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* [sweep] lifecycle: 6 confirmed gaps fixed (cancel-ceo-gate, claim_pr_review gate, needs_team_match, valid_next_verbs narrowing, pr_reviewer unclaim, complete side_effect ordering)
* [chore] logical-gaps: route-layer force gate + privileged-field gate + pre-task audit attribution
tasks.py (5 gaps):
- _HATCH_OVERRIDE_STATES expanded to 7: a privileged PATCH INTO a gate
state (completed/cancelled/awaiting_{qa,documentation,pr_review,
pm_review,ceo_approval}) now requires explicit force — the panel hatch
is no longer a quiet click that drops a task into/out of a human gate.
- _RESURRECT_SOURCE_STATES: a privileged PATCH OUT of a terminal status
(completed/cancelled) resurrects finished work and likewise requires
force, audited as an override.
- _PRIVILEGED_UPDATE_FIELDS gate: a bare task owner (UPDATE_OWN, no
ASSIGN) cannot self-reassign / re-team / re-parent / re-depend /
re-block / rewrite-plan / re-project its task — those structural fields
are PM-gated; the REST surface must not bypass the verb-layer's
reassign/delegate/triage gate. A 403 names the touched fields + the
verb to use instead.
- pre-task create denial: a role that cannot create tasks is now logged
via log_task_creation_denial (distinct task_creation target_type +
attempted payload) instead of a 'N/A' task_id that coerced to NULL and
left the role-escalation attempt unattributable.
audit.py:
- split log_task_action_denial (5-param, under PLR0913) from
log_task_creation_denial (4-param) — the create path has no task_id;
the non-UUID sentinel (N/A) is preserved in details[target_id_raw]
rather than dropped to a NULL target_id indistinguishable from any
other NULL-target denial.
tests:
- test_tasks_routes.py: parametrized admin-override gate (force
required for gate + terminal states, force succeeds).
- test_tasks_route_privileged_fields.py: dev owner 403 on
assigned_to/team/parent_task_id, 200 on dev-facing description.
- test_audit.py: pre-task attribution via log_task_creation_denial +
non-UUID sentinel preservation.
* [chore] logical-gaps: kanban board column coverage + status-class fixes (6 gaps)
models/kanban.py:
- DEV_COLUMNS: cover all 15 lifecycle statuses (was 7; dropped BACKLOG,
PAUSED, VERIFYING, NEEDS_REVISION, AWAITING_PR_REVIEW, AWAITING_PM_REVIEW,
AWAITING_CEO_APPROVAL, CANCELLED). A dev whose task bounced to
needs_revision or sits in a gate used to see their own task vanish.
- PM_COLUMNS: add the gate/revision/paused/cancelled/backlog columns so the
cell PM sees the QA->docs->PR-review->PM-review->CEO chain on its board.
- QA_COLUMNS: drop the 'In Review'->VERIFYING mapping. VERIFYING is the dev's
self-verification (task still with the dev, not with QA); it misrepresented
dev mid-verification as active QA work.
services/kanban.py:
- _build_flat_board: add an 'Other' fallback column for any task whose status
matches no configured column, so total_cards == sum(card_count) and no card
is built-then-silently-dropped (the vanished-card leak).
- get_qa_board: drop VERIFYING from qa_statuses (consistent with the column
change).
- get_documenter_board: scope to task_type=documentation so a dev IN_PROGRESS
code task sharing the cell team no longer appears under 'Gathering'.
- get_main_pm_board_flat: widen the status filter to include PENDING/CLAIMED/
COMPLETED and route those to the incoming/distributed/done columns, which
were structurally always empty under the in-flight-only filter.
tests/integration/test_kanban_service.py: parametrized coverage of every
dropped dev status, PM gate/revision states, QA excludes VERIFYING,
documenter excludes dev code tasks, flat Main PM incoming/distributed/done
populated, and the 'Other' fallback invariant.
* [chore] logical-gaps: lifecycle-enforcement validators + status-class fixes (5 gaps)
enforcement/task_lifecycle.py:
- drop the spurious VERIFYING->awaiting_documentation legacy edge. The
canonical exit is submit_qa -> awaiting_qa -> (qa_pass) ->
awaiting_documentation; the direct edge bypassed the entire QA review hop
(ungated — no role gate existed for it).
- is_waiting_state: add awaiting_pr_review. The PR-review gate parks the PM on
the reviewer; it is a waiting state. The hard-coded set was never updated
when AWAITING_PR_REVIEW was added to the enum, so the gate status was
miscategorized as active.
foundation/_validate_lifecycle.py:
- _check_status_enum_coverage: replace the tautology (STATUS_GRAPH keys every
Status by construction) with a real bidirectional check — every non-terminal
Status is the source of a transition (catches orphan states), and every
source/target referenced is a real Status member (catches stray-string
targets).
- _check_terminal_exits: split the {COMPLETED, CANCELLED} reachability into a
COMPLETED-path requirement + a cancel-exit requirement. The cancel fan-out
made the old check structurally trivial — a status whose sole exit was cancel
passed with no real forward completion path.
- _check_status_enum_parity (new, registered): cross-check spec.Status against
models.base.TaskStatus at import so the ORM column type and the lifecycle
map cannot drift (TaskType had this guard; Status did not).
tests: verifying->awaiting_documentation rejected, self-fail preserved,
awaiting_pr_review is waiting, mutually-disjoint classification invariant,
status enum parity, stray-string-target / orphan-source / cancel-only-exit
validator rejections.
* [chore] logical-gaps: stream-bus poison-pill ACK + dead-letter, periodic reclaim, cancelled-handler marker cleanup (3 gaps)
stream_bus.py:
- _handle_message isolates Event.from_json in its own try/except; an
undecodable payload (unknown EventType, bad UUID/timestamp, malformed
JSON) is dead-lettered then ACKed instead of falling through to the
broad except that only logged — a poison pill stayed pending forever
and re-failed on every reclaim. (gap: stream-bus-malformed-event-poison-pill)
- _reclaim_loop spawned alongside _listen_loop in start_listening (cancelled
in disconnect). XREADGROUP '>' delivers only NEW messages, so a runtime
handler failure left its message pending and unretried until a restart;
the loop re-runs recover_pending every 60s so the idempotency-guarded
replay actually fires. (gap: stream-bus-no-runtime-reclaim-loop)
- _run_handler_guarded marker cleanup catches BaseException so a handler
cancelled mid-flight (asyncio.CancelledError is BaseException-derived
since 3.8) clears its SET-NX marker; otherwise the guard suppressed the
very redelivery that would complete the work. (gap: stream-bus-cancelled-
handler-keeps-idempotency-marker)
TDD: 4 red->green tests in tests/unit/events/test_bus.py.
