert get_agent_team("be-dev-1") == "backend"
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def test_get_agent_team_for_main_pm_returns_value() -> None:
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"""main-pm has team 'main_pm' or None depending on config."""
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result = get_agent_team("main-pm")
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assert result is None or isinstance(result, str)
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def test_get_agent_team_for_unknown() -> None:
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assert get_agent_team("ghost-agent") is None
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def test_get_agent_cell_alias_for_team() -> None:
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assert get_agent_cell("be-dev-1") == "backend"
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Role predicates
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_is_pm_for_cell_pm() -> None:
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assert is_pm("be-pm") is True
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def test_is_pm_for_main_pm() -> None:
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assert is_pm("main-pm") is True
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def test_is_pm_for_developer() -> None:
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assert is_pm("be-dev-1") is False
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def test_is_management_for_main_pm() -> None:
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assert is_management("main-pm") is True
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def test_is_management_for_developer() -> None:
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assert is_management("be-dev-1") is False
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def test_is_ceo_for_ceo() -> None:
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assert is_ceo("ceo") is True
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def test_is_ceo_for_developer() -> None:
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assert is_ceo("be-dev-1") is False
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def test_is_board_member() -> None:
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# Whatever the actual board members are, the function should return bool.
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assert isinstance(is_board_member("auditor"), bool)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Permission predicates
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_can_send_notifications_main_pm() -> None:
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assert can_send_notifications("main-pm") is True
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def test_can_send_notifications_developer() -> None:
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assert can_send_notifications("be-dev-1") is False
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def test_can_create_tasks_main_pm() -> None:
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assert can_create_tasks("main-pm") is True
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def test_can_create_tasks_developer() -> None:
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assert can_create_tasks("be-dev-1") is False
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def test_can_assign_tasks_main_pm() -> None:
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assert can_assign_tasks("main-pm") is True
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def test_can_assign_tasks_developer() -> None:
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assert can_assign_tasks("be-dev-1") is False
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def test_can_cancel_tasks_pm() -> None:
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assert can_cancel_tasks("main-pm") is True
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def test_can_cancel_tasks_ceo() -> None:
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"""CEO cannot cancel — they observe only."""
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assert can_cancel_tasks("ceo") is False
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def test_can_cancel_tasks_auditor() -> None:
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assert can_cancel_tasks("auditor") is False
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Escalation + PM resolution
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_get_escalation_target() -> None:
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target = get_escalation_target("be-dev-1")
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assert target is None or isinstance(target, str)
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def test_get_pm_for_team_known() -> None:
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assert get_pm_for_team("backend") == "be-pm"
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def test_get_pm_for_team_unknown() -> None:
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assert get_pm_for_team("mars") is None
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def test_get_pm_for_agent_cell_pm_returns_main_pm() -> None:
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assert get_pm_for_agent("be-pm") == "main-pm"
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def test_get_pm_for_agent_developer() -> None:
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pm = get_pm_for_agent("be-dev-1")
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# Cell members' PM is their cell PM.
