Commit Graph
17 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Renn F f2e787c577 feat(grok): auto-refresh the SuperGrok token + fail fast on a dead one
The grok access token has a ~6h server-set TTL (the client cannot lengthen it),
the CLI has no refresh command, and headless 'grok -p' does NOT self-refresh an
expired token -- it hangs forever at an interactive 'Waiting for authorization...'
prompt. Live evidence: a fleet went silent within ~3 min of the token's 06:54
expiry, every agent a zombie hung at the prompt, requiring a manual 'grok login'.

- grok_auth.refresh_if_stale: mint a fresh access token from the offline_access
  refresh token via xAI's OIDC refresh_token grant (https://auth.x.ai/oauth2/token),
  atomically rewriting auth.json. The orchestrator runs it once per dispatch tick
  (serial -> no concurrent refresh-token rotation race; throttled to 60s), keeping
  the host credential live so agents never mount a dead one. No more manual login.
- Entrypoint --check guard: refuse to run (exit 78) on a missing/expired token
  instead of hanging for hours -- surfaced to _handle_stopped_container.
- Orchestrator grok-dir mount flipped read-only -> read-write in all three compose
  files so the refresh can rewrite auth.json; the per-agent file mount stays RO.

Verified: 10 unit tests; the --check guard exits 0/1/1 (valid/expired/missing)
inside the real roboco-agent-grok image. Gate green (ruff/mypy/xenon).
2026-06-19 10:15:58 +02:00
fa3e25e656 feat(grok): pluggable agent providers + Grok on the official grok CLI (#218)
* feat(providers): pluggable agent providers + Grok (xAI) backend

Add a roboco/llm/providers/ seam — an AgentProvider lifecycle ABC and a
ProviderRegistry keyed by ModelProvider — so the orchestrator can drive
agent backends other than Claude Code.

The first non-Claude backend is GrokProvider for xAI's grok-build-0.1.
xAI is OpenAI-compatible only (no Anthropic-Messages endpoint), so a Grok
agent runs an OpenAI-protocol runtime pointed at https://api.x.ai/v1
rather than the ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL injection the other providers use. It
reuses the orchestrator's existing mount/auth assembly, so it inherits the
same MCP gateway + tool-manifest wiring as every other agent by
construction, and passes its prompt via env (never an argv positional).

The change is purely additive: only GROK routes through the registry;
Anthropic / Ollama Cloud / self-hosted spawns run the existing
_spawn_container path unchanged.

Includes:
- ModelProvider.GROK (migration 038) + a seeded Grok provider row
  (migration 039) + a grok-build-0.1 catalog entry
- GET/PUT /api/providers/grok-key to store the xAI key (Fernet-encrypted,
  reusing the existing provider-key machinery)
- ClaudeCodeProvider reference adapter over the current spawn
- unit tests for the registry, GrokProvider (gateway wiring, no
  ANTHROPIC_* leak, prompt-injection safety, failure paths) and routing

The dedicated roboco-agent-grok image and the exact OpenAI-protocol CLI
invocation are the remaining piece to finalise with xAI.

* feat(providers): native Grok runtime — opencode image, config gen, panel key

Complete the native Grok (xAI) path so grok-build-0.1 runs as a real
RoboCo agent, not just the provider seam.

- roboco-agent-grok image (docker/agent-grok.Dockerfile): FROM agent-base
  + opencode (the OpenAI-protocol runtime). One image serves every role;
  role behaviour comes from the mounted manifest / mcp-config / system
  prompt, exactly as on the Claude path.
- Entrypoint renders opencode.json at spawn from the GrokProvider env
  contract + the mounted Claude Code mcp-config.json
  (roboco.llm.providers.opencode_config): translates RoboCo's gateway
  servers (roboco-flow / roboco-do / ...) into opencode's mcp block,
  declares the xAI OpenAI-compatible provider + model, and wires
  permissions + instructions. Pure, unit-tested translation.
- Orchestrator registers GrokProvider with the registry-qualified image
  (_qualify_agent_image) so it resolves in local and registry deploys.
- Compose (both files + the registry compose) gain an agent-grok-image
  builder service.
- Panel: a Grok (xAI) API key card on the AI Providers page, plus the
  grok ModelProvider value.

KNOWN PARITY GAP (opencode runtime): the bash-guard PAT-scrub and the
transcript-based usage/cost capture are Claude Code hooks and do not
transfer to opencode. bash permission is operator-tunable
(ROBOCO_GROK_BASH_PERMISSION) so a deployment can fail closed until a
security/usage-parity opencode plugin lands. That plugin and live E2E
validation are the remaining work to finalize with xAI.

* ci(release): build + publish the roboco-agent-grok image

Add roboco-agent-grok to the release workflow's image build/publish map so
registry deploys carry the Grok runtime image (parity with every other
agent image). Split from the feature commit because pushing a workflow
change requires a workflow-scoped token.

* fix(migration): commit the grok enum value before seeding (autocommit_block)

CI's "Apply database migrations" failed with asyncpg
UnsafeNewEnumValueUsageError: alembic runs the whole upgrade in a single
transaction, so migration 039's INSERT used 'grok' in the same transaction
that 038 added it — which Postgres forbids. Splitting into two migration
files did not help (one transaction spans both). Wrap the ALTER TYPE ADD
VALUE in op.get_context().autocommit_block() so the value commits before 039
(and any later migration) uses it. Still renders in offline --sql, so the
enum-migration-parity test is unaffected.

* feat(grok): price grok-build-0.1 + secret-scrub opencode plugin

- pricing.py: add grok-build-0.1 rates ($1/1M input, $0.20 cached, $2/1M
  output), verified against xAI's published pricing. Grok is a priced
  non-Anthropic model, so cost computes the moment usage is captured.
- secret-scrub.js: an opencode tool.execute.before plugin porting the
  security-critical bash-guard deny rules (git network ops, credential-file
  reads, /proc env, internal-host HTTP, roboco.* imports, ROBOCO_AGENT_ID
  forgery, env dumps, destructive rm) to the opencode runtime — restoring the
  guard the Claude Code hook can't provide there. Throwing denies the call
  (confirmed by opencode's env-protection example). Wired into the generated
  opencode.json plugin array + baked into the grok image.

Deny logic verified via node (9 deny + 5 allow cases). UNVALIDATED against a
live opencode runtime: confirm it fires in the live E2E spawn before a Grok
dev-agent touches a real repo; the bash permission is operator-tunable as a
second gate.

Cost CAPTURE (distinct from pricing) is intentionally NOT built yet: opencode's
plugin hooks expose model info but no token/usage object, so the capture path
is unconfirmed and needs the live spawn to settle.

* feat(grok): read opencode session usage for cost capture

Confirmed by inspecting a local opencode run: opencode persists per-session
usage in SQLite at ~/.local/share/opencode/opencode.db — the `session` table
carries cost + tokens_input/output/reasoning/cache_read/cache_write. xAI's
response usage object (prompt_tokens, completion_tokens,
prompt_tokens_details.cached_tokens, completion_tokens_details.reasoning_tokens)
maps directly onto those columns.

Add opencode_usage.read_session_usage / cost_for_session: read the opencode DB
and price the tokens via roboco.billing.pricing (our cost stays authoritative;
opencode's own `cost` column is kept for reference). Tested against a fixture DB
mirroring the real schema (single session, summed sessions, missing/empty DB).

Remaining wiring (for the live spawn): mount the opencode data dir on grok
spawn + call cost_for_session at reap to record the usage rollup.

* fix(grok): correct opencode provider (Responses API), stdin, reasoning cost

A live opencode run against api.x.ai/v1 surfaced three real bugs:

1. Provider package — grok-build-0.1 is driven via the OpenAI Responses API
   (opencode calls model.responses()). @ai-sdk/openai-compatible is
   chat/completions only and errors "responses is not a function". Switch the
   generated opencode.json provider + the grok image to @ai-sdk/openai.
2. Headless hang — `opencode run` blocks after init without a TTY; close stdin
   (`< /dev/null`) in the entrypoint so it proceeds to the model call.
3. Reasoning-token cost — grok-build-0.1 is a reasoning model; reasoning tokens
   bill as output but opencode stores them in a separate column. cost_for_session
   folds tokens_reasoning into output (else ~22x undercount).

Verified end-to-end against a real session row (input=6120, output=1,
reasoning=226, cache_read=1856): our pricing reproduces opencode's stored USD
cost ($0.0069452) exactly. Tests anchored to that real row.

* feat(grok): first-class xAI/Grok routing mode (UI + backend)

The Routing-mode toggle had Anthropic / Ollama / Self-Hosted / Mix but no way
to route the whole org to Grok. Add it end to end:

- backend: apply_mode("grok") + _apply_grok (GLOBAL default -> grok-build-0.1) +
  derive_mode "grok" detection; ApplyModeRequest/ModeResponse accept "grok".
- panel: a "Grok" routing-mode card (between Anthropic and Ollama, gated on the
  xAI key) + flipToGrok; a Grok group in the per-agent mix dropdown +
  catalogGrokOnly + a grok ProviderBadge variant; the mix-save key check and
  the AI-routing description now cover Grok.
- tests: integration derive_mode/apply_mode "grok" cases (+ grok provider row
  in the fixture).

Gated: ruff + mypy clean; panel typecheck + lint clean.

* feat(grok): reasoning-effort by role (cut grok-build cost on cheap roles)

grok-build-0.1 reasons heavily by default and reasoning bills at the output
rate (a live "say ok" call emitted ~300 reasoning tokens, ~85% of its cost).
Confirmed live that opencode's `--variant minimal` cuts reasoning ~54%
(298 -> 136 tokens, same prompt).

GrokProvider now picks reasoning effort by role: code-quality roles (developer,
qa, pr_reviewer) keep full reasoning; coordination / docs / board roles
(cell_pm, main_pm, documenter, product_owner, head_marketing, auditor, prompter,
secretary) run "minimal". It's passed to opencode via the entrypoint's
`--variant`. Operators can force one effort for ALL grok agents with the
ROBOCO_GROK_REASONING_EFFORT env (minimal | high | max, or default/full).

Tests cover the role map, the env override, and the spawn env wiring.

* style(panel): show the Grok (xAI) key card above the Ollama card

* fix(grok): stop opencode subagent-stream hang at the config layer

The Grok pr_reviewer wedged in_progress forever: opencode's default agent ran
with the subagent `task` tool enabled, spawned an Explore subagent on
grok-build-0.1 whose model call opened an SSE stream that went idle, and the
run hung with no timeout.

- Hard-disable opencode's subagent `task` tool in the generated opencode.json.
  No RoboCo role uses opencode-internal subagents — work flows through the
  gateway verbs — so removing the tool kills the hang trigger outright.
- Set provider.xai.options.timeout + chunkTimeout (operator-tunable via
  ROBOCO_GROK_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS / ROBOCO_GROK_CHUNK_TIMEOUT_MS) as the
  defence-in-depth backstop; chunkTimeout aborts an idle stream.
- Bundle the permission + timeout + subagent knobs into an OpencodeGuards
  dataclass (keeps the builder under the arg-count gate).
- Drop the dead ROBOCO_AGENT_TOOLS spawn env (it had no consumer); opencode
  tool restriction lives in the rendered config now.

* feat(grok): reaper watchdog kills wedged opencode containers

The heartbeat reaper deliberately skips a task whose assignee holds a live
ACTIVE container, so a Claude agent deep in a long edit/test cycle isn't
churned out from under live work. A wedged opencode container breaks that
assumption: it stays ACTIVE while firing no gateway verb, so its heartbeat
never advances and the live-instance skip would shield its task forever — the
exact way the Grok pr_reviewer parked in_progress.

Add a longer grok-idle kill threshold (ROBOCO_GROK_IDLE_KILL_SECONDS, default
900s, well past the stream chunk timeout). A GROK instance idle past it is
force-removed (its logs dumped to disk first) and evicted from the instance
registry, so the same reaper pass then releases the task. Only GROK runtimes
are eligible — a quiet Claude agent keeps the heartbeat-skip protection.

* feat(grok): guard interactive roles from GROK routes (interim)

intake (prompter) and secretary run a held-open chat session driven by the
Claude Agent SDK. GROK has no interactive runtime yet, and a GROK route for
those slugs would be spawned with the route creds injected as ANTHROPIC_*
against api.x.ai/v1 — the wrong protocol — producing a silent, empty reply
(the blank intake we observed).

Downgrade a GROK route for intake-1/secretary-1 to the Anthropic default with
a logged warning. The one-shot delivery roles route to GROK unchanged. This
guard is replaced by the real interactive fork once the opencode interactive
driver lands.

* feat(grok): capture one-shot Grok usage/cost from the opencode store

A GROK agent runs opencode, not Claude Code: it has no SDK /usage/status
server and writes no Claude transcript, so _resolve_final_token_usage found
nothing and every Grok agent finalized at 0 tokens / $0 — the opencode_usage
reader existed but had no caller.

- Mount a per-agent opencode data dir ($DATA/opencode/<agent_id> →
  /home/agent/.local/share/opencode) so opencode.db is captured, and mount the
  same host dir into the orchestrator (/data/opencode) in all three compose
  files so the finalizer can read it back — the opencode analogue of the
  mounted Claude transcript.
- _resolve_final_token_usage branches on provider_type: GROK reads opencode.db
  via opencode_usage (reasoning folded into output, billed at the output rate)
  and skips the SDK/transcript path. A 0-token read logs a WARNING so a silent
  mount failure isn't mistaken for a real zero-cost run.
- ROBOCO_OPENCODE_DATA_DIR overrides the in-orchestrator path for local runs.

* feat(grok): make interactive spawns first-class on AgentProvider (additive)

The AgentProvider ABC modelled only the one-shot lifecycle (spawn/stop/
health_check/remove), so the interactive intake/secretary roles could never
route through a provider. Add an opt-in interactive surface:

- supports_interactive class flag (default False).
- InteractiveSpawnSpec: the resolved AgentConfig + session id + role-specific
  image + optional HMAC token — everything a provider needs without importing
  orchestrator internals.
- spawn_interactive(spec): a non-abstract default that declines via
  ProviderError, so every existing one-shot provider is unchanged.

Pure scaffolding — no provider opts in yet (GrokProvider flips the flag when
its interactive driver lands). Zero behavioural change.