* [chore] logical-gaps: verb_runner trailing-None side-effect guard + actor_agent_id threading (3 gaps)
_verb_runner.py:
- run_intent skips the side_effects loop when a TRAILING composed action
returned None (its source-status check failed under a concurrent
transition). Previously the loop ran unconditionally on the None task
and _do_push_branch(None)/_do_pr_merge(None) crashed with a
NoneType AttributeError, turning the clean INVALID_STATE the
entry/intermediate guards give into a 500/respawn loop. The trailing
None now flows to the caller's `if task is None` handler. Latent today
(no shipped intent has both a None-capable compose and trailing
side_effects) but the runner is generic. (gap: runner-side-effects-fire-
on-trailing-none-task)
- _do_push_branch / _do_create_pr / _do_create_root_pr forward
actor_agent_id=agent.id into git_service (push_branch / create_pr),
matching _do_pr_merge. Without it, a verb on a task whose assigned_to
was cleared before the side effect falls through to created_by and
pushes from / opens a PR against the wrong workspace.
(gap: side-effect-handlers-drop-actor-agent-id)
- _do_escalate_to_ceo forwards actor_agent_id=agent.id so the
awaiting_ceo_approval audit row attributes to the specific PM/Board
agent. (gap: do-escalate-to-ceo-drops-actor-agent-id)
task.py: escalate_to_ceo gains actor_agent_id param, passed as
audit_agent_id to _validate_and_set_status and recorded as
escalated_by_agent_id in the event payload + log. escalate_to_ceo_for_agent
forwards agent.agent_id.
_impl.py: the main_pm complete->escalate path forwards
actor_agent_id=main_pm_agent_id.
TDD: 5 red->green tests (synthetic trailing-None intent, actor forwarding
for push_branch/create_pr/create_root_pr/escalate_to_ceo) + real-DB audit
test asserting the awaiting_ceo_approval row carries the actor UUID.
Updated 3 board escalate_to_ceo tests to assert the forwarded actor.
* [B-REL] release executor: idempotent half-landed retry + commit-scoped CI + decoupled workflow
Three confirmed gaps in the release fail-closed pipeline (#87/#318/#402):
#87 publish_failed retry duplicates changelog: execute() only short-circuits
on an existing tag. A publish_failed outcome (commit pushed + CI green, no
tag) left no tag, so a retry re-ran apply_version_bumps + write_changelog_entry
(re-inserting the entry above the already-present heading -> duplicate) and
commit_and_push (a second chore(release) commit). Add ReleaseOps
.release_commit_sha(version) detecting a prior release commit on the branch
(clone already at the target version); when present, skip the bump/changelog/
gate/commit pipeline and rejoin the shared CI -> publish tail on the existing
commit. No second commit, no duplicate entry.
#318 wait_for_ci polls branch-latest, not the release commit: a later push to
master during the ~40min wait made the latest run's head_sha != the release
sha forever, exhausting _CI_MAX_POLLS -> false ci_failed on a release whose
own CI was green. Thread head_sha through get_latest_ci_conclusion /
_fetch_latest_ci_run (GitHub actions/runs?head_sha=) so the gate polls the
release commit's own run; a concurrent push can no longer mask it.
#402 release CI gate reuses self_heal_ci_workflow: that setting documents an
empty-string mode for single-workflow repos which, inherited here, degraded
the fail-closed gate to the all-workflows mode git.py itself flags as
unreliable. Add release_ci_workflow (default ci.yml) and _resolve_release_
ci_workflow(); the release gate always resolves a NAMED workflow, never None.
Refactor: bundle the CI-fetch per-project inputs into a _CiRunQuery dataclass
so _fetch_latest_ci_run stays under the arg-count gate; unify the half-landed
path into execute's shared tail (drops a separate _publish_existing, one
return path). TDD red->green; ruff/mypy clean.
* [chore] logical-gaps: a2a service hierarchy gate (typed, unconditional) + persist skill on message row (3 gaps)
create_a2a_notification gated A2A hierarchy only when both ends resolved
(`if from_agent and target_agent:`), so an unattributed (from_agent falsy)
or unresolvable-target request slipped past the hierarchy matrix and
dispatched with from_agent='unknown' / to_agent='' — and a denial came back
as a bare ValueError indistinguishable from the missing-task_id ValueError.
Require both ends present, then validate via the shared typed
validate_a2a_access path (A2AAccessDeniedError + route_hint) so the legacy
notification surface enforces the same who-may-talk-to-whom invariant as the
conversation path.
send() accepts skill= and the gateway callers (qa/doc/pr_gate) pass it
expecting the receiver to learn which capability the message is about, but
send_chat_message never read it from options — silently dropped. Persist a
nullable skill column (migration 054) on a2a_messages, wire it through
send_chat_message + _msg_to_model + the A2AChatMessage model, and fix the
send() docstring (it claimed 'recorded in message metadata').
TDD: 4 red→green (skill recorded on message + surfaces in inbox; permission
denied raises typed A2AAccessDeniedError with route_hint; self-A2A raises
typed; missing from_agent raises instead of silent dispatch). 103 a2a
integration tests green; ruff/mypy clean; migration 054 verified
upgrade/downgrade on throwaway PG.
* [chore] logical-gaps: release-proposal already_published closes proposal + heartbeat-lock-loss cancels execute (2 gaps)
approve() closed the proposal only on status=='published'. A retry that finds
the tag already shipped returns 'already_published' (is_already_published),
so if a prior publish's route commit failed / HTTP 504'd, the proposal stayed
non-terminal forever — every retry returned already_published and never
closed it; only a manual cancel unstuck it. Close on both published and
already_published: the release shipped either way.
