* feat(gateway): delegation detail-fidelity — details survive hand-off, both directions
Details thinned out at every delegation hop: a PM child task mapped to no
parent criterion was legal (coverage only surfaced at submit_up, after the
whole wave ran — a 12-subtask docs tree grew through 8 review rounds that
way, one child titled 'docs page and route wrapper' shipping only the
page), and QA could pass work on a gestalt read (a 4-scene video brief
shipped 3 scenes past every gate because the features existed only in
prose). Three chokepoint gates:
- delegate (down): every child must declare covers_parent_criteria
resolving against the parent's real acceptance criteria — no mapping or
an unresolvable ref rejects naming every offending child and the valid
criteria; the success envelope carries parent_ac_coverage
{covered, uncovered} so a wave-planning PM sees remaining gaps in the
same turn. Full coverage stays enforced at submit_up (waves stay legal).
- pass_review (up): mandatory criteria_verified — one {criterion,
evidence} entry per task AC, matched by the findings ledger's
id-or-exact-text matcher, evidence soup-checked and capped; rejects
naming the unverified criteria; entries render deterministically into
qa_notes as '[AC] <criterion> — verified: <evidence>' lines. The old
count-only ac_verdicts gate is superseded (arg kept for back-compat).
- video briefs (structured detail at origination): an enumerable feature
list (release highlights, or input_props.highlights carried onto a
reject re-author) becomes its own scene acceptance criterion, bounded to
the AC caps; a re-author without highlights carries the
feedback-addressed criterion instead.
Extracted findings.py's criterion matcher into shared unmatched_criteria /
uncovered_acceptance_criteria instead of duplicating it; criteria_verified
joins the WAF free-text exclusion set like findings/issues.
* fix(gateway): break the block/unblock wedge — four hardening fixes from the live PM loop
A cell task looped fe-pm/main-pm block/unblock for hours (10 cycles, 43
spawns): a transient GitHub API error resolving CI became an unwaivable
blocker finding whose own fix text said no code change was required, the
submit freshness guard then demanded a commit no finding called for,
escalate_up auto-blocked, and main-pm's correct recovery plan 422'd on
the approach length cap, degrading it to a bare unblock. Four fixes:
- pr_pass CI-unresolvable refusal is now explicitly transient-worded:
retry pr_pass shortly, do NOT pr_fail over a CI-status lookup error —
a platform blip is not a code finding
- submit freshness guard grants ONE unchanged-head resubmission per
head sha when the findings ledger has zero open rows (all addressed
without code changes) — stamped via the resubmit_unchanged_head
marker so the same head can never loop a second time
- unblock carries a flip breaker: block_flip_count marker, and at the
third flip a one-shot CEO notification flags the task as structurally
wedged (unblock itself still succeeds — the breaker signals, it does
not wedge recovery)
- i_will_plan's approach cap truncates at 800 chars instead of
rejecting — an over-detailed plan must never cost the PM its turn
---------
Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(release): CI wait polls the prod rung; escape the header tooltip apostrophe
get_latest_ci_conclusion defaults to the ladder's head rung, so
wait_for_ci searched slave for a release commit that lives on master
and timed out after 40 minutes with the run already green. The wait
now passes the prod branch explicitly. Also fixes the
react/no-unescaped-entities error that turned master's Panel CI red.
* fix(panel,video): dead dialog triggers behind tooltips; dotted composition ids render
HelpTip nested inside a Dialog/AlertDialog trigger puts the trigger's
click handler on the Tooltip root, which renders no DOM — the agents
Spawn item and the KB Reindex-All / Delete-index confirms were dead.
Tooltips now wrap the triggers. The video renderer accepts interior
single dots in composition ids (release-0.25.0) with '..' still
unrepresentable, and propose_video refuses an unrenderable id at
authoring time.
* fix(dispatch): restart-safe PM review turns
A leaf task in awaiting_pm_review had no periodic pickup: the closure
dispatcher bailed on childless tasks and skipped PR-bearing review
tasks as already-promoted, assuming the submit-time PM session was
still alive — an assumption every restart breaks. Proven live on the
docs-sync leaf after the 0.25.0 redeploy, which also dependency-blocked
its sibling dev task. Childless awaiting_pm_review tasks now flow to
the PM's review turn, and the merge turn respawns its PM when none is
active.
* feat(video): verify the rendered artifact, not the source
The 14s release-0.25.0 cut shipped with only one of four scenes visibly
registering: the dev authored DOM, the smoke asserted DOM, QA read code —
nobody consumed the rendered MP4 before the CEO did. Close that loop, and
the reject loop behind it:
- sidecar frames mode: POST /render with frames=1..32 renders the cut,
ffprobes the REAL duration, extracts midpoint-sampled keyframe PNGs
(timestamps in filenames), streams a tar.gz back with X-Video-Duration
- request_render do-verb (developer/QA, request_sandbox's shape): renders
the caller's ACTUAL composition — dev's own worktree (head_sha/dirty
provenance), QA a read-only git-archive export of the assembled branch —
extracts frames to the container-shared .previews/ path, stamps the
render_preview marker, returns the paths as envelope evidence
- gate: i_am_done on a source=video task refuses without a stamped
render_preview (Requirement.RENDER_VERIFIED; canonical source string
moved to foundation as markers.VIDEO_TASK_SOURCE; mirrored in the
possibilities-matrix fast path so it cannot bypass the check)
- QA claim_review evidence carries video_context (composition id, the
dev's preview, a re-render instruction) so review checks output
- dev spawn prompt block + a 4th authoring AC order Read-every-frame
verification before submitting
- reject -> re-author: a CEO reject with a reason opens a fresh authoring
task carrying the verbatim feedback + a revise-in-place pointer at the
existing composition (best-effort, never fails the reject) — rejection
feedback no longer dies on the cancelled draft
E2E: rendered the committed release-0.25.0 composition through the new
frames mode locally — the returned keyframes show exactly the reported
failure (blank frame at 5.8s, only 'Env ladder' by 12.8s), the check the
fleet was missing.
---------
Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(lifecycle): revision findings ledger — structured QA/PR/PM/CEO failure feedback, persisted and delivered down the chain
Every bounce used to survive only as flattened prose: rounds overwrote each
other in notes_structured, request_changes persisted nothing, two raw
dev_notes appends were silently destroyed by the next handoff note, and the
dev prompt pointed at fields (qa_notes via evidence(), pm_notes) the API
never delivered. Agents re-interpreted and re-discovered every failure
before they could start fixing it.
- task_review_findings (migration 071, append-only): file/line/severity/
criterion(AC-id-validated)/expected/actual/fix/evidence per finding, with
origin (qa|pr_gate|pm|ceo), round, and an open->addressed->verified
lifecycle (waived reserved); new tasks.pm_notes + PmReviewContent give
request_changes a structured home
- producers: fail_review/pr_fail/request_changes take findings=[...] (prose
issues shimmed+merged for one release, deprecation-logged); ceo_reject
validates its reason (no 500), lands an origin=ceo finding, and bumps
round+audit on branchless coordination roots; guardrails at the verb
chokepoint (nudge >5, hard reject >10, field caps, traversal-safe file);
the dev_notes data-loss appends are removed; new task.request_changes +
task.ceo_reject audit events close rework attribution
- delivery: qa_notes/pr_reviewer_notes/pm_notes carry the deterministic
[F-id8] rendering; claim briefings, evidence(), the REVISION_REQUIRED
spawn prompt, PM triage bounced-blocks, and A2A bodies deliver open
findings; round-N+1 QA and gate reviewers get the full prior ledger;
panel Findings tab + bounced-xN chip; metrics pm_rejects/ceo_rejects +
findings counts; vault task notes render a Findings section (fail-open)
- resolution closes for every origin: i_am_done and submit_up/submit_root
take resolved_findings gated by FINDINGS_ADDRESSED (owner-gated so a
stale non-owner PM can never mutate the ledger); pass_review/pr_pass/
complete verify-stamp same-transaction; ceo_approve stamps best-effort
- 24 real-DB integration tests drive the full loop through the real
choreographer; full suite 12856 green
* docs: revision findings ledger sweep — CLAUDE.md, map, RAG corpus
- CLAUDE.md: new ledger section + corrected request_changes row
- docs/map/review-findings.md (new subsystem map) + surgical updates to
task-service/pr-gate-review/metrics-observability/vault/panel maps
- docs/rag: producers' findings contract across qa/pr-reviewer/developer/
cell-pm/main-pm/ceo role docs (the PM docs were missing request_changes
entirely), verb references, and a new architecture/review-findings.md
disambiguating ledger findings from convention findings
* test(e2e): resubmit resolves the pr_fail finding per the ledger contract
The scripted pr_fail revision loop resubmitted submit_up without
resolved_findings — correctly rejected now that FINDINGS_ADDRESSED gates
the PM resubmit verbs (green locally, red only in CI since the e2e suite
skips without ROBOCO_E2E_SMOKE=1). The scripted PM now reads the open
ledger row pr_fail persisted (new open_finding_ids arc helper) and
resolves it on resubmit, asserting the open set drains — exercising the
coordinator half of the new contract end to end.
---------
Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(sandbox): on-demand request_sandbox verb replaces eager provisioning
Sandboxes were provisioned at every agent spawn for opted-in projects,
so every role paid the sidecar spin-up and a provisioning failure
refused the spawn. Provisioning now happens when an agent asks: the
request_sandbox do-verb (dev + QA) reaches the orchestrator through
ContentActionsDeps, ensure_sandbox provisions idempotently with an
in-memory per-agent cache (evicted at teardown and janitor sweep), and
creds return in the envelope payload including ready-to-export
ROBOCO_TEST_* values. Spawn now only injects a marker env naming the
available services plus a briefing line; sandbox failures can no longer
refuse a spawn. Teardown lifecycle unchanged.
* feat(sandbox): harden request_sandbox + Phase 3 wiring proof and docs
Hardening from adversarial review: ensure_sandbox now provisions the
project's full opted-in set on first request (a later superset can
never tear down a live sandbox mid-use), serializes per-agent behind an
asyncio lock (a client timeout-retry no longer races its own in-flight
provision), and verifies container liveness on every cache hit (a dead
sandbox evicts and re-provisions instead of serving dead creds). MCP
client budget 720->1080s for the full-set cold case. Phase 3: e2e smoke
wiring test (manifest grants + guard-chain envelopes over the real
API), sandbox-db/tools/map docs and CLAUDE.md rewritten for on-demand.
* feat(sandbox): release sandboxes when the agent's work ends
CEO directive: sidecars must not dangle once the agent is done. The six
work-ending verbs (i_am_done, unclaim, i_am_idle, pass_review,
fail_review, i_documented) now release the caller's sandbox best-effort
on their success path via release_sandbox (lock + teardown + cache
evict; a no-sandbox agent costs a dict lookup). Container removal and
the janitor remain the backstop; a re-request provisions fresh.
* test(sandbox): monkeypatch the release hook instead of method assignment
mypy method-assign rejected the direct AsyncMock assignments; the prior
static gate ran before this test file landed.
* test(sandbox): guard envelope evidence for mypy in verb tests
* chore(prompts): regenerate verb tables for request_sandbox
* chore: resolve merge with master (breadcrumbs + statement budget)
---------
Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(a2a): deliver latest incoming message preview into the claim briefing
list_unread_a2a now carries last_message_preview (the latest message from the
OTHER agent, never the agent's own reply), fetched via a correlated subquery in
the same query — no N+1 on the per-verb briefing path.
* feat(a2a): read_a2a verb delivers unread message bodies to the agent
A2AService.get_unread_messages returns the caller's unread INCOMING messages
(never its own sends), marking exactly those rows read atomically so a message
arriving mid-call is preserved. Wired as the read_a2a content verb (route +
do_server tool + granted to every delivery role) — the content-bearing read the
A2A inbox lacked (read_messages only zeroed the counter).
* docs(rag): document read_a2a as the A2A content-read path
* fix(task): backlog activation no longer requires a discussion session
Removes the SessionTaskTable gate in activate() (and its dangling log field),
deletes _inherit_parent_session + its create() call, and drops the now-unused
SessionTaskTable import. Coordination rides task state; the session subsystem is
being retired. Tests updated to the new (no-session) behavior.
* fix(orchestrator): drop session sweep from _run_sweep
Removes the messaging import + sweep_timed_out_sessions call. That import sat
outside the try/except, so once messaging.py is deleted it would have killed the
entire sweep cascade (budget kill-switch, token rollups, retention, image prune,
superseded-PR reconcile). Notification sweep + all maintenance sweeps unchanged.
* release-manager --no-tags read-clone fix
* test: update evidence_repo unit test for a2a last_message_preview
* refactor(gateway): drop session propagation on delegate
Removes propagate_sessions_to_subtask from delegate(), the ChoreographerDeps
messaging field + property, and the ChoreographerDeps messaging arg in deps.py
(ContentActions messaging + import stay until the verbs are removed). Deletes the
propagation test; strips the now-invalid messaging kwarg from ChoreographerDeps
test builders.
* refactor(gateway): remove say/open_session/link_session/channels verbs
Removes the four channel/session verbs across content_actions (impls +
ContentActionsDeps.messaging), do_server (tools + registry), role_config (grants
+ _CHANNEL_DISCOVERY), do.py (routes), schemas/v1/do.py (request models), and
deps.py (MessagingService import + construction). Regenerates the prompt verb
tables. dm/notify/read_messages/read_a2a stay. Tests deleted/updated accordingly.
* uv.lock Upgrade
* refactor: remove conversation RAG indexing; Secretary announces via notification
Drops the CONVERSATIONS index (index_conversation, ConversationsIndexPlugin,
IndexType.CONVERSATIONS enum, IndexConversationParams, mentor.py type-label, the
messaging index hook) and its chunk-table manifest entries. The Secretary's
ANNOUNCE/RELAY_MESSAGE now fan out a BROADCAST notification to every agent's
inbox (NotificationService.broadcast) instead of posting to a dead channel.
* fix(panel): label RAG health error lines by subsystem
A red llm_error (e.g. the glm-5.2:cloud weekly-limit 429) rendered under
the 'Embedding: ok' header with no label, reading as an embedding failure.
Prefix each error line with LLM / Embedding / Vector store.
* refactor: remove channel/message reads from metrics, dashboard, git, events
MetricsService drops get_communication_volume + the MessageTable
message-count in get_agent_metrics (and the now-dead messages_sent_week
field). DashboardService drops get_channel_feeds/_compute_channel_status
and the message read in get_recent_activity (task activity kept);
get_auditor_metrics no longer reports communication_volume.
GitService's two primary-session-id helpers always return None now
(callers already treat None as "no primary session"). events/handlers.py
drops the SESSION_CLOSED/SESSION_TIMEOUT subscriptions + the
handle_session_boundary handler.
Forced follow-on: api/routes/dashboard.py + api/schemas/dashboard.py
dropped the now-dangling live_feeds/ChannelFeed surface and the
/metrics/communication route, which wrapped the removed service calls
directly (mypy would otherwise fail on the missing attributes).