* feat(grok): Grok-native interactive runtime (opencode serve) — container side

Builds the Grok analogue of the Claude intake/secretary live-session runtime,
satisfying the same IntakeSession seam so the existing IntakeDriver loop,
message source, relay, and StreamChunk panel contract are reused unchanged:

- OpencodeServeSession: a held-open `opencode serve` session (context persists
  across turns) where each human turn is one synchronous POST /session/:id/
  message; normalize_opencode_message maps the reply parts to text/thinking/
  tool_use/draft/turn_end chunks (draft via a propose_draft tool part or the
  fenced roboco-draft fallback). Doc-verified against opencode's server API.
- grok_intake_main / grok_secretary_main: container entrypoints mirroring the
  Claude mains but yielding an OpencodeServeSession; they render opencode.json
  (xAI provider + MCP + system prompt) first, then run the receiver + driver.
- roboco-agent-grok-prompter / -secretary images (FROM roboco-agent-grok) +
  their builder services in all three compose files.

UNVERIFIED-LIVE: the opencode serve flow + exact Part schema + draft path need
a live run against grok-build-0.1 (the part mapping is defensive). The
orchestrator wiring that routes a GROK intake/secretary route to these images
is the next step (a design decision is open — see the handoff notes).

* feat(grok): route interactive intake/secretary to opencode-serve images

Wire the GROK interactive path the in-place way (matching how the interactive
roles already choose ANTHROPIC_* per route), so a GROK route launches the
Grok-native opencode-serve image instead of the Claude SDK-driver image:

- _spawn_intake_container / _spawn_secretary_container pick the
  grok-prompter / grok-secretary image (ensuring the base→grok→interactive
  build chain) when the route is GROK, and stamp provider_type on the spec +
  AgentConfig so finalize routes usage to the opencode store.
- _build_intake_run_cmd / _build_secretary_run_cmd inject OPENAI_* + the
  opencode store mount + system-prompt env for GROK via a shared
  _append_interactive_provider_env, keeping ANTHROPIC_* for every other
  provider. The intake's minimal mounts (no gateway MCP) are preserved, so
  Grok intake matches the Claude intake's tool surface (the spec).
- Add a per-agent opencode store mount to the interactive host paths so
  interactive Grok usage/cost is captured like the one-shot path.

Removes the interim Phase-0 routing guard (the real path supersedes it) and
retires the unused AgentProvider.spawn_interactive/InteractiveSpawnSpec seam —
the interactive roles have a bespoke assembly that the one-shot provider
surface doesn't fit, so the fork lives in their own builders.

UNVERIFIED-LIVE: end-to-end intake/secretary chat on Grok needs the stack up +
opencode serve confirmed against grok-build-0.1.

* feat(grok): surface intake/secretary in the mix-mode picker; doc guardrail parity

- Panel: add intake-1 (prompter) and secretary-1 to the mix-mode per-agent
  routing list so an operator can assign Grok (or Claude) to the interactive
  roles from the UI; assigning a Grok model routes them to the opencode-serve
  image. tsc + eslint clean.
- opencode_config: correct the now-stale parity note — bash-guard is ported
  (secret-scrub.js) and usage/cost is captured (opencode store); the remaining
  gap is the budget/loop/stop/prompt-injection hooks, which need a sidecar
  plugin (open decision), with ROBOCO_GROK_BASH_PERMISSION as the interim gate.

* test(grok): mypy-clean the reaper watchdog + interactive spawn tests

The CI mypy scope (roboco/ tests/) flagged test-only typing issues my per-file
runs missed: direct method assignment (orch._remove_container = AsyncMock())
trips [method-assign], and a module-level dict[str,str] is invariant against
the dict[str, str|None] the run-spec expects.

- Use monkeypatch.setattr for _remove_container in the watchdog tests.
- Annotate the shared _HOSTS as dict[str, str | None].

Production code unchanged; mypy roboco/ tests/ is green.

* feat(grok): cost-ceiling kill-switch (budget-guardrail parity)

Claude Code's per-agent token-budget hook fires against the SDK :9000 server;
opencode exposes NO usage/budget hook to a plugin (confirmed against its plugin
docs), so the budget kill-switch can't be a plugin/sidecar — the orchestrator
enforces it instead.

_enforce_grok_cost_budget runs each dispatch tick: for every ACTIVE GROK
container it reads cumulative cost from the opencode store (the Phase-2 reader)
and kills + evicts it past ROBOCO_GROK_MAX_COST_USD (0 = off), after which the
reaper releases the freed task. This also catches a runaway loop that keeps
firing verbs (so it evades the idle watchdog) but still burns cost.

Covers the budget/runaway-burn slice of guardrail parity. The remaining Claude
hooks (prompt-injection PRE-gate, stop-guard terminal-verb) have no blocking
opencode equivalent — opencode's message/stop hooks are observe-only — and the
interactive reasoning-variant has no opencode.json/serve knob (CLI-flag only);
both are pinned for a live probe rather than shipped as a guess.

* docs(grok): document Grok's reduced guardrail posture (honest, not blocking)

Grok agents run on opencode, not Claude Code, so they do NOT have full
guardrail parity — claiming otherwise would be false. Document it truthfully
and keep them usable rather than blocking them.

- Panel routing card: an amber caveat shown in Grok/Mix mode — command/
  secret-exfil guard + cost cap apply to Grok, but the prompt-injection guard
  does NOT (opencode cannot block a turn); Anthropic/Ollama/Self-Hosted run
  through Claude Code with the full guard set; prefer those for agents that
  ingest untrusted or cross-agent content; Grok is safe for trusted work.
- docs/self/architecture/llm-provider-security.md: the reference — the two
  runtimes, which provider uses which, the per-guardrail parity matrix, why
  the injection/stop gaps exist (opencode hooks are observe-only), and the
  routing recommendation (delivery roles handling untrusted content → a
  Claude-Code-runtime provider).

Panel tsc + eslint clean.

* fix(grok): make the live interactive path work — store perms, error surfacing, variant

Found by actually running opencode serve locally (the path was doc-verified but
never executed). Three fixes:

1. EACCES on the opencode store mount (the live intake crash): on Linux docker
   auto-creates a missing bind source as root:root, so the non-root agent user
   could not mkdir/write in /home/agent/.local/share/opencode and opencode died
   at boot. _ensure_opencode_data_dir pre-creates the per-agent dir 0777 before
   the mount (one-shot via the _GrokHost seam, interactive in both spawns).

2. Silent blank reply on a model error: opencode reports a turn failure in
   info.error with parts=[], NOT as a part — verified live (a bad xAI key
   returns info.error APIError). send() / normalize_opencode_message now surface
   it as an "error" StreamChunk so a failed turn is never blank (the original
   intake bug class). Confirmed live: the error now renders.

3. Reasoning variant on the serve path: the live OpenAPI shows the message body
   accepts a "variant" field (it is NOT CLI-only, as the docs implied), so the
   pin is unblocked. send() passes ROBOCO_GROK_VARIANT as the per-turn variant;
   the orchestrator sets it per-role (_reasoning_effort_for) for interactive
   Grok, the same lever as the one-shot --variant.

opencode serve startup, POST /session, session-id extraction, the part-type
mapping (text/reasoning/tool), and the error path are all validated against a
live opencode 1.17.8. A real successful grok reply still needs a funded key.

* fix(grok): pre-create agent-owned ~/.local in the grok image (opencode state EACCES)

Running the built grok-prompter container surfaced a second EACCES the
mechanism analysis missed: bind-mounting the opencode store at
~/.local/share/opencode makes docker create the intermediate ~/.local AS ROOT,
so the non-root agent user then cannot create its sibling ~/.local/state and
opencode dies at boot. Pre-create the ~/.local tree agent-owned in the image so
the mount leaves the parents writable. Complements the orchestrator 0777
host-source pre-create (which covers the bind source on Linux).

Verified live: with this fix the container starts clean, opencode serve opens
the session, a POST /turn produces a real grok reply, and all chunks
(thinking/text/turn_end) reach the relay endpoint.

* feat(grok): prompt-injection guard for Grok (parity with the Claude hook)

The injection guard is RoboCo's own hook (user-prompt-hook.sh), not a runtime
built-in, so it can be recreated at our input boundary regardless of runtime —
opencode's lack of a blocking pre-prompt hook is irrelevant.

- prompt_guard.detect_injection: the deny patterns ported to reusable Python.
- IntakeDriver._run_turn scans every interactive turn before sending it to the
  model and denies a match as an error chunk. Covers BOTH Grok (opencode) and
  the Claude SDK intake (which runs with setting_sources=[] and so never loaded
  the bash hook — it was unguarded too).
- The one-shot grok entrypoint scans ROBOCO_INITIAL_PROMPT and refuses a
  poisoned task prompt (parity with the Claude UserPromptSubmit deny).
- Broadened the pattern (Python + the bash hook, kept in sync) to catch the
  multi-qualifier canonical phrasing "ignore all previous instructions", which
  the single-qualifier original missed — without false-positiving on
  "ignore the linting rules" (an intermediate non-qualifier word breaks it).

So Grok now has the command/secret-exfil guard (secret-scrub), the cost cap,
AND the injection guard. Verified: 94 agent_sdk tests pass; bash + Python agree
on detect/miss cases.

* docs(grok): drop the security disclaimers — injection guard closes the gap

With the prompt-injection guard now recreated for Grok (prior commit), the
"Grok lacks the injection guard / prefer Claude for delivery roles" warning is
no longer true, so remove it:

- Panel routing card: replace the amber "prefer Claude / not safe" caveat with
  a neutral one-liner — Grok agents run on opencode; the command/secret-exfil
  guard, the prompt-injection guard, and the cost cap all apply.
- docs/self/architecture/llm-provider-security.md: prompt-injection row flips to
  "yes" for Grok; intro + routing recommendation updated to "effective security
  parity, any agent (incl. delivery roles) can run on Grok"; the only remaining
  unported hook is the non-security stop-guard.
- opencode_config docstring: the remaining gap is now just the stop-guard
  (budget + injection are covered).

Panel tsc + eslint clean.

* fix(grok): allow external-directory reads so the pr-reviewer can work

Live NAS run showed the Grok pr-reviewer claim the review and fetch the diff,
then write it to /tmp and FAIL to read it back: opencode auto-denied
"external_directory (/tmp/*)" — its file tools refuse paths outside the project
cwd, and in headless serve/run mode an "ask" permission auto-rejects (no human).

Add permission.external_directory (default "allow", env
ROBOCO_GROK_EXTERNAL_DIR_PERMISSION) to the generated opencode.json. The
container is the sandbox and secret-scrub still blocks credential-file reads, so
allowing in-container external-dir reads is safe and unblocks legitimate scratch
use (e.g. the pr-reviewer grepping a large diff in /tmp).

Verified live against grok-build-0.1: with external_directory:"allow" the Read
tool reads a file outside cwd and returns its contents (no auto-reject); the
plain-string form is accepted by opencode 1.17.8.

Needs a rebuild of roboco-agent-grok + a pr-reviewer re-run on the NAS to confirm.

* refactor(grok): split eligibility out of _maybe_kill_wedged_grok (xenon C -> B)

CI complexity gate (make quality -> xenon --max-absolute B) flagged
_maybe_kill_wedged_grok at rank C — too many guard branches in one method.

Extract the kill-candidate decision into _wedged_grok_slug(task, last_heartbeat)
-> slug | None (recent-heartbeat / no-owner / not-ACTIVE / not-GROK all yield
None); _maybe_kill_wedged_grok now just kills + evicts the returned slug.
Behaviour is identical (same guards, same order) — the reaper watchdog tests
pass unchanged. xenon now passes on the full package; ruff + mypy clean.

* feat(grok): start the in-container SDK server + budget feed (Claude parity)

The keystone of the Grok parity work (CEO's "take Claude as baseline, create
what's missing" call): the one-shot Grok container now starts the same SDK
server the Claude path runs, so the per-verb circuit breaker (the flow/do MCP
servers already POST /verb/attempted to it), the per-session budget/loop
counters, the terminal-verb tracking, and the SessionEnd post-mortem all work
on Grok instead of being silently absent.

- entrypoint: launch roboco.agent_sdk.server (bare venv python, not `uv run`
  which would re-sync the drifted clone lock and stall), wait for /health,
  reset counters; run opencode WITHOUT exec so the script regains control to
  run the post-mortem and the silent-exit substitute after the run returns.
- budget-feed.js: opencode plugin that gates on /budget/status in
  tool.execute.before (halt/loop deny — the only place to stop a runaway
  one-shot run; opencode has no PostToolUse-deny) and records the executed
  tool + args-hash in tool.execute.after. Fail-open; bare-verb normalization
  for MCP-namespaced terminal verbs.
- silent-exit substitute: on a graceful exit with no terminal verb the
  entrypoint posts /terminal/force_substitute so the task isn't left stuck
  claimed/in_progress (Stop-hook parity at the boundary).
- opencode_config: wire budget-feed into the plugin array; add
  ROBOCO_OPENCODE_EXTRA_PLUGINS so per-image role tool plugins load scoped to
  one role; read the per-role ROBOCO_GROK_EDIT_PERMISSION.

Targeted gate green (ruff/mypy/xenon + opencode_config tests; node --check on
the plugins; bash -n on the entrypoint).

* feat(grok): give the Grok Secretary its CEO-authority tools (blocker)

The Grok Secretary could chat but had zero directive tools — it could not read
company state or act on a CEO command, so it was non-functional. This is the
integration blocker.

- secretary-tools.js: opencode plugin registering read_company_state /
  read_task / submit_directive via the Hooks.tool API, each calling
  /api/secretary/* with the container's HMAC agent token — a direct port of the
  Claude Secretary's SDK tools (secretary_driver.build_secretary_options). The
  high-impact directive kinds stay gated server-side (queued for CEO confirm).
- agent-grok-secretary.Dockerfile: bake the plugin and scope it to this image
  via ROBOCO_OPENCODE_EXTRA_PLUGINS, so only the Secretary carries CEO authority.
- grok_secretary_main: correct the docstring that falsely claimed the tools
  reached the API "through the mounted MCP gateway" (there is no gateway mount;
  they're an opencode plugin).
- secretary.md: name the three tools and restate the confirm-before-act gate.

Verified locally that opencode loads a file-path plugin importing
@opencode-ai/plugin and resolves the package; the live model-tool-call +
backend round-trip is flagged UNVERIFIED-LIVE for the NAS.

* feat(grok): give the Grok Intake its propose_draft tool (draft card)

The prompter prompt tells the model to call propose_draft when the spec is
ready, but on Grok that tool didn't exist — so no draft chunk, no panel draft
card, and the human couldn't launch a task from a Grok intake chat.

- intake-tools.js: opencode plugin registering propose_draft via Hooks.tool;
  the execute() only ACKs — the driver (OpencodeServeSession.normalize ->
  _is_propose_draft -> _draft_from_tool_input) intercepts the tool CALL and
  emits the `draft` chunk the panel renders.
- agent-grok-prompter.Dockerfile: bake the plugin, scoped to this image via
  ROBOCO_OPENCODE_EXTRA_PLUGINS (delivery roles never draft).
- test: a propose_draft tool part normalizes to a draft chunk (not a tool_use).