_heartbeat_loop returned silently when the lock was no longer owned (a >TTL
Redis outage let the mutex expire mid-execute), leaving executor.execute
running UNGUARDED — a concurrent approve (once Redis returns) could then
acquire the lock and _prepare_release_clone rm -rf the in-flight shared
release clone while the first execute was still mid-run_gate, re-opening the
very rm -rf-clone race the mutex+heartbeat exist to prevent. Run execute as a
task; on lock-loss the heartbeat sets a flag and cancels it, and approve()
turns the CancelledError into a structured 'lock_lost' result (an external
cancellation of approve itself still propagates — distinguished by the flag).
TDD: 2 red→green (already_published → COMPLETED not wedged; heartbeat lock-loss
→ lock_lost + execute cancelled, proposal not completed). 8 concurrency tests
green; ruff/mypy clean.
* [chore] logical-gaps: release approve async dispatch (202) — kill the 40min synchronous HTTP 504
The approve route ran the whole fail-closed execute inline: clone(600s) +
gate(1800s) + CI poll(2400s) + publish(300s) ≈ up to 85min worst case. nginx
(the single :3000 entry point, ~60s read timeout) 504'd long before it
finished, so the CEO's approve always appeared to fail even when the release
succeeded server-side — the structured ReleaseResult was unreachable over the
wire. dispatch_approve spawns the execute in a background task with a fresh
session (built from the request session's engine) and the route returns 202
'accepted' immediately; _INFLIGHT_APPROVES tracks the dispatched task for
observability (self-cleans via done-callback; the Redis mutex still refuses a
double-execute on a second click). The panel already polls GET /proposal every
30s, so it observes the final status (COMPLETED on published/already_published,
else the proposal stays open for retry); the card's approve toast now treats
'accepted' as an info 'dispatched, running in the background' instead of the
old 'Release halted' warning.
TDD: 2 route tests red→green (approve returns 202 'accepted' + the proposal
transitions to COMPLETED / stays PENDING once the background faked execute
completes; the dispatched task is awaited while the executor patch is live).
83 release tests green; ruff/mypy clean; panel typecheck+lint+format+test
green.
* [chore] mcp-servers: normalize exception bodies to Envelope + lift task_id/correlation_id on circuit_open (#232 #359 #57)
flow_server/do_server: the non-404 JSON path returned exception-handler bodies
raw (dict `error` from roboco/generic/http exception handlers, or a 422
`detail` list) — neither is the Envelope wire format the agent is prompted to
trust (string error kind + message + remediate + missing), so on any
service/validation failure the agent got no remediate and flailed until the
breaker tripped. _normalize_exception_envelope lifts the body into a real
Envelope (code -> counted string kind via _classify_dict_error_code, NOT_FOUND
-> not_found, message lifted, remediate synthesized, missing=[]; 422 -> incomplete_input with the validation detail preserved). The synthesized
envelope still flows through the breaker so a 500/422 storm trips it.
_record_and_check_circuit: the circuit_open substitution dropped task_id /
correlation_id from the top level (the SDK's envelope omits them); lift them
from the original rejection so the agent's envelope contract and ops audit-join
of the trip event still work, not just nested in inner.
intake_server._post_event: capture the relay response body under `detail` on
non-success so the grok intake agent gets the real reason (e.g. 'session not in
MegaTask scope' on a 422) instead of an opaque http_422 token with no
remediation.
TDD red->green; ruff + mypy clean; 157 mcp/SDK-breaker tests pass.
* [chore] a2a-routes: authenticate send_message responder + gate cancel task (PM-only) (#116 #423)
send_message took the responder identity from a client-supplied
metadata.from_agent, so any caller could spoof anyone (e.g.
from_agent='ceo') in the task's notes and in the spawn/notification
routed back to the original requester. Stamp the authenticated caller's
slug as the responder instead (CurrentAgentContext).
cancel_task was ungated: no auth dependency and no role check, so any
agent (or any caller) could cancel a task the lifecycle rule reserves to
PM roles (Any -> cancelled: PM roles only) — and the cascade-cancel of
all non-terminal descendants ran with a hardcoded cell_pm role and no
recorded actor. Add require_any_authenticated_agent + a PM-or-above gate,
and thread the authenticated role (into the cascade role gate) and slug
(into the cancellation note) into A2AService.cancel_task.
Tests: send_message ignores a spoofed from_agent and records the
authenticated slug; cancel rejects a developer (403) and a missing auth
header; a PM cancel threads role + slug into the service; the pre-existing
cancel success/already-terminal/not-found tests now run under a PM context
(the success test's body was missing the A2A 'name' field and false-passed
on a 422 — now genuine).
* [chore] work-session-routes: ownership check on mutating routes + stamp merge_pr merged_by from auth (#158 #271)
Every mutating work-session route keyed off session_id alone after the
role gate, so any developer could commit into / abandon / complete a
peer's active session (breaking the single-active-WorkSession invariant
and stranding that task) and any PM could merge any cell's PR — the REST
surface bypassed the verb layer's active-claimant gate entirely. Add a
shared _assert_ownership guard: dev ops require session.agent_id to be
the caller; PM merge_pr requires a cell PM to own the session's task cell
(main PM / CEO / board coordinate every cell), 404 for a missing session.
merge_pr took merged_by from the request body, so any PM could record a
PR merge under another agent's id, corrupting the merge audit trail the
completion/CEO-approval chain and metrics rely on. Drop the body param
and stamp the authenticated caller's agent_id as merged_by (the
MergePRRequest schema is gone with it).
Tests: a second dev's token hitting a peer's /commits and /abandon -> 403
(session left active); a foreign-cell PM -> 403, same-cell PM -> 200; a
spoofed body merged_by is ignored and the persisted row records the PM.
* [chore] ci-watch/dep-update dedupe: normalize git_url + treat empty-string workflow as default (#148 #1267)
The per-repo open-task dedupe filtered ProjectTable.git_url == git_url
(exact), while the orchestrator collapses its poll set by repo_key
(lower / strip trailing '/' / drop '.git'). Two projects whose git_url
differs only by those accidentals (a monorepo's cell-projects, or a
re-registered canonical project) defeated the one-open-task-per-repo
invariant and opened duplicate fix / dep-update tasks. Extract
roboco.utils.converters.repo_key as the single source and match the
dedupe query on its SQL mirror (regexp_replace(rtrim(lower(...)))).
