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https://github.com/rennf93/roboco.git
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7be725cc13
Fix the 4 real CodeQL path-injection alerts (open_conventions_pr trusted the API-settable project.workspace_path with no containment) plus defense-in-depth segment validation at the get_workspace_path chokepoint. Bump next 16.1.1->16.1.7 and transitive lockfile deps to clear 24 Dependabot alerts. Close the intake subagent-ban gap: the Claude intake driver still carried the Task tool and the prompter prompt told it to fan out research subagents, contradicting the fleet-wide ban. The remaining 47 CodeQL + 29 Dependabot alerts are dismissed on GitHub with per-alert justifications (guard patterns CodeQL can't model across call hops; next 16.2.x blocked by the verified tab-hostage router regression). Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
57 lines
1.9 KiB
Python
57 lines
1.9 KiB
Python
"""``get_workspace_path`` rejects traversal-capable path components.
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Slugs/teams are regex- or enum-validated at creation, but every workspace path
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is built at this one chokepoint — pin the by-construction guard so a raw
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``../`` / absolute / NUL segment can never place a workspace outside the root,
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regardless of what upstream validation a future caller forgets.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
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from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock
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import pytest
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from roboco.models.base import Team
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from roboco.services.workspace import WorkspaceError, WorkspaceService
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if TYPE_CHECKING:
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from pathlib import Path
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def _service(root: Path) -> WorkspaceService:
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svc = WorkspaceService(MagicMock())
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svc.session = AsyncMock()
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svc.root = root
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return svc
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"bad",
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["", ".", "..", "../escape", "a/b", "a\\b", "bad\x00slug", "/etc"],
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)
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def test_rejects_unsafe_project_slug(tmp_path: Path, bad: str) -> None:
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svc = _service(tmp_path)
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with pytest.raises(WorkspaceError, match="unsafe project slug"):
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svc.get_workspace_path(bad, Team.BACKEND, "be-dev-1")
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad", ["..", "back/end", ""])
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def test_rejects_unsafe_team_string(tmp_path: Path, bad: str) -> None:
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svc = _service(tmp_path)
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with pytest.raises(WorkspaceError, match="unsafe team"):
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svc.get_workspace_path("guard-core", bad, "be-dev-1")
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad", ["..", "../../be-dev-1", "be\x00dev"])
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def test_rejects_unsafe_agent_slug(tmp_path: Path, bad: str) -> None:
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svc = _service(tmp_path)
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with pytest.raises(WorkspaceError, match="unsafe agent slug"):
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svc.get_workspace_path("guard-core", Team.BACKEND, bad)
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def test_valid_segments_unchanged(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
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svc = _service(tmp_path)
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path = svc.get_workspace_path("guard-core", Team.BACKEND, "be-dev-1")
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assert path == tmp_path / "guard-core" / "backend" / "be-dev-1"
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