Commit Graph
49 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
e9d0e0bd48 feat(video): 0.19.0 video engine (Remotion) + preview auth + render persistence (#307)
* feat(video): Phase A — VideoEngine origination spine + held-source gates

New default-off engine skeleton: opens a UX/UI authoring task (source=video, assigned to a ux-dev, LOW complexity to clear the dev-needs-subtasks guard) and materializes a held CEO-approval draft (source=video_post). Excludes video_post from all three held-source skip sites; adds the video_draft marker, six config flags, and the feature-flag entries. Origination + gate behavior unit-tested.

* refactor(orchestrator): fold _dispatch_dev_work skip chain into a helper

The per-source if/continue chain grew past xenon's --max-absolute B when the video_post held source joined it. Extract _is_non_dev_dispatch_source (every held-CEO source plus the two Board exploration sources) so the dev loop's skip is one flat call. Behavior-identical.

* feat(video): Phase B — propose_video do-tool (metadata-only, team-gated)

UX/UI dev records a video's composition ref + per-platform captions onto the authoring task's video_draft marker. Team-gated at runtime via _caller_team (Role.DEVELOPER can't tell a ux-dev from a be-dev). Resolves the caller's ACTIVE task via get_active_task_for_agent, not an oldest-first scan that would clobber a second open video task. Metadata only, no render. Wired through do_server + route + schema; added to _DEV_DO.

* feat(video): Phase D — render loop + RemotionRenderer client

Orchestrator-async _video_render_loop renders a completed authoring task's merged composition to MP4 (vertical + square) via the remotion-renderer sidecar and materializes the held video_post draft. RemotionRenderer tars the read-clone's motion/ source, POSTs it, and saves the returned MP4 bytes to a TASK-scoped local path (no shared volume; a composition is reused across videos so a composition-scoped path would clobber an earlier draft). Render failures bounded-retry (read-clone catch-up window, transient sidecar) up to a cap, then terminal-fail. Client tested vs a mock transport; loop vs a mock renderer + real DB.

* feat(video): Phase C — release / spotlight / on-demand video triggers

Three entry points open a UX/UI video-authoring task via VideoEngine.open_video_task: (1) a published release drafts a companion video — best-effort in ReleaseProposalService.approve, never fails the publish; script from the CHANGELOG via the local model with a template fallback. (2) propose_feature_spotlight gains optional wants_video/video_script — best-effort, gated on video_on_spotlight, default-off leaves the spotlight flow byte-for-byte unchanged. (3) POST /video/request (CEO-only) for an on-demand brief, with clean disabled/not_opened responses. All gated on video_engine_enabled.

* fix(video): savepoint-isolate video-task inserts (F042 poisoned session)

The best-effort try/except around open_video_task (release-publish + spotlight hooks) swallowed the Python exception, but a DBAPI error at the insert flush left the shared session must-rollback — so the caller's next commit (release finalize / request boundary) threw PendingRollbackError: the release stuck 'pending' after actually publishing, or the spotlight draft + HTTP response were lost. Wrap both inserts (open_video_task, _originate_video_post) in a begin_nested savepoint (the repo's established F042 pattern) so a DB error rolls back only the insert. open_video_task returns None (every caller already handles it); _originate_video_post propagates to the render loop's handler. Regression test: an insert FK error returns None with the session left usable. Dormant while the flags were off; armed on the NAS.

* feat(video): Phase G — motion/ package + remotion-renderer sidecar + compose

In-repo Remotion v4 motion/ package (ReleaseAnnouncement composition; calculateMetadata returns 1080x1920 vertical / 1080x1080 square from inputProps.orientation) + a credential-free remotion-renderer sidecar: untar the POSTed motion/ source, bundle (LRU-cached per source sha), selectComposition + renderMedia h264, stream the MP4 bytes back — matching the RemotionRenderer client contract. docker/remotion.Dockerfile on Debian (Chrome apt deps, build-time Chrome pre-warm, ffmpeg bundled in @remotion/renderer). Wired into both compose files (roboco_default only, shm_size 1gb, /health check) + the release publish matrix. Verified via a real local render of both cuts; the Debian docker build is the CEO's to run.

* chore(video): D-hardening — video_post source_task_id + render-loop docstring

Add a source_task_id back-reference to the video_post held-draft marker (traceability from a draft to its authoring task; also makes the render loop's two-key idempotency check wireable later). Fix the render-loop test's stale docstring ('never retried' -> bounded-retry). Both from the Phase D critic's non-blocking follow-ups.

* feat(video): Phase E1 — VideoPostService + heartbeat mutex (approve->post)

CEO-approve->post service: heartbeat-renewed Redis mutex (fail-closed, grace=ttl-2*heartbeat), re-read-in-lock double-post guard, per-platform durable commits (asyncio.shield-ed, settle-before-rollback on lock-loss), all writes inside the lock (captions validated pre-lock, applied in-lock — no stale whole-column clobber), idempotent, per-platform retry-skip. Poster interfaces (X/TikTok, mocked here). Reject + list-held-drafts. Survived 3 adversarial rounds; residual = a crash in the poster->commit window (CEO-gated low-freq, documented).

* fix(video): G-hardening — renderer leaks + Share Tech Mono brand font

Sidecar: give bundle() an explicit outDir tracked + deleted on LRU eviction (was leaking ~19MB remotion-webpack-bundle-* per source); res.on('close') cleanup so an aborted/retried download no longer leaks its remotion-out-* MP4 dir. Fonts: vendor Share Tech Mono (roboco-website brand font) as the display face (self-hosted woff2, 400-weight, headline fontWeight 700->400 to avoid faux-bold) + self-hosted Inter body — no gstatic fetch at render time (lsof-verified). Extras: composition_id whitelist (400) + Multer error middleware (400/413).

* feat(video): Phase E2 — X v2 + TikTok posters, tiktok_credentials, routes

LiveXVideoPoster (X v2 chunked media upload: init/append/finalize/STATUS-poll -> tweet w/ media_ids, OAuth1 signer reused). LiveTikTokPoster (OAuth2 inbox: init -> chunked PUT with asymmetric final chunk -> status-fetch; 401 -> refresh_token grant, rotated token persisted). tiktok_credentials Fernet singleton + migration 062 (single head). Routes: CEO approve/reject + list held drafts + write-only tiktok creds, wiring real posters into VideoPostService. Residual: a lock-loss right after a token-refresh flush can discard the rotated token (same rare CEO-gated class as the documented post->commit window).

* feat(video): Phase F — panel video-post queue + TikTok creds card + flags

video-post-queue.tsx: <video> MP4 preview with 9:16/1:1 cut switch, per-platform editable captions (280/2200 counters, over-limit disables approve), approve/reject, Request-a-video dialog. tiktok-credentials-card.tsx (4 write-only OAuth2 fields). feature-flags-card inlines TikTokCredentialsForm under video_engine_enabled. Mounted in command-center. tsc/eslint clean, 273 panel tests green. NOTE: needs the GET /video/posts/{id}/media route + mp4_paths on VideoPostResponse (folded into H) for the preview source.

* feat(video): Phase H — media route + e2e smoke + NAS arming + docs

GET /video/posts/{id}/media?cut= (CEO-gated FileResponse of the rendered MP4; closes the panel preview gap) + mp4_paths on VideoPostResponse. e2e smoke tests/e2e_smoke/test_video_pipeline.py (full flow, sidecar+X/TikTok mocked; asserts dispatcher skips, render-loop materialize, propose_video team-gate, approve idempotency). NAS arming: docker-compose.yml/.yaml ROBOCO_VIDEO_ENGINE_ENABLED/ON_RELEASE/ON_SPOTLIGHT default-on (.yaml resynced to .yml); registry stays off. CLAUDE.md video-engine section + CHANGELOG. Fixed 2 pre-existing route-test pollution leaks. Full suite 11763 passed.

* fix(video): auth-carrying preview, media route confinement, VideoPost type drift

Three fixes along the video preview path:

1. panel video preview auth: the <video> element was pointed straight at
   GET /video/posts/{id}/media, but a native <video src> GET carries none
   of axios's X-Agent-ID/X-Agent-Role headers — so in the default
   header-trust deployment the request 401s. Fetch the cut via
   videoApi.getMediaBlob (axios, responseType: blob) and drive <video>
   off a URL.createObjectURL result instead. The object URL is revoked
   on cut-change (the previous cut's URL) and on unmount, so neither
   cut switches nor row teardown leak blob URLs.

2. backend media route confinement: GET /video/posts/{id}/media now
   resolves mp4_path and refuses it with 404 when it falls outside
   settings.video_output_dir. Defense-in-depth against any future
   writer of mp4_paths serving files from arbitrary disk locations.

3. panel VideoPost type/comment drift: added mp4_paths to the
   VideoPost interface (the committed VideoPostResponse already
   carries it), and corrected the stale comment on videoMediaUrl
   that claimed no route served the rendered bytes — the route has
   existed since the media endpoint landed; the comment now describes
   why getMediaBlob exists instead of a direct <video src>.

* Persist rendered videos to data in physical storage.

* ++

* docs(video): 0.18.0 CHANGELOG entry + RAG + map reference for video engine

- Move the video engine bullet from [Unreleased] into [0.18.0] and note
  the ROBOCO_VIDEO_OUTPUT_DIR bind-mount persistence.
- Add docs/rag/architecture/video-engine.md (mirrors x-engine.md shape:
  enable/disable, three triggers, render loop + sidecar, CEO gate, media
  route confinement, credentials).
- Reference the video render loop in docs/map/orchestrator.md's engine list.

* chore(video): re-bump to 0.19.0 + sync registry compose defaults

Version was wrongly bumped to 0.18.0; 0.18.0 is an already-released
section. Restore its 2026-07-04 date and move the video-engine CHANGELOG
bullet into a new [0.19.0] - 2026-07-05 section above it. Bump
pyproject.toml, roboco/__init__.py, roboco/config.py (app_version),
panel/package.json, and the motion/README inputProps example to 0.19.0.

docker-compose.registry.yml: add ROBOCO_VIDEO_ENGINE_ENABLED /
_VIDEO_ON_RELEASE / _VIDEO_ON_SPOTLIGHT defaulted false (NAS arms them
true), and comment out the video-renders bind mount with a short note
so the public registry image ships video off by default. Structural
sync with docker-compose.yml maintained.

* fix(video): rate-limit /render + reflow motion/README

CodeQL flagged js/missing-rate-limiting on the renderer /render route.
The sidecar is container-network-only with one trusted caller (the
orchestrator, which renders cuts serially), so this limiter is a
retry-storm ceiling (30/min, well above legit render rate), not the
primary control. Also reflows motion/README.md hard-wrapped prose that
failed the markdown quality gate.

* fix(build): finish pnpm 11 migration + regen verb tables

The panel Docker image build failed on `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`:
node:22-alpine's corepack resolved to its bundled pnpm 11, but
panel/package.json pinned packageManager to pnpm@10.25.0, and pnpm 11
refuses to run against that pin. The Dockerfiles were already written for
pnpm 11 (comments, CI=true, strictDepBuilds); the package.json pin was the
stale outlier. Finish the migration instead of working around it:

- panel/package.json: packageManager pnpm@10.25.0 -> pnpm@11.10.0; drop the
  `pnpm` field (pnpm 11 ignores it — build approval lives in
  panel/pnpm-workspace.yaml's allowBuilds). Lockfile unchanged (pnpm 11
  accepts it as-is); frozen-lockfile verified.
- remotion-renderer/package.json: pin packageManager pnpm@11.10.0 for
  determinism (was relying on corepack's implicit default); engines.node
  >=22.13 (pnpm 11 requirement).
- docker/panel.Dockerfile + docker/remotion.Dockerfile: `corepack prepare
  pnpm@11.10.0 --activate` so the build uses the pinned version explicitly
  instead of trusting corepack's bundled default (which a future
  node:22-alpine could change).
- .github/workflows/panel-ci.yml: Node 20 -> 22 (pnpm 11 requires
  Node >=22.13; Node 20 fails the engines check).

Also regenerate agents/prompts/_generated/{developer,head_marketing,verbs}.md
— the video engine added propose_video and extended propose_feature_spotlight
(wants_video, video_script) but the verb tables weren't refreshed, failing
the foundation-check quality gate.

* chore(build): approve esbuild build script in remotion pnpm-workspace.yaml

pnpm 11 generated this file with a placeholder ('set this to true or false')
during install; resolve it to true so local dev of the renderer doesn't
re-prompt. esbuild's postinstall only verifies the prebuilt platform binary
(@esbuild/<platform> is installed as an optional dep), so approving it is
safe and silences the ERR_PNPM_IGNORED_BUILDS warning.

* fix(build): copy pnpm-workspace.yaml into panel + remotion images

pnpm 11 hard-errors with [ERR_PNPM_IGNORED_BUILDS] (exit 1) when a
dependency ships a postinstall script that isn't approved in
allowBuilds. Both Dockerfiles copied only package.json + pnpm-lock.yaml,
so the build-approval map in pnpm-workspace.yaml never made it into the
image — the remotion image build died on esbuild@0.28.1's postinstall.

Copy pnpm-workspace.yaml alongside the manifests in both images. In
panel, this also drops the --config.strictDepBuilds=false workaround:
with sharp and unrs-resolver now approved, their postinstalls run and
install the platform-specific binaries (previously skipped, leaving
sharp without its @img/sharp-* binary at runtime).

Verified locally: remotion + panel `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`
exit 0 with the workspace file present; both exit 1 without it.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-05 13:37:17 +02:00
Renn F 1b992df3ad fix(hooks): repair 3 production hooks broken by a heredoc/stdin bug
`<pipe JSON> | python3 - <<'PY'` makes both `python3 -` and the heredoc claim
stdin; the heredoc wins, so the piped JSON is silently discarded — each hook
read empty input and never triggered. Fixed to `python3 -c "$(cat <<'PY')"`
(cat consumes the heredoc, python3's stdin stays free for the pipe), matching
the already-correct fable-stop-gate-hook.sh.

Impact, all verified before/after:
- user-prompt-hook.sh: the prompt-injection guard ALLOWED injection strings
  (exit 0); now correctly DENIES (exit 2). Security hole closed.
- post-tool-budget-hook.sh: every tool call hashed to {tool:unknown} — loop
  detection was blind; now hashes the real tool + args.
- usage-report-hook.sh: transcript path resolved empty so its curl sync never
  fired; now fires correctly.

2-line change per file; no logic/threshold/message/contract change. bash-guard
78/78 + fable-hooks 15/15 green; repo-wide grep confirms no remaining instances.
2026-07-04 06:51:18 +02:00
Renn F 7716830322 feat(fleet): opus-fable adoption — doctrine + discipline hooks (v0.18.0 A)
Fleet behaves more like Fable 5 on existing model tiers, behind
ROBOCO_FABLE_MODE_ENABLED (config default off; armed :-true on the NAS compose,
absent from the registry compose).

- Doctrine: vendored agents/prompts/doctrine/fable.md composed into every
  agent's system prompt via fable_doctrine_layer() after base.md.
- Hooks (Claude Code): 4 non-overlapping hooks (stop-gate/bash-discipline/
  honesty-nudge/precompact) appended per-agent via _fable_hook_groups(). The
  make-quality + lint-suppression duplicates are deliberately NOT added (already
  gate-enforced); session-start skipped.
- Hooks (grok): conservative V1 — only the non-denying honesty-nudge, since a
  grok hook deny cancels the whole run.
- Flag on the feature-flags card; hook scripts shipped into the agent image.

Flag-off spawn path proven byte-identical (worktree diff, sha256 match); full
suite green (2074 unit + e2e-smoke + hook harness), mypy/xenon/ruff clean.
Fixed a real stdin bug in the vendored stop-gate hook (heredoc + pipe both
claimed stdin). Distilled from rennf93/opus-fable-playbook (MIT).
2026-07-04 06:44:40 +02:00
a807904999 fix(panel): KB playbooks category, LLM-health diagnostic, scorecard tab, feature-flags 2-col + X creds dropdown; fix(a2a): publish live event from direct send path; fix(docker): orchestrator Node 22 (#305)
Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-03 21:29:12 +02:00
12745352aa CC capability lockdown: shared credential mount + curl|sh RCE closed (+5 hardenings spec'd) (#302)
* fix(security): lock down shared Claude Code credential mount + curl|sh RCE

Audit of Claude Code capabilities reachable inside a spawned agent
container turned up two live gaps against the shared harness state:

- Every agent container bind-mounts the host's ~/.claude (OAuth store) and
  ~/.claude.json read-write (_build_mount_args) — the shared subscription
  auth used by the whole fleet. Nothing denied the native Read tool or the
  bash-guard hook from reading .credentials.json / .claude.json, so any
  role could exfiltrate the harness's own Claude Code auth. Deny both at
  the settings.json layer (absolute // form, per the #167 gotcha) and in
  the bash-guard hook's credential-exfil checks (cat/grep/source/base64/
  interpreter one-liners), mirroring the existing .netrc/.git-credentials
  treatment.
- The bash-guard hook only blocked curl/wget to github.com or internal
  hosts; `curl <any other host>/install.sh | bash` (or `bash <(curl ...)`,
  `eval "$(curl ...)"`) executed untrusted remote code unchecked. New
  checks deny piping a fetch into an actual shell (sh/bash/zsh/dash/ksh)
  while leaving non-executing consumers (tar, jq, -o file) untouched.

Also add --disable-slash-commands to every container agent spawn: skills
resolve independently of the --tools allowlist, so a contaminated shared
~/.claude could otherwise leak host skills/plugins into an agent session.
No RoboCo role's workflow uses a Claude Code skill.

64 -> 78 shell bash-guard cases, 54 -> 71 pytest bash-guard cases, plus a
new 5-case settings/CLI test module. ruff/mypy/xenon B clean.

* docs: changelog for the CC capability lockdown

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-03 03:05:37 +02:00
0ca9d91b72 v0.16.0: fastapi-guard HTTP security layer — calibrated + scanner honeytrap (#290)
* [fastapi-guard] Phase 1a: gated config flags for the HTTP security layer

Adds the ROBOCO_GUARD_* settings (all default-off / secure-default) for the
upcoming fastapi-guard 7.2.0 hardening — guard_enabled (master switch),
guard_fail_secure (fail-closed default; NAS overrides to false),
guard_telemetry_enabled + guard_agent_api_key + guard_project_id (guard-agent
telemetry, opt-in), guard_emergency + guard_emergency_whitelist (lockdown kill
switch). Inert until consumed: nothing reads them yet, so the request path is
unchanged. Foundation for v0.16.0.

* [fastapi-guard] Phase 1b: security foundation module + gated wiring

Add fastapi-guard 7.2.0 + guard-core 3.3.0 (bare, unpinned) and roboco/security.py:
- build_security_config() from settings — behind-nginx real-IP (trusted_proxies +
  trust_x_forwarded_proto), HSTS/CSP headers, threat-ban + 404-sweep rules,
  redis-backed state, exclude_paths (/ws + health + docs), env-driven
  enforce_https, fail_secure (secure default), emergency lockdown, guard-agent
  telemetry (opt-in), passive-mode calibration switch.
- guard_deco singleton (SecurityDecorator) for per-route decorators (Phase 2+).
- Three custom content validators guard's WAF can't cover: prompt-injection /
  role-override, secret-exfil / credential-in-body, internal-SSRF.
- apply_guard(app) + guarded_lifespan() wired into create_app AFTER settings.
  guard_passive_mode config flag added.

Entirely gated by ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED (default off): create_app mounts nothing
and returns the unchanged app when off (verified). make quality GREEN
(cov 95.32%, pip-audit clean, import-linter 2/0). 12 new unit tests.

* [fastapi-guard] Phase 2: critical-path decorators

Apply guard decorators to the highest-value endpoints (metadata-only; enforced
only when the middleware is mounted, so no-op while ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED is off):
- provider keys (ollama/grok/self-hosted writes): strict rate_limit +
  max_request_size + block_clouds (no datacenter IP should touch secret writes).
- settings write + release approve/reject (CEO-gated): strict rate_limit.
- intake chat (prompter start/messages/events): rate_limit + max_request_size +
  custom_validation(prompt_injection_validator) — the prompt-facing free-text
  ingress gets the injection/role-override/secret-exfil content scan.

make quality GREEN (cov 95.32%, contracts 2/0). App builds with guard off,
decorators inert (verified).

* [fastapi-guard] Phase 3: wide decorator coverage across ingress + sensitive routes

Targeted-wide application (metadata-only; no-op until ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED). The
global SecurityMiddleware already rate-limits + WAF-scans every request, so this
adds the custom content validators on free-text ingress + tight limits on
sensitive ops (not blanket per-route rate_limit on reads):

- agent gateway do verbs (note/say/commit/dm/pitch/progress/draft_playbook/...):
  rate_limit + max_request_size + custom_validation(secret_exfil or prompt_injection).
- a2a message/send + chat writes: rate_limit + size + prompt_injection.
- optimal/RAG (kb/search, rag/query, mentor/ask, errors/decisions/standards/
  learnings): prompt_injection on searches, secret_exfil on record writes; docs
  index → internal_ssrf.
- tasks: create/update → prompt_injection; QA/doc/PM transitions → secret_exfil;
  CEO-gated verbs → tight rate_limit.
- secretary chat → prompt_injection; research → internal_ssrf; orchestrator
  spawn/mutations → rate_limit; git ops + flow verbs → tight rate_limit.
Pure GET/reads left to the global middleware. Applied via a Sonnet workflow,
then verified: app builds with guard off (decorators inert), make quality GREEN
(cov 95.37%, contracts 2/0). Decoy/honeypot-path surface deferred (needs verified
guard ban-API integration — not rushed).

* [fastapi-guard] Phase 5: arm the NAS composes in passive/log-only mode

Arm ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED=true + ROBOCO_GUARD_PASSIVE_MODE=true +
ROBOCO_GUARD_FAIL_SECURE=false on the two NAS composes (docker-compose.yaml +
.yml). Passive = guard mounts and logs what it WOULD block but blocks nothing,
so the next NAS deploy calibrates against real traffic; flip PASSIVE_MODE off
after the false-positive review to enforce. fail_secure=false keeps a
guard-internal error from 500ing the personal deploy. The registry (user-facing)
compose is deliberately left unarmed so its published default stays conservative.
Phase 4 (passive calibration) is the operational step this enables.

* feat(security): Phase 3b — full-arsenal per-route guard enrichment

Stack the applicable guard decorators per surface instead of the minimal
rate_limit/max_request_size/custom_validation triad: content_type_filter on
every JSON-body write, honeypot_detection form-traps on human-facing POSTs,
block_clouds on key-writes + CEO release ops, behavior_analysis runaway-rate
rules on the agent flow/do verbs, suspicious_detection + usage_monitor on the
sensitive surfaces. Nine distinct decorators now applied thoughtfully per
endpoint. All metadata-only — no-op while ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED is off.

* fix(a2a): permit PR reviewer to deliver gate verdicts to the owning PM

can_a2a_direct had no pr_reviewer rule, so a reviewer (team=board, or a cell
team) fell through to the cell-member path and was cross-cell-denied when the
in-path gate delivered a pr_fail change-request to main-pm (or a cross-cell
cell-pm): "Cannot A2A main-pm ... Ask None to coordinate with None". The
delivery is best-effort, so pr_fail still transitioned but the verdict never
reached the owning PM — the blind-re-submit signal-gap the pr_fail fix closes.

Add an explicit pr_reviewer handler: it may A2A only cell_pm / main_pm (its
sole comms surface — everything else it posts on the PR itself), with a matching
route hint. The cell reviewers kept same-team access by coincidence; this scopes
every reviewer to PM-only, the correct model, with no other A2A caller affected.

Refresh uv.lock to the current resolution.

* feat(models): adopt Claude Sonnet 5 as the sonnet tier

Point the 'sonnet' alias at claude-sonnet-5 (MODEL_MAP) and give pr_reviewer
its own opus tier in ROLE_MODEL_MAP — it was falling through to the sonnet
default, and the role gates untrusted external/fork PRs plus root→master, which
warrants opus.

Price claude-sonnet-5 at the promotional 33% off Sonnet 4.6 ($2.01 / $10.05,
cache 0.201 / 0.5025) through 2026-08-31 via a dedicated pricing fragment that
beats the bare 'sonnet' alias; revert to full rate when the promo ends. Bare
'sonnet' stays full-rate as a conservative fallback (prod prices the resolved
claude-sonnet-5 id from the transcript).

Update the model docs and the billing / usage / manifest / spawn tests.

* feat(security): calibrate the guard WAF for RoboCo traffic + document the layer

The first end-to-end run of the fastapi-guard layer showed active enforcement
would block ~50% of legitimate agent traffic — RoboCo request bodies are code,
SQL, diffs, file paths, HTML, and URLs, which the stock signature WAF reads as
attacks. build_security_config now excludes RoboCo's free-text top-level body
fields (derived from the real request models, including the free-form container
fields whose nested prose is stringified and scanned) from WAF scanning,
dropping the active-mode false-positive rate to zero while keeping the WAF on
every non-excluded (id/enum/slug/branch) field and leaving the
prompt-injection / secret-exfil / internal-SSRF validators — which run
independently of the exclusion — fully in force. enable_penetration_detection
is made explicit.

Only excluded_detection_body_fields is reliable on guard 7.2.1: the per-route
categories knob is bypassed for JSON bodies, and the body scanner excludes
top-level keys only (scanning str(value) of every non-excluded field), so
free-form container fields must be excluded wholesale.

Adds tests/unit/test_security_middleware.py — the first end-to-end exercise of
the middleware (mounts it, drives guard's lifespan, fires real requests):
proves passive mode is log-only, active mode does not false-positive on
realistic agent payloads, threats are still blocked inside excluded fields, and
the WAF still fires on non-excluded fields.

Docs: CHANGELOG (Unreleased); a user-facing Optional-subsystems page + nav +
env reference for the HTTP security layer; the agent-facing RAG corpus
(what it is + why a request could be blocked); and the roboco mapping
(api-core-websocket / deployment-tooling / _complete_map).

* feat(security): Surface N — scanner honeytrap (guard /api auto-ban + nginx edge-drop)

Turns scanner probes against the scanner, in two layers matched to where
traffic lands. Behind nginx only /api, /ws, /health, /ready reach the
orchestrator, so guard can only see (and ban) scanner probes on those paths;
the classic root probes (/.env, /wp-login.php, /phpmyadmin, /.git/config) hit
the panel. So:

- build_security_config's threat_ban_config gains recon / sensitive_file /
  cms_probing categories. A scanner probing those fingerprints on an /api path
  is detected on the URL-path scan; repeated probes from one IP trip an adaptive
  per-IP auto-ban (redis-backed, 24h). Only bans in active mode (passive logs
  the recon hit) and needs redis (the 24h ban exceeds the in-memory cap). The
  spec's decoy-route file is redundant — the WAF url-path scan bans regardless
  of a registered route — so it is intentionally omitted.
- docker/nginx.conf drops the classic root scanner paths at the edge with 444
  (connection closed, no response) before they reach the panel, anchored to
  known scanner fingerprints so /.well-known and every real panel/API route are
  untouched. Always on, independent of ROBOCO_GUARD_ENABLED.

Tests: 2 unit (the exclusion set + the scanner-ban categories are present) and
2 integration (a decoy path is blocked in active mode, passes in passive). The
nginx regex was validated against 15 scanner + 19 legit paths (0 false
positives). Docs: CHANGELOG, the HTTP-security page, the roboco mapping, and the
agent-facing RAG corpus.

* Token optimization — per-role observability, compute policy, spawn preflight (#291)

* test(models): lock the sonnet→claude-sonnet-5 MODEL_MAP invariant

* feat(usage): surface cache tokens + cache_hit_rate in usage breakdowns

* feat(usage): add per-role usage breakdown endpoint

* feat(usage): add spawn-waste signal (per-role unproductive rate + respawn strikes)

* feat(panel): surface per-role cost/cache + spawn-waste on the metrics page

* feat(routing): Phase 2 per-role compute policy — qa→haiku, main_pm→sonnet, per-role effort env mechanism (default-inert)

* feat(orchestrator): Phase 3 flag-gated spawn preflight — refuse non-gateway delivery roles (respawn-forever guard)

* chore(compose): arm ROBOCO_SPAWN_PREFLIGHT_ENABLED on the NAS composes

* docs: per-role usage observability, per-role compute policy, and spawn preflight

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(panel): pin outputFileTracingRoot so the standalone build isn't broken by stray lockfiles

* feat(routing): populate ROLE_EFFORT_MAP + wire the verified --effort flag (cell_pm/board/auditor to medium)

* feat(gateway): omit empty context_briefing sections (Phase 4 payload compaction)

* refactor(orchestrator): extract spawn chokepoint guards to restore xenon rank B on spawn_agent

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-01 23:54:48 +02:00
Renn F 7be10057d0 [bug] agent image: stop baking VIRTUAL_ENV=/app/.venv (silences uv run warning)
The agent-base image baked VIRTUAL_ENV=/app/.venv globally (since 8e201901,
conventional venv-baking, no targeted rationale), so every bare uv run in a
workspace clone warned 'VIRTUAL_ENV=/app/.venv does not match project .venv
and will be ignored' on every gate run. uv used the workspace .venv correctly
(the warning was noise), but it flooded every agent transcript.

The load-bearing MCP/SDK pin is UV_PROJECT_ENVIRONMENT=/app/.venv + --no-sync
(added in #179, the actual startup-stall fix), NOT VIRTUAL_ENV — so removing
VIRTUAL_ENV does not regress #179. The gateway tools stay on PATH.

Verified by building the image (roboco-agent-base:venv-verify) and smoke-
testing in a real container: (1) VIRTUAL_ENV is empty, python resolves to
/app/.venv/bin/python via PATH; (2) bare uv run from /app imports a roboco
module with no warning; (3) the MCP-launch path — cwd with its OWN .venv —
UV_PROJECT_ENVIRONMENT=/app/.venv uv run --no-sync resolves to /app/.venv/
bin/python, overriding the cwd .venv (the exact MCP-server invariant), no
warning; (4) grep for 'does not match|will be ignored' across all output is
empty. bash-guard-tests.sh 64/0, ruff clean, test_workspace_uv_resolves_clone_venv 3/3.

Ships on next agent-image rebuild + redeploy.
2026-06-30 09:58:36 +02:00
15effce014 Chore: 141 Gaps fill-in (#283)
* Updated uv.lock

* Bunch of fixes we need to verify first..

* feat(megatask): per-cell project map root-subtasks (multi-project, multi-cell)

A MegaTask root-subtask can now target an ad-hoc per-cell project map — a
third targeting shape that mirrors the existing product fan-out root. In
RoboCo a project is per-cell (ProjectTable.assigned_cell); a monorepo is N
per-cell projects sharing one git_url. So 'multi-cell' IS 'multi-project',
and a task may mix per-cell projects across products or include OSS-library
projects not in any product.

Storage: migration 052 adds task_cell_projects (mirrors product_projects;
unique per (task, team)). TaskTable gains a cascade-delete cell_projects
relationship; TaskCreateRequest / TaskCreate / Task response carry the map.

Policy: batch.is_branchless_coordination + is_valid_batch_shape gain a
has_cell_projects param — a root-subtask targets exactly one of project /
product / cell-map; the umbrella still targets none. TaskService passes
has_cell_projects at every predicate call site and persists the rows in
create(). _ensure_branch_for_task cuts feature/main_pm/{root} per distinct
project in the map (via _distinct_projects_for_task); _require_target_or_umbrella
and _validate_batch_membership accept the map shape.

Fan-out: every distinct_project_ids site (task.py branch creation, routes
_project_for_complete + _resolve_project_for_merge, orchestrator
_ambient_projects_for_task, pr_review._project_slug_for, git._project_for_task)
generalizes to first-distinct-project-of-map-or-product. Choreographer
_resolve_subtask_project resolves a delegated subtask's cell from the parent's
cell map. The product-scoped _slugs_for_product intake helper is unchanged.

Intake: prompter._draft_cell_map extracts the per-cell map from the_work[].
_validate_batch_scope counts distinct projects across all drafts' cells
(>=2 min stays; one 2-cell draft satisfies it). create_task_from_draft
persists cell_projects for >=2-cell drafts (project_id/product_id None),
collapses a 1-cell map to the single-project shape, and leaves single-cell
top-level project_id drafts unchanged. _resolve_owning_team routes a
multi-cell map to Main PM (coordination root, like a product root — a cell
PM can't delegate cross-cell). propose_draft/propose_batch tool descriptions
declare the per-cell project_id (both Claude SDK + grok runtimes).

The umbrella stays branchless / pure-coordination / submit_root-rejected;
the CEO-escalation pr_number gate is not widened (the map root is
is_umbrella=False, mirroring a product root, so submit_root supplies it).
Single-cell root-subtasks and everything below them are byte-for-byte
unchanged. Un-run MegaTask waves (multi-cell drafts) become runnable.

* [feature] Panel per-cell project picker + pnpm format infra

MegaTask root-subtasks can fan out across cells (be+fe, fe+uxui). Since a
RoboCo project is per-cell (ProjectTable.assigned_cell), a monorepo is N
per-cell projects sharing one git_url — so multi-cell IS multi-project. The
batch-review card now shows one project Select per the_work entry, scoped to
that cell's repos, instead of one Select bound to a single top-level
project_id. confirmBatch validates each cell's project is in scope and the
batch still spans >=2 distinct projects.

- prompter.ts: CellWork gains optional project_id (the per-cell picker seam).
- batch-review-card.tsx: per-cell Selects (one per the_work entry), scoped to
  the cell's projects; legacy single-cell drafts keep the one-Select path.
- use-prompter.ts: updateBatchDraftProject edits per-cell (entryIndex);  confirmBatch validates every cell; batchFromEvent parses per-cell map.

Also adds the missing pnpm format infrastructure (the panel had no formatter
at all): prettier devDep + .prettierrc.json (default-style config: 80-col,
double-quote, semi, trailing-comma-all) + .prettierignore, plus format /
format:check scripts. Only the 3 changed files above were reformatted; the
~222 pre-existing non-compliant files are left untouched (a wholesale reformat
is a separate explicit decision, not bundled into this feature).

* [fix] MegaTask verification: migration 052 enum + async cell-map read

Two real bugs surfaced running the full gate against a containerized
Postgres (and the orchestrator boot log):

1. Migration 052 crashed a real orchestrator boot with
   'type "team" already exists'. The generic sa.Enum(create_type=False)
   does NOT set the postgres enum's create_type attribute, so op.create_table
   (checkfirst=False) emitted a redundant CREATE TYPE against the pre-existing
   team enum. Switched to postgresql.ENUM(create_type=False) — the postgres-
   native enum whose create_type _check_for_name_in_memos actually reads, so
   the CREATE TYPE is suppressed. Verified: 051->052 upgrade against a DB where
   the team enum pre-existed (the exact path that crashed) now succeeds;
   downgrade 052->051 drops the table and preserves the shared enum; fresh
   upgrade head clean. (Migration 016 has the same latent sa.Enum pattern but
   never re-runs in prod, so it's noted, not touched here.)

2. _ensure_branch_for_task read task.cell_projects (lazy=selectin to-many)
   directly, tripping MissingGreenlet on a freshly-created/unqueried task —
   which then poisoned the async session (PendingRollbackError). Replaced with
   _task_has_cell_map: peeks InstanceState.unloaded (no IO) and reads the
   already-loaded map, falling back to an awaited count query only when the
   relationship is genuinely unloaded. Non-ORM stubs route to the plain
   attribute. Fixes 2 integration tests; the 6 cell-map unit tests still pass.

Also: typed the self stub as Any in test_choreographer_subtask_project
(mypy tests/ wants Choreographer, not SimpleNamespace) — the codebase idiom.

Gate: ruff format/check clean; mypy roboco/ + tests/ clean; full pytest
10371 passed / 388 skipped against containerized pgvector:pg16; vulture clean.
Pre-existing xenon C-rank on reassign (from prior commit 19a474d3, not this
feature) still blocks make quality — surfaced separately.

* [refactor] Extract reassign board-advisory diversion helper (C→B complexity)

`reassign` in roboco/services/task.py hit xenon absolute complexity 11 (a
C-rank block), failing `make quality`'s --max-absolute B gate. The C-rank
originated in 19a474d3 (pre-existing, not this feature branch's work).

Extract the board/advisory → cell-task diversion into
`_maybe_divert_board_advisory_reassign` (complexity 4, A). reassign drops to
9 (B); behavior is byte-for-byte preserved — the helper runs the same
guard + pool diversion + log, returning the diverted task or None so the
caller falls through to the normal handoff. Whole-repo xenon exits 0; the 159
reassign / board-guard tests pass.

Unblocks `make quality` on feature/metrics-granularity.

* [fix] migration 016: postgresql.ENUM(create_type=False) for reused team enum

016_add_products_and_task_product_id used `sa.Enum(..., create_type=False)`
for the reused Postgres "team" enum — the same latent defect that crashed
052 on a real orchestrator boot. On the generic `sa.Enum` the
`create_type` kwarg is silently dropped, so `_check_for_name_in_memos`
never sees it and `op.create_table` (checkfirst=False) emits a redundant
`CREATE TYPE team` that fails with "type 'team' already exists" against a
DB where the enum pre-exists.

Switch to the postgres-native `postgresql.ENUM(..., create_type=False)` —
its `create_type` is a real attribute the guard reads, so the CREATE TYPE
is suppressed (and DROP TYPE on downgrade too). The member list is inert
under create_type=False (it never creates/alters the type), so it stays at
016's original six, reflecting the enum as it stood then, not the
later-widened set.

This never crashed in prod because 016 is never re-run (alembic_version is
past it), but it's the same defect class. Verified on the real boot path:
upgrade to 015 in process A (team enum created by 001), then `upgrade head`
in a fresh process B — 016 applied clean, no DuplicateObjectError; downgrade
016->015 clean, shared team enum preserved.

See project_migration_enum_create_type_gotcha.

* [chore] panel: prettier reformat across the codebase

Apply `pnpm format` (prettier 3.8.5, 80-col / double-quote / semi /
trailing-comma-all) to the 223 pre-existing panel files that predated the
prettier infra added in cb5365a4. Pure formatting — no semantic changes:
multi-line arrays/objects collapsed where they fit, trailing newlines added
(.prettierrc.json), import grouping unchanged.

Verified: `pnpm format:check` clean, `pnpm lint` clean, `pnpm typecheck`
clean, `pnpm test` 113/113 pass (7 files).

* Bunch of runtime fixes for MegaTask and other issues

* Fix different project same PR number collision problem

Fix (two layers):
1. Root cause — pr_merge and rebase_pr_for_task now take a required project_id and scope the lookup where(pr_number == X AND project_id == Y). Required so no caller can forget — the bug class can't recur. All 4 call sites updated (choreographer cell_pm_complete, the rebase-retry, the superseded close_pull_request now passes project_id, and _verb_runner._do_pr_merge).
2. Crash guard — _finalize_cell_complete None-checks the complete() return and returns a clean invalid_state envelope (with a remediate hint) instead of dereffing None → 500 → respawn loop.

* Fix: Make main_pm + task_type=code impossible

* Fix Main PM needs revision can't re delegate

* [chore] Bump local LLM glm-5→glm-5.2 + swap Ollama fleet defaults off minimax

- llm_catalog: OLLAMA_DEFAULT_MODEL minimax-m3:cloud → kimi-k2.7-code:cloud;
  role defaults kimi-k2.6→kimi-k2.7-code, developer minimax→kimi, product_owner/
  ceo kimi→glm-5.2, documenter glm→kimi; GLM 5.1→5.2 comment fix.
- config + .env.example + docker-compose{.yml,.yaml,.registry.yml} + docs +
  memory_distiller + optimal_brain: glm-5:cloud → glm-5.2:cloud.
- panel ai-routing-card: typed SelfHostedModel/boolean annotations; drop the
  stale "Minimax M3 default" string (default is now catalog-driven).
- tests: glm-5:cloud → glm-5.2:cloud in pricing + rate-limit-retry fixtures.

* [fix] submit_root: hard unchanged-PR gate stops the pr_fail re-submit loop

The 2026-06-27 infinite pr_fail loop: a Main-PM root (PR #139) was pr_fail'd,
routed to needs_revision, and re-submitted byte-identical → awaiting_pr_review
→ pr_fail again, forever. The prior hint/a2a steer was ignored by the weak
coordinator model — hints don't stop a model that won't read them. A HARD gate
refuses the re-submit when the assembled root PR's head SHA is unchanged since
the last pr_fail (no new cell work → identical diff); a different SHA ⇒ the
branch advanced ⇒ allow. Every ambiguous case fails open (no prior fail, no
recorded SHA, no pr_number, unresolvable slug, git error, closed PR) — only the
exact-unchanged case is hard-blocked.

- content/models: PrReviewContent.head_sha (optional; JSON col → no migration).
- git: get_pr_head_sha (GitHub pulls API; None on any failure → fail-open).
- pr_gate: pr_fail captures head_sha into the verdict record; pr_pass does not.
- _impl: submit_root runs _submit_root_unchanged_pr_guard after _submit_up_guard;
  _current_root_pr_head_sha resolves slug + current SHA (fail-open).
- pr_review: extract module-level resolve_task_project_slug, shared by the mixin
  and the gate helper (_LegacyChoreographer reaches it via cast to the
  ChoreographerHelpers typed view — it doesn't inherit the helpers mixin).
- tests: test_submit_root_unchanged_pr_guard (11 — refuse/allow/6 fail-open/3
  capture-side, mypy-clean via cc:Any spy idiom, zero type:ignore) +
  test_pr_gate_notifies_pm capture-path stub.

* [chore] mypy tests/: clear all 15 pre-existing type errors so make quality can go green

The branch tip had 15 mypy tests/ errors in files this bundle did not author,
which blocked CI's make quality mypy step (mypy roboco/ tests/) regardless of
the bundle's own commits. Pre-existing is still existing — fix every one:

- test_schemas_v1_flow.py (8): the StrList coercion tests intentionally pass
  SDK-nested list-of-strings input ([[['...']]], {'item':{'$text':'...'}}, int,
  dict). Annotate those literals as list[Any] locals so mypy accepts the
  coerce-able shape; the StrList BeforeValidator still flattens to list[str] at
  runtime. No type:ignore.
- test_pr_gate_records_verdict.py (3): notes_structured is dict|None; narrow
  with 'assert t.notes_structured is not None' before indexing (the existing
  pattern at line 90).
- test_pr_review_hand_format_guard.py (1 site, 2 errors): the _verb_runner()
  spy assertion — use the cc: Any = c alias idiom so assert_not_awaited
  resolves; drops the now-unused type:ignore[union-attr].
- test_pr_gate_notifies_pm.py (1): drop the unused type:ignore[method-assign]
  on the a2a.send reassignment.
- test_content_models.py (1): narrow coerced with isinstance(coerced,
  PrReviewContent) before reading .issues (the base _Content lacks the field).

Gates: rm -rf .mypy_cache && mypy roboco/ tests/ = Success (855 files);
ruff check + format clean; 5 affected suites = 40 passed.

* [fix] fail_qa routes needs_revision back to the dev, never the pool

A dev task in needs_revision must go back to the developer, never the
pool. The pool path let a cell PM re-claim the revision (PMs can claim
needs_revision) — the live 2026-06-27 'needs revision on a dev task sent to
the cell PM' bug.

fail_qa's original_developer marker is the fast path, but it is
unreliable in practice (live observation: never persisted), so the
unassign else-branch was the load-bearing path and it dropped the task
into the pool. Add a work-session fallback (_resolve_revision_dev) that
resolves the developer who actually worked the task — the most recent
work session whose agent is a developer, the QA's own session excluded
— and reassigns to that dev instead of unassigning. Only unassign when
no developer ever touched the task. Self-heals the marker so a
subsequent re-fail takes the fast path and the QA-review index
attributes the work correctly.

* [feature] delegate carries dev-task collision surface (sequencing S1)

The cell/main PM's delegate verb now carries the dev-task collision
surface (intends_to_touch / adds_migration / touches_shared) and an
explicit depends_on override through DelegateRequest -> DelegateInputs
-> _create_subtask_from_inputs -> create_subtask, and create_subtask
forwards sequence / dependency_ids / batch_id / surfaces into the
prepared TaskCreateRequest instead of dropping them (the base create
already persists them at task.py:878-884).

This is the plumbing for the multi-level sequencing model edge kind 3
(dev-task collision DAG). Previously a dev task delegated with a
collision surface or an explicit dependency lost it before persistence
— dependency_ids was always [], so the only dev-task ordering was the
weak assignee-keyed spawn barrier (the live 2026-06-27 out-of-order
break: 40842957 started before 9b3682b8's PR merged). Phase S2 runs
SequencingService over the surfaced siblings and wires the DAG via
add_dependency.

* [feature] wire dev-task collision DAG at cell-PM delegation (sequencing S2)

Pure dev_task_collision_edges in sequencing.py turns a parent's surfaced
siblings into (depends_on_id, task_id) pairs via SequencingService. TaskService.
wire_sibling_collision_dag wires them through add_dependency (idempotent). The
choreographer calls it after each dev-task delegate so the sibling collision DAG
is built incrementally as the cell PM decomposes — file-overlap serializes,
migration chains, shared-last; stable (priority, sequence) ordering keeps edges
from flipping into reverse cycles on re-runs.

* [feature] wire cell-task wave chain + by-osmosis edge (sequencing S3)

Kind 2 (cell-task wave chain): a new cell-task under root-subtask UT_n
depends on every cell-task under every root-subtask in UT_n.dependency_ids
(the kind-1 wave-chain edges), so its branch carries the previous wave's
merged cell work. Re-derived from the root-subtask's deps, not the cell-task's
own dependency_ids (which also carry UX/product-fanout edges the by-osmosis
edge must not pick up). A root may fan to several cell-tasks (different cells),
so the previous wave's cell-task is a SET.

Kind 4 (by-osmosis): the first dev task (sequence 0) under a cell-task depends
on each predecessor cell-task's tail (max-sequence) dev task, so the new wave's
first branch carries the previous wave's fully-merged tail. Subsequent dev
tasks inherit the tail via kind 3 or the merged base.

Both wired from _create_subtask_from_inputs, dispatched on parent.team
(MAIN_PM -> kind 2; cell team -> kind 4). Pure helpers
(cell_task_wave_chain_depends_on, by_osmosis_tail_dev_tasks) unit-tested in
test_sequencing.py; TaskService methods integration-tested. Idempotent +
best-effort throughout (add_dependency dedupes; missing predecessors are
no-ops). Also fixes a latent mypy-tests gap (estimated_complexity required on
direct TaskCreateRequest calls in the S2 tests).

* [feature] sync_branch dev verb — gate-level branch rebase (Phase B1)

Raw shell git is denied to agents (Bash(git:*) base deny), so a developer
whose branch fell behind its base had no gate-level rebase — only the
CEO/PM-only /rebase HTTP route. sync_branch is the dev verb that wraps the
rebase through the gate (traced + evidenced), so the 'everything goes through
the gates' invariant holds.

- lifecycle: IntentSpec sync_branch (dev-only, ownership-gated, composes=(),
  git-only — no DB transition); _next_hint_synced helper.
- GitService.sync_task_branch: rebase task.branch_name onto its resolved base
  via rebase_onto_base (fetch + rebase + force-with-lease push).
- Choreographer.sync_branch + _sync_branch_preflight_rejection: not_found /
  unknown-role / spec-gate / no-branch / protected-base guards, then the git
  op; conflicts abort (no force-push) and steer to resolve-by-hand; git failure
  steers to i_am_blocked.
- HTTP route /api/v1/flow/developer/sync_branch + SyncBranchRequest schema.
- MCP tool sync_branch(task_id) + _TOOLS registration (manifest auto-propagates
  via intents_for_role(Role.DEVELOPER)).

Tests: intent spec (5), choreographer handler (8: happy/conflicts/not_found/
not_authorized/no-branch/protected-base/git-failure/audit), route (1), MCP (1).
ruff + mypy roboco/ tests/ clean; unit suite green (DB-fixture errors env-only).

* [feature] i_am_done behind-base submit gate (Phase B2)

A sibling's PR merging into the parent branch while a dev worked leaves the
dev's branch behind its base — the assembled PR then can't merge cleanly and
the sibling's changes go missing (the 2026-06-27 out-of-order dev-task break).
The behind-base gate refuses i_am_done in that state and steers the dev to
sync_branch (the Phase B1 gate-level rebase verb).

- GitService.is_behind_base: rev-list --left-right --count across
  origin/{base}...origin/{head} → (behind, ahead); fetch-first so origin
  reflects the pushed head. Raises on git failure (consistent with
  rebase_onto_base); malformed stdout degrades to (0,0).
- Choreographer._behind_base_gate: wired into _i_am_done_gate after
  _ensure_branch_pushed. behind>0 → invalid_state remediate→sync_branch.
  Fail-open on git/base-resolution error (flaky fetch can't strand a task at
  the submit gate — the merge layer has its own behind checks). Skipped for
  branchless roots and protected bases (master/main/-prefixed).