The ci_watch (git_url, workflow) dedupe used func.coalesce(ci_watch_workflow,
default), but SQL COALESCE only substitutes for NULL — a project saved with
ci_watch_workflow='' (reachable via panel/API) yielded coalesce('', default)
= '' != default, so the DB diverged from the engine/orchestrator (which
collapse '' to the default via Python truthiness) and opened a duplicate
fix task every red cycle. Wrap with func.nullif(..., '') so an empty string
collapses to the default too.
Tests: a ''-workflow + NULL-workflow project on one repo dedupe to one task;
git_url accidentals (.git suffix / trailing slash) dedupe across both
ci_watch and dep_update. The orchestrator _repo_key now delegates to repo_key.
* [chore] admin_set_status: attribute the blocked-restore to the admin actor + emit override row (#2176)
admin_set_status taking a BLOCKED task to pending/in_progress with a
pre-block snapshot returned early via _apply_pre_block_restore, which
emitted its audit row with agent_role=None and audit_agent_id=restored_owner
(the pre-block dev) — the admin actor_id/actor_role were dropped entirely.
Because this branch runs with force=false (pending/in_progress aren't hatch
destinations), the distinguishing task.admin_override row (written only on
the non-restore path, gated by force) was never written, so an operator
could silently re-own a blocked task with no trace of who triggered it.
Thread actor_id/actor_role into _apply_pre_block_restore (admin_set_status
passes them with admin_override=True) so the transition audit row attributes
the re-owning to the admin, and emit a task.admin_override row (forced=False,
restore=True) on this branch independent of the force flag. The in-band
unblock(restore=True) path passes no actor and keeps the legacy attribution
(restored owner) with no override row.
Test: admin PATCH status=pending on a BLOCKED task with a snapshot attributes
every audit row to the admin (not the restored dev) and emits the override
row.
* [chore] converters: typed InvalidIdentifierError from require_uuid + log the orchestrator drop (#25)
require_uuid raised a bare ValueError('UUID value cannot be None'), so a
malformed/None identifier propagated as an opaque error callers either let
500 or broad-catch-and-silently-swallow — the orchestrator reaper call site
wrapped it in a bare except-Exception return with NO log, dropping a bad
task_id_str invisibly. Introduce InvalidIdentifierError(ValueError) and
raise it from require_uuid for both None and unparseable input; it stays a
ValueError subclass so existing except-ValueError / except-Exception callers
are unaffected, but typed so a caller can handle a bad identifier distinctly.
The reaper now catches the typed error, logs at warning, and no-ops — the
drop is visible instead of swallowed.
Tests: None and an unparseable string both raise InvalidIdentifierError; it
subclasses ValueError (back-comat).
* [sweep] notification_delivery: list_system_notifications over-fetch-then-slice for pending_ack_only
The SQL limit was applied before the post-fetch 'not fully acked' Python
filter. A window of newer fully-acked ack-required rows filled the limit
and masked older unacked notifications the operator still needs to act on
(the pending-ACK queue silently under-reported; a CEO-approval notification
could be hidden by newer already-acked noise). pending_ack_only now drops
the SQL limit, filters in Python, then slices to limit; the non-pending
branch keeps the SQL limit unchanged.
* [sweep] proactive: drop vestigial code-patterns surface from context package
Code indexing was removed, so _find_code_patterns always returned [] yet
build_context_package still called it, ContextPackage.code_patterns stayed
a live field, _build_summary advertised 'Found N code patterns', and
_count_items counted it — a permanently-empty slot the system claimed to
populate. The dead method, its call, the summary line, and the count
reference are removed. The code_patterns field itself is retained
(always-empty, serialized in to_dict and the optimal route response) for
API/schema back-compat, marked deprecated in its docstring.
* [sweep] migration 052: integration-test the task_cell_projects unique constraint
The UNIQUE(task_id, team) 'one project per cell per task' invariant was
only exercised through SimpleNamespace stubs that never touch a DB
session, so the real Postgres constraint was unverified. If it were
mis-declared or dropped, two same-team rows could coexist and
_resolve_subtask_project would non-deterministically return one, cutting
a subtask's branch/PR against the wrong repo. Adds an integration test
that inserts two same-(task_id, team) rows and asserts IntegrityError on
uq_task_cell_projects_task_team, plus a positive different-teams case.
* [sweep] pr_gate: classify MegaTask root-subtask as root so its root->master PR gets COMMENT (#608)
_post_gate_review_to_pr identified a root->master PR by absence of a
parent_task_id. A MegaTask root-subtask opens its own root->master PR into
the project's master (submit_root, parent='master') but carries
parent_task_id=umbrella, so is_root was False and the gate posted APPROVE
(pr_pass) / REQUEST_CHANGES (pr_fail) instead of COMMENT. The APPROVE could
satisfy a single-approval master branch-protection rule and let a non-CEO
merge via the GitHub UI before the CEO, against the documented invariant
that only the CEO acts on master. is_root now also covers
is_batch_root_subtask (batch_id set + parented); a non-batch cell-PM
coordination root keeps batch_id=None so it stays a cell->root PR
(APPROVE/REQUEST_CHANGES). Extends the _task test helper with a batch_id
kwarg.
* [sweep] enforcement: complete the status-class partition + coverage invariant (#247)
is_waiting_state already covered awaiting_pr_review (the primary fix), but
the doc's coverage invariant was missing: backlog and pending fell through
ALL three predicates (terminal/active/waiting), so a future enum addition
could silently land in no category. is_waiting_state now also covers
pending (waiting for a claim) and backlog (waiting on PM activation), so
is_terminal_state / is_active_state / is_waiting_state partition the whole
Status enum. Adds test_status_classification_covers_every_enum_member
asserting every Status member is classified by exactly one predicate, so
an enum addition that drifts the partition fails the build.
* [chore] test-suite: unblock the quality gate (mypy + 2 behavior fixes)
12 mypy errors across 5 test files: drop banned type:ignore comments
(lifecycle_spec monkeypatch uses cast(Any, ...); the ignores were unused),
wrap SQLAlchemy-typed ids with cast(UUID, ...) for AgentContext / WorkSession
args (AgentTable.id is Mapped[sqla UUID], not uuid.UUID), annotate **kw: Any,
and cast(Any, svc) for a method-assignment mock.
test_cancel_descendants_cascades_for_authorized_pm: the child was parked in
awaiting_ceo_approval, which the spec gates to CEO-only cancel
(lifecycle.py:378-389) — a cell_pm cascade correctly refuses it (the #103
refuse path). Use a PM-cancelable in_progress child so the positive-cascade
assertion holds; the refuse case is already covered by its sibling test.
test_a2a_message_auth: /message/send now resolves the authenticated
responder slug via get_agent_context (a DB lookup, #116). This is a DB-free
unit test of the token gate + route body, so stub get_agent_context in the
fixture — the gate (require_any_authenticated_agent) still runs real and
401s on a missing/forged token before that dependency resolves.