The live tool-call -> draft-card path is flagged UNVERIFIED-LIVE for the NAS.

* feat(grok): scope opencode edit/bash/external-dir permissions per role

Grok wrote ONE global permission block, so a Grok pr_reviewer (or qa / PM /
auditor) ran with edit=allow + bash=allow on untrusted PR content. Now the
permissions are derived per role, mirroring orchestrator._get_role_permissions
on the Claude path:

- edit  — allow only roles that write code (role_config.allows_write:
  developer / documenter); everyone else edit=deny.
- bash  — allow only roles that legitimately run a shell (developer /
  documenter / cell_pm / main_pm); the read-only reviewers (qa / pr_reviewer /
  auditor) and the board get bash=deny. secret-scrub still guards the rest.
- external_directory — only the pr_reviewer reads scratch outside its cwd (the
  /tmp diff); delivery roles get deny.

One-shot roles resolve these in GrokProvider._append_grok_env; the interactive
intake/secretary set edit=deny + bash=deny in the orchestrator (intake keeps
external-dir reads for sibling product repos, the secretary does not). The
Claude path is untouched — the permission env is a GROK-only contract.

Targeted gate green (ruff/mypy/xenon + provider + interactive-spawn tests).

* feat(grok): park the provider on an xAI 429 (break the respawn loop)

A one-shot grok run that hit an xAI 429 exited without a terminal verb; the
dispatcher then re-spawned the same task every tick (429 -> exit -> respawn), a
container/token/cost loop with no living agent to call i_am_blocked.

- entrypoint: detect a rate-limit signature in the run output and exit 75
  (EX_TEMPFAIL); a rate-limited task is NOT substituted — it must be retried.
- _handle_stopped_container: on a grok exit 75, park the provider via the
  rate-limit tracker (retry_after window) instead of crash-retrying, and don't
  count it as a crash. The existing probe-resume loop clears the park after the
  window (unknown-provider time-expiry fallback) and the task is retried.
- spawn_agent: a grok-only, fail-open guard skips the launch while the provider
  is parked, so the dispatcher no-ops instead of looping. The Claude path is
  untouched.

Targeted gate green (ruff/mypy/xenon + new rate-limit tests; bash -n on the
entrypoint).

* feat(grok): close the secret-scrub bash-guard parity gaps

secret-scrub.js (the opencode bash guard) was missing three rules the Claude
bash-guard hook has, leaving a Grok dev able to read secrets the Claude path
blocks:

- source / dot-source of a credential-bearing file (source .env, . ./.env,
  .bashrc / .git-credentials / .netrc / /proc/*/environ).
- interpreter one-liner reading a credential file
  (python -c "open('.env')", node -e "readFileSync('.git-credentials')").
- git-ops check now runs on a SKELETONIZED command (heredoc bodies + echo/printf
  args stripped) so a README/heredoc that merely documents `git push` is no
  longer mistaken for invoking it — a false-positive parity fix from the Claude
  guard.

Functionally smoke-tested with node against the real plugin (git push denied;
echo/heredoc "git push" allowed; source/interpreter cred reads denied; normal
commands allowed). Live opencode firing stays flagged in the file header.

* fix(grok): record a usage session for interactive intake/secretary (M1+M7)

_spawn_intake_container / _spawn_secretary_container built the AgentInstance by
hand and never recorded an agent_spawn_sessions row, so the reap finalizer had
no usage_session_id to look up — every interactive session (Claude or Grok)
finalized at 0 tokens / $0 in the rollups. Record the session (task_id=None) and
pin its id on the instance, mirroring _launch_spawn; the GROK path reads
opencode.db by this id, the Claude path reads the transcript.

Also correct the grok_intake_main docstring (M7): it claimed the serve process
was "gateway-wired" with an "MCP gateway", but interactive intake mounts no
gateway — its only tool is propose_draft, registered by the intake-tools.js
plugin.

* fix(grok): surface a dead opencode-serve clearly instead of a zombie chat (M2)

If `opencode serve` died after the session opened, every subsequent turn failed
with an opaque httpx connection error while the container lingered. send() now
detects the exited subprocess (returncode set) and yields a clear error chunk +
turn_end so the panel shows a real "session ended — start a new chat" message;
the idle watchdog / a human reap then tears the container down.

* fix(grok): close the panel relay when the cost-cap kills an interactive chat (M4)

_enforce_grok_cost_budget killed + evicted a container directly. For the
interactive roles (intake/secretary) that left the panel SSE relay open with no
close sentinel, so the chat froze with no explanation. Add
PrompterLiveRegistry.close_by_agent (push a final error event, then close every
session bound to that agent) and call it from the cost-cap watchdog when the
killed agent is the intake or secretary, so the panel reports the chat ended on
the cost cap instead of hanging.

* fix(grok): make the opencode runtime actually load — proven live on grok-build-0.1

Live verification (opencode 1.17.8 + grok-build-0.1, funded key) showed the Grok
runtime was loading INERT, three ways:

1. The provider override `provider.xai.npm=@ai-sdk/openai` failed model
   resolution (ProviderModelNotFoundError) — opencode can't resolve that package
   from its module path. Worse, ANY custom `provider.xai` block (even just
   options) breaks plugin-tool registration. opencode's BUILT-IN xai provider
   drives grok-build-0.1 with working tool-calls, so emit NO provider block; the
   key + base reach it via XAI_API_KEY / XAI_BASE_URL env (provider.options.apiKey
   alone does NOT authenticate).
2. Plugins referenced by absolute path in the config `plugin:` array never
   registered their hooks/tools. opencode 1.17.8 only registers from the plugin
   AUTO-DISCOVERY dir (~/.config/opencode/plugin/). Bake all plugins there.
3. Plugins must use a NAMED export, not `export default`.

Changes:
- opencode_config: no `provider` block, no `plugin` array; drop the dead
  XaiTarget + timeout machinery; build_opencode_config now takes a model string.
- GrokProvider / orchestrator interactive env: inject XAI_API_KEY + XAI_BASE_URL
  (drop the now-unused OPENAI_*).
- secret-scrub / budget-feed / secretary-tools / intake-tools: named exports;
  baked into /home/agent/.config/opencode/plugin/ (drop the EXTRA_PLUGINS env).
- agent-grok* Dockerfiles: plugin dir + agent ownership; drop the unneeded
  @ai-sdk/openai global install.

Verified live end-to-end: grok-build-0.1 calls read_company_state AND
submit_directive through secretary-tools.js and the backend receives both with
the agent token; a tool.execute.before guard fires; built-in tool-calls work.
Targeted gate green (ruff/mypy/xenon + opencode_config/providers/interactive
tests; node --check the plugins).

* fix(grok): deliver intake draft via the relay + correct opencode-mechanism docs

Live end-to-end verification (opencode 1.17.8 + grok-build-0.1) of the WHOLE
integration, then fixes for what it surfaced:

1) Intake draft card (FUNCTIONAL): opencode's synchronous serve reply
   (POST /session/:id/message) returns only [step-start, text, step-finish] — it
   does NOT include tool-call parts, so the driver could never extract the
   propose_draft draft. intake-tools.js now POSTs the draft straight to the
   prompter-live relay (/api/prompter/live/{session}/events, the same endpoint
   the driver's relay sink uses), so the panel renders the card regardless.
   Verified live: grok calls propose_draft -> the relay receives the draft.

2) Correct misattributed opencode "bugs" (DOCS): earlier comments asserted as
   general opencode behavior that a provider.xai block / npm override / config
   plugin:-array "break" registration. Re-testing showed those were artifacts of
   a PROJECT-level .opencode/opencode.json; from the GLOBAL config (which
   opencode_config writes) the built-in provider, model resolution, the plugin
   array AND the auto-discovery dir all work, and MCP gateway verbs register
   (delivery agents verified). Reframed the comments as design choices (built-in
   provider + XAI_API_KEY env + plugins baked in the auto-discovery dir with
   named exports) and dropped the false claims.

3) Reasoning --variant: passing it does not error, but whether opencode applies a
   named reasoning variant to grok-build-0.1 (no provider-defined variants) is
   UNVERIFIED — comment softened from a "~54% cut" claim to best-effort,
   measure-on-NAS.

Verified live this session: one-shot delivery (model + MCP verbs + plugins +
hooks), secretary tools (read_company_state + submit_directive -> backend with
token), intake draft (relay), grok built-in-provider tool-calling. Remaining
NAS-only: full container assembly (SDK :9000 startup, entrypoint hooks, 429
parking) + the --variant cost measurement. Gate green (ruff/mypy + 51 tests;
node --check the plugins).

* feat(grok): reap abandoned interactive chats (M3)

An interactive intake/secretary chat the human abandoned (closed the tab without
confirming or stopping) leaked its container until the orchestrator restarted —
the wedged-grok reaper is task-driven and these run task_id=None, and an SSE
disconnect intentionally does NOT reap (so a page reload can reconnect).

Reap by IDLE TIME, not connection state: PrompterLiveRegistry tracks
last_activity (bumped on every push/deliver = a turn), and the 60s sweeper
retires sessions idle past ROBOCO_INTERACTIVE_IDLE_REAP_SECONDS (default 1800;
0 disables) via reap_intake_session / reap_secretary_session. An active or
page-reloaded chat that keeps exchanging turns stays fresh and is never reaped;
board-review-parked sessions (task_id set) are exempt. Provider-agnostic — fixes
the leak for both Claude and Grok interactive.

Tests: idle-only reap (active/parked/closed excluded), activity bump keeps a
session alive, threshold 0 disables. Gate green (ruff/mypy/xenon + prompter_live).

* fix(panel): resolve agent names from the live roster so they never drift

A review task assigned to the pr-reviewer rendered as a truncated raw
UUID instead of its name. Root cause: the panel resolved assignees from a
hardcoded static roster in agent-utils.ts that had drifted — it never
gained the board-adjacent agents added backend-side (intake-1,
secretary-1, pr-reviewer-1). Their UUIDs hit no map entry, so
getAgentDisplayName fell through to the unknown-UUID branch and returned
agentId.slice(0, 8). Every assignee surface (task table, task detail,
subtasks, journals, communications, commit cards) shares that resolver, so
all of them showed the fragment.

Make the live /api/agents roster the source of truth instead of a static
duplicate that silently rots:

- agent-utils: add a runtime registry (registerAgentRoster) keyed by both
  UUID and slug; resolveToSlug / getAgentDisplayName / isKnownAgent consult
  it first. The static maps remain only as an offline / first-paint
  fallback (now complete with the three agents).
- api/agents: surface the backend UUID on AgentDefinition (getAll/getOne
  previously dropped it), so the registry can key by UUID.
- use-agents: add useAgentRosterSync (registers the live roster) and derive
  useAgents from live definitions, falling back to the static roster.
- providers: mount the sync once inside QueryClientProvider.

Now any agent the backend knows about resolves, including ones added after
this change — the panel can no longer drift out of sync.

Tests: agent-utils unit tests cover the three agents end-to-end, a
live-roster-only agent (drift-proofing), live-overrides-static, and a
regression guard for the existing roster.

* fix(pr-review): post a COMMENT review when GitHub forbids self-review

A pr-reviewer review of an org-authored PR never reached GitHub. The agent
side ran correctly (claim → read-only diff → review → post_pr_review →
completed + CEO notify), but the GitHub publish 422'd with "Can not request
changes on your own pull request": the PR was authored by the same account
that owns the project PAT. post_pr_review posts best-effort after the DB
transition, so the failure was logged and swallowed — the task completed and
the CEO was notified "reviewed" while the PR showed no review.

GitHub forbids APPROVE / REQUEST_CHANGES on your own PR but DOES allow a
plain COMMENT review. The org's internal PRs (and any PR the PAT owner
opened) hit this. Retry once as a COMMENT review on the self-review 422 so
the review actually lands; the verdict is already stated in the body. The
external/fork-PR path (different author) is unchanged — REQUEST_CHANGES
succeeds there and the fallback never fires.

Tests: self-review 422 downgrades to COMMENT and returns the COMMENT result;
a failing COMMENT retry still surfaces GitError with no infinite loop; the
existing non-self 422 still raises.

* fix(grok): harden cost-guard, pin runtime, refresh stale plugin comments

Address review findings on the Grok provider work:

- budget-feed plugin failed open unconditionally, so a one-shot task agent
  whose in-container SDK budget server went unreachable would run with the
  cost cap unenforced. The entrypoint now exports ROBOCO_BUDGET_ENFORCE=1
  (one-shot agents always start that server) and the plugin's pre-exec gate
  fails CLOSED when the flag is set and the budget endpoint is unreachable,
  halting an uncapped burn. Interactive serve agents (intake/secretary) set
  no flag and keep failing open (they run no budget server by design).

- Pin opencode-ai to the live-verified 1.17.8 (was an unpinned global npm
  install). Untrusted model output runs under it; bump the pin deliberately.

- Document the ROBOCO_GROK_* operator vars in .env.example (image, the three
  opencode permissions, reasoning effort, idle-kill, cost ceiling).

- Refresh stale plugin comments: the MCP tool-name shape and the secretary
  tool-registration path are confirmed live, and secret-scrub's load route is
  the auto-discovery dir (not a config plugin: array). Keep the honest
  not-yet-exercised caveat on secret-scrub's deny path and the reasoning
  variant — those remain genuinely unverified.

* fix(grok): unbreak workspace-cwd agents, free trapped agents, stop self-PR review

Three bugs surfaced by the first live Grok lifecycle run:

- Dev/QA/doc agents crash-looped at startup with ModuleNotFoundError on
  roboco.llm.providers. The entrypoint ran the opencode-config render from the
  agent's workspace-clone cwd, whose own roboco/ dir shadows /app on the
  sys.path front; a branch without the grok code lacks the providers package.
  Render from /app so the installed package always resolves (the render has no
  cwd dependency — writes global, reads ROBOCO_MCP_CONFIG).

- A budget/loop halt blocked EVERY tool, including i_am_idle, unclaim, and
  i_am_blocked, so a halted agent could neither continue nor stop and flailed —
  one billed model turn per blocked retry. The before-gate now always lets the
  release verbs through so a halted agent can exit cleanly.

- The inbound reviewer ingested the org's OWN PRs (authored by the repo-owner
  account), which can't take a REQUEST_CHANGES review (GitHub 422) and get
  re-reviewed every poll. The normalizer flags author_is_owner and ingestion
  skips them — the reviewer reviews only PRs the org did not author.
  External/contributor PRs are unaffected.