* refactor: delete MessagingService + channel seeding
Edited db/__init__.py and services/__init__.py first (drop the unconditional
Channel/Group/Message/Session table + MessagingService re-exports), then
deleted services/messaging.py, then trimmed db/seed.py to only create_agents
(create_channels/create_channel_memberships/create_initial_messages gone).
Forced expansion: api/routes/{channels,groups,sessions,messages}.py import
roboco.services.messaging directly (not through the package __init__), as
does api/routes/tasks.py (the session-links embed on GET /tasks/{id} and the
GET /{id}/sessions route). Deleting messaging.py without addressing these
breaks `import roboco.api.app` immediately, since app.py eagerly imports all
route modules at startup. Since the 4 CRUD route files are 100%
MessagingService-backed with zero independent logic (and are wholesale
deletes in the plan's later API-routes task anyway), deleted them now +
unmounted from app.py/routes/__init__.py; tasks.py got the same surgical
trim its later task already specified (drop session-links embed +
TaskSessionLinkResponse/TaskResponse.sessions). This pulls a slice of that
later work forward — the routes/schemas for channels/groups/sessions/messages
still need their own pass, but their messaging-coupled parts are gone.
Verified with a full-suite collection sweep (12010 tests collected, zero
import errors) beyond the directly touched test dirs, given the expanded
blast radius.
* refactor: remove channel/session/message models, tables, and channel policy
Models: deleted channel.py/group.py/session.py/messaging.py wholesale
(zero external consumers besides the models/__init__.py re-export).
message.py surgically trimmed: removed MessageCreate (dead) and MessageEdit
(never instantiated; ExtractedMessage.edit_history retyped to
list[dict[str, Any]] to match how it's actually persisted — confirmed
ExtractedMessage was never written to any DB table, so MessageTable's
removal carries no functional risk to the kept extraction pipeline).
base.py: removed SessionStatus + ChannelType, kept MessageType. Also
removed the confirmed-dead channels_read/channels_write fields from
models/agent.py:AgentPermissions and models/dashboard.py:ChannelFeedData.
db/tables.py: deleted ChannelTable/GroupTable/SessionTable/SessionTaskTable/
MessageTable, TaskTable.session_links, and JournalEntryTable.session_id —
cascaded through models/journal.py, services/journal.py, and
api/schemas+routes/journals.py (22 plumbing sites).
foundation/policy/communications.py: removed the ChannelSpec/CHANNELS
catalog + TEAM_SCOPED_ROLES/_CELL_*/_AUDITOR_ONLY helpers, kept the
notification policy (Priority/parse_priority/NOTIFY_SENDER_ROLES/
ACK_REQUIRED_BY_TYPE). enforcement/channel_access.py deleted (confirmed
fully dead in production). agents_config.py: removed CHANNEL_ACCESS
(kept A2A_ALLOWED_PAIRS). seeds/initial_data.py: removed
DEFAULT_CHANNELS/CHANNEL_MEMBERSHIPS/AUDITOR_SILENT_ACCESS + the
never-consumed INITIAL_MESSAGES. config.py: removed
session_idle_timeout_seconds (zero consumers). exceptions.py: removed
dead ChannelError/ChannelAccessDeniedError/SessionClosedError.
Forced expansion beyond the original file list — ChannelType cascaded
into a live, mounted surface the plan didn't trace: agents_config.
CHANNEL_ACCESS -> services/permissions.py's channel-RBAC methods (not
models/permissions.py, which turned out to have no channel code at all)
-> two real endpoints in api/routes/stream.py (GET /permissions,
GET /permissions/channel/{name}) and two dependency factories in
api/deps.py. Removed the channel methods + fields, deleted the
channel-specific stream.py endpoint, deleted require_channel_read/write.
Also deleted api/schemas/{channels,sessions}.py (hard dependency on the
removed enums; already fully dead after the Task 10 route deletions) and
api/schemas/messages.py (a TYPE_CHECKING-only import of the deleted
MessageTable; likewise already fully dead) + its dedicated test file.
Test updates: test_permissions.py -14 channel tests (matches the planned
count exactly), test_communications.py / test_communications_consumers.py
split to keep only notification-policy coverage, test_exceptions.py -9,
test_deps.py -4, plus the journal/stream/foundation-smoke fallout. Also
fixed a pre-existing (Task 7) broken assertion in
test_foundation_phase3_smoke.py that inspected a `say()` method already
removed from ContentActions.
Verified: full-suite collection (11961 tests, zero import errors) and a
complete test run (11567 passed, 394 skipped, 0 failed) in addition to
the targeted suites.
* migration: drop channels/groups/sessions/session_tasks/messages + enum types
alembic/versions/060_drop_messaging.py: drop_column journal_entries.
session_id (sidesteps hardcoding the FK constraint name — verified
empirically against a live migrated DB that it's actually
fk_journal_entries_session_id_sessions, but drop_column doesn't care
either way); drop_table in FK order (messages -> session_tasks ->
sessions -> groups -> channels); DROP TABLE IF EXISTS chunks_conversations
(runtime-provisioned, not alembic-managed, would otherwise orphan); DROP
TYPE IF EXISTS for messagetype/sessionstatus/sessionscope/channeltype
(messagetype's Python enum stays for ExtractedMessage, but the DB type
had zero live columns left once MessageTable was dropped in the prior
commit). downgrade() raises NotImplementedError — one-way removal.
Pruned scripts/reset_runtime_state.sql + .sh: removed the DELETE/COUNT
lines for messages/session_tasks/sessions/groups/channels and the
groups.active_session_id reset block.
Verified end-to-end against a scratch Postgres DB: full migration chain
001->060 applies cleanly, alembic heads shows a single head, all 6 dropped
tables + 4 enum types + the journal_entries.session_id column are
confirmed gone, journal_entries keeps only its journal_id/task_id FKs,
downgrade correctly raises NotImplementedError without corrupting DB
state, and the pruned reset_runtime_state.sql runs clean (no errors)
against a fully-migrated DB.
* refactor(api): remove channel/session/message routes + WS streams
Most of this task's file list was already forced through in earlier
commits (routes/{channels,groups,sessions,messages}.py + app.py/__init__.py
unmounting in the MessagingService-deletion commit; tasks.py's
session-links embed + GET /{id}/sessions + schemas/tasks.py's
TaskResponse.sessions in that same commit; deps.py's require_channel_read/
write + schemas/{channels,sessions}.py in the models/tables commit). This
closes out what was left:
- api/websocket.py: deleted the channel_stream + session_stream routes,
ConnectionManager's channel_connections/session_connections dicts,
connect_channel/connect_session, broadcast_to_channel/broadcast_to_session,
get_channel_subscriber_count, and their cleanup lines in disconnect().
Agent streams, notification streams, and the operator system stream are
untouched.
- api/websocket_bridge.py: deleted _handle_session_event +
_handle_message_event and their SESSION_CREATED/SESSION_CLOSED/
SESSION_TIMEOUT/MESSAGE_SENT subscriptions. The A2A live-view, rate-limit,
usage, agent-lifecycle, and notification bridges are untouched.
- api/schemas/websocket.py: removed NewMessageBroadcast, WSMessageNew,
WSMessageEdit, WSMessageDelete, WSSessionClosed — kept the WSMessage base
class (still subclassed by the kept WSAgentStream/WSNotification) plus
those two.
- api/schemas/groups.py: deleted (already fully orphaned since routes/
groups.py was removed; its GroupResponse/GroupDetailResponse had zero
consumers).
Updated the 5 websocket test files accordingly (removed the channel/
session-specific tests + fixed imports); test_websocket_bridge.py's
registration-coverage test dropped the SESSION_*/MESSAGE_SENT assertions.
Verified: full-suite collection (11943 tests, zero import errors) and a
complete test run (11549 passed, 394 skipped, 0 failed).
* docs: retire channels/sessions/messages from agent-facing docs + CLAUDE.md
Rewrites docs/rag (RAG-indexed) + docs/map + CLAUDE.md to reflect A2A (dm +
read_a2a) as primary agent comms; deletes the channel docs, splits messaging-tools
+ messaging-notification (renamed notification.md), swaps the WS worked example to
A2A_MESSAGE_SENT. _complete_map.md still needs regeneration (generated file).
* refactor(panel): remove Communications surface (channels/sessions)
Deletes the /communications routes, message components, task-detail Sessions tab,
use-channels + channel/session WS hooks, and the channels/sessions/messages/groups
api clients; prunes the Channel/Session/Message/Group types + mock data. (Auditor
live-feeds + dashboard.ts dead-route cleanup is a follow-up.)
* refactor(panel): drop auditor channel-feed + dead communication-metric route
* docs(map): regenerate _complete_map from updated slices
* fix(a2a): reduce get_unread_messages complexity below xenon C + stale comments
Extract the per-conversation unread-counter recompute into _reset_unread_counter
(the CI quality gate flagged get_unread_messages as rank C). Also drop the deleted
open_session from a content_actions comment and reword an evidence_repo docstring
that cited the removed messaging._notify_mentions.
---------
Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
* release-manager: fencing-token mutex + executor/readiness hardening
Closes the release-mutex TTL race (#17, HIGH) and the remaining
release-manager gaps (#88, #89, #201, #202):
- #17: the release mutex is now acquired with a uuid4 fencing token and
released via Lua compare-and-del; a background asyncio heartbeat
compare-and-expires the TTL ~every 60s while the execute owns the lock,
so a live execute no longer expires and a crashed one auto-releases
<=3000s. A second approve after TTL expiry cannot usurp and rm -rf the
in-flight clone — the fenced first-finally keeps its lock.
- #89: a Redis outage during acquire stays fail-closed (the execute never
runs) but now returns a distinct redis_unavailable result + log so the
CEO sees the cause instead of a false already_in_progress.
- #88: commit_and_push RuntimeError is wrapped into a structured
ReleaseResult(commit_failed) instead of a 500.
- #201: first-release fallback still emits untracked version-ref files as
gaps (no longer silenced by the first-release branch).
- #202: _await_proc awaits proc.wait() after kill() so a timeout cannot
leak a zombie.
TDD: tests/unit/services/test_release_proposal_concurrency.py extends
_FakeRedis with eval/get/expire and pins the fencing/heartbeat/usurper
invariants + the redis_unavailable result.
* PM/code-task creation guard + main_pm coverage + issue carve-out
Closes the creation-time role x task_type gap (the user's explicit example)
and the main_pm delegate hole:
- New pure helper `pm_cannot_own_code(role, task_type, is_issue_resolution)`
in foundation/policy/batch.py — single source of truth. Both PM roles
(cell_pm + main_pm) coordinate; a `code` task assigned/claimed by a PM is
a structural mismatch, EXCEPT a PM taking a code task in needs_revision to
resolve review/QA issues directly (the carve-out).
- Creation-time guard: TaskService.create calls the helper (closes the
create-with-cell-PM-assignee hole the team-based check misses).
- Delegate path + spec claim gate consult the same helper.
`_validate_assignee_task_type` / `_task_type_hint_for` now key on the
Role (CELL_PM OR MAIN_PM), not the cell-PM slug set — closes the
delegate-to-main-pm-as-code hole.
- identity.role_for_uuid_or_none is None-tolerant (treats None as "not a
PM" and proceeds) so a malformed/missing assignee cannot crash the guard.
- prompter.create_task_from_draft reuses the guard at draft-create.
TDD: test_batch.py (helper matrix + carve-out), test_main_pm_code_guard.py
(main_pm coverage), test_delegate_assignee_task_type.py (delegate parity),
test_lifecycle_spec.py (claim gate: rejects PM claiming code from pending,
allows from needs_revision + PM claiming planning + dev claiming code).
* task-service: completion hooks + escalation/cancel/audit hardening
Closes the task-service cluster (#21/#98, #99, #100, #101, #103, #216; #102
verified already-covered, #217 verified already-guarded):
- #21/#98: ceo_approve now closes the work session + triggers completion
hooks before worktree removal (no-op when work_session_id is None), so a
CEO-approved task lands the same close-path as PM-completed.
- #99: apply_escalation routes through the transition validator with an
enumerated escalation exemption (_ESCALATABLE_TO_BLOCKED) instead of an
arbitrary source->BLOCKED write; BACKLOG is refused.
- #100: branchless ceo_reject awaiting_ceo_approval->pending gets a real
spec edge (ceo_reject_to_pool ActionSpec + _STATUS_TRANSITIONS entry) so
future admin-override tightening can't wedge the path.
- #101: revision_count bump is documented as the single chokepoint, with
the pre-block RESTORE path undoing it when restoring a snapshotted
needs_revision (same cycle resuming, not a new rejection).
- #103: cancel cascade surfaces non-terminal orphans instead of swallowing
the role violation.
- #216: _remove_task_worktree_on_terminal escalates recurring FS/permission
failure (audit/notify after N) instead of silent-failing forever.
- #102: pinned in test_verb_runner_midverb_invalid_state.py (committed with
the choreographer cluster) — verb-runner savepoints already surface a
concurrent mid-verb state change as INVALID_STATE.
- #217: submit_for_qa claimed_by guard verified intact.
TDD: test_task.py, test_worktree_cleanup_on_complete.py,
test_escalation_board_guard.py (#99), test_task_service_* integration,
test_lifecycle_spec.py.
* choreographer: gate-claim guards + pr-gate hardening + fail-open logging
Closes the choreographer cluster (#5/#222, #29, #30, #82, #188, #189,
#192; #157/#187 verified already-fixed/pinned; #102 pin lives here):
- #5/#222: the unchanged-PR guard's fail-open head_sha lookup now logs
(warning) on a slug-resolver/git-helper error so a regression cannot
silently turn the pr_fail re-submit loop-stopper into a no-op. Stays
fail-open (never wedges the PM).
- #29: pinned (REFUTED-with-pin) — _lane_claim_guard already returns the
error envelope without releasing the claim on a transient lookup error.
- #30: pinned (REFUTED-with-negative-pin) — a non-batch branchless main_pm
root cannot bypass the complete spec gate (is_batch_umbrella requires
batch_id set).
- #82: _post_gate_review_to_pr wraps the slug-resolution call in try/except
(mirrors _capture_pr_head_sha) so a malformed cell_map AttributeError no
longer 500s the reviewer after a committed gate transition.
- #188: _is_hand_formatted_verdict anchors the header regex to line-start,
so a quoted (> ## Summary) or inline (mid-prose) header mention no longer
false-refuses a hand-formatted verdict.
- #189: pr_fail re-captures the PR head SHA after the transition commits and
re-stamps the verdict note only when it advanced (closes the stale-SHA
false-allow loop-hole); no-advance stays a single note write.
- #192: claim_gate_review skips the dev claim guards (already_active/paused/
lane) via a new skip_dev_guards param — a pr_reviewer inspecting an
assembled PR does not start work, so the single-active-task / code-lane
invariants do not apply; the dependency guard is kept, and QA's
claim_review parity is preserved.
- #157/#187: verified in tree — pr_review-only handoff is intentionally
prior-work-worth-resuming; self_review_block wiring (reviewer != dev)
holds on assembled tasks with 4 existing pin tests.