* [chore] complexity: split 5 C-rank blocks to <=B for the xenon gate
No behavior change; each C-rank function factored into a helper so the
complexity gate (xenon --max-absolute B) holds.
- lifecycle.can_invoke_action: extract the team-match check into
_check_team_match.
- a2a.cancel_task: extract _status_value_of + _apply_cancel_note.
- task._apply_pre_block_restore: extract _restore_block_ownership (status/
owner restore + snapshot clear) and _emit_admin_override_audit (#2176).
- release_proposal.approve: extract _finalize_release_lock (heartbeat/
execute cancel + mutex release) out of the finally.
- kanban.get_main_pm_board_flat: dict-dispatch the column routing instead
of a 7-branch if/elif ladder (status wins over team; in-flight + no cell
team falls through to Coordination, #196).
* [chore] lifecycle artifacts: regenerate to match the spec (foundation-check)
The rendered artifacts (docs/rag/lifecycle, panel/lib/lifecycle.json, the
_generated role-prompt fragments) had drifted from the spec — the prior
sweep commits (cancel-CEO gate, claim_pr_review preconditions, pr_reviewer
unclaim, complete merge-first ordering) changed spec data without
regenerating, and the foundation-check render+diff stage never ran because
mypy failed earlier in the gate. make foundation-check now passes.
* [fix] chat: wire live message delivery end-to-end (MESSAGE_SENT)
send_message persisted messages but never broadcast them, there was no
MESSAGE_SENT event type or bridge forwarder, and the panel session view
had no websocket subscription — the live chat path was dead end-to-end.
- add EventType.MESSAGE_SENT and publish it best-effort on every persisted
send (a bus outage logs, never rolls back the durable row)
- bridge _handle_message_event forwards to /ws/sessions/{id} and
/ws/channels/{id}; subscribe it in register_websocket_bridge_handlers
- panel useSessionStream subscribes the session view; the page invalidates
the transcript + session-detail queries on each message.new so the held
(staleTime Infinity) views refresh live without the manual Refresh
* [fix] chat: return session task_links in one read; drop panel N+1
GET /sessions/{id} ran a bare select and session_to_response omitted
task_links, so it always returned them empty — the panel worked around it
with a triple-fetch (get session, get-tasks-for-session which re-fetched
the same endpoint, then a task GET per link), and the links never showed.
- add get_session_with_links(_or_raise) that eager-loads task_links -> task
- add session_to_response_with_links; GET /sessions/{id} uses both
- panel useSession now relies on the single populated response; remove the
dead getTasksForSession + per-task fetch and the unused tasksApi import
* [fix] chat: validate reply_to against the effective session; guard closed-session composer
Posting to a closed session transparently redirects the message to the
group's active session (intended for agents holding stale refs), but
reply_to was validated against the requested session, not the one the
message lands in — letting a cross-session reply slip through — and the
panel silently posted there too, so the message vanished from the view.
- validate reply_to against session.id (the effective, possibly-redirected
session), not req.session_id
- panel: render a "session is closed" notice instead of the composer for a
non-active session; if a send still lands elsewhere (stale status), toast
that it went to the active session rather than letting it appear to vanish
* [fix] chat: close session/group/message read IDOR; fix doubled 404s
get_session and the messages-list took an agent id but never used it, and
get_group took none at all — any authenticated agent could read any private
channel's group, session, and message transcripts. Three NotFoundError sites
also passed a full sentence as resource_type, yielding "... not found not found".
- add require_group_read_access / require_session_read_access (channel
member / silent observer / privileged, mirroring list_group_sessions_for_agent)
and get_session_with_links_for_agent; enforce on GET /sessions/{id},
GET /sessions/{id}/tasks, GET /messages, GET /groups/{id} (-> 403 on deny)
- fix the three doubled-404 sites to the NotFoundError(resource_type, resource_id) form
Also folds two gate fixes for the prior chat commits: cast session.id to UUID
for the reply_to validation, and ruff import/format touch-ups.
Note: POST /messages intentionally still skips the channel write-ACL on the
HTTP (human-CEO/panel) path — the CEO is not in writers for 8/11 channels, so
enforcing it there would block the panel; the gateway/agent path enforces it.
* [fix] secretary: harden live chat — stuck spinner, mid-reply clobber, reload
The Secretary live chat had three live-behaviour bugs: a dropped SSE
connection left a permanent "thinking…" spinner (openStream set no
transport-error handler, so the no-data error Event was swallowed by the
JSON-parse guard and streaming never reset); sending mid-reply wiped the
accumulation buffer and pushed a user message without guarding the in-flight
turn, abandoning/duplicating the reply; and the chat lived only in React
state, so a reload wiped it.
- route the dual-purpose `error` listener: server-sent JSON → handleEvent,
transport error (no data) → reset streaming, surface a notice, close stream
- guard send while streaming (streamingRef); disable the composer Send/Enter
while a reply is in flight
- persist sessionId + messages to localStorage (TTL'd) and, on mount, restore
+ re-attach the stream once the backend confirms the session is still alive
(mirrors the intake/prompter durability)
* [chore] groups: extract group-read helper to keep module rank A
The get_group IDOR access-check added try/except branches that tipped the
module to xenon rank B. Extract the service-error→HTTP mapping into a small
helper so get_group stays lean and the module is rank A again (behaviour
unchanged; covered by the groups route tests).
* [fix] chat: correct panel session-task mutation endpoints
linkTask/unlinkTask posted to /add-task and /remove-task (with a body), but
the backend exposes POST /sessions/{id}/tasks and DELETE
/sessions/{id}/tasks/{task_id} (path param) — so every call 404'd. updateTaskLink
targeted /update-task, a route that does not exist at all. Point linkTask and
unlinkTask at the real routes and drop the phantom updateTaskLink. All three were
unused, so no behaviour changes today — this removes a latent 404 trap.