Tests: owner-authored PR flagged + skipped; normalize shape covers the new
field. Gate green on the changed modules (ruff/mypy/xenon + 48 tests).

* feat(grok-cli): render config.toml + map per-role grok CLI flags

First piece of the Grok CLI provider that replaces the opencode runtime: a
pure, unit-tested module the agent entrypoint runs to translate the mounted
mcp-config.json into ~/.grok/config.toml ([mcp_servers]) and compute the
per-role 'grok -p' flags — subagent/shell/edit tool removal, raw-git-mutation
and rm-rf denies, reasoning effort — mirroring ClaudeCodeProvider's per-role
permissions with native grok flags instead of an opencode permission block +
JS guard plugins. Uses tomli_w. The rendered config + env injection are
validated live against grok-build (the model called the server through it).

* feat(grok-cli): grok CLI agent image + headless entrypoint

The roboco-agent-grok image now installs xAI's official grok CLI (Grok Build,
pinned 0.2.56) instead of opencode, authenticated by the SuperGrok subscription
via a mounted ~/.grok/auth.json (parity with the Claude ~/.claude mount, no
metered API key). The entrypoint renders ~/.grok/config.toml + per-role flags
from /app (the ModuleNotFound-shadowing lesson), runs grok -p headless with
--output-format json, keeps the prompt-injection guard, and exits 75 on a
rate-limit so the orchestrator parks the provider. No in-container SDK server or
budget-feed — native --max-turns + server-side terminal-substitute replace them.

* feat(grok-cli): GrokCliProvider — subscription auth mount, mirrors ClaudeCodeProvider

Replace the opencode GrokProvider with GrokCliProvider: reuses the orchestrator's
shared mount/auth/git assembly (gateway + identity) exactly like the Claude path,
mounts the host ~/.grok/auth.json read-only (SuperGrok subscription) instead of
injecting an xAI key, and sets the slim env the grok-cli entrypoint + renderer
read (ROBOCO_AGENT_ID for per-role flags, model, mcp-config, prompt). Provider
routing fields are blanked before the shared step so the grok endpoint is never
mislabelled ANTHROPIC_*. Per-role permission logic now lives in grok_cli_config,
so the provider is slim. Registry/orchestrator/exports updated; provider tests
rewritten for the CLI behavior (no XAI key, auth mount present/absent).

* feat(grok-cli): capture per-session token usage + notional cost

Grok runs on the SuperGrok subscription, but — exactly like Claude on Max — we
still record per-agent tokens and a notional cost for the dashboard. The grok
CLI writes a cumulative totalTokens per turn into
~/.grok/sessions/<cwd>/<session-id>/updates.jsonl (the grok analogue of the
Claude transcript / old opencode.db); the max is the session total. This reader
locates that file (url-encoded cwd), extracts the total, and prices it at the
output rate (no input/output split from the CLI; conservative + matches the
reasoning-at-output convention). Validated against a real grok-build session
(18253 tokens -> $0.0365). Entrypoint + finalize wiring follows.

* feat(grok-cli): wire usage capture into the run (session id + post-run extract)

The provider pins a fixed session id (ROBOCO_AGENT_SESSION_ID, reused from the
agent session id as on the Claude path); the entrypoint passes it to
'grok -p -s <id>' so the run's session store is locatable, then runs the usage
reader post-run (best-effort) to write the captured tokens + cost. The
orchestrator-side finalize that reads that file follows.

* feat(grok-cli): read captured usage at finalize; keep interactive serve working

The provider mounts the per-agent data dir and points the entrypoint's usage
file at it; the orchestrator's grok finalize reads that usage.json first (the
grok-CLI total, priced at the output rate) and falls back to opencode.db for the
still-opencode interactive intake/secretary path. Re-add _reasoning_effort_for to
grok.py as a clearly-temporary shim for that interactive path (it needs opencode's
"minimal" variant, distinct from the CLI's --effort) until it is converted too.

* feat(grok): convert interactive intake/secretary to the grok CLI; delete opencode

Move the last Grok runtime off opencode onto xAI's official `grok` CLI, for full
parity with the Claude path. The intake/secretary chat now runs per-turn headless
`grok -p` invocations that resume one session id (proven live: context carries
across runs), with streaming-json deltas mapped to the existing panel StreamChunk
kinds — the IntakeDriver loop, message source, relay, and idle reaper are reused
unchanged; only the SessionFactory differs (GrokCliSession replaces the
opencode-serve session).

- GrokCliSession + a pure, unit-tested streaming-json -> StreamChunk assembler
  (thought coalesced to one block, text streamed live, end captures the session
  id for -r, fenced-draft fallback, clear errors incl. rate-limit).
- intake propose_draft and secretary read_company_state/read_task/submit_directive
  are now FastMCP servers (roboco-intake / roboco-secretary) wired into
  ~/.grok/config.toml, launched via `uv run --directory /app` to resolve the
  installed package. The secretary tools reuse the shared backend helpers.
- Orchestrator: interactive spawn mounts the subscription auth + per-agent usage
  dir (no metered xAI key, no permission env — grok flags carry per-role perms);
  usage/cost now read a captured usage.json (drop the opencode.db reader, the
  _opencode_db_path/_grok_usage_from_opencode methods, and the cost-cap's
  opencode read). hosts["opencode"] -> hosts["grok_usage"]; OPENCODE_DATA_DIR ->
  GROK_USAGE_DATA_DIR.
- Fix one-shot usage capture: `-s` does not pin the session id (grok generates
  its own), so the entrypoint now reads the real id back from the JSON run log
  and the reader uses it; usage is captured per-turn on the interactive path.
- Delete the opencode layer: opencode_config/opencode_usage/opencode_session, the
  docker/grok/*.js plugins, the old one-shot entrypoint, and their tests.
- Compose (all three files), .env.example, and stale comments updated to the
  grok-CLI runtime; add the SuperGrok auth mount + grok-usage dir.

Gate green: ruff, mypy (296 files), xenon, tests. NAS build/verify pending.

* fix(grok): deliver the role blueprint as grok's system prompt via ~/.grok/AGENTS.md

The blueprint was mounted at /app/system-prompt.md but never reached grok — a real
parity gap vs the Claude path (which passes --system-prompt-file). grok agents ran
only on the per-task prompt, missing their RoboCo role/org context.

Verified live on grok 0.2.56 that the obvious flags do NOT work headless:
`--system-prompt-override` and `--rules` are silently ignored under `grok -p`
(identical output with and without). What IS honoured is grok's instruction-file
discovery — and `$HOME/.grok/AGENTS.md` is loaded GLOBALLY regardless of --cwd
(a project AGENTS.md only loads from the cwd/project root, which would pollute the
agent's git workspace). Proven end to end: a blueprint written there makes grok
adopt the role ("I am the RoboCo intake interviewer ... -- intake-1").

write_agents_md() copies /app/system-prompt.md -> ~/.grok/AGENTS.md; the one-shot
render (grok_cli_config.main) and both interactive mains call it. No git pollution
(it lives in ~/.grok, not the workspace), and it covers repo-cwd and /app-cwd
roles alike. Reverted the non-working --system-prompt-override wiring.

* feat(grok): close the Claude-parity divergences (reasoning, subagents, web, bash-guard)

Bring the grok CLI to parity with the Claude path on the four deliberate
differences:

- Reasoning: drop the per-role `--effort low` default — Claude sets no per-role
  thinking budget, so grok now uses the model default for every role. The
  fleet-wide ROBOCO_GROK_REASONING_EFFORT override stays as a cost lever. (This
  also un-caps intake-draft quality, the one that actually mattered.)
- Subagents: the intake interviewer may now fan out to subagents (parity with the
  Claude intake's `Task` allowance); every other role still has `Agent` removed.
- Web: `--disable-web-search` for every role — no agent gets direct web (Claude's
  tool set has none either); the roles that get web reach it through the gated
  roboco-search MCP, unaffected.
- Bash command filtering: full parity, split by deny semantics. Verified live that
  a grok PreToolUse hook deny CANCELS the run, while native `--deny` denies
  GRACEFULLY (the agent gets a permission error and recovers). So:
    * git network/branch/history ops -> native `--deny` (operational reflex; the
      agent must recover, not drop the task). Expanded to the full bash-guard set.
    * credential-exfil / identity-forgery / internal-API / env-dump patterns ->
      the SAME bash-guard the Claude path runs, wired as a grok PreToolUse hook
      (ROBOCO_GUARD_SKIP_GIT=1 so it leaves git to `--deny`). A hard cancel is the
      right response there — no legitimate agent reads ~/.netrc or forges an
      X-Agent-ID. One tolerance line (accept grok's camelCase `toolInput`) makes
      the one tested script guard both runtimes; +5 grok cases (50/50 green).

Also cleaned stale internal task-number / smoke labels out of bash-guard-hook.sh.

* fix(grok): install grok CLI to ~/.grok/bin (its real default), not ~/.local/bin

The image build failed at `chown ... /home/agent/.local: No such file or
directory`. The grok installer's default is $HOME/.grok/bin — the binary lands at
~/.grok/bin/grok; ~/.local/bin/grok is only a convenience SYMLINK the installer
creates on macOS but not in the Linux container. So the Dockerfile referenced a
directory that never existed:
  - PATH pointed at ~/.local/bin -> `grok` would not be found at runtime even if
    the build had passed;
  - chown targeted ~/.local -> the build aborted.

Point PATH + chown at ~/.grok/bin / ~/.grok. Also harden the install: download the
script to a file (a `curl | bash` pipe swallows a curl failure as a silent no-op)
and verify the binary installed and runs (`test -x` + `grok --version`), so a
broken install fails the build loudly instead of producing a grok-less image.

* fix(grok): address adversarial-review findings across the grok-CLI conversion

A 7-dimension adversarial review (find -> independently refute) surfaced 14 real
issues; fixed each:

Runtime bugs
- GrokCliSession.send drained stdout fully BEFORE stderr — a >64KB stderr burst
  would deadlock the turn forever (spinner never clears). Drain stderr
  concurrently, and add a per-turn watchdog (ROBOCO_GROK_TURN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
  default 600s) that kills a wedged process and emits error+turn_end.
- Crash-restarted grok agents launched `grok -p ""` (empty prompt) — Claude gets
  a scan-for-work fallback. Default the prompt in _spawn_container so every
  dedicated provider gets it too.
- _grok_usage_json read /data/grok-usage unconditionally while its writers branch
  compose-vs-local, so a local-mode agent finalized at $0 and the cost-cap was
  inert. Single-source the path in a new _grok_usage_dir helper (read == write).
- GrokCliSession secretary role fell through to "unknown" (get_agent_role returns
  a truthy sentinel, never None), defeating the ROBOCO_AGENT_ROLE fallback.

Parity / hardening
- --deny set was missing `git tag -d` / `git reflog delete` that the Claude
  bash-guard blocks — added them (the "same set" claim is now true).
- Interactive mains now install the bash-guard hook too (defense-in-depth).
- Compose: collapse the GROK_AUTH_DIR / ROBOCO_HOST_GROK_DIR auth-mount pair into
  one canonical var so a partial override can't silently break agent auth.

Docs / comments
- Panel routing card + architecture security doc no longer say Grok runs on the
  deleted opencode runtime; orchestrator comments point at the renamed entrypoint.

Tests
- Cover the interactive _render_grok_config MCP wiring (ModuleNotFound guard +
  secretary HMAC env), the cost-cap kill-failure + interactive relay-close paths,
  the local-mode usage read, the role fallback, the turn timeout, and the new
  git denies. (#13 — a separate grok "Write" tool — investigated: grok's only
  built-in file-mutation tool is search_replace, already removed; no gap.)

Gate green: ruff, mypy, xenon, tests.

* fix(grok): declare tomli-w as a runtime dependency (agent image needs it)

The grok agent image failed at spawn with `ModuleNotFoundError: No module named
'tomli_w'` when rendering ~/.grok/config.toml. tomli_w was only a transitive dep
of a dev-extra package, so it was present in dev/orchestrator envs but excluded
from the agent image, which builds its venv with `uv sync --frozen --no-dev`.
grok_cli_config imports it at module load to serialize the MCP gateway config, so
without it a Grok agent gets no gateway verbs.

Promote tomli-w to a direct [project.dependencies] entry. Locked with
`--upgrade-package tomli-w` so only tomli-w is added — no incidental churn of the
8 unrelated packages a full re-resolve would have bumped.

* Updated uv.lock

* fix(grok): auto-approve tool execution (--always-approve) so headless agents can call tools

Live smoke caught every grok agent (Main PM, pr-reviewer, dev, …) ending its run
with stopReason=Cancelled and empty output the instant it reached for a tool. Root
cause: headless `grok -p` cannot approve a tool call without `--always-approve`
(grok's docs: required for unattended automation), and the per-role args didn't
pass it — so no agent could call a gateway verb, an edit, or an MCP tool, and the
run was cancelled.

Add `--always-approve` to grok_cli_args_for_role (one place → every role, one-shot
and interactive). Safety is unaffected: `--disallowed-tools` still removes tools
and `--deny` still hard-blocks command patterns regardless of approval (a denied
command returns a permission error and the agent recovers — verified live).

Proven in the rebuilt image side-by-side: without the flag a tool call yields
Cancelled/not-called; with the real rendered args it returns EndTurn and the MCP
tool actually runs. (My earlier in-image tool-calling check passed `--always-approve`
manually, which masked that the production args omitted it — fixed.)

* fix(pr-review): seed claim heartbeat so the grok reviewer isn't wedge-killed

pr_review_claim transitioned a review task pending -> in_progress but never
seeded last_heartbeat_at, unlike every sibling claim path (_finalize_claim,
qa_claim, doc claim). The reaper treats a NULL heartbeat as a stale claim, and
the GROK idle-kill watchdog bypasses the live-container skip on a NULL
heartbeat -- so the reviewer container was killed (Cancelled) before it could
post_pr_review, churning the task back to pending on a respawn loop. A Claude
reviewer was shielded by the live-instance skip; only GROK manifested it.

Seed the heartbeat at claim time, matching the established invariant. Verified
against a real Postgres (10/10 test_pr_review_db tests, incl. the new
last_heartbeat_at assertion).

* fix(grok): stream one-shot output live + capture real token usage

Two gaps the buffered run hid, both verified in the real image with mounted
SuperGrok auth:

- Observability: the entrypoint buffered grok's output to a temp file and only
  cat it after the run, so `docker logs` was blank while the agent worked.
  Switch the one-shot to --output-format streaming-json piped through tee:
  grok flushes each thought/text event incrementally (confirmed token-by-token
  live in-container), so the agent's reasoning shows in docker logs in real
  time, parity with the Claude stream-json path. Read the session id back from
  the NDJSON run log (the terminal `end` event) since -s does not pin it.