TDD: test_choreographer_*, test_pr_gate_posts_review (#82),
test_pr_review_hand_format_guard (#188), test_submit_root_unchanged_pr_guard
(#189), test_claim_gate_review_guards (#192), test_verb_runner_midverb
_invalid_state (#102 pin).
* playbook curate: guard the gating commit against a poisoned session (#55)
The explicit `session.commit()` that gates the RAG index (commit-before-index
so an uncommitted playbook cannot land in the corpus) raised PendingRollbackError
when a prior mid-verb failure had rolled the caller's session back — 500ing the
whole curation verb instead of returning a clean envelope, and (worse) risking a
fall-through to index an uncommitted playbook. Wrap the commit: on
PendingRollbackError, log + return invalid_state with a re-fetch/retry remediate
and skip the index. The happy path still commits exactly once then indexes.
TDD: test_playbook_verbs.py — poisoned-session returns a clean invalid_state and
does NOT index; clean-session still commits once + indexes (pins no fail-closed
inversion / no double-commit).
* [chore] gateway: atomic activate merge — preserve probe_failures across re-park (#156)
activate() was a blind SET that reset probe_failures to 0, so a probe-failure
increment that just landed (or was in flight) could be wiped by a concurrent
re-park — resetting the give-up / CEO-notify count mid-episode. Route activate
through a server-side Lua merge (roboco:activate_rate_limit) that refreshes the
episode metadata (kind / activated_at / retry_after / affected_agents) while
carrying over the previous probe_failures count. Indivisible w.r.t. the
increment/reset scripts (Redis single-threads an EVAL).
#56 (notify to prompter/secretary refused) verified SAFE — the pin tests
(test_notify_rejects_prompter_recipient / _secretary_recipient /
_allows_ceo_recipient) already cover the only human notify target invariant;
no legitimate send is dropped, no code change.
* [chore] foundation/policy: spec gates + QA retry-key pin (Cluster F)
#50 sync_branch composes=() so the spec gate accepted a terminal/paused/
blocked task and the handler rebased a dead/parked branch — add a
PRECONDITION_SYNC_BRANCH_STATE (claimed/in_progress/verifying/needs_revision
only), rejection_kind=invalid_state. TDD: 28 spec tests.
#148 submit_root's prose asserts 'a Main-PM root is planning-typed, never
code' but only the creation path (main_pm_cannot_own_code) backed it — add
PRECONDITION_ROOT_NOT_CODE on the submit_root IntentSpec (defense in depth),
scoped to submit_root only so the shared submit_for_review action keeps
cell_pm+code submit_up parity. Graceful on Mock/None task_type so the
choreographer Mock-task tests don't crash. TDD: 2 spec tests.
#150 VERB_RETRY_LIMITS is keyed by the MCP-exposed names (pass/fail), not
the IntentSpec-internal pass_review/fail_review — already correct; add a
pin test so a one-sided rename can't silently drop the QA-handoff cap.
#142 main_pm_cannot_own_code/pm_cannot_own_code already normalize casing
(.lower()) — no-op, pin test test_main_pm_cannot_own_code_is_case_insensitive
already in tree.
* [chore] worksession-git: 405 merge-method fallback + non-destructive close (Cluster W)
#108 _merge_with_retry hardcoded 'squash' and raised MergeConflictError on a
405 with no method fallback — wedging the PM on an open, mergeable PR whose
repo merely had the squash button off. Add a 405 fallback to a permitted
method (via _first_allowed_merge_method, exclude='squash'), mirroring the CEO
merge_pull_request path. A 405 with no permitted fallback (or a second 405)
still falls through to the already-merged disambiguation / MergeConflictError.
TDD: 2 new tests (fallback-success, no-permitted-method-raises).
#109 close_pull_request defaulted delete_branch=True, so the choreographer
supersede path deleted a superseded PR's branch while the orchestrator
supersede path explicitly preserved it — the two disagreed, and the
destructive default ran on the 'close the dead PR' path where the branch may
still be referenced / useful for audit. Flip the default to False (opt-in
deletion) and make the choreographer caller explicit (parity with the
orchestrator). TDD: 1 new test (default preserves branch); existing
deletion-when-requested test now passes delete_branch=True explicitly.
Dispositions verified against current code (no silent drops):
- #27 REFUTED/FIXED-UNDEPLOYED: work_session.merge_pr resolves by session_id
(no global pr_number lookup); the real cross-repo collision fix
(project_id scoping on pr_merge/close_pull_request/rebase_pr_for_task/
pr_target) is already in tree + tested (test_pr_merge_scopes_task_lookup_
by_project_id, test_close_pull_request_scopes_task_lookup_by_project_id,
test_git_pr_target_scoping). Verify-only.
- #106 REFUTED: a guard exists (rev-list --count {base_ref}..{branch} == 0)
before reset --hard + base_ref falls back to default_branch; tests lock
the safety (test_create_branch_never_repoints_branch_with_real_work,
test_create_branch_does_not_reset_or_checkout_shared_clone).
- #218 BY-DESIGN: the merge_pr idempotent guard intentionally preserves the
audit trail (docstring + test_merge_pr_idempotent_on_already_completed_
preserves_audit_trail); a COMPLETED session always carries attribution
(COMPLETED only via merge_pr), so the NULL-COMPLETED case is unreachable.
- #104 BY-DESIGN: agents never merge to the repo default branch in RoboCo's
model (root→master is CEO-only); the guard is a correct CEO-only rail,
locked by test_pr_merge_into_default_branch_is_ceo_only.
* [chore] llm: surface disabled-provider downgrade + scrub probe log (#20/#3/#211)
#20/#3 resolve_for_agent silently fell through to the legacy Anthropic path
when a configured provider was disabled — indistinguishable from 'no
assignment', so the operator got no signal that spawns bypassed the
provider. Surface the bypass with a warning (graceful degradation stays the
default — a stalled spawn is worse than a routing miss) and add an opt-in
ROBOCO_ROUTING_STRICT (default-off) that fail-closes instead. Wired into the
panel Feature Flags card. TDD: 3 unit tests (warn-on-disabled, strict-raises,
no-assignment-stays-silent).
#211 probe_ollama_tags logged str(exc) raw on the generic-exception branch —
structured log could carry connection internals / stack traces. Log the
exception class name only. TDD: existing generic-branch test strengthened to
assert the log kwargs don't leak the raw text.
* [chore] support/stream/optimal/playbook/comms hardening (Cluster S)
Logical-gaps sweep, Cluster S (TDD, red→green per item):
#64 notification_delivery.acknowledge published the NOTIFICATION_ACKED bus
event directly (bypassing the outbox) — a rollback left a phantom ACK. Route
it through defer_bus_publish (after_commit), mirroring deliver.
#76 playbook.archive()/reject() stamped the archiver into approved_by/
approved_at, overwriting approval provenance (and fabricating approval for a
rejected draft). Add archived_by/archived_at (migration 053 + table + model)
and write those on archive/reject, leaving approval attribution intact.
#181 vector_store.replace_chunks wiped existing index rows even when every
chunk lacked an embedding (embedder failure). Skip the wipe when chunks is
non-empty but records is empty — preserve good rows for nothing.
#182/#183 optimal.record_learning recomputed a learn-{md5(full_content)}
tracking source that never matched the URI the plugin embedded chunks under
(roboco://learnings/{doc_id}, doc_id=lrn-{hash100}). Use the plugin's
returned doc_id so de-index/lookup-by-source finds the chunk rows.
#96/#97 transcription periodic flush only peeked ready buffers (unbounded
map growth) and ran sync callbacks on the event loop (a slow callback
blocked the flush task). Flush (remove) each ready buffer after notifying,
and offload each callback to a thread.
#212 _TEAM_SCOPED_ROLES was duplicated across communications/agents_config/
seeds. Single-source it in foundation.policy.communications; consumers
reference that object (identity-tested).
#19 stream_bus._dispatch_event re-ran already-succeeded handlers on a
recover_pending replay (duplicate side effects). Add a per-(event.id,
handler) SET-NX idempotency guard: skip on a hit, clear the key on handler
failure so a replay re-runs it, fail-open when redis is unavailable.
Dispositions (no code change): #77 approve() index-write pair asserted
BY-DESIGN; #62/#63 notification DB-dedup verified pinned; #184/#185 REFUTED;
#214 REFUTED; #215 BY-DESIGN.
* [chore] db/migrations: graph-integrity guard + conftest unreachable-DB warning (Cluster D)
Logical-gaps sweep, Cluster D (TDD + real alembic upgrade head verification):
#16/#37 add tests/unit/test_migration_graph_integrity.py — a static guard that
the alembic migration graph has exactly one head, every down_revision resolves,
every revision is reachable from a root, and no revision id is duplicated. The
suite builds its DB via Base.metadata.create_all (not alembic upgrade head), so
a forked head / dangling down_revision / duplicate id would otherwise ship
silently and break a real deploy mid-stream.
Caught a real bug in the process: migration 053's revision id
"053_playbook_archived_attribution" (33 chars) exceeded alembic's
alembic_version.version_num VARCHAR(32) — a fresh `alembic upgrade head` raised
"value too long for type character varying(32)" at the 053 stamp. Renamed to
"053_playbook_archived_attr" (26 chars). Verified end-to-end on a scratch PG:
upgrade head stamps 053, downgrade -1 returns to 052. (The pre-existing
test_every_migration_revision_id_fits_the_alembic_version_column guard is now
green too; it had been red on the 33-char id.)
#90 conftest silently pytest.skip'd every DB test when Postgres was unreachable
— a non-Docker box reported a green run of all-skips. Extract the warning into
_warn_if_pg_unavailable and fire it at import so the operator sees the DB is
down (the per-test skip path is unchanged). Test: warns when unavailable, silent
when reachable (verified under -W error::UserWarning).
Dispositions (verified against real code + a fresh alembic upgrade head, no code
change): #6 REFUTED — sa.Enum(create_type=False) at 001:119/304 does NOT break a
fresh upgrade head (001→052 applied cleanly on a scratch DB); #8 REFUTED — the
upgrade passed 030/031 (RAG chunk tables) without pgvector installed; pgvector is
a runtime concern handled by roboco/db/base.py, not a migration prerequisite;
#40 REFUTED — the `|| echo` mask was already removed and partial-schema drift
reports exit 1 (only by-design unreachable/unmigrated skips remain); #204 REFUTED
— the property walk seed IS pinned (random.Random(20260504), line 97); #205/#206
REFUTED — the smoke-trace fixture IS wired via
test_lifecycle_smoke_replay.py (8 passed); no shell smoke scripts exist in the
tree to wire; #137 BY-DESIGN — pyproject version 0.14.0 is an operational note,
no code gate.
* [chore] panel: admin-override force flag + kanban subtask_count + ws cleanup + ui-store dedupe (Cluster P)
#13: kanban admin-override into a hatch state (completed / awaiting_qa /
awaiting_pm_review) now requires an explicit force=true from the panel and
emits a dedicated task.admin_override audit row server-side; non-hatch
overrides need no force. Backend gate in tasks route + admin_set_status;
panel kanban-board sends force for hatch targets; TaskUpdate carries force.
#198: kanban service threads the real subtask_count (one grouped query) into
dev + priority-swimlane + main-pm-flat boards instead of a hardcoded 0.
#79: useWebSocket cleanup clears messages/lastMessage/state on unmount or
endpoint change so a dep-change (navigating to another stream) can't leak the
prior subscription's stale snapshot as live.
#186: disambiguate the duplicate ui-store modules -- the session/scroll store
in lib/stores renamed to useScrollRestorationStore / scroll-restoration-store
(barrel + 2 consumers updated); the sidebar/theme useUIStore in @/store is now
the sole useUIStore.
#12: verified already in-tree (release-proposal-card surfaces non-404 errors
with retry; getProposal maps only 404->null). #80 by-design (handleTransportError
already resets isSending on a no-payload SSE drop). #81 docs (streamUrl docstring
records that live-intake SSE auth is session-id-based bearer-style).
Backend: ruff+mypy clean, 278 tests green. Panel: lint+typecheck clean, 159 tests.
* orchestrator: park/reaper/readopt/a2a hardening + self-heal/ci-watch dedupe (Cluster O)
Closes the orchestrator-side logical gaps from the sweep:
- #75 a2a human-only drop surfaced: _dispatch_a2a_work logs the skip
("a2a request targets a human-only role; left as a notification for the
human (not spawned)") instead of silently dropping the target — the
CEO/secretary/prompter still see the notification; only the spawn is
suppressed. (orchestrator.py)
- #72 readopt liveness: _readopt_running_agents requires a non-stale live
claim (via _agent_holds_live_claim) and skips a zombie container so a
reaped-but-restart-readopted agent isn't double-counted as active.
- #74 shutdown drain: stop() calls _flush_respawn_tracker so the durable
respawn counter write-throughs aren't lost on a clean stop.
- #71 resolve_wait active-guard + deferred liveness: a rate_limit_lifted
WaitingRecord is only confirmed-live after a _confirm_resume_liveness
probe (deferred deletion _resume_confirm_delay=30.0), and an
already-active agent short-circuits the repark. Scoped to
rate_limit_lifted records (the only ones at risk of a false lift).
- #73 stuck-Claude kill: _maybe_kill_stuck_claude + _claude_stuck_kill_ttl
(config.claude_stuck_kill_seconds) — a live container whose heartbeat is
stale past the grace AND whose gateway probe is broken is killed+evicted,
not protected forever by the reaper's live-skip.
- #230 verified FIXED-UNDEPLOYED: _gateway_broken_past_grace already
requires N consecutive false-broken probes (not one flaky streak); no
change, test added to pin the N-consecutive invariant.
- #43 self-heal per-observation dedupe: a fingerprint collapses repeat
CEO notifications for the same CI regression.
- #44 ci_watch dedupe by (git_url, workflow): a monorepo's multiple
workflows each get their own fix task (was collapsed by git_url alone).
- #49 identity.role_for_slug_or_none None-hardening: a stale/malformed
slug resolves to None and the human-only skip falls through to the safe
"not spawnable" path instead of crashing.
- #193 strategy engine: notify the CEO on a persistent assess failure
instead of failing silently in the background loop.
TDD: test_no_spawn_human_roles (a2a skip surfaced), test_orchestrator_
shutdown_drain (#74), test_provider_overload_break (#71), test_readopt_
running_agents (#72), test_resolve_wait_repark (#71), test_stale_claim_
reaper (#73/#230), test_strategy_engine_loop (#193, new),
test_self_heal_engine (#43), test_ci_watch_engine (#44), test_identity
(#49). All red->green.
* chore: make-quality green — xenon complexity refactors + mypy test fixes + lifecycle regen
No behavior changes. Brings the tree to a fully green `make quality` (the
base branch never passed the xenon B-rank gate on several blocks; the
lifecycle artifacts had drifted from the committed ceo_reject_to_pool edge).
Xenon B-rank refactors (extract a helper; preserve semantics exactly):
- api/routes/tasks.py: _apply_forced_status_override + _StatusOverride
dataclass bundle (update_task override block).
- services/task.py: _enforce_no_pm_code_on_create (create guards) +
_escalation_diverts_to_pool (collapses the two board/advisory +
main_pm+code divert branches into one predicate).