* [docs] chat: document live message delivery (MESSAGE_SENT / message.new)
Document the live transcript-update path the chat-subsystem fixes wired:
- docs/api/websockets.md: add the message.new event-types row (carried on
/ws/sessions + /ws/channels from EventType.MESSAGE_SENT) and note the
forwarder sets type:"message.new"
- docs/panel/communications-and-journals.md: the session transcript updates
live; a closed session is read-only (composer disabled)
- CLAUDE.md: name message.new on the per-resource streams and make
MESSAGE_SENT the worked example of the add-a-live-event recipe
The internal roboco_map slices (gitignored) were updated in place to match.
* [docs] reconcile published docs with code since v0.13.0
Drift caught by the doc-reconciliation pass (all verified against HEAD):
- CLAUDE.md + rag: pr_reviewer gained the unclaim verb (16b71be8)
- rag permissions/task-states/task-tools: awaiting_ceo_approval -> cancelled is
CEO-only, not PM+CEO (16b71be8 cancel-ceo-gate; lifecycle.py:373-382)
- deploy/env-reference: ROBOCO_APP_VERSION default 0.9.0 -> 0.14.0 (config.py:31);
add ROBOCO_RELEASE_CI_WORKFLOW row (2759edf7, config.py:454)
- deploy/data-and-migrations: 44->54 revisions, head 054_a2a_message_skill
- optional/autonomous-maintenance: CI-watch dedupe is per (repo, workflow) (d34bc1a7)
---------
Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
451 lines
16 KiB
Python
451 lines
16 KiB
Python
"""Real-DB integration test for ``agent_id`` population on audit rows.
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Why this test exists
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--------------------
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Two audit-row defects, both producing ``audit_log.agent_id = NULL``:
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1. ``task.awaiting_qa`` is fired from inside ``_validate_and_set_status``
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AFTER ``submit_for_qa`` has already cleared ``task.claimed_by = None``
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(see ``roboco/services/task.py``). The audit writer reads
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``task.claimed_by`` at fire time and gets ``None`` — even though a real
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developer just submitted the work. The Auditor agent then has no way
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to ask "who submitted this for QA?" from the audit table alone.
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2. ``log_agent_event`` (called by the orchestrator on ``agent.spawned``,
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``agent.spawn_failed``, ``agent.stopped``, etc.) only knows the agent's
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slug, not its UUID. It always passes ``agent_id=None`` to ``_persist``
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and stuffs the slug into ``details``. Same NULL problem — the
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``audit_log.agent_id`` column is FK to ``agents.id``, so we want the
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real UUID stored, not just a sidecar string.
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Both fixes are validated here against a real Postgres DB:
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* Test 1 seeds an agent, simulates the submit_for_qa "capture before
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mutate" by passing the dev's UUID through the explicit
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``audit_agent_id`` parameter, and asserts the row written to
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``audit_log`` has ``agent_id`` set to the dev's UUID (NOT NULL).
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* Test 2 seeds an agent with a known slug, calls ``log_agent_event``
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with that slug, and asserts the row written to ``audit_log`` has
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``agent_id`` resolved to the seeded agent's UUID via the new
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resolver path.
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Both tests would FAIL on the pre-fix code: the first because the audit
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row's agent_id would be NULL (claimed_by cleared before fire), and the
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second because ``log_agent_event`` hard-codes ``agent_id=None``.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import asyncio
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from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
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from uuid import UUID, uuid4
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import pytest
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import pytest_asyncio
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from roboco.db import base as roboco_db_base
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from roboco.db.tables import AgentTable, AuditLogTable, ProjectTable, TaskTable
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from roboco.models.base import (
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AgentRole,
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AgentStatus,
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Complexity,
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TaskNature,
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TaskStatus,
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TaskType,
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Team,
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)
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from roboco.services.audit import AuditService
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from roboco.services.task import TaskService
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from sqlalchemy import select
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from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import async_sessionmaker
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if TYPE_CHECKING:
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from collections.abc import AsyncIterator
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from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
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async def _seed_agent_with_slug(
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session: AsyncSession, slug: str | None = None
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) -> tuple[UUID, str]:
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"""Insert a minimal AgentTable row and return (id, slug).
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Provides a real FK target so ``audit_log.agent_id`` writes succeed
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instead of silently failing the best-effort persist.
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"""
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actual_slug = slug or f"audit-agent-test-{uuid4().hex[:8]}"
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agent = AgentTable(
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id=uuid4(),
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name="Audit Agent ID Test",
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slug=actual_slug,
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role=AgentRole.DEVELOPER,
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team=None,
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status=AgentStatus.ACTIVE,
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model_config={},
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system_prompt="audit agent_id test",
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capabilities=[],
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permissions={},
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metrics={},
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)
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session.add(agent)
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await session.commit()
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return UUID(str(agent.id)), actual_slug
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@pytest_asyncio.fixture
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async def patched_session_factory(
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db_session: AsyncSession, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
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) -> AsyncIterator[AsyncSession]:
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"""Point ``get_session_factory`` at the test-DB engine for the run.
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``AuditService._persist`` and ``log_agent_event`` open their own
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sessions via ``roboco.db.base.get_session_factory()`` — without this
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they bind to the production DB URL.
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"""
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test_engine = db_session.bind
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test_factory = async_sessionmaker(
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bind=test_engine, expire_on_commit=False, autoflush=False
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)
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monkeypatch.setattr(roboco_db_base, "get_session_factory", lambda: test_factory)
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yield db_session
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_log_task_event_persists_explicit_agent_id_when_claimed_by_was_cleared(
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patched_session_factory: AsyncSession,
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) -> None:
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"""``log_task_event`` writes the explicit ``agent_id`` even after caller mutation.
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Simulates the ``submit_for_qa`` race: the caller captures the dev's
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UUID before clearing ``task.claimed_by``, then passes the captured
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value into the audit write. The audit row must have ``agent_id``
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populated — that's the whole point of capture-before-mutate.
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On the pre-fix code, ``submit_for_qa`` would clear ``claimed_by``
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first and ``_validate_and_set_status`` would read the now-None value,
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producing ``audit_log.agent_id = NULL``.