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assert pm == "be-pm" or pm is None
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# A2A policy
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_can_a2a_direct_to_ceo_denied() -> None:
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allowed, reason = can_a2a_direct("be-dev-1", "ceo")
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assert allowed is False
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assert reason is not None
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def test_can_a2a_direct_within_cell() -> None:
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allowed, _ = can_a2a_direct("be-dev-1", "be-qa")
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assert isinstance(allowed, bool)
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def test_get_a2a_route_hint_returns_string() -> None:
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hint = get_a2a_route_hint("be-dev-1", "fe-dev-1")
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assert isinstance(hint, str)
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def test_get_a2a_route_hint_for_ceo() -> None:
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hint = get_a2a_route_hint("be-dev-1", "ceo")
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assert "CEO" in hint
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# get_cell_members
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_get_cell_members_backend() -> None:
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members = get_cell_members("backend")
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assert isinstance(members, list)
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def test_get_cell_members_unknown() -> None:
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assert get_cell_members("mars") == []
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# get_agent_skills
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_get_agent_skills_returns_list() -> None:
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skills = get_agent_skills("be-dev-1")
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assert isinstance(skills, list)
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def test_get_agent_skills_unknown_agent() -> None:
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skills = get_agent_skills("ghost-agent")
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assert isinstance(skills, list)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Token issuance + verification (lines 45-46, 67-72, 83-89)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_issue_agent_token_returns_unsigned_when_secret_missing(
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monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
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) -> None:
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monkeypatch.delenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", raising=False)
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assert issue_agent_token("be-dev-1", "developer", "backend") == "UNSIGNED"
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_SHA256_HEX_LEN = 64
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def test_issue_agent_token_signs_when_secret_present(
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monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
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) -> None:
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monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", "test-secret")
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tok = issue_agent_token("be-dev-1", "developer", "backend")
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assert tok != "UNSIGNED"
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# 64 hex chars from sha256
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assert len(tok) == _SHA256_HEX_LEN
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def test_verify_agent_token_round_trips(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
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monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", "rt-secret")
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tok = issue_agent_token("be-dev-1", "developer", "backend")
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assert verify_agent_token(tok, "be-dev-1", "developer", "backend") is True
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def test_verify_agent_token_rejects_when_secret_missing(
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monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
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) -> None:
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monkeypatch.delenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", raising=False)
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assert verify_agent_token("anything", "be-dev-1", "developer", "backend") is False
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def test_verify_agent_token_rejects_unsigned_sentinel(
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monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
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) -> None:
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monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", "any-secret")
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assert verify_agent_token("UNSIGNED", "be-dev-1", "developer", "backend") is False
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def test_verify_agent_token_rejects_empty_token(
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monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
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) -> None:
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monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", "any-secret")
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assert verify_agent_token("", "be-dev-1", "developer", "backend") is False
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def test_verify_agent_token_rejects_mismatched_signature(
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monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
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) -> None:
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monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", "real-secret")
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tok = issue_agent_token("be-dev-1", "developer", "backend")
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# Verify with different role → mismatch.
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assert verify_agent_token(tok, "be-dev-1", "qa", "backend") is False
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# issue_panel_token — the panel's CEO credential for secure mode
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_issue_panel_token_verifies_under_panel_headers(
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monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
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) -> None:
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"""The panel token must verify under the EXACT headers the panel sends:
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X-Agent-Id = CEO uuid, X-Agent-Role = ceo, and NO team (empty)."""
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monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", "panel-secret")
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tok = issue_panel_token()
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assert verify_agent_token(tok, CEO_AGENT_ID, "ceo", "") is True
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def test_issue_panel_token_unsigned_without_secret(
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monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
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) -> None:
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monkeypatch.delenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", raising=False)
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assert issue_panel_token() == "UNSIGNED"
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def test_panel_token_does_not_grant_other_roles_or_identities(
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monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
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) -> None:
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"""The panel token is bound to the CEO identity — it cannot be replayed to
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claim a different role or agent id."""
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monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", "panel-secret")
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tok = issue_panel_token()
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assert verify_agent_token(tok, CEO_AGENT_ID, "developer", "") is False
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assert verify_agent_token(tok, "be-dev-1", "ceo", "") is False
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# get_pm_for_agent main_pm escalation (line 360)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_get_pm_for_agent_main_pm_returns_product_owner() -> None:
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assert get_pm_for_agent("main-pm") == "product-owner"
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# A2A check branches: cell PM rejects board (line 682), cell-member without
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# team falls through to management route (line 704), board successful path
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# (732), main_pm dispatch (744), cell-member outbound to no-team (771-772).
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_can_a2a_direct_cell_pm_to_board_denied() -> None:
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allowed, reason = can_a2a_direct("be-pm", "product-owner")
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assert allowed is False
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assert reason is not None
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assert "main-pm" in reason
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def test_can_a2a_direct_cell_member_to_unknown_management() -> None:
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"""Cell dev → CEO routes through CEO branch, not management."""