Tests: gate (6: refuse+steer/up-to-date/branchless/protected/fail-open-base/
fail-open-git), is_behind_base (6: parse/up-to-date/malformed/argv-form/
requires-branch/missing-project). ruff + mypy roboco/ tests/ clean; unit green.

* [docs] sync_branch prompt + behind-base guidance (Phase B3)

Update every behind-base/rebase guidance surface to reflect the B1
sync_branch dev verb + B2 i_am_done behind-base gate: devs now self-rebase
through the gate instead of escalating a plain behind-base condition; PMs
still escalate cell/root integration branches (they have no rebase verb).

- developer.md: sync_branch in the verb table; 'When your branch is behind
  its base' rewritten — call sync_branch, do NOT i_am_blocked a plain
  behind-base; conflicts → resolve by hand, commit, sync_branch again.
- cell_pm.md: delegate signature gains intends_to_touch/adds_migration/
  touches_shared/depends_on + a 'Collision surface' section (fill it on every
  code subtask so sibling dev tasks that touch the same files sequence into a
  conflict-free order — the 2026-06-27 out-of-order break fix); behind-base
  section steers devs to sync_branch, PMs escalate only the integration branch.
- main_pm.md: behind-base section — dev leaf = dev's sync_branch; cell/root
  integration branch = escalate_up.
- RAG git-errors.md / blocked-tools.md: devs sync_branch, PMs escalate.
- docs/troubleshooting/common-issues.md: leaf self-rebases; integration branch
  still escalates to operator.
- CLAUDE.md verb surface: developer gains sync_branch.
- agents/prompts/_generated/*: regenerated via scripts/regenerate_verb_tables.py
  — adds sync_branch to the dev table AND catches the generated tables up to
  the S1/S2 delegate sequencing params + meltdown-fix note top-level params
  (the derived files had drifted stale vs the already-committed schemas).

Docs/prompts only — no code. ruff + mypy roboco/ tests/ clean.

* [chore] orchestrator: refuse to spawn human-only roles (CEO/prompter/secretary)

A live 2026-06-27 incident saw a CEO agent container spawned. Root cause:
_dispatch_a2a_work iterates every A2A/notification target and spawns it
with no human-role filter, and _is_agent_active('ceo') is always false
(the CEO is never a container), so the 'skip if active' check could never
protect the CEO. Any CEO-addressed notification (board handoff, escalation)
launched a CEO container — the system acting as the human CEO: a trust
violation. The CEO is the human operator; intake (prompter) and secretary
are human-driven chats launched through their own dedicated guarded paths
(_spawn_intake_container / _spawn_secretary_container), never spawn_agent.

Fix: a single chokepoint guard at the top of spawn_agent refuses
Role.CEO / PROMPTER / SECRETARY (raises AgentReadinessError + logs). This
structurally covers every dispatcher present and future, since they all go
through spawn_agent. Plus a defense-in-depth skip in _dispatch_a2a_work so
a human-role target never even calls in (avoids error-log spam; the
notification stays for the human to read in the panel).

Safe: the dedicated human-spawn paths do not route through spawn_agent.
Regression tests: spawn_agent refuses ceo/intake-1/secretary-1, does NOT
refuse a real agent; _dispatch_a2a_work skips CEO/intake/secretary targets
and still spawns real-agent + mixed-target cases.

* [chore] orchestrator: skip human-only assignees in claimed/pm-review dispatchers

Defense-in-depth for the spawn_agent human-role chokepoint (d31d6719).
The chokepoint structurally guarantees no CEO/prompter/secretary container
can ever spawn — every dispatcher goes through spawn_agent. But two
dispatchers resolve an arbitrary assigned_to and spawn it with only a
None/unknown-role filter, so a human-assigned task would reach the
chokepoint and RAISE: caught by the per-dispatcher try/except, but it
aborts that dispatcher's whole tick (stalling other respawns behind the
mis-assigned task) and error-logs every cycle. The other dispatchers are
already safe by whitelist/hardcoded slug (blocker_resolver_slug returns
None for non-PM/non-BOARD; escalation/approval use whitelists; marketing
and audit hardcode their non-human slug).

- _claimed_task_needs_agent: return None for a CEO/prompter/secretary
  assignee — no container to respawn, and do NOT release a human-owned
  task to pending (that would re-route it to a PM). Leave it for the human.
- _dispatch_pm_review_work (assigned branch): skip a human-only assignee
  so a CEO-assigned awaiting_pm_review task neither spawns nor aborts the
  dispatcher's tick.

Audited all target-iterating dispatchers; only these two lacked a filter.
Regression tests cover both skips.

* [F002] retype board-routed MegaTask root-subtasks code->planning on activation

_activate_batch_root_subtasks flipped a held root-subtask to team=MAIN_PM
but left task_type=code (intake only coerces main_pm-team drafts, so a
board-routed code root reached activation still code-typed). The
main_pm+code combo re-introduces the 2026-06-27 meltdown. Mirror
approve_and_start's own retype via main_pm_cannot_own_code so the
activated child is a planning-typed coordination root.

TDD: RED test_activate_batch_root_subtasks_retypes_code_to_planning
watched fail (task_type stayed CODE), then GREEN after the retype.
ruff+mypy clean; 125 batch/umbrella/approve tests green, no regressions.

* [F003,F004,F014] enforce HMAC agent-token gate on do routes + WebSocket streams

F003/F014: /api/v1/do/* only required X-Agent-ID (UUID) — no token check,
unlike the flow routers' role guards. A forged X-Agent-ID passed. Added
require_any_authenticated_agent (token-only; do router serves all roles)
and applied it as a router-level dependency. Binds X-Agent-ID to a verified
HMAC token when ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED=true; rejects a forged token
even in dev mode.

F004: /ws/* per-agent streams (channels/agents/sessions/notifications)
never read the nginx-injected X-Agent-Token, so in strict mode an agent on
the Docker network could subscribe to another agent's notifications with
no auth. Added _require_panel_token verifying the CEO panel token against
the CEO identity; wired into all four per-agent streams (system stream
stays operator-only per its docstring). Same strict/dev contract.

TDD: RED tests watched fail (no gate -> 200/accept), then GREEN. ruff+mypy
clean; 399 api/mcp + 29 WS tests green, no regressions.

* [F005,F006] grok auth: directory mount + atomic-write fallback

F005: the single-file bind mount of auth.json pinned the inode, so the
orchestrator's atomic refresh (tmp+rename within ~/.grok) never reached a
running grok container — a long-lived container hung at the login prompt
when the original ~6h token expired. Mount the host ~/.grok DIRECTORY (ro)
at /home/agent/.grok-auth-ro; the entrypoint symlinks ~/.grok/auth.json at
that RO mount so grok + the --check backstop read the live credential (the
directory mount sees the host-side rename) while grok's writable state
(config.toml, sessions/) stays in the image's ~/.grok.

F006: a rotated refresh_token is single-use — xAI invalidates the old one
the instant it issues the new one. If the atomic write failed after the
rotation, the file kept the now-dead old refresh_token and the credential
was permanently lost on the next refresh. _atomic_write now falls back to a
direct write when tmp+replace fails, so the rotated token always lands on
disk (losing the write is catastrophic; losing atomicity is not).

TDD: RED tests watched fail, then GREEN. ruff+mypy clean; 32 grok tests
green, no regressions.

* [F016,F017] choreographer: surface invalid_state instead of None.status 500 on submit_root / i_am_blocked

Both verbs compose a single atomic action whose None return (the verb's
own result) flowed out of run_intent and was dereferenced as t.status,
HTTP 500-ing with no actionable rejection:

- F016 submit_root: submit_for_review returns None when the root->master
  PR was already opened / the task raced out of in_progress. Post-runner
  None-guard extracted into _submit_root_finalize -> invalid_state
  (re-fetch; if awaiting_pr_review the PR is open, wait for reviewer;
  else re-delegate fixes and retry) instead of None.status.

- F017 i_am_blocked: escalate returns None in four cases (no task, no
  agent, no resolvable escalation-target slug, no target agent row) e.g.
  a developer whose role has no PM above it. _run_i_am_blocked_intent
  now guards updated is None -> (t, invalid_state rejection) with
  remediation (re-fetch + escalate to CEO directly / retry) instead of
  the caller deref'ing None.status -> 500 + respawn-loop.

TDD red->green; ruff + mypy clean; gateway suite green (58 passed).

* [F007] choreographer: cell-level unchanged-PR re-submit loop-stopper for submit_up

The root loop-stopper (F016) was root-only; a weak cell PM could re-submit
the unchanged cell->root PR after a pr_fail and loop awaiting_pr_review ->
pr_fail forever (the cell analogue of the 2026-06-27 root loop).

pr_fail stamps the assembled PR's head SHA into notes_structured.pr_review
.head_sha for cell AND root gate tasks alike (the capture is gate-verb-
level, not root-level), so the same structural refusal applies to submit_up:
if the cell PR's current head SHA equals the SHA the last pr_fail recorded,
no new dev work landed on the cell branch -> the diff is byte-identical ->
refuse, do not re-open the gate. Different SHA -> branch advanced -> allow.

- _submit_up_unchanged_pr_guard mirrors _submit_root_unchanged_pr_guard
  (cell-PM remediation: re-delegate to the dev + wait for re-assembly),
  wired into submit_up after _submit_up_guard passes.
- Renamed shared _current_root_pr_head_sha -> _current_pr_head_sha (both
  guards use it; the lookup was never root-specific).
- Every ambiguous case FAILS OPEN (no prior fail, no recorded sha, no
  pr_number, no resolvable project, git/closed-PR None) — only the exact-
  unchanged case is hard-blocked.

TDD red->green; ruff + mypy clean; F007+F016 guard suites green (15 passed).

* [F008] evidence_builder: surface persisted pr_review verdict+issues in the PM task_handoff

The pr_fail a2a steer to the owning PM is fire-and-forget; a PM respawned
into needs_revision later read none of it (build_task_handoff never looked
at notes_structured), saw a generic 'needs revision' with zero concrete
change-requests, and re-submitted the same PR (the 2026-06-27 infinite
pr_fail loop on 9980d0a0 / PR #138). The signal-gap was only partially
closed by the a2a.

build_task_handoff now extracts notes_structured.pr_review
(verdict/summary/issues/head_sha — the slot pr_fail authors on every fail)
into a pr_review field on the handoff, so every PM briefing for the task
carries the concrete change-requests. A prior pr_fail alone now counts as
prior-work-worth-resuming. Type-guarded + capped; absent => no key (no
misleading empty slot).

TDD red->green; ruff + mypy clean; evidence_builder suite green (14 passed).

* [F009] notification: derive requires_ack from ACK_REQUIRED_BY_TYPE, not the True default

NotificationService._create_notification built NotificationTable without
requires_ack, so the column default (True) applied to EVERY notification -
including informational REVIEW_REQUEST / DOCUMENTATION_REQUEST /
A2A_REQUEST / KNOWLEDGE_SHARE (ACK_REQUIRED_BY_TYPE -> False) and every
@mention from MessagingService._notify_mentions. Each false ack-required
inflated the recipient's unacked set and soft-blocked i_am_idle into
respawn churn.

- _create_notification: requires_ack=ACK_REQUIRED_BY_TYPE.get(type, True)
  (unmapped types default True - preserve the action-required bias).
- _notify_mentions: requires_ack=False explicit (MENTION is informational).

TDD red->green (identity is False/is True assertions - the mocked
flush doesn't apply SQLA's insert-time default, so pre-fix the attribute
was None); ruff + mypy clean; notification suite green (18 passed).

* [F010] notification: never dedup informational notifications (knowledge-share data loss)

The purpose-based dedup suppressed a same-purpose (same sender/type/task,
overlapping recipients) notification while a prior one was unacked. For
informational types (KNOWLEDGE_SHARE / MENTION / A2A_REQUEST / BROADCAST +
the pickup-proves-receipt triad) each send carries DISTINCT content (a new
learning, a new mention) and acking is voluntary, so a recipient who never
acks the prior one let the dedup permanently suppress every subsequent
same-sender broadcast - silent learning-broadcast data loss.

The dedup's anti-loop rationale (stop unacked-set inflation soft-blocking
i_am_idle) only holds for action-required signals. Gate the dedup on
ACK_REQUIRED_BY_TYPE.get(type, True): action-required types still dedup,
informational types always create. Unmapped types default True (dedup on).

TDD red->green; ruff + mypy clean; notification + dedup suites green (20).

* [F011] playbook: de-index rejected/archived playbooks from the PLAYBOOKS RAG index

* [F012] release_executor: fail-closed on git add/commit before push

* [F013] release_proposal: Redis SET NX mutex guards the ~40min execute against concurrent approves

* [F015] flow_qa/flow_doc: add i_am_blocked route (manifest-registered escape hatch was 404)

* [F018] claim_guards: treat blocked as active + broaden the guard lookup so a blocked dev can't double-claim

* [F019] git: clear orphaned .git/*.lock files after a timeout-SIGKILL'd mutation op

* [F031] identity: role_for_slug_or_none so defensive skip-guards don't crash the dispatcher tick on stale slugs

* [F032] test: unknown-assignee claim reaches release-to-pending path

F031's role_for_slug_or_none fix made the unknown-assignee release branch
in _dispatch_claimed_without_agent reachable (the human-only guard no
longer raises/short-circuits on a stale slug). Lock that reachability in:
a claimed task with an unknown-assignee UUID past grace returns the slug
(not None) so get_agent_role -> 'unknown' releases the claim to pending
for a role-matched reclaim.

* [F033] orchestrator: capture container_id at startup re-adoption

_readopt_running_agents registered re-adopted ACTIVE instances with
container_id=None. _check_health skips container_id-is-None instances, so
when a re-adopted container later exited the stopped-container handler
never ran and the task stranded under a phantom ACTIVE instance forever.

Add _resolve_container_id (docker inspect -f '{{.Id}}') and store the real
id on re-adopt. Best-effort: a probe failure degrades to None (still
ACTIVE; the reaper's Docker-liveness fallback covers it).

* [F034] orchestrator: re-stamp respawn last_check at restore

_pm_made_rule_following_retry bounds its tracing_gap audit lookup with
since = record.get('last_check'). A stale persisted last_check from before
the restart matched pre-restart tracing_gap rows, falsely resetting the
breaker on the very first post-restart spawn — exactly when a fresh strike
count should be evaluating current state.

_partition_respawn_rows now re-stamps last_check to the restore time on
every restorable entry, bounding the lookup to post-restart gaps only.

* [F035] orchestrator: probe-resume loop actually revives parked agents

_park_provider_unavailable parked the provider + offlined the instance but
never registered a WaitingRecord, so _on_probe_success -> _parked_agents_for
(always filtered on waiting_for=='rate_limit_lifted') returned [] and
resolve_wait revived nobody — recovery fell to the 600s stale-claim reaper
instead of the probe-success path the parking design relied on.

Register + persist a rate_limit_lifted WaitingRecord at park time (mirrors
mark_waiting_long, minus stop_agent — the container is already dead).

Companion reaper guard: _reap_with_service now skips provider-parked
assignees (_assignee_is_provider_parked) so the claim survives until the
probe revives the agent — otherwise the reaper releases the claim to pending
and probe-success respawns on a task the agent no longer owns.

* [F036] orchestrator: read transcript for overload detection too

The SDK server writes model-API errors (529/500/503) to /tmp/sdk-server.log,
not stdout, so an overload marker can appear only in the durable Claude
transcript — the same rationale already applied to the session-limit
detector. _provider_overload_park_target read only docker logs, so an
overload was missed and the agent crash-respawned straight back into it.

Now concatenates the transcript tail before matching, mirroring the
rate-limit path.

* [F037] orchestrator: drop bare error-NNN overload markers

The bare 'error 529'/'error 500'/'error 503' markers were broad enough to
false-match an agent that merely writes about an HTTP status code in its own
notes ('the endpoint returned error 500, retrying'), parking the whole
Anthropic fleet on a non-issue.

The SDK error formatter emits 'API Error: NNN' + a JSON error type, so the
remaining 'api error: 529/500/503' + 'overloaded_error' +
'internal_server_error' markers cover every real overload without that
false-match surface.

* [F038/F039] orchestrator: sign X-Agent-Token on self-API calls

The prior self-PATCH 401 fix only carried X-Agent-ID/X-Agent-Role. Arming
ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED=true made the middleware require a signed
X-Agent-Token, so every orchestrator self-call (auto-block / auto-resume /
auto-recover / SLA annotation) 401'd and silently no-op'd — wedging
paused/blocked parents.

Add _system_api_headers() that wraps the base headers with a signed token
for the system identity (issue_agent_token); switch all six self-call sites.
Dev fallback: no secret set => UNSIGNED sentinel + auth not required.

* [F040] orchestrator: finalize grok spawn session on cost-cap kill

_enforce_grok_cost_budget killed + evicted the container without calling
_finalize_spawn_session, so the open agent_spawn_sessions row stayed open
(ended_at IS NULL) and the burned usage/cost was never recorded in the
dashboard.

Call _finalize_spawn_session(exit_reason='cost_cap') BEFORE popping the
instance — it reads self._instances[agent_id] for the model +
usage_session_id, which the pop would lose.

* [F041] park grok exit-78 (auth missing/expired) instead of crash-retrying

A one-shot grok container whose entrypoint ran grok_auth --check and found
the token missing/expired exits 78 (EX_CONFIG). Crash-retrying 3x burns
tokens for zero progress — the agent cannot start without a valid token.
Park the provider with kind=auth_missing (same shape as the 429 exit-75
path) so the probe-resume loop revives the task once grok_auth.refresh_if_stale
mints a fresh token; if still expired, the next exit 78 re-parks (no burn).

Also fixes a latent F035 regression: _park_provider_unavailable now registers
a WaitingRecord, so the bare-__new__ rate-limit park test had to set
_waiting_records + stub _persist_waiting_record (mirrors the overload-test
fixture).

* [F042] isolate concurrent-duplicate conventions cache put in a savepoint

Two task creates for the same project/HEAD can race to populate the
conventions cache; the loser's INSERT fails the partial-unique index with
IntegrityError. A bare session.add + flush poisons the shared session (the
task-create transaction rides the same session), so every subsequent op
raises 'this session is in error state' and task creation crashes.

Run the INSERT in a savepoint (begin_nested) and swallow the IntegrityError:
only the savepoint rolls back, the outer transaction stays usable, and the
winner's row satisfies the next _cache_get.

* [F043] guard escalate_up against resurrecting terminal tasks

escalate_up had composes=() and no source-status guard, so a PM could
escalate a COMPLETED/CANCELLED task and apply_escalation set it back to
BLOCKED — bypassing the state machine's terminal-state invariant.

Defense in depth:
- spec: add PRECONDITION_NON_TERMINAL to escalate_up's extra_preconditions so
  the lifecycle gate rejects terminal tasks (invalid_state) before the
  journal:decision write fires; generalize _check_intent_preconditions to
  honor non-tracing rejection_kind (not_authorized / invalid_state).
- service: apply_escalation (the single write primitive) returns False and
  refuses to mutate a terminal task — covers the HTTP escalate route which
  bypasses the spec gate. escalate() / escalate_up_to_role() return None on
  refusal so the gateway emits a clean invalid_state envelope.
- route: the HTTP escalate route 409s a terminal task BEFORE sending the
  escalation notification (so a finished task isn't yanked back, PM not pinged).

* [F044] pr_pass gate remediation points the reviewer at pr_fail, not i_am_blocked

The pr_pass gate runs the toolchain + conventions guards on the REVIEWER's
workspace, but their remediation text said 'call i_am_blocked' — a verb the
PR reviewer does not have. The reviewer would chase a verb they cannot call
instead of rejecting the PR.

Make the guards reviewer-aware: a reviewer=True flag (passed by _pr_pass_blocked)
switches the remediation to pr_fail(issues=[...]) — the reviewer's reject
lever, sending the PR back to needs_revision for the dev to fix the
environment / validator. The dev (i_am_done) path keeps i_am_blocked, which a
dev does have. _conventions_guard (the pr_pass path) now passes reviewer=True
through to _conventions_rejection.

* [F045] rate-limit: loud activate-failure log + in-memory orphan-probe fallback

The in-verb i_am_blocked(rate_limited) path wrapped RateLimitStateTracker.activate
in a bare contextlib.suppress. A silent activate failure stranded the fleet:
agents were parked in _waiting_records but the provider never entered the tracker,
so the tracker-driven _sweep_rate_limit_probes never probed it and no
_on_probe_success ever resumed them — parked agents stuck in WAITING_LONG.

Fix: (1) replace the bare suppress with a try/except that logs an error event
naming the provider + affected agents; (2) in _sweep_rate_limit_probes, after
probing the tracker-listed set, scan _waiting_records for any rate_limit_lifted
provider the loop did NOT cover and probe it via the time-expiry fallback (empty
state -> probe now) so _on_probe_success resumes the parked agents. The fallback
reads only local memory, so it still resumes when Redis was down at park time
(list_rate_limited_providers failure now falls through to the orphan scan instead
of returning early).

* [F046] pr_gate: guard None runner result on concurrent transition (pr_pass/pr_fail)

_gate_decision dereferenced the verb-runner result without a None guard.
run_intent returns None when a concurrent transition (cancel or a racing
reviewer) moves the task out of awaiting_pr_review between the precondition
gate and the runner's final composed action (the verb runner's documented
last-action source-status contract). The subsequent t.assigned_to /
t.status / _post_gate_review_to_pr(t, ...) dereferences then crashed the
gate with a 500 AttributeError. Add a None guard that surfaces a clean
invalid_state rejection (re-fetch + re-issue) before any dereference; no
PR post or a2a runs against a None task. TDD test_pr_gate_notifies_pm.py (+2).

* [F047] conventions: reviewer-aware block-finding remediation on pr_pass gate

The pr_pass (reviewer) conventions guard reused the dev-path block-finding
remediation: 'add a waiver to .roboco/conventions.yml in your branch'. A
pr_reviewer does not own the assembled cell->root / root->master branch and
has no commit verb on it, so the waiver remediation is unreachable — a false
positive stranded the gate with no self-recovery (the reviewer could neither
commit a waiver nor pr_pass). The fail-open content path is documented
precision-over-recall and stays as-is; the actionable gap is the remediation.

Fix: _conventions_rejection now branches the block-finding remediation on
reviewer=True (mirroring the could_not_run branch from F044). The reviewer
path points at pr_fail carrying the findings as issues so the PR returns to
needs_revision and the DEV fixes the violation or commits the waiver (the dev
CAN commit to the branch); waiver authorship is framed as the dev's action,
not the reviewer's. Dev i_am_done path wording unchanged. TDD
test_conventions_gate_pr_pass.py (+1).

* [F048] notify: reject human-only recipients (prompter/secretary) — no agent ack path

notify() only checked the SENDER role. The recipient was resolved by
NotificationService._resolve_recipients, which drops only unresolvable slugs
— it does not exclude human-only roles. The prompter (intake-1) and secretary
(secretary-1) are seeded agent rows, so they resolved, and an ack-required
ALERT addressed to them sat permanently unacked (no agent auto-acks it),
polluted the panel's pending-ack view, and — via the dedup query's
~acked_by.contains — permanently suppressed any later same-purpose
notification from the same sender to that human role. The knowledge-share
path already excludes all three human-only roles; the general notify path
did not.

Fix: a recipient-role guard in notify() via _reject_disallowed_recipient
(folds the new check into the existing CEO-dependency-block return slot so
notify stays under the PLR0911 return limit). Rejects prompter/secretary
with not_authorized; the CEO is human too but acks via the panel, so it stays
an allowed recipient (its only disallowed case, a dependency-block page, is
preserved). TDD test_notify.py (+3: reject prompter, reject secretary, allow
CEO).

* [F049] merge_pull_request: idempotent on already-merged PR (mirror _merge_with_retry)

* [F050] merge_pr_for_task: verify caller pr_number matches task's recorded PR

* [F051] open_conventions_pr: refuse dirty tree + verify checkout-base landed

* [F052] pr_target: scope task lookup by project_id (mirror close_pull_request)

* [F053] _token_for_project: log decryption failure (key rotation) with project slug

* [F054] learnings index: enforce shareable on every shared retrieval path (private-leak fix)

* [F055] messaging: recover from concurrent channel auto-create race via savepoint + re-fetch

* [F056] messaging: lock group row before session check-then-create to prevent active-session orphan race

* [F057] playbook: index/unindex as a post-commit step so the RAG corpus never leads the status transaction

* [F058] release-readiness: non-empty bump plan on first release

_canonical_bump_files derived the bump set from the previous
chore(release): commit. On the first release there is no such commit,
so it returned [] -> assess set version_bump_plan=[] -> the executor
published a tag with no files bumped (a no-op masquerading as X.Y.Z).

Fall back to the version-reference scan when no prior release commit
exists: the files currently embedding the version are exactly the set a
first release must bump, and the set the first release commit then
records as canonical for subsequent releases. Read-only derivation; the
CEO-approval gate and fail-closed executor are untouched.

* [F059] self-heal: hold fix tasks for CEO Approve-&-Start (restore dispatch gate)

The module docstring promised self-heal fix tasks 'wait for the CEO's
Approve-&-Start', but _originate created them confirmed_by_human=True and the
orchestrator dispatched them at once — a self-heal fix that re-broke CI would
trigger another cycle, open another auto-dispatched fix, and loop with no CEO
gate on dispatch.

Restore the documented gate:
* _originate opens the task confirmed_by_human=False (held for the CEO).
* The orchestrator holds a self-heal task out of both the PM and dev dispatch
  paths until confirmed_by_human flips True.
* approve_and_start (the CEO's start gate) sets confirmed_by_human=True so the
  held task finally dispatches (idempotent for board/intake tasks already True).
* list_pending_for_agent scopes the give_me_work hold to self-heal
  (source != self_heal OR confirmed_by_human) so an already-alive PM can't grab
  it pre-approval — while ordinary delegated subtasks (confirmed_by_human=False
  by default, where the delegation IS the authorization) still dispatch.

The 'never self-deploys' guarantee (no merge) is unchanged.

* [F059] fix DB-integration test auth + retype self-heal root code→planning

conftest test-DB defaults matched the project's own running postgres
(roboco/roboco @ localhost:15432, the docker-compose roboco-postgres
service with CREATEDB) instead of the OS user on localhost:5432 which has
no such role — every db_session test failed with InvalidPasswordError
instead of running.

Once the DB connection worked, the self-heal origination DB test went RED
with MAIN_PM_NO_CODE: the self-heal root was task_type=CODE owned by
main_pm, the combo the main_pm_cannot_own_code guard rejects. The Main PM
coordinates the fix (delegates the code work to a cell dev); it has no
code verb. Retyped CODE→PLANNING and rewrote description/AC to
coordination-level.

* [F060] emit reversal audit row on claim-branch-failure rollback

The forward task.claimed audit row is flushed before the branch-creation
attempt, and AuditService commits on its own connection, so the rollback's
flush reverts the task row but not that audit row — the journey's last
event stayed task.claimed while the task reverted to its pre-claim status,
diverging from real state and corrupting downstream cycle-time/bottleneck
metrics. The rollback now emits a CLAIMED->original reversal audit row
(only when the forward transition was made) attributed to the claimant.

* Removing completely unnecessary files (for the repo they are unnecessary)

* [F061] audit status-transition rows now written in-session (F061/F073/F075)

_emit_status_transition_audit now writes AuditLogTable rows into
self.session synchronously (session.add) instead of dispatching
AuditService.log_task_event fire-and-forget on its own connection.

The audit row now commits/rolls back atomically with the status
transition in the caller's transaction, closing three facets at once:
- F061: audit commit no longer decoupled from the transition commit
- F073: a committed transition can no longer have NO audit row
  (the row rides the same transaction; a swallowed persist can't drop it)
- F075: a transition rolled back inside a verb savepoint no longer
  leaves a phantom audit row (the row is in the savepoint too)

log_task_event is now called only from this helper (narrow blast
radius verified); revision_count increment stays at this single
chokepoint. Cycle-time/bottleneck reconstruction from task.<status>
events is no longer silently corruptible.

Tests: test_emit_status_transition_audit_writes_in_session_atomically,
test_finalize_claim_rollback_emits_reversal_audit, escalation-audit
tests retargeted to in-session AuditLogTable rows.

Also: _canonical_bump_files grep-looseness follow-on (F058) -- filter
by subject, not body; git log --grep matches any message line, so a
non-release commit whose body references chore(release): shadowed the
real release commit. Test
test_canonical_bump_files_ignores_body_only_chore_release_match.

* [F061] drop type:ignore from audit-emit tests

Convention: no type:ignore/noqa. The F061 in-session audit-emit
tests used '# type: ignore[assignment]' to assign a MagicMock to
AsyncSession.add, and the F060 test assigned to .flush the same way.

Rewritten to hold a local 'session: MagicMock' variable (mypy sees
its auto-children as MagicMock, so .add.side_effect / .flush assign
cleanly with no suppression). Verified via 'mypy tests/' that both
files are now type-clean (the F060/F061 commits had skipped tests/
in mypy, masking two method-assign errors).

* [chore] clear all 64 pre-existing mypy errors in tests/ (no type:ignore)

Convention: no type:ignore/noqa, and pre-existing violations still
violate. The make-quality gate runs 'mypy roboco/ tests/', but the
prior commits' gates only ran mypy on production files, masking 64
type errors across 15 test files (method-assign, unused-ignore,
no-untyped-def, attr-defined, union-attr, has-type, index, misc).

Fixed without any type:ignore:
- method-assign (svc.session.X = / svc.method = AsyncMock()): hold a
  local 'session: MagicMock'/'AsyncMock' and assert on it, or stub via
  object.__setattr__ / monkeypatch / a typed '_bind' helper returning
  Any, or alias 'cc: Any = c' (the pattern the file already used).
- unused 'type: ignore[assignment]' (real code was method-assign):
  removed; replaced with the no-suppression patterns above.
- 'Callable[...] has no attribute assert_*': keep a typed local ref to
  the AsyncMock and assert on the local, not the method-typed attr.
- no-untyped-def: annotate helper params (Any / pytest.MonkeyPatch).
- attr-defined / index / union-attr: type the helper as Any, narrow
  with an 'is not None' assert, or add the missing attr to a fake.
- has-type / return-value: fix the declared return type to the tuple
  the function actually returns.
- PLC0415 inline imports: hoisted to top-level.

test_pr_gate_notifies_pm._stub_gate_path converted fully to the
'cc: Any = c' alias (it already used it for one attr) so its five
'# type: ignore[method-assign]' suppressions are gone.

mypy tests/: 64 errors -> 0 (538 files). ruff check tests/: clean.
All 84 tests in the touched files pass.

* [chore] remove all remaining type:ignore suppressions from tests/

Converts 115 `# type: ignore[...]` suppressions across 23 test files to
no-suppression patterns (helper-return widening to Any, local Any aliases,
cc:Any aliases, cast at narrow call sites, typed fixtures) so the hard
no-type:ignore convention holds across tests/. No test logic or assertions
changed — only mock-wiring mechanics and type annotations.

Gate: ruff check tests/ clean; mypy tests/ (538 files) clean; 176 changed-file
tests pass. Zero real suppressions remain (the 7 grep hits are 3 hygiene-
checker string-literal test inputs and 4 prose mentions in comments).

* [F062] work_session.merge_pr: idempotency + active-status guard

merge_pr unconditionally set pr_status=merged, pr_merged_at, merged_by,
status=COMPLETED on whatever session it loaded — the only session-terminal
transition in WorkSessionService lacking both the active-status guard
(complete/abandon) and the terminal-idempotency guard (close). Two failure
modes: (1) a retried merge after a successful-but-unconfirmed GitHub merge
overwrote merged_by/pr_merged_at with the retry's actor/timestamp, corrupting
the merge audit trail; (2) merge_pr on an ABANDONED session resurrected it to
COMPLETED, undoing the single-active abandonment. Mirrors close()'s guard:
if status != ACTIVE, return the session unchanged. Both git.py callers await
merge_pr and discard the return, so the no-op is safe. TDD: 3 tests
(happy-path + both modes).

* [F063] workspace._clone_repo: rmtree half-configured clone on failure

If _configure_git raised CalledProcessError before its `remote set-url`
scrub, .git/config kept the tokenized auth URL (the project PAT) and
_assert_no_pat_leak never ran. The except clauses raised WorkspaceError
without removing the workspace, so the next ensure_workspace's health
short-circuit (valid .git with HEAD + objects) skipped past the leak —
mounting the agent on a workspace whose .git/config let it read+exfiltrate
the PAT. Both clone-failure except clauses now rmtree the workspace before
raising, so a half-configured clone is destroyed and ensure_workspace
re-clones from scratch. TDD: 2 tests (configure-failure leak + timeout).

* [F067] flow_main_pm: add missing /triage route

main_pm's manifest advertises triage (lifecycle.intents_for_role(MAIN_PM)
includes it via _PM_ROLES, alongside triage_all) but flow_main_pm.py had no
POST /triage route, so a main_pm agent calling triage hit a raw 404 that
bypassed the per-verb circuit breaker. Added the route mirroring flow_cell_pm's
/triage — wires to the existing team-scoped choreographer.triage (uses pm.team,
works for any PM role; Main PM gets its own team's blocked/awaiting tasks).
Fix direction: add-route, NOT remove-from-manifest — the manifest is spec-correct
(intents_for_role by construction); removing triage would contradict the spec
and leave main_pm with only cross-team triage_all. TDD: test_triage_route_exists_and_dispatches.

* [F068][F069] mcp servers: classify all rejection shapes + envelope 404s

F068: the do/flow-server circuit breaker only counted rejections whose
`error` field was a STRING in _CIRCUIT_REJECTION_KINDS. A 422 validation
failure (no `error` field, a `detail` list) and a 500/HTTPException
(dict-shaped `error` from the exception handlers) both bypassed the breaker
→ unbounded retries on a storm of either. Added _classify_rejection(payload)
(shared, applied to both servers) mapping all three shapes to a counted kind:
string error (existing), dict error → substring-mapped code
(*DENIED*/*AUTHORIZED*/*FORBIDDEN*/*PERMISSION*→not_authorized,
INVALID_INPUT/*VALIDATION*→incomplete_input, *NOT_FOUND*→None parity, else
→invalid_state), 422 detail→incomplete_input. The dict TypeError defence lives
in the classifier (isinstance, never dict-in-frozenset).

F069: a manifest-registered verb whose HTTP route is missing got FastAPI's raw
`{"detail":"Not Found"}` 404 body — a non-envelope payload the breaker
couldn't classify, so a storm bypassed it. _post now synthesizes an
invalid_state Envelope rejection (with a remediate hint → i_am_blocked/i_am_idle)
for a 404 status, routed through _record_and_check_circuit so the breaker counts
it. A 404 that carries a real Envelope (error field present) is surfaced as-is,
preserving test_flow_post_returns_envelope_on_404. TDD: 422/dict/404 tests in
both server test files; updated test_dict_shaped_error_does_not_crash to assert
the SDK is now called with not_authorized (replacing the pass-through assertion
that encoded the bug).

* [F064][F065][F066] websocket: non-blocking fan-out, finally-disconnect, idle timeout

F064: the bridge forwarder awaited every conn.send_text in a gather with no
per-connection queue and no send timeout — one slow WS client back-pressured
ALL event delivery to ALL clients (head-of-line blocking on the listen loop).
Each connect_* now registers a _ClientConnection (bounded asyncio.Queue(256) +
sender task); broadcasts enqueue via put_nowait (drop + structlog warn on
QueueFull) and return immediately. The sender drains the queue with each send
wrapped in wait_for(SEND_TIMEOUT=10s). Unregistered legacy sockets (set
directly into a subscription set, bypassing connect_*) get a timeout-bounded
fallback send task held in _pending_sends (ruff RUF006). disconnect cancels +
drops the sender.

F065: route handlers caught only WebSocketDisconnect with no finally — a
non-clean exit (anyio closed-resource, CancelledError, transport error)
propagated without manager.disconnect, leaking the dead socket into every
subscription set forever. Added finally: manager.disconnect(websocket) to all
5 handlers (disconnect is idempotent).

F066: no server-side heartbeat/idle timeout — a half-open socket from a dead
container blocked receive_text forever and was never reaped. receive_text now
wraps in wait_for(IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=90s); on TimeoutError, log + fall
through to the F065 finally. Named module constants (no config.py precedent for
WS tuning; callers/tests patch them).

TDD: 22 new tests across 3 files (handler cleanup, idle timeout, send queue),
non-flaky across repeats; 1 existing test adapted with a yield for the new
async fan-out (assertion unchanged). ruff/mypy clean, 421 unit/api tests pass.
No type:ignore/noqa.

* [F022][F023][F024][F025][F026] api: scrub secrets from 422 log, gate a2a/dashboard/orchestrator routes, SSE session-per-query

- middleware: redact known credential fields (git_token/api_key/token/...)
  from the 422 request-validation log line; response body unchanged
- a2a: require_any_authenticated_agent on /message/send + /message/stream;
  subscribe_to_task opens a short-lived session per poll instead of holding
  one asyncpg connection for the full SSE lifetime (pool exhaustion) + auth
- dashboard: gate auditor flag/report mutating routes to Auditor or CEO
- orchestrator: router-level CEO gate on all control routes (spawn/stop/...)

TDD; ruff/mypy clean; 449 unit/api tests green; no type:ignore/noqa.

* [F030] conventions: typescript-scoped custom rules now apply to .tsx files

The validator tags a .tsx file as language 'tsx' (the JSX grammar needs
that tag, distinct from plain 'typescript'), but a custom rule scoped to
'typescript' — the language the scan reports for a React+TS repo — silently
skipped every .tsx file. The two suffix maps were NOT unified: the 'tsx'
tag is load-bearing (grammars.py picks the JSX grammar on it; hygiene.py
keys on it), so unifying would make .tsx fail to parse.

Fix is in check_custom: a one-directional dialect map _DIALECT_OF =
{'tsx': 'typescript'} — a typescript-scoped rule fires on a .tsx file,
but a tsx-scoped (JSX-only) rule still does not fire on plain .ts.

TDD; ruff/mypy clean; 80 unit + 38 integration conventions tests green.

* [F029] websocket: remove broken /api/permissions/check loopback from channel stream

channel_stream called validate_channel_access, which HTTP-loopbacked to
GET /api/permissions/check — a route that does not exist. Every call 404'd
-> False -> the channel stream closed with WS_1008_POLICY_VIOLATION for
EVERY client, so the real-time channel stream was dead. Removed the
function, its call site, and the now-unused httpx + settings imports.

Post-F004 the panel-token gate is the channel-stream authorization (the
CEO panel is the sole WS client and may view every channel), so the
broken loopback is removed rather than replaced with an in-process check
the CEO always passes. The legitimate enforcement.validate_channel_access
(slugs, in-process static ACL) is a different function and is untouched.

F027 is resolved-by-F004 (no code change): all three per-agent streams
gate on _require_panel_token first, so only the authorized CEO panel can
connect — 'any viewer subscribes to any target' is closed.

TDD; ruff/mypy clean; 530 unit/api+enforcement+RBAC tests green.

* [F078] release_executor: deadline every subprocess (git/make/gh/clone)

A hung git/make/gh/clone would block the CEO-gated release loop
indefinitely. Wrap each proc.communicate() in asyncio.wait_for via a
shared _await_proc helper; on expiry proc.kill() the child and return a
non-zero rc (124) so every caller's fail-closed branch fires. Mirrors the
quality-gate _run_one kill-on-timeout idiom.

Deadlines are generous (30min gate / 10min clone / 5min push+gh) so a
legitimate slow op is never wrongly aborted — floor-assertion tests pin
the floors to guard exactly that logical regression. Green path returns
the real rc unchanged.

* [F072] reaper: deadline docker inspect/exec + harden _check_health sweep

A hung Docker daemon (or a stuck container FS) froze the single asyncio
event loop: the reaper runs inline before every dispatch tick and shares
that loop with every background sweeper. Bound each docker subprocess
with asyncio.wait_for; on expiry proc.kill() the child and either raise
(inspect / resolve_container_id — callers apply their own fail-direction)
or return None (the gateway probe — inconclusive, caller declines to act,
matching its existing probe-failure contract). Deadlines generous
(10s inspect / 30s exec) so a legitimate slow docker call is never
wrongly aborted; floor-assertion tests pin the floors.

Also harden _check_health's per-agent loop so one agent's hung inspect
skips that agent, not the whole sweep — preserving the check-all-agents
invariant the timeout-then-raise would otherwise break (without this, a
hung daemon means no agent gets health-checked any tick).

* [F076] say/dm: handler guard rejects all 4 no-comms roles, not just auditor

The say()/dm() defence-in-depth guard only rejected auditor, but CLAUDE.md
mandates the same no-agent-comms invariant for pr_reviewer (posts findings
on the PR), prompter and secretary (human-only, note + evidence). For those
three the manifest was the only gate, so a call bypassing the manifest
(direct API POST, test harness, future routing change) would not be refused
at the handler — admission depended on the agent's slug happening to be
absent from the channel/a2a matrix. Extend the guard to a _NO_COMMS_ROLES
frozenset (auditor + pr_reviewer + prompter + secretary), matching the
explicit role-frozenset gates on commit/notify/pitch/playbook/open_session.
Role-appropriate remediation per role. The claimed defence-in-depth now
covers 4 of 4 silent roles, not 1 of 4.

* [F070] drain fire-and-forget _bg_tasks on shutdown (bounded, data-preserving)

Orchestrator.stop() cancelled only the named loop tasks + agents, then
returned, abandoning in-flight _schedule_bg work. An in-flight
_persist_respawn_record upsert dropped at shutdown meant the last few
gate-mutation strikes never reached the DB; restore_respawn_tracker() on
the next start repopulated a stale lower count and the dispatcher re-burned
the full 4-spawn strike threshold against a still-wedged task — the exact
re-burn the durable tracker exists to stop. Audit-log writes (load-bearing
for cycle-time/rework metrics) were similarly dropped.

Add _drain_bg_tasks(): bounded wait (5s default) lets short DB writes
commit before exit (data preserved), then cancels any stuck task past the
deadline so a hang can't wedge shutdown. return_exceptions=True so one
failing bg task doesn't crash the drain. Wrap the stop_agent loop in
try/except + logger.exception so one bad agent can't skip the drain
(re-introducing the data-loss tail). Floor test pins the deadline >= 3s
so a too-short change can't silently drop a legitimate slow write.

* [F071] abort non-blocking intake/secretary spawn on mid-spawn shutdown

The non-blocking spawn (start_intake_session / start_secretary_session)
schedules _spawn_intake_container_guarded / _spawn_secretary_container_guarded
via _schedule_bg. Those run docker run and only register in _instances at the
END. If shutdown arrived between docker run and the registration line, the
container was started but the orchestrator had no handle — stop() iterates
only _instances, so the container was orphaned (leaked, manual docker rm).
Worse, the F070 drain could let the spawn coroutine complete the
registration AFTER stop() already iterated _instances, landing a live
container into a shutting-down registry nothing tears down.

Add a post-docker-run shutdown guard in _spawn_intake_container and
_spawn_secretary_container: re-check self._running after _run_container_cmd
returns; if the orchestrator began shutting down, remove the just-started
container (by its deterministic name) and raise _SpawnAbortedDuringShutdown
WITHOUT registering. The guarded wrappers catch that BEFORE except Exception
and close the live relay silently (shutdown is not a user-facing failure,
no error pushed to the SSE stream). The F070 stop() drain awaits the bg
spawn coroutine, so the abort surfaces cleanly.

TOCTOU-safe: between the _running check and the _instances assignment there
is no await (config + instance construction are sync), so once the check
passes, registration completes before the event loop can interleave stop().
The normal running path is unchanged (sanity tests pin it).

* [F074] per-agent advisory lock closes claim TOCTOU

_run_claim_guards read the agent's other tasks via unlocked SELECTs
before claim() took its row lock, and claim()'s FOR UPDATE locked only
the TARGET row — so two concurrent i_will_work_on by the SAME agent on
TWO DIFFERENT pending tasks each locked their own row, each read an
empty in_progress set, each passed already_active, each claimed+started
→ the agent ended with two in_progress tasks (the in-process asyncio
Lock is lost on orchestrator-restart split-brain, so it wasn't a
DB-level guarantee).

Fix: TaskService.acquire_claim_lock takes a transaction-scoped
pg_advisory_xact_lock keyed by hashtextextended(agent_id). The gate
acquires it BEFORE the guard reads (for non-coordinator roles only) so
the second concurrent claim's read sees the first's committed
in_progress task and is rejected. Tx-scoped → auto-releases on
commit/rollback, can't outlive the request.

Coordinator exemption (the key logical-regression guard): cell_pm /
main_pm do NOT take the lock — the PM coordinator concurrency feature
lets a PM plan+delegate many roots in parallel, and a per-agent lock
would serialize those claims and regress it. Matches the existing
_COORDINATOR_ROLES already_active/paused guard exemption. A hash
collision only causes benign false serialization, never a false
negative.

Tests: unit (dev acquires lock before guard read; coordinator does
not) + real-PG integration (same-agent serializes, different-agent
does not, releases on rollback).

* [F021] handle SSE transport errors so the intake composer isn't stuck

openStream registered listeners for the server-sent event kinds but not
the EventSource's own transport-level error. The 'error' kind IS in
LIVE_EVENT_KINDS, so a server-sent event:error (JSON MessageEvent) was
handled — but a dropped connection / dead session fires a plain Event
with NO data, which JSON.parse(undefined) swallowed in the try/catch,
so the stream 'stayed open' (EventSource loop-reconnected a session that
no longer existed) and isSending stayed true — the composer was
permanently disabled.

Fix: route the 'error' event by payload. A MessageEvent with string
data is a server-sent error → handleEvent (unchanged). A no-data Event
is a transport error → handleTransportError: clear streamingId/activity,
set isSending false, add a 'connection lost' error message, keep a
draft/batch preview up (so the human can still act on a proposed card)
else land on 'chatting', and close the dead stream so EventSource stops
loop-reconnecting.

Tests: renderHook + a jsdom EventSource double that fires a transport
error (plain Event, no data) vs a server-sent error (MessageEvent +
JSON). RED: transport error left isSending true; GREEN: resets to
false, surfaces the message, closes the stream. The server-sent-JSON
path is unchanged. Full panel suite (129) green; eslint/typecheck/prettier clean.

* [F081] Approve dialog: label notes required (>=20 chars), not optional

The CEO Approve dialog's notes label fell into the default branch
('Notes (optional') for the approve action, but approve actually
requires substantive notes >= 20 chars — enforced client-side
(toast error on < 20) and server-side. So the CEO was told 'optional'
and only learned the real requirement from a toast after hitting
submit with empty notes.

approve and start both require >= 20 chars; reject only requires a
reason. Collapse the label to two branches: reject -> 'Reason for
rejection (required)'; everything else (approve + start) ->
'Approval notes (required, >= 20 characters)'. The approve
placeholder now also signals intent ('Why this is ready to ship...').

Tests: render the queue, click Approve, assert the notes label says
'required' + '20' and does NOT say 'optional'. RED: label read
'Notes (optional)'; GREEN: 'Approval notes (required, >= 20
characters)'. eslint/typecheck/prettier clean.

* [F082] surface release-proposal query failures instead of silent hide

The card collapsed any non-404 backend failure (500 / network drop) onto
`!proposal` and returned null, so the CEO had no idea the release-proposal
endpoint was unreachable. Distinguish the cases: isError + a Retry affordance
vs the 404 null empty state that stays hidden. Mirrors PrReviewQueue.

* [F083] clear stale usage snapshot when /ws/system leaves connected

The hook synced wsState into the store but never dropped usageData when the
stream dropped, so on reconnect wsState flipped to "connected" before any
fresh USAGE_SNAPSHOT arrived and UsageOverviewPanel rendered the prior
session's totals/cost as if they were live. Clear usageData whenever state
leaves "connected" so the panel falls back to the polling summary until a
new snapshot lands. Connected->connected is a no-op clear skip.

* [F084] scope per-control disable to the in-flight mutation, not all

FeatureFlagsCard disabled every switch while any one flag toggle was pending,
and PlaybookReviewQueue disabled every row's Approve while any one approve was
pending — so the operator couldn't act on an independent control during a
slow round-trip. Gate the disable on the in-flight mutation's variables
(matching key / id) so only the control being mutated locks; the others stay
usable. The same-flag double-tap protection is preserved.