- services/prompter.py: _coerce_pm_code_to_planning (create_task_from_draft).
- services/notification.py: _duplicate_unacked_exists (_create_notification
purpose-based dedup query + ACK_REQUIRED_BY_TYPE gate).
- services/sequencing.py: _same_assignee_lane_edges (the undeclared-surface
same-assignee lane fallback at the tail of dev_task_collision_edges).
- gateway/choreographer/_impl.py: _pm_task_type_error static helper
(_validate_assignee_task_type compound PM guard).
- gateway/choreographer/pr_gate.py: _gate_review_event_verdict +
_gate_review_body static helpers (_post_gate_review_to_pr).
mypy test fixes (no type:ignore — banned; use typing.cast with quoted
strings per TC006):
- test_task_update_completeness: TaskUpdate(acceptance_criteria=None).
- test_bus: cast("Redis", _FakeRedis()); Redis import under TYPE_CHECKING.
- test_pr_merge_concurrency: capture AsyncMocks into locals before asserting.
- test_notification_delivery_phantom: cast("UUID", to_agents[0]).
Lifecycle artifact regen (owed from Cluster T #100 — the
awaiting_ceo_approval -> pending `ceo_reject_to_pool` edge was added to the
spec in 3d633084 without regenerating the derived artifacts the
foundation-check gate diffs against): docs/rag/lifecycle/intent-verbs.md,
docs/rag/lifecycle/status-transitions.md, panel/lib/lifecycle.json.
services/kanban.py: ruff format only (collapses the _load_subtask_counts
signature that drifted unformatted from Cluster P).
* [chore] logical-gaps sweep — Cluster I (intake/product/pitch)
#57/#58 prompter: preserve a top-level product_id with a 1-cell map
(prompter.py create_task_from_draft — top-level target wins over a
redundant 1-cell map instead of dropping product_id); reject — not
silently skip — a malformed project_id in the_work cell entries
(prompter.py _draft_cell_map raises ValidationError).
#59/#159 prompter: create_task_from_draft now operates on a copy
(_copy_draft) so _validate_and_coerce_draft / _clean_list never mutate
the caller's draft dict.
#160 prompter: _resolve_owning_team consults product/board routing
before forcing MAIN_PM on a multi-cell map (product root stays Board,
product+assignee-is-board stays Board).
#83/#84 github_provisioning: create_repo is idempotent by GitHub name
— a 422 "name already exists" (orphaned repo from a rolled-back prior
approval) is fetched and reused instead of erroring; pitch re-approval
now reuses the orphaned repo end-to-end.
#196 kanban: flat main-PM board has a "coordination" column for
non-cell teams (MAIN_PM/Board) instead of dropping their cards.
#197 project update: an explicit null in the PATCH body now clears the
stored field, distinct from an absent field (leave unchanged).
ProjectService.update drops exclude_none so explicit-None applies; the
PATCH route uses ProjectUpdate.model_validate(data.model_dump(
exclude_unset=True)) to preserve the request's unset-tracking (the old
field-by-field construction marked every field set and defeated the
distinction — nulling NOT-NULL git_url).
TDD: prompter 47, github_provisioning+pitch 16, kanban+project 67,
project routes 37 — all green; ruff + mypy clean.
* [chore] logical-gaps sweep — Cluster M (mcp-servers)
#60 flow_server/do_server: the circuit-breaker substitution no longer
erases the fixable rejection — the original envelope (kind/message/
remediate) is nested as inner on a copy of the SDK's circuit_open
envelope (the SDK dict is not mutated in place). The agent still sees
WHY the verb failed, not just that the breaker tripped.
#61 flow_server/do_server: a 404 carrying a *descriptive* detail
(not FastAPI's bare default {"detail":"Not Found"}) is now a
real resource not_found, surfaced as not_found so the agent
re-fetches state — instead of a misleading "server-side wiring gap"
invalid_state. The bare default and unparseable 404s still synthesize
the wiring-gap envelope; a 404 with a real Envelope (error field)
is still surfaced as-is.
#161 flow_server/do_server: dict error.code classification now uses
an exact-code map (authoritative for the codes the handlers emit) with
a substring fallback for unknown codes. Fixes the real regression:
AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED carries no AUTHORIZED/DENIED/PERMISSION
substring, so the old substring-only rule dropped it to invalid_state
instead of not_authorized — an auth storm attributed as a state storm.
The fallback also adds AUTH so future AUTH-prefixed codes classify.
#162 flow_server/do_server: _register_tools gains a
ROBOCO_ALLOW_FULL_TOOLSET env override (default-off) so a missing
manifest falls back to the full tool set instead of raising — a
dev/test escape hatch. Production fail-loud behaviour is unchanged.
#163 intake_server: propose_batch accepts name as well as
title (intake drafts in the wild have used both), normalizing a
name-only draft onto a copy as title (caller's dict never mutated),
and reports the dropped count + reason in the return instead of
silently vanishing malformed drafts. The empty-batch hint now names
name as an alternative.
TDD: 123 mcp_servers tests green (14 new + 2 updated); ruff + mypy clean.
* [chore] Cluster N — conventions/docs logical-gaps sweep
#33: _create_new_doc/_update_existing_doc now resolve via
_resolve_contained_path (the RAG-returned update path was not containment-
checked — an escaping source could write/overwrite outside the docs dir).
#34: _commit_doc_to_repo returns committed/skipped/failed instead of
swallowing all exceptions; surfaced on DocRef.commit_status, the write
response, and the docs MCP guidance so a failed repo commit is fail-loud.
#35: write_doc only updates the similar doc when its filename matches — a
different filename creates a new file instead of collapsing onto the
similar doc's path (the dedup-overwrite defect codified by the old tests).
#129: a custom rule scoped to a language the validator never reports (a
typo) is surfaced as a warn finding on .roboco/conventions.yml via the
runner's once-per-run validation; #32 (tsx->typescript dialect) stays
BY-DESIGN.
#130: _cache_put only swallows a UNIQUE violation (23505) as a concurrent
duplicate; a non-unique IntegrityError (FK/NOT NULL/check) is log-errored
and re-raised instead of being silently misattributed.
#132: health re-reads the live file status (a cached degraded row hid an
in-place repair at a stale head key); get_map skips cached degraded rows
and stops caching degraded so a repaired file re-derives. #134 BY-DESIGN.
#133: _DB_METHODS gains stream/stream_scalars (SQLAlchemy 2.0 streaming
constructs are data access too — a route calling them is not thin).
#199: regenerate_verb_tables._annot_str strips Annotated[...] metadata
(BeforeValidator) before rendering; regenerated verbs.md + per-role
prompts so the BeforeValidator(func=...) repr (with a memory address) no
longer leaks into agent-facing prompt text.
TDD: 206 conventions/docs tests green (incl. 5 new files / appended
cases); ruff + mypy clean.
* [chore] Cluster 16 — cross-cutting hygiene logical-gaps sweep
Disposition + fix the 10 cross-cutting-hygiene gaps, TDD. make quality green
(ruff, mypy 944 files, pytest, xenon, vulture, foundation-check, enum-parity).
FIX:
- #24 /ws/system now gated by _require_panel_token (matches every sibling
/ws/* stream); rejects a missing token in strict mode and a forged token
even in dev. (roboco/api/websocket.py)
- #25 two drifted _require_ceo implementations (orchestrator router vs release
handler) unified on a single require_ceo_role helper in deps — same 403,
same role set, accepts Role/AgentRole/"ceo". (roboco/api/deps.py,
routes/orchestrator.py, routes/release.py)
- #11 a spawn session for a delivery role (developer/qa/documenter) with no
task_id now logs an unattributed-usage warning via is_unattributed_delivery_spawn.
(roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py)
- #65 pricing returns a structured CostResult(cost_usd, unpriced, is_anthropic)
so an unpriced Anthropic model (real spend we'd undercount) is flagged
instead of silently $0; calculate_cost stays a thin float wrapper.
(roboco/billing/pricing.py, billing/__init__.py)
- #67 blocker-metrics "blocked since" reads the task.blocked audit transition
(indexed on target_id/event_type/timestamp), not updated_at — which
over-counted when a blocked task was touched for a non-blocking reason.
Falls back to updated_at/created_at only with no audit row.
(roboco/services/metrics.py)
- #94 grok refresh_if_stale uses double-checked locking (_refresh_lock +
_recheck_or_refresh) so two concurrent callers don't both POST the
single-use refresh grant and burn the credential. (grok_auth.py)
DOCS (fix the doc, behavior already correct/pinned by tests):
- #66 get_summary docstring corrected — it sums raw agent_spawn_sessions rows
(sub-day precise); daily_usage_rollups/get_today_summary can diverge for
"today" until the sweeper catches up. (roboco/services/usage.py)
- #68 DashboardStorage is a documented in-memory stub; added a test pinning
that auditor flags are lost on storage reset (persisting = a migration +
service refactor, out of scope as a half-implementation).
(tests/integration/test_dashboard_service.py)
BY-DESIGN (no code change, with file:line evidence):
- #28 dashboard reads are open to the authenticated operator (dashboard.py:36
documents this); mutating auditor routes already gate via
_require_auditor_or_ceo. Role-gating reads would break the panel (no
X-Agent-ID on dashboard reads) and CEO-token-gating the router would block
the Auditor (auditor token != CEO token). nginx is the prod boundary.
REFUTED (narrowing would reintroduce a documented hang):
- #93 the ~/.grok directory mount (vs a single auth.json file) is load-bearing
— a single-file bind mount pins the inode so the atomic tmp.replace refresh
doesn't propagate to running containers (they hang at grok's login prompt).
Already documented in grok.py:161 and locked by
test_intake_grok_mounts_subscription_auth_when_present.
Incidental gate-greening (mypy errors a stale .mypy_cache had hidden in
earlier-cluster test files; xenon refactors for the new B-threshold):
- tests/unit/test_regenerate_verb_tables.py: type the dynamic-module loader.
- tests/unit/services/test_prompter.py: annotate the draft dict as dict[str,Any].
- tests/unit/services/test_conventions_cache_put.py: _FakeOrig is a real Exception
(IntegrityError's orig arg requires BaseException).
- metrics._blocked_since_map extracted from get_blocker_metrics (complexity).
- intake_server._normalize_batch_drafts extracted from propose_batch (complexity).
* Docs update
* [bug] spawn: self-heal vanished clone + branch ref before worktree ensure (be-dev-1 fatal loop)
A vanished clone_root (disk loss / /data/workspaces wipe / manual cleanup)
fatal-looped the resume path: _ensure_worktree_before_spawn ran
`git -C <missing>` and released the claim, but the reaper-style release
preserves assigned_to + branch_name so the next dispatch is a RESUME
(create_branch never re-runs to re-clone) and the same missing clone failed
every ~30s.
- workspace.py: ensure_worktree_self_heal re-attaches a present worktree +
symlinks the shared .venv; on a missing local branch ref it fetches from
origin (create_branch pushes at claim time, so pushed work survives) and
re-creates the ref, falling back to -b origin/HEAD only when the branch
was never pushed. _fetch_branch_ref is the token-aware fetch helper.
- orchestrator.py: _ensure_worktree_before_spawn health-checks the clone
and re-clones via ensure_workspace BEFORE the worktree self-heal. Fatal
git-state (WorkspaceError) still releases the claim + aborts; transient
failures abort without releasing (a fresh claim wouldn't help and
re-cloning is destructive).
TDD: 21 new + 61 related worktree/git/cancel/cleanup tests green; ruff +
mypy clean.
---------
Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
* Updated uv.lock
* Bunch of fixes we need to verify first..
* feat(megatask): per-cell project map root-subtasks (multi-project, multi-cell)
A MegaTask root-subtask can now target an ad-hoc per-cell project map — a
third targeting shape that mirrors the existing product fan-out root. In
RoboCo a project is per-cell (ProjectTable.assigned_cell); a monorepo is N
per-cell projects sharing one git_url. So 'multi-cell' IS 'multi-project',
and a task may mix per-cell projects across products or include OSS-library
projects not in any product.
Storage: migration 052 adds task_cell_projects (mirrors product_projects;
unique per (task, team)). TaskTable gains a cascade-delete cell_projects
relationship; TaskCreateRequest / TaskCreate / Task response carry the map.
Policy: batch.is_branchless_coordination + is_valid_batch_shape gain a
has_cell_projects param — a root-subtask targets exactly one of project /
product / cell-map; the umbrella still targets none. TaskService passes
has_cell_projects at every predicate call site and persists the rows in
create(). _ensure_branch_for_task cuts feature/main_pm/{root} per distinct
project in the map (via _distinct_projects_for_task); _require_target_or_umbrella
and _validate_batch_membership accept the map shape.
Fan-out: every distinct_project_ids site (task.py branch creation, routes
_project_for_complete + _resolve_project_for_merge, orchestrator
_ambient_projects_for_task, pr_review._project_slug_for, git._project_for_task)
generalizes to first-distinct-project-of-map-or-product. Choreographer
_resolve_subtask_project resolves a delegated subtask's cell from the parent's
cell map. The product-scoped _slugs_for_product intake helper is unchanged.
Intake: prompter._draft_cell_map extracts the per-cell map from the_work[].
_validate_batch_scope counts distinct projects across all drafts' cells
(>=2 min stays; one 2-cell draft satisfies it). create_task_from_draft
persists cell_projects for >=2-cell drafts (project_id/product_id None),
collapses a 1-cell map to the single-project shape, and leaves single-cell
top-level project_id drafts unchanged. _resolve_owning_team routes a
multi-cell map to Main PM (coordination root, like a product root — a cell
PM can't delegate cross-cell). propose_draft/propose_batch tool descriptions
declare the per-cell project_id (both Claude SDK + grok runtimes).
The umbrella stays branchless / pure-coordination / submit_root-rejected;
the CEO-escalation pr_number gate is not widened (the map root is
is_umbrella=False, mirroring a product root, so submit_root supplies it).
Single-cell root-subtasks and everything below them are byte-for-byte
unchanged. Un-run MegaTask waves (multi-cell drafts) become runnable.
* [feature] Panel per-cell project picker + pnpm format infra
MegaTask root-subtasks can fan out across cells (be+fe, fe+uxui). Since a
RoboCo project is per-cell (ProjectTable.assigned_cell), a monorepo is N
per-cell projects sharing one git_url — so multi-cell IS multi-project. The
batch-review card now shows one project Select per the_work entry, scoped to
that cell's repos, instead of one Select bound to a single top-level
project_id. confirmBatch validates each cell's project is in scope and the
batch still spans >=2 distinct projects.
- prompter.ts: CellWork gains optional project_id (the per-cell picker seam).
- batch-review-card.tsx: per-cell Selects (one per the_work entry), scoped to
the cell's projects; legacy single-cell drafts keep the one-Select path.
- use-prompter.ts: updateBatchDraftProject edits per-cell (entryIndex); confirmBatch validates every cell; batchFromEvent parses per-cell map.