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"""
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dev_uuid, _ = await _seed_agent_with_slug(patched_session_factory)
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audit = AuditService()
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task_id = uuid4()
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# Caller pattern: capture-before-mutate. The dev's UUID is captured
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# and passed explicitly even though `task.claimed_by` was set to None.
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await audit.log_task_event(
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event_type="task.awaiting_qa",
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task_id=task_id,
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agent_id=dev_uuid,
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details={
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"from_status": "verifying",
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"to_status": "awaiting_qa",
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"agent_role": "developer",
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"team": "backend",
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},
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)
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# Read back the row from audit_log.
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result = await patched_session_factory.execute(
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select(AuditLogTable)
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.where(AuditLogTable.event_type == "task.awaiting_qa")
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.where(AuditLogTable.target_id == task_id)
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)
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rows = list(result.scalars().all())
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assert len(rows) == 1, "Expected exactly one task.awaiting_qa row"
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row = rows[0]
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assert row.agent_id is not None, (
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"agent_id must be populated when caller passes a captured UUID — "
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"this is the capture-before-mutate fix for submit_for_qa"
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)
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assert row.agent_id == dev_uuid
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_log_agent_event_resolves_slug_to_uuid(
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patched_session_factory: AsyncSession,
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) -> None:
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"""``log_agent_event`` resolves the agent slug to its UUID.
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The orchestrator only sees agent slugs at spawn time. The audit row's
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``agent_id`` column is FK to ``agents.id`` — we want the real UUID
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stored, not just a slug stuffed into ``details``.
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On the pre-fix code, ``log_agent_event`` always passed
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``agent_id=None`` to ``_persist``, producing ``audit_log.agent_id = NULL``.
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"""
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expected_uuid, slug = await _seed_agent_with_slug(patched_session_factory)
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audit = AuditService()
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task_id = uuid4()
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# Orchestrator-style call — passes slug only.
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await audit.log_agent_event(
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event_type="agent.spawned",
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agent_slug=slug,
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task_id=task_id,
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details={"container_id": "abc123def456", "model": "claude-opus-4-6"},
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)
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# Read back the row.
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result = await patched_session_factory.execute(
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select(AuditLogTable)
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.where(AuditLogTable.event_type == "agent.spawned")
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.where(AuditLogTable.target_id == task_id)
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)
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rows = list(result.scalars().all())
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assert len(rows) == 1, "Expected exactly one agent.spawned row"
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row = rows[0]
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assert row.agent_id is not None, (
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"agent_id must be resolved from the slug — this is the slug-to-UUID "
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"fix for log_agent_event so audit rows have a real FK to agents.id"
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)
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assert row.agent_id == expected_uuid
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# Slug should still be present in details for redundancy.
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assert row.details.get("agent_slug") == slug
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_submit_for_qa_writes_audit_with_dev_agent_id(
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patched_session_factory: AsyncSession,
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) -> None:
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"""End-to-end: ``submit_for_qa`` -> ``task.awaiting_qa`` row with dev's UUID.
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This is the integration test for the capture-before-mutate fix.
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Pre-fix flow:
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1. submit_for_qa sets ``task.claimed_by = None``
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2. submit_for_qa calls ``_validate_and_set_status``
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3. ``_validate_and_set_status`` reads ``task.claimed_by`` -> None
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4. audit row written with ``agent_id = NULL``
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Post-fix flow:
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1. submit_for_qa captures ``original_dev = task.claimed_by`` first
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2. submit_for_qa sets ``task.claimed_by = None``
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3. submit_for_qa passes ``audit_agent_id=original_dev`` to
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``_validate_and_set_status``
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4. audit row written with ``agent_id = <dev's UUID>``
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"""
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# Seed dev + system + project + a VERIFYING task claimed by dev.
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dev_uuid, _ = await _seed_agent_with_slug(patched_session_factory)
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system_uuid, _ = await _seed_agent_with_slug(patched_session_factory)
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project = ProjectTable(
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id=uuid4(),
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name="Audit Test Project",
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slug=f"audit-test-{uuid4().hex[:8]}",
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git_url="https://github.com/example/audit-test.git",
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default_branch="main",
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protected_branches=["main"],
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assigned_cell=Team.BACKEND,
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created_by=system_uuid,
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is_active=True,
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)
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patched_session_factory.add(project)
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await patched_session_factory.flush()
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task = TaskTable(
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id=uuid4(),
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title="Audit-id capture test",
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description=(
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"Verifies submit_for_qa captures dev UUID before clearing claimed_by."
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),
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acceptance_criteria=["Audit row has agent_id populated"],
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status=TaskStatus.VERIFYING,
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priority=2,
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task_type=TaskType.CODE,
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nature=TaskNature.TECHNICAL,
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project_id=project.id,
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branch_name="feature/backend/AUDIT001",
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pr_number=99,
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pr_url="https://github.com/example/audit-test/pull/99",
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docs_complete=False,
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pr_created=True,
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created_by=system_uuid,
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assigned_to=dev_uuid,
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claimed_by=dev_uuid,
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team=Team.BACKEND,
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dependency_ids=[],
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blocker_ids=[],
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sequence=0,
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plan={"steps": ["impl"]},
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estimated_complexity=Complexity.MEDIUM,
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checkpoints=[],
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progress_updates=[{"at": "t0", "note": "started"}],
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commits=[{"sha": "abc123", "message": "[AUDIT001] init"}],
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documents=[],
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dev_notes="impl complete",
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self_verified=True,
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)
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patched_session_factory.add(task)
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await patched_session_factory.commit()
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# Exercise: dev role submitting their own verified task to QA.
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service = TaskService(patched_session_factory)
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captured_task_id = UUID(str(task.id))
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result = await service.submit_for_qa(captured_task_id, agent_role="developer")
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assert result is not None
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# Sanity: claimed_by IS cleared (this is intentional — QA needs to claim).
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assert result.claimed_by is None
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# Wait for the fire-and-forget audit task to complete. The `_validate_
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# and_set_status` write goes onto a strong-ref'd background task; we
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# join the same task set the service uses by sleeping briefly. (The
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# production code uses asyncio.create_task; in tests there's no other
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# scheduler so a short sleep + manual await is the cleanest path.)
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pending = [bg for bg in service._background_tasks if not bg.done()]
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if pending:
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await asyncio.gather(*pending, return_exceptions=True)
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# Also drain any audit-internal tasks scheduled via get_running_loop().