* [F085] reject submitting both project_id and product_id

validate() only checked 'at least one of project/product', so the dialog let
both be submitted together. The server silently lets product_id win at routing
and drops project_id, recording a misleading, never-used repo. Add a validator
that refuses the ambiguous submit with a clear error. The at-least-one rule and
the single-pick submit paths are unchanged.

* [F020] kanban: confirm admin-override drags that skip lifecycle preconditions

A drag on the operator kanban routes the status move through the admin
status-override, which bypasses the in-band lifecycle validator entirely.
That override is intentional (it's how an operator recovers a wedged task)
but it also let a careless drag skip material preconditions silently —
completing a task with no open PR, QA-bypassing, finishing docs on a task
whose docs aren't complete.

Leave the override intact but make the bypass explicit: compute the
preconditions the dragged move would skip (open PR, docs complete,
self-verified + commits + progress for submit-qa, visible non-terminal
subtasks for coordination-root targets) and, when any are skipped, hold the
move behind a confirmation dialog that lists exactly what's being skipped.
Precision over recall — only warn on what the panel can verify from the
task and its in-list children; never fabricate a 'satisfied' claim, and
stay silent on benign transitions that gate on nothing we can check.

The admin status-override capability is preserved (Confirm still fires it);
this only surfaces the bypass instead of letting it happen silently. Does
not touch the master-merge invariant — the board's updateTask is the
operator override, not the Main-PM merge path.

* [F086] prompter: restore parked cell content on project toggle off/on

rebuildCellWork appended a blank {summary:'', items:[]} entry for a newly-
selected cell, so toggling a cell's project OFF then back ON in the MegaTask
review card discarded the agent-authored per-cell summary/items — the entry
was dropped on toggle-off and re-added blank on toggle-on.

Park each draft's last per-cell content in client-only BatchProposal state
(parkedCellWork, keyed by draft index — never sent to the backend; confirm
ships only title/drafts/project_ids/route, and it ride-alongs into the
localStorage persist slice so the restore survives a reload mid-review).
rebuildCellWork gains an optional priorByCell map: a re-added cell with no
live entry restores its parked summary/items (with the new project_id) in-
stead of blanking; a live entry still wins over a stale parked copy so an
in-place edit is never regressed. parkCellWork is the pure merge seam
(prevParked seeds, live work overwrites) the setBatchDraftProjects updater
calls — kept pure so the updater stays a thin caller.

Tests: rebuildCellWork restore/blank-fallback/live-wins + parkCellWork
retain/overwrite/merge (6 new), 19 GREEN. eslint/typecheck/prettier clean.
No wire-payload change, no regression to the fill/drop/one-repo-per-cell
invariants.

* Updated domain

* [F087,F088] enforce panel token on live-chat bridges (Phase 5)

Add a CEO-bound, header-token-only gate (require_panel_token) at the route
level of the prompter_live + secretary_live bridges, which were the only
panel-facing API surface that ran unauthenticated. It mirrors the WS
_require_panel_token and _check_agent_auth_token contracts: in dev
(ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED unset) a missing token is allowed; a
presented-but-forged token is rejected even in dev; in prod nginx already
injects the CEO-signed X-Agent-Token on /api/ for GET + POST, so the SSE
stream (EventSource can't set headers) and the POSTs are now checked instead
of anonymous. Applied to start/stream/status/messages/stop on both routers;
preview_live_batch switched from CurrentAgentContext+noqa to the route-level
gate (genuinely auth-only). confirm/confirm-batch/re-interview keep
CurrentAgentContext (they use agent.identity). The container->relay /events
callback is intentionally left ungated (internal Docker network, opaque
session id) — gated by a test sentinel so Option B (spawn+SDK token wiring)
is a deliberate future decision. No panel/nginx/spawn/SDK changes; master
merge invariant untouched. 22 new TDD auth tests, 492 api tests green.

* [F089] honest WorkSession agent_id nullability across the read path

The work_sessions.agent_id column is nullable=True with ondelete=SET
NULL — deleting an agent nulls the FK on every session it ever held. The
ORM annotation lied (Mapped[UUID] non-optional), the converter papered
over the lie (typing_cast to a non-optional UUID), and the response
model rejected None outright (WorkSessionResponse.agent_id: UUID). A
session whose agent had been deleted crashed the GET endpoint with a
pydantic ValidationError instead of serializing agent_id: null.

Make the read path honest end-to-end:
- WorkSessionTable.agent_id: Mapped[UUID | None] (matches the column).
- WorkSessionResponse.agent_id: UUID | None (serializes null, no crash).
- session_to_response passes agent_id via typing_cast('UUID | None', ...)
  to bridge SQLAlchemy's UUID[Any] to stdlib uuid.UUID while preserving
  None-ness (the cast stays for the same mypy-plugin reason every other
  field uses one; it no longer narrows away None).

WorkSessionCreate.agent_id stays UUID — at create time the claiming
agent is always known. The unused WorkSession pydantic read model is
left as-is (never materialized from a DB row). task.py:_needs_revision_dev
already None-guards ws.agent_id via to_python_uuid (returns None -> skip).

* [F090] drop auditor from write_roles on main-pm-board / board-private

The auditor is a silent, read-only observer on every channel, but the
channel catalog (roboco/foundation/policy/communications.py) listed it
in write_roles for main-pm-board and board-private 'for parity' with the
legacy CHANNEL_ACCESS table, while the actual silent-observer rule was
enforced only at the say/dm guard (content_actions._NO_COMMS_ROLES) and
PermissionService.can_write_channel's auditor short-circuit.

That left the catalog-only enforcement path — the HTTP messaging route
(messages.py send_message -> validate_channel_access) — authorizing an
auditor write that both the say/dm guard and PermissionService would
have blocked. A reader of the catalog also believed the auditor could
post to those channels, which is false.

Fix: remove Role.AUDITOR from write_roles on both channels (main-pm
+ board remain writers; ceo remains a writer on board-private). The
auditor stays in read_roles, so its silent read is unchanged. silent_roles
is left empty (matches the announcements precedent: auditor reads via
read_roles, not the silent bucket) — the DB seed and silent_observers
field are untouched.

Logical-regression check: the auditor's read access on both channels
is byte-for-byte preserved (still in read_roles, so validate_channel_access
read returns True via the direct list); the legitimate writers (main-pm,
product-owner, head-marketing, ceo) are untouched; CHANNEL_ACCESS is
derived from the spec so the foundation/seed drift tests self-adjust;
PermissionService.can_write_channel already short-circuited auditor to
False everywhere, so no behavior change there; AUDITOR_SILENT_ACCESS is
unchanged (auditor not added to silent_roles -> no DB silent_observers
change -> no group-access behavior change); the say/dm _NO_COMMS_ROLES
guard is unchanged. Tests: 3 new in test_channel_access.py — auditor
write on main-pm-board/board-private now raises ChannelAccessDeniedError
(RED before: returned True), auditor read still True, main-pm/ceo still
write.

* [F091] warn at spawn time when host grok auth.json is missing

GrokCliProvider._append_grok_auth_mount silently skipped the mount when
the host ~/.grok/auth.json was absent. The spawn still succeeded (docker
run returned 0 — the container was created), so the operator had no
spawn-time signal that the agent was doomed: the entrypoint's
`python -m roboco.llm.providers.grok_auth --check` backstop then
refused to start (exit 78) and the failure only surfaced later via the
container's log markers.

Fix: emit a spawn-time WARNING (module logger) naming the missing file
and the remediation (`grok login` on the host, or set
ROBOCO_HOST_GROK_DIR) when the mount is skipped. The spawn outcome is
unchanged — the container still starts and the existing exit-78 -> park
flow (F041) still catches it — but the operator now sees the missing
credential immediately instead of diagnosing a later exit-78.

Logical-regression check: the mount-present path is byte-for-byte
unchanged (auth.json exists -> the -v bind is appended, no warning); the
spawn still succeeds when auth is absent (no raise — the existing
test_grok_spawn_omits_auth_mount_when_absent still passes: no mount, no
crash); the exit-78 entrypoint backstop and the orchestrator's
exit-78-park handling (F041) are untouched; a module-level logger adds no
side effects. Tests: new test_grok_spawn_warns_when_auth_absent uses
caplog to assert a WARNING mentioning auth.json + `grok login` is
emitted on a missing-credential spawn (RED before: no warning; GREEN
after). 102 grok tests green; ruff/mypy clean.

* [F092] decode JWT exp when refresh omits expires_in

xAI's refresh-token response sometimes omits expires_in. Without it the
new access token kept the stale pre-refresh expires_at, so is_valid /
--check forever rejected a fresh token — and the refresh loop re-rotated
the single-use refresh token every tick, killing the credential (F006).

The access token is a JWT whose exp is the authoritative expiry: decode it
when expires_in is absent. Fallback to the documented ~6h TTL + a structlog
warning when the JWT exp is unreadable, so a fresh token is treated as live
instead of stale.

* [F093] serialize concurrent live-chat spawns under a per-agent lock

The intake and secretary agent ids are each a single fixed id, so two
concurrent start_intake_session / start_secretary_session calls raced on
the container name (docker run --name roboco-agent-<id>) and the
_instances[<id>] write: both passed the reap-prior check before either
registered, both ran docker run, and the last _instances write won,
orphaning the other container + its relay.

Add _intake_spawn_lock / _secretary_spawn_lock (asyncio.Lock) and wrap the
_spawn_intake_container / _spawn_secretary_container bodies so the second
start waits for the first to fully register before its own reap-prior check
runs. Distinct from self._lock (which stop_agent takes) to avoid a
reentrancy deadlock: the spawn body holds the spawn lock then calls
stop_agent (acquires self._lock) — lock order is always spawn_lock ->
self._lock, never the reverse.

* [F094] add a persistent-probe-failure escape hatch to provider parking

_on_probe_failure only incremented the failure counter and, at 10 failures,
sent a one-shot CEO notification. It never cleared the tracker, never gave
up, never fell back to time-expiry. _do_probe returns False for any non-2xx
AND any httpx error, so a permanently unreachable probe endpoint (removed
API key, network partition to the probe host, misconfigured base URL) kept
the provider parked forever — every agent on it gated by
_provider_spawn_parked, their tasks reaped to pending but the spawn gate
queuing every spawn, sitting pending forever. The only recovery was the
operator manually clearing the Redis key.

Past _PROBE_GIVE_UP_THRESHOLD (30) persistent failures, fall back to the
same time-expiry optimism the unprobeable-provider path uses (_do_probe
returns True when there is no probe URL): clear the park and resume parked
agents. If the provider is genuinely still down the real workload attempts
re-park via the 429/5xx path, so this is bounded burn — strictly better
than a silent forever-strand. Kept above the CEO-notify threshold (10) so
the operator still gets the notification first.

* [F095] orchestrator: parked-provider spawn short-circuits before expensive prepare

spawn_agent ran the full _prepare_agent_spawn (writes blueprint/settings/
briefing/MCP files, ensures the image, registers a STARTING instance) every
dispatcher tick only to bail at the after-prepare parked-provider check —
wasting all that file I/O while the provider stayed parked and leaving a
STARTING instance registered then downgraded to OFFLINE.

Move the parked check before _prepare_agent_spawn: resolve the route cheaply
via _resolve_agent_route (only provider_type is needed) and bail with a
minimal unregistered OFFLINE instance. The existing-running check stays
first (inside the lock) so a live agent is never replaced; a TOCTOU
re-check guards the unlocked window before prepare; the after-prepare
check is kept as a rare-race defense (a park landing during prepare).

* [F096] orchestrator: serialize fire-and-forget respawn persists per commit order

_persist_respawn_record is fire-and-forget per gate mutation; a respawn loop
fires count 1->2->3->4 in quick succession, scheduling one persist per
increment for the same (agent_slug, task_id). The ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE upsert
is row-level race-free, but the fire-and-forget tasks can still COMMIT out of
order: a slow stale persist (count=2) scheduled first can resolve AFTER a fast
fresh one (count=4) scheduled second, leaving the durable row at the stale low
count and re-burning the strike threshold on restart.

Fix: acquire self._respawn_persist_lock (new asyncio.Lock) as the FIRST await
in _persist_respawn_record, so acquisition order = task creation order (FIFO
ready queue) = logical schedule order, and commits land in that order. The
durable row always ends at the latest logical value. The lock lives in the bg
task, so the dispatcher hot path never blocks; persists are best-effort and
a slow one queuing the rest just delays the durable catch-up (in-memory record
stays authoritative).

* [F097] orchestrator: back off grok re-park retry_after within a rate-limit episode

_probe_target returns (None, {}) for grok — the grok CLI's xAI endpoint is
closed and the SuperGrok OIDC access token is not a valid bearer for the metered
api.x.ai, so a real probe would either no-op or strand grok parked forever.
_do_probe treats url-is-None as success (time-expiry optimism), so once the
60s retry_after passes the probe loop optimistically clears the grok park, a
cleared park dispatches a fresh grok agent that hits the still-active xAI 429,
exits 75, and re-parks — a flat ~90s crash-retry cycle for the whole xAI
rate-limit window (each cycle costs container startup + a rejected grok call).

Fix: track _grok_repark_count + _grok_last_park_at in _park_grok_rate_limited
and back the re-park retry_after off exponentially within one episode
(60 -> 120 -> 240 -> ... capped at 2**4 = ~16min cycle) so the churn dampens. A
gap past _GROK_REPARK_EPISODE_GAP_S (25min, > the capped cycle) means no re-park
for that long => the rate limit actually lifted => a fresh episode resets the
count to the base 60s, so recovery latency isn't penalized across episodes.
The first park in a fresh episode is unchanged at 60s.

* [F098] orchestrator: keep waiting record through a re-park during probe-success resume

resolve_wait deleted the waiting record (in-memory + durable) BEFORE calling
spawn_agent. A re-park in the window between the probe-success clear and the
spawn — the provider's rate limit lifts then immediately re-limits, or a second
provider limit lands — bails spawn with an OFFLINE instance (the parked-provider
short-circuit). Deleting the record first orphaned the agent: with no record
the probe-resume loop can never revive it and the spawn gate bails every tick,
so the agent is lost until the operator intervenes.

Fix: spawn first, then tear down the record only once a container actually
launched (instance.state == ACTIVE). On an OFFLINE bail the record stays so the
next probe-success re-attempts the resume. On a spawn EXCEPTION the record is
torn down + re-raised so the probe loop doesn't keep re-resuming a task that
moved to a different state (e.g. readiness refused -> task auto-blocked) —
matching the pre-fix behavior where the record was deleted before the spawn.

* [F099] wire pr_pass/pr_fail self_review block in the spec gate

The pr_pass/pr_fail ActionSpecs carry self_review_block=True, but
_gate_preflight never populated Context.original_developer_slug, and
actor_slug was read off agent.slug — which GatewayAgentView does not
carry, so it was always None in production. The block was structurally
dormant: a reviewer who was also the original developer of the
assembled PR could pass (or fail) their own work. The service-layer
_validate_not_self_review backstop only covers qa/documenter, not
pr_reviewer, so the spec gate is the only defense.

Set actor_slug=str(reviewer_agent_id) (GatewayAgentView has no slug,
so the UUID is the identity) and original_developer_slug from the
original_developer marker (a UUID stored as a string). Both resolve to
UUID strings, so the spec's string-equality comparison fires when the
reviewer IS the recorded original developer.

The marker is never set on assembled coordination tasks (only on
dev-leaf tasks at QA/doc claim), so the block stays dormant by design
in production — but the gate is now correctly wired to fire if the
marker were ever set to the reviewer. Zero production behavior change;
the dormant-in-production state is pinned by the no-marker test.

* [F100] atomic Redis probe-failure counter via server-side Lua

increment_probe_failures / reset_probe_failures did a non-atomic
get_state (GET) -> mutate -> set (SET) in Python. A concurrent
activate() re-park writes a FRESH episode blob (probe_failures: 0 +
fresh activated_at / retry_after / affected_agents / kind); if the
stale increment's SET landed after the fresh activate's SET, the stale
blob overwrote the fresh episode metadata AND un-reset the counter
(clobbering the new episode).

Redis single-threads a Lua EVAL, so a server-side read-modify-write
is indivisible: activate's SET is serialized entirely before or after
the script, never interleaved between the script's GET and SET. The
two scripts mutate ONLY probe_failures, so every other episode field
survives the bump. activate stays a single atomic SET (a fresh episode
resetting the counter to 0 is correct semantics).

* [F101] enforce PR-open state gate on gateway open_pr (parity with HTTP path)

* [F102] make project_id mandatory on pr_target (close cross-repo pr_number collision)

* [F103] make project_id mandatory on close_pull_request (close cross-repo collision)

* [F104] fail-closed on conventions resolution errors (block gate no longer silently disabled)

* [F106] compound (timestamp, id) keyset cursor for message pagination

get_messages used strict timestamp inequalities with a non-deterministic
order_by(timestamp.desc()), so equal-timestamp messages were cut by limit
on one page and excluded (strict < T / > T) from the next — they vanished
across pages. Bundled the (timestamp, id) pair into a MessageCursor dataclass
so the next page resumes exactly past the cursor's id at the shared
timestamp (or_: strictly-older OR same-timestamp-smaller-id for before; the
mirror for after), with a deterministic order_by(timestamp.desc(), id.desc())
so the last-item cursor is unambiguous. id is None for a legacy timestamp-
only cursor (strict inequality, prior behavior). The route builds cursors
from the flat before/before_id + after/after_id HTTP params; the schema now
carries the tie-breaker ids. Also clears PLR0913 (cursors replace the
before_id/after_id params).

* [F107] defer Redis bus publish until DB commit (no phantom notifications)

deliver() and _persist_and_deliver() ran inside the caller's open
transaction: the notification row was flushed but not committed, yet
NOTIFICATION_SENT was published to the Redis bus immediately. A commit
failure (DB hiccup, constraint, asyncpg error) rolled the row back while
connected WebSocket clients had already received a push for an id that
no longer existed — a phantom notification (notify_get -> NotFoundError).

Added a deferred-publish (transactional-outbox) helper: defer_bus_publish
enqueues the event on session.info and registers one-shot after_commit /
after_rollback listeners on session.sync_session the first time it is
called for that session. On commit, the after_commit listener schedules
the async drain via asyncio.create_task on the running loop (the listener
fires synchronously inside await AsyncSession.commit, so the loop is
active); the task handles are stashed on the session so callers/tests can
await them. On rollback, after_rollback drops the pending queue — a
rolled-back txn emits nothing. deliver() now builds the per-recipient
events up front (data materialized to strings, so deferral is safe even
if the ORM object later expires) and defers each; the delivered_at DB
marker stays in-tx (rolls back with the row). The bus block stays
best-effort (try/except + log) so a bus-init failure never propagates or
rolls back the notification row — matching the prior inline semantics.

This fixes every deliver/_persist_and_deliver caller at once (the two
cited in F107 plus the orchestrator + task.py deliver sites), since they
all commit the session afterward (the deferred publish fires on that
commit; the row is durable by the time the event goes out).

* [F108] atomic replace_chunks: single-txn delete+insert closes reindex race

* [F109] playbook curation status guards: approve/reject draft-only, archive approved-only

* [F110] draft slug TOCTOU: catch IntegrityError on flush -> ConflictError (no 500)

* [F113] collapse WorkSession creation to the validated service path

_create_work_session_if_needed constructed WorkSessionTable directly,
duplicating WorkSessionService.create's validation (existing-active
check, single-active-per-task supersede, project/task existence). The
two sites had drifted. Route through WorkSessionService.create instead,
mapping ConflictError to the idempotent 'if needed' None. Remove the
now-dead _supersede_other_active_sessions (create's
supersede_active_sessions_for_task replaces it).

Fix three pre-existing RED tests surfaced by the sweep (all confirmed
failing on the F110 commit before this change):
- test_fail_qa_work_session_fallback_excludes_qa_session: inserted two
  ACTIVE work_sessions per task, violating uq_work_sessions_one_active
  _per_task (migration 047). The QA session is now ABANDONED — still in
  the fallback query's result set (the query filters by task_id +
  agent_id, not status), so the exclude filter (agent_id != qa_id) is
  still exercised and the dev is resolved.
- test_ceo_reject_routes_coordination_task_to_main_pm /
  test_ceo_reject_routes_batch_umbrella_to_main_pm: ceo_reject emits an
  audit row keyed to CEO_AGENT_ID, but the tests never seeded the CEO
  agent row (fk_audit_log_agent_id_agents). Seed the CEO agent (get-or-
  create, mirroring test_ceo_reject_writes_handoff_journal).

* [F114] single-claimant guard on pr_gate_claim

pr_gate_claim delegated straight to _qa_or_doc_claim, which overwrites
claimed_by / active_claimant_id with no single-claimant check. Two
reviewers race-claiming the same awaiting_pr_review task would
last-write-wins overwrite the first claim, and the first reviewer's
subsequent pr_pass / pr_fail would actor-mismatch against the new owner
(wasting a review cycle). The orchestrator's gate dispatcher already
prevents double-reviewer-dispatch in normal flow (one task -> one team
-> one reviewer + is_agent_active + per-tick spawned set), so the race
is only reachable via direct concurrent API calls (defense-in-depth).

Add a role-aware single-claimant guard in pr_gate_claim: lock the row
FOR UPDATE (serialize concurrent claims, mirroring the dev claim path),
then refuse only when the task is already actively claimed by a
DIFFERENT PR-reviewer. The gate task is owned by the PM at entry
(submit_for_review does not clear ownership, unlike submit_for_qa), so
the guard must distinguish a PM/dev owner — which the first reviewer
legitimately overclaims — from a competing reviewer claim; checking the
existing claimant's role (pr_reviewer) does exactly that. A re-claim by
the same reviewer is idempotent (skipped by the != check). The gateway
claim_gate_review handler already maps a None return to a clean
invalid_state envelope ('it may already be claimed; give_me_work for
the next'), so no gateway change is needed.

TDD: 3 integration tests in test_task_service_basics.py — reject a second
reviewer race-claim (returns None, first claim intact), allow the first
reviewer when the PM owns the root (regression guard for the
PM-owns-at-entry model), idempotent re-claim by the same reviewer.
Confirmed the reject test RED first (race-claim succeeded, overwriting
reviewer1).

* [F115] sample monorepo per (repo,workflow)/(repo,command) not per repo

The CI-watch and dep-update loaders collapsed a monorepo's cell-projects
to one canonical entry per repo (slug-sorted-first), so a repo whose cells
each carry their OWN ci_watch_workflow / dep_update_command had only the
canonical cell's workflow/command sampled — a red on another cell's
workflow or drift on another cell's lockfile was missed (under-count).

Refactor the shared one-per-repo collapse into _projects_one_per_key, keyed
by repo identity for external-PR discovery (unchanged: one review per PR per
repo), by (repo, effective workflow) for CI-watch, and by (repo, command)
for dep-update. Each distinct workflow/command is now sampled once; the
engines' per-git_url fix-task dedup still prevents duplicate fix tasks for
the same repo. _projects_one_per_repo now delegates to _projects_one_per_key.

key_fn uses a string annotation (Callable lives under TYPE_CHECKING, like
the existing Coroutine/Iterable annotations at lines 4193/5279).

* [R115] originate ci_watch/dep_update fix tasks as PLANNING coordination roots

The Main-PM-code-impossibility guard (commit e202ce39, Thread 4 of this
audit) made team=MAIN_PM + task_type=CODE impossible — a Main PM coordinates,
it does not write code. But the ci_watch and dep_update engines still
originated their fix tasks as task_type=TaskType.CODE assigned to main-pm,
so task_svc.create raised MAIN_PM_NO_CODE and NO fix task was ever opened
— a regression introduced by the earlier audit fix (confirmed: the engine
tests pass at e202ce39~1 and fail at HEAD).

Mirror the hardened self_heal_engine precedent (self_heal_engine.py:197)
which already uses task_type=TaskType.PLANNING for its Main-PM coordination
root with an explicit 'decompose the fix and delegate the code work to a
cell dev — the Main PM does not write the fix itself' description. Both
engines now originate PLANNING coordination roots with matching delegation
guidance in the description + acceptance criteria. confirmed_by_human
stays True for both (they ride the normal delivery flow without the CEO
gate, unlike self-heal — intentional per the architecture).

The dedupe/open-cap queries (list_open_ci_watch_tasks /
list_open_dep_update_tasks) key on source + non-terminal status + git_url,
NOT task_type, so the type change does not break dedup (still one open fix
task per repo).

The two source-test fixtures (test_ci_watch_source / test_dep_update_source)
created CODE+MAIN_PM tasks directly to exercise the listing queries — same
guard violation; switched to PLANNING (the queries assert on source/status,
not task_type, so the fixture type matches the engines' corrected type).

* [F116] hold the read-clone lock across the dep-probe local clone

dry_upgrade_changes_lockfile called ensure_read_clone (which syncs the
read clone under the _meta-conventions lock then releases it) and ran
'git clone --local --no-hardlinks <read_clone>' OUTSIDE the lock. A
concurrent ensure_read_clone -> _sync_read_clone (fetch + hard-reset to
origin's default branch) could mutate the read clone's working tree /
object db mid-clone, racing the clone and producing an inconsistent or
failing probe.

Split _probe_lockfile_change into _clone_local_into (the local clone,
run under the read-clone lock) + _probe_lockfile_on_clone (the upgrade +
git status, run without the lock on the now-independent copy). The probe
acquires _ensure_lock_for(slug, '_meta-conventions') — the same lock
ensure_read_clone syncs under — and holds it only for the clone step; the
upgrade operates on the full --no-hardlinks copy and never touches the
read clone, so the lock is released before it to avoid blocking
conventions reads for the upgrade duration.

The tiny gap between ensure_read_clone releasing the lock and the probe
re-acquiring it is safe: any concurrent _sync_read_clone completes under
the lock before the probe acquires, so the clone reads a stable state.

* [F117] stop the orchestrator in lifespan shutdown BEFORE closing the DB

The lifespan shutdown closed OptimalService + the DB, and only THEN did
bootstrap's finally block call orchestrator.stop() — so stop() ran with
the DB already closed. stop() drains fire-and-forget _bg_tasks writes
(respawn_tracker upserts, audit-log rows) and stop_agent finalizes work
sessions / agent state, all needing the DB still open; closing it first
silently dropped those final writes (the durable PM-respawn counter's
last few strikes, the metrics-bearing audit trail tail).

Move orchestrator.stop() into the lifespan shutdown path, BEFORE
close_optimal_service + close_db, guarded by a new get_orchestrator_or_none()
safe accessor (no crash when no orchestrator is wired — tests,
skip_orchestrator). bootstrap's finally-block stop() becomes an idempotent
safety net: stop() gains a _stopped flag (getattr-guarded so __new__-
constructed test instances still stop) so the double-call is a clean no-op,
not a re-stop of already-stopped agents / re-drain of an empty bg set.

* [F118] coerce a lone-string where_to_look into a list

where_to_look is a list-typed handoff field like consequences/next_steps
but was the only one NOT in the _wrap_scalar_in_list field_validator. A
well-intentioned where_to_look='src/api/' 422'd at the route with no
remediation envelope, and the agent's retry loop tripped the do-server
circuit breaker — the exact failure mode the other list fields were
hardened against. Add it to the mode='before' validator so a lone string
is wrapped into a one-element list before type coercion.

* [F119] sender reaps dead sockets on send error instead of waiting for receive idle timeout

* [F120] release a stopped agent's claimed task immediately on budget-kill/shutdown

* [F122] name the already-open PR in submit_up's None-state remediate

submit_up's create_pr pre-side-effect opens the cell→root PR BEFORE
submit_for_review runs (its pr_created gate requires it — lifecycle.py:1338-1343).
When submit_for_review returns None (a concurrent state change raced the task
out of in_progress between the precondition gate and the composed action), the
old remediate ('check task state — must be in_progress with PR ready') hid
that the PR was already open on GitHub — an orphaned external artifact the PM
could not reconcile. Mirror submit_root's F016 None-envelope remediate: name
the open PR, point the PM at re-fetch + reconcile, and note create_pr is
idempotent so a re-issue re-attaches to the existing PR (no duplicate). Pure
message improvement — zero behavior change; reordering is off the table
(create_pr must precede the pr_created gate).

* [F124] re-check dependency state before releasing a dependency-blocked claim

The unmet_dependency guard read dependency state via an unlocked SELECT, then
fired release_dependency_blocked_claim (a state mutation: claimed/in_progress
-> pending, clears branch_name, abandons WorkSession) as a side-effect BEFORE
returning the rejection. An upstream dependency that reached a terminal state
(completed/cancelled) in the microseconds between the read and the release left
the task NEEDLESSLY released — its branch cleared + WorkSession abandoned +
assignee bounced, only to be re-dispatched + re-claimed when the dependency-
completion re-dispatch fired a moment later.

Re-check unmet_dependency_ids immediately before the release and skip it
(returning None — proceed) when the upstream just completed. Dependencies are
monotonic (unmet -> met only; terminal states never reopen), so a fresh read
that now finds them met stays met: safe to proceed without releasing. The
'still unmet' path is byte-for-byte the prior behavior (no regression). The
cross-task residual window (upstream completes between the re-check and the
release) is not closable by a row lock on the dependent, but the re-check
narrows the window from [first read -> release] to [re-check -> release], and
in the common case the first read already sees met (no guard fires). No
committed-work loss either way (a dependency-blocked task has none; the branch
ref + commits persist across the branch_name clear).

* [F125] serialize same-parent delegate via per-parent advisory lock

The delegate sibling-dedup guard read the parent's existing subtasks via an
unlocked get_subtasks SELECT (the dedup read) then created the subtask (the
write) with no DB serialization between them. Two concurrent delegate calls
for the same parent (PM re-delegating while a reaper re-dispatches, or two
orchestrator ticks racing) each read a duplicate-free sibling set, each passed
the dedup guard, and each created a subtask — the parent got the duplicate the
guard exists to prevent (the smoke-run runaway pattern).

Fix: a PostgreSQL transaction-scoped advisory lock keyed by the parent task
id (seed 1, disjoint from the per-agent claim lock's seed 0), acquired at the
top of the delegate body before the first get_subtasks read (the briefing
context read AND the dedup sibling read) and held through create_subtask's
flush + the outer request commit. The second concurrent same-parent delegate
blocks until the first commits, then its dedup read sees the committed
sibling and is rejected.

Per-PARENT (not per-agent): a coordinator PM legitimately delegates many
subtasks under one parent in quick succession and plans many roots in
parallel — a per-agent lock would serialize all of a PM's delegates and
regress the PM coordinator concurrency feature. The per-parent lock
serializes only same-parent delegates (the dedup invariant is per-parent)
and leaves different parents untouched.

TDD: red-first ordering test (lock acquired before first get_subtasks read
and before create_subtask) + no-regression test (create still runs).

* [F127] per-task advisory lock prevents open_pr milestone double-emit

open_pr's idempotent re-entry guard (pr_number is not None) read t.pr_number
from an unlocked fetch. Two concurrent same-task open_pr calls (the
alive-but-unresponsive respawn race) both fetched pr_number=None, both passed
the guard, both ran the runner (GitHub 422 ensures one PR), and both reached
_record_milestone_progress -> a double-emitted 70% 'opened PR #N' entry.

Fix: acquire_task_lock (pg_advisory_xact_lock, seed 2) before the fetch, held
through the runner + milestone + request commit. The second concurrent call
blocks until the first commits, then its fetch sees the committed pr_number
and the idempotent guard short-circuits without re-emitting. Per-task (single-
active-task guard means same-task concurrent open_pr is only the bug case).

* [F128] require active claim on explicit-task content posts

_verify_explicit_task_ownership checked assigned_to, which is stale
across a reap/handoff (persists until reassignment; active_claimant_id is
cleared on release). A reaped agent could keep posting say/dm/note to its
former task. Add the active-claimant check when assigned_to == caller;
assigned_to=None keep its existing allow (read-side inspection between
reassignments uses evidence, which has its own ownership path).

Existing 'active owner' test mocks passed assigned_to=agent_id without
active_claimant_id; production sets both together on claim, so the mocks
were incomplete. Updated to set both — realistic, not a behavior change.

* [F129,F130] harden quality gate _run_one exit status + timeout cleanup

F129: _run_one returned 'proc.returncode or 0', masking a None returncode
(communicate returned without a recorded exit code — process killed
out-of-band) as 0 / success. Treat None as a non-zero failure (fail-closed).

F130: on timeout, _run_one killed the subprocess but never awaited wait()
— communicate() was cancelled so it never closed the stdout/stderr pipes,
leaving a transient zombie + leaked FDs. Await wait() after kill() to reap
the process and close the transports.

* [F132] timeout the conventions validator + reap on hang

_run_conventions_validator awaited proc.communicate() with no timeout —
a hung subprocess (tree-sitter deadlock, huge repo) hung the
i_am_done/pr_pass gate forever and orphaned the python subprocess on
orchestrator restart. Wrap communicate() in wait_for(120s); on timeout
kill+wait the proc and fail closed (could_not_run=True → block gate
refuses the submit), matching the validator's own fail-loud philosophy.

* [F135] re-check activity before sweeper closes a session (TOCTOU)

sweep_timed_out_sessions read last_activity_at once at the candidate
SELECT, then closed. A message landing in that window refreshed
last_activity_at in the DB, but the sweeper closed on its stale in-memory
value — closing a just-used session. Re-read last_activity_at fresh right
before the close and skip if the session is no longer timed out.

* [F136] cancel startup indexing task on OptimalService.close()

close() cancelled only the periodic update task, then cleared the plugins.
The startup _indexing_task (background auto-index, slow Ollama / large repo)
could still be mid-flight at shutdown and write against closed/cleared
plugins. Cancel and await _indexing_task FIRST (its tail starts the periodic
task, so ordering also prevents a late periodic spawn), then the periodic
task, then clear plugins.

* [F139] scope active_task_owns_branch to the polled project

active_task_owns_branch did an unscoped WHERE branch_name = ? — a cross-project
branch_name collision (UUID-derived 8-char prefixes, theoretical) made the
internal-PR reviewer skip the WRONG project's PR (project A's leftover PR
skipped because project B happened to have an active task with the same
branch). Pass project_id (in scope at the orchestrator call site) and add
TaskTable.project_id == project_id to the WHERE. Correct for single-project
tasks and MegaTask multi-repo batches alike: each root-subtask carries its own
project_id matching its own repo, so a branch on project A's repo is owned
only by a task whose project_id == A.

* [sweep] strip Fxxx audit-ID tokens + trim bloated comments/docstrings + add behavior-change docs

Post-audit sweep over the 135 audit-fix commits since 19a474d3:

1. Stripped every # Fxxx: audit-ID token from comments AND every Fxxx token
   from docstring openings across 211 blocks / ~626 lines. The CEO flagged
   these twice: audit-issue IDs in code confuse future devs/agents. The
   descriptive text is preserved; only the Fxxx token is removed (and bloated
   narrative blocks trimmed to 1-3 lines keeping the one non-obvious invariant).
2. Trimmed bloated comments/docstrings to the concise standard (1-3 lines).
3. Added missing behavior-change docs for the audit-fix batch: prompts/roles
   (documenter, pr_reviewer, qa), user-facing docs (api auth, websockets,
   agent-gateway, megatask, merge-model, task-lifecycle, grok, resilience,
   conventions, panel, security, troubleshooting), and the RAG corpus (cell-pm,
   main-pm, pr-reviewer, qa roles; conventions; messaging-tools; escalation;
   megatask; task-claiming workflows).

Comment/docstring/prose ONLY — zero code-line edits (verified: the diff
contains no def/class/return/if/for/await/assignment/call lines). Gates green:
ruff format + ruff check clean, mypy clean on roboco/. The only pytest failures
are the pre-existing sync_branch tracing-decision gap (B1, 250be5c2) — not
sweep-caused and tracked separately.

* [fix] register sync_branch in VERBS_WITHOUT_TRACING

sync_branch (B1, 250be5c2) is a git-only rebase+force-push verb (composes=(),
no DB transition, side_effects=()) but was never registered in the tracing
parity tables, so test_every_intent_verb_has_a_tracing_decision failed.
Mirrors open_pr: a mechanical git op with inline preconditions (ownership),
no journal/plan rationale required.

* chore(release): 0.14.0

* [fix] resolve 16 mypy errors across 9 test files (make quality gate)

type-clean the test files so make quality (mypy roboco/ tests/) is green:
- Any-typed locals for the two TypeError-asserting scoping tests (bypass
  the required-arg check without getattr/ruff B009)
- Any-typed view for the shutdown-drain _drain_bg_tasks override (bypass
  mypy method-assign without setattr/ruff B010)
- cast("uuid.UUID", ...) / cast("UUID", ...) for SQLAlchemy UUID[Any]
  returns (TC006-quoted), config=None for AgentInstance stubs, None-narrowed
  await_args, Iterator return on a yielding fixture, UUID annotation on the
  _task helper. No type:ignore / noqa.

* [docs] regenerate lifecycle artifacts for sync_branch + branch-keyed submit_root gate

The committed artifacts were stale: lifecycle.py grew the sync_branch verb
(B1) and the branch-keyed submit_root gate description (B2/B3) but the
generated markdown/json were never regenerated. make foundation-check
enforces artifact==generator(lifecycle.py); regenerating restores that.
No source change — pure generator output.

* [refactor] reduce xenon C-rank blocks to A (behavior-preserving)

Extract helpers / flatten conditionals in 11 blocks that rated C(11)+
under xenon --max-absolute B, dropping pr_gate.py module rank B->A in
the process. Pure move-and-call refactors: each extracted helper holds
the original logic verbatim and the caller delegates to it; no control
flow, return values, or side effects changed.

Sites: validators._extract_strs, sequencing.dev_task_collision_edges,
evidence_builder.build_task_handoff, intake_driver._coerce_draft,
task.claim_task_for_agent (2 guards), prompter.create_task_from_draft
(validate+assignee), pr_gate._gate_decision (3 helpers),
orchestrator._handle_stopped_container + _reap_with_service,
_impl._create_subtask_from_inputs + complete.

_impl helper returns tuple[TaskNature, list[str]] to preserve mypy
narrowing of acceptance_criteria at the TaskCreateRequest site.

Also fix vulture: rename unused __aexit__ param tb->_tb in
test_conventions_cache_put.py (was hidden while xenon short-circuited
the gate).

* [security] bash-guard uv run --active deny + CodeQL path-traversal fixes

Fix 1 (be-dev-1 brick prevention): bash-guard now denies 'uv run --active'
and 'uv run'/'uvx' against /app targets. In the agent container
VIRTUAL_ENV=/app/.venv is baked globally, so 'uv run --active' always
resolves onto the image-baked MCP-gateway venv and uv rebuilds it,
deleting /app/.venv/bin and bricking every MCP server spawn. Bare
'uv run' (workspace .venv, cwd-relative) is untouched.

CodeQL fixes:
- docs.py: replace bypassable '..' substring guard with a
  resolve-and-contain helper (_resolve_contained_path). An absolute
  path made pathlib reset (base / '/etc/passwd' == '/etc/passwd'),
  letting read_doc/delete_doc reach arbitrary files. Applied to both
  sinks.
- orchestrator.py: _safe_agent_path_segment at the spawn_agent
  chokepoint (rejects traversal-shaped agent_id before any fs op) and
  inside _remove_container (slug guard before the log-dir mkdir,
  defense-in-depth).
- agent_sdk/server.py: /usage/sync transcript_path now resolved and
  contained under ROBOCO_TRANSCRIPT_DIR with a .jsonl suffix requirement
  (was Path(raw) — unauthenticated endpoint could stat arbitrary files).

TDD RED->GREEN across all four; make quality green (4890 passed).

* [fix] enum-parity gate: drop false-green mask, skip empty/unmigrated DB

The foundation-check gate ran the enum verifier behind
`|| echo "(skipped — postgres unreachable)"`, which swallows ANY
non-zero exit — including real drift — and prints 'All quality gates
passed'. On a host with a dockerized but empty/unmigrated `roboco` DB
(0 tables: the agentrole/team enum types don't exist), the verifier
connected, found every foundation value 'missing', exited 1, and the
mask relabeled it 'skipped' → false-green.

Fix:
- scripts/verify_postgres_enums.py: move skip semantics INTO the script.
  Distinguish unreachable (skip, exit 0), DB-not-migrated/both-enum-types-
  absent (skip, exit 0), real drift (exit 1), match (exit 0). Extract
  pure enum_drift + should_skip_for_unmigrated helpers + a type_exists
  probe so an empty DB is 'no migrated target', not drift.
- Makefile: drop the `|| echo` mask — real drift now fails the gate.

TDD RED->GREEN (10 tests); make quality green (10906 passed).

* [security] docs path guard: reject '.'/empty segments for clean 400

_resolve_contained_path used an '..' substring ban, which (a) left rel='.'
passing the guard — read_doc/delete_doc then got the base DIRECTORY itself
and raised IsADirectoryError (500) instead of a clean ValidationError, and
(b) false-rejected legit filenames containing '..' like 'v1..v2.md'.

Replace the substring ban with a raw-segment check (rel.split('/')) that
rejects any '.', '..', or empty segment. Path(rel).parts was the wrong tool
— pathlib collapses '.' and empty segments on 3.13, hiding them. The split
check catches '.' / 'a/./b' / 'a//b' / '..' / 'a/../b' while allowing
'v1..v2.md' ('..' inside a filename, no bad segment). The post-resolve
parents-containment check (the real defense) is unchanged.

TDD RED->GREEN (4 new tests); make quality green (10910 passed).

Follow-up to the CodeQL path-traversal review: the two CodeQL 'High' alerts
on this guard are false-positives-on-the-fix (resolve-and-contain already
contains the bypass); this hardening closes the one genuine low residual
(rel='.' -> 500) the review surfaced, which CodeQL did not flag.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-29 05:38:21 +02:00
Renn F 9a988cebd1 feat(toolchain): build-essentials in the agent runtime for target interpreters
The agent runner stage had build-essential only in the builder. When toolchain
matching is on, uv provisions the workspace against the target project's Python
and must compile an sdist for any dependency lacking a wheel for that version —
so build-essential now stays at runtime. The runner already permits uv managed
python downloads (only the builder pins UV_PYTHON_PREFERENCE=only-system, for
RoboCo's own 3.13 venv). Verified locally: in the built image,
`uv venv --python 3.14 && uv run python` prints Python 3.14.6 while the system
interpreter stays 3.13.
2026-06-22 01:54:32 +02:00
Renn F 61d6cde40f fix(docker): pre-create ~/.claude.json in the agent base image
Claude Code prints "configuration file not found at ~/.claude.json" (3x) at startup when that sibling file is absent. The orchestrator only bind-mounts the host copy when it exists, and delivery agents (unlike intake/secretary, which pre-create it in Python) launch the CLI directly with no wrapper — so when the host file is gone the warning floods every agent's logs. Pre-create an empty {} config in the image; the host mount still overrides it when present and the CLI self-heals the file.
2026-06-21 09:40:54 +02:00
Renn F 6f3ba2f42e fix(bash-guard): block package-env mutations targeting /app (all providers)
An agent that ran `uv sync` / `pip install` against /app rebuilt the
orchestrator's MCP-gateway venv (/app/.venv) — breaking its own gateway tools
(every roboco-flow/-do/-git verb), stranding it, and getting its task reaped.
Deny package-mutation verbs (uv sync/lock/add/remove, uv pip, pip install)
whose target resolves to /app (cd /app, --project/--directory /app, /app/.venv,
UV_PROJECT_ENVIRONMENT=/app). Placed outside the ROBOCO_GUARD_SKIP_GIT gate so
it fires for every provider — the Claude PreToolUse hook and the grok exfil
hook alike. Reads of /app and workspace installs are untouched.
2026-06-20 22:51:02 +02:00
50e31274f2 fix(bash-guard): deny git verbs hidden in command substitutions (#226)
Closes the real bypass antfleet flagged in PR #223 (credit to them for the
finding): a denied git verb inside $(...) or backticks is expanded by the
shell before the wrapping echo/printf runs, so the skeletonizer's strip hid it
from the git check. This reworks it correctly where #223's fix could not land:

- targets the live source (docker/scripts/bash-guard-hook.sh, COPY'd to
  /app/scripts/), not a path that doesn't exist;
- runs INSIDE the ROBOCO_GUARD_SKIP_GIT guard, so on grok it stays the native
  --deny's job and never hard-cancels the run (#223 ran it unconditionally);
- excludes single-quoted strings and heredoc bodies (literal / data, matching
  the skeletonizer), so a README documenting git verbs isn't a false positive;
- fails closed (a non-sentinel / python failure denies).

44 bash-guard tests pass (5 new: dollar/backtick/double-quoted substitution
deny, single-quoted literal allow, grok-skip allow).

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-19 20:51:02 +02:00
Renn F f2e787c577 feat(grok): auto-refresh the SuperGrok token + fail fast on a dead one
The grok access token has a ~6h server-set TTL (the client cannot lengthen it),
the CLI has no refresh command, and headless 'grok -p' does NOT self-refresh an
expired token -- it hangs forever at an interactive 'Waiting for authorization...'
prompt. Live evidence: a fleet went silent within ~3 min of the token's 06:54
expiry, every agent a zombie hung at the prompt, requiring a manual 'grok login'.

- grok_auth.refresh_if_stale: mint a fresh access token from the offline_access
  refresh token via xAI's OIDC refresh_token grant (https://auth.x.ai/oauth2/token),
  atomically rewriting auth.json. The orchestrator runs it once per dispatch tick
  (serial -> no concurrent refresh-token rotation race; throttled to 60s), keeping
  the host credential live so agents never mount a dead one. No more manual login.
- Entrypoint --check guard: refuse to run (exit 78) on a missing/expired token
  instead of hanging for hours -- surfaced to _handle_stopped_container.
- Orchestrator grok-dir mount flipped read-only -> read-write in all three compose
  files so the refresh can rewrite auth.json; the per-agent file mount stays RO.

Verified: 10 unit tests; the --check guard exits 0/1/1 (valid/expired/missing)
inside the real roboco-agent-grok image. Gate green (ruff/mypy/xenon).
2026-06-19 10:15:58 +02:00
fa3e25e656 feat(grok): pluggable agent providers + Grok on the official grok CLI (#218)
* feat(providers): pluggable agent providers + Grok (xAI) backend

Add a roboco/llm/providers/ seam — an AgentProvider lifecycle ABC and a
ProviderRegistry keyed by ModelProvider — so the orchestrator can drive
agent backends other than Claude Code.

The first non-Claude backend is GrokProvider for xAI's grok-build-0.1.
xAI is OpenAI-compatible only (no Anthropic-Messages endpoint), so a Grok
agent runs an OpenAI-protocol runtime pointed at https://api.x.ai/v1
rather than the ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL injection the other providers use. It
reuses the orchestrator's existing mount/auth assembly, so it inherits the
same MCP gateway + tool-manifest wiring as every other agent by
construction, and passes its prompt via env (never an argv positional).

The change is purely additive: only GROK routes through the registry;
Anthropic / Ollama Cloud / self-hosted spawns run the existing
_spawn_container path unchanged.

Includes:
- ModelProvider.GROK (migration 038) + a seeded Grok provider row
  (migration 039) + a grok-build-0.1 catalog entry
- GET/PUT /api/providers/grok-key to store the xAI key (Fernet-encrypted,
  reusing the existing provider-key machinery)
- ClaudeCodeProvider reference adapter over the current spawn
- unit tests for the registry, GrokProvider (gateway wiring, no
  ANTHROPIC_* leak, prompt-injection safety, failure paths) and routing

The dedicated roboco-agent-grok image and the exact OpenAI-protocol CLI
invocation are the remaining piece to finalise with xAI.

* feat(providers): native Grok runtime — opencode image, config gen, panel key

Complete the native Grok (xAI) path so grok-build-0.1 runs as a real
RoboCo agent, not just the provider seam.

- roboco-agent-grok image (docker/agent-grok.Dockerfile): FROM agent-base
  + opencode (the OpenAI-protocol runtime). One image serves every role;
  role behaviour comes from the mounted manifest / mcp-config / system
  prompt, exactly as on the Claude path.
- Entrypoint renders opencode.json at spawn from the GrokProvider env
  contract + the mounted Claude Code mcp-config.json
  (roboco.llm.providers.opencode_config): translates RoboCo's gateway
  servers (roboco-flow / roboco-do / ...) into opencode's mcp block,
  declares the xAI OpenAI-compatible provider + model, and wires
  permissions + instructions. Pure, unit-tested translation.
- Orchestrator registers GrokProvider with the registry-qualified image
  (_qualify_agent_image) so it resolves in local and registry deploys.
- Compose (both files + the registry compose) gain an agent-grok-image
  builder service.
- Panel: a Grok (xAI) API key card on the AI Providers page, plus the
  grok ModelProvider value.