Also adds the missing pnpm format infrastructure (the panel had no formatter
at all): prettier devDep + .prettierrc.json (default-style config: 80-col,
double-quote, semi, trailing-comma-all) + .prettierignore, plus format /
format:check scripts. Only the 3 changed files above were reformatted; the
~222 pre-existing non-compliant files are left untouched (a wholesale reformat
is a separate explicit decision, not bundled into this feature).
* [fix] MegaTask verification: migration 052 enum + async cell-map read
Two real bugs surfaced running the full gate against a containerized
Postgres (and the orchestrator boot log):
1. Migration 052 crashed a real orchestrator boot with
'type "team" already exists'. The generic sa.Enum(create_type=False)
does NOT set the postgres enum's create_type attribute, so op.create_table
(checkfirst=False) emitted a redundant CREATE TYPE against the pre-existing
team enum. Switched to postgresql.ENUM(create_type=False) — the postgres-
native enum whose create_type _check_for_name_in_memos actually reads, so
the CREATE TYPE is suppressed. Verified: 051->052 upgrade against a DB where
the team enum pre-existed (the exact path that crashed) now succeeds;
downgrade 052->051 drops the table and preserves the shared enum; fresh
upgrade head clean. (Migration 016 has the same latent sa.Enum pattern but
never re-runs in prod, so it's noted, not touched here.)
2. _ensure_branch_for_task read task.cell_projects (lazy=selectin to-many)
directly, tripping MissingGreenlet on a freshly-created/unqueried task —
which then poisoned the async session (PendingRollbackError). Replaced with
_task_has_cell_map: peeks InstanceState.unloaded (no IO) and reads the
already-loaded map, falling back to an awaited count query only when the
relationship is genuinely unloaded. Non-ORM stubs route to the plain
attribute. Fixes 2 integration tests; the 6 cell-map unit tests still pass.
Also: typed the self stub as Any in test_choreographer_subtask_project
(mypy tests/ wants Choreographer, not SimpleNamespace) — the codebase idiom.
Gate: ruff format/check clean; mypy roboco/ + tests/ clean; full pytest
10371 passed / 388 skipped against containerized pgvector:pg16; vulture clean.
Pre-existing xenon C-rank on reassign (from prior commit 19a474d3, not this
feature) still blocks make quality — surfaced separately.
* [refactor] Extract reassign board-advisory diversion helper (C→B complexity)
`reassign` in roboco/services/task.py hit xenon absolute complexity 11 (a
C-rank block), failing `make quality`'s --max-absolute B gate. The C-rank
originated in 19a474d3 (pre-existing, not this feature branch's work).
Extract the board/advisory → cell-task diversion into
`_maybe_divert_board_advisory_reassign` (complexity 4, A). reassign drops to
9 (B); behavior is byte-for-byte preserved — the helper runs the same
guard + pool diversion + log, returning the diverted task or None so the
caller falls through to the normal handoff. Whole-repo xenon exits 0; the 159
reassign / board-guard tests pass.
Unblocks `make quality` on feature/metrics-granularity.
* [fix] migration 016: postgresql.ENUM(create_type=False) for reused team enum
016_add_products_and_task_product_id used `sa.Enum(..., create_type=False)`
for the reused Postgres "team" enum — the same latent defect that crashed
052 on a real orchestrator boot. On the generic `sa.Enum` the
`create_type` kwarg is silently dropped, so `_check_for_name_in_memos`
never sees it and `op.create_table` (checkfirst=False) emits a redundant
`CREATE TYPE team` that fails with "type 'team' already exists" against a
DB where the enum pre-exists.
Switch to the postgres-native `postgresql.ENUM(..., create_type=False)` —
its `create_type` is a real attribute the guard reads, so the CREATE TYPE
is suppressed (and DROP TYPE on downgrade too). The member list is inert
under create_type=False (it never creates/alters the type), so it stays at
016's original six, reflecting the enum as it stood then, not the
later-widened set.
This never crashed in prod because 016 is never re-run (alembic_version is
past it), but it's the same defect class. Verified on the real boot path:
upgrade to 015 in process A (team enum created by 001), then `upgrade head`
in a fresh process B — 016 applied clean, no DuplicateObjectError; downgrade
016->015 clean, shared team enum preserved.
See project_migration_enum_create_type_gotcha.
* [chore] panel: prettier reformat across the codebase
Apply `pnpm format` (prettier 3.8.5, 80-col / double-quote / semi /
trailing-comma-all) to the 223 pre-existing panel files that predated the
prettier infra added in cb5365a4. Pure formatting — no semantic changes:
multi-line arrays/objects collapsed where they fit, trailing newlines added
(.prettierrc.json), import grouping unchanged.
Verified: `pnpm format:check` clean, `pnpm lint` clean, `pnpm typecheck`
clean, `pnpm test` 113/113 pass (7 files).
* Bunch of runtime fixes for MegaTask and other issues
* Fix different project same PR number collision problem
Fix (two layers):
1. Root cause — pr_merge and rebase_pr_for_task now take a required project_id and scope the lookup where(pr_number == X AND project_id == Y). Required so no caller can forget — the bug class can't recur. All 4 call sites updated (choreographer cell_pm_complete, the rebase-retry, the superseded close_pull_request now passes project_id, and _verb_runner._do_pr_merge).
2. Crash guard — _finalize_cell_complete None-checks the complete() return and returns a clean invalid_state envelope (with a remediate hint) instead of dereffing None → 500 → respawn loop.
* Fix: Make main_pm + task_type=code impossible
* Fix Main PM needs revision can't re delegate
* [chore] Bump local LLM glm-5→glm-5.2 + swap Ollama fleet defaults off minimax
- llm_catalog: OLLAMA_DEFAULT_MODEL minimax-m3:cloud → kimi-k2.7-code:cloud;
role defaults kimi-k2.6→kimi-k2.7-code, developer minimax→kimi, product_owner/
ceo kimi→glm-5.2, documenter glm→kimi; GLM 5.1→5.2 comment fix.
- config + .env.example + docker-compose{.yml,.yaml,.registry.yml} + docs +
memory_distiller + optimal_brain: glm-5:cloud → glm-5.2:cloud.
- panel ai-routing-card: typed SelfHostedModel/boolean annotations; drop the
stale "Minimax M3 default" string (default is now catalog-driven).
- tests: glm-5:cloud → glm-5.2:cloud in pricing + rate-limit-retry fixtures.
* [fix] submit_root: hard unchanged-PR gate stops the pr_fail re-submit loop
The 2026-06-27 infinite pr_fail loop: a Main-PM root (PR #139) was pr_fail'd,
routed to needs_revision, and re-submitted byte-identical → awaiting_pr_review
→ pr_fail again, forever. The prior hint/a2a steer was ignored by the weak
coordinator model — hints don't stop a model that won't read them. A HARD gate
refuses the re-submit when the assembled root PR's head SHA is unchanged since
the last pr_fail (no new cell work → identical diff); a different SHA ⇒ the
branch advanced ⇒ allow. Every ambiguous case fails open (no prior fail, no
recorded SHA, no pr_number, unresolvable slug, git error, closed PR) — only the
exact-unchanged case is hard-blocked.
- content/models: PrReviewContent.head_sha (optional; JSON col → no migration).
- git: get_pr_head_sha (GitHub pulls API; None on any failure → fail-open).
- pr_gate: pr_fail captures head_sha into the verdict record; pr_pass does not.
- _impl: submit_root runs _submit_root_unchanged_pr_guard after _submit_up_guard;
_current_root_pr_head_sha resolves slug + current SHA (fail-open).
- pr_review: extract module-level resolve_task_project_slug, shared by the mixin
and the gate helper (_LegacyChoreographer reaches it via cast to the
ChoreographerHelpers typed view — it doesn't inherit the helpers mixin).
- tests: test_submit_root_unchanged_pr_guard (11 — refuse/allow/6 fail-open/3
capture-side, mypy-clean via cc:Any spy idiom, zero type:ignore) +
test_pr_gate_notifies_pm capture-path stub.
* [chore] mypy tests/: clear all 15 pre-existing type errors so make quality can go green
The branch tip had 15 mypy tests/ errors in files this bundle did not author,
which blocked CI's make quality mypy step (mypy roboco/ tests/) regardless of
the bundle's own commits. Pre-existing is still existing — fix every one:
- test_schemas_v1_flow.py (8): the StrList coercion tests intentionally pass
SDK-nested list-of-strings input ([[['...']]], {'item':{'$text':'...'}}, int,
dict). Annotate those literals as list[Any] locals so mypy accepts the
coerce-able shape; the StrList BeforeValidator still flattens to list[str] at
runtime. No type:ignore.
- test_pr_gate_records_verdict.py (3): notes_structured is dict|None; narrow
with 'assert t.notes_structured is not None' before indexing (the existing
pattern at line 90).
- test_pr_review_hand_format_guard.py (1 site, 2 errors): the _verb_runner()
spy assertion — use the cc: Any = c alias idiom so assert_not_awaited
resolves; drops the now-unused type:ignore[union-attr].
- test_pr_gate_notifies_pm.py (1): drop the unused type:ignore[method-assign]
on the a2a.send reassignment.
- test_content_models.py (1): narrow coerced with isinstance(coerced,
PrReviewContent) before reading .issues (the base _Content lacks the field).
Gates: rm -rf .mypy_cache && mypy roboco/ tests/ = Success (855 files);
ruff check + format clean; 5 affected suites = 40 passed.
* [fix] fail_qa routes needs_revision back to the dev, never the pool
A dev task in needs_revision must go back to the developer, never the
pool. The pool path let a cell PM re-claim the revision (PMs can claim
needs_revision) — the live 2026-06-27 'needs revision on a dev task sent to
the cell PM' bug.
fail_qa's original_developer marker is the fast path, but it is
unreliable in practice (live observation: never persisted), so the
unassign else-branch was the load-bearing path and it dropped the task
into the pool. Add a work-session fallback (_resolve_revision_dev) that
resolves the developer who actually worked the task — the most recent
work session whose agent is a developer, the QA's own session excluded
— and reassigns to that dev instead of unassigning. Only unassign when
no developer ever touched the task. Self-heals the marker so a
subsequent re-fail takes the fast path and the QA-review index
attributes the work correctly.
* [feature] delegate carries dev-task collision surface (sequencing S1)
The cell/main PM's delegate verb now carries the dev-task collision
surface (intends_to_touch / adds_migration / touches_shared) and an
explicit depends_on override through DelegateRequest -> DelegateInputs
-> _create_subtask_from_inputs -> create_subtask, and create_subtask
forwards sequence / dependency_ids / batch_id / surfaces into the
prepared TaskCreateRequest instead of dropping them (the base create
already persists them at task.py:878-884).
This is the plumbing for the multi-level sequencing model edge kind 3
(dev-task collision DAG). Previously a dev task delegated with a
collision surface or an explicit dependency lost it before persistence
— dependency_ids was always [], so the only dev-task ordering was the
weak assignee-keyed spawn barrier (the live 2026-06-27 out-of-order
break: 40842957 started before 9b3682b8's PR merged). Phase S2 runs
SequencingService over the surfaced siblings and wires the DAG via
add_dependency.
* [feature] wire dev-task collision DAG at cell-PM delegation (sequencing S2)
Pure dev_task_collision_edges in sequencing.py turns a parent's surfaced
siblings into (depends_on_id, task_id) pairs via SequencingService. TaskService.
wire_sibling_collision_dag wires them through add_dependency (idempotent). The
choreographer calls it after each dev-task delegate so the sibling collision DAG
is built incrementally as the cell PM decomposes — file-overlap serializes,
migration chains, shared-last; stable (priority, sequence) ordering keeps edges
from flipping into reverse cycles on re-runs.
* [feature] wire cell-task wave chain + by-osmosis edge (sequencing S3)
Kind 2 (cell-task wave chain): a new cell-task under root-subtask UT_n
depends on every cell-task under every root-subtask in UT_n.dependency_ids
(the kind-1 wave-chain edges), so its branch carries the previous wave's
merged cell work. Re-derived from the root-subtask's deps, not the cell-task's
own dependency_ids (which also carry UX/product-fanout edges the by-osmosis
edge must not pick up). A root may fan to several cell-tasks (different cells),
so the previous wave's cell-task is a SET.
Kind 4 (by-osmosis): the first dev task (sequence 0) under a cell-task depends
on each predecessor cell-task's tail (max-sequence) dev task, so the new wave's
first branch carries the previous wave's fully-merged tail. Subsequent dev
tasks inherit the tail via kind 3 or the merged base.
Both wired from _create_subtask_from_inputs, dispatched on parent.team
(MAIN_PM -> kind 2; cell team -> kind 4). Pure helpers
(cell_task_wave_chain_depends_on, by_osmosis_tail_dev_tasks) unit-tested in
test_sequencing.py; TaskService methods integration-tested. Idempotent +
best-effort throughout (add_dependency dedupes; missing predecessors are
no-ops). Also fixes a latent mypy-tests gap (estimated_complexity required on
direct TaskCreateRequest calls in the S2 tests).
* [feature] sync_branch dev verb — gate-level branch rebase (Phase B1)
Raw shell git is denied to agents (Bash(git:*) base deny), so a developer
whose branch fell behind its base had no gate-level rebase — only the
CEO/PM-only /rebase HTTP route. sync_branch is the dev verb that wraps the
rebase through the gate (traced + evidenced), so the 'everything goes through
the gates' invariant holds.
- lifecycle: IntentSpec sync_branch (dev-only, ownership-gated, composes=(),
git-only — no DB transition); _next_hint_synced helper.
- GitService.sync_task_branch: rebase task.branch_name onto its resolved base
via rebase_onto_base (fetch + rebase + force-with-lease push).
- Choreographer.sync_branch + _sync_branch_preflight_rejection: not_found /
unknown-role / spec-gate / no-branch / protected-base guards, then the git
op; conflicts abort (no force-push) and steer to resolve-by-hand; git failure
steers to i_am_blocked.
- HTTP route /api/v1/flow/developer/sync_branch + SyncBranchRequest schema.
- MCP tool sync_branch(task_id) + _TOOLS registration (manifest auto-propagates
via intents_for_role(Role.DEVELOPER)).
Tests: intent spec (5), choreographer handler (8: happy/conflicts/not_found/
not_authorized/no-branch/protected-base/git-failure/audit), route (1), MCP (1).
ruff + mypy roboco/ tests/ clean; unit suite green (DB-fixture errors env-only).
* [feature] i_am_done behind-base submit gate (Phase B2)
A sibling's PR merging into the parent branch while a dev worked leaves the
dev's branch behind its base — the assembled PR then can't merge cleanly and
the sibling's changes go missing (the 2026-06-27 out-of-order dev-task break).
The behind-base gate refuses i_am_done in that state and steers the dev to
sync_branch (the Phase B1 gate-level rebase verb).
- GitService.is_behind_base: rev-list --left-right --count across
origin/{base}...origin/{head} → (behind, ahead); fetch-first so origin
reflects the pushed head. Raises on git failure (consistent with
rebase_onto_base); malformed stdout degrades to (0,0).
- Choreographer._behind_base_gate: wired into _i_am_done_gate after
_ensure_branch_pushed. behind>0 → invalid_state remediate→sync_branch.