- Usage: total_tokens read 0 for every grok run. grok nests the cumulative
  totalTokens on params.update._meta, but the reader looked at params._meta
  (which only holds event ids); the unit fixture had the same wrong shape, so
  the tests masked it. Read the real path (with params._meta / top-level
  fallbacks) and fix the fixture to the real grok shape. Verified live:
  usage.json now reports total_tokens=3262, cost_usd=0.006524 (was 0).

* fix(grok): validate agent_id before using it as a usage-dir path segment

CodeQL flagged a high-severity py/path-injection: agent_id flowed from
request-facing call sites into _grok_usage_dir() and on to read_text(), so a
value containing '..' or a separator could traverse the filesystem. Validate
agent_id against the slug/uuid allowlist ([A-Za-z0-9_-]+) at the single
chokepoint (_grok_usage_dir feeds both the mount and the finalize read);
anything else raises. Rejects traversal; accepts every real agent slug.

* fix(grok): use explicit-guard path sanitizer CodeQL recognizes as a barrier

The re.fullmatch allowlist from a35b640d was secure but CodeQL's py/path-injection
dataflow did not model the regex call as a barrier, so the high-severity alert
persisted on the analyzed merge. Switch _safe_agent_path_segment to explicit
guards (empty / '.' / '..' / '/' / '\\' / NUL) -- the barrier form the query
recognizes -- which still rejects every traversal vector. Drop the now-unused
re import.

* fix(api): validate agent_id at the orchestrator route boundary (path-injection)

CodeQL traces the py/path-injection from the request agent_id path param on the
orchestrator routes (stop/spawn/resolve-wait/mark-waiting/status) down to the
grok usage-dir read. Validate agent_id at the HTTP boundary with explicit
traversal guards (empty / '.' / '..' / '/' / '\\' / NUL) returning 422, so the
sanitized value is what flows downstream and the query sees a barrier at the
source. Runtime _grok_usage_dir keeps its guard as defense in depth for
non-HTTP callers.

* fix(grok): sanitize usage-dir agent_id with Path(...).name (CodeQL barrier)

Proven against the analyzed merge: CodeQL does not propagate a control-flow guard
through a helper's return value, so neither the route validator nor the
_safe_agent_path_segment guard cleared the py/path-injection alert. Reduce the
validated id to its final path component with Path(...).name -- a data-flow
sanitizer CodeQL models and propagates through the return -- at the single
source of truth (_grok_usage_dir), covering both the finalize read and the
mount/mkdir. The guard stays for fail-loud reject semantics; .name is the
recognized barrier (identity for a valid slug).

* fix(grok): containment-check the usage read against a fixed root (path-injection)

Three sanitizers failed to clear the CodeQL alert because the query does not
model them here: a regex guard, an explicit guard, and Path(...).name (verified
each against the analyzed merge). Replace with the barrier CodeQL does
recognize -- and that is also a genuine control -- at the read sink: resolve the
usage.json path and refuse it unless it is_relative_to the resolved usage root
(a fixed, untainted base from config, extracted as _grok_usage_root).

Note the github-advanced-security autofix proposed 'if usage_json.parent !=
usage_dir: return None', which is a no-op -- appending the constant 'usage.json'
never changes the parent, and it compares against the tainted dir, not a safe
base. This compares against the fixed root instead. The _safe_agent_path_segment
guard stays (fail-loud reject upstream, covers the mount/write side).

* fix(grok): sanitize the usage read with os.path.basename (CodeQL-modeled barrier)

Four prior barriers did not clear the py/path-injection alert (verified each
against the analyzed merge): a regex guard, an explicit guard, Path(...).name,
and an is_relative_to containment check. The one sanitizer CodeQL's query
documents -- os.path.basename -- was never actually tried: it was swapped for
Path(...).name to dodge ruff PTH119, and that pathlib form is not modeled.

Apply os.path.basename to the agent id in _grok_usage_json's own scope (the read
sink), so there is no recognition or interprocedural-propagation ambiguity, and
allow PTH119 for this file with a documented reason. The _safe_agent_path_segment
guard and the route 422 stay as the actual reject controls.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-19 09:15:01 +02:00
Renn F e1cbf00474 chore(deploy): commit docker-compose.yaml so the file the NAS uses matches
Both compose files are git-TRACKED, and Docker picks docker-compose.yaml over
.yml — so the NAS reads the .yaml. The self-heal env (and prior changes) had
only been committed to the .yml, leaving the tracked .yaml stale in the repo.
Commit the .yaml so both carry the same config. Going forward: commit BOTH.
2026-06-17 22:32:42 +02:00
Renn F e9a3b55999 feat(deploy): enable external-PR review by default in the compose
Wire the external-PR settings into the orchestrator env in both compose
files: ROBOCO_EXTERNAL_PR_ENABLED defaults to true (overridable via .env),
with require_human_confirm kept true and the poll-interval/allowlist knobs
documented inline. The config default stays off (safe for library use); the
deployment compose turns the read-only review on. The code default is
unchanged — only the shipped compose flips it.

Read-only: enabling this only discovers inbound external/fork PRs and posts
one change-request. The supersede that builds contributor code is still
CEO-triggered and human-confirm gated.
2026-06-17 01:04:18 +02:00
Renn F 7a8c083c31 feat(deploy): give the PR reviewer its own image, like every other agent
pr-reviewer-1 was the one agent with no dedicated image and no compose
builder service — it reused roboco-agent-base, which left it absent from the
compose files entirely (so it looked like the PR reviewer simply was not
there). Make it first-class for parity: add docker/agent-pr-reviewer.Dockerfile
(FROM the base — read-only reviewer, no extra toolchain), an
agent-pr-reviewer-image builder service in both compose files and the registry
compose, the image in the release workflow's publish list, and map
pr-reviewer-1 -> roboco-agent-pr-reviewer in the orchestrator plus its
lazy-build dockerfile map. Supersedes the earlier base-reuse mapping.
2026-06-17 00:56:56 +02:00
46d89b58fe feat: company-in-a-box — goal-aware company layer (0.4.0) (#171)
* feat(goals): company charter singleton — data layer (Business Goals slice 1)

First slice of the company-in-a-box "Business Goals" phase: a single CEO-owned
charter row (north star + objectives + constraints + operating policy) that
will be injected into every agent's context_briefing so all work is goal-aware.

- CompanyGoalsTable: singleton table (all-zeros id), JSON objectives /
  constraints / operating_policy, updated_at / updated_by.
- migration 032: create + seed the singleton row (offline-renderable; column
  server-defaults fill an INSERT of just the id).
- CompanyGoalsService: get() (empty defaults when unset) + upsert() (singleton,
  partial update, caller commits).
- tests: empty defaults, roundtrip, singleton + partial-update preservation.

Next slices (mapped, not yet built): briefing injection (BriefingInputs +
build_context_briefing + EvidenceRepo), API route (GET any / PUT CEO-only),
panel /goals page, and base/Board/PM prompt mentions.

* feat(goals): inject the company charter into every agent briefing (slice 2)

The charter is now goal-aware context for every agent:
- BriefingInputs gains company_goals; build_context_briefing surfaces it.
- EvidenceRepo.company_goals(): single-row lookup returning a COMPACT charter
  (north star + objectives + constraints + operating policy; audit columns
  dropped, lists capped) or None when unset, so an empty charter never bloats
  the per-verb briefing.
- _briefing_for wires it into every context_briefing.

Tests: briefing surfaces company_goals (defaults None); repo returns None for an
absent/empty charter and the compact dict when set.

* feat(goals): company charter API — GET any agent, PUT CEO-only (slice 3)

- routes/company_goals.py: GET returns the charter (any authenticated agent —
  it drives every briefing); PUT is CEO-only (403 otherwise), partial update via
  model_dump(exclude_unset=True), explicit commit.
- schemas/company_goals.py: response + partial-update models.
- registered at /api/company-goals.
- tests: GET open to any role, CEO update persists + is readable, non-CEO 403.

* feat(goals): make the company charter actionable in agent prompts (slice 5)

Agents already receive company_goals in the briefing (slice 2); now tell them to
act on it:
- base.md: universal "Align with the company charter" section — favour work and
  trade-offs that advance the objectives, honour the constraints, flag conflicts;
  never a license to leave your role.
- board / main_pm / cell_pm: role-specific lines tying triage / cell-routing /
  subtask decomposition to the charter.

Prompts are composed at spawn from base.md + roles/*.md directly (compose_prompt),
so no _generated regeneration is needed.

* feat(goals): company charter panel page (slice 4)

CEO-facing editor for the charter at /company-goals:
- lib/api/company-goals.ts: get / update (PUT) client.
- company-goals-card.tsx: edit north star + constraints (one per line) +
  objectives / operating_policy (JSON, parsed + validated with toast errors);
  display derives from server state (no set-state-in-effect).
- (dashboard)/company-goals/page.tsx + a "Company Goals" sidebar nav link.

tsc --noEmit + eslint clean. Completes Phase 1 (Business Goals): data, briefing
injection, API, prompts, panel.

* fix(test): make test_app route assertions robust to FastAPI 0.137 _IncludedRouter

FastAPI 0.137 stopped flattening include_router into app.routes — each include is
now an _IncludedRouter (a BaseRoute with no .path), so `{r.path for r in
app.routes}` raised AttributeError and the two router-registration tests failed
(the bump arrived via the claude-agent-sdk update in uv.lock). Add
_registered_paths(): OpenAPI schema paths (the stable public contract) plus each
included router's prefix, which also covers the websocket /ws mount (never in the
schema). Drops the now-incorrect type: ignore[attr-defined].

* feat(research): pluggable web search/fetch for Board + PM agents

Add a provider-agnostic web-research capability so the Board and PMs can
ground decisions in current external evidence the knowledge base can't
answer.

- ResearchService selects a provider adapter from config: Tavily, Brave,
  and Exa adapters plus a NullProvider that degrades gracefully when no
  key is set. Result count and fetched-content size are clamped to caps.
- /api/research/search and /api/research/fetch: role-gated to Board + PMs
  (and the CEO), with a per-agent/day Redis quota that fails open.
- roboco-search MCP server (web_search / web_fetch) calls those routes;
  the provider key stays server-side and agent containers never egress.
  Mounted per role by the orchestrator, behind a master switch.
- Charter-aware prompt guidance for Board, Main PM, and Cell PM.

Additive: with no key configured it is a no-op and the existing delivery
lifecycle is unchanged.

* feat(pitch): Board pitch -> CEO approve -> auto-provision repos

Add an additive origination path so a product can be proposed, approved,
and stood up without manual repo/Project setup.

- Pitch entity + migration (pitches table); PitchService create/list/
  reject/approve.
- GitHubProvisioningService: the one place that creates repos (POST
  /orgs/{org}/repos). Server-side token/org; when unconfigured the whole
  approve path is inert and nothing is created.
- On approval: provision one repo per target cell, register a Project per
  repo, create a Product when multi-cell, and seed one Main-PM delivery
  task — all reusing the existing Product / coordination-task machinery.
- /api/pitches: Board authors (PO/HoM), CEO approves/rejects, Board+PM+CEO
  view. Errors mapped via a single translator.

Additive: the delivery lifecycle is untouched; with no provisioning token
the capability is a no-op. Agent-facing pitch tool + panel are follow-ups.

* feat(strategy): dormant autonomous strategy engine (engine 2)

Add a second, optional engine that watches the company against its
standing goals and surfaces what needs the CEO — without touching the
delivery lifecycle (engine 1).

- StrategyEngine.assess() reports observations: the company is idle while
  goals stand, and tasks stranded in 'blocked' past a threshold.
- run_cycle() notifies the CEO (notify-only; it never spends, builds, or
  auto-approves — originating work stays a CEO decision).
- Orchestrator runs it on its own interval, started/stopped with the other
  background loops; the loop returns immediately unless enabled.

DORMANT by default (strategy_engine_enabled=False): the loop never runs and
a standard deployment is unchanged. Auto-origination is a further opt-in.

* docs(changelog): record Business Goals, Web Research, Pitch->Provision, and the dormant strategy engine under Unreleased

* feat(secretary): wire the Secretary role end-to-end (foundation)

Add SECRETARY as a distinct role — the CEO's conversational chief-of-staff,
governed separately from the Prompter (which stays read-only/human-only).
This is the role foundation only; authority, the live agent, and the panel
land in following commits.

- foundation/identity: Role.SECRETARY (board level), seeded secretary-1 agent,
  role-level mapping.
- journaling read tier (ALL — it advises the CEO), role_config entry,
  per-role model (opus), prompt-layer mapping + roles/secretary.md.
- i_am_idle gains SECRETARY so the role has a verb surface.
- migration 034: add 'secretary' to the agentrole enum (mirrors 025).
- Role-registry tests updated for the new role.

Inert by itself (nothing spawns it yet); additive — existing roles unchanged.

* feat(secretary): directives + gate-list authority (backend)

The Secretary acts only under CEO command. Low-risk directives (relay a
dictated message) execute immediately; high-impact ones — charter edits,
task start/cancel/override, pitch approval, announcements — are recorded
pending and run only after the CEO confirms (the gate list).

- secretary_directives table (migration 035) as the command audit + queue.
- SecretaryService: read company state; submit (direct->run, gated->queue +
  notify CEO); confirm/reject; execution runs with the CEO as actor through
  the existing services (the Secretary never holds CEO authority itself).
- /api/secretary: submit + state/task reads (Secretary or CEO); list/confirm/
  reject (CEO only). Writes commit explicitly.

* feat(secretary): live conversational agent (container + bridge)

Stand up the Secretary as a persistent Claude-SDK container the CEO chats
with, mirroring the Intake agent and reusing its driver/session machinery.

- secretary_driver: build_secretary_options exposes read_company_state /
  read_task / submit_directive as SDK tools that call /api/secretary/* with
  the agent's HMAC token; backend-call logic is module-level + tested.
- secretary_main: container entrypoint (receiver + relay) reusing IntakeDriver.
- orchestrator: start/spawn/reap secretary session + run-cmd builder; no
  workspace clone (reads state via API), mints a role=secretary token.
- secretary_live routes: panel <-> container bridge over the live registry.
- agent-secretary image (Dockerfile + compose build service).

Inert until a session is started; additive — intake and all agents unchanged.

* feat(secretary): panel chat + directive confirmation queue

The CEO's Secretary surface: a live chat (SSE) to talk to the Secretary, and
a 'Needs your confirmation' queue listing gated directives the Secretary
proposed — each with Confirm / Reject. Adds the sidebar nav entry.