KNOWN PARITY GAP (opencode runtime): the bash-guard PAT-scrub and the
transcript-based usage/cost capture are Claude Code hooks and do not
transfer to opencode. bash permission is operator-tunable
(ROBOCO_GROK_BASH_PERMISSION) so a deployment can fail closed until a
security/usage-parity opencode plugin lands. That plugin and live E2E
validation are the remaining work to finalize with xAI.

* ci(release): build + publish the roboco-agent-grok image

Add roboco-agent-grok to the release workflow's image build/publish map so
registry deploys carry the Grok runtime image (parity with every other
agent image). Split from the feature commit because pushing a workflow
change requires a workflow-scoped token.

* fix(migration): commit the grok enum value before seeding (autocommit_block)

CI's "Apply database migrations" failed with asyncpg
UnsafeNewEnumValueUsageError: alembic runs the whole upgrade in a single
transaction, so migration 039's INSERT used 'grok' in the same transaction
that 038 added it — which Postgres forbids. Splitting into two migration
files did not help (one transaction spans both). Wrap the ALTER TYPE ADD
VALUE in op.get_context().autocommit_block() so the value commits before 039
(and any later migration) uses it. Still renders in offline --sql, so the
enum-migration-parity test is unaffected.

* feat(grok): price grok-build-0.1 + secret-scrub opencode plugin

- pricing.py: add grok-build-0.1 rates ($1/1M input, $0.20 cached, $2/1M
  output), verified against xAI's published pricing. Grok is a priced
  non-Anthropic model, so cost computes the moment usage is captured.
- secret-scrub.js: an opencode tool.execute.before plugin porting the
  security-critical bash-guard deny rules (git network ops, credential-file
  reads, /proc env, internal-host HTTP, roboco.* imports, ROBOCO_AGENT_ID
  forgery, env dumps, destructive rm) to the opencode runtime — restoring the
  guard the Claude Code hook can't provide there. Throwing denies the call
  (confirmed by opencode's env-protection example). Wired into the generated
  opencode.json plugin array + baked into the grok image.

Deny logic verified via node (9 deny + 5 allow cases). UNVALIDATED against a
live opencode runtime: confirm it fires in the live E2E spawn before a Grok
dev-agent touches a real repo; the bash permission is operator-tunable as a
second gate.

Cost CAPTURE (distinct from pricing) is intentionally NOT built yet: opencode's
plugin hooks expose model info but no token/usage object, so the capture path
is unconfirmed and needs the live spawn to settle.

* feat(grok): read opencode session usage for cost capture

Confirmed by inspecting a local opencode run: opencode persists per-session
usage in SQLite at ~/.local/share/opencode/opencode.db — the `session` table
carries cost + tokens_input/output/reasoning/cache_read/cache_write. xAI's
response usage object (prompt_tokens, completion_tokens,
prompt_tokens_details.cached_tokens, completion_tokens_details.reasoning_tokens)
maps directly onto those columns.

Add opencode_usage.read_session_usage / cost_for_session: read the opencode DB
and price the tokens via roboco.billing.pricing (our cost stays authoritative;
opencode's own `cost` column is kept for reference). Tested against a fixture DB
mirroring the real schema (single session, summed sessions, missing/empty DB).

Remaining wiring (for the live spawn): mount the opencode data dir on grok
spawn + call cost_for_session at reap to record the usage rollup.

* fix(grok): correct opencode provider (Responses API), stdin, reasoning cost

A live opencode run against api.x.ai/v1 surfaced three real bugs:

1. Provider package — grok-build-0.1 is driven via the OpenAI Responses API
   (opencode calls model.responses()). @ai-sdk/openai-compatible is
   chat/completions only and errors "responses is not a function". Switch the
   generated opencode.json provider + the grok image to @ai-sdk/openai.
2. Headless hang — `opencode run` blocks after init without a TTY; close stdin
   (`< /dev/null`) in the entrypoint so it proceeds to the model call.
3. Reasoning-token cost — grok-build-0.1 is a reasoning model; reasoning tokens
   bill as output but opencode stores them in a separate column. cost_for_session
   folds tokens_reasoning into output (else ~22x undercount).

Verified end-to-end against a real session row (input=6120, output=1,
reasoning=226, cache_read=1856): our pricing reproduces opencode's stored USD
cost ($0.0069452) exactly. Tests anchored to that real row.

* feat(grok): first-class xAI/Grok routing mode (UI + backend)

The Routing-mode toggle had Anthropic / Ollama / Self-Hosted / Mix but no way
to route the whole org to Grok. Add it end to end:

- backend: apply_mode("grok") + _apply_grok (GLOBAL default -> grok-build-0.1) +
  derive_mode "grok" detection; ApplyModeRequest/ModeResponse accept "grok".
- panel: a "Grok" routing-mode card (between Anthropic and Ollama, gated on the
  xAI key) + flipToGrok; a Grok group in the per-agent mix dropdown +
  catalogGrokOnly + a grok ProviderBadge variant; the mix-save key check and
  the AI-routing description now cover Grok.
- tests: integration derive_mode/apply_mode "grok" cases (+ grok provider row
  in the fixture).

Gated: ruff + mypy clean; panel typecheck + lint clean.

* feat(grok): reasoning-effort by role (cut grok-build cost on cheap roles)

grok-build-0.1 reasons heavily by default and reasoning bills at the output
rate (a live "say ok" call emitted ~300 reasoning tokens, ~85% of its cost).
Confirmed live that opencode's `--variant minimal` cuts reasoning ~54%
(298 -> 136 tokens, same prompt).

GrokProvider now picks reasoning effort by role: code-quality roles (developer,
qa, pr_reviewer) keep full reasoning; coordination / docs / board roles
(cell_pm, main_pm, documenter, product_owner, head_marketing, auditor, prompter,
secretary) run "minimal". It's passed to opencode via the entrypoint's
`--variant`. Operators can force one effort for ALL grok agents with the
ROBOCO_GROK_REASONING_EFFORT env (minimal | high | max, or default/full).

Tests cover the role map, the env override, and the spawn env wiring.

* style(panel): show the Grok (xAI) key card above the Ollama card

* fix(grok): stop opencode subagent-stream hang at the config layer

The Grok pr_reviewer wedged in_progress forever: opencode's default agent ran
with the subagent `task` tool enabled, spawned an Explore subagent on
grok-build-0.1 whose model call opened an SSE stream that went idle, and the
run hung with no timeout.

- Hard-disable opencode's subagent `task` tool in the generated opencode.json.
  No RoboCo role uses opencode-internal subagents — work flows through the
  gateway verbs — so removing the tool kills the hang trigger outright.
- Set provider.xai.options.timeout + chunkTimeout (operator-tunable via
  ROBOCO_GROK_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS / ROBOCO_GROK_CHUNK_TIMEOUT_MS) as the
  defence-in-depth backstop; chunkTimeout aborts an idle stream.
- Bundle the permission + timeout + subagent knobs into an OpencodeGuards
  dataclass (keeps the builder under the arg-count gate).
- Drop the dead ROBOCO_AGENT_TOOLS spawn env (it had no consumer); opencode
  tool restriction lives in the rendered config now.

* feat(grok): reaper watchdog kills wedged opencode containers

The heartbeat reaper deliberately skips a task whose assignee holds a live
ACTIVE container, so a Claude agent deep in a long edit/test cycle isn't
churned out from under live work. A wedged opencode container breaks that
assumption: it stays ACTIVE while firing no gateway verb, so its heartbeat
never advances and the live-instance skip would shield its task forever — the
exact way the Grok pr_reviewer parked in_progress.

Add a longer grok-idle kill threshold (ROBOCO_GROK_IDLE_KILL_SECONDS, default
900s, well past the stream chunk timeout). A GROK instance idle past it is
force-removed (its logs dumped to disk first) and evicted from the instance
registry, so the same reaper pass then releases the task. Only GROK runtimes
are eligible — a quiet Claude agent keeps the heartbeat-skip protection.

* feat(grok): guard interactive roles from GROK routes (interim)

intake (prompter) and secretary run a held-open chat session driven by the
Claude Agent SDK. GROK has no interactive runtime yet, and a GROK route for
those slugs would be spawned with the route creds injected as ANTHROPIC_*
against api.x.ai/v1 — the wrong protocol — producing a silent, empty reply
(the blank intake we observed).

Downgrade a GROK route for intake-1/secretary-1 to the Anthropic default with
a logged warning. The one-shot delivery roles route to GROK unchanged. This
guard is replaced by the real interactive fork once the opencode interactive
driver lands.

* feat(grok): capture one-shot Grok usage/cost from the opencode store

A GROK agent runs opencode, not Claude Code: it has no SDK /usage/status
server and writes no Claude transcript, so _resolve_final_token_usage found
nothing and every Grok agent finalized at 0 tokens / $0 — the opencode_usage
reader existed but had no caller.

- Mount a per-agent opencode data dir ($DATA/opencode/<agent_id> →
  /home/agent/.local/share/opencode) so opencode.db is captured, and mount the
  same host dir into the orchestrator (/data/opencode) in all three compose
  files so the finalizer can read it back — the opencode analogue of the
  mounted Claude transcript.
- _resolve_final_token_usage branches on provider_type: GROK reads opencode.db
  via opencode_usage (reasoning folded into output, billed at the output rate)
  and skips the SDK/transcript path. A 0-token read logs a WARNING so a silent
  mount failure isn't mistaken for a real zero-cost run.
- ROBOCO_OPENCODE_DATA_DIR overrides the in-orchestrator path for local runs.

* feat(grok): make interactive spawns first-class on AgentProvider (additive)

The AgentProvider ABC modelled only the one-shot lifecycle (spawn/stop/
health_check/remove), so the interactive intake/secretary roles could never
route through a provider. Add an opt-in interactive surface:

- supports_interactive class flag (default False).
- InteractiveSpawnSpec: the resolved AgentConfig + session id + role-specific
  image + optional HMAC token — everything a provider needs without importing
  orchestrator internals.
- spawn_interactive(spec): a non-abstract default that declines via
  ProviderError, so every existing one-shot provider is unchanged.

Pure scaffolding — no provider opts in yet (GrokProvider flips the flag when
its interactive driver lands). Zero behavioural change.

* feat(grok): Grok-native interactive runtime (opencode serve) — container side

Builds the Grok analogue of the Claude intake/secretary live-session runtime,
satisfying the same IntakeSession seam so the existing IntakeDriver loop,
message source, relay, and StreamChunk panel contract are reused unchanged:

- OpencodeServeSession: a held-open `opencode serve` session (context persists
  across turns) where each human turn is one synchronous POST /session/:id/
  message; normalize_opencode_message maps the reply parts to text/thinking/
  tool_use/draft/turn_end chunks (draft via a propose_draft tool part or the
  fenced roboco-draft fallback). Doc-verified against opencode's server API.
- grok_intake_main / grok_secretary_main: container entrypoints mirroring the
  Claude mains but yielding an OpencodeServeSession; they render opencode.json
  (xAI provider + MCP + system prompt) first, then run the receiver + driver.
- roboco-agent-grok-prompter / -secretary images (FROM roboco-agent-grok) +
  their builder services in all three compose files.

UNVERIFIED-LIVE: the opencode serve flow + exact Part schema + draft path need
a live run against grok-build-0.1 (the part mapping is defensive). The
orchestrator wiring that routes a GROK intake/secretary route to these images
is the next step (a design decision is open — see the handoff notes).

* feat(grok): route interactive intake/secretary to opencode-serve images

Wire the GROK interactive path the in-place way (matching how the interactive
roles already choose ANTHROPIC_* per route), so a GROK route launches the
Grok-native opencode-serve image instead of the Claude SDK-driver image:

- _spawn_intake_container / _spawn_secretary_container pick the
  grok-prompter / grok-secretary image (ensuring the base→grok→interactive
  build chain) when the route is GROK, and stamp provider_type on the spec +
  AgentConfig so finalize routes usage to the opencode store.
- _build_intake_run_cmd / _build_secretary_run_cmd inject OPENAI_* + the
  opencode store mount + system-prompt env for GROK via a shared
  _append_interactive_provider_env, keeping ANTHROPIC_* for every other
  provider. The intake's minimal mounts (no gateway MCP) are preserved, so
  Grok intake matches the Claude intake's tool surface (the spec).
- Add a per-agent opencode store mount to the interactive host paths so
  interactive Grok usage/cost is captured like the one-shot path.

Removes the interim Phase-0 routing guard (the real path supersedes it) and
retires the unused AgentProvider.spawn_interactive/InteractiveSpawnSpec seam —
the interactive roles have a bespoke assembly that the one-shot provider
surface doesn't fit, so the fork lives in their own builders.

UNVERIFIED-LIVE: end-to-end intake/secretary chat on Grok needs the stack up +
opencode serve confirmed against grok-build-0.1.

* feat(grok): surface intake/secretary in the mix-mode picker; doc guardrail parity

- Panel: add intake-1 (prompter) and secretary-1 to the mix-mode per-agent
  routing list so an operator can assign Grok (or Claude) to the interactive
  roles from the UI; assigning a Grok model routes them to the opencode-serve
  image. tsc + eslint clean.
- opencode_config: correct the now-stale parity note — bash-guard is ported
  (secret-scrub.js) and usage/cost is captured (opencode store); the remaining
  gap is the budget/loop/stop/prompt-injection hooks, which need a sidecar
  plugin (open decision), with ROBOCO_GROK_BASH_PERMISSION as the interim gate.

* test(grok): mypy-clean the reaper watchdog + interactive spawn tests

The CI mypy scope (roboco/ tests/) flagged test-only typing issues my per-file
runs missed: direct method assignment (orch._remove_container = AsyncMock())
trips [method-assign], and a module-level dict[str,str] is invariant against
the dict[str, str|None] the run-spec expects.

- Use monkeypatch.setattr for _remove_container in the watchdog tests.
- Annotate the shared _HOSTS as dict[str, str | None].

Production code unchanged; mypy roboco/ tests/ is green.

* feat(grok): cost-ceiling kill-switch (budget-guardrail parity)

Claude Code's per-agent token-budget hook fires against the SDK :9000 server;
opencode exposes NO usage/budget hook to a plugin (confirmed against its plugin
docs), so the budget kill-switch can't be a plugin/sidecar — the orchestrator
enforces it instead.

_enforce_grok_cost_budget runs each dispatch tick: for every ACTIVE GROK
container it reads cumulative cost from the opencode store (the Phase-2 reader)
and kills + evicts it past ROBOCO_GROK_MAX_COST_USD (0 = off), after which the
reaper releases the freed task. This also catches a runaway loop that keeps
firing verbs (so it evades the idle watchdog) but still burns cost.

Covers the budget/runaway-burn slice of guardrail parity. The remaining Claude
hooks (prompt-injection PRE-gate, stop-guard terminal-verb) have no blocking
opencode equivalent — opencode's message/stop hooks are observe-only — and the
interactive reasoning-variant has no opencode.json/serve knob (CLI-flag only);
both are pinned for a live probe rather than shipped as a guess.

* docs(grok): document Grok's reduced guardrail posture (honest, not blocking)

Grok agents run on opencode, not Claude Code, so they do NOT have full
guardrail parity — claiming otherwise would be false. Document it truthfully
and keep them usable rather than blocking them.

- Panel routing card: an amber caveat shown in Grok/Mix mode — command/
  secret-exfil guard + cost cap apply to Grok, but the prompt-injection guard
  does NOT (opencode cannot block a turn); Anthropic/Ollama/Self-Hosted run
  through Claude Code with the full guard set; prefer those for agents that
  ingest untrusted or cross-agent content; Grok is safe for trusted work.
- docs/self/architecture/llm-provider-security.md: the reference — the two
  runtimes, which provider uses which, the per-guardrail parity matrix, why
  the injection/stop gaps exist (opencode hooks are observe-only), and the
  routing recommendation (delivery roles handling untrusted content → a
  Claude-Code-runtime provider).

Panel tsc + eslint clean.

* fix(grok): make the live interactive path work — store perms, error surfacing, variant

Found by actually running opencode serve locally (the path was doc-verified but
never executed). Three fixes:

1. EACCES on the opencode store mount (the live intake crash): on Linux docker
   auto-creates a missing bind source as root:root, so the non-root agent user
   could not mkdir/write in /home/agent/.local/share/opencode and opencode died
   at boot. _ensure_opencode_data_dir pre-creates the per-agent dir 0777 before
   the mount (one-shot via the _GrokHost seam, interactive in both spawns).

2. Silent blank reply on a model error: opencode reports a turn failure in
   info.error with parts=[], NOT as a part — verified live (a bad xAI key
   returns info.error APIError). send() / normalize_opencode_message now surface
   it as an "error" StreamChunk so a failed turn is never blank (the original
   intake bug class). Confirmed live: the error now renders.

3. Reasoning variant on the serve path: the live OpenAPI shows the message body
   accepts a "variant" field (it is NOT CLI-only, as the docs implied), so the
   pin is unblocked. send() passes ROBOCO_GROK_VARIANT as the per-turn variant;
   the orchestrator sets it per-role (_reasoning_effort_for) for interactive
   Grok, the same lever as the one-shot --variant.

opencode serve startup, POST /session, session-id extraction, the part-type
mapping (text/reasoning/tool), and the error path are all validated against a
live opencode 1.17.8. A real successful grok reply still needs a funded key.

* fix(grok): pre-create agent-owned ~/.local in the grok image (opencode state EACCES)

Running the built grok-prompter container surfaced a second EACCES the
mechanism analysis missed: bind-mounting the opencode store at
~/.local/share/opencode makes docker create the intermediate ~/.local AS ROOT,
so the non-root agent user then cannot create its sibling ~/.local/state and
opencode dies at boot. Pre-create the ~/.local tree agent-owned in the image so
the mount leaves the parents writable. Complements the orchestrator 0777
host-source pre-create (which covers the bind source on Linux).

Verified live: with this fix the container starts clean, opencode serve opens
the session, a POST /turn produces a real grok reply, and all chunks
(thinking/text/turn_end) reach the relay endpoint.

* feat(grok): prompt-injection guard for Grok (parity with the Claude hook)

The injection guard is RoboCo's own hook (user-prompt-hook.sh), not a runtime
built-in, so it can be recreated at our input boundary regardless of runtime —
opencode's lack of a blocking pre-prompt hook is irrelevant.

- prompt_guard.detect_injection: the deny patterns ported to reusable Python.
- IntakeDriver._run_turn scans every interactive turn before sending it to the
  model and denies a match as an error chunk. Covers BOTH Grok (opencode) and
  the Claude SDK intake (which runs with setting_sources=[] and so never loaded
  the bash hook — it was unguarded too).
- The one-shot grok entrypoint scans ROBOCO_INITIAL_PROMPT and refuses a
  poisoned task prompt (parity with the Claude UserPromptSubmit deny).
- Broadened the pattern (Python + the bash hook, kept in sync) to catch the
  multi-qualifier canonical phrasing "ignore all previous instructions", which
  the single-qualifier original missed — without false-positiving on
  "ignore the linting rules" (an intermediate non-qualifier word breaks it).

So Grok now has the command/secret-exfil guard (secret-scrub), the cost cap,
AND the injection guard. Verified: 94 agent_sdk tests pass; bash + Python agree
on detect/miss cases.

* docs(grok): drop the security disclaimers — injection guard closes the gap

With the prompt-injection guard now recreated for Grok (prior commit), the
"Grok lacks the injection guard / prefer Claude for delivery roles" warning is
no longer true, so remove it:

- Panel routing card: replace the amber "prefer Claude / not safe" caveat with
  a neutral one-liner — Grok agents run on opencode; the command/secret-exfil
  guard, the prompt-injection guard, and the cost cap all apply.
- docs/self/architecture/llm-provider-security.md: prompt-injection row flips to
  "yes" for Grok; intro + routing recommendation updated to "effective security
  parity, any agent (incl. delivery roles) can run on Grok"; the only remaining
  unported hook is the non-security stop-guard.
- opencode_config docstring: the remaining gap is now just the stop-guard
  (budget + injection are covered).

Panel tsc + eslint clean.

* fix(grok): allow external-directory reads so the pr-reviewer can work

Live NAS run showed the Grok pr-reviewer claim the review and fetch the diff,
then write it to /tmp and FAIL to read it back: opencode auto-denied
"external_directory (/tmp/*)" — its file tools refuse paths outside the project
cwd, and in headless serve/run mode an "ask" permission auto-rejects (no human).

Add permission.external_directory (default "allow", env
ROBOCO_GROK_EXTERNAL_DIR_PERMISSION) to the generated opencode.json. The
container is the sandbox and secret-scrub still blocks credential-file reads, so
allowing in-container external-dir reads is safe and unblocks legitimate scratch
use (e.g. the pr-reviewer grepping a large diff in /tmp).

Verified live against grok-build-0.1: with external_directory:"allow" the Read
tool reads a file outside cwd and returns its contents (no auto-reject); the
plain-string form is accepted by opencode 1.17.8.

Needs a rebuild of roboco-agent-grok + a pr-reviewer re-run on the NAS to confirm.

* refactor(grok): split eligibility out of _maybe_kill_wedged_grok (xenon C -> B)

CI complexity gate (make quality -> xenon --max-absolute B) flagged
_maybe_kill_wedged_grok at rank C — too many guard branches in one method.

Extract the kill-candidate decision into _wedged_grok_slug(task, last_heartbeat)
-> slug | None (recent-heartbeat / no-owner / not-ACTIVE / not-GROK all yield
None); _maybe_kill_wedged_grok now just kills + evicts the returned slug.
Behaviour is identical (same guards, same order) — the reaper watchdog tests
pass unchanged. xenon now passes on the full package; ruff + mypy clean.

* feat(grok): start the in-container SDK server + budget feed (Claude parity)

The keystone of the Grok parity work (CEO's "take Claude as baseline, create
what's missing" call): the one-shot Grok container now starts the same SDK
server the Claude path runs, so the per-verb circuit breaker (the flow/do MCP
servers already POST /verb/attempted to it), the per-session budget/loop
counters, the terminal-verb tracking, and the SessionEnd post-mortem all work
on Grok instead of being silently absent.

- entrypoint: launch roboco.agent_sdk.server (bare venv python, not `uv run`
  which would re-sync the drifted clone lock and stall), wait for /health,
  reset counters; run opencode WITHOUT exec so the script regains control to
  run the post-mortem and the silent-exit substitute after the run returns.
- budget-feed.js: opencode plugin that gates on /budget/status in
  tool.execute.before (halt/loop deny — the only place to stop a runaway
  one-shot run; opencode has no PostToolUse-deny) and records the executed
  tool + args-hash in tool.execute.after. Fail-open; bare-verb normalization
  for MCP-namespaced terminal verbs.
- silent-exit substitute: on a graceful exit with no terminal verb the
  entrypoint posts /terminal/force_substitute so the task isn't left stuck
  claimed/in_progress (Stop-hook parity at the boundary).
- opencode_config: wire budget-feed into the plugin array; add
  ROBOCO_OPENCODE_EXTRA_PLUGINS so per-image role tool plugins load scoped to
  one role; read the per-role ROBOCO_GROK_EDIT_PERMISSION.

Targeted gate green (ruff/mypy/xenon + opencode_config tests; node --check on
the plugins; bash -n on the entrypoint).

* feat(grok): give the Grok Secretary its CEO-authority tools (blocker)

The Grok Secretary could chat but had zero directive tools — it could not read
company state or act on a CEO command, so it was non-functional. This is the
integration blocker.

- secretary-tools.js: opencode plugin registering read_company_state /
  read_task / submit_directive via the Hooks.tool API, each calling
  /api/secretary/* with the container's HMAC agent token — a direct port of the
  Claude Secretary's SDK tools (secretary_driver.build_secretary_options). The
  high-impact directive kinds stay gated server-side (queued for CEO confirm).
- agent-grok-secretary.Dockerfile: bake the plugin and scope it to this image
  via ROBOCO_OPENCODE_EXTRA_PLUGINS, so only the Secretary carries CEO authority.
- grok_secretary_main: correct the docstring that falsely claimed the tools
  reached the API "through the mounted MCP gateway" (there is no gateway mount;
  they're an opencode plugin).
- secretary.md: name the three tools and restate the confirm-before-act gate.

Verified locally that opencode loads a file-path plugin importing
@opencode-ai/plugin and resolves the package; the live model-tool-call +
backend round-trip is flagged UNVERIFIED-LIVE for the NAS.

* feat(grok): give the Grok Intake its propose_draft tool (draft card)

The prompter prompt tells the model to call propose_draft when the spec is
ready, but on Grok that tool didn't exist — so no draft chunk, no panel draft
card, and the human couldn't launch a task from a Grok intake chat.

- intake-tools.js: opencode plugin registering propose_draft via Hooks.tool;
  the execute() only ACKs — the driver (OpencodeServeSession.normalize ->
  _is_propose_draft -> _draft_from_tool_input) intercepts the tool CALL and
  emits the `draft` chunk the panel renders.
- agent-grok-prompter.Dockerfile: bake the plugin, scoped to this image via
  ROBOCO_OPENCODE_EXTRA_PLUGINS (delivery roles never draft).
- test: a propose_draft tool part normalizes to a draft chunk (not a tool_use).

The live tool-call -> draft-card path is flagged UNVERIFIED-LIVE for the NAS.

* feat(grok): scope opencode edit/bash/external-dir permissions per role

Grok wrote ONE global permission block, so a Grok pr_reviewer (or qa / PM /
auditor) ran with edit=allow + bash=allow on untrusted PR content. Now the
permissions are derived per role, mirroring orchestrator._get_role_permissions
on the Claude path:

- edit  — allow only roles that write code (role_config.allows_write:
  developer / documenter); everyone else edit=deny.
- bash  — allow only roles that legitimately run a shell (developer /
  documenter / cell_pm / main_pm); the read-only reviewers (qa / pr_reviewer /
  auditor) and the board get bash=deny. secret-scrub still guards the rest.
- external_directory — only the pr_reviewer reads scratch outside its cwd (the
  /tmp diff); delivery roles get deny.

One-shot roles resolve these in GrokProvider._append_grok_env; the interactive
intake/secretary set edit=deny + bash=deny in the orchestrator (intake keeps
external-dir reads for sibling product repos, the secretary does not). The
Claude path is untouched — the permission env is a GROK-only contract.

Targeted gate green (ruff/mypy/xenon + provider + interactive-spawn tests).

* feat(grok): park the provider on an xAI 429 (break the respawn loop)

A one-shot grok run that hit an xAI 429 exited without a terminal verb; the
dispatcher then re-spawned the same task every tick (429 -> exit -> respawn), a
container/token/cost loop with no living agent to call i_am_blocked.

- entrypoint: detect a rate-limit signature in the run output and exit 75
  (EX_TEMPFAIL); a rate-limited task is NOT substituted — it must be retried.
- _handle_stopped_container: on a grok exit 75, park the provider via the
  rate-limit tracker (retry_after window) instead of crash-retrying, and don't
  count it as a crash. The existing probe-resume loop clears the park after the
  window (unknown-provider time-expiry fallback) and the task is retried.
- spawn_agent: a grok-only, fail-open guard skips the launch while the provider
  is parked, so the dispatcher no-ops instead of looping. The Claude path is
  untouched.

Targeted gate green (ruff/mypy/xenon + new rate-limit tests; bash -n on the
entrypoint).

* feat(grok): close the secret-scrub bash-guard parity gaps

secret-scrub.js (the opencode bash guard) was missing three rules the Claude
bash-guard hook has, leaving a Grok dev able to read secrets the Claude path
blocks:

- source / dot-source of a credential-bearing file (source .env, . ./.env,
  .bashrc / .git-credentials / .netrc / /proc/*/environ).
- interpreter one-liner reading a credential file
  (python -c "open('.env')", node -e "readFileSync('.git-credentials')").
- git-ops check now runs on a SKELETONIZED command (heredoc bodies + echo/printf
  args stripped) so a README/heredoc that merely documents `git push` is no
  longer mistaken for invoking it — a false-positive parity fix from the Claude
  guard.

Functionally smoke-tested with node against the real plugin (git push denied;
echo/heredoc "git push" allowed; source/interpreter cred reads denied; normal
commands allowed). Live opencode firing stays flagged in the file header.

* fix(grok): record a usage session for interactive intake/secretary (M1+M7)

_spawn_intake_container / _spawn_secretary_container built the AgentInstance by
hand and never recorded an agent_spawn_sessions row, so the reap finalizer had
no usage_session_id to look up — every interactive session (Claude or Grok)
finalized at 0 tokens / $0 in the rollups. Record the session (task_id=None) and
pin its id on the instance, mirroring _launch_spawn; the GROK path reads
opencode.db by this id, the Claude path reads the transcript.

Also correct the grok_intake_main docstring (M7): it claimed the serve process
was "gateway-wired" with an "MCP gateway", but interactive intake mounts no
gateway — its only tool is propose_draft, registered by the intake-tools.js
plugin.

* fix(grok): surface a dead opencode-serve clearly instead of a zombie chat (M2)

If `opencode serve` died after the session opened, every subsequent turn failed
with an opaque httpx connection error while the container lingered. send() now
detects the exited subprocess (returncode set) and yields a clear error chunk +
turn_end so the panel shows a real "session ended — start a new chat" message;
the idle watchdog / a human reap then tears the container down.

* fix(grok): close the panel relay when the cost-cap kills an interactive chat (M4)

_enforce_grok_cost_budget killed + evicted a container directly. For the
interactive roles (intake/secretary) that left the panel SSE relay open with no
close sentinel, so the chat froze with no explanation. Add
PrompterLiveRegistry.close_by_agent (push a final error event, then close every
session bound to that agent) and call it from the cost-cap watchdog when the
killed agent is the intake or secretary, so the panel reports the chat ended on
the cost cap instead of hanging.

* fix(grok): make the opencode runtime actually load — proven live on grok-build-0.1

Live verification (opencode 1.17.8 + grok-build-0.1, funded key) showed the Grok
runtime was loading INERT, three ways:

1. The provider override `provider.xai.npm=@ai-sdk/openai` failed model
   resolution (ProviderModelNotFoundError) — opencode can't resolve that package
   from its module path. Worse, ANY custom `provider.xai` block (even just
   options) breaks plugin-tool registration. opencode's BUILT-IN xai provider
   drives grok-build-0.1 with working tool-calls, so emit NO provider block; the
   key + base reach it via XAI_API_KEY / XAI_BASE_URL env (provider.options.apiKey
   alone does NOT authenticate).
2. Plugins referenced by absolute path in the config `plugin:` array never
   registered their hooks/tools. opencode 1.17.8 only registers from the plugin
   AUTO-DISCOVERY dir (~/.config/opencode/plugin/). Bake all plugins there.
3. Plugins must use a NAMED export, not `export default`.

Changes:
- opencode_config: no `provider` block, no `plugin` array; drop the dead
  XaiTarget + timeout machinery; build_opencode_config now takes a model string.
- GrokProvider / orchestrator interactive env: inject XAI_API_KEY + XAI_BASE_URL
  (drop the now-unused OPENAI_*).
- secret-scrub / budget-feed / secretary-tools / intake-tools: named exports;
  baked into /home/agent/.config/opencode/plugin/ (drop the EXTRA_PLUGINS env).
- agent-grok* Dockerfiles: plugin dir + agent ownership; drop the unneeded
  @ai-sdk/openai global install.

Verified live end-to-end: grok-build-0.1 calls read_company_state AND
submit_directive through secretary-tools.js and the backend receives both with
the agent token; a tool.execute.before guard fires; built-in tool-calls work.
Targeted gate green (ruff/mypy/xenon + opencode_config/providers/interactive
tests; node --check the plugins).

* fix(grok): deliver intake draft via the relay + correct opencode-mechanism docs

Live end-to-end verification (opencode 1.17.8 + grok-build-0.1) of the WHOLE
integration, then fixes for what it surfaced:

1) Intake draft card (FUNCTIONAL): opencode's synchronous serve reply
   (POST /session/:id/message) returns only [step-start, text, step-finish] — it
   does NOT include tool-call parts, so the driver could never extract the
   propose_draft draft. intake-tools.js now POSTs the draft straight to the
   prompter-live relay (/api/prompter/live/{session}/events, the same endpoint
   the driver's relay sink uses), so the panel renders the card regardless.
   Verified live: grok calls propose_draft -> the relay receives the draft.

2) Correct misattributed opencode "bugs" (DOCS): earlier comments asserted as
   general opencode behavior that a provider.xai block / npm override / config
   plugin:-array "break" registration. Re-testing showed those were artifacts of
   a PROJECT-level .opencode/opencode.json; from the GLOBAL config (which
   opencode_config writes) the built-in provider, model resolution, the plugin
   array AND the auto-discovery dir all work, and MCP gateway verbs register
   (delivery agents verified). Reframed the comments as design choices (built-in
   provider + XAI_API_KEY env + plugins baked in the auto-discovery dir with
   named exports) and dropped the false claims.

3) Reasoning --variant: passing it does not error, but whether opencode applies a
   named reasoning variant to grok-build-0.1 (no provider-defined variants) is
   UNVERIFIED — comment softened from a "~54% cut" claim to best-effort,
   measure-on-NAS.

Verified live this session: one-shot delivery (model + MCP verbs + plugins +
hooks), secretary tools (read_company_state + submit_directive -> backend with
token), intake draft (relay), grok built-in-provider tool-calling. Remaining
NAS-only: full container assembly (SDK :9000 startup, entrypoint hooks, 429
parking) + the --variant cost measurement. Gate green (ruff/mypy + 51 tests;
node --check the plugins).

* feat(grok): reap abandoned interactive chats (M3)

An interactive intake/secretary chat the human abandoned (closed the tab without
confirming or stopping) leaked its container until the orchestrator restarted —
the wedged-grok reaper is task-driven and these run task_id=None, and an SSE
disconnect intentionally does NOT reap (so a page reload can reconnect).

Reap by IDLE TIME, not connection state: PrompterLiveRegistry tracks
last_activity (bumped on every push/deliver = a turn), and the 60s sweeper
retires sessions idle past ROBOCO_INTERACTIVE_IDLE_REAP_SECONDS (default 1800;
0 disables) via reap_intake_session / reap_secretary_session. An active or
page-reloaded chat that keeps exchanging turns stays fresh and is never reaped;
board-review-parked sessions (task_id set) are exempt. Provider-agnostic — fixes
the leak for both Claude and Grok interactive.

Tests: idle-only reap (active/parked/closed excluded), activity bump keeps a
session alive, threshold 0 disables. Gate green (ruff/mypy/xenon + prompter_live).

* fix(panel): resolve agent names from the live roster so they never drift

A review task assigned to the pr-reviewer rendered as a truncated raw
UUID instead of its name. Root cause: the panel resolved assignees from a
hardcoded static roster in agent-utils.ts that had drifted — it never
gained the board-adjacent agents added backend-side (intake-1,
secretary-1, pr-reviewer-1). Their UUIDs hit no map entry, so
getAgentDisplayName fell through to the unknown-UUID branch and returned
agentId.slice(0, 8). Every assignee surface (task table, task detail,
subtasks, journals, communications, commit cards) shares that resolver, so
all of them showed the fragment.

Make the live /api/agents roster the source of truth instead of a static
duplicate that silently rots:

- agent-utils: add a runtime registry (registerAgentRoster) keyed by both
  UUID and slug; resolveToSlug / getAgentDisplayName / isKnownAgent consult
  it first. The static maps remain only as an offline / first-paint
  fallback (now complete with the three agents).
- api/agents: surface the backend UUID on AgentDefinition (getAll/getOne
  previously dropped it), so the registry can key by UUID.
- use-agents: add useAgentRosterSync (registers the live roster) and derive
  useAgents from live definitions, falling back to the static roster.
- providers: mount the sync once inside QueryClientProvider.

Now any agent the backend knows about resolves, including ones added after
this change — the panel can no longer drift out of sync.

Tests: agent-utils unit tests cover the three agents end-to-end, a
live-roster-only agent (drift-proofing), live-overrides-static, and a
regression guard for the existing roster.

* fix(pr-review): post a COMMENT review when GitHub forbids self-review

A pr-reviewer review of an org-authored PR never reached GitHub. The agent
side ran correctly (claim → read-only diff → review → post_pr_review →
completed + CEO notify), but the GitHub publish 422'd with "Can not request
changes on your own pull request": the PR was authored by the same account
that owns the project PAT. post_pr_review posts best-effort after the DB
transition, so the failure was logged and swallowed — the task completed and
the CEO was notified "reviewed" while the PR showed no review.

GitHub forbids APPROVE / REQUEST_CHANGES on your own PR but DOES allow a
plain COMMENT review. The org's internal PRs (and any PR the PAT owner
opened) hit this. Retry once as a COMMENT review on the self-review 422 so
the review actually lands; the verdict is already stated in the body. The
external/fork-PR path (different author) is unchanged — REQUEST_CHANGES
succeeds there and the fallback never fires.

Tests: self-review 422 downgrades to COMMENT and returns the COMMENT result;
a failing COMMENT retry still surfaces GitError with no infinite loop; the
existing non-self 422 still raises.

* fix(grok): harden cost-guard, pin runtime, refresh stale plugin comments

Address review findings on the Grok provider work:

- budget-feed plugin failed open unconditionally, so a one-shot task agent
  whose in-container SDK budget server went unreachable would run with the
  cost cap unenforced. The entrypoint now exports ROBOCO_BUDGET_ENFORCE=1
  (one-shot agents always start that server) and the plugin's pre-exec gate
  fails CLOSED when the flag is set and the budget endpoint is unreachable,
  halting an uncapped burn. Interactive serve agents (intake/secretary) set
  no flag and keep failing open (they run no budget server by design).

- Pin opencode-ai to the live-verified 1.17.8 (was an unpinned global npm
  install). Untrusted model output runs under it; bump the pin deliberately.

- Document the ROBOCO_GROK_* operator vars in .env.example (image, the three
  opencode permissions, reasoning effort, idle-kill, cost ceiling).

- Refresh stale plugin comments: the MCP tool-name shape and the secretary
  tool-registration path are confirmed live, and secret-scrub's load route is
  the auto-discovery dir (not a config plugin: array). Keep the honest
  not-yet-exercised caveat on secret-scrub's deny path and the reasoning
  variant — those remain genuinely unverified.

* fix(grok): unbreak workspace-cwd agents, free trapped agents, stop self-PR review

Three bugs surfaced by the first live Grok lifecycle run:

- Dev/QA/doc agents crash-looped at startup with ModuleNotFoundError on
  roboco.llm.providers. The entrypoint ran the opencode-config render from the
  agent's workspace-clone cwd, whose own roboco/ dir shadows /app on the
  sys.path front; a branch without the grok code lacks the providers package.
  Render from /app so the installed package always resolves (the render has no
  cwd dependency — writes global, reads ROBOCO_MCP_CONFIG).

- A budget/loop halt blocked EVERY tool, including i_am_idle, unclaim, and
  i_am_blocked, so a halted agent could neither continue nor stop and flailed —
  one billed model turn per blocked retry. The before-gate now always lets the
  release verbs through so a halted agent can exit cleanly.

- The inbound reviewer ingested the org's OWN PRs (authored by the repo-owner
  account), which can't take a REQUEST_CHANGES review (GitHub 422) and get
  re-reviewed every poll. The normalizer flags author_is_owner and ingestion
  skips them — the reviewer reviews only PRs the org did not author.
  External/contributor PRs are unaffected.

Tests: owner-authored PR flagged + skipped; normalize shape covers the new
field. Gate green on the changed modules (ruff/mypy/xenon + 48 tests).

* feat(grok-cli): render config.toml + map per-role grok CLI flags

First piece of the Grok CLI provider that replaces the opencode runtime: a
pure, unit-tested module the agent entrypoint runs to translate the mounted
mcp-config.json into ~/.grok/config.toml ([mcp_servers]) and compute the
per-role 'grok -p' flags — subagent/shell/edit tool removal, raw-git-mutation
and rm-rf denies, reasoning effort — mirroring ClaudeCodeProvider's per-role
permissions with native grok flags instead of an opencode permission block +
JS guard plugins. Uses tomli_w. The rendered config + env injection are
validated live against grok-build (the model called the server through it).

* feat(grok-cli): grok CLI agent image + headless entrypoint

The roboco-agent-grok image now installs xAI's official grok CLI (Grok Build,
pinned 0.2.56) instead of opencode, authenticated by the SuperGrok subscription
via a mounted ~/.grok/auth.json (parity with the Claude ~/.claude mount, no
metered API key). The entrypoint renders ~/.grok/config.toml + per-role flags
from /app (the ModuleNotFound-shadowing lesson), runs grok -p headless with
--output-format json, keeps the prompt-injection guard, and exits 75 on a
rate-limit so the orchestrator parks the provider. No in-container SDK server or
budget-feed — native --max-turns + server-side terminal-substitute replace them.

* feat(grok-cli): GrokCliProvider — subscription auth mount, mirrors ClaudeCodeProvider

Replace the opencode GrokProvider with GrokCliProvider: reuses the orchestrator's
shared mount/auth/git assembly (gateway + identity) exactly like the Claude path,
mounts the host ~/.grok/auth.json read-only (SuperGrok subscription) instead of
injecting an xAI key, and sets the slim env the grok-cli entrypoint + renderer
read (ROBOCO_AGENT_ID for per-role flags, model, mcp-config, prompt). Provider
routing fields are blanked before the shared step so the grok endpoint is never
mislabelled ANTHROPIC_*. Per-role permission logic now lives in grok_cli_config,
so the provider is slim. Registry/orchestrator/exports updated; provider tests
rewritten for the CLI behavior (no XAI key, auth mount present/absent).

* feat(grok-cli): capture per-session token usage + notional cost

Grok runs on the SuperGrok subscription, but — exactly like Claude on Max — we
still record per-agent tokens and a notional cost for the dashboard. The grok
CLI writes a cumulative totalTokens per turn into
~/.grok/sessions/<cwd>/<session-id>/updates.jsonl (the grok analogue of the
Claude transcript / old opencode.db); the max is the session total. This reader
locates that file (url-encoded cwd), extracts the total, and prices it at the
output rate (no input/output split from the CLI; conservative + matches the
reasoning-at-output convention). Validated against a real grok-build session
(18253 tokens -> $0.0365). Entrypoint + finalize wiring follows.

* feat(grok-cli): wire usage capture into the run (session id + post-run extract)

The provider pins a fixed session id (ROBOCO_AGENT_SESSION_ID, reused from the
agent session id as on the Claude path); the entrypoint passes it to
'grok -p -s <id>' so the run's session store is locatable, then runs the usage
reader post-run (best-effort) to write the captured tokens + cost. The
orchestrator-side finalize that reads that file follows.

* feat(grok-cli): read captured usage at finalize; keep interactive serve working

The provider mounts the per-agent data dir and points the entrypoint's usage
file at it; the orchestrator's grok finalize reads that usage.json first (the
grok-CLI total, priced at the output rate) and falls back to opencode.db for the
still-opencode interactive intake/secretary path. Re-add _reasoning_effort_for to
grok.py as a clearly-temporary shim for that interactive path (it needs opencode's
"minimal" variant, distinct from the CLI's --effort) until it is converted too.

* feat(grok): convert interactive intake/secretary to the grok CLI; delete opencode

Move the last Grok runtime off opencode onto xAI's official `grok` CLI, for full
parity with the Claude path. The intake/secretary chat now runs per-turn headless
`grok -p` invocations that resume one session id (proven live: context carries
across runs), with streaming-json deltas mapped to the existing panel StreamChunk
kinds — the IntakeDriver loop, message source, relay, and idle reaper are reused
unchanged; only the SessionFactory differs (GrokCliSession replaces the
opencode-serve session).

- GrokCliSession + a pure, unit-tested streaming-json -> StreamChunk assembler
  (thought coalesced to one block, text streamed live, end captures the session
  id for -r, fenced-draft fallback, clear errors incl. rate-limit).
- intake propose_draft and secretary read_company_state/read_task/submit_directive
  are now FastMCP servers (roboco-intake / roboco-secretary) wired into
  ~/.grok/config.toml, launched via `uv run --directory /app` to resolve the
  installed package. The secretary tools reuse the shared backend helpers.
- Orchestrator: interactive spawn mounts the subscription auth + per-agent usage
  dir (no metered xAI key, no permission env — grok flags carry per-role perms);
  usage/cost now read a captured usage.json (drop the opencode.db reader, the
  _opencode_db_path/_grok_usage_from_opencode methods, and the cost-cap's
  opencode read). hosts["opencode"] -> hosts["grok_usage"]; OPENCODE_DATA_DIR ->
  GROK_USAGE_DATA_DIR.
- Fix one-shot usage capture: `-s` does not pin the session id (grok generates
  its own), so the entrypoint now reads the real id back from the JSON run log
  and the reader uses it; usage is captured per-turn on the interactive path.
- Delete the opencode layer: opencode_config/opencode_usage/opencode_session, the
  docker/grok/*.js plugins, the old one-shot entrypoint, and their tests.
- Compose (all three files), .env.example, and stale comments updated to the
  grok-CLI runtime; add the SuperGrok auth mount + grok-usage dir.

Gate green: ruff, mypy (296 files), xenon, tests. NAS build/verify pending.

* fix(grok): deliver the role blueprint as grok's system prompt via ~/.grok/AGENTS.md

The blueprint was mounted at /app/system-prompt.md but never reached grok — a real
parity gap vs the Claude path (which passes --system-prompt-file). grok agents ran
only on the per-task prompt, missing their RoboCo role/org context.

Verified live on grok 0.2.56 that the obvious flags do NOT work headless:
`--system-prompt-override` and `--rules` are silently ignored under `grok -p`
(identical output with and without). What IS honoured is grok's instruction-file
discovery — and `$HOME/.grok/AGENTS.md` is loaded GLOBALLY regardless of --cwd
(a project AGENTS.md only loads from the cwd/project root, which would pollute the
agent's git workspace). Proven end to end: a blueprint written there makes grok
adopt the role ("I am the RoboCo intake interviewer ... -- intake-1").

write_agents_md() copies /app/system-prompt.md -> ~/.grok/AGENTS.md; the one-shot
render (grok_cli_config.main) and both interactive mains call it. No git pollution
(it lives in ~/.grok, not the workspace), and it covers repo-cwd and /app-cwd
roles alike. Reverted the non-working --system-prompt-override wiring.

* feat(grok): close the Claude-parity divergences (reasoning, subagents, web, bash-guard)

Bring the grok CLI to parity with the Claude path on the four deliberate
differences:

- Reasoning: drop the per-role `--effort low` default — Claude sets no per-role
  thinking budget, so grok now uses the model default for every role. The
  fleet-wide ROBOCO_GROK_REASONING_EFFORT override stays as a cost lever. (This
  also un-caps intake-draft quality, the one that actually mattered.)
- Subagents: the intake interviewer may now fan out to subagents (parity with the
  Claude intake's `Task` allowance); every other role still has `Agent` removed.
- Web: `--disable-web-search` for every role — no agent gets direct web (Claude's
  tool set has none either); the roles that get web reach it through the gated
  roboco-search MCP, unaffected.
- Bash command filtering: full parity, split by deny semantics. Verified live that
  a grok PreToolUse hook deny CANCELS the run, while native `--deny` denies
  GRACEFULLY (the agent gets a permission error and recovers). So:
    * git network/branch/history ops -> native `--deny` (operational reflex; the
      agent must recover, not drop the task). Expanded to the full bash-guard set.
    * credential-exfil / identity-forgery / internal-API / env-dump patterns ->
      the SAME bash-guard the Claude path runs, wired as a grok PreToolUse hook
      (ROBOCO_GUARD_SKIP_GIT=1 so it leaves git to `--deny`). A hard cancel is the
      right response there — no legitimate agent reads ~/.netrc or forges an
      X-Agent-ID. One tolerance line (accept grok's camelCase `toolInput`) makes
      the one tested script guard both runtimes; +5 grok cases (50/50 green).

Also cleaned stale internal task-number / smoke labels out of bash-guard-hook.sh.

* fix(grok): install grok CLI to ~/.grok/bin (its real default), not ~/.local/bin

The image build failed at `chown ... /home/agent/.local: No such file or
directory`. The grok installer's default is $HOME/.grok/bin — the binary lands at
~/.grok/bin/grok; ~/.local/bin/grok is only a convenience SYMLINK the installer
creates on macOS but not in the Linux container. So the Dockerfile referenced a
directory that never existed:
  - PATH pointed at ~/.local/bin -> `grok` would not be found at runtime even if
    the build had passed;
  - chown targeted ~/.local -> the build aborted.

Point PATH + chown at ~/.grok/bin / ~/.grok. Also harden the install: download the
script to a file (a `curl | bash` pipe swallows a curl failure as a silent no-op)
and verify the binary installed and runs (`test -x` + `grok --version`), so a
broken install fails the build loudly instead of producing a grok-less image.