Fail-open on git/base-resolution error (flaky fetch can't strand a task at
the submit gate — the merge layer has its own behind checks). Skipped for
branchless roots and protected bases (master/main/-prefixed).
Tests: gate (6: refuse+steer/up-to-date/branchless/protected/fail-open-base/
fail-open-git), is_behind_base (6: parse/up-to-date/malformed/argv-form/
requires-branch/missing-project). ruff + mypy roboco/ tests/ clean; unit green.
* [docs] sync_branch prompt + behind-base guidance (Phase B3)
Update every behind-base/rebase guidance surface to reflect the B1
sync_branch dev verb + B2 i_am_done behind-base gate: devs now self-rebase
through the gate instead of escalating a plain behind-base condition; PMs
still escalate cell/root integration branches (they have no rebase verb).
- developer.md: sync_branch in the verb table; 'When your branch is behind
its base' rewritten — call sync_branch, do NOT i_am_blocked a plain
behind-base; conflicts → resolve by hand, commit, sync_branch again.
- cell_pm.md: delegate signature gains intends_to_touch/adds_migration/
touches_shared/depends_on + a 'Collision surface' section (fill it on every
code subtask so sibling dev tasks that touch the same files sequence into a
conflict-free order — the 2026-06-27 out-of-order break fix); behind-base
section steers devs to sync_branch, PMs escalate only the integration branch.
- main_pm.md: behind-base section — dev leaf = dev's sync_branch; cell/root
integration branch = escalate_up.
- RAG git-errors.md / blocked-tools.md: devs sync_branch, PMs escalate.
- docs/troubleshooting/common-issues.md: leaf self-rebases; integration branch
still escalates to operator.
- CLAUDE.md verb surface: developer gains sync_branch.
- agents/prompts/_generated/*: regenerated via scripts/regenerate_verb_tables.py
— adds sync_branch to the dev table AND catches the generated tables up to
the S1/S2 delegate sequencing params + meltdown-fix note top-level params
(the derived files had drifted stale vs the already-committed schemas).
Docs/prompts only — no code. ruff + mypy roboco/ tests/ clean.
* [chore] orchestrator: refuse to spawn human-only roles (CEO/prompter/secretary)
A live 2026-06-27 incident saw a CEO agent container spawned. Root cause:
_dispatch_a2a_work iterates every A2A/notification target and spawns it
with no human-role filter, and _is_agent_active('ceo') is always false
(the CEO is never a container), so the 'skip if active' check could never
protect the CEO. Any CEO-addressed notification (board handoff, escalation)
launched a CEO container — the system acting as the human CEO: a trust
violation. The CEO is the human operator; intake (prompter) and secretary
are human-driven chats launched through their own dedicated guarded paths
(_spawn_intake_container / _spawn_secretary_container), never spawn_agent.
Fix: a single chokepoint guard at the top of spawn_agent refuses
Role.CEO / PROMPTER / SECRETARY (raises AgentReadinessError + logs). This
structurally covers every dispatcher present and future, since they all go
through spawn_agent. Plus a defense-in-depth skip in _dispatch_a2a_work so
a human-role target never even calls in (avoids error-log spam; the
notification stays for the human to read in the panel).
Safe: the dedicated human-spawn paths do not route through spawn_agent.
Regression tests: spawn_agent refuses ceo/intake-1/secretary-1, does NOT
refuse a real agent; _dispatch_a2a_work skips CEO/intake/secretary targets
and still spawns real-agent + mixed-target cases.
* [chore] orchestrator: skip human-only assignees in claimed/pm-review dispatchers
Defense-in-depth for the spawn_agent human-role chokepoint (d31d6719).
The chokepoint structurally guarantees no CEO/prompter/secretary container
can ever spawn — every dispatcher goes through spawn_agent. But two
dispatchers resolve an arbitrary assigned_to and spawn it with only a
None/unknown-role filter, so a human-assigned task would reach the
chokepoint and RAISE: caught by the per-dispatcher try/except, but it
aborts that dispatcher's whole tick (stalling other respawns behind the
mis-assigned task) and error-logs every cycle. The other dispatchers are
already safe by whitelist/hardcoded slug (blocker_resolver_slug returns
None for non-PM/non-BOARD; escalation/approval use whitelists; marketing
and audit hardcode their non-human slug).
- _claimed_task_needs_agent: return None for a CEO/prompter/secretary
assignee — no container to respawn, and do NOT release a human-owned
task to pending (that would re-route it to a PM). Leave it for the human.
- _dispatch_pm_review_work (assigned branch): skip a human-only assignee
so a CEO-assigned awaiting_pm_review task neither spawns nor aborts the
dispatcher's tick.
Audited all target-iterating dispatchers; only these two lacked a filter.
Regression tests cover both skips.
* [F002] retype board-routed MegaTask root-subtasks code->planning on activation
_activate_batch_root_subtasks flipped a held root-subtask to team=MAIN_PM
but left task_type=code (intake only coerces main_pm-team drafts, so a
board-routed code root reached activation still code-typed). The
main_pm+code combo re-introduces the 2026-06-27 meltdown. Mirror
approve_and_start's own retype via main_pm_cannot_own_code so the
activated child is a planning-typed coordination root.
TDD: RED test_activate_batch_root_subtasks_retypes_code_to_planning
watched fail (task_type stayed CODE), then GREEN after the retype.
ruff+mypy clean; 125 batch/umbrella/approve tests green, no regressions.
* [F003,F004,F014] enforce HMAC agent-token gate on do routes + WebSocket streams
F003/F014: /api/v1/do/* only required X-Agent-ID (UUID) — no token check,
unlike the flow routers' role guards. A forged X-Agent-ID passed. Added
require_any_authenticated_agent (token-only; do router serves all roles)
and applied it as a router-level dependency. Binds X-Agent-ID to a verified
HMAC token when ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED=true; rejects a forged token
even in dev mode.
F004: /ws/* per-agent streams (channels/agents/sessions/notifications)
never read the nginx-injected X-Agent-Token, so in strict mode an agent on
the Docker network could subscribe to another agent's notifications with
no auth. Added _require_panel_token verifying the CEO panel token against
the CEO identity; wired into all four per-agent streams (system stream
stays operator-only per its docstring). Same strict/dev contract.
TDD: RED tests watched fail (no gate -> 200/accept), then GREEN. ruff+mypy
clean; 399 api/mcp + 29 WS tests green, no regressions.
* [F005,F006] grok auth: directory mount + atomic-write fallback
F005: the single-file bind mount of auth.json pinned the inode, so the
orchestrator's atomic refresh (tmp+rename within ~/.grok) never reached a
running grok container — a long-lived container hung at the login prompt
when the original ~6h token expired. Mount the host ~/.grok DIRECTORY (ro)
at /home/agent/.grok-auth-ro; the entrypoint symlinks ~/.grok/auth.json at
that RO mount so grok + the --check backstop read the live credential (the
directory mount sees the host-side rename) while grok's writable state
(config.toml, sessions/) stays in the image's ~/.grok.
F006: a rotated refresh_token is single-use — xAI invalidates the old one
the instant it issues the new one. If the atomic write failed after the
rotation, the file kept the now-dead old refresh_token and the credential
was permanently lost on the next refresh. _atomic_write now falls back to a
direct write when tmp+replace fails, so the rotated token always lands on
disk (losing the write is catastrophic; losing atomicity is not).
TDD: RED tests watched fail, then GREEN. ruff+mypy clean; 32 grok tests
green, no regressions.
* [F016,F017] choreographer: surface invalid_state instead of None.status 500 on submit_root / i_am_blocked
Both verbs compose a single atomic action whose None return (the verb's
own result) flowed out of run_intent and was dereferenced as t.status,
HTTP 500-ing with no actionable rejection:
- F016 submit_root: submit_for_review returns None when the root->master
PR was already opened / the task raced out of in_progress. Post-runner
None-guard extracted into _submit_root_finalize -> invalid_state
(re-fetch; if awaiting_pr_review the PR is open, wait for reviewer;
else re-delegate fixes and retry) instead of None.status.
- F017 i_am_blocked: escalate returns None in four cases (no task, no
agent, no resolvable escalation-target slug, no target agent row) e.g.
a developer whose role has no PM above it. _run_i_am_blocked_intent
now guards updated is None -> (t, invalid_state rejection) with
remediation (re-fetch + escalate to CEO directly / retry) instead of
the caller deref'ing None.status -> 500 + respawn-loop.
TDD red->green; ruff + mypy clean; gateway suite green (58 passed).
* [F007] choreographer: cell-level unchanged-PR re-submit loop-stopper for submit_up
The root loop-stopper (F016) was root-only; a weak cell PM could re-submit
the unchanged cell->root PR after a pr_fail and loop awaiting_pr_review ->
pr_fail forever (the cell analogue of the 2026-06-27 root loop).
pr_fail stamps the assembled PR's head SHA into notes_structured.pr_review
.head_sha for cell AND root gate tasks alike (the capture is gate-verb-
level, not root-level), so the same structural refusal applies to submit_up:
if the cell PR's current head SHA equals the SHA the last pr_fail recorded,
no new dev work landed on the cell branch -> the diff is byte-identical ->
refuse, do not re-open the gate. Different SHA -> branch advanced -> allow.
- _submit_up_unchanged_pr_guard mirrors _submit_root_unchanged_pr_guard
(cell-PM remediation: re-delegate to the dev + wait for re-assembly),
wired into submit_up after _submit_up_guard passes.
- Renamed shared _current_root_pr_head_sha -> _current_pr_head_sha (both
guards use it; the lookup was never root-specific).
- Every ambiguous case FAILS OPEN (no prior fail, no recorded sha, no
pr_number, no resolvable project, git/closed-PR None) — only the exact-
unchanged case is hard-blocked.
TDD red->green; ruff + mypy clean; F007+F016 guard suites green (15 passed).
* [F008] evidence_builder: surface persisted pr_review verdict+issues in the PM task_handoff
The pr_fail a2a steer to the owning PM is fire-and-forget; a PM respawned
into needs_revision later read none of it (build_task_handoff never looked
at notes_structured), saw a generic 'needs revision' with zero concrete
change-requests, and re-submitted the same PR (the 2026-06-27 infinite
pr_fail loop on 9980d0a0 / PR #138). The signal-gap was only partially
closed by the a2a.
build_task_handoff now extracts notes_structured.pr_review
(verdict/summary/issues/head_sha — the slot pr_fail authors on every fail)
into a pr_review field on the handoff, so every PM briefing for the task
carries the concrete change-requests. A prior pr_fail alone now counts as
prior-work-worth-resuming. Type-guarded + capped; absent => no key (no
misleading empty slot).
TDD red->green; ruff + mypy clean; evidence_builder suite green (14 passed).
* [F009] notification: derive requires_ack from ACK_REQUIRED_BY_TYPE, not the True default
NotificationService._create_notification built NotificationTable without
requires_ack, so the column default (True) applied to EVERY notification -
including informational REVIEW_REQUEST / DOCUMENTATION_REQUEST /
A2A_REQUEST / KNOWLEDGE_SHARE (ACK_REQUIRED_BY_TYPE -> False) and every
@mention from MessagingService._notify_mentions. Each false ack-required
inflated the recipient's unacked set and soft-blocked i_am_idle into
respawn churn.
- _create_notification: requires_ack=ACK_REQUIRED_BY_TYPE.get(type, True)
(unmapped types default True - preserve the action-required bias).
- _notify_mentions: requires_ack=False explicit (MENTION is informational).
TDD red->green (identity is False/is True assertions - the mocked
flush doesn't apply SQLA's insert-time default, so pre-fix the attribute
was None); ruff + mypy clean; notification suite green (18 passed).
* [F010] notification: never dedup informational notifications (knowledge-share data loss)
The purpose-based dedup suppressed a same-purpose (same sender/type/task,
overlapping recipients) notification while a prior one was unacked. For
informational types (KNOWLEDGE_SHARE / MENTION / A2A_REQUEST / BROADCAST +
the pickup-proves-receipt triad) each send carries DISTINCT content (a new
learning, a new mention) and acking is voluntary, so a recipient who never
acks the prior one let the dedup permanently suppress every subsequent
same-sender broadcast - silent learning-broadcast data loss.
The dedup's anti-loop rationale (stop unacked-set inflation soft-blocking
i_am_idle) only holds for action-required signals. Gate the dedup on
ACK_REQUIRED_BY_TYPE.get(type, True): action-required types still dedup,
informational types always create. Unmapped types default True (dedup on).
TDD red->green; ruff + mypy clean; notification + dedup suites green (20).
* [F011] playbook: de-index rejected/archived playbooks from the PLAYBOOKS RAG index
* [F012] release_executor: fail-closed on git add/commit before push
* [F013] release_proposal: Redis SET NX mutex guards the ~40min execute against concurrent approves
* [F015] flow_qa/flow_doc: add i_am_blocked route (manifest-registered escape hatch was 404)
* [F018] claim_guards: treat blocked as active + broaden the guard lookup so a blocked dev can't double-claim
* [F019] git: clear orphaned .git/*.lock files after a timeout-SIGKILL'd mutation op
* [F031] identity: role_for_slug_or_none so defensive skip-guards don't crash the dispatcher tick on stale slugs
* [F032] test: unknown-assignee claim reaches release-to-pending path
F031's role_for_slug_or_none fix made the unknown-assignee release branch
in _dispatch_claimed_without_agent reachable (the human-only guard no
longer raises/short-circuits on a stale slug). Lock that reachability in:
a claimed task with an unknown-assignee UUID past grace returns the slug
(not None) so get_agent_role -> 'unknown' releases the claim to pending
for a role-matched reclaim.
* [F033] orchestrator: capture container_id at startup re-adoption
_readopt_running_agents registered re-adopted ACTIVE instances with
container_id=None. _check_health skips container_id-is-None instances, so
when a re-adopted container later exited the stopped-container handler
never ran and the task stranded under a phantom ACTIVE instance forever.
Add _resolve_container_id (docker inspect -f '{{.Id}}') and store the real
id on re-adopt. Best-effort: a probe failure degrades to None (still
ACTIVE; the reaper's Docker-liveness fallback covers it).
* [F034] orchestrator: re-stamp respawn last_check at restore
_pm_made_rule_following_retry bounds its tracing_gap audit lookup with
since = record.get('last_check'). A stale persisted last_check from before
the restart matched pre-restart tracing_gap rows, falsely resetting the
breaker on the very first post-restart spawn — exactly when a fresh strike
count should be evaluating current state.
_partition_respawn_rows now re-stamps last_check to the restore time on
every restorable entry, bounding the lookup to post-restart gaps only.
* [F035] orchestrator: probe-resume loop actually revives parked agents
_park_provider_unavailable parked the provider + offlined the instance but
never registered a WaitingRecord, so _on_probe_success -> _parked_agents_for
(always filtered on waiting_for=='rate_limit_lifted') returned [] and
resolve_wait revived nobody — recovery fell to the 600s stale-claim reaper
instead of the probe-success path the parking design relied on.
Register + persist a rate_limit_lifted WaitingRecord at park time (mirrors
mark_waiting_long, minus stop_agent — the container is already dead).