- lib/api/secretary.ts: live (start/stream/status/send/stop) + directive
  (list/confirm/reject) + state clients (all as the CEO).
- hooks/use-secretary.ts: drives one chat, accumulating SSE token deltas.
- secretary page: chat pane + pending-directive cards.

Completes the Secretary end-to-end (role + authority + live agent + panel).

* feat(pitch): agent-facing pitch tool + pitches panel

Complete the pitch path: the Board can now author pitches through the gateway,
and the CEO reviews/approves them in the panel.

- content_actions.pitch (Board-only) -> PitchService.create, returning an
  Envelope; wired as a do-tool (do_server + /api/v1/do/pitch + schema) and
  added to the Board's do-tools.
- Panel /pitches page: lists pitches with CEO Approve & provision / Reject;
  sidebar nav entry.

Pitch (Phase 4) is now end-to-end: author -> CEO approve -> auto-provision.

* feat(cockpit): read-only 'is the business winning?' summary

A pure aggregation for the CEO over existing data — no new state, no writes.

- CockpitService.summary(): charter north-star/objectives, delivery counts
  (in-flight/blocked/awaiting-CEO), 30-day spend vs the charter's budget cap,
  pending pitches, and the strategy engine's signals (what needs you). Stamped
  basis='proxy' — performance is a proxy until real launches.
- GET /api/cockpit/summary (CEO / Board / Main PM / Secretary).
- Panel /cockpit page + sidebar nav.

Reuses goals + usage + StrategyEngine.assess(); reads only.

* docs(changelog): add the Secretary and Cockpit to Unreleased

* fix(test): isolate the company-goals empty-defaults test from committed state

The shared test DB persists committed writes across tests; a route test
commits a charter, so the unit test's 'unset' assertion must establish its
own clean precondition rather than assume global emptiness.

* fix(gateway): lower evidence_repo complexity to rank A (xenon gate)

company_goals()'s 4-way `or` emptiness check tipped the module average to
rank B; `any(...)` is equivalent and keeps the module under the gate's A bar.

* chore(compose): mirror agent-secretary-image build into docker-compose.yaml

Both compose files are byte-identical and tracked; .yaml carries the same
agent-secretary-image build service already present in docker-compose.yml.

* chore(lifecycle): regenerate artifacts for secretary i_am_idle

The secretary role gained i_am_idle in the lifecycle spec; regenerate the
generated prompt/doc/json artifacts so foundation-check stays green.

* docs(changelog): cut the company-in-a-box phases to 0.4.0

Label the six additive phases (business goals, web research, pitch-provision,
strategy engine, secretary, cockpit) as 0.4.0; tag v0.4.0 is held until the
branch merges to master so it points at the release commit.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-15 20:47:41 +02:00
Renn F 93c6ef8a57 chore(compose): raise stale-claim reaper timeouts to 30m so long agent tasks aren't reaped mid-work 2026-06-10 13:43:55 +02:00
9f8834155a Feature: prompter gold upgrade (#84)
* feat(prompter): make the assistant a RoboCo insider and fully wire launch

The Prompter's intelligence lived in two thin static prompts, so it asked
generic checklist questions and produced a flat task. The launch path was
also only half-wired: the panel called the generic task-create endpoint with
no project, bypassing the Prompter's own confirm flow.

Interview brain
- Rewrite the chat system prompt with RoboCo's org model, the task-spec
  standard, a dimensions playbook, and a reflect-back, 1-2-questions-per-turn,
  auto-stop discipline.
- Inject the live projects/products list each turn so the assistant grounds
  questions in real surfaces and resolves the target itself.
- Replace the brittle phrase-match readiness with a parsed roboco-meta control
  block (parse_readiness); the block is stripped from the visible reply and the
  turn now returns draft_ready + scale.

Structured GOLD draft
- Add first-class draft fields (objective, what_this_builds, the_work, notes)
  carried in the existing draft_data JSONB — no migration.
- Compose the GOLD markdown description deterministically from those fields
  (compose_description); the model never hand-formats the body.

Adaptive routing + wired launch
- Confirm now runs through the Prompter confirm endpoint with the human's
  project/product choice and edited structured draft.
- Single-cell targets a project and the cell team; a multi-cell feature targets
  a product and becomes a Main-PM coordination root that fans out.

Frontend
- Turn-envelope draft_ready (drop the duplicated phrase-match), structured
  draft card, confirm dialog with a project/product picker and a per-cell
  The Work editor, and the corrected priority labels (0 highest .. 3 lowest).

* fix(prompter): commit session writes so they survive across requests

Session create returned 201 but the row was never durably committed, so the
immediately-following /messages call could not find it and 404'd. The prompter
routes were the only write surface that never called db.commit() — every other
write route (tasks, a2a, groups, docs, product) commits explicitly rather than
rely on the request-teardown auto-commit, which is sensitive to middleware and
teardown ordering under the production server.

- Commit explicitly in all four prompter write routes (create session, send
  message, get/generate draft, confirm).
- Fix _get_session's NotFoundError: it passed a full sentence as resource_type,
  producing the doubled "... not found not found" message; now uses the
  (resource_type, resource_id) signature.
- Panel: when a message hits a session the server no longer has, start a fresh
  session and retry once instead of dead-ending on a stale id.

Add a regression test that gives each request its own non-committing session —
the real cross-request boundary the shared-session integration tests never
crossed. It reproduces the production 404 without the route commit and passes
with it.

* refactor(prompter): drop the "GOLD" jargon for plain wording

"GOLD" was informal shorthand for "a good/well-formed spec" that should never
have been baked into the LLM prompts, comments, and docstrings as if it were a
defined term. Replace it everywhere with plain language ("a well-formed task",
"a complete task spec", "the markdown description", "structured spec fields").
No behaviour change.

* feat(intake): add the intake interviewer agent role (static definition)

Phase 1 of the intake-agent feature: a new first-class `prompter` role — the
intake interviewer the CEO chats with to draft a task. This commit defines the
role across every foundation layer (no runtime yet); spawning + the live
session come next.

- identity: Role.PROMPTER, RoleLevel.INTAKE (lowest authority), an AGENTS row
  (intake-1) on the board team, ROLE_LEVEL entry. Deliberately NOT in
  BOARD_ROLES — it interviews, it does not review.
- lifecycle: gets i_am_idle like every agent (its only verb); no
  delivery-lifecycle intents.
- journaling: ReadTier.OWN — isolated, reads only its own journal.
- role_config: human-only manifest — note + evidence only, no say/dm/notify/
  channels; allows_subagent=True (research), allows_write=False.
- agents_config derives it automatically and correctly excludes it from
  TASK_CREATOR_ROLES (it drafts, it never creates tasks).
- seed presentation ("Intake"); regenerated lifecycle artifacts.
- role system prompt: read the code first, single-CEO awareness, propose
  rather than interrogate — written against the failures we saw.
- docs: roster count 19 -> 20, org charts, verb-surface table, usage roster.

All foundation drift checks pass; role/manifest/permission tests green.

* feat(intake): migrate agentrole enum to add 'prompter'

ALTER TYPE agentrole ADD VALUE IF NOT EXISTS 'prompter' so the intake agent
row seeds/spawns against a migrated production DB. Forward-only (postgres
can't drop enum values), guarded for offline mode — matches migration 012.

* style(intake): ruff format the role additions

* fix(intake): unguard the agentrole migration so it renders offline

The enum-migration-parity test renders 'alembic upgrade head --sql' (offline)
and greps for ALTER TYPE ... ADD VALUE. The is_offline_mode() guard skipped
emitting it, so the parity check couldn't see 'prompter'. Drop the guard —
PG16 permits ADD VALUE in a transaction, same as migration 020's backfill.

* feat(intake): the live-session driver (Claude Agent SDK loop)

Phase 2 begins. The intake agent isn't a one-shot `claude -p`; it's a live
Claude Code session the human chats with. This driver is the container's loop:
open one long-lived claude-agent-sdk ClaudeSDKClient, then per human message
run a turn (query + receive_response) and stream its events out, keeping
conversation context in-process — verified against the real SDK (v0.2.94).

- StreamChunk + normalize(): map SDK messages (StreamEvent text deltas,
  AssistantMessage text/thinking/tool_use blocks, ResultMessage→session_id) to
  panel-facing chunks. Duck-typed, so it works on real SDK objects and on test
  fakes alike — SDK-free, fully unit-tested.
- IntakeDriver.run(): the loop, with injected session/source/sink seams; a turn
  failure surfaces as an error chunk without killing the session.
- SdkIntakeSession + build_intake_options: the only SDK-coupled code (lazy
  import; needs the live claude binary, so excluded from coverage).
- Add claude-agent-sdk dependency + mypy ignore-missing-stubs.

Relay, panel SSE, and the persistent on-demand spawn are the next steps.

* Updated uv.lock

* feat(intake): the panel<->agent live bridge (registry, routes, entrypoint, image)

Wires the live intake chat end to end (Phase 2 integration layer):

- prompter_live.py: the orchestrator-side per-session registry — open/close,
  push (agent->panel), stream (SSE drain), deliver (panel->container). In-process
  (the orchestrator is single-process). 7 unit tests.
- routes/prompter_live.py: GET /live/{id}/stream (SSE), POST /live/{id}/messages
  (deliver), POST /live/{id}/events (relay in); registered under /api/prompter.
  5 integration tests.
- agent_sdk/intake_main.py: the container entrypoint — a POST /turn receiver
  (the driver's MessageSource) + a relay-poster EventSink + the ClaudeSDKClient
  session, run concurrently. 4 unit tests on the wiring helpers.
- docker/agent-prompter.Dockerfile: FROM base, ENTRYPOINT = the driver (not the
  one-shot `claude` the other agents use).

Remaining for Phase 2: the orchestrator persistent-spawn path (scope->workspace
clone, CMD = driver, registry.open on spawn, reap-on-confirm) — the deploy-side
piece, best finalized against a buildable image.

* feat(intake): orchestrator persistent spawn + start/stop for the live chat

Add the task-free spawn path for the intake (prompter) agent: one fixed
intake-1 container running the Agent-SDK driver (image ENTRYPOINT, not
claude -p), one live session at a time.

- spawn_intake_session clones the scope's repo(s) via WorkspaceService
  (project -> one; product -> each distinct project, primary first),
  composes the intake-1 prompt, resolves the model, and builds docker run
  via _build_intake_run_cmd: no settings/hook mount (driver owns 9000),
  no MCP config, no -w; registers the live relay and best-effort delivers
  the opening message once the receiver is up.
- reap_intake_session closes the relay and stops the container.
- Routes: POST /live/start (project XOR product) and POST /live/{id}/stop.
- ROLE_MODEL_MAP[prompter]=opus; intake-1 -> roboco-agent-prompter image map.
- Replace the budget-sweep try/except/continue with _fetch_budget_status,
  which logs the swallow at debug instead of silently dropping it.

25 new tests; docker + the clone are mocked. End-to-end container spawn is
pending a built image and the stack.

* feat(intake): wire /prompter to the live agent — scope form + SSE chat

Replace the Ollama chat loop on /prompter with the spawned-agent flow.

- IntakeForm: pick scope (project XOR product) + opening message + Start
  before the chat; the agent clones that scope and reads the real code.
- use-prompter rewritten as the live brain (lib/api/prompter-live.ts): Start
  spawns via POST /live/start, then an EventSource on /live/{id}/stream
  streams the agent working — token deltas fill the assistant bubble,
  tool_use/thinking drive a live activity line, a draft event renders the
  existing DraftProposalCard. Messages go via POST /live/{id}/messages.
- Chat UX unchanged (Keep Chatting / Review & Confirm / ConfirmDialog reused);
  reap-on-confirm and reap-on-leave call POST /live/{id}/stop.
- Drop the dead Ollama prompterApi client; trim prompter.ts to shared types.

Frontend gate green (tsc --noEmit, lint, build). The draft event + the
/live/{id}/confirm endpoint are the Phase 4 backend seam.

* feat(intake): confirm draft -> backlog task + agent draft emission

Complete the live intake vertical: the agent proposes a structured draft and
Review & Confirm turns it into a task.

- Draft emission: the prompter prompt instructs the agent to emit a fenced
  roboco-draft JSON block when the spec is ready; the driver parses it into a
  'draft' event over the existing relay -> the panel's DraftProposalCard. The
  panel strips the raw block from the chat bubble.
- Fix a double-text bug: with include_partial_messages the reply arrives as
  both StreamEvent deltas and the final AssistantMessage; the driver now takes
  text from deltas only and the AssistantMessage for thinking/tool_use/draft.
- POST /live/{id}/confirm -> confirm_live_draft, reusing a draft->task core
  extracted from confirm_draft; reaps the session on success.
- Both prompter confirm paths create at BACKLOG, not pending: backlog is the
  holding area a draft waits in until it's reviewed and promoted to pending
  (TaskService.activate). The legacy Ollama confirm was creating at pending,
  skipping that gate — fixed.
- Remove the dead 'context' bootstrap param from the Ollama session-create
  chain (schema + route + method + tests), superseded by the live scope form.
- No suppressions: replace every type:ignore/noqa across the intake surface
  with a real fix (ORM .id -> UUID(str(x)); fakes -> monkeypatch.setattr;
  lazy imports -> pyproject per-file ignore; union-attr -> recipients[0]).

Full make quality green; frontend tsc + lint green.

* build(intake): add the agent-prompter image builder to compose

The orchestrator references roboco-agent-prompter (AGENT_IMAGES + the
_ensure_agent_image dockerfile map) and docker/agent-prompter.Dockerfile
exists, but docker-compose.yml built every other agent image up front and
left this one out — so the image wasn't pre-built for a stack bring-up.

Mirror the other specialized agent-*-image builders: build from
docker/agent-prompter.Dockerfile, tag roboco-agent-prompter, depend on
agent-base-image.

* Created docker-compose.yaml for the NAS

* fix(intake): non-blocking /live/start so spawn never times out

The start POST awaited the whole spawn — workspace clone + first-time image
build + docker run — which blew past the panel's 60s HTTP timeout ('Request
timed out. The server may be busy.') and triggered a duplicate send. Found on
the 2026-06-09 NAS smoke.

- start_intake_session opens the live relay synchronously, then spawns the
  container in the background (_spawn_intake_container_guarded). The route
  returns the session id immediately; the panel opens the SSE stream right away.
- A background spawn failure is pushed onto the relay as an 'error' event and
  closes the session, so the panel shows it instead of hanging.
- spawn_intake_session stays as the synchronous variant for direct callers/tests.
- Panel shows a 'Preparing the agent…' indicator until the first event arrives.