* fix(grok): address adversarial-review findings across the grok-CLI conversion

A 7-dimension adversarial review (find -> independently refute) surfaced 14 real
issues; fixed each:

Runtime bugs
- GrokCliSession.send drained stdout fully BEFORE stderr — a >64KB stderr burst
  would deadlock the turn forever (spinner never clears). Drain stderr
  concurrently, and add a per-turn watchdog (ROBOCO_GROK_TURN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
  default 600s) that kills a wedged process and emits error+turn_end.
- Crash-restarted grok agents launched `grok -p ""` (empty prompt) — Claude gets
  a scan-for-work fallback. Default the prompt in _spawn_container so every
  dedicated provider gets it too.
- _grok_usage_json read /data/grok-usage unconditionally while its writers branch
  compose-vs-local, so a local-mode agent finalized at $0 and the cost-cap was
  inert. Single-source the path in a new _grok_usage_dir helper (read == write).
- GrokCliSession secretary role fell through to "unknown" (get_agent_role returns
  a truthy sentinel, never None), defeating the ROBOCO_AGENT_ROLE fallback.

Parity / hardening
- --deny set was missing `git tag -d` / `git reflog delete` that the Claude
  bash-guard blocks — added them (the "same set" claim is now true).
- Interactive mains now install the bash-guard hook too (defense-in-depth).
- Compose: collapse the GROK_AUTH_DIR / ROBOCO_HOST_GROK_DIR auth-mount pair into
  one canonical var so a partial override can't silently break agent auth.

Docs / comments
- Panel routing card + architecture security doc no longer say Grok runs on the
  deleted opencode runtime; orchestrator comments point at the renamed entrypoint.

Tests
- Cover the interactive _render_grok_config MCP wiring (ModuleNotFound guard +
  secretary HMAC env), the cost-cap kill-failure + interactive relay-close paths,
  the local-mode usage read, the role fallback, the turn timeout, and the new
  git denies. (#13 — a separate grok "Write" tool — investigated: grok's only
  built-in file-mutation tool is search_replace, already removed; no gap.)

Gate green: ruff, mypy, xenon, tests.

* fix(grok): declare tomli-w as a runtime dependency (agent image needs it)

The grok agent image failed at spawn with `ModuleNotFoundError: No module named
'tomli_w'` when rendering ~/.grok/config.toml. tomli_w was only a transitive dep
of a dev-extra package, so it was present in dev/orchestrator envs but excluded
from the agent image, which builds its venv with `uv sync --frozen --no-dev`.
grok_cli_config imports it at module load to serialize the MCP gateway config, so
without it a Grok agent gets no gateway verbs.

Promote tomli-w to a direct [project.dependencies] entry. Locked with
`--upgrade-package tomli-w` so only tomli-w is added — no incidental churn of the
8 unrelated packages a full re-resolve would have bumped.

* Updated uv.lock

* fix(grok): auto-approve tool execution (--always-approve) so headless agents can call tools

Live smoke caught every grok agent (Main PM, pr-reviewer, dev, …) ending its run
with stopReason=Cancelled and empty output the instant it reached for a tool. Root
cause: headless `grok -p` cannot approve a tool call without `--always-approve`
(grok's docs: required for unattended automation), and the per-role args didn't
pass it — so no agent could call a gateway verb, an edit, or an MCP tool, and the
run was cancelled.

Add `--always-approve` to grok_cli_args_for_role (one place → every role, one-shot
and interactive). Safety is unaffected: `--disallowed-tools` still removes tools
and `--deny` still hard-blocks command patterns regardless of approval (a denied
command returns a permission error and the agent recovers — verified live).

Proven in the rebuilt image side-by-side: without the flag a tool call yields
Cancelled/not-called; with the real rendered args it returns EndTurn and the MCP
tool actually runs. (My earlier in-image tool-calling check passed `--always-approve`
manually, which masked that the production args omitted it — fixed.)

* fix(pr-review): seed claim heartbeat so the grok reviewer isn't wedge-killed

pr_review_claim transitioned a review task pending -> in_progress but never
seeded last_heartbeat_at, unlike every sibling claim path (_finalize_claim,
qa_claim, doc claim). The reaper treats a NULL heartbeat as a stale claim, and
the GROK idle-kill watchdog bypasses the live-container skip on a NULL
heartbeat -- so the reviewer container was killed (Cancelled) before it could
post_pr_review, churning the task back to pending on a respawn loop. A Claude
reviewer was shielded by the live-instance skip; only GROK manifested it.

Seed the heartbeat at claim time, matching the established invariant. Verified
against a real Postgres (10/10 test_pr_review_db tests, incl. the new
last_heartbeat_at assertion).

* fix(grok): stream one-shot output live + capture real token usage

Two gaps the buffered run hid, both verified in the real image with mounted
SuperGrok auth:

- Observability: the entrypoint buffered grok's output to a temp file and only
  cat it after the run, so `docker logs` was blank while the agent worked.
  Switch the one-shot to --output-format streaming-json piped through tee:
  grok flushes each thought/text event incrementally (confirmed token-by-token
  live in-container), so the agent's reasoning shows in docker logs in real
  time, parity with the Claude stream-json path. Read the session id back from
  the NDJSON run log (the terminal `end` event) since -s does not pin it.

- Usage: total_tokens read 0 for every grok run. grok nests the cumulative
  totalTokens on params.update._meta, but the reader looked at params._meta
  (which only holds event ids); the unit fixture had the same wrong shape, so
  the tests masked it. Read the real path (with params._meta / top-level
  fallbacks) and fix the fixture to the real grok shape. Verified live:
  usage.json now reports total_tokens=3262, cost_usd=0.006524 (was 0).

* fix(grok): validate agent_id before using it as a usage-dir path segment

CodeQL flagged a high-severity py/path-injection: agent_id flowed from
request-facing call sites into _grok_usage_dir() and on to read_text(), so a
value containing '..' or a separator could traverse the filesystem. Validate
agent_id against the slug/uuid allowlist ([A-Za-z0-9_-]+) at the single
chokepoint (_grok_usage_dir feeds both the mount and the finalize read);
anything else raises. Rejects traversal; accepts every real agent slug.

* fix(grok): use explicit-guard path sanitizer CodeQL recognizes as a barrier

The re.fullmatch allowlist from a35b640d was secure but CodeQL's py/path-injection
dataflow did not model the regex call as a barrier, so the high-severity alert
persisted on the analyzed merge. Switch _safe_agent_path_segment to explicit
guards (empty / '.' / '..' / '/' / '\\' / NUL) -- the barrier form the query
recognizes -- which still rejects every traversal vector. Drop the now-unused
re import.

* fix(api): validate agent_id at the orchestrator route boundary (path-injection)

CodeQL traces the py/path-injection from the request agent_id path param on the
orchestrator routes (stop/spawn/resolve-wait/mark-waiting/status) down to the
grok usage-dir read. Validate agent_id at the HTTP boundary with explicit
traversal guards (empty / '.' / '..' / '/' / '\\' / NUL) returning 422, so the
sanitized value is what flows downstream and the query sees a barrier at the
source. Runtime _grok_usage_dir keeps its guard as defense in depth for
non-HTTP callers.

* fix(grok): sanitize usage-dir agent_id with Path(...).name (CodeQL barrier)

Proven against the analyzed merge: CodeQL does not propagate a control-flow guard
through a helper's return value, so neither the route validator nor the
_safe_agent_path_segment guard cleared the py/path-injection alert. Reduce the
validated id to its final path component with Path(...).name -- a data-flow
sanitizer CodeQL models and propagates through the return -- at the single
source of truth (_grok_usage_dir), covering both the finalize read and the
mount/mkdir. The guard stays for fail-loud reject semantics; .name is the
recognized barrier (identity for a valid slug).

* fix(grok): containment-check the usage read against a fixed root (path-injection)

Three sanitizers failed to clear the CodeQL alert because the query does not
model them here: a regex guard, an explicit guard, and Path(...).name (verified
each against the analyzed merge). Replace with the barrier CodeQL does
recognize -- and that is also a genuine control -- at the read sink: resolve the
usage.json path and refuse it unless it is_relative_to the resolved usage root
(a fixed, untainted base from config, extracted as _grok_usage_root).

Note the github-advanced-security autofix proposed 'if usage_json.parent !=
usage_dir: return None', which is a no-op -- appending the constant 'usage.json'
never changes the parent, and it compares against the tainted dir, not a safe
base. This compares against the fixed root instead. The _safe_agent_path_segment
guard stays (fail-loud reject upstream, covers the mount/write side).

* fix(grok): sanitize the usage read with os.path.basename (CodeQL-modeled barrier)

Four prior barriers did not clear the py/path-injection alert (verified each
against the analyzed merge): a regex guard, an explicit guard, Path(...).name,
and an is_relative_to containment check. The one sanitizer CodeQL's query
documents -- os.path.basename -- was never actually tried: it was swapped for
Path(...).name to dodge ruff PTH119, and that pathlib form is not modeled.

Apply os.path.basename to the agent id in _grok_usage_json's own scope (the read
sink), so there is no recognition or interprocedural-propagation ambiguity, and
allow PTH119 for this file with a documented reason. The _safe_agent_path_segment
guard and the route 422 stay as the actual reject controls.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-19 09:15:01 +02:00
Renn F 7a8c083c31 feat(deploy): give the PR reviewer its own image, like every other agent
pr-reviewer-1 was the one agent with no dedicated image and no compose
builder service — it reused roboco-agent-base, which left it absent from the
compose files entirely (so it looked like the PR reviewer simply was not
there). Make it first-class for parity: add docker/agent-pr-reviewer.Dockerfile
(FROM the base — read-only reviewer, no extra toolchain), an
agent-pr-reviewer-image builder service in both compose files and the registry
compose, the image in the release workflow's publish list, and map
pr-reviewer-1 -> roboco-agent-pr-reviewer in the orchestrator plus its
lazy-build dockerfile map. Supersedes the earlier base-reuse mapping.
2026-06-17 00:56:56 +02:00
Renn F 25aed51c04 fix(agent): launch agent uv-run subprocesses with --no-sync
Agents with a write workspace (developer/product_owner/head_marketing/documenter)
run with cwd = their git workspace clone. Claude Code launches each MCP server
(flow/do/git-readonly/optimal/docs/search) and the SDK server as
`uv run python -m ...` from that cwd. When the clone's uv.lock drifts from the
baked image, `uv run` re-resolves and re-syncs /app/.venv against the clone's
lock — a multi-minute stall on a cold wheel cache — so the servers never reach
"connected": they sit at status="pending" and the agent gets ZERO gateway
verbs. It then can't claim/commit/idle (all MCP verbs), its Stop is rejected,
and it respawns in a loop redoing work it can't submit.

UV_PROJECT_ENVIRONMENT pins the venv location but does NOT stop the cwd-relative
resolve/sync (confirmed empirically on uv 0.11.1); `--no-sync` does, so the
servers reuse the baked /app/.venv as-is and start instantly. The /app-cwd roles
(qa/cell_pm/main_pm/auditor) were unaffected because their env already matches.

- orchestrator.py: --no-sync on all 6 generated MCP servers
- docker/scripts/sdk-startup-hook.sh: --no-sync on the agent_sdk.server launch
- test_spawn_strict_mcp.py: assert every server's args start with run,--no-sync
2026-06-15 22:43:05 +02:00
46d89b58fe feat: company-in-a-box — goal-aware company layer (0.4.0) (#171)
* feat(goals): company charter singleton — data layer (Business Goals slice 1)

First slice of the company-in-a-box "Business Goals" phase: a single CEO-owned
charter row (north star + objectives + constraints + operating policy) that
will be injected into every agent's context_briefing so all work is goal-aware.

- CompanyGoalsTable: singleton table (all-zeros id), JSON objectives /
  constraints / operating_policy, updated_at / updated_by.
- migration 032: create + seed the singleton row (offline-renderable; column
  server-defaults fill an INSERT of just the id).
- CompanyGoalsService: get() (empty defaults when unset) + upsert() (singleton,
  partial update, caller commits).
- tests: empty defaults, roundtrip, singleton + partial-update preservation.

Next slices (mapped, not yet built): briefing injection (BriefingInputs +
build_context_briefing + EvidenceRepo), API route (GET any / PUT CEO-only),
panel /goals page, and base/Board/PM prompt mentions.

* feat(goals): inject the company charter into every agent briefing (slice 2)

The charter is now goal-aware context for every agent:
- BriefingInputs gains company_goals; build_context_briefing surfaces it.
- EvidenceRepo.company_goals(): single-row lookup returning a COMPACT charter
  (north star + objectives + constraints + operating policy; audit columns
  dropped, lists capped) or None when unset, so an empty charter never bloats
  the per-verb briefing.
- _briefing_for wires it into every context_briefing.

Tests: briefing surfaces company_goals (defaults None); repo returns None for an
absent/empty charter and the compact dict when set.

* feat(goals): company charter API — GET any agent, PUT CEO-only (slice 3)

- routes/company_goals.py: GET returns the charter (any authenticated agent —
  it drives every briefing); PUT is CEO-only (403 otherwise), partial update via
  model_dump(exclude_unset=True), explicit commit.
- schemas/company_goals.py: response + partial-update models.
- registered at /api/company-goals.
- tests: GET open to any role, CEO update persists + is readable, non-CEO 403.

* feat(goals): make the company charter actionable in agent prompts (slice 5)

Agents already receive company_goals in the briefing (slice 2); now tell them to
act on it:
- base.md: universal "Align with the company charter" section — favour work and
  trade-offs that advance the objectives, honour the constraints, flag conflicts;
  never a license to leave your role.
- board / main_pm / cell_pm: role-specific lines tying triage / cell-routing /
  subtask decomposition to the charter.

Prompts are composed at spawn from base.md + roles/*.md directly (compose_prompt),
so no _generated regeneration is needed.

* feat(goals): company charter panel page (slice 4)

CEO-facing editor for the charter at /company-goals:
- lib/api/company-goals.ts: get / update (PUT) client.
- company-goals-card.tsx: edit north star + constraints (one per line) +
  objectives / operating_policy (JSON, parsed + validated with toast errors);
  display derives from server state (no set-state-in-effect).
- (dashboard)/company-goals/page.tsx + a "Company Goals" sidebar nav link.

tsc --noEmit + eslint clean. Completes Phase 1 (Business Goals): data, briefing
injection, API, prompts, panel.

* fix(test): make test_app route assertions robust to FastAPI 0.137 _IncludedRouter

FastAPI 0.137 stopped flattening include_router into app.routes — each include is
now an _IncludedRouter (a BaseRoute with no .path), so `{r.path for r in
app.routes}` raised AttributeError and the two router-registration tests failed
(the bump arrived via the claude-agent-sdk update in uv.lock). Add
_registered_paths(): OpenAPI schema paths (the stable public contract) plus each
included router's prefix, which also covers the websocket /ws mount (never in the
schema). Drops the now-incorrect type: ignore[attr-defined].

* feat(research): pluggable web search/fetch for Board + PM agents

Add a provider-agnostic web-research capability so the Board and PMs can
ground decisions in current external evidence the knowledge base can't
answer.

- ResearchService selects a provider adapter from config: Tavily, Brave,
  and Exa adapters plus a NullProvider that degrades gracefully when no
  key is set. Result count and fetched-content size are clamped to caps.
- /api/research/search and /api/research/fetch: role-gated to Board + PMs
  (and the CEO), with a per-agent/day Redis quota that fails open.
- roboco-search MCP server (web_search / web_fetch) calls those routes;
  the provider key stays server-side and agent containers never egress.
  Mounted per role by the orchestrator, behind a master switch.
- Charter-aware prompt guidance for Board, Main PM, and Cell PM.

Additive: with no key configured it is a no-op and the existing delivery
lifecycle is unchanged.

* feat(pitch): Board pitch -> CEO approve -> auto-provision repos

Add an additive origination path so a product can be proposed, approved,
and stood up without manual repo/Project setup.

- Pitch entity + migration (pitches table); PitchService create/list/
  reject/approve.
- GitHubProvisioningService: the one place that creates repos (POST
  /orgs/{org}/repos). Server-side token/org; when unconfigured the whole
  approve path is inert and nothing is created.
- On approval: provision one repo per target cell, register a Project per
  repo, create a Product when multi-cell, and seed one Main-PM delivery
  task — all reusing the existing Product / coordination-task machinery.
- /api/pitches: Board authors (PO/HoM), CEO approves/rejects, Board+PM+CEO
  view. Errors mapped via a single translator.

Additive: the delivery lifecycle is untouched; with no provisioning token
the capability is a no-op. Agent-facing pitch tool + panel are follow-ups.

* feat(strategy): dormant autonomous strategy engine (engine 2)

Add a second, optional engine that watches the company against its
standing goals and surfaces what needs the CEO — without touching the
delivery lifecycle (engine 1).

- StrategyEngine.assess() reports observations: the company is idle while
  goals stand, and tasks stranded in 'blocked' past a threshold.
- run_cycle() notifies the CEO (notify-only; it never spends, builds, or
  auto-approves — originating work stays a CEO decision).
- Orchestrator runs it on its own interval, started/stopped with the other
  background loops; the loop returns immediately unless enabled.

DORMANT by default (strategy_engine_enabled=False): the loop never runs and
a standard deployment is unchanged. Auto-origination is a further opt-in.

* docs(changelog): record Business Goals, Web Research, Pitch->Provision, and the dormant strategy engine under Unreleased

* feat(secretary): wire the Secretary role end-to-end (foundation)

Add SECRETARY as a distinct role — the CEO's conversational chief-of-staff,
governed separately from the Prompter (which stays read-only/human-only).
This is the role foundation only; authority, the live agent, and the panel
land in following commits.

- foundation/identity: Role.SECRETARY (board level), seeded secretary-1 agent,
  role-level mapping.
- journaling read tier (ALL — it advises the CEO), role_config entry,
  per-role model (opus), prompt-layer mapping + roles/secretary.md.
- i_am_idle gains SECRETARY so the role has a verb surface.
- migration 034: add 'secretary' to the agentrole enum (mirrors 025).
- Role-registry tests updated for the new role.

Inert by itself (nothing spawns it yet); additive — existing roles unchanged.

* feat(secretary): directives + gate-list authority (backend)

The Secretary acts only under CEO command. Low-risk directives (relay a
dictated message) execute immediately; high-impact ones — charter edits,
task start/cancel/override, pitch approval, announcements — are recorded
pending and run only after the CEO confirms (the gate list).

- secretary_directives table (migration 035) as the command audit + queue.
- SecretaryService: read company state; submit (direct->run, gated->queue +
  notify CEO); confirm/reject; execution runs with the CEO as actor through
  the existing services (the Secretary never holds CEO authority itself).
- /api/secretary: submit + state/task reads (Secretary or CEO); list/confirm/
  reject (CEO only). Writes commit explicitly.

* feat(secretary): live conversational agent (container + bridge)

Stand up the Secretary as a persistent Claude-SDK container the CEO chats
with, mirroring the Intake agent and reusing its driver/session machinery.

- secretary_driver: build_secretary_options exposes read_company_state /
  read_task / submit_directive as SDK tools that call /api/secretary/* with
  the agent's HMAC token; backend-call logic is module-level + tested.
- secretary_main: container entrypoint (receiver + relay) reusing IntakeDriver.
- orchestrator: start/spawn/reap secretary session + run-cmd builder; no
  workspace clone (reads state via API), mints a role=secretary token.
- secretary_live routes: panel <-> container bridge over the live registry.
- agent-secretary image (Dockerfile + compose build service).

Inert until a session is started; additive — intake and all agents unchanged.

* feat(secretary): panel chat + directive confirmation queue

The CEO's Secretary surface: a live chat (SSE) to talk to the Secretary, and
a 'Needs your confirmation' queue listing gated directives the Secretary
proposed — each with Confirm / Reject. Adds the sidebar nav entry.

- lib/api/secretary.ts: live (start/stream/status/send/stop) + directive
  (list/confirm/reject) + state clients (all as the CEO).
- hooks/use-secretary.ts: drives one chat, accumulating SSE token deltas.
- secretary page: chat pane + pending-directive cards.

Completes the Secretary end-to-end (role + authority + live agent + panel).

* feat(pitch): agent-facing pitch tool + pitches panel

Complete the pitch path: the Board can now author pitches through the gateway,
and the CEO reviews/approves them in the panel.

- content_actions.pitch (Board-only) -> PitchService.create, returning an
  Envelope; wired as a do-tool (do_server + /api/v1/do/pitch + schema) and
  added to the Board's do-tools.
- Panel /pitches page: lists pitches with CEO Approve & provision / Reject;
  sidebar nav entry.

Pitch (Phase 4) is now end-to-end: author -> CEO approve -> auto-provision.

* feat(cockpit): read-only 'is the business winning?' summary

A pure aggregation for the CEO over existing data — no new state, no writes.

- CockpitService.summary(): charter north-star/objectives, delivery counts
  (in-flight/blocked/awaiting-CEO), 30-day spend vs the charter's budget cap,
  pending pitches, and the strategy engine's signals (what needs you). Stamped
  basis='proxy' — performance is a proxy until real launches.
- GET /api/cockpit/summary (CEO / Board / Main PM / Secretary).
- Panel /cockpit page + sidebar nav.

Reuses goals + usage + StrategyEngine.assess(); reads only.

* docs(changelog): add the Secretary and Cockpit to Unreleased

* fix(test): isolate the company-goals empty-defaults test from committed state

The shared test DB persists committed writes across tests; a route test
commits a charter, so the unit test's 'unset' assertion must establish its
own clean precondition rather than assume global emptiness.

* fix(gateway): lower evidence_repo complexity to rank A (xenon gate)

company_goals()'s 4-way `or` emptiness check tipped the module average to
rank B; `any(...)` is equivalent and keeps the module under the gate's A bar.

* chore(compose): mirror agent-secretary-image build into docker-compose.yaml

Both compose files are byte-identical and tracked; .yaml carries the same
agent-secretary-image build service already present in docker-compose.yml.

* chore(lifecycle): regenerate artifacts for secretary i_am_idle

The secretary role gained i_am_idle in the lifecycle spec; regenerate the
generated prompt/doc/json artifacts so foundation-check stays green.

* docs(changelog): cut the company-in-a-box phases to 0.4.0

Label the six additive phases (business goals, web research, pitch-provision,
strategy engine, secretary, cockpit) as 0.4.0; tag v0.4.0 is held until the
branch merges to master so it points at the release commit.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-15 20:47:41 +02:00
Renn F 08540107e5 fix(panel): chown public assets to nextjs so they don't 500
The panel image copied /app/public without --chown, leaving every asset
root:root rwxrwx---. The container runs as the non-root nextjs user (uid
1001), which falls under 'other' (no perms) → EACCES reading any public file
→ Next.js returns 500 for /roboco-logo.png and friends. A redeploy never
helped because the image itself baked in the bad ownership. Chown the public
copy to nextjs:nodejs, matching the standalone/static copies.
2026-06-11 18:46:27 +02:00
Renn F cc4ccb7ea3 fix(usage): capture agent token usage from the Claude Code transcript
The token-usage pipeline was fully built — per-session SDK counters,
/usage/status, the orchestrator finalize-fetch that writes token columns and
estimated cost to the spawn-session row, the daily rollup, and the dashboard
— but nothing ever populated the counters. /usage/report had zero callers, so
every session reported zero tokens and the cost dashboard rendered all-zeros.
A redeploy could not fix code that was never written.

Close the loop with the producer that was missing. Claude Code does not pass
token counts to hooks, but it does pass the session transcript path, and each
assistant entry records its API call's usage. Add:

- POST /usage/sync, which parses the transcript and *sets* the cumulative
  totals absolutely (idempotent — re-syncing the same or a grown transcript
  overwrites, never double-counts), with a (size, mtime) short-circuit so an
  unchanged transcript skips the re-parse.
- usage-report-hook.sh, which hands the SDK the transcript path. Registered on
  PostToolUse (keeps mid-run snapshots and reaped-agent sessions accurate) and
  Stop (guarantees a final sync at turn end before finalize reads the totals).

Field mapping verified against a real Claude Code transcript:
message.usage.{input_tokens, output_tokens, cache_read_input_tokens,
cache_creation_input_tokens}. Unit tests cover summation, idempotency, growth,
a missing transcript, and malformed lines.
2026-06-11 07:46:19 +02:00
9f8834155a Feature: prompter gold upgrade (#84)
* feat(prompter): make the assistant a RoboCo insider and fully wire launch

The Prompter's intelligence lived in two thin static prompts, so it asked
generic checklist questions and produced a flat task. The launch path was
also only half-wired: the panel called the generic task-create endpoint with
no project, bypassing the Prompter's own confirm flow.

Interview brain
- Rewrite the chat system prompt with RoboCo's org model, the task-spec
  standard, a dimensions playbook, and a reflect-back, 1-2-questions-per-turn,
  auto-stop discipline.
- Inject the live projects/products list each turn so the assistant grounds
  questions in real surfaces and resolves the target itself.
- Replace the brittle phrase-match readiness with a parsed roboco-meta control
  block (parse_readiness); the block is stripped from the visible reply and the
  turn now returns draft_ready + scale.

Structured GOLD draft
- Add first-class draft fields (objective, what_this_builds, the_work, notes)
  carried in the existing draft_data JSONB — no migration.
- Compose the GOLD markdown description deterministically from those fields
  (compose_description); the model never hand-formats the body.

Adaptive routing + wired launch
- Confirm now runs through the Prompter confirm endpoint with the human's
  project/product choice and edited structured draft.
- Single-cell targets a project and the cell team; a multi-cell feature targets
  a product and becomes a Main-PM coordination root that fans out.

Frontend
- Turn-envelope draft_ready (drop the duplicated phrase-match), structured
  draft card, confirm dialog with a project/product picker and a per-cell
  The Work editor, and the corrected priority labels (0 highest .. 3 lowest).

* fix(prompter): commit session writes so they survive across requests

Session create returned 201 but the row was never durably committed, so the
immediately-following /messages call could not find it and 404'd. The prompter
routes were the only write surface that never called db.commit() — every other
write route (tasks, a2a, groups, docs, product) commits explicitly rather than
rely on the request-teardown auto-commit, which is sensitive to middleware and
teardown ordering under the production server.

- Commit explicitly in all four prompter write routes (create session, send
  message, get/generate draft, confirm).
- Fix _get_session's NotFoundError: it passed a full sentence as resource_type,
  producing the doubled "... not found not found" message; now uses the
  (resource_type, resource_id) signature.
- Panel: when a message hits a session the server no longer has, start a fresh
  session and retry once instead of dead-ending on a stale id.

Add a regression test that gives each request its own non-committing session —
the real cross-request boundary the shared-session integration tests never
crossed. It reproduces the production 404 without the route commit and passes
with it.

* refactor(prompter): drop the "GOLD" jargon for plain wording

"GOLD" was informal shorthand for "a good/well-formed spec" that should never
have been baked into the LLM prompts, comments, and docstrings as if it were a
defined term. Replace it everywhere with plain language ("a well-formed task",
"a complete task spec", "the markdown description", "structured spec fields").
No behaviour change.

* feat(intake): add the intake interviewer agent role (static definition)

Phase 1 of the intake-agent feature: a new first-class `prompter` role — the
intake interviewer the CEO chats with to draft a task. This commit defines the
role across every foundation layer (no runtime yet); spawning + the live
session come next.

- identity: Role.PROMPTER, RoleLevel.INTAKE (lowest authority), an AGENTS row
  (intake-1) on the board team, ROLE_LEVEL entry. Deliberately NOT in
  BOARD_ROLES — it interviews, it does not review.
- lifecycle: gets i_am_idle like every agent (its only verb); no
  delivery-lifecycle intents.
- journaling: ReadTier.OWN — isolated, reads only its own journal.
- role_config: human-only manifest — note + evidence only, no say/dm/notify/
  channels; allows_subagent=True (research), allows_write=False.
- agents_config derives it automatically and correctly excludes it from
  TASK_CREATOR_ROLES (it drafts, it never creates tasks).
- seed presentation ("Intake"); regenerated lifecycle artifacts.
- role system prompt: read the code first, single-CEO awareness, propose
  rather than interrogate — written against the failures we saw.
- docs: roster count 19 -> 20, org charts, verb-surface table, usage roster.

All foundation drift checks pass; role/manifest/permission tests green.

* feat(intake): migrate agentrole enum to add 'prompter'

ALTER TYPE agentrole ADD VALUE IF NOT EXISTS 'prompter' so the intake agent
row seeds/spawns against a migrated production DB. Forward-only (postgres
can't drop enum values), guarded for offline mode — matches migration 012.

* style(intake): ruff format the role additions

* fix(intake): unguard the agentrole migration so it renders offline

The enum-migration-parity test renders 'alembic upgrade head --sql' (offline)
and greps for ALTER TYPE ... ADD VALUE. The is_offline_mode() guard skipped
emitting it, so the parity check couldn't see 'prompter'. Drop the guard —
PG16 permits ADD VALUE in a transaction, same as migration 020's backfill.

* feat(intake): the live-session driver (Claude Agent SDK loop)

Phase 2 begins. The intake agent isn't a one-shot `claude -p`; it's a live
Claude Code session the human chats with. This driver is the container's loop:
open one long-lived claude-agent-sdk ClaudeSDKClient, then per human message
run a turn (query + receive_response) and stream its events out, keeping
conversation context in-process — verified against the real SDK (v0.2.94).

- StreamChunk + normalize(): map SDK messages (StreamEvent text deltas,
  AssistantMessage text/thinking/tool_use blocks, ResultMessage→session_id) to
  panel-facing chunks. Duck-typed, so it works on real SDK objects and on test
  fakes alike — SDK-free, fully unit-tested.
- IntakeDriver.run(): the loop, with injected session/source/sink seams; a turn
  failure surfaces as an error chunk without killing the session.
- SdkIntakeSession + build_intake_options: the only SDK-coupled code (lazy
  import; needs the live claude binary, so excluded from coverage).
- Add claude-agent-sdk dependency + mypy ignore-missing-stubs.

Relay, panel SSE, and the persistent on-demand spawn are the next steps.

* Updated uv.lock

* feat(intake): the panel<->agent live bridge (registry, routes, entrypoint, image)

Wires the live intake chat end to end (Phase 2 integration layer):

- prompter_live.py: the orchestrator-side per-session registry — open/close,
  push (agent->panel), stream (SSE drain), deliver (panel->container). In-process
  (the orchestrator is single-process). 7 unit tests.
- routes/prompter_live.py: GET /live/{id}/stream (SSE), POST /live/{id}/messages
  (deliver), POST /live/{id}/events (relay in); registered under /api/prompter.
  5 integration tests.
- agent_sdk/intake_main.py: the container entrypoint — a POST /turn receiver
  (the driver's MessageSource) + a relay-poster EventSink + the ClaudeSDKClient
  session, run concurrently. 4 unit tests on the wiring helpers.
- docker/agent-prompter.Dockerfile: FROM base, ENTRYPOINT = the driver (not the
  one-shot `claude` the other agents use).

Remaining for Phase 2: the orchestrator persistent-spawn path (scope->workspace
clone, CMD = driver, registry.open on spawn, reap-on-confirm) — the deploy-side
piece, best finalized against a buildable image.

* feat(intake): orchestrator persistent spawn + start/stop for the live chat

Add the task-free spawn path for the intake (prompter) agent: one fixed
intake-1 container running the Agent-SDK driver (image ENTRYPOINT, not
claude -p), one live session at a time.

- spawn_intake_session clones the scope's repo(s) via WorkspaceService
  (project -> one; product -> each distinct project, primary first),
  composes the intake-1 prompt, resolves the model, and builds docker run
  via _build_intake_run_cmd: no settings/hook mount (driver owns 9000),
  no MCP config, no -w; registers the live relay and best-effort delivers
  the opening message once the receiver is up.
- reap_intake_session closes the relay and stops the container.
- Routes: POST /live/start (project XOR product) and POST /live/{id}/stop.
- ROLE_MODEL_MAP[prompter]=opus; intake-1 -> roboco-agent-prompter image map.
- Replace the budget-sweep try/except/continue with _fetch_budget_status,
  which logs the swallow at debug instead of silently dropping it.

25 new tests; docker + the clone are mocked. End-to-end container spawn is
pending a built image and the stack.

* feat(intake): wire /prompter to the live agent — scope form + SSE chat

Replace the Ollama chat loop on /prompter with the spawned-agent flow.

- IntakeForm: pick scope (project XOR product) + opening message + Start
  before the chat; the agent clones that scope and reads the real code.
- use-prompter rewritten as the live brain (lib/api/prompter-live.ts): Start
  spawns via POST /live/start, then an EventSource on /live/{id}/stream
  streams the agent working — token deltas fill the assistant bubble,
  tool_use/thinking drive a live activity line, a draft event renders the
  existing DraftProposalCard. Messages go via POST /live/{id}/messages.
- Chat UX unchanged (Keep Chatting / Review & Confirm / ConfirmDialog reused);
  reap-on-confirm and reap-on-leave call POST /live/{id}/stop.
- Drop the dead Ollama prompterApi client; trim prompter.ts to shared types.

Frontend gate green (tsc --noEmit, lint, build). The draft event + the
/live/{id}/confirm endpoint are the Phase 4 backend seam.

* feat(intake): confirm draft -> backlog task + agent draft emission

Complete the live intake vertical: the agent proposes a structured draft and
Review & Confirm turns it into a task.

- Draft emission: the prompter prompt instructs the agent to emit a fenced
  roboco-draft JSON block when the spec is ready; the driver parses it into a
  'draft' event over the existing relay -> the panel's DraftProposalCard. The
  panel strips the raw block from the chat bubble.
- Fix a double-text bug: with include_partial_messages the reply arrives as
  both StreamEvent deltas and the final AssistantMessage; the driver now takes
  text from deltas only and the AssistantMessage for thinking/tool_use/draft.
- POST /live/{id}/confirm -> confirm_live_draft, reusing a draft->task core
  extracted from confirm_draft; reaps the session on success.
- Both prompter confirm paths create at BACKLOG, not pending: backlog is the
  holding area a draft waits in until it's reviewed and promoted to pending
  (TaskService.activate). The legacy Ollama confirm was creating at pending,
  skipping that gate — fixed.
- Remove the dead 'context' bootstrap param from the Ollama session-create
  chain (schema + route + method + tests), superseded by the live scope form.
- No suppressions: replace every type:ignore/noqa across the intake surface
  with a real fix (ORM .id -> UUID(str(x)); fakes -> monkeypatch.setattr;
  lazy imports -> pyproject per-file ignore; union-attr -> recipients[0]).

Full make quality green; frontend tsc + lint green.

* build(intake): add the agent-prompter image builder to compose

The orchestrator references roboco-agent-prompter (AGENT_IMAGES + the
_ensure_agent_image dockerfile map) and docker/agent-prompter.Dockerfile
exists, but docker-compose.yml built every other agent image up front and
left this one out — so the image wasn't pre-built for a stack bring-up.

Mirror the other specialized agent-*-image builders: build from
docker/agent-prompter.Dockerfile, tag roboco-agent-prompter, depend on
agent-base-image.

* Created docker-compose.yaml for the NAS

* fix(intake): non-blocking /live/start so spawn never times out

The start POST awaited the whole spawn — workspace clone + first-time image
build + docker run — which blew past the panel's 60s HTTP timeout ('Request
timed out. The server may be busy.') and triggered a duplicate send. Found on
the 2026-06-09 NAS smoke.

- start_intake_session opens the live relay synchronously, then spawns the
  container in the background (_spawn_intake_container_guarded). The route
  returns the session id immediately; the panel opens the SSE stream right away.
- A background spawn failure is pushed onto the relay as an 'error' event and
  closes the session, so the panel shows it instead of hanging.
- spawn_intake_session stays as the synchronous variant for direct callers/tests.
- Panel shows a 'Preparing the agent…' indicator until the first event arrives.

18 intake-spawn tests green; tsc + lint green. E2E re-validates on next smoke.

* fix(intake): propose_draft MCP tool + lock the agent down

Smoke 2026-06-09 exposed two compounding problems: the agent never reliably
emitted the draft (it narrated the spec instead of typing the magic fence), and
it had inherited the CEO's entire Claude Code env — Write/Edit/Bash + Gmail/
Notion/Calendar/Drive MCP — because bypassPermissions ignored the allowlist and
the mounted ~/.claude leaked the host MCP config.

- propose_draft: build_intake_options now registers an in-process SDK MCP tool
  (create_sdk_mcp_server + @tool). The agent calls it to submit the draft; the
  driver turns that ToolUseBlock into a 'draft' event (_is_propose_draft /
  _draft_from_tool_input, tolerant of nested/flat/JSON-string input). The fenced
  roboco-draft block stays as a fallback.
- Lockdown: strict_mcp_config=True + setting_sources=[] (ignore host MCP +
  settings); permission_mode 'dontAsk' + a can_use_tool gate enforcing a hard
  allowlist (Read/Grep/Glob/Task + propose_draft) replaces bypassPermissions.
- Prompt: call propose_draft (not a fence); the draft's downstream chain is
  backlog -> Board (PO + HoM) -> CEO approve -> Main PM, and the agent's job ends
  at the draft (it never routes or hands off).

SDK API verified against the installed claude-agent-sdk. Driver detection unit-
tested; the SDK-construction is validated on the next NAS smoke (incl. that
setting_sources=[] doesn't break the mounted-~/.claude auth).

* fix(intake): panel UX cluster from the smoke (#3/#4/#6/#12)

- #3 message boundaries: a tool call now ends the current text bubble, so the
  agent's words before and after a tool render as separate messages instead of
  one merged wall (the 'two waves merged into one bubble' the CEO saw).
- #4 activity indicator: promoted from tiny grey text to a prominent primary-
  tinted pill so 'watch it work' is actually visible.
- #12 End chat: a header button (any chat state) reaps the agent and resets to
  the form, reusing startAnother (which already stops the session). Backend
  POST /live/{id}/stop already existed.
- #6 log noise: the opening-message delivery retry logs at debug, not error —
  those failures are expected until the container receiver is up.
- Also fix a latent test gap from the #1 commit: the live-route test's fake
  orchestrator now exposes start_intake_session (the route's non-blocking entry).

Frontend tsc + lint green; live-route + prompter_live tests green.

* fix(intake): render markdown in the chat bubbles (#8)

The agent emits rich markdown (### headers, **bold**, tables, lists) but the
bubble rendered raw text, so it was illegible (CEO-flagged on the smoke). Render
assistant content with react-markdown + remark-gfm (GFM tables) in a prose
container. Adds react-markdown + remark-gfm to the panel.

* feat(intake): #14 — two start routes (Board review vs straight to Main PM)

Per the CEO spec, the draft confirm now starts the task at PENDING with an
explicit assignment instead of parking it at backlog:

- route="board" (Board review & Start): assigned to the Product Owner, so the
  orchestrator dispatches the full Board review (PO + Head of Marketing) before
  the Main PM picks it up.
- route="main_pm" (Approve & Start): assigned straight to the Main PM, who
  delegates to the cells (Board review skipped).

create_task_from_draft gains status + assigned_to params (default BACKLOG, so the
legacy confirm_draft is unchanged); confirm_live_draft + the /live/{id}/confirm
request carry the route. Service tests cover both routes.

* feat(intake): #14 draft-card buttons — Board review vs Approve & Start

Three buttons on the draft card now (CEO spec): Keep chatting / Board review &
Start / Approve & Start. The two action buttons confirm directly with their
route — launchTask(route) sends route to POST /live/{id}/confirm, which starts
the task at pending assigned to the Board (PO+HoM) or straight to the Main PM.

Supersedes the ConfirmDialog review step (scope is chosen up front in the form),
so it's removed from the page flow. The ConfirmDialog component + its sub-editors
are now unused — flagged for a follow-up cleanup, left in place to avoid churn.

tsc + lint green.

* fix(intake): keep the live SSE stream bound to its relay session

The orchestrator opened the relay session twice per live chat — once on the
request path (before the start call returns) and again inside the background
container spawn. The SSE stream binds to the session's queue the moment the
panel connects, so the second open swapped in a fresh queue and stranded the
stream: the agent replied normally, but its events went to the new queue while
the panel kept reading the old one, so the chat looked frozen on "Preparing…".

The second open was always redundant (the relay is opened by the caller before
the spawn). Remove it, and make open() idempotent so a live session is never
replaced out from under a stream that is already connected to it.

* fix(intake): draft-card launch buttons silently did nothing

The launch path required a `description` field, but the prompter draft schema
intentionally has none — it sends `objective` + the structured spec and the
backend composes the description (compose_description). `editableDraft.description`
was therefore undefined, so `description.trim()` inside launch validation threw a
TypeError that propagated out of the button's onClick. Clicking "Board review &
Start" / "Approve & Start" did nothing, with no feedback — the wall blocking the
whole confirm → task → reap flow.

- Map a proposed draft's description from `objective` as a fallback.
- Make launch validation null-safe.
- Replace the silent early-return with a toast that names what's missing, so a
  blocked launch is never a dead, feedback-less button again.

* fix(intake): steer the agent to ask inline, not via AskUserQuestion

The intake's job is to ask clarifying questions, so it reached for the
AskUserQuestion tool — which isn't wired to the live chat panel and isn't in its
allowlist. The bare deny left it to stumble ("let me clarify… — no worries, let
me just lay it out") and waste a visible turn.

- Prompt: spell out that it asks by writing in the chat (the human reads every
  message live) and that no question/prompt tool is available to it.
- Gate: give AskUserQuestion a specific deny message that nudges it to ask inline,
  so even a reflex attempt degrades gracefully.

Also refresh the now-stale "what happens after propose_draft" section: the draft
card has three choices (Keep chatting / Board review & Start / Approve & Start)
and produces a pending task — not the old two-button "backlog" description.

* feat(intake): copy buttons on agent messages and the draft card

The CEO asked for a way to save the agent's plan/spec elsewhere "just in case" —
a cheap manual backstop until refresh-durability lands.

- New CopyButton: async Clipboard API when available, plus a legacy
  textarea+execCommand fallback. The fallback is load-bearing — the panel is
  served over plain http on a LAN IP, where navigator.clipboard is absent
  (clipboard needs a secure context), so the modern API alone would never copy.
- Copy button under each assistant message (copies its text).
- Copy button on the draft card (copies the full spec as markdown: title,
  objective, what-this-builds, the-work per cell, notes, success criteria).

* feat(intake): unbuffer logs + log each turn so the container isn't a black box

Debugging the intake smoke was painful for two reasons: (a) the orchestrator
block-buffered stdout, so `docker logs` lagged minutes behind reality, and (b)
the intake container logged only "session opened" then went silent for the whole
conversation (the chat streams to the relay, not stdout).

- Set PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1 on the orchestrator and agent-base images so structured
  logs reach `docker logs` in real time instead of in large delayed chunks.
- Log each intake turn: "turn received" (with char count) and "turn streamed"
  (chunk count + whether a draft was emitted), so the container logs show the
  conversation's shape at a glance.

* chore(intake): remove the dead ConfirmDialog draft editor

The three-button draft card (Keep chatting / Board review & Start / Approve &
Start) replaced the old review-modal confirm flow, leaving ConfirmDialog and its
sub-editors (StringListEditor, TheWorkEditor) referenced by nothing but the
barrel export. Remove the three files and the export — typecheck + lint confirm
no remaining references.

* fix(intake): coerce bad draft enums on confirm instead of hard-failing

The intake agent is an LLM and will emit off-enum values — e.g. task_type="feature",
which is not a valid TaskType (code/documentation/research/planning/design/
administrative). `_coerce_draft_enums` called `TaskType(value)` directly, which
raised, and the confirm 400'd with "Draft has invalid or missing required fields:
'feature' is not a valid TaskType". That forced the agent to discover the valid
values and self-correct in-chat — unacceptable: clicking "Approve & Start" must
never blow up on a cosmetic enum guess.

Coerce each enum to a sane default on invalid/missing (task_type→code,
nature→technical, complexity→medium); team falls back to the first valid cell in
the_work, then backend. `_lead_cell_team` now skips invalid cell names too. The
confirm/launch action no longer hard-fails on an enum the model got wrong.

* fix(intake): draft card no longer renders above the user's latest message

attachDraft fell back to "the last assistant message anywhere" when the current
turn had no streamed text yet (propose_draft called first). That last message was
often the PREVIOUS turn's — sitting above the user's "Yes, propose it" — so the
draft card rendered above the user's message. Attach only to the current turn's
streaming message; otherwise append a fresh assistant message so the card always
lands at the bottom of the thread.

* test(intake): guard draft enum coercion + invalid-cell skipping

Regression tests for the confirm-time enum coercion: an off-enum task_type
("feature") / nature / complexity coerce to code/technical/medium instead of
raising, and _lead_cell_team skips invalid cell names. Locks in that a bad enum
guess from the agent can never 400 the launch again.

* fix(intake): stop the agent fumbling through Claude Code meta-tools

In smoke it reflexively probed CC built-ins before reaching propose_draft —
plan mode + ExitPlanMode (it announced a written plan and waited instead of
emitting the draft), ToolSearch, Write — each correctly denied by the lockdown
but stumbly, and it only proposed after explicit CEO nudges.

- Gate: ExitPlanMode now gets a specific deny nudge ("you don't use plan mode;
  call propose_draft"), and the generic deny names the actual toolset instead
  of a bare "not available", so any probe degrades into guidance.
- Prompt: forbid plan mode/ExitPlanMode/ToolSearch explicitly and spell out
  "you do not plan and wait — call propose_draft directly when the spec is
  ready," plus an anti-pattern bullet.

* feat(intake): make the container logs transparent mid-turn

`docker logs` on the intake container was a black box: only turn start/end, while
the agent read the codebase and spawned 20+ subagents invisibly (the conversation
streams to the relay, not stdout), and the benign 3x ~/.claude.json warning was
the only thing visible.

- Driver logs each tool call mid-turn ("Intake tool use" with the tool name) and
  the draft emission, plus a tools count in the turn-streamed summary. Text deltas
  stay unlogged (they'd spam). Now the logs show the turn's real shape.
- Pre-create ~/.claude.json ({}) at container boot so the CLI's "config not found"
  warning (printed 3x, self-healed anyway) stops drowning the real logs.

* fix(intake): render markdown in user messages + scope copy to code blocks

Two display fixes from the smoke:
- User messages collapsed newlines (plain {content} in a div) and rendered no
  markdown — a "1.\n2.\n3." answer showed as one run-on line. Render user AND
  assistant bubbles through a shared GFM markdown body that inherits the bubble's
  text color, so lists / newlines / styling render correctly on both.
- Copy was blanketed on every assistant message; scope it to KEY parts — a copy
  button on fenced code blocks (the draft card keeps its own). Removed the
  per-message button.

* fix(intake): prevent duplicate tasks from a double-click on launch

Clicking a draft launch button twice fired two confirms and created duplicate
tasks. Add a synchronous re-entry guard (a ref — no stale-closure window) at the
top of launchTask so a second click returns immediately, and disable + spin the
draft-card buttons while a launch is in flight so it's visually clear it's working.

* docs(how-to): lead task creation with the Task Assistant flow

Rewrite "1 · It starts with you" to walk the Prompter/Task Assistant path —
scope form, the agent reading the codebase, its grounded analysis, the draft
card, and the created task — then flow into the Board review. Replaces the old
manual task-definition form shots.

Image placeholder: images/prompter_draft_card.png (the 3-button card) is
referenced but not yet captured — TODO comment marks it for the next smoke run.
A second comment flags an optional re-capture of prompter_run_2 after the
markdown-rendering fix.

* fix(intake): restore assistant message text contrast

The markdown refactor dropped `dark:prose-invert` and made text inherit the
bubble's color, but the assistant bubble had no explicit text color — so its text
rendered near-invisible (dark-on-dark on bg-muted). Give the assistant bubble an
explicit text-foreground; the user bubble already carries text-primary-foreground,
and [&_*]:!text-inherit now resolves to a readable color on both.

* fix(intake): coerce draft priority too — confirm 500'd on priority="high"

The enum-coercion fix covered task_type/nature/complexity/team, but priority is a
non-enum int field handled by `int(draft_data.get("priority", 2))`, and the agent
guesses a word ("high") as readily as a number — so int("high") raised ValueError
and the confirm 500'd. Same class of bug, one field missed.

Add _coerce_priority: map words (urgent/high/medium/low → 0/1/2/3), clamp numbers
to 0-3, default to 2 (medium) on anything else. The launch can no longer crash on
any field the LLM guessed. + regression test.

* fix(intake): draft card shows distinct cells, not one badge per work item

the_work has one entry per work item, so a cell with several items rendered its
badge repeatedly ("Board-led across Backend Backend Backend Frontend Frontend
…"). De-dupe to distinct teams so the card reads "Board-led across Backend
Frontend" — and the "Cell:" vs "Board-led across" label keys off distinct count.