Companion reaper guard: _reap_with_service now skips provider-parked
assignees (_assignee_is_provider_parked) so the claim survives until the
probe revives the agent — otherwise the reaper releases the claim to pending
and probe-success respawns on a task the agent no longer owns.
* [F036] orchestrator: read transcript for overload detection too
The SDK server writes model-API errors (529/500/503) to /tmp/sdk-server.log,
not stdout, so an overload marker can appear only in the durable Claude
transcript — the same rationale already applied to the session-limit
detector. _provider_overload_park_target read only docker logs, so an
overload was missed and the agent crash-respawned straight back into it.
Now concatenates the transcript tail before matching, mirroring the
rate-limit path.
* [F037] orchestrator: drop bare error-NNN overload markers
The bare 'error 529'/'error 500'/'error 503' markers were broad enough to
false-match an agent that merely writes about an HTTP status code in its own
notes ('the endpoint returned error 500, retrying'), parking the whole
Anthropic fleet on a non-issue.
The SDK error formatter emits 'API Error: NNN' + a JSON error type, so the
remaining 'api error: 529/500/503' + 'overloaded_error' +
'internal_server_error' markers cover every real overload without that
false-match surface.
* [F038/F039] orchestrator: sign X-Agent-Token on self-API calls
The prior self-PATCH 401 fix only carried X-Agent-ID/X-Agent-Role. Arming
ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED=true made the middleware require a signed
X-Agent-Token, so every orchestrator self-call (auto-block / auto-resume /
auto-recover / SLA annotation) 401'd and silently no-op'd — wedging
paused/blocked parents.
Add _system_api_headers() that wraps the base headers with a signed token
for the system identity (issue_agent_token); switch all six self-call sites.
Dev fallback: no secret set => UNSIGNED sentinel + auth not required.
* [F040] orchestrator: finalize grok spawn session on cost-cap kill
_enforce_grok_cost_budget killed + evicted the container without calling
_finalize_spawn_session, so the open agent_spawn_sessions row stayed open
(ended_at IS NULL) and the burned usage/cost was never recorded in the
dashboard.
Call _finalize_spawn_session(exit_reason='cost_cap') BEFORE popping the
instance — it reads self._instances[agent_id] for the model +
usage_session_id, which the pop would lose.
* [F041] park grok exit-78 (auth missing/expired) instead of crash-retrying
A one-shot grok container whose entrypoint ran grok_auth --check and found
the token missing/expired exits 78 (EX_CONFIG). Crash-retrying 3x burns
tokens for zero progress — the agent cannot start without a valid token.
Park the provider with kind=auth_missing (same shape as the 429 exit-75
path) so the probe-resume loop revives the task once grok_auth.refresh_if_stale
mints a fresh token; if still expired, the next exit 78 re-parks (no burn).
Also fixes a latent F035 regression: _park_provider_unavailable now registers
a WaitingRecord, so the bare-__new__ rate-limit park test had to set
_waiting_records + stub _persist_waiting_record (mirrors the overload-test
fixture).
* [F042] isolate concurrent-duplicate conventions cache put in a savepoint
Two task creates for the same project/HEAD can race to populate the
conventions cache; the loser's INSERT fails the partial-unique index with
IntegrityError. A bare session.add + flush poisons the shared session (the
task-create transaction rides the same session), so every subsequent op
raises 'this session is in error state' and task creation crashes.
Run the INSERT in a savepoint (begin_nested) and swallow the IntegrityError:
only the savepoint rolls back, the outer transaction stays usable, and the
winner's row satisfies the next _cache_get.
* [F043] guard escalate_up against resurrecting terminal tasks
escalate_up had composes=() and no source-status guard, so a PM could
escalate a COMPLETED/CANCELLED task and apply_escalation set it back to
BLOCKED — bypassing the state machine's terminal-state invariant.
Defense in depth:
- spec: add PRECONDITION_NON_TERMINAL to escalate_up's extra_preconditions so
the lifecycle gate rejects terminal tasks (invalid_state) before the
journal:decision write fires; generalize _check_intent_preconditions to
honor non-tracing rejection_kind (not_authorized / invalid_state).
- service: apply_escalation (the single write primitive) returns False and
refuses to mutate a terminal task — covers the HTTP escalate route which
bypasses the spec gate. escalate() / escalate_up_to_role() return None on
refusal so the gateway emits a clean invalid_state envelope.
- route: the HTTP escalate route 409s a terminal task BEFORE sending the
escalation notification (so a finished task isn't yanked back, PM not pinged).
* [F044] pr_pass gate remediation points the reviewer at pr_fail, not i_am_blocked
The pr_pass gate runs the toolchain + conventions guards on the REVIEWER's
workspace, but their remediation text said 'call i_am_blocked' — a verb the
PR reviewer does not have. The reviewer would chase a verb they cannot call
instead of rejecting the PR.
Make the guards reviewer-aware: a reviewer=True flag (passed by _pr_pass_blocked)
switches the remediation to pr_fail(issues=[...]) — the reviewer's reject
lever, sending the PR back to needs_revision for the dev to fix the
environment / validator. The dev (i_am_done) path keeps i_am_blocked, which a
dev does have. _conventions_guard (the pr_pass path) now passes reviewer=True
through to _conventions_rejection.
* [F045] rate-limit: loud activate-failure log + in-memory orphan-probe fallback
The in-verb i_am_blocked(rate_limited) path wrapped RateLimitStateTracker.activate
in a bare contextlib.suppress. A silent activate failure stranded the fleet:
agents were parked in _waiting_records but the provider never entered the tracker,
so the tracker-driven _sweep_rate_limit_probes never probed it and no
_on_probe_success ever resumed them — parked agents stuck in WAITING_LONG.
Fix: (1) replace the bare suppress with a try/except that logs an error event
naming the provider + affected agents; (2) in _sweep_rate_limit_probes, after
probing the tracker-listed set, scan _waiting_records for any rate_limit_lifted
provider the loop did NOT cover and probe it via the time-expiry fallback (empty
state -> probe now) so _on_probe_success resumes the parked agents. The fallback
reads only local memory, so it still resumes when Redis was down at park time
(list_rate_limited_providers failure now falls through to the orphan scan instead
of returning early).
* [F046] pr_gate: guard None runner result on concurrent transition (pr_pass/pr_fail)
_gate_decision dereferenced the verb-runner result without a None guard.
run_intent returns None when a concurrent transition (cancel or a racing
reviewer) moves the task out of awaiting_pr_review between the precondition
gate and the runner's final composed action (the verb runner's documented
last-action source-status contract). The subsequent t.assigned_to /
t.status / _post_gate_review_to_pr(t, ...) dereferences then crashed the
gate with a 500 AttributeError. Add a None guard that surfaces a clean
invalid_state rejection (re-fetch + re-issue) before any dereference; no
PR post or a2a runs against a None task. TDD test_pr_gate_notifies_pm.py (+2).
* [F047] conventions: reviewer-aware block-finding remediation on pr_pass gate
The pr_pass (reviewer) conventions guard reused the dev-path block-finding
remediation: 'add a waiver to .roboco/conventions.yml in your branch'. A
pr_reviewer does not own the assembled cell->root / root->master branch and
has no commit verb on it, so the waiver remediation is unreachable — a false
positive stranded the gate with no self-recovery (the reviewer could neither
commit a waiver nor pr_pass). The fail-open content path is documented
precision-over-recall and stays as-is; the actionable gap is the remediation.
Fix: _conventions_rejection now branches the block-finding remediation on
reviewer=True (mirroring the could_not_run branch from F044). The reviewer
path points at pr_fail carrying the findings as issues so the PR returns to
needs_revision and the DEV fixes the violation or commits the waiver (the dev
CAN commit to the branch); waiver authorship is framed as the dev's action,
not the reviewer's. Dev i_am_done path wording unchanged. TDD
test_conventions_gate_pr_pass.py (+1).
* [F048] notify: reject human-only recipients (prompter/secretary) — no agent ack path
notify() only checked the SENDER role. The recipient was resolved by
NotificationService._resolve_recipients, which drops only unresolvable slugs
— it does not exclude human-only roles. The prompter (intake-1) and secretary
(secretary-1) are seeded agent rows, so they resolved, and an ack-required
ALERT addressed to them sat permanently unacked (no agent auto-acks it),
polluted the panel's pending-ack view, and — via the dedup query's
~acked_by.contains — permanently suppressed any later same-purpose
notification from the same sender to that human role. The knowledge-share
path already excludes all three human-only roles; the general notify path
did not.
Fix: a recipient-role guard in notify() via _reject_disallowed_recipient
(folds the new check into the existing CEO-dependency-block return slot so
notify stays under the PLR0911 return limit). Rejects prompter/secretary
with not_authorized; the CEO is human too but acks via the panel, so it stays
an allowed recipient (its only disallowed case, a dependency-block page, is
preserved). TDD test_notify.py (+3: reject prompter, reject secretary, allow
CEO).
* [F049] merge_pull_request: idempotent on already-merged PR (mirror _merge_with_retry)
* [F050] merge_pr_for_task: verify caller pr_number matches task's recorded PR
* [F051] open_conventions_pr: refuse dirty tree + verify checkout-base landed
* [F052] pr_target: scope task lookup by project_id (mirror close_pull_request)
* [F053] _token_for_project: log decryption failure (key rotation) with project slug
* [F054] learnings index: enforce shareable on every shared retrieval path (private-leak fix)
* [F055] messaging: recover from concurrent channel auto-create race via savepoint + re-fetch
* [F056] messaging: lock group row before session check-then-create to prevent active-session orphan race
* [F057] playbook: index/unindex as a post-commit step so the RAG corpus never leads the status transaction
* [F058] release-readiness: non-empty bump plan on first release
_canonical_bump_files derived the bump set from the previous
chore(release): commit. On the first release there is no such commit,
so it returned [] -> assess set version_bump_plan=[] -> the executor
published a tag with no files bumped (a no-op masquerading as X.Y.Z).
Fall back to the version-reference scan when no prior release commit
exists: the files currently embedding the version are exactly the set a
first release must bump, and the set the first release commit then
records as canonical for subsequent releases. Read-only derivation; the
CEO-approval gate and fail-closed executor are untouched.
* [F059] self-heal: hold fix tasks for CEO Approve-&-Start (restore dispatch gate)
The module docstring promised self-heal fix tasks 'wait for the CEO's
Approve-&-Start', but _originate created them confirmed_by_human=True and the
orchestrator dispatched them at once — a self-heal fix that re-broke CI would
trigger another cycle, open another auto-dispatched fix, and loop with no CEO
gate on dispatch.
Restore the documented gate:
* _originate opens the task confirmed_by_human=False (held for the CEO).
* The orchestrator holds a self-heal task out of both the PM and dev dispatch
paths until confirmed_by_human flips True.
* approve_and_start (the CEO's start gate) sets confirmed_by_human=True so the
held task finally dispatches (idempotent for board/intake tasks already True).
* list_pending_for_agent scopes the give_me_work hold to self-heal
(source != self_heal OR confirmed_by_human) so an already-alive PM can't grab
it pre-approval — while ordinary delegated subtasks (confirmed_by_human=False
by default, where the delegation IS the authorization) still dispatch.
The 'never self-deploys' guarantee (no merge) is unchanged.
* [F059] fix DB-integration test auth + retype self-heal root code→planning
conftest test-DB defaults matched the project's own running postgres
(roboco/roboco @ localhost:15432, the docker-compose roboco-postgres
service with CREATEDB) instead of the OS user on localhost:5432 which has
no such role — every db_session test failed with InvalidPasswordError
instead of running.
Once the DB connection worked, the self-heal origination DB test went RED
with MAIN_PM_NO_CODE: the self-heal root was task_type=CODE owned by
main_pm, the combo the main_pm_cannot_own_code guard rejects. The Main PM
coordinates the fix (delegates the code work to a cell dev); it has no
code verb. Retyped CODE→PLANNING and rewrote description/AC to
coordination-level.
* [F060] emit reversal audit row on claim-branch-failure rollback
The forward task.claimed audit row is flushed before the branch-creation
attempt, and AuditService commits on its own connection, so the rollback's
flush reverts the task row but not that audit row — the journey's last
event stayed task.claimed while the task reverted to its pre-claim status,
diverging from real state and corrupting downstream cycle-time/bottleneck
metrics. The rollback now emits a CLAIMED->original reversal audit row
(only when the forward transition was made) attributed to the claimant.
* Removing completely unnecessary files (for the repo they are unnecessary)
* [F061] audit status-transition rows now written in-session (F061/F073/F075)
_emit_status_transition_audit now writes AuditLogTable rows into
self.session synchronously (session.add) instead of dispatching
AuditService.log_task_event fire-and-forget on its own connection.
The audit row now commits/rolls back atomically with the status
transition in the caller's transaction, closing three facets at once:
- F061: audit commit no longer decoupled from the transition commit
- F073: a committed transition can no longer have NO audit row
(the row rides the same transaction; a swallowed persist can't drop it)
- F075: a transition rolled back inside a verb savepoint no longer
leaves a phantom audit row (the row is in the savepoint too)
log_task_event is now called only from this helper (narrow blast
radius verified); revision_count increment stays at this single
chokepoint. Cycle-time/bottleneck reconstruction from task.<status>
events is no longer silently corruptible.
Tests: test_emit_status_transition_audit_writes_in_session_atomically,
test_finalize_claim_rollback_emits_reversal_audit, escalation-audit
tests retargeted to in-session AuditLogTable rows.
Also: _canonical_bump_files grep-looseness follow-on (F058) -- filter
by subject, not body; git log --grep matches any message line, so a
non-release commit whose body references chore(release): shadowed the
real release commit. Test
test_canonical_bump_files_ignores_body_only_chore_release_match.
* [F061] drop type:ignore from audit-emit tests
Convention: no type:ignore/noqa. The F061 in-session audit-emit
tests used '# type: ignore[assignment]' to assign a MagicMock to
AsyncSession.add, and the F060 test assigned to .flush the same way.
Rewritten to hold a local 'session: MagicMock' variable (mypy sees
its auto-children as MagicMock, so .add.side_effect / .flush assign
cleanly with no suppression). Verified via 'mypy tests/' that both
files are now type-clean (the F060/F061 commits had skipped tests/
in mypy, masking two method-assign errors).
* [chore] clear all 64 pre-existing mypy errors in tests/ (no type:ignore)
Convention: no type:ignore/noqa, and pre-existing violations still
violate. The make-quality gate runs 'mypy roboco/ tests/', but the
prior commits' gates only ran mypy on production files, masking 64
type errors across 15 test files (method-assign, unused-ignore,
no-untyped-def, attr-defined, union-attr, has-type, index, misc).
Fixed without any type:ignore:
- method-assign (svc.session.X = / svc.method = AsyncMock()): hold a
local 'session: MagicMock'/'AsyncMock' and assert on it, or stub via
object.__setattr__ / monkeypatch / a typed '_bind' helper returning
Any, or alias 'cc: Any = c' (the pattern the file already used).
- unused 'type: ignore[assignment]' (real code was method-assign):
removed; replaced with the no-suppression patterns above.