18 intake-spawn tests green; tsc + lint green. E2E re-validates on next smoke.

* fix(intake): propose_draft MCP tool + lock the agent down

Smoke 2026-06-09 exposed two compounding problems: the agent never reliably
emitted the draft (it narrated the spec instead of typing the magic fence), and
it had inherited the CEO's entire Claude Code env — Write/Edit/Bash + Gmail/
Notion/Calendar/Drive MCP — because bypassPermissions ignored the allowlist and
the mounted ~/.claude leaked the host MCP config.

- propose_draft: build_intake_options now registers an in-process SDK MCP tool
  (create_sdk_mcp_server + @tool). The agent calls it to submit the draft; the
  driver turns that ToolUseBlock into a 'draft' event (_is_propose_draft /
  _draft_from_tool_input, tolerant of nested/flat/JSON-string input). The fenced
  roboco-draft block stays as a fallback.
- Lockdown: strict_mcp_config=True + setting_sources=[] (ignore host MCP +
  settings); permission_mode 'dontAsk' + a can_use_tool gate enforcing a hard
  allowlist (Read/Grep/Glob/Task + propose_draft) replaces bypassPermissions.
- Prompt: call propose_draft (not a fence); the draft's downstream chain is
  backlog -> Board (PO + HoM) -> CEO approve -> Main PM, and the agent's job ends
  at the draft (it never routes or hands off).

SDK API verified against the installed claude-agent-sdk. Driver detection unit-
tested; the SDK-construction is validated on the next NAS smoke (incl. that
setting_sources=[] doesn't break the mounted-~/.claude auth).

* fix(intake): panel UX cluster from the smoke (#3/#4/#6/#12)

- #3 message boundaries: a tool call now ends the current text bubble, so the
  agent's words before and after a tool render as separate messages instead of
  one merged wall (the 'two waves merged into one bubble' the CEO saw).
- #4 activity indicator: promoted from tiny grey text to a prominent primary-
  tinted pill so 'watch it work' is actually visible.
- #12 End chat: a header button (any chat state) reaps the agent and resets to
  the form, reusing startAnother (which already stops the session). Backend
  POST /live/{id}/stop already existed.
- #6 log noise: the opening-message delivery retry logs at debug, not error —
  those failures are expected until the container receiver is up.
- Also fix a latent test gap from the #1 commit: the live-route test's fake
  orchestrator now exposes start_intake_session (the route's non-blocking entry).

Frontend tsc + lint green; live-route + prompter_live tests green.

* fix(intake): render markdown in the chat bubbles (#8)

The agent emits rich markdown (### headers, **bold**, tables, lists) but the
bubble rendered raw text, so it was illegible (CEO-flagged on the smoke). Render
assistant content with react-markdown + remark-gfm (GFM tables) in a prose
container. Adds react-markdown + remark-gfm to the panel.

* feat(intake): #14 — two start routes (Board review vs straight to Main PM)

Per the CEO spec, the draft confirm now starts the task at PENDING with an
explicit assignment instead of parking it at backlog:

- route="board" (Board review & Start): assigned to the Product Owner, so the
  orchestrator dispatches the full Board review (PO + Head of Marketing) before
  the Main PM picks it up.
- route="main_pm" (Approve & Start): assigned straight to the Main PM, who
  delegates to the cells (Board review skipped).

create_task_from_draft gains status + assigned_to params (default BACKLOG, so the
legacy confirm_draft is unchanged); confirm_live_draft + the /live/{id}/confirm
request carry the route. Service tests cover both routes.

* feat(intake): #14 draft-card buttons — Board review vs Approve & Start

Three buttons on the draft card now (CEO spec): Keep chatting / Board review &
Start / Approve & Start. The two action buttons confirm directly with their
route — launchTask(route) sends route to POST /live/{id}/confirm, which starts
the task at pending assigned to the Board (PO+HoM) or straight to the Main PM.

Supersedes the ConfirmDialog review step (scope is chosen up front in the form),
so it's removed from the page flow. The ConfirmDialog component + its sub-editors
are now unused — flagged for a follow-up cleanup, left in place to avoid churn.

tsc + lint green.

* fix(intake): keep the live SSE stream bound to its relay session

The orchestrator opened the relay session twice per live chat — once on the
request path (before the start call returns) and again inside the background
container spawn. The SSE stream binds to the session's queue the moment the
panel connects, so the second open swapped in a fresh queue and stranded the
stream: the agent replied normally, but its events went to the new queue while
the panel kept reading the old one, so the chat looked frozen on "Preparing…".

The second open was always redundant (the relay is opened by the caller before
the spawn). Remove it, and make open() idempotent so a live session is never
replaced out from under a stream that is already connected to it.

* fix(intake): draft-card launch buttons silently did nothing

The launch path required a `description` field, but the prompter draft schema
intentionally has none — it sends `objective` + the structured spec and the
backend composes the description (compose_description). `editableDraft.description`
was therefore undefined, so `description.trim()` inside launch validation threw a
TypeError that propagated out of the button's onClick. Clicking "Board review &
Start" / "Approve & Start" did nothing, with no feedback — the wall blocking the
whole confirm → task → reap flow.

- Map a proposed draft's description from `objective` as a fallback.
- Make launch validation null-safe.
- Replace the silent early-return with a toast that names what's missing, so a
  blocked launch is never a dead, feedback-less button again.

* fix(intake): steer the agent to ask inline, not via AskUserQuestion

The intake's job is to ask clarifying questions, so it reached for the
AskUserQuestion tool — which isn't wired to the live chat panel and isn't in its
allowlist. The bare deny left it to stumble ("let me clarify… — no worries, let
me just lay it out") and waste a visible turn.

- Prompt: spell out that it asks by writing in the chat (the human reads every
  message live) and that no question/prompt tool is available to it.
- Gate: give AskUserQuestion a specific deny message that nudges it to ask inline,
  so even a reflex attempt degrades gracefully.

Also refresh the now-stale "what happens after propose_draft" section: the draft
card has three choices (Keep chatting / Board review & Start / Approve & Start)
and produces a pending task — not the old two-button "backlog" description.

* feat(intake): copy buttons on agent messages and the draft card

The CEO asked for a way to save the agent's plan/spec elsewhere "just in case" —
a cheap manual backstop until refresh-durability lands.

- New CopyButton: async Clipboard API when available, plus a legacy
  textarea+execCommand fallback. The fallback is load-bearing — the panel is
  served over plain http on a LAN IP, where navigator.clipboard is absent
  (clipboard needs a secure context), so the modern API alone would never copy.
- Copy button under each assistant message (copies its text).
- Copy button on the draft card (copies the full spec as markdown: title,
  objective, what-this-builds, the-work per cell, notes, success criteria).

* feat(intake): unbuffer logs + log each turn so the container isn't a black box

Debugging the intake smoke was painful for two reasons: (a) the orchestrator
block-buffered stdout, so `docker logs` lagged minutes behind reality, and (b)
the intake container logged only "session opened" then went silent for the whole
conversation (the chat streams to the relay, not stdout).

- Set PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1 on the orchestrator and agent-base images so structured
  logs reach `docker logs` in real time instead of in large delayed chunks.
- Log each intake turn: "turn received" (with char count) and "turn streamed"
  (chunk count + whether a draft was emitted), so the container logs show the
  conversation's shape at a glance.

* chore(intake): remove the dead ConfirmDialog draft editor

The three-button draft card (Keep chatting / Board review & Start / Approve &
Start) replaced the old review-modal confirm flow, leaving ConfirmDialog and its
sub-editors (StringListEditor, TheWorkEditor) referenced by nothing but the
barrel export. Remove the three files and the export — typecheck + lint confirm
no remaining references.

* fix(intake): coerce bad draft enums on confirm instead of hard-failing

The intake agent is an LLM and will emit off-enum values — e.g. task_type="feature",
which is not a valid TaskType (code/documentation/research/planning/design/
administrative). `_coerce_draft_enums` called `TaskType(value)` directly, which
raised, and the confirm 400'd with "Draft has invalid or missing required fields:
'feature' is not a valid TaskType". That forced the agent to discover the valid
values and self-correct in-chat — unacceptable: clicking "Approve & Start" must
never blow up on a cosmetic enum guess.

Coerce each enum to a sane default on invalid/missing (task_type→code,
nature→technical, complexity→medium); team falls back to the first valid cell in
the_work, then backend. `_lead_cell_team` now skips invalid cell names too. The
confirm/launch action no longer hard-fails on an enum the model got wrong.

* fix(intake): draft card no longer renders above the user's latest message

attachDraft fell back to "the last assistant message anywhere" when the current
turn had no streamed text yet (propose_draft called first). That last message was
often the PREVIOUS turn's — sitting above the user's "Yes, propose it" — so the
draft card rendered above the user's message. Attach only to the current turn's
streaming message; otherwise append a fresh assistant message so the card always
lands at the bottom of the thread.

* test(intake): guard draft enum coercion + invalid-cell skipping

Regression tests for the confirm-time enum coercion: an off-enum task_type
("feature") / nature / complexity coerce to code/technical/medium instead of
raising, and _lead_cell_team skips invalid cell names. Locks in that a bad enum
guess from the agent can never 400 the launch again.

* fix(intake): stop the agent fumbling through Claude Code meta-tools

In smoke it reflexively probed CC built-ins before reaching propose_draft —
plan mode + ExitPlanMode (it announced a written plan and waited instead of
emitting the draft), ToolSearch, Write — each correctly denied by the lockdown
but stumbly, and it only proposed after explicit CEO nudges.

- Gate: ExitPlanMode now gets a specific deny nudge ("you don't use plan mode;
  call propose_draft"), and the generic deny names the actual toolset instead
  of a bare "not available", so any probe degrades into guidance.
- Prompt: forbid plan mode/ExitPlanMode/ToolSearch explicitly and spell out
  "you do not plan and wait — call propose_draft directly when the spec is
  ready," plus an anti-pattern bullet.

* feat(intake): make the container logs transparent mid-turn

`docker logs` on the intake container was a black box: only turn start/end, while
the agent read the codebase and spawned 20+ subagents invisibly (the conversation
streams to the relay, not stdout), and the benign 3x ~/.claude.json warning was
the only thing visible.

- Driver logs each tool call mid-turn ("Intake tool use" with the tool name) and
  the draft emission, plus a tools count in the turn-streamed summary. Text deltas
  stay unlogged (they'd spam). Now the logs show the turn's real shape.
- Pre-create ~/.claude.json ({}) at container boot so the CLI's "config not found"
  warning (printed 3x, self-healed anyway) stops drowning the real logs.

* fix(intake): render markdown in user messages + scope copy to code blocks

Two display fixes from the smoke:
- User messages collapsed newlines (plain {content} in a div) and rendered no
  markdown — a "1.\n2.\n3." answer showed as one run-on line. Render user AND
  assistant bubbles through a shared GFM markdown body that inherits the bubble's
  text color, so lists / newlines / styling render correctly on both.
- Copy was blanketed on every assistant message; scope it to KEY parts — a copy
  button on fenced code blocks (the draft card keeps its own). Removed the
  per-message button.

* fix(intake): prevent duplicate tasks from a double-click on launch

Clicking a draft launch button twice fired two confirms and created duplicate
tasks. Add a synchronous re-entry guard (a ref — no stale-closure window) at the
top of launchTask so a second click returns immediately, and disable + spin the
draft-card buttons while a launch is in flight so it's visually clear it's working.

* docs(how-to): lead task creation with the Task Assistant flow

Rewrite "1 · It starts with you" to walk the Prompter/Task Assistant path —
scope form, the agent reading the codebase, its grounded analysis, the draft
card, and the created task — then flow into the Board review. Replaces the old
manual task-definition form shots.

Image placeholder: images/prompter_draft_card.png (the 3-button card) is
referenced but not yet captured — TODO comment marks it for the next smoke run.
A second comment flags an optional re-capture of prompter_run_2 after the
markdown-rendering fix.

* fix(intake): restore assistant message text contrast

The markdown refactor dropped `dark:prose-invert` and made text inherit the
bubble's color, but the assistant bubble had no explicit text color — so its text
rendered near-invisible (dark-on-dark on bg-muted). Give the assistant bubble an
explicit text-foreground; the user bubble already carries text-primary-foreground,
and [&_*]:!text-inherit now resolves to a readable color on both.

* fix(intake): coerce draft priority too — confirm 500'd on priority="high"

The enum-coercion fix covered task_type/nature/complexity/team, but priority is a
non-enum int field handled by `int(draft_data.get("priority", 2))`, and the agent
guesses a word ("high") as readily as a number — so int("high") raised ValueError
and the confirm 500'd. Same class of bug, one field missed.

Add _coerce_priority: map words (urgent/high/medium/low → 0/1/2/3), clamp numbers
to 0-3, default to 2 (medium) on anything else. The launch can no longer crash on
any field the LLM guessed. + regression test.

* fix(intake): draft card shows distinct cells, not one badge per work item

the_work has one entry per work item, so a cell with several items rendered its
badge repeatedly ("Board-led across Backend Backend Backend Frontend Frontend
…"). De-dupe to distinct teams so the card reads "Board-led across Backend
Frontend" — and the "Cell:" vs "Board-led across" label keys off distinct count.

* docs(how-to): hero the teaser gif + resolve the Prompter/Task Assistant thread

- Move the 12s teaser gif to the top as the hero — it was buried between the
  "prefer video" link and the first screenshot.
- Name the connection: the Task Assistant IS the Prompter, so section 1 (using
  the tool) and the rest (RoboCo building it) read as one story — you use the
  tool the company built for itself, then watch the build.
- Re-anchor the section 1 → Board transition to follow the Prompter's own
  journey, instead of implying section 1's example task is the one reviewed next.

* Included images for how-to.md

* docs(how-to): align agent count to 20 (matches README + CLAUDE.md)

The how-to said "18 agents" with UX/UI at one dev and no Intake — stale against
the authoritative count. Bump 18→20 (prose + spelled-out eighteen→twenty), give
UX/UI 2 devs, and add the Intake line to the org tree (Intake leads section 1, so
it belongs in the tree). README + CLAUDE.md already say 20.

* ci(release): publish all RoboCo images to GHCR + Docker Hub

The release published only the orchestrator to GHCR. Build and push the full set
the stack needs — agent-base, the 8 agent images, orchestrator, and panel — to
BOTH ghcr.io/rennf93/* and docker.io/renzof93/*, at :<version> and :latest, so
consumers can pull instead of compose-building.