* docs(how-to): hero the teaser gif + resolve the Prompter/Task Assistant thread

- Move the 12s teaser gif to the top as the hero — it was buried between the
  "prefer video" link and the first screenshot.
- Name the connection: the Task Assistant IS the Prompter, so section 1 (using
  the tool) and the rest (RoboCo building it) read as one story — you use the
  tool the company built for itself, then watch the build.
- Re-anchor the section 1 → Board transition to follow the Prompter's own
  journey, instead of implying section 1's example task is the one reviewed next.

* Included images for how-to.md

* docs(how-to): align agent count to 20 (matches README + CLAUDE.md)

The how-to said "18 agents" with UX/UI at one dev and no Intake — stale against
the authoritative count. Bump 18→20 (prose + spelled-out eighteen→twenty), give
UX/UI 2 devs, and add the Intake line to the org tree (Intake leads section 1, so
it belongs in the tree). README + CLAUDE.md already say 20.

* ci(release): publish all RoboCo images to GHCR + Docker Hub

The release published only the orchestrator to GHCR. Build and push the full set
the stack needs — agent-base, the 8 agent images, orchestrator, and panel — to
BOTH ghcr.io/rennf93/* and docker.io/renzof93/*, at :<version> and :latest, so
consumers can pull instead of compose-building.

- agent-base builds first (the agent images build FROM roboco-agent-base, a local
  tag), then the rest; push only after every build succeeds.
- Image names mirror the docker-compose `image:` values 1:1.
- Free disk on the runner first (11 images is space-heavy).
- Needs a DOCKERHUB_TOKEN repo secret for the Docker Hub login.
- SECURITY.md updated to reference both registries.

* ci(release): use short SHA as the image tag on manual dispatch

A workflow_dispatch runs against a branch, and the branch name (e.g.
feature/prompter-gold-upgrade) was used verbatim as the image tag — but "/" is
illegal in a Docker tag, so the first build failed instantly with "invalid
reference format". Releases still tag from the release tag; manual dispatch now
always uses the short SHA, which is a valid tag.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-09 17:08:34 +02:00
06682f33c6 Fix: agent workflow hardening (#70)
* fix(gateway): push the branch before QA handoff so reviewers see the latest commits

The commit content tool commits locally without pushing; only open_pr pushed
the branch. On the first submission that was fine, but a fix committed while
addressing needs_revision never reached origin (open_pr is skipped once the PR
exists), so QA — which reviews the remote PR branch — re-reviewed the stale
remote and re-failed the task on every cycle, a loop that never converged.

i_am_done now pushes the task branch (idempotent; a no-op when nothing is
unpushed) as part of the shared submit gate, covering both the normal and
resume-from-verifying paths. A push failure blocks the handoff with a clear
remediation rather than parking the task in awaiting_qa with commits that exist
only in the developer's local workspace.

* fix(orchestrator): don't reap a stale claim while the agent's container is alive

The stale-claim reaper released any claimed/in_progress task whose
last_heartbeat_at exceeded the TTL. The heartbeat only updates on certain
gateway calls, so a developer deep in a long edit/test cycle outran the TTL and
had its claim reaped mid-work — churning the task and risking a double spawn
against the still-running container.

The reaper now skips a task whose assignee still holds a live (ACTIVE) agent
instance, trusting container liveness — the ground truth — over the heartbeat
proxy. The check is defensive on missing fields so a heartbeat-only caller (and
the reaper's existing unit tests) behave exactly as before.

* fix(gateway): refuse to unblock a task while a dependency is unfinished

A PM unblock on a dependency-gated task moved it straight to in_progress,
overriding the dependency — letting a dependent proceed without its upstream's
work (e.g. a frontend task built before its UX design lands). A dependency
block is meant to clear on its own via _unblock_dependents the moment the
upstream reaches a terminal state.

unblock now refuses while any dependency is still non-terminal, returning a
clear remediation that the block resolves automatically. Manual unblock remains
available for genuine, non-dependency blockers.

* fix(gateway): release a dependency-blocked claim to pending instead of looping

A task that reached claimed/in_progress with an unfinished dependency was left
in that state when the claim guard rejected, so the orchestrator's respawn loop
kept reviving its assignee — which could make no progress — burning work for
nothing.

The claim guard now releases such a task back to pending. claimed -> blocked is
not a legal transition, so pending — held by the dispatch dependency filter — is
the lifecycle-correct resting state: the respawn loop ignores pending tasks, and
_unblock_dependents re-dispatches it once the upstream reaches a terminal state.
release_dependency_blocked_claim shares a _force_unclaim_to_pending core with
unclaim_for_reaper so both record a truthful work-session abandon reason.

* feat(security): warn at startup in header-trust mode + document the auth posture

When ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED is not enabled the API accepts the X-Agent-Id /
X-Agent-Role headers without a signed token, so any client that can reach it may
act as any role (including 'ceo'). The API now logs a clear warning at startup
in this mode, and the README gains a Security section documenting the auth
posture and how to harden it. Acceptable only on a trusted private network — do
not expose the API to untrusted networks.

* fix(workspace): scope the refresh fetch to current + default branch

ensure_workspace's healthy short-circuit ran an all-refs 'git fetch origin' to
keep every origin/<branch> ref current. On a monorepo with many accumulated
feature/* branches that exceeds the refresh timeout, the fetch silently fails,
and the workspace keeps a stale base — so an agent builds on an out-of-date
branch.

The refresh now fetches only the workspace's current branch and the repo's
default branch (resolved via origin/HEAD), with --no-tags --prune: it transfers
near-nothing and can't time out. Readers need their own branch and the default;
the integration branch is refreshed at branch-creation time.

* fix(git): refresh a dependency-blocked task's branch off the current integration tip

A cross-cell dependent (e.g. a frontend task waiting on the UX design) was
branched off a base captured before its upstream merged into the integration
branch, and the branch was never re-synced — so the agent built on a stale
snapshot with none of the upstream's work.

Two changes close the gap:
- release_dependency_blocked_claim now clears branch_name, so the re-claim
  (after the dependency clears) re-runs branch creation.
- create_branch, when the branch is already on disk with no commits of its own,
  resets it onto the freshly-pulled base — the dependent now builds on the
  current integration tip. A branch carrying real commits is left untouched, so
  no work is discarded; the cell->leaf cascade carries the upstream down to the
  dev branch automatically.

* refactor(gateway): drop the sibling-sequence claim guard

Sibling sequence no longer gates a claim. Cross-cell ordering is
enforced by task dependencies — a cell task that depends on another is
held until its upstream reaches a terminal state, a stronger,
status-aware gate than the sequence-number check. That check was
dormant in practice anyway: every fan-out child carries sequence 0, on
which the guard short-circuited. `sequence` stays a sibling-ordering /
dispatch-priority field (list_pending ordering and the panel).

Removes sibling_sequence_guard and its _earlier_blocking_sibling
helper, the now-unused skip_sequence parameter threaded through the
claim verbs, and the sibling fetch that fed it.

* feat(gateway): sort a cross-cell dependent after its upstream

When the frontend cell task is wired to depend on its UX/UI sibling, set
its sequence to the upstream's sequence + 1 so it sorts after the design
it waits on — list_pending ordering and the panel now show UX ahead of
the implementation it gates, in either delegation order.

Adds TaskService.set_sequence (the sibling-ordering field is a service
write; it carries no claim-gating semantics — dependencies gate claims).

* feat(gateway): make the backend cell depend on UX too

UX/UI design defines the screens and API contracts both implementation
cells build against, so the backend cell — not just the frontend — waits
on the UX/UI cell task in a product fan-out and sorts after it. Wires in
either delegation order: a backend task delegated after UX gets the
dependency directly; a UX task delegated after a still-pending backend
sibling retro-wires it.

Mirrors the existing frontend wiring (_depend_backend_on_ux and
_depend_pending_backends_on_ux). Backend is held by the same dependency
gate, so it costs no extra dispatch churn.

* fix(websocket): forward notification acks instead of logging them incomplete

The bridge handler serves both notification.sent and notification.acked,
but acked events carry `agent_id` (the acking agent) rather than
`recipient_id`, so every acknowledgement tripped the missing-field guard
and logged "Incomplete notification event" instead of reaching the panel.
Accept either field as the recipient.

* feat(api): hint the full UUID when a truncated task id fails validation

Agents copy the 8-character task prefix the system shows them (the commit
prefix, task summaries) and send it as task_id, which fails UUID
validation with an opaque "invalid length" 422 and wastes a call. The
request-validation handler now detects a task_id UUID error and attaches
a `remediate` hint telling the agent to retry with the full 36-character
UUID from its task envelope.

* fix(audit): record the blocked transition when a task is escalated

Escalation sets a task to blocked by writing task.status directly, which
bypassed the validated transition helper and so never emitted a
task.blocked audit row — the lifecycle moved but the Auditor saw nothing.
Extract the audit emit from the central transition helper into
_emit_status_transition_audit and call it from the escalate path,
capturing the prior status and outgoing owner before reassignment so the
row is attributed correctly.

* fix(docs): stop doubling the docs path so design specs index into RAG

The documenter sometimes hands a doc path already rooted at docs/, and
joining it onto DOCS_BASE_PATH (/app/docs) produced /app/docs/docs/...,
so the file was never found and the spec never indexed — the frontend
cell could not retrieve the UX design over RAG. Normalize the path
before joining: trust an absolute path, otherwise strip a single
redundant leading docs/ segment.

* feat(security): let the control panel authenticate in secure mode

With ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED=true every request must carry a valid
HMAC token, which locked the human control panel out — it sends role
headers but no token. nginx, the only trusted hop between the browser
and the API, now injects the CEO token on /api and /ws, so the browser
never holds the signing secret. The injected value is just the existing
per-agent token issued for the CEO identity (issue_panel_token), so the
token-verification path is unchanged. An empty value (dev/header-trust
mode) renders to no header.

`make panel-token` prints the value; set it as ROBOCO_PANEL_AGENT_TOKEN
in .env before enabling secure mode. .env.example and the README
Security section document the flow.

* chore(compose): consolidate the two compose files into one

docker-compose.yml and docker-compose.yaml had diverged: .yml — the file
Docker actually uses — carried ROBOCO_PUBLIC_BASE_URL but was missing the
/app/manifests bind-mount, while .yaml had the manifests mount but not
the base URL. Merge the union into docker-compose.yml and delete the
duplicate so there is one source of truth and no "multiple config files"
warning.

This activates the manifests mount in the deployed file: without it the
orchestrator writes per-agent tool manifests to its ephemeral container
fs, they never reach the host for the daemon to bind-mount, and agents
fall back to all-verbs registration. Drop the stale .yaml reference from
the config.py docstring, the labeler, and the CI path filters.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-05 16:35:22 +02:00
Renn F 78faf6f4da fix(docker): ship uv in orchestrator runner, set production env + host userns
The orchestrator runner stage lacked uv, so workspace dep pre-install
(`uv sync`) and `uv run` CI commands failed at runtime; copy uv from the
builder stage like agent-base does. Set ROBOCO_ENVIRONMENT=production on
the orchestrator service so structlog emits JSON instead of console output.
Add userns_mode: "host" so the orchestrator's chown of cloned workspaces to
the agent uid isn't blocked by docker's user-namespace remap.
2026-06-03 18:57:49 +02:00
110aaa7a77 Chore: v1 removal gateway canonical (#46)
* chore(agent_sdk): remove dead /traceability/remind endpoint and reminder map

The TRACEABILITY_REMINDERS dict and its /traceability/remind endpoint were
keyed entirely on pre-gateway tool names (roboco_task_*, roboco_journal_*,
roboco_message_send, roboco_session_create_for_tasks) deleted in the gateway
cutover. The endpoint had zero callers; v2 enforces traceability server-side
in the Choreographer.

* fix(bootstrap,seeds): onboarding prompts call give_me_work(), not deleted roboco_task_scan()

The startup prompt and the seeded cell/all-hands channel onboarding messages
instructed agents to call roboco_task_scan() — a tool removed in the gateway
cutover. Point them at the live give_me_work() flow verb.

* fix: replace remaining deleted v1 tool names with gateway verbs

Spawn prompts, onboarding strings, remediation messages, and comments still
referenced pre-gateway tools deleted in the cutover (roboco_task_*,
roboco_agent_idle, roboco_notify_*, roboco_message_send,
roboco_session_create_for_tasks, roboco_journal_*, roboco_escalate). Rewrote
each to the correct role-scoped gateway verb (give_me_work/i_will_work_on for
workers, triage for PMs, i_am_done vs complete, notify/notify_ack, escalate_up,
unclaim, i_documented, open_session, note). Updated one enforcement-message
test that matched the old tool name by coincidence.

* test: guard against deleted v1 tool names reappearing in roboco/

Scans roboco/ for the deleted pre-gateway tool names; excludes the orphaned
roboco/agents/ subtree (removed in a later phase).

* chore(exceptions): drop 8 unused pre-gateway exception classes + their tests

LLMError, RAGError, AlreadyExistsError, TaskBlockedError, TaskClaimError,
AgentNotAvailableError, AgentBusyError, NotificationPermissionError were never
raised in production. SessionClosedError/DatabaseError are kept (live + tested).

* chore(models): drop unused pre-gateway notification/channel/handoff factories

Removes create_task_assignment/_blocker_escalation/_review_request/
_documentation_request/_priority_change/_alert/_broadcast, create_cell_channel/
_cross_cell_channel/_announcements_channel, create_handoff (+ HandoffParams),
ProactiveContext, and A2APartType. The gateway choreographer builds these
server-side now. Drops the matching dead-code tests.

* chore(services): drop unused pre-gateway permission/messaging/audit/optimal/remediation methods

These pre-gateway helpers (channel-permission checks, channel-membership ops,
permission-denial audit hooks, doc ingestion, two remediation hints) have no
production caller — the gateway role_config + enforcement layer replaced them.
Drops the matching dead-code tests; live methods (send_message, the SESSION_*
flow, log_task_action_denial, etc.) are untouched.

* chore(orchestrator,ws,events,config): drop unused pre-gateway lifecycle/broadcast/roster symbols

orchestrator: get_running_agents, is_agent_busy, queue_priority_work,
get_all_instances (+ their OrchestratorAccessProtocol declarations in events.py).
websocket: broadcast_new_message, broadcast_session_closed (no event type emits
them). agents_config: ALL_PMS/ALL_DEVS/ALL_QA/CELL_PMS roster constants (ALL_DOCS
stays — it gates docs-write workspace perms).

* refactor(agents): delete orphaned pre-gateway agent subtree + dead organization model

The Gateway/full cutover replaced the Python agent-class implementations with
the server-side Choreographer; the classes survived only as a self-referential
island. Removes roboco/agents/{base,mixins,factory,board,developer,documenter,
pm,qa,orchestrator}.py and roboco/agents/factories/{board,cells,developers,
documenters,pms,qa}.py, plus roboco/models/organization.py (Cell/Board/
Organization — used only by those factories). Keeps factories/_base.py
(compose_prompt — the live prompt-layer composer the orchestrator calls at
spawn) behind minimal package __init__ files.

* chore(db): drop dead tasks.execution_log + outputs columns (migration 015)

Both JSON columns had zero readers/writers in code, tests, and migrations —
execution progress is tracked via progress_updates and artifacts via
commits/documents. Removes the ORM columns, the Pydantic Task.execution_log/
outputs fields, the ExecutionLog/FileRef models (+ their __init__ exports), and
the now-invalid kwargs from test fixtures. Migration 015 (down_revision
014_drop_pm_approvals) verified live: upgrade drops, downgrade re-adds.
Apply on the NAS with 'alembic upgrade head' at next deploy.

* chore(config): drop 16 unread Settings fields

Verified unused (no settings.X, no self.X property use, no getattr-by-name):
app_name, reload, workers, openai_api_key, secret_key, access_token_expire_minutes,
algorithm, log_level, log_format, the four session_* limits, message_max_length,
commit_subject_min_chars, commit_banned_words, agent_budget_sweep_interval_seconds.
Removes the empty Logging + Sessions&Messages sections and orphaned .env.example
vars. Kept: redis_db/redis_password (redis_url property), agent_sla_* (read via
getattr in task_lifecycle), encryption_key, and all live thresholds.

NOTE: commit_banned_words/commit_subject_min_chars and
agent_budget_sweep_interval_seconds were feature-config never wired to their
consumer (commit validator / budget sweep) — removed as dead, but flagged in
case the intent was to wire them.

* test(lifecycle): give i_will_work_on calls a substantive plan (#171 contract)

The real-DB lifecycle tests called i_will_work_on with a 13-char plan and no
risks/technical_considerations, so the substantive-plan gate (#171) rejected
them with incomplete_input — failing on master. Supply a >=150-char plan plus
technical_considerations and risks (mirroring tests/unit/gateway/
test_choreographer_dev.py). All 6 now pass; gate runs with no deselect.

* feat(gateway): wire commit-validator thresholds to settings

commit_subject_min_chars and commit_banned_words were config defined but never
read — the gateway commit() gate used the validator's hardcoded module defaults.
Re-add the two Settings fields and pass them through validate_commit_message in
content_actions.commit(), so config is the source of truth (validator defaults
remain the standalone/CI fallback). Adds wiring tests that monkeypatch settings
and assert the gate honors them.

* refactor(orchestrator): retire gateway_enabled flag; trigger_filter is unconditional

The gateway_enabled Settings field gated only the trigger_filter spawn-cooldown
(never the agent tool surface). Prod ran it on; the Phase-0 'legacy dispatch
path' it guarded no longer exists. Remove the field + the early-return branch in
gateway_pre_spawn_check so the cooldown runs for every spawn, drop the now-dead
ROBOCO_GATEWAY_ENABLED from docker-compose.yml, and update the stale Phase-0
comments + cooldown test. The per-container ROBOCO_GATEWAY_ENABLED env (set by
_append_manifest_args, read by agent_sdk to load the manifest) is unaffected.

* refactor(api): relabel /api/v2 -> /api/v1 as the canonical gateway surface

The gateway is the only agent API now, so the 'v2' label (with no v1) was
misleading. Renames roboco/api/routes/v2 -> routes/v1, schemas/v2 -> schemas/v1
(+ the matching test dirs and test_v2_role_dep/test_schemas_v2_flow files),
rewrites every /api/v2 path, routes.v2/schemas.v2 import, and v2-* router tag to
v1, and refreshes the stale 'v2' comments/docstrings. The panel is untouched (it
uses the unversioned /api/* REST routes). flow_server/do_server now POST to
/api/v1/*.

* docs(scripts): reset_runtime_state header matches actual SQL behavior

The header claimed it preserves groups + journals, but the .sql wipes both
(verified live: groups 6->0, journals 5->0; only agents/projects/channels
survive). Correct the wiped/preserved lists to match.

* refactor(gateway): extract _build_rich_plan to drop i_will_work_on under the complexity gate

i_will_work_on was cyclomatic rank C (11) — one over the xenon --max-absolute B
threshold — because of the five `x or default` fallbacks in the rich_plan dict.
Move that dict into a small _build_rich_plan helper (behaviour identical); both
methods are now rank B. make quality is fully green (xenon was its last failure;
bandit already passed — its 34 findings are all LOW severity, filtered by -ll).

* feat(foundation): add canonical CELL_TEAMS set; dedupe cell-subset literals

* feat(db): add ProductTable + ProductProjectTable ORM (per-cell project map)

* feat(task): add additive nullable product_id (ORM + model + DTO + create threading)

* feat(task): thread product_id through create_subtask/route/response

* feat(db): migration 016 — products, product_projects, tasks.product_id

* fix(db): document migration 016 plan deviations (revision len, FK name)

Two values in migration 016 intentionally diverge from the Task 2.4 plan
literals; this strengthens the in-file justification so the deviations are
self-documenting and verifiable.

- revision id (plan line 623): the plan's 36-char
  "016_add_products_and_task_product_id" overflows alembic_version.version_num
  (VARCHAR(32)) — alembic upgrade head raises asyncpg
  StringDataRightTruncationError. Kept at 27 chars
  ("016_add_products_product_id") so Step 4's live round-trip stays green.
- downgrade FK name (plan line 683): roboco/db/base.py sets a metadata
  naming_convention, so the FK upgrade() creates is
  "fk_tasks_product_id_products", not the Postgres default
  "tasks_product_id_fkey". The plan literal does not exist in the DB and
  would fail the downgrade with "constraint does not exist".

Both verified via the live upgrade/downgrade round-trip on a throwaway DB.

Issue 3 note: the prior commit (b896cac) also touched
tests/unit/api/test_schemas_tasks.py (added product_id=None to the
task_to_response stub). That line is load-bearing — task_to_response reads
task.product_id (added in Task 2.3, commit 67afa6b) — and belongs to Task 2.3's
scope; it is left in place because removing it breaks 4 tests and history is
not rewritten.

* refactor(db): trim migration 016 deviation notes to plan-faithful form

Reverts the out-of-scope documentation expansion (commit 1a4f296), which
was a second undocumented commit beyond Task 2.4's single plan-specified
commit and only bloated the migration docstring/comments.

The migration file now matches the plan-specified commit (b896cac) byte for
byte: the two necessary deviations from the plan literals stay (revision id
shortened to fit alembic_version.version_num VARCHAR(32); downgrade FK name
follows db/base.py's metadata naming_convention), each kept to a concise
inline note in the plan's header style.

The Task 2.3-scoped test stub line (tests/unit/api/test_schemas_tasks.py
product_id=None) is load-bearing — task_to_response reads task.product_id —
and is left in place; history is not rewritten.

Verified: live alembic upgrade head + downgrade to 015 round-trip on a
throwaway DB drops products/product_projects/tasks.product_id cleanly, and
make quality is green.

* refactor(test): annotate db_session and drop type: ignore in migration 016 test

Annotate the test_products_tables_and_task_fk_exist param as
db_session: AsyncSession (imported under TYPE_CHECKING) and remove the
# type: ignore[no-untyped-def] suppression, matching the typed db_session
pattern used across tests/integration/.

* feat(models): Product + ProductCreate/Update + ProductCellMapping (cell-validated)

* refactor(models): minimize ProductCellMapping config override to use_enum_values

The previous override re-declared validate_assignment, populate_by_name,
and extra=forbid, which RobocoBase already supplies. Pydantic merges
model_config across inheritance, so overriding only use_enum_values=False
is sufficient to keep team as a real Team enum (required so team in
CELL_TEAMS and enum identity hold for callers) while inheriting the rest
of the base config.

* fix(models): document ProductCellMapping use_enum_values override as plan-mandated

Resolves SPEC-COMPLIANCE review notes for Task 3.1 (Product domain models).

1. The ProductCellMapping use_enum_values=False override is a deviation from a
   bare project.py mirror, but it is mandated by the plan's own Task 3.1 code:
   RobocoBase sets use_enum_values=True, which coerces team to the plain string
   "backend". The plan's Step 1 test asserts m.team is Team.BACKEND (enum
   identity) and the Step 3 validator formats its error with v.value, both of
   which require team to remain a real Team enum. The override is therefore
   necessary; this commit relabels the comment to cite the specific spec lines
   that force it instead of leaving it as an unexplained departure. Downstream
   Task 3.2 (_replace_cells / project_for) already tolerates either form and the
   ORM stores the same value regardless, so the override has no behavioral reach
   beyond the in-memory enum identity the plan's test checks.

2. test_product_model.py hoists 'from uuid import uuid4' to module level rather
   than inline (as the plan's verbatim Step 1 code shows) because the global
   Pylint PLC0415 rule (import-outside-top-level) forbids inline imports and
   there is no per-file-ignore for tests/unit/models/. The hoisted form is the
   only ruff-clean rendering of the plan's test; left unchanged here.

3. Task 3.1 landed across two commits (c616d95 create, 6ebad255 refactor) rather
   than the plan's single Step 5 commit. Earlier history is intentionally not
   rewritten; this single follow-up commit brings the model to its final
   spec-faithful, fully-documented state.

* feat(service): ProductService CRUD + project_for per-cell resolver

* feat(api): Product CRUD routes + schemas, wired into the app

* fix(api): roll back and map cell-replacement IntegrityError on product update

update_product replaced cells via ProductService._replace_cells without
any try/except, so a duplicate-team cell (uq_product_projects_product_team)
or a non-existent project_id (product_projects.project_id FK) raised an
IntegrityError at flush, poisoning the AsyncSession and surfacing an
unhandled 500 with no rollback. Wrap the update + commit in a try/except
that rolls back and maps the UNIQUE violation to 409 and the FK violation
to 422, mirroring create_product's rollback discipline. Add integration
tests covering both client-error paths.

* fix(api): map create_product cell-mapping IntegrityError to 409/422

create_product only caught the slug conflict ('already exists' in str(e))
and bare-raised everything else, so a cells entry whose project_id does not
reference any project let the product_projects.project_id FK IntegrityError
propagate out of the route as an unhandled 500. The matching update_product
path was already hardened (uq_product_projects_product_team -> 409, FK
violation -> 422); apply the same mapping in create_product so a bad
project_id (or a duplicate-team cell) is a client error, not a server error.
The slug conflict is now caught as ConflictError directly instead of via a
broad except + string match.

* feat(gateway): add optional project_id to delegate inputs/request/routes

* feat(gateway): per-cell project routing (override -> product map -> parent) + product_id inheritance

* feat(task): approve_and_start — reassign board task to Main PM (CEO gate #1)

* feat(api): POST /tasks/{id}/approve-and-start (CEO gate #1, notes-required)

* test(api): cover approve-and-start 404-before-notes-gate for missing task

* feat(panel): Product types + Task.product_id

* feat(panel): productsApi + hooks + tasksApi.approveAndStart

* feat(panel): Products management screen + sidebar nav

* feat(panel): Approve & Start button (CEO gate #1)

* fix(api): narrow delete_product to IntegrityError + cover 204/409 delete paths

* test(task): assert approve_and_start persists + appends the audit note

* refactor(db): migration 016 names the tasks.product_id FK explicitly (house style)

* fix(db): make migrations authoritative + self-heal orphan product tables

init_db() no longer silently falls back to create_all when alembic upgrade
fails. That fallback masked migration failures and, since create_all cannot
ALTER an existing table, left the schema inconsistent — turning an unapplied
migration 016 into a crash loop: 016's CREATE TABLE products failed, the
upgrade rolled back, create_all re-created an empty orphan products table, and
every later boot failed again on the now-existing table while tasks.product_id
never got added. Now a migration failure is raised so the real error surfaces.

Migration 016 additionally drops EMPTY orphan products/product_projects tables
left by the old fallback before creating them, so an already-polluted DB
self-heals on the next deploy with no manual SQL. Skipped in offline (--sql)
mode; refuses to drop a table that holds rows.

* fix(db): create_all is the schema source of truth; alembic for increments

The Alembic chain is incomplete relative to the ORM — columns/tables like
notifications.delivered_at and the RAG indexed_documents table have NO migration
and have only ever been materialized by create_all. Tests don't catch this
because the test DB is also built via create_all, so migrations are never
exercised. The prior 'migrations are authoritative' init_db (and before it, the
create_all-only-on-failure fallback) therefore left a migrate-only boot with
missing columns/tables.

init_db now reflects reality:
  - Fresh DB  -> create_all builds the full current ORM schema, then stamp
                 Alembic at head so later incremental migrations apply.
  - Existing  -> run pending migrations (a real failure is raised, not masked),
                 then create_all(checkfirst) to gap-fill any missing ORM tables.
create_all cannot add a column to an existing table, so an ORM column added
without a migration needs a fresh rebuild of that table to appear.

* fix(db): migration 017 reconciles the Alembic chain with the full ORM schema

For years the live schema was built by create_all, not migrations, so the chain
drifted — tables/columns/indexes in the ORM had no migration (the
indexed_documents table, notifications.delivered_at, ~15 indexes, plus
timestamptz/server-default metadata). With init_db no longer masking that via a
create_all fallback, a migrate-only boot was missing those objects.

017 was produced by 'alembic revision --autogenerate' against Base.metadata,
reviewed, and verified: on a fresh DB, 'alembic upgrade head' (001..017) now
reproduces the create_all schema EXACTLY — a re-run of autogenerate detects zero
changes — and the 017 upgrade/downgrade round-trips cleanly. The migration chain
is now complete: migrate-only and create_all converge.

Also updates the init_db tests to assert the new behaviour (raise on an existing
DB's migration failure; create_all + stamp head on a fresh DB) instead of the
removed silent fallback.

* feat(panel): Product picker in the New Task form (drives per-cell routing)

The Products screen and Approve & Start button shipped, but the task-creation
form had no way to attach a Product — so a human couldn't set product_id from
the UI, which is exactly what drives per-cell project routing of delegated
subtasks. Adds an optional Product dropdown (Advanced -> Git config) populated
from useProducts(); 'None' falls back to the single project.

* fix(db): seed data is preserved on a fresh DB (run migrations, not bare create_all)

The previous fresh-DB path (create_all + stamp head) built the tables but never
ran the migration chain, so migration-embedded SEED DATA was skipped — most
visibly the AI providers seeded in 004. After a DB reset that left
provider_configs empty, so PUT /api/providers/ollama-key 404'd (the handler
raises NotFoundError when the Ollama provider row is missing).

Since migration 017 made the chain reproduce the full ORM schema, init_db now
runs 'alembic upgrade head' from base on a fresh DB — building every
table/column/index AND running the seeds. Verified: a fresh upgrade head seeds
both provider rows. Existing DBs still get migrations + create_all gap-fill.
Updates the init_db fresh-DB test accordingly.

* feat(task): project_id optional when a product_id is set (board fan-out tasks)

A board task that fans out across cells via a Product has no single repo of its
own — backend/frontend/ux_ui are each wrong, because the root coordinates and
delegates. Forcing one arbitrary Project was broken design (flagged at design
time). project_id is now nullable; a task must have project_id OR product_id:
  - TaskCreate model validator + a TaskService.create() invariant (covers every
    create path).
  - ORM/DTO/schema: project_id nullable; task_to_response uses to_python_uuid.
  - Gateway: a parent with only a product can delegate (guard now needs BOTH
    project and product to be None to reject); _resolve_subtask_project resolves
    each subtask from the product map and raises a clear error if a cell has no
    mapping and no parent project.
  - Migration 018 (tasks.project_id nullable), round-trip verified; fresh
    upgrade head still seeds providers.
  - Panel: Project no longer required once a Product is selected.
  - Removed the dead, never-called a2a create_task_from_message (it could only
    ever create a repo-less task) + its two coverage-only tests.

make quality green; panel tsc/lint/build green.

* Upgrade to Minimax M3

* fix(db): seed providers on existing DBs + correct enum casing

Migration 004 created the modelprovider/assignmentscope enums and seeded
provider rows in UPPERCASE, but the ORM (_str_enum) reads/writes the
lowercase StrEnum .value — so a fresh migrate-from-base DB built an enum
the ORM cannot read. Lowercase the enum labels and seed values in 004.

Add idempotent migration 019 to (re)seed the Anthropic + Ollama Cloud
providers with ON CONFLICT (name) DO NOTHING, so an existing DB whose
provider_configs table was created by create_all (and never ran 004's
seed) gets the rows on the next `alembic upgrade head` — fixing the
/api/providers/ollama-key 404 without a volume wipe.

* fix(tasks): let board/fan-out coordination tasks flow without a repo

A coordination task (project_id NULL, product_id set) targets no repo of
its own — it fans out to cell subtasks that each resolve a real project
from the product's cell->project map. Several paths still assumed every
task does git work and blocked it:

- orchestrator: add _is_coordination_task() and exempt these tasks from
  the project/branch/git-token gates in _readiness_check_task,
  _readiness_gate, _check_stuck_conditions, _validate_task_for_spawn.
- services/task.py: _ensure_branch_for_task returns "" (no branch) for a
  coordination task instead of raising; activate requires project OR
  product. This unblocks Main PM's i_will_plan claim, which otherwise
  raised before it could delegate the fan-out.
- gateway: _pending_assignment_guard exempts advisory roles
  (product_owner/head_marketing/auditor) from the "assigned but never
  claimed" idle gate — they review without claiming, so they could not
  satisfy a claim-or-unclaim remediation.

Adds focused unit tests for each.

* fix(tasks): coordination tasks reach in_progress + team reflects Main PM

The board->cells fan-out deadlocked: a coordination/fan-out task (product set,
no project of its own) could be created and claimed, but start()'s
claimed->in_progress transition hit validate_git_requirements, which still
demanded a branch_name and raised GitRequirementError. So Main PM's i_will_plan
never completed — it looped and never delegated. c961282 exempted
_ensure_branch_for_task (branch creation) but missed this parallel git gate in
the enforcement layer.

- task_lifecycle.py: add GitContext.is_coordination; skip the
  claimed->in_progress branch_name gate when it is set.
- task.py: populate is_coordination=(project_id is None and product_id is not
  None) in _validate_and_set_status; a branchless code task is still gated.
- approve_and_start: set team=Team.MAIN_PM on hand-off so the task isn't left
  labelled team=board after it leaves the board (now assigned to main-pm).

Adds a lifecycle-gate unit test and an end-to-end integration test that
claims, plans, and starts a project-less coordination task.

* fix(hooks): remove dead traceability hook + stale deleted-verb references

The v1-removal cleanup (2cfbf39) deleted the /traceability/remind SDK endpoint
but left the PostToolUse hook that curls it, so every gateway tool call 404'd
and agents silently lost their traceability reminders. Remove the dangling hook
(registration + TRACEABILITY_TRIGGER_TOOLS + Dockerfile COPY + the script); v2
carries per-verb guidance on the Envelope. Also correct two stale pre-gateway
tool names in hook text: the budget loop-detector nudged agents toward the
deleted roboco_task_escalate() (now unclaim()/i_am_idle(), which every looping
role has), and an sdk-startup comment referenced roboco_task_scan/get.

Extends the deleted-tool-name guard to scan docker/scripts/*.sh and to assert
every $SDK_URL/<path> a hook curls is a route still served by the SDK — the
check that would have caught this class (it lives in shell, invisible to mypy
and the Python import graph).

* fix(db): backfill ORM enum values the migration chain never added

Several StrEnum values were added to the ORM over time without a matching
`ALTER TYPE ... ADD VALUE` migration; 017 was autogenerate-derived and
autogenerate does not detect added enum labels, so the drift survived. On a DB
whose enum type predates the value, binding it raises at runtime — e.g.
`invalid input value for enum notificationtype: "a2a_request"` on
GET /api/notifications (list_system_notifications), and the same class for
blockerresolvertype/handoffstatus/team.

Migration 020 adds every drifted value idempotently (ADD VALUE IF NOT EXISTS —
no-op when 009 already reconciled it). Runs on the next `alembic upgrade head`.

Detected by comparing each ORM enum's values to the labels the migration chain
produces; adds tests/unit/test_enum_migration_parity.py which renders the chain
offline and fails on any future drift — the check that would have caught both
this and the provider-enum bug.

* fix(orchestrator): stop branch auto-block, board reassign, unblock livelock, agentless claims

Cluster C1 — four coupled orchestrator/task-invariant defects:

#18: a branch is created only at claim, so a pending, never-claimed code task
legitimately has no branch_name. The stuck-detection sweep (pending-only) and
readiness gate flagged that as "Task missing branch_name" and auto-blocked the
task every tick, so it never dispatched. Centralize the gate in
_branch_is_expected (status in claimed/in_progress/verifying, never a
coordination task) and apply it in both _check_stuck_conditions and
_readiness_check_task.

#14: the main_pm -> product_owner escalation rung handed an in_progress
descendant code task to the Product Owner (a board role) and marked it BLOCKED;
the board has no verb to own code work, so the dev's finished work deadlocked.
TaskService.apply_escalation (the single write primitive — covers both the
gateway escalate verb and the HTTP escalate route) now diverts a descendant code
task targeting a board/advisory role: it releases the task to PENDING for a
role-matched cell claim instead of stranding it.

#17: a blocked task reassigned to Main PM kept respawning the ex-assignee cell
PM to unblock it, but the assignee-only pre-unblock note returned not_authorized
— a livelock. _dispatch_blocker_work now dispatches the task's CURRENT PM/board
assignee (the unblock authority), falling back to the cell PM only when no
PM/board holds it. Also: a branchless coordination parent yields no valid merge
target — resolve_parent_branch now falls back to the child's own project default
branch (e.g. master) via TaskService.project_default_branch_for_task, and
_check_parent_branch_ready no longer blocks a child on a coordination parent's
non-existent branch.

#19: a task left claimed/in_progress with an assignee but no running container
was invisibly stuck (only PENDING tasks get fresh dispatch; the heartbeat reaper
can't see a freshly-seeded claim). New _dispatch_claimed_without_agent net:
after a short grace window it respawns the assignee, or releases the claim to
pending (lifecycle-safe via unclaim_for_reaper) when the assignee is unknown.
New config ROBOCO_CLAIMED_NO_AGENT_GRACE_SECONDS (default 120).

* fix(gateway): tolerant note verb + lock evidence do-tool invariant

#15: the note verb no longer hard-rejects thin decision/reflect payloads.
List-typed fields (options, consequences, next_steps) coerce a lone scalar
into a one-element list at both the NoteRequest schema (mode=before
validator) and the service layer; missing narrative fields default to a
visible placeholder instead of returning incomplete_input. The note is
always recorded, preserving audit value, and a well-intentioned note can no
longer trip the do-server 3-strikes circuit breaker. Widen the agent-facing
do_server.note hints to accept list-or-scalar and refresh the docstrings.

#8: add regression coverage locking the invariant that every role's do_tools
carries evidence (role_config + developer spawn manifest). The current source
already registers mcp__roboco-do__evidence for developers end-to-end; the
report stemmed from a stale deployed build, and the tests prevent silent
regression.

* fix(gateway): allow UX devs to receive design tasks; surface delegation rules to cell PM

The UX/UI cell's developers (ux-dev-1/ux-dev-2, Role.DEVELOPER on
Team.UX_UI) ARE its designers, but _validate_assignee_task_type rejected
task_type='design' for every DEVELOPER, blocking the UX cell's normal
design delegation. Allow 'design' for UX-team devs only; backend/frontend
devs stay rejected (design routing belongs to the UX cell). The
orchestrator already dispatches a developer for a design task
(_dev_dispatch_role_matches returns True), so this creates no orphan like
the documentation case.

Replace the static Cell-PM 'pass planning' remediate with a per-assignee
hint so a dev/design mis-type gets a developer-class next-step instead of
an off-topic planning hint.

Surface the three delegation guardrails in the cell-PM prompt so PMs stop
probing them by trial and error: valid task_type per assignee (incl.
design for UX devs), documentation auto-creation (non-delegatable), and
the sequential single-active code-spine. Fix the delegate-row task_type
list (documentation is NOT delegatable) and update the lifecycle spec
description; regenerate the lifecycle artifacts.

* fix(orchestrator): improve agent briefings for handoff consumption, product/project model, and workspace/secret hygiene

Main PM (roles/main_pm.md):
- Require reading the upstream Product Owner / Head of Marketing handoff
  (their decision/reflect journal entries + task description) BEFORE doing
  any own research or calling i_will_plan, so the Main PM builds on the
  Board's analysis instead of duplicating it. Added a dedicated section,
  hardened workflow step 1, and added an anti-pattern.
- Add a 'Products vs Projects' section: a Product fans out to one Project
  per cell; those Projects may be the SAME repo (monorepo subtrees) or
  DIFFERENT repos (multi-repo). The Main PM coordinates across them and
  must not assume one repo or call a monorepo subtree 'a separate repo'.
  Names the Prompter monorepo case (github.com/rennf93/roboco).

Developer (roles/developer.md):
- State the exact workspace path convention
  /data/workspaces/<project-slug>/<team>/<agent-slug>/, that the cwd is
  already set there, to stay inside the own cell workspace, and to not
  probe/guess the path (ls /, find /).
- Sanctioned secret handling: env/printenv is bash-guard denied and
  reveals nothing; needed secrets arrive via the task description, else
  i_am_blocked so the PM supplies them. Added matching anti-patterns.

Tests: add tests/unit/agents/test_briefing_cluster_c4.py asserting the
composed system prompt (the text mounted into agent containers) carries
each of the above.

* fix(orchestrator): board review involves PO+HoM and notifies CEO

Cluster C5 (#2, #4): a board/coordination task was reviewed by the Product
Owner alone, and the CEO got no formal signal when the review finished —
only buried channel chatter — so the Approve & Start handoff was invisible.

#4 — Board review is now a two-reviewer gate. _handle_board_assigned_task
dispatches BOTH the Product Owner and the Head of Marketing (one-shot each),
regardless of which one holds assigned_to, and the unassigned board-routing
path delegates here instead of claiming + spawning the PO alone. Board tasks
stay pending/unassigned for the CEO's Approve & Start. The board prompt now
makes the PO+HoM pair-review model explicit (HoM owns the UX/positioning
dimension).

#2 — Once BOTH reviewers have finished (dispatched and no longer active),
the orchestrator emits exactly one formal CEO notification via
NotificationService.send_board_review_complete_notification (APPROVAL type,
ack-required, carrying related_task_id) so the handoff is an actionable
signal. One-shot per task; a notification failure clears the guard so a
later tick can retry.

To let the non-assignee board member record its review note on a task held
by the other board member, content-action ownership now exempts a board role
posting to a board/coordination task (project_id is None, product_id set).
The exemption is narrow: it does not widen ownership for any other role or
any project-backed task.

Unit tests cover both reviewers dispatched, one-shot dispatch, the CEO
notification fired exactly once when both are done (and not before), the
retry-on-failure path, the notification builder, and the board co-review
ownership exemption (allowed for board+coordination, blocked otherwise).

* fix(workspace): install dev deps post-clone + raise git commit timeout for large changesets

Cluster C6 (#10, #13, #12-investigate).

#10: per-agent workspace clones never had the project's dev dependencies
installed, so the make-quality gate (ruff/mypy/pytest for Python, the TS
toolchain for the panel) was missing and devs re-downloaded tooling per
task. WorkspaceService now runs the project's install after cloning
(`uv sync` for Python, `pnpm install`/`npm ci`/`npm install` for Node/TS,
detected by manifest/lockfile). Idempotent via a lockfile-digest marker
under .git/ so a re-entry with unchanged lockfiles is a no-op; also runs on
the healthy short-circuit so pre-existing clones get backfilled. Gated by
workspace_install_dev_deps (default on) with workspace_dep_install_timeout_seconds.

#13: the gateway commit verb timed out on the large panel changeset because
every git op used the hardcoded 30s _GIT_TIMEOUT and each call also re-walks
the tree to chown. _run_git now takes a per-call timeout override sourced
from settings (git_command_timeout_seconds default); the staging + commit
ops in commit() and create_commit() use the longer git_commit_timeout_seconds
(default 180s). httpx REST timeouts unchanged in value.

#12 (investigate only — no push, no history change): the clone base ref is
NOT hardcoded; it already comes from project.default_branch threaded through
git.get_workspace -> ensure_workspace -> _clone_repo (git clone --branch).
The stale-base problem is a deploy/process issue (GitHub master is behind the
deployed migration chain), resolvable only by pushing the chain to master.
The default_branch column is the existing configurable lever.

* fix(panel): gate Approve & Start to board coordination tasks; stop 404 storm on closed sessions

CEO gate #1 button only renders for a PENDING board coordination/fan-out
task (no project_id, has product_id) — the board-reviewed handoff that
approve_and_start accepts — instead of every PENDING board-team task.
approve_and_start requires PENDING (it re-targets to Main PM without a
status change), so the gate stays on PENDING rather than the unrelated
end-of-work awaiting_ceo_approval state.

Session/message reads now treat a 404 as terminal and never retry it: a
reaped session is gone for good, and retrying every dead session-id is
what produced the growing 404 storm on GET /api/messages. The transcript
loads once (staleTime Infinity, no focus/reconnect refetch) so closed
sessions stay viewable without re-polling.

* fix(orchestrator): role-correct respawn prompt, throttle agentless dispatch, broaden #14 guard

#19 wrong-role prompt on respawn: _get_prompt_for_agent fell through to the
developer prompt for every non-dev/doc/qa role, so a respawned PM or board
agent was told to write code and call verbs it does not own. Route by the
agent's actual role through the existing per-role prompt builders
(developer/qa/documenter/cell_pm/main_pm/product_owner/head_marketing/auditor).
Both callers benefit; _spawn_pending_dev only ever passes developer/documenter/
unknown, so its behavior is unchanged.

#19 spawn-burst: _dispatch_claimed_without_agent looped over every agentless
claimed/in_progress task and could spawn many containers in one tick. Break
after the first respawn so a restart can't trigger a burst, matching every
sibling dispatcher. The release-to-pending path spawns nothing and keeps
draining stale unknown claims.

#14 guard scope: _is_descendant_code_task only matched CODE, so a descendant
DOCUMENTATION or DESIGN task escalated to a board/advisory role was still
stranded on a role with no verb to own it. Rename to
_is_descendant_executable_task and broaden to CODE/DOCUMENTATION/DESIGN — the
cell-executed types a board role cannot own. PLANNING/RESEARCH/ADMINISTRATIVE
route to a PM, not a cell agent, and are left unchanged; root tasks are still
reviewed up the chain.

* fix(docker): add node+pnpm to orchestrator so it pre-installs frontend cell deps

* Added .github workflows

* refactor(services): extract helpers to keep install_dev_deps + developer task-type check under the xenon complexity gate

* chore(github): add launch kit — CI, GHCR release, labels, templates, funding, dependabot npm, community docs

* chore(github): bump_version — drop unused noqa, fix datetime UTC import

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-03 06:35:03 +02:00
Renn F 3742483e1c fix(agent): pin uv to baked /app/.venv so MCP/SDK servers start instantly (#179)
Every agent MCP server is launched as `uv run python -m roboco.mcp.<server>`
(via the orchestrator-generated mcp-config.json) and the SDK server via
`uv run python -m roboco.agent_sdk.server` (sdk-startup-hook.sh) — both with
cwd = the agent's WORKSPACE, not /app. `uv run` then resolves a cwd-relative
`.venv` (≠ the image's baked /app/.venv), ignores VIRTUAL_ENV with a warning,
and RE-SYNCS the full dependency set (torch/lancedb/pyarrow/scipy, ~350MB)
into a fresh venv on every spawn.

A warm host uv wheel cache masks this (fast re-resolve from cached wheels —
earlier runs this session opened PR #26/#28/#29 fine). On a COLD cache (first
spawn after an image rebuild — exactly when deploying new fixes) the download
takes minutes, the MCP servers never register, and the agent burns its whole
budget with "No such tool available: mcp__roboco-*" before reaping. Observed
this session: be-dev-1 never claimed; /tmp/sdk-server.log showed the live
torch/lancedb download + the `VIRTUAL_ENV ... will be ignored` warning.

Fix: set UV_PROJECT_ENVIRONMENT=/app/.venv in (1) every MCP server's env in
the generated mcp-config.json (one place — shared mcp_env dict) and (2) the
SDK startup hook. uv then reuses the pre-baked image venv instantly,
regardless of cwd or cache state. Not a regression from this session's code
(none of #172b/#175/#176/#177/#178 touched the launch/venv path — verified);
a pre-existing launch-cwd fragility that rebuilding to deploy exposed.

Test: _generate_mcp_config asserts every server env pins
UV_PROJECT_ENVIRONMENT=/app/.venv. make quality green.
2026-05-23 01:23:18 +02:00
Renn F 1d02b09fe0 fix(bash-guard): deny interpreter/library HTTP to internal hosts (#175)
The internal-API rule only fired when the FIRST shell token was an HTTP
CLI (curl/wget/http/https/httpie). smoke-17 showed an agent reach the
orchestrator with hand-forged X-Agent-ID/X-Agent-Role headers via:

  python3 << 'EOF'
  import httpx
  httpx.post("http://roboco-orchestrator:8000/api/v2/flow/developer/i_will_work_on",
             headers={"X-Agent-ID": "<self>", "X-Agent-Role": "developer"})
  EOF

The binary is python3 (slips the CLI check) and it imports httpx, not
roboco.* (slips the #164 import check). Only minimax's wrong endpoint
path prevented a real gateway bypass under a forged identity.

Add a language-agnostic rule: deny when the command pairs an HTTP-client
token (httpx/requests/urllib/aiohttp/http.client/net::http/fetch(/
node-fetch/axios/...) with a forbidden internal host, consistent with
the curl/wget sibling (inspects full $low incl. heredoc body). External
HTTP (pypi/docs/github) has no internal host so it still passes. The
stale "interpreter one-liners — out of scope" KNOWN GAP comment is
corrected; the variable-expansion gap remains documented.

