Two agent-authored fields were leaking non-developer content into the
human note columns the panel renders:
- apply_escalation appended '[ESCALATED] From X to Y\nReason: ...' to
dev_notes (the developer's space). On a re-escalation loop a stuck cell
PM grew one task's dev_notes to ~8KB across 5 escalations. It now writes
a structured orchestration_markers['escalation'] record; the target
still learns the reason from the escalate notification.
- approve_and_start string-packed 'approve_and_start_notes:<text>' into
quick_context (raw key:value soup). It now writes
orchestration_markers['approve_and_start_notes'], leaving quick_context
for the human ResumptionNote only.
Adds typed marker accessors (get/set_escalation, get/set_approve_and_start_notes)
and refactors _record_pr_review under the complexity bound by extracting
_compose_review_body. Documents update_task_with_message as the legacy
A2A-protocol log (dev_notes is intentional there, not pollution).
The single non-empty/non-placeholder gate caught a lone banned token
(wip) and below-floor strings, but multi-token soup made entirely of
placeholders (wip wip, tbd / na, todo todo todo) slipped through both
checks. Add an all-tokens-filler test that strips edge punctuation per
token and rejects when every meaningful token is banned — without
flagging real prose that merely contains a filler word (none of the
tests failed). Strengthens every content model + gateway anti-soup
guard that composes reject_trivial.
Renn F