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# Dev → main-pm: management → falls into cell_member branch's else case.
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allowed, reason = can_a2a_direct("be-dev-1", "main-pm")
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# Either path works; just ensure structured output.
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assert isinstance(allowed, bool)
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assert reason is None or isinstance(reason, str)
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def test_can_a2a_direct_main_pm_to_developer_denied() -> None:
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allowed, reason = can_a2a_direct("main-pm", "be-dev-1")
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# main-pm to a developer routed via cell PM.
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assert allowed is False
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assert reason is not None
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def test_can_a2a_direct_main_pm_to_cell_pm_allowed() -> None:
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allowed, _ = can_a2a_direct("main-pm", "be-pm")
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assert allowed is True
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def test_can_a2a_direct_board_to_main_pm_allowed() -> None:
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allowed, _ = can_a2a_direct("product-owner", "main-pm")
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assert allowed is True
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def test_can_a2a_direct_board_to_developer_denied() -> None:
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allowed, reason = can_a2a_direct("product-owner", "be-dev-1")
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assert allowed is False
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assert reason is not None
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def test_can_a2a_direct_pr_reviewer_to_main_pm_allowed() -> None:
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|
"""The root→master gate reviewer delivers pr_fail change-requests to the
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|
owning Main PM. Denying it silently strands the verdict (blind re-submit)."""
|
|
allowed, reason = can_a2a_direct("pr-reviewer-1", "main-pm")
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assert allowed is True
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|
assert reason is None
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def test_can_a2a_direct_cell_pr_reviewer_to_cell_pm_allowed() -> None:
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|
"""The cell→root gate reviewer delivers its verdict to the owning cell PM."""
|
|
allowed, reason = can_a2a_direct("be-pr-reviewer", "be-pm")
|
|
assert allowed is True
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|
assert reason is None
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def test_can_a2a_direct_pr_reviewer_to_developer_denied() -> None:
|
|
"""A PR reviewer only A2As the owning PM — never devs/qa directly."""
|
|
allowed, reason = can_a2a_direct("pr-reviewer-1", "be-dev-1")
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|
assert allowed is False
|
|
assert reason is not None
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def test_get_a2a_route_hint_cell_member_to_management() -> None:
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|
"""Non-CEO cell-member → management agent (no team) routes via cell PM."""
|
|
hint = get_a2a_route_hint("be-dev-1", "main-pm")
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# main-pm has team None → falls through to management branch (771-772).
|
|
assert "be-pm" in hint or "main-pm" in hint or "Use" in hint
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def test_can_a2a_direct_cell_member_to_unknown_returns_management_hint() -> None:
|
|
"""Cell-member → agent with unresolvable team hits management branch (704)."""
|
|
allowed, reason = can_a2a_direct("be-dev-1", "ghost-agent")
|
|
assert allowed is False
|
|
assert reason is not None
|
|
assert "be-pm" in reason or "main-pm" in reason
|
|
|
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|
|
def test_can_a2a_direct_unknown_from_agent_falls_through() -> None:
|
|
"""An agent with no team hits the final fallback (line 750)."""
|
|
allowed, reason = can_a2a_direct("ghost", "be-dev-1")
|
|
assert allowed is False
|
|
assert reason is not None
|
|
assert "not permitted" in reason
|
|
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|
|
def test_get_a2a_route_hint_cell_member_to_unknown_routes_via_cell_pm() -> None:
|
|
"""Cell-member → unknown agent (no team) hits lines 770-772."""
|
|
hint = get_a2a_route_hint("be-dev-1", "ghost-agent")
|
|
assert "be-pm" in hint
|
|
assert "main-pm" in hint
|
|
|
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|
|
def test_get_a2a_route_hint_unknown_from_agent_falls_through() -> None:
|
|
"""from_agent with no team falls through to escalate fallback (line 774)."""
|
|
hint = get_a2a_route_hint("ghost", "be-dev-1")
|
|
assert "escalate" in hint.lower()
|