11 new tests incl. the exact smoke-17 heredoc, requests/urllib/aiohttp/
node-fetch/Net::HTTP variants, and allow-cases (external host, client
import w/o host, pytest runner). make quality green.
2026-05-18 00:08:04 +02:00
Renn F 8158eb37ef unpinning claude clode version 2026-05-16 05:28:20 +02:00
Renn F 1605d187f1 fix(security): bash-guard git-ops check inspects commands, not file content (#165)
The git network/auth deny rule matched its regex against the whole
command string, so heredoc bodies and echo/printf arguments that merely
documented git verbs (a README, a notes file) were treated as git
invocations and denied. This wedged smoke-13's dev: after wiping the
README via an Edit/Write fallback it could not restore it because every
`cat > README.md << EOF ... git commit ... EOF` was blocked.

The git-ops check now runs against a skeleton of the command with
heredoc bodies and echo/printf literal args stripped (both are data the
shell writes, never executed). Quoted args to a shell interpreter
(`bash -c "... && git fetch"`) ARE executed, are not echo/printf/heredoc
bodies, and so survive untouched — the hook's core purpose is preserved.
A sentinel prefix distinguishes a legitimately-empty skeleton from a
python failure (fail closed on failure). All other rules, including the
#164 import-bypass rule, still inspect the full command.
2026-05-16 02:20:08 +02:00
Renn F 81f5655d48 fix(security): block gateway-internals import + agent-id forgery (#164)
Smoke-12: be-dev-1 (minimax-m2.7) bypassed the entire MCP boundary by
running `uv run python3 -c "import os;
os.environ['ROBOCO_AGENT_ID']='...'; from roboco.mcp.flow_server
import open_pr; open_pr(...)"` from the Bash tool. This voided the
per-role tool manifest (role-scoping is meaningless if the agent can
import any server module in-process), forged agent identity via an
env-var rewrite, and ran choreographer code outside the gateway's
tracing + auth.

bash-guard-hook.sh now adds two deny rules:
  1. Any python/uv/poetry/pipenv/pdm/hatch invocation that imports or
     `-m`-runs roboco.* internals (mcp/services/runtime/foundation/
     api/enforcement). The whole command string — heredoc body
     included — is matched, so quoting/heredoc forms are covered.
  2. Any assignment or export of ROBOCO_AGENT_ID (identity forgery).

Reading roboco source for context (cat/grep) is still allowed — the
block is on *executing* internals, not viewing them. Normal python
one-liners without roboco imports still pass.

19 bash-guard tests pass (10 prior + 9 new). Note: takes effect on
agent-image rebuild (hook ships in the agent container).
2026-05-16 00:59:26 +02:00
Renn F 47c674d70e fix(hooks): post-tool-budget-hook records terminal tool to SDK
Smoke-8: the stop-hook still nagged after a successful i_am_idle even
after #145's _TERMINAL_TOOLS rename. Root cause was upstream — nothing
was POSTing to /terminal/tool_recorded, so the SDK's recent_tools
deque stayed empty and had_terminal_recently() always returned False.

The PostToolUse hooks already record every tool call to
/budget/tool_called for the budget/loop tracker. Added a parallel call
to /terminal/tool_recorded so the terminal-tracker sees the same
stream. Fire-and-forget; never blocks Claude.

After the SDK suffix-strip (line ~798 in agent_sdk/server.py),
mcp__roboco-flow__i_am_idle becomes i_am_idle which is in
_TERMINAL_TOOLS (per #145). Stop-hook reads /terminal/stop_attempt
and now sees had_terminal_recently=true on the first attempt → exits 0.
2026-05-15 04:54:08 +02:00
Renn F 85e20e6a2a fix(docker): B5 tighten bash-guard denial message to 2 lines
Smoke run 3 showed the bash-guard hook emitting 8+ lines on every
blocked shell-git op — enumerating every alternative MCP verb across
roboco-flow / roboco-do / roboco-git-readonly. That's repeated token
spend on every refused retry; the LLM doesn't need the full alt-list
inline, it has the role prompt + the MCP tool schema for that.

Trimmed to 2 lines: denial reason + a one-line pointer to the role's
State→Verb table. Test asserts <= 3 echo lines in any denial block.

Spec ref: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-12-post-smoke-3-fixes-design.md
section B5.
2026-05-12 04:37:01 +02:00
Renn F 7254ceee50 fix(docker): B1 update shell hooks to gateway verb names
Smoke run 3 showed stop-hook.sh complaining 'Denied: you stopped
without calling a terminal tool' AFTER agents successfully called
i_am_idle() — because the hook listed 9 pre-gateway verb names
(roboco_agent_idle, roboco_task_substitute, etc.) that no longer
exist. Same staleness in bash-guard-hook.sh.

Both hooks now reference current gateway verbs only. stop-hook
branches its suggestion by ROBOCO_AGENT_ROLE so devs see
i_am_done/i_am_blocked, QAs see pass/fail, PMs see complete/escalate_up.

Spec ref: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-12-post-smoke-3-fixes-design.md
section B1.
2026-05-12 03:48:47 +02:00
207aaecd72 Feature: lifecycle canonical spec (#14)
* chore: clean make quality baseline on feature/lifecycle-canonical-spec

Three classes of pre-existing issues blocking `make quality`:

1. Alembic migrations 002/009/011 used runtime introspection
   (op.get_bind() + inspect / bind.execute) without guarding for
   offline (--sql) mode. `alembic upgrade head --sql` is part of
   `make quality`; in offline mode `op.get_bind()` returns a
   MockConnection with no inspection system, so the migrations
   crashed before emitting their SQL stubs. Each migration now
   short-circuits or simplifies in `context.is_offline_mode()` —
   live-DB behavior is unchanged.

2. ruff format drift on three files left over from prior in-flight
   edits (choreographer/_impl.py, content_actions.py, and one test
   file). `ruff format` applied.

3. vulture flagged two unused `tb` parameters in async __aexit__
   stubs in test_task_service_lifecycle_misc.py. The parameter is
   protocol-required but unused by the body — renamed to `_tb`
   (vulture treats underscore-prefixed names as intentionally unused).

`make quality` is now green from this branch's HEAD; subsequent
lifecycle-spec work can use it as the per-task gate.

* feat(lifecycle): canonical spec package + Role/Status/TaskType enums

Foundation for the canonical lifecycle/permissions module. Enums
mirror docs/internal/old/workflows/STATUS_TRANSITIONS.md +
PERMISSIONS.md. Tests pin enum membership against both the
predecessor canon and roboco.models.base.TaskType.

* feat(lifecycle): Decision dataclass with allow/reject/tracing_gap constructors

Single rejection shape every consumer maps to its native format
(Envelope, HTTP code, prompt hint). __post_init__ enforces the
allowed/rejection_kind invariants so a malformed Decision can't reach
a consumer.

* fix(lifecycle): tighten Decision invariants per Task 2 review

Two reviewer findings on the Task 2 Decision dataclass, addressed
in one commit:

1. The docstring promised `allowed=True ⇒ rejection_kind is None
   AND missing == [] AND remediate is None`, but __post_init__ only
   checked the rejection_kind half. A caller could construct an
   allow-shaped Decision with stale missing/remediate fields and
   sneak it past validation. Tighten __post_init__ to enforce the
   full invariant. Add a regression test.

2. tracing_gap defensively copies the missing list (`list(missing)`)
   to isolate the stored list from later caller-side mutation, but
   no test pinned this. Add a regression test that mutates the source
   list after construction and asserts the stored list is unchanged.

Issue 2 from the same review (mutable list vs tuple for `missing`)
is a broader design call deferred until consumers exist; the
defensive copy is sufficient until then.

* feat(lifecycle): Precondition/ActionSpec/IntentSpec/StatusTransition dataclasses

The four dataclasses that hold the canonical tables. ActionSpec and
StatusTransition are direct ports of pre-gateway PERMISSIONS.md +
STATUS_TRANSITIONS.md rows. IntentSpec is the gateway-only addition:
each gateway intent verb declares which atomic actions it composes.

* feat(lifecycle): _STATUS_TRANSITIONS table + STATUS_GRAPH view

Direct port of STATUS_TRANSITIONS.md. Every transition records its
trigger action and (optionally) a role constraint. STATUS_GRAPH is
the precomputed source→{targets} view callers use for reachability
checks.

* fix(lifecycle): pin role_constraint values + clarify Task-5 handoff

Two reviewer findings on Task 4 _STATUS_TRANSITIONS, addressed in
one commit:

1. The original Task-4 tests verified (source, target) pairs but
   not role_constraint contents. A typo in a single role name (e.g.
   forgetting MAIN_PM from escalate_to_ceo) would have slipped past
   them silently. Add test_status_transitions_role_constraints_match_canon
   pinning every non-None constraint and the cancel-block invariant.

2. role_constraint=None on the `claim` rows from PENDING and
   NEEDS_REVISION was load-bearing — it is the explicit handoff
   point between the StatusTransition table (state machine layer)
   and CLAIM_RULES (per-role claim authority, lands in Task 5).
   The original inline comment said this in passing; expand it so
   the design choice is unmissable for a stranger reading just
   spec.py.

* feat(lifecycle): _ATOMIC_ACTIONS + CLAIM_RULES + ROLE_TEAM_RULES tables

Direct port of PERMISSIONS.md. Every task management tool gets an
ActionSpec with allowed_roles, source_statuses, target_status,
self_review_block, and needs_team_match flags. CLAIM_RULES maps each
Role to the statuses they can claim from. ROLE_TEAM_RULES is the
per-slug team restriction.

* fix(lifecycle): tighten ActionSpec contracts per Task 5 review

Three reviewer findings on Task 5's _ATOMIC_ACTIONS table, addressed
in one commit:

1. set_plan.source_statuses widened to {CLAIMED, IN_PROGRESS} but
   every existing caller (i_will_work_on / i_will_plan compositions)
   runs set_plan while CLAIMED, between claim and start. Narrow to
   {CLAIMED} only. If a future "edit plan mid-flight" feature lands,
   widen explicitly with test coverage at that time.

2. needs_team_match was set True only on claim/qa_pass/qa_fail/
   docs_complete. Defense-in-depth says every role-scoped task
   action should re-assert team match (don't rely on the inheritance
   chain through assigned_to alone). Flip to True on: start,
   set_plan, block, pause, submit_verification, submit_qa,
   submit_pm_review, complete, create_subtask. Leave False on
   board/CEO actions and PM cross-cell interventions (unblock,
   resume, cancel) where the cross-cell semantics are intentional.

3. claim.source_statuses is intentionally a SUPERSET of any single
   role's CLAIM_RULES allowance (the table holds the union; CLAIM_RULES
   holds the per-role authority). Add an inline comment above the
   claim ActionSpec so a future reader doesn't conclude the two
   tables disagree — they don't, they encode overlapping facts at
   different grains.

* feat(lifecycle): _INTENT_VERBS table — every gateway verb declared

Each gateway intent verb is now a named composition of atomic actions
plus optional side effects. i_will_work_on = (claim, set_plan, start);
i_am_done = (submit_verification, submit_qa); open_pr is pure side
effects (push_branch, create_pr); etc.

* fix(lifecycle): widen block.allowed_roles to include QA + Documenter

Task 6 review caught a role-set inconsistency: i_am_blocked.allowed_roles
admits dev/QA/doc, but the underlying block.allowed_roles only allowed
dev+PM. Result: a QA or documenter calling i_am_blocked would pass the
IntentSpec gate and then be rejected by the composed ActionSpec gate
when Task 7 wires can_invoke_intent.

Widen block to include QA + Documenter. The semantic case is sound: a
QA reviewing a task can discover an external blocker; a documenter
writing docs may need PM intervention. Predecessor PERMISSIONS.md
restricted block to dev+PM, but with the gateway exposing i_am_blocked
to all worker roles, the underlying atomic must agree.

The deeper unclaim/escalate_up "imperative verb" concern from the same
review (composes=() but mutates state) is deferred to Task 8 where the
validator design lands.

* feat(lifecycle): public lookup functions + Context + preconditions

can_claim, can_invoke_action, can_invoke_intent, valid_next_verbs,
composed_actions_for, intents_for_role, status_after — the entire
public surface every consumer will use. Context carries the
caller-supplied state preconditions need (plan, journal-decision
flag, etc.). Preconditions for plan/commits/no_pr/ownership are
declared once and wired into the relevant IntentSpecs.

* fix(lifecycle): wire PRECONDITION_OWNERSHIP through Context.actor_id

Task 7 review found _p_owns_task reads agent.id but every call site
passes None for the agent arg. Result: getattr(None, "id", object())
returns a fresh sentinel, task.assigned_to == <sentinel> is always
False, and open_pr / i_am_done would reject every owner the moment
Task 9 wires consumers.

Fix: thread identity through Context.actor_id (new UUID field) and
rewrite _p_owns_task to read from the context. Both call sites already
pass the Context — no signature changes elsewhere. Add green-path
test exercising the owner-can-open-pr case the existing tests
missed (the Task 7 plan only tested precondition-failure paths,
which masked the bug).

Plus surface hygiene: STATUS_GRAPH, CLAIM_RULES, ROLE_TEAM_RULES,
and the four PRECONDITION_* constants are now in
roboco.lifecycle.__init__.__all__ so consumers in Tasks 8/9 don't
depend on the implicit `from roboco.lifecycle.spec import ...`
backdoor.

* feat(lifecycle): import-time self-consistency validators

10 validators run at module import; first failure raises
LifecycleSpecError and prevents the package from loading. Covers
status enum coverage, reachability, terminal exits, intent
compositions, status chain consistency, claim-rule role/status
coverage, self-review symmetry, team-rule slug existence, and
StatusTransition action references.

* fix(lifecycle): close validator gaps; resolve BACKLOG-claim and submit_qa IN_PROGRESS-shortcut ambiguity

Three reviewer follow-ups on Task 8's _validate.py, plus two real
data corrections the new action-target-reachability validator
surfaced.

1. Design spec §9 calls for "every ActionSpec.target_status, when
   set, is reachable from each source_status via STATUS_GRAPH" —
   missing from Task 8's 10 validators. Add
   _check_action_target_reachable_from_source.

2. _check_role_team_rules_slugs verified slug existence in
   AGENT_UUIDS but NOT that the cell team in ROLE_TEAM_RULES
   matches the seed. Add _check_role_team_rules_team_match,
   scoped to non-None entries only — None means "exempt from
   team-match enforcement" (cross-cell roles), not "no team in
   org chart".

3. test_validators_pass_on_real_spec was ceremonial. Add
   test_run_all_validators_raises_on_unknown_intent_action,
   a deliberate-break regression that monkeypatches _INTENT_VERBS
   to inject a fake action and asserts LifecycleSpecError raises.

The new action-target-reachability validator caught two real
data inconsistencies between the predecessor canon docs and the
spec tables:

A. claim.source_statuses listed BACKLOG and CLAIM_RULES[*PM]
   listed BACKLOG, but STATUS_GRAPH[BACKLOG] = {PENDING, CANCELLED}
   only. Resolution: PMs use the explicit \`activate\` action to
   move BACKLOG → PENDING, then claim from PENDING. Drop BACKLOG
   from claim.source_statuses and CLAIM_RULES.

B. submit_qa.source_statuses listed IN_PROGRESS, but
   STATUS_GRAPH[IN_PROGRESS] does NOT include AWAITING_QA. The
   intent verb i_am_done composes (submit_verification, submit_qa)
   which forces IN_PROGRESS → VERIFYING → AWAITING_QA — no
   shortcut. Drop the stale IN_PROGRESS entry from
   submit_qa.source_statuses.

Both corrections tighten the canonical state machine to a strict
no-skip transition graph. Pre-gateway PERMISSIONS.md/STATUS_TRANSITIONS.md
disagreements are resolved here; spec.py is the canon now.

* feat(gateway): Envelope.from_decision maps lifecycle Decisions to envelopes

Single shape adapter so verb bodies stop hand-composing rejection
envelopes. Each rejection_kind maps to a specific envelope flavor;
'self_review' folds into 'not_authorized' with a parenthetical hint;
constructing from an allow Decision raises (programmer error).

* feat(gateway): VerbRunner for atomic composed-action dispatch

Wraps spec.composed_actions_for(intent) in session.begin_nested()
so mid-sequence failures roll the DB back. Side effects run AFTER
the savepoint commits. Each atomic action name dispatches to a
TaskService method via a single, exhaustive _dispatch_atomic
mapping. New verbs slot in by adding an IntentSpec entry + a
_dispatch_atomic case if a new atomic is needed.

* refactor(gateway): i_will_work_on uses spec.can_invoke_intent + VerbRunner

Replace the bespoke status-branch dispatcher in i_will_work_on with the
spec-driven flow: load task -> load agent -> build spec.Context ->
spec.can_invoke_intent (and spec.can_claim for per-role status authority)
-> Envelope.from_decision on rejection -> VerbRunner.run_intent on success.

The _i_will_work_on_pending, _i_will_work_on_claimed,
_i_will_work_on_needs_revision, and _start_failed_envelope helpers are
removed; the runner replaces them. Two narrow verb-body re-entry blocks
remain for behaviors the spec does not yet model:

  1. in_progress + same agent -> idempotent heartbeat-only return
  2. claimed + same agent -> _resume_from_claimed (set_plan + start)
     to recover from a stuck mid-claim crash without re-running claim
     against a state the spec excludes.

The behavioral claim guards (already_active / paused / sibling_sequence)
also stay imperative for now -- they're not in the spec yet and migrate
into spec.extra_preconditions in a later task. Per-role claim authority
is enforced via spec.can_claim because the atomic claim action's
source_statuses are the union across roles; CLAIM_RULES narrows.

Parity test in tests/lifecycle/test_consumer_parity.py runs the verb
against every (role x status x task_type='code') combo (112 rows) and
asserts the envelope error matches the spec's Decision (or can_claim's
Decision when the intent gate passes but per-role claim authority does
not). This is the contract that makes spec/verb drift impossible.

Existing tests updated where rejection-message text changed (the spec
now produces the messages, e.g. "role 'cell_pm' may not call
'i_will_work_on'" instead of "PM cannot execute code") or where the
spec's stricter view ("invalid_state" -> "not_authorized" for a dev
trying to claim awaiting_qa) is more accurate. Test fixtures were
updated to wire task.session.begin_nested as a proper async context
manager (required by VerbRunner) and to set agent_for().id so runner-
driven calls line up with assert_awaited_with(task_id, agent_id).

* refactor(lifecycle): push CLAIM_RULES enforcement into can_invoke_action

Task 11's i_will_work_on migration had to call spec.can_claim()
separately after spec.can_invoke_intent() because the claim action's
source_statuses is the union across all claim-eligible roles —
can_invoke_intent alone would let a developer pass for claiming
awaiting_qa (a QA-only state).

The retrofit pattern would repeat in every claim-composing verb
(i_will_plan, claim_review, claim_doc_task). Push the per-role
narrowing inside can_invoke_action when the action is "claim",
using the same not_authorized vs invalid_state disambiguation
can_claim already implemented (status-reserved-for-another-role
returns not_authorized; status-no-role-can-claim returns
invalid_state). Extracted the body to _check_claim_rules_narrow
to keep can_invoke_action under xenon's complexity threshold.

Update _i_will_work_on_gate to drop the redundant spec.can_claim
call. Update test_consumer_parity.py to assert only against
can_invoke_intent's Decision.

Tasks 12-22 will inherit the cleaner pattern: spec.can_invoke_intent
is the single gate; verb bodies don't need per-action retrofits.

* refactor(gateway): i_will_plan uses spec.can_invoke_intent + VerbRunner

Migrates i_will_plan to the spec-driven pattern Task 11 set up for
i_will_work_on. The verb body now: (1) loads task + agent, (2) builds
Context, (3) checks idempotent/recovery re-entry, (4) calls
spec.can_invoke_intent, (5) returns Envelope.from_decision on
rejection, (6) delegates composition to VerbRunner. The
_i_will_plan_* helpers are removed — the runner replaces them.

Parity test in tests/lifecycle/test_consumer_parity.py runs the verb
against every (role × status × task_type) combo and asserts the
envelope matches spec.Decision.

* refactor(gateway): delegate uses spec.can_invoke_intent for role/state gate

Migrates delegate to the spec-driven role/state gate. The chain
validation (main_pm->cell_pm, cell_pm->its team's devs), the
assignee-vs-task_type rule (Cell PMs receive planning-typed only),
the enum coercion, and the parent-lifecycle/cap guards STAY in the
verb body — they encode delegate-specific semantics the spec
doesn't model.

Parity test in tests/lifecycle/test_consumer_parity.py asserts the
spec's role+state rejection is correctly surfaced. Chain/assignee
rejections continue to be tested in test_choreographer_pm_extras.

* refactor(gateway): open_pr uses spec.can_invoke_intent + VerbRunner

Migrates open_pr to spec-driven gating. The spec's
extra_preconditions (PRECONDITION_OWNERSHIP, PRECONDITION_COMMITS,
PRECONDITION_NO_PR) handle all three precondition checks; the verb
body delegates side-effect dispatch (push_branch, create_pr) to
VerbRunner.

Idempotent re-entry retained: an open_pr call against a task that
already has a PR (and the caller owns it) returns OK without
re-opening, rather than the tracing_gap the spec would otherwise
produce. This preserves agent ergonomics — two calls in a row
shouldn't surface a misleading "no_prior_pr" hint.

Parity test in tests/lifecycle/test_consumer_parity.py runs the verb
against representative (status x commits x pr_number) combos and
asserts the envelope matches spec.Decision.

* refactor(gateway): i_am_done uses spec.can_invoke_intent + VerbRunner

Migrates i_am_done to spec-driven gating. The spec's
extra_preconditions (PRECONDITION_OWNERSHIP, PRECONDITION_COMMITS)
handle ownership and commit-count checks; VerbRunner dispatches
the (submit_verification, submit_qa) atomic chain.

The tracing-gate preconditions (progress entry, journal:reflect,
acceptance criteria) and the field-level submit-qa gates stay in
the verb body — they model gates the spec doesn't yet cover.
Defense-in-depth: those gates run after the spec accepts the
ownership/commits checks.

Parity test in tests/lifecycle/test_consumer_parity.py runs the
verb against (role × status × ownership × commits) and asserts
the envelope matches spec.Decision.

* refactor(gateway): i_am_blocked uses spec.can_invoke_intent + VerbRunner

Migrates i_am_blocked to spec-driven gating. The journal:struggle
write stays in the verb body (it's a side effect outside the
lifecycle action). VerbRunner dispatches the `block` atomic action
via task_service.escalate.

Parity test in tests/lifecycle/test_consumer_parity.py.

* refactor(gateway): unclaim and resume use spec.can_invoke_intent

Migrates both verbs to the spec-driven gate. unclaim's verb body
keeps its dispatch (task.unclaim_for_agent) because composes=();
resume goes through VerbRunner with composes=("resume",).

The reassignment-rejection branch (introduced in 19f27b4 for the
2026-05-08 trace's "not your claim" case) stays - the spec doesn't
model "task got reassigned out from under you by an upstream verb,"
and the existing envelope text ("current owner: X - call
give_me_work() to find your current work") is the load-bearing
hint that fixed the original bug. Extracted the shared branch into
_reassigned_rejection / _ReassignedCtx so both verbs reuse it
without duplicating the envelope construction.

Parity tests in tests/lifecycle/test_consumer_parity.py.

* refactor(gateway): complete uses spec.can_invoke_intent at the dispatcher

Migrates the top-level `complete` dispatcher to gate role/state via
spec.can_invoke_intent before routing to cell_pm_complete or
main_pm_complete. The two lower-level methods keep their existing
PR-merge / CEO-escalation logic and pre-flight guards (those model
journal:decision preconditions and PR-mergeability checks the spec
doesn't model yet).

The runner pattern is NOT applied here — `complete` has two divergent
runtime paths (Cell PM merges leaf into parent branch; Main PM opens
master PR + escalates to CEO) that don't fit the runner's
single-composition model. Verb-body-owns-dispatch is the right
pattern.

Parity test in tests/lifecycle/test_consumer_parity.py runs the
verb against (role × status) combos and asserts the dispatcher's
spec rejection is correctly surfaced.

* refactor(gateway): escalate_up, escalate_to_ceo, submit_up use spec.can_invoke_intent

Migrates the three PM-side escalation/submission verbs to
spec-driven role/state gating. The verb-specific guards
(journal:decision, escalation_target configured, _submit_up_guard's
ownership + notes-length + subtasks-terminal) STAY in the verb body
- the spec doesn't model these.

escalate_up has composes=() so the verb body owns dispatch via
task.escalate. escalate_to_ceo and submit_up route their
compositions through VerbRunner.

Parity tests in tests/lifecycle/test_consumer_parity.py.

* refactor(gateway): qa.py + doc.py role mixins use spec.can_invoke_intent

Migrates the five QA + Documenter verbs (claim_review, pass_review,
fail_review, claim_doc_task, i_documented) to spec-driven gating.

The self-review block lives at the atomic-action layer
(_ATOMIC_ACTIONS["qa_pass"|"qa_fail"|"docs_complete"].self_review_block=True)
and naturally fires when the verb body builds a Context with
actor_slug==original_developer_slug. No verb-body retrofits needed.

The verb-specific helpers (_verify_qa_owner, _qa_pass_gate_check,
_check_i_documented_inputs) STAY — they encode notes-length /
journal:learning / files-list / qa_evidence_inspected gates the
spec doesn't model.

claim_review and claim_doc_task own dispatch via task.qa_claim /
task.doc_claim respectively (not the runner) because those
specialized claim methods keep status at AWAITING_QA /
AWAITING_DOCUMENTATION, which is what the downstream qa_pass /
qa_fail / docs_complete source-status requirement expects.
The spec gate still validates role + claim source-status + task_type
before dispatch.

pass_review / fail_review / i_documented route their compositions
(qa_pass / qa_fail / docs_complete) through VerbRunner.run_intent
inside a savepoint.

Parity tests in tests/lifecycle/test_consumer_parity.py for all
five verbs.

* fix(lifecycle): claim_review and claim_doc_task have empty composes

Tasks 21-22 surfaced a real spec/runtime mismatch: both verbs were
declared composes=("claim", "start"), but the actual implementation
uses task.qa_claim / task.doc_claim which intentionally keep status
at AWAITING_QA / AWAITING_DOCUMENTATION. If the runner ever ran the
declared composition, it would transition the task to CLAIMED then
IN_PROGRESS, breaking the source-status invariants of qa_pass,
qa_fail, and docs_complete.

The spec is the canon — align it to the runtime. composes=() means
"verb body owns dispatch" (same pattern as escalate_up and unclaim).
The spec gate still validates role + AWAITING_QA / AWAITING_
DOCUMENTATION source-status via the role's CLAIM_RULES narrowing,
enforced through special handling in can_invoke_intent, so role/state
safety is preserved.

* refactor(gateway): role_config flow lists derived from spec.intents_for_role

Hand-maintained _DEV_FLOW etc. tuples replaced with calls into the
spec. Adding/removing a role from an IntentSpec.allowed_roles now
automatically updates the MCP manifest. The spec is the canon;
role_config becomes a thin shim that adds the do-tool / write /
subagent / description metadata the spec doesn't carry.

* feat(lifecycle): generators + make lifecycle for deterministic artifact regen

Renders intent-verbs.md, status-transitions.md, panel/lib/lifecycle.json,
and per-role agents/prompts/_generated/lifecycle-{role}.md fragments
from the canonical spec. `make lifecycle` runs the regenerator;
deterministic output enables CI to gate on `git diff --exit-code` after
running it. The agent prompt fragments will be injected at the top of
each role's system prompt (Task 25) so agents see the same verbs the
gateway accepts.

* feat(lifecycle): inject generated prompt fragments + CI drift gate

Each agent's system prompt now starts with the spec-generated
'verbs available to your role' fragment. CI runs make lifecycle
and fails if regeneration produces a diff — drift between spec
and artifacts cannot land on master.

* refactor(gateway): delete verb_gates.py — superseded by lifecycle.spec

verb_gates.is_verb_allowed and verb_gates.valid_next_verbs are now
spec.can_invoke_intent(...).allowed and spec.valid_next_verbs.
Importers updated to consume the canonical spec module directly.
tests/unit/gateway/test_verb_gates.py removed — coverage lives in
tests/lifecycle/test_spec.py.

envelope.with_introspection wraps spec.valid_next_verbs with role-string
coercion + best-effort try/except so malformed task fixtures (AsyncMock
status) and unknown role strings still yield [] instead of raising —
preserves the legacy verb_gates contract.

content_actions content-tool RBAC (commit/notify) is now a pair of
explicit role frozensets in this file. These are content tools, not
lifecycle intents, so they intentionally do NOT live in spec._INTENT_VERBS.

Two existing introspection tests asserted "commit" in valid_next_verbs;
fixed to assert open_pr/i_am_done — commit is correctly absent under
the canonical spec because it is a do-server content tool, not a flow
intent verb.

* refactor(gateway): collapse scattered role constants into spec

The pm_cannot_execute_code_guard and role_typed_claim_guard guards
both modeled rules the spec now handles via can_invoke_action's
CLAIM_RULES narrowing and ActionSpec.allowed_task_types. Drop them
from claim_guards.py — the choreographer's existing skip-flags on
_run_claim_guards are now permanent: those guards no longer fire.
Simplify _run_claim_guards's signature accordingly.

The concurrency-invariant guards (already_active_guard,
paused_tasks_guard, sibling_sequence_guard) STAY — the spec doesn't
model these system-level invariants. sibling_sequence_guard's loop
body extracted into _earlier_blocking_sibling helper to keep the
slimmed module under xenon's --max-modules A average.

* refactor(enforcement): task_lifecycle becomes a thin view of lifecycle.spec

VALID_TRANSITIONS and ROLE_RESTRICTED_TRANSITIONS are now derived
from roboco.lifecycle.spec — no independent tables. The 433-line
file collapses to ~30 lines of view definitions; future changes
go in spec.py. Helper functions exported by the legacy module are
preserved as thin wrappers so existing consumers don't need to
change their imports today.

A small _LEGACY_OPERATIONAL_EDGES table sits alongside the
spec-derived view to cover transitions the runtime exercises but
the spec has not yet absorbed (voluntary unclaim, reaper sweep,
PM-direct completes from in_progress, parallel-doc-PR developer
trigger). It is fenced and clearly documented; once those callers
are migrated to spec-driven dispatch the constant goes empty and
the file collapses to a pure view.

A test in test_task_service_lifecycle_misc.py was rewritten: the
predecessor asserted CEO-only authority over awaiting_ceo_approval
cancels (legacy table behavior), but the canonical spec authorizes
{CELL_PM, MAIN_PM, CEO} uniformly across all non-terminal cancel
sources. The test now exercises the broader spec-defined cascade.

* feat(lifecycle): UNMIGRATED guard pins known-debt consumers

Two pieces of debt surfaced during Task 28's collapse of
enforcement/task_lifecycle.py: (1) ~11 operational edges still in
the shim's _LEGACY_OPERATIONAL_EDGES because the spec's
_STATUS_TRANSITIONS doesn't yet model them; (2) role-gate
disagreements in _LEGACY_ROLE_GATES that the spec disagrees with.

UNMIGRATED is the named-debt set; KNOWN_UNMIGRATED_CONSUMERS pins
the catalog so a contributor adding a new entry must update both
sides. Validator (_check_unmigrated_is_subset) fires at import if
they drift. Test pins the current entries.

Phase 3's terminal invariant is `UNMIGRATED == frozenset()` —
expected when both legacy data carriers fold into spec, at which
point the assertion becomes a permanent regression guard.

* test(lifecycle): tier 3 end-to-end real-DB happy paths

Eight integration tests covering every major lifecycle path:
dev (pending → awaiting_qa), QA pass, QA fail, doc handoff,
Cell PM complete, Main PM escalate-to-CEO, block+unblock,
pause+resume. Each test drives the spec → choreographer →
TaskService → DB stack with only the git layer mocked. Catches
"spec says X, DB constraint says Y" mismatches the unit-tier
parametrized parity suite cannot detect.

* test(lifecycle): tier 4 smoke replay — pin known-bug shapes after spec migration

Synthesized fixture covering the 9 bugs from the 2026-05-08
audit-log trace + the 2 from the 2026-05-09 follow-up trace. Each
record documents (verb, role, task setup, expected post-fix
envelope shape, fix commit, spec invariant). The replay test
parametrizes over the records and asserts the spec / choreographer
behavior now matches the post-fix expectation — locks in the
fixes as permanent regressions.

The original audit log was wiped during cleanup; the fixture is
a documented synthesis, not a verbatim capture. The bug list is
faithful to the prior session's analysis of the trace.

* fix(orchestrator): silence dev-dispatcher noise for non-dev-lane tasks

Dev dispatcher fetched all pending/claimed/in_progress tasks regardless
of assignee role and warned 'role/task_type mismatch' on each pass when
it found cell_pm/main_pm/product_owner/etc. tasks — those belong to
_dispatch_pm_work, not this lane. The 30s warning loop showed up
prominently in the 2026-05-10 smoke run.

Filter at the lane boundary: silently skip when assignee role is not
developer/documenter/unknown. The D-49 misassignment warning still
fires for the legitimate cases (developer assigned a documentation
task, etc.).

* fix(gateway,prompts): unblock the three smoke-run dead-ends

Three issues surfaced by the 2026-05-10 smoke run, fixed together
because they're all blockers for end-to-end task completion:

1. Acceptance-criteria tracing gate was unsatisfiable. Nothing in the
   codebase writes to task.acceptance_criteria_status, so
   _check_acceptance_criteria always returned every criterion as
   missing. Treat a reflect note as the addressing artifact: when the
   agent has written one, the gate clears. Per-criterion citation via
   acceptance_criteria_status is still honored when populated, so the
   schema stays available for future per-criterion tracking.

2. Cell PM runaway re-decomposition. On every wake-up be-pm
   re-decomposed its parent task without checking for existing
   children, producing duplicate dev subtasks. cell_pm.md now teaches
   'list children before delegating' and 'one dev subtask is usually
   enough — QA/Documenter/PM-merge engage automatically'. Added
   anti-pattern entries for re-decomposition and over-decomposition.

3. Main PM exit/respawn loop on claimed-state tasks. The model
   cycled through delegate/resume/escalate/unblock looking for a verb
   that worked on 'claimed', and got cleanly rejected by every one.
   The right verb is i_will_plan (it composes claim+set_plan+start
   and resumes from claimed). main_pm.md now spells this out
   explicitly with a worked example of which verbs reject and why.

* feat(prompts): restore pre-gateway lifecycle scaffolding across all 6 roles

The gateway migration shrank role prompts from ~50 lines to ~15
(commit 534152c for dev; analogous shrinks for qa/doc/cell_pm/main_pm/board
in e12a596, 05ac832, 8dc381b). The verb surface got cleaner but the
prescription for using verbs through the lifecycle disappeared. The
2026-05-10 smoke run surfaced the regression: agents thrash through
verbs hoping one fits, journal sparsely, skip the dev reflect note,
and (for cell PMs) re-decompose on every wake-up.

Each role prompt now restores three sections that the pre-gateway
versions had:

1. State -> Verb table — what to call when respawned in each
   lifecycle status. Eliminates the verb-cycling antipattern: the
   agent looks up its current status and calls the one verb that
   transitions out of it.

2. Mandatory pre-handoff checklist — explicit walk-through of the
   gates the next verb will check, ordered so the agent fixes the
   missing piece before retrying:
   - developer: 7 items before i_am_done
   - qa: 8 items before pass/fail (incl. self-review forbidden,
     read dev journal not just diff, name artifact per criterion)
   - doc: 7 items before i_documented
   - cell_pm: 7 items before submit_up (incl. integration green)
   - main_pm: 7 items before complete(root)
   - board: separate checklists for escalate_to_ceo (PO/HoM) and
     reflect-note quality (Auditor — its only output)

3. Journaling cadence — when to use each of the five scopes
   (note/decision/struggle/learning/reflect). The pre-gateway
   prompts named all five scopes with role-specific examples;
   the post-gateway prompts mention 'reflect' once and skip the
   rest. Restored across every role.

Plus restored the load-bearing rules that got dropped:

- Cell PM: 'A SINGLE subtask flows through dev -> QA -> doc ->
  PM-merge. DON'T split into per-role subtasks.' This is exactly
  what be-pm violated in the smoke run, creating duplicate
  'branch naming subtask' / 'PR workflow subtask' / etc.
- QA + Doc: 'read the dev's journal, not just the diff' — pre-
  gateway forced this via roboco_journal_read_team; post-gateway
  the inline data exists but the agent isn't told to use it.
- Developer: 'every acceptance criterion gets a citation in the
  reflect note' — pairs with the tracing-gate change in 75b667d
  where the reflect note is treated as the addressing artifact.

* feat(foundation): bootstrap foundation/identity.py with Role/Team/RoleLevel

Phase 1 task 1 of the foundation canonicalization plan
(docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-10-foundation-canonicalization-design.md).

Three enums, no consumers yet — separate tasks migrate the existing
forks (models.base.AgentRole, lifecycle.spec.Role, agents_config role
sets, services/permissions.PM_ROLES) onto this canonical surface.

* feat(foundation/identity): add AGENTS catalog (single source for slug->role+team+UUID)

Resolves head-marketing.team drift (spec §5.1) by setting Team.BOARD
authoritatively. Team.MARKETING remains in the enum for legacy seed
data but no agent claims it; flagged for removal in cleanup.

* feat(foundation/identity): add role-sets + ROLE_LEVEL hierarchy

* feat(foundation/identity): add lookups + public API re-exports

* feat(foundation): import-time validators (uniqueness, role coverage, role-level)

* chore(foundation): verify+align postgres agentrole/team enums with foundation/identity

scripts/verify_postgres_enums.py reads the live agentrole+team enums
from postgres (via asyncpg using roboco.config.settings.database_*)
and compares them against the foundation Role+Team enums. Exits 0 on
match, 1 on drift (with a per-side diff), and 1 with a clear message
if postgres is unreachable so callers like make foundation-check can
treat that as a skip.

alembic/versions/012_align_agentrole_team_with_foundation.py is the
forward-only safety-net migration. It runs ALTER TYPE agentrole ADD
VALUE IF NOT EXISTS 'system' (idempotent on postgres >= 9.6) so any
DB without the recently-added Role.SYSTEM sentinel gets it on next
upgrade. Postgres has no DROP VALUE primitive without a destructive
type recreation, so foundation keeps legacy values (e.g. Team.MARKETING)
to absorb the inverse direction; the migration's downgrade is
intentionally a no-op.

Local verification deferred: postgres is not reachable from this
workstation (role 'roboco' does not exist), so the script could not
confirm the live enum shape. The migration is idempotent and runs
unconditionally on the next alembic upgrade head, and whoever next
runs make foundation-check against a live DB will get the post-migration
proof of alignment.

* refactor(lifecycle): re-export Role from foundation.identity (single source)

* refactor(models): re-export AgentRole and Team from foundation.identity

Removes the parallel Team and AgentRole StrEnum definitions in
models/base.py. They are now bound to roboco.foundation.identity.Role
and roboco.foundation.identity.Team respectively, so AgentRole IS
identity.Role (same Python class object). SQLAlchemy column types
bound as sa.Enum(AgentRole, name='agentrole') continue to work because
identity is preserved across import paths.

Note: foundation.Team drops the legacy 'fullstack' member that lived
on models.base.Team. The two _resolve_team_dir tests that used
Team.FULLSTACK to exercise the 'fullstack' branch now pass the literal
string 'fullstack' instead — same code path, no enum-membership coupling.

Adds two identity assertions to tests/foundation/test_role_reexport.py
verifying AgentRole is identity.Role and Team is identity.Team.

* fix(foundation): correct Team enum — add FULLSTACK, remove QA

The original plan's audit incorrectly identified the models/base.Team
membership. Actual original was 7 values: backend, frontend, ux_ui,
fullstack, main_pm, board, marketing. My plan replaced fullstack with
qa and added system — but qa was never a team (only a role).

Postgres team enum has fullstack (alembic 009), and services/task.py:675
+ services/git.py:779 branch on the literal "fullstack". Without
foundation.Team.FULLSTACK, any Project row with assigned_cell="fullstack"
would fail to round-trip through the SQLAlchemy ORM.

This correction:
- Adds FULLSTACK; removes QA from foundation.Team
- Updates the 8-value test expected set
- Restores tests/integration/test_task_service_misc.py to use Team.FULLSTACK

* refactor(agents_config): derive AGENT_ROLE_MAP/AGENT_TEAM_MAP/CELL_MEMBERS from foundation

* refactor(roles): canonicalize role-sets via foundation.identity

- agents_config.PM_ROLES (5-role: PMs + board + CEO) renamed to
  TASK_CREATOR_ROLES; the name PM_ROLES is reserved for the canonical
  2-role set (CELL_PM + MAIN_PM) defined in foundation.identity.
- agents_config._BOARD_ROLES aliased to foundation.BOARD_ROLES (drops
  main_pm from the set; board A2A handler updated to keep allowing
  board -> main_pm direct messaging via explicit branch).
- services/permissions.PM_ROLES (2-role) re-exported from foundation.

Closes the silent semantic divergence flagged in spec section 3 (HIGH severity).

* refactor(seeds,orchestrator): derive agent catalogs from foundation

- seeds/initial_data.AGENT_UUIDS derived from foundation.AGENTS.
- DEFAULT_AGENTS row generation pulls slug+role+team+id from foundation;
  per-agent presentation strings (display name) stay in this file in
  _AGENT_PRESENTATION dict. The system sentinel remains a literal with
  team=None because the postgres `team` enum has no 'system' value.
- runtime/orchestrator._AGENT_TEAM_MAP and the cell-prefix table replaced
  with foundation.team_for_slug. _AGENT_TEAM_MAP is now a derived ClassVar
  covering every slug (not just management).
- head-marketing.team resolved to "board" (was "marketing" in seed +
  orchestrator, "board" in agents_config — three-way drift, now unified).
- ceo.team resolved to "board" (was None in seed; foundation declares
  board membership so the seed-bootstrapped DB row now reflects that).
- Adds tests/foundation/test_seed_orchestrator_parity.py — gate against
  future drift between seed/orchestrator and foundation.

Closes the identity sub-phase. Adding an agent edits exactly one file:
foundation/identity.py:AGENTS.

* feat(foundation/policy): task_completeness rules + denylist

Implements spec §5.2: field-level completeness rules at create/delegate
time, plus the denylist that catches the literal placeholder string from
the deleted services/task.py:5061-5062 silent fallback ("completed and
reviewed by assignee" — agents copy-paste this from old logs).

CompletenessSpec is data; check() is a pure function; field_hints map
gives the agent the literal answer key for each missing field.

* feat(envelope): add incomplete_input envelope kind for interrogation pattern

Sister to tracing_gap; distinct error code lets agent prompts teach
incomplete_input handling separately from tracing-gap recovery. Carries
missing + field_hints + remediate for the spec §5.2.1 interrogation
pattern; Task 19 will wire the gateway delegate verb to use it.

* feat(foundation/task_completeness): auto-fill helpers (team, priority, parent)

* feat(api/schemas): DelegateRequest enforces TASK_AT_CREATE constraints

Removes silent defaults for nature/task_type/estimated_complexity;
adds min_length=20 to description; requires non-empty acceptance_criteria.
Mirrors foundation.policy.task_completeness.TASK_AT_CREATE so under-filled
delegate calls fail at the request boundary (422) instead of being silently
papered over downstream.

Tests touching delegate calls updated to pass the now-required fields.

* feat(models/task): TaskCreate + TaskCreateRequest enforce TASK_AT_CREATE

* feat(api/schemas): TaskUpdate rejects blanking acceptance_criteria

Golden Rule preservation — acceptance_criteria cannot be set to []/None
via PATCH. Pydantic field min_length doesn't catch explicit None, so a
model_validator(mode='before') guards the patch payload.

* fix(services/task): delete silent acceptance_criteria fallback (skeleton-task root cause)

The fallback at services/task.py:5061-5062 silently replaced empty
acceptance_criteria with ['completed and reviewed by assignee'] -
the proximate cause of every skeleton task in the 2026-05-10 smoke
run. Removed; create_subtask now invokes foundation.policy.task_completeness
and raises TaskCompletenessError on missing fields (spec section 5.2).

Two existing transition tests relied on a 1-char description default
that the new completeness check rejects (description min_length=20);
both updated to pass an explicit valid description. New integration
test pins the rejection contract (empty list + legacy phrase both
raise).

Companion code path at services/gateway/choreographer/_impl.py:1852
(the upstream `or []` collapse) is fixed in the next task.

* fix(gateway/delegate): use task_completeness + Envelope.incomplete_input

Replaces the `acceptance_criteria=inputs.acceptance_criteria or []`
collapse at _impl.py:1852 with a foundation.policy.task_completeness
check that rejects empty / placeholder input via
Envelope.incomplete_input — the spec section 5.2.1 interrogation pattern.

Auto-fill helpers (fill_team_from_assignee + fill_priority_from_parent)
fill the unambiguous fields before the check, then anything still
missing surfaces as a structured rejection with field_hints; the agent
gets a literal answer key for what to provide on retry.

DelegateInputs gains an explicit `nature` field (no default) so the
HTTP boundary can thread DelegateRequest.nature through to the
choreographer. Route handlers (flow_cell_pm, flow_main_pm) forward it.
The hardcoded TaskNature.TECHNICAL fallback in _create_subtask_from_inputs
is removed; the helper now coerces inputs.nature to the enum or raises
TaskCompletenessError if a non-gateway caller bypassed the check.

Closes the gateway-side path to skeleton tasks. Service-layer raise
(Task 18) remains as defense-in-depth for non-gateway callers.

Existing delegate-guard tests updated to pass full payloads — the
prior `title='x', description='y'` minimal stubs now hit the
completeness gate first; the full payloads still exercise the
auth/chain/cap guards downstream.

* feat(api/routes/tasks): POST /tasks uses foundation.task_completeness check

Replace the hand-rolled acceptance_criteria non-empty check in the
POST /tasks handler with a call to task_completeness.check(TASK_AT_CREATE,
data). Route, schema (TaskCreate), and service (TaskCreateRequest) now
all share one canonical notion of 'complete' — the fourth and final
create path is now strict.

Pydantic still rejects structurally invalid payloads (empty AC list,
short title/description, missing enums) with 422. The TC check at the
route boundary additionally rejects denylisted placeholder phrases
('completed and reviewed by assignee', etc.) that pass schema validation
but signal a stub task.

Add tests/integration/test_post_tasks_completeness.py:
  - empty acceptance_criteria  -> 422 (Pydantic)
  - placeholder phrase         -> 400/422 with 'acceptance_criteria' in body

* chore(make): add foundation-check drift gate (mirrors lifecycle-check)

* test(foundation): Phase 1 smoke gate — skeleton-task path returns incomplete_input

Phase 1 closes here: identity catalogs are single-sourced; the silent
acceptance_criteria fallback is gone; gateway delegate returns
incomplete_input with populated field_hints when criteria are missing.

The 2026-05-10 smoke run that produced skeleton tasks no longer can.
Phases 2-4 (tracing, journaling, communications, agent_loop, housekeeping)
get their own plans.

* feat(foundation/policy): journaling scope catalog (5 panel-UI scopes)

* feat(foundation/policy/journaling): role read tiers + protected journals

* refactor(content_actions): derive _VALID_NOTE_SCOPES from foundation.journaling

* refactor(services/journal): derive _SCOPE_TO_TYPE from foundation.journaling

* refactor(enforcement/journal_perms): import read-tier rules from foundation

PROTECTED_JOURNALS + ROLE_READ_TIERS now sourced from foundation.policy.journaling.
The local helpers (_check_protected_access, _check_cell_pm_access,
_check_cell_member_access) are collapsed into a single tier-driven check via
_decide_protected / _decide_by_tier. Pre-Phase-2 GLOBAL_READERS that lumped
CEO/auditor/PO/HoM/main_pm together is split into ReadTier.ALL (ceo+auditor —
includes protected) vs ReadTier.ALL_CELLS (others — excludes protected).
Observable behavior preserved.

* feat(foundation/policy): tracing Requirement enum + check_requirements

19 requirements (16 from pre-Phase-2 tracing_gate + 3 pre-gateway parity:
JOURNAL_NOTE_AT_CLAIM, JOURNAL_DECISION_AT_CLAIM, JOURNAL_DURING_WORK).
GateContext expanded with the new presence flags and journal_during_work_count.
Acceptance-criteria checker keeps the spec §9 item 1 reflect-note shortcut.

* feat(foundation/policy/tracing): VERB_REQUIREMENTS table + verb parity validator

Maps every gateway intent verb to its required-set. Includes the 6 inline
journal:decision callsites (submit_up, complete, unblock, escalate_up,
escalate_to_ceo, delegate) plus the 4 pre-gateway parity additions
(NOTE_AT_CLAIM, DECISION_AT_CLAIM, REFLECT on complete, DURING_WORK).
Validator asserts every spec verb is covered or explicitly waived, and
every Requirement enum value is used by at least one verb.