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for _ in range(5):
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await asyncio.sleep(0.05)
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# Verify the audit row.
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result_rows = await patched_session_factory.execute(
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select(AuditLogTable)
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.where(AuditLogTable.event_type == "task.awaiting_qa")
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.where(AuditLogTable.target_id == captured_task_id)
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)
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rows = list(result_rows.scalars().all())
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assert len(rows) == 1, (
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f"Expected exactly one task.awaiting_qa audit row, got {len(rows)}"
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)
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row = rows[0]
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assert row.agent_id == dev_uuid, (
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f"audit_log.agent_id must be the dev's UUID ({dev_uuid}), got "
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f"{row.agent_id} — capture-before-mutate regressed"
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)
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_log_agent_event_unknown_slug_writes_null_agent_id(
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patched_session_factory: AsyncSession,
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) -> None:
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"""An unknown slug must NOT block the audit write.
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The audit subsystem is best-effort — observability must never fail
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the operation being observed. If the slug doesn't resolve, the row
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is still written with ``agent_id=NULL`` and the slug preserved in
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``details`` for forensic recovery.
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"""
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audit = AuditService()
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task_id = uuid4()
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unknown_slug = f"never-seeded-{uuid4().hex[:8]}"
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await audit.log_agent_event(
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event_type="agent.spawn_failed",
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agent_slug=unknown_slug,
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task_id=task_id,
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details={"error": "container died"},
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severity="error",
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)
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result = await patched_session_factory.execute(
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select(AuditLogTable)
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.where(AuditLogTable.event_type == "agent.spawn_failed")
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.where(AuditLogTable.target_id == task_id)
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)
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rows = list(result.scalars().all())
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assert len(rows) == 1
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# agent_id is NULL because slug didn't resolve, but the write succeeded
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# and the slug is preserved in details for forensic lookup.
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assert rows[0].agent_id is None
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assert rows[0].details.get("agent_slug") == unknown_slug
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_escalate_to_ceo_writes_audit_with_actor_agent_id(
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patched_session_factory: AsyncSession,
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|
) -> None:
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|
"""End-to-end: ``escalate_to_ceo(actor_agent_id=...)`` -> the
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``task.awaiting_ceo_approval`` audit row carries the escalating agent's
|
|
UUID, not NULL.
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|
|
|
Every sibling transition (claim/start/qa_pass/pr_pass) forwards the actor
|
|
UUID to ``_validate_and_set_status(audit_agent_id=...)``; the
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|
escalate_to_ceo branch lost it, attributing the escalation only to a role
|
|
(ambiguous when multiple PMs of the same role could escalate). Mirrors
|
|
``test_submit_for_qa_writes_audit_with_dev_agent_id``.
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|
"""
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|
actor_uuid, _ = await _seed_agent_with_slug(patched_session_factory)
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|
system_uuid, _ = await _seed_agent_with_slug(patched_session_factory)
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|
|
|
project = ProjectTable(
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|
id=uuid4(),
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|
name="Escalate Audit Test Project",
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|
slug=f"escalate-audit-{uuid4().hex[:8]}",
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|
git_url="https://github.com/example/escalate-audit.git",
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|
default_branch="main",
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|
protected_branches=["main"],
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|
assigned_cell=Team.BACKEND,
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|
created_by=system_uuid,
|
|
is_active=True,
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|
)
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|
patched_session_factory.add(project)
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|
await patched_session_factory.flush()
|
|
|
|
task = TaskTable(
|
|
id=uuid4(),
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|
title="Escalate audit-id test",
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|
description="Verifies escalate_to_ceo stamps the actor UUID on the audit row.",
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|
acceptance_criteria=["audit row has agent_id populated"],
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|
status=TaskStatus.AWAITING_PM_REVIEW,
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|
priority=2,
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|
task_type=TaskType.CODE,
|
|
nature=TaskNature.TECHNICAL,
|
|
project_id=project.id,
|
|
branch_name="feature/main_pm/ROOT0001",
|
|
pr_number=99,
|
|
pr_url="https://github.com/example/escalate-audit/pull/99",
|
|
docs_complete=True,
|
|
pr_created=True,
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|
created_by=system_uuid,
|
|
assigned_to=actor_uuid,
|
|
claimed_by=actor_uuid,
|
|
team=Team.BACKEND,
|
|
dependency_ids=[],
|
|
blocker_ids=[],
|
|
sequence=0,
|
|
plan={"steps": ["impl"]},
|
|
estimated_complexity=Complexity.MEDIUM,
|
|
checkpoints=[],
|
|
progress_updates=[],
|
|
commits=[{"sha": "abc123", "message": "[ROOT0001] init"}],
|
|
documents=[],
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|
dev_notes="root complete",
|
|
self_verified=True,
|
|
)
|
|
patched_session_factory.add(task)
|
|
await patched_session_factory.commit()
|
|
|
|
service = TaskService(patched_session_factory)
|
|
captured_task_id = UUID(str(task.id))
|
|
result = await service.escalate_to_ceo(
|
|
captured_task_id,
|
|
agent_role="main_pm",
|
|
actor_agent_id=actor_uuid,
|
|
)
|
|
assert result is not None
|
|
assert result.status == TaskStatus.AWAITING_CEO_APPROVAL
|
|
|
|
# Drain any background tasks the transition scheduled.
|
|
pending = [bg for bg in service._background_tasks if not bg.done()]
|
|
if pending:
|
|
await asyncio.gather(*pending, return_exceptions=True)
|
|
for _ in range(5):
|
|
await asyncio.sleep(0.05)
|
|
|
|
result_rows = await patched_session_factory.execute(
|
|
select(AuditLogTable)
|
|
.where(AuditLogTable.event_type == "task.awaiting_ceo_approval")
|
|
.where(AuditLogTable.target_id == captured_task_id)
|
|
)
|
|
rows = list(result_rows.scalars().all())
|
|
assert len(rows) == 1, (
|
|
f"Expected exactly one task.awaiting_ceo_approval audit row, got {len(rows)}"
|
|
)
|
|
assert rows[0].agent_id == actor_uuid, (
|
|
f"audit_log.agent_id must be the escalating PM's UUID ({actor_uuid}), "
|
|
f"got {rows[0].agent_id} — escalate_to_ceo dropped the actor from the "
|
|
"audit trail"
|
|
)
|