- agent-base builds first (the agent images build FROM roboco-agent-base, a local
  tag), then the rest; push only after every build succeeds.
- Image names mirror the docker-compose `image:` values 1:1.
- Free disk on the runner first (11 images is space-heavy).
- Needs a DOCKERHUB_TOKEN repo secret for the Docker Hub login.
- SECURITY.md updated to reference both registries.

* ci(release): use short SHA as the image tag on manual dispatch

A workflow_dispatch runs against a branch, and the branch name (e.g.
feature/prompter-gold-upgrade) was used verbatim as the image tag — but "/" is
illegal in a Docker tag, so the first build failed instantly with "invalid
reference format". Releases still tag from the release tag; manual dispatch now
always uses the short SHA, which is a valid tag.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-09 17:08:34 +02:00
06682f33c6 Fix: agent workflow hardening (#70)
* fix(gateway): push the branch before QA handoff so reviewers see the latest commits

The commit content tool commits locally without pushing; only open_pr pushed
the branch. On the first submission that was fine, but a fix committed while
addressing needs_revision never reached origin (open_pr is skipped once the PR
exists), so QA — which reviews the remote PR branch — re-reviewed the stale
remote and re-failed the task on every cycle, a loop that never converged.

i_am_done now pushes the task branch (idempotent; a no-op when nothing is
unpushed) as part of the shared submit gate, covering both the normal and
resume-from-verifying paths. A push failure blocks the handoff with a clear
remediation rather than parking the task in awaiting_qa with commits that exist
only in the developer's local workspace.

* fix(orchestrator): don't reap a stale claim while the agent's container is alive

The stale-claim reaper released any claimed/in_progress task whose
last_heartbeat_at exceeded the TTL. The heartbeat only updates on certain
gateway calls, so a developer deep in a long edit/test cycle outran the TTL and
had its claim reaped mid-work — churning the task and risking a double spawn
against the still-running container.

The reaper now skips a task whose assignee still holds a live (ACTIVE) agent
instance, trusting container liveness — the ground truth — over the heartbeat
proxy. The check is defensive on missing fields so a heartbeat-only caller (and
the reaper's existing unit tests) behave exactly as before.

* fix(gateway): refuse to unblock a task while a dependency is unfinished

A PM unblock on a dependency-gated task moved it straight to in_progress,
overriding the dependency — letting a dependent proceed without its upstream's
work (e.g. a frontend task built before its UX design lands). A dependency
block is meant to clear on its own via _unblock_dependents the moment the
upstream reaches a terminal state.

unblock now refuses while any dependency is still non-terminal, returning a
clear remediation that the block resolves automatically. Manual unblock remains
available for genuine, non-dependency blockers.

* fix(gateway): release a dependency-blocked claim to pending instead of looping

A task that reached claimed/in_progress with an unfinished dependency was left
in that state when the claim guard rejected, so the orchestrator's respawn loop
kept reviving its assignee — which could make no progress — burning work for
nothing.

The claim guard now releases such a task back to pending. claimed -> blocked is
not a legal transition, so pending — held by the dispatch dependency filter — is
the lifecycle-correct resting state: the respawn loop ignores pending tasks, and
_unblock_dependents re-dispatches it once the upstream reaches a terminal state.
release_dependency_blocked_claim shares a _force_unclaim_to_pending core with
unclaim_for_reaper so both record a truthful work-session abandon reason.

* feat(security): warn at startup in header-trust mode + document the auth posture

When ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED is not enabled the API accepts the X-Agent-Id /
X-Agent-Role headers without a signed token, so any client that can reach it may
act as any role (including 'ceo'). The API now logs a clear warning at startup
in this mode, and the README gains a Security section documenting the auth
posture and how to harden it. Acceptable only on a trusted private network — do
not expose the API to untrusted networks.

* fix(workspace): scope the refresh fetch to current + default branch

ensure_workspace's healthy short-circuit ran an all-refs 'git fetch origin' to
keep every origin/<branch> ref current. On a monorepo with many accumulated
feature/* branches that exceeds the refresh timeout, the fetch silently fails,
and the workspace keeps a stale base — so an agent builds on an out-of-date
branch.

The refresh now fetches only the workspace's current branch and the repo's
default branch (resolved via origin/HEAD), with --no-tags --prune: it transfers
near-nothing and can't time out. Readers need their own branch and the default;
the integration branch is refreshed at branch-creation time.

* fix(git): refresh a dependency-blocked task's branch off the current integration tip

A cross-cell dependent (e.g. a frontend task waiting on the UX design) was
branched off a base captured before its upstream merged into the integration
branch, and the branch was never re-synced — so the agent built on a stale
snapshot with none of the upstream's work.

Two changes close the gap:
- release_dependency_blocked_claim now clears branch_name, so the re-claim
  (after the dependency clears) re-runs branch creation.
- create_branch, when the branch is already on disk with no commits of its own,
  resets it onto the freshly-pulled base — the dependent now builds on the
  current integration tip. A branch carrying real commits is left untouched, so
  no work is discarded; the cell->leaf cascade carries the upstream down to the
  dev branch automatically.

* refactor(gateway): drop the sibling-sequence claim guard

Sibling sequence no longer gates a claim. Cross-cell ordering is
enforced by task dependencies — a cell task that depends on another is
held until its upstream reaches a terminal state, a stronger,
status-aware gate than the sequence-number check. That check was
dormant in practice anyway: every fan-out child carries sequence 0, on
which the guard short-circuited. `sequence` stays a sibling-ordering /
dispatch-priority field (list_pending ordering and the panel).

Removes sibling_sequence_guard and its _earlier_blocking_sibling
helper, the now-unused skip_sequence parameter threaded through the
claim verbs, and the sibling fetch that fed it.

* feat(gateway): sort a cross-cell dependent after its upstream

When the frontend cell task is wired to depend on its UX/UI sibling, set
its sequence to the upstream's sequence + 1 so it sorts after the design
it waits on — list_pending ordering and the panel now show UX ahead of
the implementation it gates, in either delegation order.

Adds TaskService.set_sequence (the sibling-ordering field is a service
write; it carries no claim-gating semantics — dependencies gate claims).

* feat(gateway): make the backend cell depend on UX too

UX/UI design defines the screens and API contracts both implementation
cells build against, so the backend cell — not just the frontend — waits
on the UX/UI cell task in a product fan-out and sorts after it. Wires in
either delegation order: a backend task delegated after UX gets the
dependency directly; a UX task delegated after a still-pending backend
sibling retro-wires it.

Mirrors the existing frontend wiring (_depend_backend_on_ux and
_depend_pending_backends_on_ux). Backend is held by the same dependency
gate, so it costs no extra dispatch churn.

* fix(websocket): forward notification acks instead of logging them incomplete

The bridge handler serves both notification.sent and notification.acked,
but acked events carry `agent_id` (the acking agent) rather than
`recipient_id`, so every acknowledgement tripped the missing-field guard
and logged "Incomplete notification event" instead of reaching the panel.
Accept either field as the recipient.

* feat(api): hint the full UUID when a truncated task id fails validation

Agents copy the 8-character task prefix the system shows them (the commit
prefix, task summaries) and send it as task_id, which fails UUID
validation with an opaque "invalid length" 422 and wastes a call. The
request-validation handler now detects a task_id UUID error and attaches
a `remediate` hint telling the agent to retry with the full 36-character
UUID from its task envelope.

* fix(audit): record the blocked transition when a task is escalated

Escalation sets a task to blocked by writing task.status directly, which
bypassed the validated transition helper and so never emitted a
task.blocked audit row — the lifecycle moved but the Auditor saw nothing.
Extract the audit emit from the central transition helper into
_emit_status_transition_audit and call it from the escalate path,
capturing the prior status and outgoing owner before reassignment so the
row is attributed correctly.

* fix(docs): stop doubling the docs path so design specs index into RAG

The documenter sometimes hands a doc path already rooted at docs/, and
joining it onto DOCS_BASE_PATH (/app/docs) produced /app/docs/docs/...,
so the file was never found and the spec never indexed — the frontend
cell could not retrieve the UX design over RAG. Normalize the path
before joining: trust an absolute path, otherwise strip a single
redundant leading docs/ segment.

* feat(security): let the control panel authenticate in secure mode

With ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED=true every request must carry a valid
HMAC token, which locked the human control panel out — it sends role
headers but no token. nginx, the only trusted hop between the browser
and the API, now injects the CEO token on /api and /ws, so the browser
never holds the signing secret. The injected value is just the existing
per-agent token issued for the CEO identity (issue_panel_token), so the
token-verification path is unchanged. An empty value (dev/header-trust
mode) renders to no header.

`make panel-token` prints the value; set it as ROBOCO_PANEL_AGENT_TOKEN
in .env before enabling secure mode. .env.example and the README
Security section document the flow.

* chore(compose): consolidate the two compose files into one

docker-compose.yml and docker-compose.yaml had diverged: .yml — the file
Docker actually uses — carried ROBOCO_PUBLIC_BASE_URL but was missing the
/app/manifests bind-mount, while .yaml had the manifests mount but not
the base URL. Merge the union into docker-compose.yml and delete the
duplicate so there is one source of truth and no "multiple config files"
warning.

This activates the manifests mount in the deployed file: without it the
orchestrator writes per-agent tool manifests to its ephemeral container
fs, they never reach the host for the daemon to bind-mount, and agents
fall back to all-verbs registration. Drop the stale .yaml reference from
the config.py docstring, the labeler, and the CI path filters.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-05 16:35:22 +02:00
Renn F ab687915f5 fix(docker): drop no-op userns_mode (NAS has no userns-remap)
The chown failures were never a userns-remap issue (the NAS daemon has no
userns-remap configured) — they were the .git-only chown leaving the working
tree root-owned, fixed separately. userns_mode:host on the orchestrator alone
was a no-op at best and a latent footgun (orchestrator un-remapped while agents
are not) if remap were ever enabled. Keep the uv-in-runner + env=production.
2026-06-04 00:40:28 +02:00
Renn F 78faf6f4da fix(docker): ship uv in orchestrator runner, set production env + host userns
The orchestrator runner stage lacked uv, so workspace dep pre-install
(`uv sync`) and `uv run` CI commands failed at runtime; copy uv from the
builder stage like agent-base does. Set ROBOCO_ENVIRONMENT=production on
the orchestrator service so structlog emits JSON instead of console output.
Add userns_mode: "host" so the orchestrator's chown of cloned workspaces to
the agent uid isn't blocked by docker's user-namespace remap.
2026-06-03 18:57:49 +02:00
Renn F 4829f93a68 fix(gateway): unblock task claim; full Phase 0/1/2 remediation
Resolves the 100% claim-failure rate introduced by the gateway rewrite
  (commit 62bda0c plus 78 follow-ups). Live smoke runs hit
  `404 /api/v2/flow/developer/...` on every dev verb plus a manifest
  fallback that silently exposed off-role verbs to PMs — confirmed
  firing simultaneously in NAS agent logs (be-dev-1, be-pm, main-pm).

  Audit reports under docs/internal/audit_2026_05_04/ catalogue 49
  defects across gateway, services, prompts, MCP transport, substrate,
  and tests (8 detail reports + master synthesis). Six smoking guns;
  three proven in production logs.

  Phase 0 — unblock claim:
  - URL prefix /api/v2/flow/dev → /developer; slug-map board roles
    (product_owner, head_marketing) → /board (D-01)
  - _i_will_work_on AttributeError on None across pending /
    needs_revision / claimed re-entry branches (D-02)
  - Seed last_heartbeat_at in _qa_or_doc_claim (D-03)
  - Drop misleading i_have_committed verb; dev flow uses commit() (D-04)
  - Manifest mount via compose; flow_server + do_server fail loud
    instead of exposing all-verbs fallback (D-12)
  - MCP _post() surfaces envelope body on 4xx so agents see remediate
    hints (D-13)
    on git failure so retries aren't blocked by half-state (S-01)

  Phase 1 — lifecycle stability:
  - _resolve_skill falls back to AgentTable.capabilities (D-06)
  - main_pm_complete uses kwargs for escalate_to_ceo (D-07)
  - i_am_done auto-runs submit_verification when in_progress (D-08)
  - active_claimant_id wired in claim/unclaim paths — single-claimant
    invariant now functional (D-05)
  - qa_pass/qa_fail assert claimed_by parity with qa_agent_id (D-18)
  - Prompt-drift sweep: fail() shape, i_am_done(task_id, notes),
    subtask cap (12 hard / 8 soft), error-code symbology rewritten in
    base.md + per-role anti-patterns (D-10/11/29/30/31, D-37)

  Phase 2 — invariants + architecture:
  - Real-DB integration test exercising claim → in_progress → commit
    → submit_for_qa → i_am_done → awaiting_qa (P2-1)
  - choreographer.py → package; 3 of 6 role mixins extracted
    (board, doc, qa). _impl.py 2,526 → 2,080 lines (-18%). Continuation
    plan in docs/internal/audit_2026_05_04/p2_2_decompose_plan.md (P2-2)
  - Closure guards consolidated via _subtasks_not_terminal_envelope (P2-3)
  - TaskService.unclaim_for_reaper routed through canonical
    _validate_and_set_status; in_progress → pending added to
    VALID_TRANSITIONS (P2-4)
  - Dead code removed: i_am_done_with_catchup verb, _run_catch_up helper
    (P2-5)
  - 6 state-machine invariants asserted via property test (P2-6)
  - attempt_id (uuid4) stamped on every gateway.rejected audit row (P2-7)
  - _reconcile_orphan_claims_on_startup rolls back tasks left CLAIMED
    with branch_name=NULL from prior crashes (P2-8)
  - scripts/regenerate_verb_tables.py introspects Pydantic schemas +
    role_config; compose_prompt injects per-role tables as a layer.
    Eliminates the prompt-drift class structurally (P2-9)

  Other:
  - D-48: orchestrator mounts host's ~/.claude.json when present so
    agents don't boot from backup recovery on every spawn
  - D-49: dev dispatcher rejects role-mismatched spawns (e.g. doc task
    assigned to dev agent)

  Tests: 553 pass · ruff + mypy clean. Live NAS smoke verification
  pending — needs the stack brought back up.
2026-05-04 23:43:55 +02:00
Renn F d15b7ae561 Enforcements, hooks and code quality 2026-04-21 17:48:45 +02:00
Renn F 8e201901c0 I mean, it's at a good place rn... 2026-04-20 15:10:54 +02:00
Renn F 0023c25d60 Added git workflow + fixing some issues 2026-04-19 16:13:42 +02:00
Renn F 6ea4ba2bbe Switch from embeddinggemma:300m to qwen3-embedding:0.6b 2026-01-08 18:08:29 +01:00
Renn F 955455d704 Git integration and Project workspace fixes 2026-01-08 16:45:25 +01:00