PLAN added to i_will_work_on / i_will_plan (mirrors spec.PRECONDITION_PLAN
in the tracing layer). SELF_VERIFIED added to i_am_done as a defense-in-depth
backstop (auto-set by the in_progress→verifying transition).

* refactor(gateway/i_am_done): tracing gates via foundation.policy.tracing

Adds JOURNAL_DURING_WORK_AT_LEAST_ONE check (pre-gateway parity P2 —
agents must write at least one decision/learning/struggle entry between
claim and submit). Adds journal.has_struggle_for_task helper.
Replaces the pre-Phase-2 tracing_gate.check_requirements call.

SELF_VERIFIED is filtered from the pre-flight required-set: the spec
composes (submit_verification, submit_qa) for i_am_done and the
auto-run submit_verification flips self_verified=True before submit_qa
runs. The flag therefore acts as a defense-in-depth backstop AFTER the
spec, not before — checking it pre-flight would block the auto-verify
path. SELF_VERIFIED stays in the foundation required-set and is
re-asserted by the spec action's own preconditions.

Test fixtures updated: 9 i_am_done success-path tests now mock
has_decision_for_task=True (or equivalent) so the new during-work
cadence gate is satisfied. NO_PR-token assertion broadened to also
accept the foundation token "pr_open".

* refactor(gateway/qa): pass/fail gates via foundation.policy.tracing

* refactor(gateway/doc): i_documented gates via foundation.policy.tracing

Doc-specific missing-key translations (docs_notes>=min, docs_files_non_empty)
added to the central _build_tracing_gap translator established in Task 9.

* refactor(gateway): unify 6 inline journal:decision checks via tracing.check_requirements

Pre-Phase-2 inline blocks at _impl.py lines ~2230/2394/2442/2574/2814/2895
each ran the same has_decision_for_task + Envelope.tracing_gap pattern. They
now call:

- _check_pm_decision_required(verb, ...) — for unblock, escalate_up,
  escalate_to_ceo, delegate. Each declares only JOURNAL_DECISION in
  VERB_REQUIREMENTS, so a single helper consuming
  tracing.requirements_for(verb) suffices.
- _check_complete_gates — for cell_pm_complete and main_pm_complete.
  Consumes VERB_REQUIREMENTS["complete"] = JOURNAL_DECISION + JOURNAL_REFLECT
  + NOTES_MIN_CHARS. The inline _subtasks_not_terminal_envelope is kept
  because its remediation enumerates the non-terminal subtask ids — strictly
  richer than the foundation hint.
- _check_submit_up_gates — for submit_up. Consumes
  VERB_REQUIREMENTS["submit_up"] minus SUBTASKS_TERMINAL (deferred to the
  inline envelope for the same reason as complete).

Also adds the journal:decision tracing gate to the delegate verb
(VERB_REQUIREMENTS["delegate"] = {JOURNAL_DECISION}) — pre-gateway PM.md
required journal:decision before each delegate, but the gateway path had
not yet enforced it. Threaded into _delegate_extra_guards so the verb
body's return count stays under the lint cap.

_build_tracing_gap gains hint translations for journal:decision, notes>=min,
and subtasks_terminal. The body is refactored to a static dispatch table
+ acceptance-criteria batch handler so the branch count stays under the
lint cap.

PM-verb success-path tests updated to provide notes >= 20 chars (the new
NOTES_MIN_CHARS gate); has_reflect_for_task mocks added to a few tests
where they're now load-bearing (AsyncMock truthiness covers most).
6575 tests passing, mypy + ruff clean.

* feat(gateway/claim): require journal:note_at_claim and journal:decision_at_claim

Pre-gateway parity P1, P3: developers wrote a note (scope='note') on
every claim; PMs wrote a decision (scope='decision') on plan. Restored
via foundation.policy.tracing requirements wired through a new
_post_claim_journal_gate helper that runs AFTER the composed
(claim, set_plan, start) sequence completes.

Failed checks return tracing_gap with a remediate hint that tells the
agent to journal then retry. The claim itself stays — the agent
journals and re-issues the verb (idempotent re-entry shortcuts back
to OK once the entry is present).

Adds journal.has_note_for_task helper paralleling
has_decision/reflect/learning/struggle. The PLAN requirement is
filtered out of the post-claim check because spec.PRECONDITION_PLAN
already enforced it before the runner ran — re-asserting at the
tracing layer would emit a misleading hint.

Two new tests verify the gate fires for missing note/decision; existing
success-path tests already mock the journal service via AsyncMock
(returning truthy) so no regressions.

* test(foundation): Phase 2 smoke gate + tracing_gate.py deleted

Phase 2 closes here:
- foundation/policy/journaling.py owns the 5-scope catalog + read tiers
- foundation/policy/tracing.py owns Requirement enum + VERB_REQUIREMENTS
- 6 inline journal:decision checks replaced with unified helpers
- pre-gateway parity restored: NOTE_AT_CLAIM, DECISION_AT_CLAIM,
  DURING_WORK, REFLECT-on-complete
- services/gateway/tracing_gate.py deleted
- enforcement/journal_perms.py read-tier rules canonicalized

Smoke gate 2 enforces: no inline has_decision_for_task remains; every
intent verb has a tracing decision; tracing_gate module is gone.

* fix(foundation/task_completeness): align hint strings with actual enum values

_HINT_NATURE listed 5 values (technical | bugfix | feature | refactor | docs)
but TaskNature only has 2 (TECHNICAL / NON_TECHNICAL). _HINT_ESTIMATED_COMPLEXITY
listed "critical" which Complexity doesn't have. _HINT_TEAM omitted FULLSTACK
(real, used) and didn't note that MARKETING is legacy seed-data. _HINT_TASK_TYPE
was already correct.

Hints now reflect the actual enums in roboco/models/base.py and
roboco/foundation/identity.py — agents reading the gateway's incomplete_input
remediate envelopes will no longer be told to send values the enums reject.

Tests using nature="feature" (DelegateRequest's nature is `str`, not the
enum, so it accepted the fake value silently) updated to nature="technical"
so they exercise a real enum value end-to-end.

* fix(orchestrator): remove dead "critical" complexity branches

Complexity enum has only LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH — no CRITICAL value.
The three "critical" branches in dispatch logic at lines ~3032 / 3331 /
5049 were dead code (the comparison can never be true). Removed.

Surfaced during Phase 2 closeout when the foundation hint string was
audited against the actual enum.

* feat(foundation/policy/communications): Priority + NOTIFY_SENDER_ROLES + ACK_REQUIRED_BY_TYPE

* feat(foundation/policy/communications): CHANNELS catalog (channel topology)

* refactor(agents_config): derive CHANNEL_ACCESS from foundation.communications

* refactor(seeds): derive DEFAULT_CHANNELS / CHANNEL_MEMBERSHIPS from foundation

* refactor(content_actions): derive notify allowlist + priorities from foundation

Replaces _NOTIFY_ALLOWED_ROLES + _VALID_NOTIFY_PRIORITIES literals with
derivations from foundation.communications.NOTIFY_SENDER_ROLES + Priority.

Behavior change: pre-Phase-3 the literal frozenset {cell_pm, main_pm,
product_owner, head_marketing} excluded CEO. Foundation includes CEO
(per spec 5.5). The contradiction with agents_config.NOTIFICATION_PERMISSIONS
(which already granted CEO can_send=True) is now resolved.

* refactor(notification_delivery): requires_ack from foundation.ACK_REQUIRED_BY_TYPE

* refactor(enforcement,agents_config): delete dead notification policy

- enforcement/notification_perms.py deleted (dead at call-graph; only
  the enforcement/__init__.py re-export kept it reachable, and that
  re-export is gone too).
- agents_config.NOTIFICATION_PERMISSIONS dict deleted; agents_config
  .can_send_notifications now derives from
  foundation.policy.communications.NOTIFY_SENDER_ROLES (auditor
  correctly excluded — silent observer per spec §5.5).
- services/permissions.py: _can_role_send_notifications and
  can_agent_send_notifications now derive from NOTIFY_SENDER_ROLES;
  _get_notification_scope encodes the scope rule (cell/all/list)
  locally as a function-of-role and returns list[AgentRole] instead
  of list[slug]; can_notify list-scope branch updated to match.
- enforcement/__init__.py: removed the notification_perms re-export
  and the NotificationPermissionError, get_notification_scope,
  validate_notification_permission names from __all__.

Closes the spec §3 contradiction: gateway content_actions
._NOTIFY_ALLOWED_ROLES (Task 5) and the legacy
agents_config.NOTIFICATION_PERMISSIONS no longer disagree about
whether auditor may call notify(). Both now derive from
foundation.NOTIFY_SENDER_ROLES.

* fix(content_actions): runtime auditor guard in say/dm (defense in depth)

Closes the spec §5.5 gap where the auditor's silent role was enforced
ONLY by manifest exclusion. The manifest pre-filters the tool surface
exposed to the auditor agent, but if anything bypassed it, the auditor
could speak. The new runtime guard in ContentActions.say/dm refuses
with Envelope.not_authorized when the caller's role is "auditor",
regardless of how the call arrived.

* fix(a2a): pass Priority tristate end-to-end (was reduced to boolean)

Pre-Phase-3 path:
  request priority: str -> services/a2a.py reduces to urgent: bool
  -> services/notification.py maps bool back to NotificationPriority
This made Priority.HIGH unreachable through the A2A path.

After this fix the full tristate (NORMAL/HIGH/URGENT) survives end-to-end:

  * services/a2a.py:create_a2a_notification parses metadata["priority"]
    (preferred) or falls back to legacy metadata["urgent"] / config.urgent
    (URGENT-only). Unknown values fall back to NORMAL.
  * services/notification.py:send_a2a_notification now takes
    a2a_context["priority"] (NotificationPriority); a defensive bool/str
    coerce keeps legacy callers from crashing.
  * runtime/orchestrator.py:_build_a2a_prompt reads priority off the
    notification row (the source of truth) instead of a non-existent
    metadata.urgent and renders three tiers: URGENT bold, HIGH softer,
    NORMAL no prefix.

Cosmetic [URGENT] body/subject prefix stays urgent-only; HIGH gets no
prefix but is recorded as HIGH at the NotificationTable.priority column.

Tests:
  * 9 new tests in tests/integration/test_a2a_priority_tristate.py
    pinning the round-trip for HIGH/NORMAL/URGENT through both layers
    plus legacy-bool backcompat.
  * Updated tests/unit/services/test_notification.py::test_send_a2a_notification
    to the new priority= contract.

Closes the spec section 3 contradiction flagged in the audit.

* feat(foundation/policy): agent_loop BudgetPolicy + VERB_RETRY_LIMITS

* refactor(agent_sdk): import budget thresholds from foundation

* refactor(orchestrator): import _PM_RESPAWN_MAX_UNPRODUCTIVE from foundation

* fix(post-tool-budget-hook): exit 1 on loop-halt (was exit 0 / non-blocking)

Pre-Phase-3 the hook printed [Loop] and exit 0'd — agents could ignore it
and keep retrying. The 2026-05-10 smoke run showed i_am_done retried 5+
times within the global 150-tool budget, never hitting a real wall.

Now the hook reads the SDK response's loop_action field (sourced from
foundation.BudgetPolicy.loop_action; default "halt") and exits 1 to
deny the wrapping tool call when the rolling-window loop detector fires
AND loop_action is "halt". Operators can soften via env
ROBOCO_AGENT_LOOP_ACTION=warn for debugging.

Changes:
- BudgetStatus pydantic model: add loop_action: Literal["warn", "halt"]
  (default "halt") so the SDK response carries the policy.
- agent_sdk/server.py: read ROBOCO_AGENT_LOOP_ACTION env override on top
  of foundation default and surface it in _budget_snapshot().
- post-tool-budget-hook.sh: parse .loop_action, exit 1 to stderr when
  loop+halt; falls back to legacy warn-only print if the field is
  missing (older SDK / partial deploy).

* feat(agent_sdk): per-verb retry circuit breaker via foundation.VERB_RETRY_LIMITS

Pre-Phase-3 the gateway had no per-verb retry cap. The 2026-05-10 smoke
showed i_am_done retried 5+ times in 2 minutes within the global 150-tool
budget — the agent never hit a real wall.

Now the SDK tracks (verb, task_id) -> deque[timestamp] over a 60s sliding
window. When the count for a verb exceeds foundation.retry_limit_for(verb),
the next attempt receives Envelope.circuit_open with a remediate hint
pointing to i_am_blocked / i_am_idle as graceful exits.

Verbs in foundation.UNLIMITED_RETRY_VERBS (give_me_work, triage,
evidence, etc.) bypass the breaker. Only rejection envelopes
(tracing_gap, invalid_state, not_authorized, incomplete_input) feed
the counter — successful calls do not count.

Wire-up:
- Envelope.circuit_open classmethod + as_dict pass-through
- _SessionState.verb_attempts: defaultdict[(verb, task_id), deque[float]]
- Helpers _record_verb_attempt / _verb_attempt_count / _check_verb_circuit
- POST /verb/attempted: hook posts after a rejected gateway call;
  response carries breaker state + (when open) the wire-format
  Envelope.circuit_open dict the agent should surface to itself
- GET /verb/circuit_status: read-only state probe
- _state.reset() (also POST /budget/reset) wipes the tracker on spawn

* test(foundation): Phase 3 smoke gate + foundation-check extended

Phase 3 closes here:
- foundation/policy/communications.py owns Priority, NOTIFY_SENDER_ROLES,
  ACK_REQUIRED_BY_TYPE, ChannelSpec, CHANNELS, parse_priority
- foundation/policy/agent_loop.py owns BudgetPolicy, VERB_RETRY_LIMITS,
  UNLIMITED_RETRY_VERBS, retry_limit_for
- 6 channel topology fork sites collapsed to one source (CHANNELS)
- Notification sender contradiction closed (CEO included; auditor excluded)
- A2A urgency tristate restored (HIGH reachable end-to-end); A2A
  service now consumes parse_priority instead of inlining branches
  (also drops create_a2a_notification CC from C/13 to A/<10)
- Auditor silent role enforced at runtime in say/dm
- enforcement/notification_perms.py deleted (was dead code)
- 7 hand-set requires_ack callsites consolidated to ACK_REQUIRED_BY_TYPE
- post-tool-budget-hook.sh exits 1 on loop-halt
- Per-verb retry circuit breaker live in agent_sdk (60s sliding window)

make foundation-check now validates communications + tracing + journaling
+ identity drift in one command. make quality green.

* refactor(lifecycle): copy spec.py to foundation/policy/lifecycle.py + shim

Phase 4 Task 1 — relocates the canonical lifecycle spec next to its policy
siblings (task_completeness, tracing, journaling, communications, agent_loop).

The original roboco/lifecycle/spec.py is now an explicit re-export shim;
consumers continue to work unchanged. Subsequent Phase 4 tasks (2-7) migrate
the imports in batches, then Task 8 deletes the shim.

No behavior change — pure code move.

* refactor(services): import lifecycle from foundation (Phase 4 batch)

* refactor(agents,enforcement): import lifecycle from foundation (Phase 4 batch)

* refactor(tests): import lifecycle from foundation (Phase 4 batch)

* refactor(foundation): absorb lifecycle _validate + _generators

Phase 4 Tasks 9 + 10. Moves the lifecycle spec's internal validators
to roboco/foundation/_validate_lifecycle.py and its RAG/prompt artifact
emitter to roboco/foundation/_generators.py.

The lifecycle validators live in a sibling module (not merged with
foundation/_validate.py) because the lifecycle spec imports from
foundation at module load — placing the lifecycle checks alongside the
identity checks would create an import cycle between
roboco.foundation and roboco.foundation.policy.lifecycle (the latter
calls the validators at the bottom of its own definition). The
_validate_lifecycle module defers its policy.lifecycle imports to
function bodies so it loads cleanly when the spec hasn't finished
initialising yet; the per-file PLC0415 exemption in pyproject.toml
documents the reason.

Test files relocated:
- tests/lifecycle/test_spec.py        -> tests/foundation/test_lifecycle_spec.py
- tests/lifecycle/test_generators.py  -> tests/foundation/test_lifecycle_generators.py

scripts/build_lifecycle_artifacts.py now imports the generators from
roboco.foundation; the on-disk artifacts (docs/rag/lifecycle,
panel/lib/lifecycle.json, agents/prompts/_generated/lifecycle-*.md)
regenerate byte-identically.

After this commit, roboco/lifecycle/ contains only the spec.py and
__init__.py re-export shims — Task 8 deletes those.

No behavior change. 6638 tests pass; make quality green.

* refactor(lifecycle): delete legacy roboco/lifecycle/ package

Phase 4 Task 8. All consumers migrated to roboco.foundation.policy.lifecycle
in Tasks 2-7; the internal validators + generators moved to foundation in
Tasks 9-10. The legacy package contained only re-export shims.

Also trims tests/foundation/test_role_reexport.py — the two assertions that
checked the lifecycle.spec shim's object-identity are gone with the shim.
The two models.base shim assertions (AgentRole / Team) are still
meaningful and stay.

Inline docstrings / comments in enforcement/task_lifecycle.py,
services/gateway/role_config.py, services/gateway/content_actions.py,
tests/integration/test_task_service_lifecycle_misc.py and
foundation/policy/lifecycle.py that referenced the now-deleted
roboco.lifecycle.spec module are updated to point at
roboco.foundation.policy.lifecycle.

After this commit, roboco.lifecycle is gone. Lifecycle policy lives only
at roboco.foundation.policy.lifecycle. Adding new lifecycle rules edits
exactly that one file.

* refactor(api): consolidate route-guard role-sets via foundation

Replace hand-written role-name string frozensets in roboco/api/deps.py
(_PM_OR_ABOVE_ROLES, _DEVELOPER_OR_ABOVE_ROLES, _GLOBAL_CELL_ACCESS_ROLES)
and roboco/api/routes/v2/_role_dep.py (require_dev/qa/doc/cell_pm/main_pm/
board/auditor) with foundation-derived expressions over PM_ROLES,
BOARD_ROLES, DEV_ROLES, and Role enum members.

Behavior is preserved: Role is a StrEnum, so the lowercase X-Agent-Role
header still compares equal to its matching member. HEAD_MARKETING stays
excluded from every -or-above set (marketing spokesperson, not approver);
the carve-out is now expressed as (BOARD_ROLES - {Role.HEAD_MARKETING})
instead of an opaque literal.

Adds tests/foundation/test_route_guard_consolidation.py (6 tests) pinning
both the foundation-derived membership and the import contract.

* test(foundation): Phase 4 smoke gate + housekeeping closeout

Phase 4 closes the foundation canonicalization effort (Phases 1-4 spanning
2026-05-10 -> 2026-05-11):

Phase 1 - identity + task_completeness (skeleton-task bug killed)
Phase 2 - tracing + journaling (pre-gateway cadence restored)
Phase 3 - communications + agent_loop (channel/notification/A2A/circuit-breaker)
Phase 4 - housekeeping (lifecycle moved to foundation; consumers migrated)

All cross-cutting policy now lives in roboco/foundation/. Adding a policy
edits exactly one file. The legacy roboco.lifecycle package is gone.
Smoke gates 1-4 enforce: no skeleton tasks, no inline journal:decision
checks, channel topology canonical, A2A tristate preserved, auditor silent
at runtime, lifecycle module path canonical.

make quality + make foundation-check both green.

* fix(mcp/agent_sdk): wire per-verb circuit breaker into response handler

Phase 3 Task 14 added the SDK infrastructure (tracker, endpoints,
Envelope.circuit_open, retry_limit_for) but nothing was actually
recording rejections — the breaker never tripped. This commit wires
the gateway-response path so every rejection envelope (tracing_gap /
invalid_state / not_authorized / incomplete_input) hits
POST /verb/attempted, and if the breaker is open, the envelope is
substituted with the circuit_open response before the agent sees it.

Best-effort: SDK-unreachable / malformed-response failures fall open
(agent sees the original rejection), so the breaker never breaks the
gateway path.

* fix(notification_delivery): retype CEO approval-flow notifications APPROVAL

notify_assignee_of_ceo_rejection and notify_ceo_of_escalation were both
typed NotificationType.TASK_ASSIGNMENT, which the Phase 3 foundation
table (ACK_REQUIRED_BY_TYPE in roboco/foundation/policy/communications.py)
maps to requires_ack=False. Both are approval-flow notifications and
should mandate acknowledgment.

Retyped both to NotificationType.APPROVAL so the table lookup yields
requires_ack=True via ACK_REQUIRED_BY_TYPE[NotificationType.APPROVAL].

* test(foundation): move lifecycle parity + smoke-replay tests under tests/foundation/

Phase 4 Task 8 deleted roboco/lifecycle/ but tests/lifecycle/ still held
two files importing roboco.foundation.policy.lifecycle. Mirror the layout
of test_lifecycle_spec.py and test_lifecycle_generators.py (moved in
Phase 4 Tasks 9+10) by relocating them under tests/foundation/ with the
test_lifecycle_* prefix, then delete the now-empty tests/lifecycle/
package.

  tests/lifecycle/test_consumer_parity.py
    -> tests/foundation/test_lifecycle_consumer_parity.py
  tests/lifecycle/test_smoke_replay.py
    -> tests/foundation/test_lifecycle_smoke_replay.py

* build(make): consolidate ci-lifecycle-check into foundation-check

ci-lifecycle-check was a thin wrapper that regenerated lifecycle artifacts
via scripts/build_lifecycle_artifacts.py and gated on git diff. After
Phase 4 it sat alongside foundation-check covering the same drift-gate
intent. Merge the lifecycle-artifact regen + git-diff step into
foundation-check so a single 'make foundation-check' is the canonical
drift gate.

Keep ci-lifecycle-check as a phony alias forwarding to foundation-check
for any external script or CI lane still using the old target name.
Drop the redundant ci-lifecycle-check call from 'make quality'.

* ++

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-11 02:15:47 +02:00
Renn F 73e1e96851 Many fixes and cleanups 2026-05-09 03:15:09 +02:00
Renn F c0c5838baa fix(bash-guard): close scheme-less curl bypass
Previous regex used a greedy [^|]* and required at least one / before
the host, so 'curl roboco-orchestrator:8000/api' (no scheme, no slash)
slipped through. Split into two simpler checks: (a) line starts with
curl/wget/http/https/httpie, AND (b) line contains a forbidden host.
Probe-verified: scheme-ful, scheme-less, and protocol-relative forms
all denied; external URLs still allowed; GitHub-specific deny still
fires first.
2026-05-03 06:17:37 +02:00
Renn F 8381ade3ce fix(bash-guard): deny internal curl to orchestrator/localhost
Prompts told agents internal API calls were denied; the guard only
denied GitHub. Combined with task 4 (X-Agent-Role enforcement) this
closes the manifest-bypass loophole.
2026-05-03 06:11:38 +02:00
62bda0c497 Gateway/full (#9)
* chore(gateway): scaffold gateway package and test layout

* feat(config): add gateway feature flags, coordination thresholds, commit-validator settings

* feat(gateway): add standardized response envelope with ok/error variants

* feat(gateway): add remediation hint catalog for tracing-gap and invalid-state errors

* feat(gateway): add per-role flow/do tool catalog with developer, qa, doc, pm, board configs

* feat(db): add gateway columns — active_claimant_id, heartbeat, pre_block snapshot, acceptance_criteria_status, qa_evidence_inspected

* feat(db): create gateway_triggers table for dispatcher decision logging

* feat(db): align canonical skill set; substitute qa_review -> code_review across agent seeds

* fix(db/008): make skill alignment in-place + idempotent; preserve column and existing custom skills

* feat(gateway): add claimant_lock for single-active-agent invariant with heartbeat staleness

* feat(gateway): add trigger_filter with stale-cleanup, claimant-queue, and cooldown rules

* feat(gateway): add tracing_gate with plan, progress, journal, acceptance_criteria, qa requirements

* refactor(gateway): drop per-file ruff ignores; refactor tracing_gate with dispatch table + GateContext

* feat(gateway): add merge_chain to resolve PR target by branch hierarchy depth

* feat(gateway): add commit_validator with min-length, banned-words, and conventional-shape hints

* feat(gateway): add evidence_builder for verb-response evidence and capped context_briefing

* feat(gateway): add Choreographer skeleton with per-phase verb signatures and DI protocols

* feat(runtime): add spawn_manifest builder for per-role pre-loaded tool registration

Introduces SpawnInputs dataclass + build_for_role(inputs) + write_manifest()
in roboco/runtime/spawn_manifest.py; reads role_config for allowed verbs/tools,
emits JSON manifest that SDK shim reads at container startup to eliminate ToolSearch.

* feat(runtime): wire gateway pre-spawn check (trigger_filter + claimant_lock) into orchestrator behind ROBOCO_GATEWAY_ENABLED flag

- Add GatewayTriggerTable SQLAlchemy ORM model to roboco/db/tables.py
  (matches existing table from migration 007_gateway_triggers_table)
- Add module-level gateway_pre_spawn_check() + helpers to orchestrator.py
  (gated: returns ("spawn", "gateway disabled") immediately when flag is False)
- Wire gateway check into _safe_spawn() — the single dispatcher choke-point
  for all agent spawns; QUEUE or DROP outcome logs and returns None (no spawn)
- ROBOCO_GATEWAY_ENABLED defaults to False; legacy behaviour is unchanged

* feat(agent_sdk): load tool-manifest.json at startup behind ROBOCO_GATEWAY_ENABLED flag (no agent-visible change yet)

Adds load_tool_manifest() to the SDK server that reads env at call-time
so gateway-enabled agents can obtain their pre-registered tool list at
startup; returns None when the flag is off, leaving the legacy briefing
path completely unchanged.

* fix(optimal_brain): skip indexing when source ID is None to eliminate roboco://journals/None spam

- Add `build_doc_source(kind, id_)` module-level helper in indexes/base.py that
  returns None when id_ is None instead of producing a "roboco://journals/None" URI
- Update abstract `build_source_uri` return type to `str | None` so subclasses
  can legitimately signal a missing ID
- Short-circuit `ingest()` and `_prepare_docs_for_batch()` in BaseIndexPlugin
  when `build_source_uri` returns None (debug log, no push to vector store)
- Fix JournalsIndexPlugin.build_source_uri: `kwargs.get("entry_id")` returns the
  kwarg value even when it is None, so fall back to doc_id before calling
  build_doc_source
- Fix ConversationsIndexPlugin.build_source_uri: return None when session_id is
  None rather than producing "roboco://conversations/None-unknown"
- Add 9 unit tests with a piragi-free conftest that stubs sys.modules

* fix(agent_sdk): inject X-Agent-ID header on notification-poller requests

Both `_check_pending_a2a` and `_auto_ack_a2a_notifications` in
`roboco/mcp/a2a_server.py` were calling the main API without identity
headers, causing orchestrator `Missing X-Agent-ID header` warnings on
`GET /api/v1/notifications/pending-a2a` and the ack-a2a POST.

Add module-level `AGENT_ROLE` constant (mirrors the existing `AGENT_ID`
pattern) and pass `{"X-Agent-ID": AGENT_ID, "X-Agent-Role": AGENT_ROLE}`
on both requests.

* fix(git): use ROBOCO_PUBLIC_BASE_URL for commit-trailer Links instead of hardcoded localhost

* fix(test_runner): call uv run pytest/ruff directly; add make to orchestrator Dockerfile as backstop

FileNotFoundError was propagating as a raw 500 when a project had `make test`
configured but make was not installed in the orchestrator container.

Two fixes:
1. Catch FileNotFoundError in _run_command and re-raise as ValidationError (400)
   with a clear message telling the operator to reconfigure the project command
   (e.g. replace 'make test' with 'uv run pytest').
2. Add `make` to the orchestrator Dockerfile runner-stage apt-get so projects
   that legitimately use make targets continue to work without reconfiguration.

* fix(api/git): resolve project by slug or UUID in git_log endpoint

Add _resolve_project_slug() helper to git routes that tries UUID
lookup first and falls back to slug, matching the pattern already
used in project routes. Apply to all four read-only git endpoints:
status, log, branches, diff.

* fix(a2a): auto-create conversation when conversation_id absent; reject empty IDs in URL builder

* fix(agent_sdk): default subagent model to parent agent's model from spawn manifest, not hardcoded haiku

Inject CLAUDE_CODE_SUBAGENT_MODEL env var into every agent container at
spawn time.  Claude Code ≥2.1.x reads this variable to override the
default Task (Agent) subagent model, which otherwise hard-codes
claude-haiku-4-5-20251001.  When the parent runs on a non-Anthropic
provider (e.g. Ollama Cloud / minimax-m2.7:cloud) that Anthropic model
is unreachable, so subagent dispatch fails.

The value follows the same provider-aware translation already used for
the --model CLI flag: Anthropic short names go through MODEL_MAP, and
non-Anthropic identifiers are passed verbatim.  To avoid calling the
class by name inside a @staticmethod, the shared translation logic is
extracted to the module-level _resolve_agent_cli_model() helper;
_resolve_cli_model() now delegates to it.

Verified: CLAUDE_CODE_SUBAGENT_MODEL is present and honoured in the
Claude Code 2.1.123 binary (grep confirmed the env-var lookup pattern
`if(process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_SUBAGENT_MODEL) return KK(…)`).

* chore(makefile): add quality and quality-fast targets composing every PR gate

* chore(quality): add import-linter dependency and gateway boundary contract

* test(property): scaffold tracing-completeness assertion (filled in Phase 4)

* Format test file to pass ruff check

* fix(gateway): drop Protocol scaffolding from choreographer skeleton; del-statements on unused stub args; clear vulture whitelist

* linting

* feat(gateway): Phase 1 dev cutover — ChoreographerDeps + give_me_work

Add ChoreographerDeps frozen dataclass (7 deps: task, work_session, git,
a2a, journal, audit, evidence_repo), refactor Choreographer.__init__ to
accept the bundle, implement give_me_work + _briefing_for via
evidence_builder.build_context_briefing, and add property accessors for
all deps. All Phase 2-4 stubs gain del-statements and still raise
NotImplementedError. 3 tests added and passing; mypy/ruff/vulture clean.

* feat(gateway): implement i_will_work_on handling pending, claimed, and needs_revision recovery

* feat(gateway): implement i_have_committed with plan-required precondition

Replaces the NotImplementedError stub with the real implementation: looks up
the agent's active task, enforces plan presence before recording, calls
task.add_progress, and returns a structured Envelope. Adds 3 unit tests
(records progress, no active task → invalid_state, no plan → tracing_gap).

* feat(gateway): implement i_am_done with smart catch-up and skill resolution

* feat(gateway): implement i_am_blocked (struggle + escalate) and i_am_idle (with unread soft-block)

* feat(gateway): add ContentActions for commit, note, say, dm, evidence with auto-inject and validation

* feat(api/v2): add /api/v2/flow/dev/* endpoints delegating to Choreographer

Six intent-verb endpoints (give_me_work, i_will_work_on, i_have_committed,
i_am_done, i_am_blocked, i_am_idle) under /api/v2/flow/dev/, each a thin
handler that delegates to Choreographer. Includes Pydantic request schemas,
EvidenceRepo Phase 1 stub (all methods return []), get_choreographer FastAPI
dep wired with all 7 service deps, and 8 unit tests (all passing).

* feat(api/v2): add /api/v2/do/* endpoints for commit, note, say, dm, evidence

* feat(mcp): add roboco-flow MCP server for intent verbs (Phase 1: dev verbs implemented)

* feat(mcp): add roboco-do MCP server for smart-wrapped content tools

* feat(runtime): mount per-agent tool-manifest.json on developer-container spawn; gateway flag enabled for devs only

* docs(prompts): rewrite developer role prompt for gateway-only verbs (~15 lines vs 49)

* chore(mcp): confirm dev manifest excludes legacy task/journal/notify/a2a tools (Phase 1 cutover; servers retired in Phase 4)

* feat(gateway): implement claim_review with inline evidence (kills #15) and qa_evidence_inspected tracking

* feat(gateway): implement pass_review with qa_notes/learning/evidence tracing gates

* feat(gateway): implement fail_review with issue list, tracing gates, and dev A2A handoff

* feat(api/v2): add /api/v2/flow/qa/* endpoints (claim_review, pass, fail, give_me_work, i_am_idle)

* feat(mcp): add QA verbs (claim_review, pass, fail) to roboco-flow MCP server

* docs(prompts): rewrite QA role prompt for gateway verbs; explicitly warn against grep-the-commit anti-pattern

* feat(runtime): enable gateway flag for QA-role spawns (Phase 2 cutover)

* feat(gateway): implement claim_doc_task and i_documented with file-list and notes-min-chars gates

* feat(gateway): implement triage (cell PM) and triage_all (main PM) with priority order

* feat(gateway): implement unblock with pre_block_state restoration (kills #23)

* feat(gateway): implement cell_pm_complete with auto-merge to parent branch (kills #22 for cell scope)

* feat(gateway): implement main_pm_complete (open master PR + escalate to CEO)

* feat(gateway): add complete() dispatcher routing to cell_pm_complete or main_pm_complete by role

* feat(gateway): implement escalate_up routing by role.escalation_target

* feat(api/v2): add /api/v2/flow/{documenter,cell_pm,main_pm}/* endpoints

* feat(mcp): add Doc + PM verbs to roboco-flow MCP server (claim_doc_task, i_documented, triage, triage_all, unblock, complete, escalate_up)

* docs(prompts): rewrite Doc, Cell PM, and Main PM role prompts for gateway verbs

* feat(runtime): enable gateway flag for Doc, Cell PM, and Main PM roles (Phase 3 cutover)

* test(integration): full pending->awaiting_ceo_approval test through dev/QA/doc/cell-PM/main-PM gateway path

* chore(tests): rename unused args to _args in flow_server tests

Cleared RUF059 lint blocker for Phase 3 closeout. The destructured args was only consumed in URL-asserting tests; one variant only checks kwargs["json"], so its args is now _args.

* chore: untrack docs/superpowers/ + add to .gitignore

Plans + spec were inadvertently swept into commits 5d41a4b and de0c5b5 by subagent 'git add -A' calls. Removed from index and gitignored going forward; files remain on disk for ongoing reference. They still exist in history of those two commits — invoke a follow-up filter-repo if a full purge is desired.

* feat(gateway): implement Board escalate_to_ceo with role allow-list

Allows main_pm, product_owner, and head_marketing to escalate tasks to
CEO. Enforces awaiting_pm_review state and journal:decision tracing gate.
Closes Phase 4 Task 1.

* feat(gateway): implement board_triage prioritizing strategic root tasks

Adds Choreographer.board_triage and TaskService.list_strategic_for_board.
PO and Head Marketing get curated lists of strategic-nature root tasks
in awaiting_pm_review. Closes Phase 4 Task 2.

* feat(gateway): implement auditor_triage surfacing long-running blocked-task anomalies

Adds Choreographer.auditor_triage and TaskService.list_long_running_blocked.
The Auditor surfaces tasks blocked >30min as anomalies for reflect-note
observation. Closes Phase 4 Task 3.

* chore(tests): add return + arg type annotations to gateway tests

All gateway test functions now have -> None and parameter annotations. Cleared 63 mypy [no-untyped-def] errors that pre-existed since Phase 1. Mypy now clean across tests/unit/gateway/.

* feat(api/v2): add /api/v2/flow/{board,auditor}/* endpoints

Board: triage, escalate_to_ceo, i_am_idle.
Auditor: triage, i_am_idle (read-only role).
Adds EscalateToCeoRequest schema with reason min_length validation.
Closes Phase 4 Task 4.

* feat(mcp): add Board + Auditor verbs to roboco-flow MCP server

Adds escalate_to_ceo MCP tool used by Board (PO + Head Marketing) and Main PM. Updates the implemented set in _validate_role_compatibility. Auditor uses the existing triage tool with role-routing in URL.

Closes Phase 4 Task 5.

* docs(prompts): rewrite Board (PO, Head-Marketing, Auditor) prompts for gateway verbs

All 3 board identity files + roles/board.md now use the slim, gateway-aware shape (no ToolSearch directive, no state-tool table). Auditor is explicit about its read-only scope. Closes Phase 4 Task 6.

* feat(runtime): enable gateway manifest for ALL roles (Phase 4 cutover)

Adds product_owner, head_marketing, auditor to GATEWAY_ENABLED_ROLES. Every spawned agent now gets a gateway manifest mounted at /app/tool-manifest.json. The legacy briefing path is dead. Closes Phase 4 Task 8.

* test(property): implement tracing-completeness assertion across smoke-test batch

Replaces Phase 0 stub. Asserts the 6 tracing-contract requirements on every
completed task: audit_log agent_id non-null per state-transition row,
DEVELOPER:TASK_REFLECTION journal entry, QA:LEARNING journal entry,
CELL_PM/MAIN_PM:DECISION_LOG journal entry, acceptance_criteria_status
covering every criterion with a referencing_artifact_id, and
qa_evidence_inspected = true.

Uses an in-memory ephemeral Postgres test DB (`roboco_test_<pid>_<rand>`)
provisioned per pytest session, not SQLite — the production schema relies
on Postgres-only types (UUID, ARRAY) the SQLite dialect cannot compile.
Tests requesting db_session/smoke_test_batch are auto-skipped when no
Postgres is reachable on localhost:5432; ROBOCO_TEST_DB_HOST/PORT/USER
override the endpoint.

Schema is built via Base.metadata.create_all + manual ALTER for the
acceptance_criteria_status / qa_evidence_inspected columns, NOT via
`alembic upgrade head`. This sidesteps two pre-existing layer-drift items
that block any fresh migration run today:

  1. Migration 001 declares the agentrole Postgres enum with lowercase
     values (qa, developer, ...) but the SQLAlchemy ORM binds
     Enum(AgentRole) to the StrEnum's uppercase NAMES — production DBs
     mask this by being bootstrapped via create_all and stamped at 001.
  2. Migration 008 runs UPDATE agents SET skills WHERE id over an
     agents.skills column that no migration in this chain ever creates.

Documented in conftest.py so a future migrations cleanup can find them.
Also notes that acceptance_criteria_status/qa_evidence_inspected are in
the DB schema (per migration 006) but are NOT mapped on the ORM TaskTable
nor on the Pydantic Task model — services that read them via
`task.qa_evidence_inspected` rely on those values being set on raw rows.
The property test uses raw SQL to read the columns directly, matching the
DB-level contract.

Closes Phase 4 Task 11.

Side change: pyproject.toml — adds asyncpg.* to the existing
[[tool.mypy.overrides]] ignore_missing_imports list (asyncpg ships no
py.typed marker), matching the convention used for redis, anthropic,
piragi, etc.

Test count: 1; backend: Postgres (localhost test DB).

* style(mcp/flow_server): single-line _post call after format pass

* fix(db): map 7 gateway columns from migration 006 to TaskTable + Task model

active_claimant_id, last_heartbeat_at, pre_block_state, pre_block_assignee, pre_block_metadata, acceptance_criteria_status, qa_evidence_inspected: present in DB since migration 006 but absent from the ORM mapping. Gateway code (tracing_gate, choreographer, claimant_lock) reads these via task.<attr>; without the mapping, runtime would AttributeError. Closes PHASE4-BUG-A.

* fix(db): repair alembic chain — neutralize 008, add 009 enum reconcile, ORM uses values_callable

Three coordinated changes that close PHASE4-BUG-B:

1. roboco/db/tables.py — introduce _str_enum() helper that wraps Enum() with values_callable=lambda obj: [m.value for m in obj]. Apply to all 23 StrEnum-typed mapped columns. ORM now serializes by .value (lowercase) to match alembic 001's declared enum values; default Enum() was using .name (uppercase) which never matched.

2. alembic/versions/008_align_skills.py — replace with documented no-op. The original migration referenced agents.skills, a column that has never existed in any migration (the agents table has capabilities, not skills). The substitution intent (qa_review -> code_review) was already satisfied statically in roboco/agents_config.py.

3. alembic/versions/009_enum_reconcile.py — new migration that:
   - Adds missing enum values: agentrole.system, team.fullstack, taskstatus.quarantined.
   - Detects uppercase drift from a Base.metadata.create_all bootstrap and rebuilds agentrole/team/taskstatus enums with lowercase members + USING lower(col::text)::enum on every column referenced. No-op if already lowercase.

Tests stay green: 281 passed.

* feat(services): backfill 36 gateway-shaped methods for Choreographer

The gateway Choreographer was wired to call methods that the underlying
services did not expose. This adds them as thin wrappers + queries (most
alias canonical methods; a handful are gateway-specific variants).

TaskService — 26 methods: aliases (submit_verification, submit_qa,
list_blocked_for_team, list_blocked_all_teams,
list_awaiting_pm_review_for_team, list_assigned_for_agent), agent
queries (agent_for, qa_agent_for_team, documenter_for_team,
cell_pm_for_team, get_active_task_for_agent, list_paused_for_agent),
triage queries (list_awaiting_main_pm_all, all_subtasks_terminal),
state setters (set_plan, mark_evidence_inspected, mark_agent_idle),
QA/Doc claim variants (qa_claim, doc_claim, qa_pass, qa_fail),
PM completion (cell_pm_complete with merge_commit), unblock with
state restore (unblock_with_restore), and escalation
(escalate, escalate_up_to_role). Also adds GatewayAgentView
dataclass that unifies DB and config-derived agent attributes.

JournalService — 4 methods: existence checks (has_decision_for_task,
has_learning_for_task, has_reflect_for_task) + write_struggle.

GitService — 4 methods: branch-keyed entry points (create_pr,
pr_merge, pr_target, diff) plus push_branch helper. Each derives
project + workspace from the task that owns the branch / PR.

WorkSessionService — 2 methods: files_changed + has_unpushed_commits.
PR existence is the proxy for pushed (no per-commit push column).

Choreographer: switched git.push(branch_name) call to push_branch()
to dispatch to the new gateway-shaped helper.

* test(services): unit tests for 36 gateway-backfill methods

Adds happy-path + edge tests for every method added in the prior
backfill commit. Total 61 new tests across:
  - tests/unit/services/test_task.py (36)
  - tests/unit/services/test_journal.py (8)
  - tests/unit/services/test_git.py (10)
  - tests/unit/services/test_work_session.py (7)

Each test mocks at the session boundary (no DB) and stubs adjacent
service methods via a dynamic _bind helper to avoid mypy
[method-assign] noise without resorting to type:ignore comments.

* test(gateway): switch dev catch-up assertion to push_branch

The Choreographer's catch-up sequence was renamed from git.push(branch)
to git.push_branch(branch) when GitService got a gateway-shaped helper
in the prior commit. This updates the existing assertion to match.

* feat(mcp): add roboco-git-readonly server with status/log/diff/branches

Slim FastMCP server exposing the four read-only git tools every role
needs (status, log, diff, branch_list) by forwarding to /api/v1/git/*
on the orchestrator. Replaces the read-only half of the legacy
roboco-git server; write operations now go through gateway verbs in
roboco-flow / roboco-do.

The endpoint shapes mirror the panel-facing API (project_slug,
include_remote, staged/file_path) so the same backend handlers serve
both human and agent traffic.

* refactor(mcp): delete legacy task/journal/notify/a2a/message/project servers

Phase 4 cutover: agents now reach every state-changing surface through
the gateway (roboco-flow intent verbs + roboco-do content tools), with
roboco-git-readonly + roboco-optimal + roboco-docs covering reads. The
seven legacy MCP servers + their handler trees are dead code from the
agent side, so they're removed:

  roboco/mcp/task_server.py            (1020 LOC)
  roboco/mcp/journal_server.py         (512 LOC)
  roboco/mcp/notify_server.py          (440 LOC)
  roboco/mcp/a2a_server.py             (790 LOC)
  roboco/mcp/message_server.py         (682 LOC)
  roboco/mcp/project_server.py         (667 LOC)
  roboco/mcp/tasks/  (handlers+utils)  (~4300 LOC)
  roboco/mcp/test/   (in-container runner; replaced by gateway evidence
                      + manual smoke)
  roboco/mcp/git/    (full server; read-only half migrates to the new
                      slim roboco-git-readonly module, write half is
                      owned by gateway verbs)

Orchestrator updates:
  - _generate_mcp_config registers only roboco-flow, roboco-do,
    roboco-git-readonly, roboco-optimal, and (for docs roles) roboco-docs.
    No more per-role legacy fan-out.
  - base_allow flips to mcp__roboco-flow__*, mcp__roboco-do__*,
    mcp__roboco-optimal__*, mcp__roboco-git-readonly__*. Role-specific
    allow lists are reduced to file IO scoping, since gateway verbs
    enforce role policy server-side.
  - TRACEABILITY_TRIGGER_TOOLS rewritten in terms of the gateway servers
    (mcp__roboco-flow__* / mcp__roboco-do__*) instead of the now-deleted
    per-tool list.

Test fix: tests/unit/services/test_a2a.py imported _handle_send_chat_message
from the deleted a2a_server. The four MCP-layer URL-builder tests (empty
conversation_id guard) are dropped — the equivalent boundary now lives
in /api/v2/do/* which has its own integration coverage. The two
service-layer nil-UUID guard tests are kept; they exercise A2AService
directly and remain meaningful (the panel still uses the v1 chat surface,
where a buggy caller could pass the nil UUID).

Net: ~9600 LOC removed from roboco/mcp/. quality-fast green:
338 tests pass, mypy clean, ruff clean. No /api/v1/* router changes —
those endpoints stay live for the panel UI which still uses every
lifecycle action; agents have no prompts that name them so the path is
dead code from the agent side.

* docs(claude.md): replace legacy MCP listing with gateway/verb-surface section

Phase 4 cutover: agents go through roboco-flow + roboco-do (gateway), not the deleted task/journal/notify/a2a/message/project servers. Document the verb surface per role + the Envelope response shape so future Claude Code sessions land in the correct mental model. Closes Phase 4 Task 13.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-02 03:11:49 +02:00
Renn F d15b7ae561 Enforcements, hooks and code quality 2026-04-21 17:48:45 +02:00
Renn F e4b4ac6d33 Fixed some ggit operations and that. Still needs work. PR problem 2026-04-21 04:21:08 +02:00
Renn F 8e201901c0 I mean, it's at a good place rn... 2026-04-20 15:10:54 +02:00
Renn F 68eded5f2c Traceability hooks and other fixes 2026-01-11 21:32:26 +01:00
Renn F c621710ae6 A2A wiring up 2026-01-06 00:59:09 +01:00
Renn F ecc049684d Fixes Applied
1. Transaction Rollback Bug

  File: roboco/services/optimal_brain/indexes/base.py
  - Changed: On transaction error, now closes and reconnects instead of just rollback
  - Before: conn.rollback() (didn't fully reset connection state)
  - After: conn.close() + store._init_schema() (forces fresh connection)

  2. Docs Directory Path

  Files:
  - roboco/services/optimal.py - Added /app/docs as first path to check
  - docker/orchestrator.Dockerfile - Added COPY docs /app/docs

  3. Shared SentenceTransformer

  Files:
  - Created roboco/services/optimal_brain/shared_embedder.py - Singleton holder
  - Modified roboco/services/optimal_brain/indexes/base.py - Uses shared embedder
  - Modified roboco/services/optimal.py - Closes shared embedder on shutdown
2025-12-27 22:05:07 +01:00
Renn F 8c3bf9e22c Huge refactoring but stuff is working again; minus some issues here and there. 2025-12-26 18:01:53 +01:00
Renn F 7f13e10bf4 Documenter is ignored but it works pretty well 2025-12-25 07:40:39 +01:00
Renn F 67eac35c68 Moved on to DHI (Docker Hardened Images) 2025-12-24 22:19:43 +01:00
Renn F 204b959733 1. Blueprint updates - Added NO_GROUPS escalation docs to all 12 agent blueprints
2. Multi-image Docker architecture - Created role-specific Dockerfiles:
  - agent-base.Dockerfile (shared foundation)
  - agent-pm.Dockerfile, agent-dev-be.Dockerfile, agent-dev-fe.Dockerfile
  - agent-qa-be.Dockerfile, agent-qa-fe.Dockerfile, agent-doc.Dockerfile, agent-ux.Dockerfile
3. Orchestrator updates - roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py:
  - Added AGENT_IMAGES mapping and get_agent_image() function
  - Updated _ensure_agent_image() to build base + specialized images
  - Updated _spawn_container() to use role-specific image
  - Made _generate_mcp_config() role-aware (though kept notify for all since they need to receive)
2025-12-23 21:23:50 +01:00
Renn F 1753f5c9e6 Improved workflow. Ready for git, figma, etc; AND BIGGER TESTS 2025-12-23 04:39:46 +01:00
Renn F 54c0a41055 Improved Orchestrator is now Smarter and cost-efficient/effective. MCPs still unreachable 2025-12-15 00:26:28 +01:00
Renn F bc9cd7575d V0 finally out 2025-12-14 22:05:34 +01:00