- 'Callable[...] has no attribute assert_*': keep a typed local ref to
the AsyncMock and assert on the local, not the method-typed attr.
- no-untyped-def: annotate helper params (Any / pytest.MonkeyPatch).
- attr-defined / index / union-attr: type the helper as Any, narrow
with an 'is not None' assert, or add the missing attr to a fake.
- has-type / return-value: fix the declared return type to the tuple
the function actually returns.
- PLC0415 inline imports: hoisted to top-level.
test_pr_gate_notifies_pm._stub_gate_path converted fully to the
'cc: Any = c' alias (it already used it for one attr) so its five
'# type: ignore[method-assign]' suppressions are gone.
mypy tests/: 64 errors -> 0 (538 files). ruff check tests/: clean.
All 84 tests in the touched files pass.
* [chore] remove all remaining type:ignore suppressions from tests/
Converts 115 `# type: ignore[...]` suppressions across 23 test files to
no-suppression patterns (helper-return widening to Any, local Any aliases,
cc:Any aliases, cast at narrow call sites, typed fixtures) so the hard
no-type:ignore convention holds across tests/. No test logic or assertions
changed — only mock-wiring mechanics and type annotations.
Gate: ruff check tests/ clean; mypy tests/ (538 files) clean; 176 changed-file
tests pass. Zero real suppressions remain (the 7 grep hits are 3 hygiene-
checker string-literal test inputs and 4 prose mentions in comments).
* [F062] work_session.merge_pr: idempotency + active-status guard
merge_pr unconditionally set pr_status=merged, pr_merged_at, merged_by,
status=COMPLETED on whatever session it loaded — the only session-terminal
transition in WorkSessionService lacking both the active-status guard
(complete/abandon) and the terminal-idempotency guard (close). Two failure
modes: (1) a retried merge after a successful-but-unconfirmed GitHub merge
overwrote merged_by/pr_merged_at with the retry's actor/timestamp, corrupting
the merge audit trail; (2) merge_pr on an ABANDONED session resurrected it to
COMPLETED, undoing the single-active abandonment. Mirrors close()'s guard:
if status != ACTIVE, return the session unchanged. Both git.py callers await
merge_pr and discard the return, so the no-op is safe. TDD: 3 tests
(happy-path + both modes).
* [F063] workspace._clone_repo: rmtree half-configured clone on failure
If _configure_git raised CalledProcessError before its `remote set-url`
scrub, .git/config kept the tokenized auth URL (the project PAT) and
_assert_no_pat_leak never ran. The except clauses raised WorkspaceError
without removing the workspace, so the next ensure_workspace's health
short-circuit (valid .git with HEAD + objects) skipped past the leak —
mounting the agent on a workspace whose .git/config let it read+exfiltrate
the PAT. Both clone-failure except clauses now rmtree the workspace before
raising, so a half-configured clone is destroyed and ensure_workspace
re-clones from scratch. TDD: 2 tests (configure-failure leak + timeout).
* [F067] flow_main_pm: add missing /triage route
main_pm's manifest advertises triage (lifecycle.intents_for_role(MAIN_PM)
includes it via _PM_ROLES, alongside triage_all) but flow_main_pm.py had no
POST /triage route, so a main_pm agent calling triage hit a raw 404 that
bypassed the per-verb circuit breaker. Added the route mirroring flow_cell_pm's
/triage — wires to the existing team-scoped choreographer.triage (uses pm.team,
works for any PM role; Main PM gets its own team's blocked/awaiting tasks).
Fix direction: add-route, NOT remove-from-manifest — the manifest is spec-correct
(intents_for_role by construction); removing triage would contradict the spec
and leave main_pm with only cross-team triage_all. TDD: test_triage_route_exists_and_dispatches.
* [F068][F069] mcp servers: classify all rejection shapes + envelope 404s
F068: the do/flow-server circuit breaker only counted rejections whose
`error` field was a STRING in _CIRCUIT_REJECTION_KINDS. A 422 validation
failure (no `error` field, a `detail` list) and a 500/HTTPException
(dict-shaped `error` from the exception handlers) both bypassed the breaker
→ unbounded retries on a storm of either. Added _classify_rejection(payload)
(shared, applied to both servers) mapping all three shapes to a counted kind:
string error (existing), dict error → substring-mapped code
(*DENIED*/*AUTHORIZED*/*FORBIDDEN*/*PERMISSION*→not_authorized,
INVALID_INPUT/*VALIDATION*→incomplete_input, *NOT_FOUND*→None parity, else
→invalid_state), 422 detail→incomplete_input. The dict TypeError defence lives
in the classifier (isinstance, never dict-in-frozenset).
F069: a manifest-registered verb whose HTTP route is missing got FastAPI's raw
`{"detail":"Not Found"}` 404 body — a non-envelope payload the breaker
couldn't classify, so a storm bypassed it. _post now synthesizes an
invalid_state Envelope rejection (with a remediate hint → i_am_blocked/i_am_idle)
for a 404 status, routed through _record_and_check_circuit so the breaker counts
it. A 404 that carries a real Envelope (error field present) is surfaced as-is,
preserving test_flow_post_returns_envelope_on_404. TDD: 422/dict/404 tests in
both server test files; updated test_dict_shaped_error_does_not_crash to assert
the SDK is now called with not_authorized (replacing the pass-through assertion
that encoded the bug).
* [F064][F065][F066] websocket: non-blocking fan-out, finally-disconnect, idle timeout
F064: the bridge forwarder awaited every conn.send_text in a gather with no
per-connection queue and no send timeout — one slow WS client back-pressured
ALL event delivery to ALL clients (head-of-line blocking on the listen loop).
Each connect_* now registers a _ClientConnection (bounded asyncio.Queue(256) +
sender task); broadcasts enqueue via put_nowait (drop + structlog warn on
QueueFull) and return immediately. The sender drains the queue with each send
wrapped in wait_for(SEND_TIMEOUT=10s). Unregistered legacy sockets (set
directly into a subscription set, bypassing connect_*) get a timeout-bounded
fallback send task held in _pending_sends (ruff RUF006). disconnect cancels +
drops the sender.
F065: route handlers caught only WebSocketDisconnect with no finally — a
non-clean exit (anyio closed-resource, CancelledError, transport error)
propagated without manager.disconnect, leaking the dead socket into every
subscription set forever. Added finally: manager.disconnect(websocket) to all
5 handlers (disconnect is idempotent).
F066: no server-side heartbeat/idle timeout — a half-open socket from a dead
container blocked receive_text forever and was never reaped. receive_text now
wraps in wait_for(IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=90s); on TimeoutError, log + fall
through to the F065 finally. Named module constants (no config.py precedent for
WS tuning; callers/tests patch them).
TDD: 22 new tests across 3 files (handler cleanup, idle timeout, send queue),
non-flaky across repeats; 1 existing test adapted with a yield for the new
async fan-out (assertion unchanged). ruff/mypy clean, 421 unit/api tests pass.
No type:ignore/noqa.
* [F022][F023][F024][F025][F026] api: scrub secrets from 422 log, gate a2a/dashboard/orchestrator routes, SSE session-per-query
- middleware: redact known credential fields (git_token/api_key/token/...)
from the 422 request-validation log line; response body unchanged
- a2a: require_any_authenticated_agent on /message/send + /message/stream;
subscribe_to_task opens a short-lived session per poll instead of holding
one asyncpg connection for the full SSE lifetime (pool exhaustion) + auth
- dashboard: gate auditor flag/report mutating routes to Auditor or CEO
- orchestrator: router-level CEO gate on all control routes (spawn/stop/...)
TDD; ruff/mypy clean; 449 unit/api tests green; no type:ignore/noqa.
* [F030] conventions: typescript-scoped custom rules now apply to .tsx files
The validator tags a .tsx file as language 'tsx' (the JSX grammar needs
that tag, distinct from plain 'typescript'), but a custom rule scoped to
'typescript' — the language the scan reports for a React+TS repo — silently
skipped every .tsx file. The two suffix maps were NOT unified: the 'tsx'
tag is load-bearing (grammars.py picks the JSX grammar on it; hygiene.py
keys on it), so unifying would make .tsx fail to parse.
Fix is in check_custom: a one-directional dialect map _DIALECT_OF =
{'tsx': 'typescript'} — a typescript-scoped rule fires on a .tsx file,
but a tsx-scoped (JSX-only) rule still does not fire on plain .ts.
TDD; ruff/mypy clean; 80 unit + 38 integration conventions tests green.
* [F029] websocket: remove broken /api/permissions/check loopback from channel stream
channel_stream called validate_channel_access, which HTTP-loopbacked to
GET /api/permissions/check — a route that does not exist. Every call 404'd
-> False -> the channel stream closed with WS_1008_POLICY_VIOLATION for
EVERY client, so the real-time channel stream was dead. Removed the
function, its call site, and the now-unused httpx + settings imports.
Post-F004 the panel-token gate is the channel-stream authorization (the
CEO panel is the sole WS client and may view every channel), so the
broken loopback is removed rather than replaced with an in-process check
the CEO always passes. The legitimate enforcement.validate_channel_access
(slugs, in-process static ACL) is a different function and is untouched.
F027 is resolved-by-F004 (no code change): all three per-agent streams
gate on _require_panel_token first, so only the authorized CEO panel can
connect — 'any viewer subscribes to any target' is closed.
TDD; ruff/mypy clean; 530 unit/api+enforcement+RBAC tests green.
* [F078] release_executor: deadline every subprocess (git/make/gh/clone)
A hung git/make/gh/clone would block the CEO-gated release loop
indefinitely. Wrap each proc.communicate() in asyncio.wait_for via a
shared _await_proc helper; on expiry proc.kill() the child and return a
non-zero rc (124) so every caller's fail-closed branch fires. Mirrors the
quality-gate _run_one kill-on-timeout idiom.
Deadlines are generous (30min gate / 10min clone / 5min push+gh) so a
legitimate slow op is never wrongly aborted — floor-assertion tests pin
the floors to guard exactly that logical regression. Green path returns
the real rc unchanged.
* [F072] reaper: deadline docker inspect/exec + harden _check_health sweep
A hung Docker daemon (or a stuck container FS) froze the single asyncio
event loop: the reaper runs inline before every dispatch tick and shares
that loop with every background sweeper. Bound each docker subprocess
with asyncio.wait_for; on expiry proc.kill() the child and either raise
(inspect / resolve_container_id — callers apply their own fail-direction)
or return None (the gateway probe — inconclusive, caller declines to act,
matching its existing probe-failure contract). Deadlines generous
(10s inspect / 30s exec) so a legitimate slow docker call is never
wrongly aborted; floor-assertion tests pin the floors.
Also harden _check_health's per-agent loop so one agent's hung inspect
skips that agent, not the whole sweep — preserving the check-all-agents
invariant the timeout-then-raise would otherwise break (without this, a
hung daemon means no agent gets health-checked any tick).
* [F076] say/dm: handler guard rejects all 4 no-comms roles, not just auditor
The say()/dm() defence-in-depth guard only rejected auditor, but CLAUDE.md
mandates the same no-agent-comms invariant for pr_reviewer (posts findings
on the PR), prompter and secretary (human-only, note + evidence). For those
three the manifest was the only gate, so a call bypassing the manifest
(direct API POST, test harness, future routing change) would not be refused
at the handler — admission depended on the agent's slug happening to be
absent from the channel/a2a matrix. Extend the guard to a _NO_COMMS_ROLES
frozenset (auditor + pr_reviewer + prompter + secretary), matching the
explicit role-frozenset gates on commit/notify/pitch/playbook/open_session.
Role-appropriate remediation per role. The claimed defence-in-depth now
covers 4 of 4 silent roles, not 1 of 4.
* [F070] drain fire-and-forget _bg_tasks on shutdown (bounded, data-preserving)
Orchestrator.stop() cancelled only the named loop tasks + agents, then
returned, abandoning in-flight _schedule_bg work. An in-flight
_persist_respawn_record upsert dropped at shutdown meant the last few
gate-mutation strikes never reached the DB; restore_respawn_tracker() on
the next start repopulated a stale lower count and the dispatcher re-burned
the full 4-spawn strike threshold against a still-wedged task — the exact
re-burn the durable tracker exists to stop. Audit-log writes (load-bearing
for cycle-time/rework metrics) were similarly dropped.
Add _drain_bg_tasks(): bounded wait (5s default) lets short DB writes
commit before exit (data preserved), then cancels any stuck task past the
deadline so a hang can't wedge shutdown. return_exceptions=True so one
failing bg task doesn't crash the drain. Wrap the stop_agent loop in
try/except + logger.exception so one bad agent can't skip the drain
(re-introducing the data-loss tail). Floor test pins the deadline >= 3s
so a too-short change can't silently drop a legitimate slow write.
* [F071] abort non-blocking intake/secretary spawn on mid-spawn shutdown
The non-blocking spawn (start_intake_session / start_secretary_session)
schedules _spawn_intake_container_guarded / _spawn_secretary_container_guarded
via _schedule_bg. Those run docker run and only register in _instances at the
END. If shutdown arrived between docker run and the registration line, the
container was started but the orchestrator had no handle — stop() iterates
only _instances, so the container was orphaned (leaked, manual docker rm).
Worse, the F070 drain could let the spawn coroutine complete the
registration AFTER stop() already iterated _instances, landing a live
container into a shutting-down registry nothing tears down.
Add a post-docker-run shutdown guard in _spawn_intake_container and
_spawn_secretary_container: re-check self._running after _run_container_cmd
returns; if the orchestrator began shutting down, remove the just-started
container (by its deterministic name) and raise _SpawnAbortedDuringShutdown
WITHOUT registering. The guarded wrappers catch that BEFORE except Exception
and close the live relay silently (shutdown is not a user-facing failure,
no error pushed to the SSE stream). The F070 stop() drain awaits the bg
spawn coroutine, so the abort surfaces cleanly.
TOCTOU-safe: between the _running check and the _instances assignment there
is no await (config + instance construction are sync), so once the check
passes, registration completes before the event loop can interleave stop().
The normal running path is unchanged (sanity tests pin it).
* [F074] per-agent advisory lock closes claim TOCTOU
_run_claim_guards read the agent's other tasks via unlocked SELECTs
before claim() took its row lock, and claim()'s FOR UPDATE locked only
the TARGET row — so two concurrent i_will_work_on by the SAME agent on
TWO DIFFERENT pending tasks each locked their own row, each read an
empty in_progress set, each passed already_active, each claimed+started
→ the agent ended with two in_progress tasks (the in-process asyncio
Lock is lost on orchestrator-restart split-brain, so it wasn't a
DB-level guarantee).
Fix: TaskService.acquire_claim_lock takes a transaction-scoped
pg_advisory_xact_lock keyed by hashtextextended(agent_id). The gate
acquires it BEFORE the guard reads (for non-coordinator roles only) so
the second concurrent claim's read sees the first's committed
in_progress task and is rejected. Tx-scoped → auto-releases on
commit/rollback, can't outlive the request.
Coordinator exemption (the key logical-regression guard): cell_pm /
main_pm do NOT take the lock — the PM coordinator concurrency feature
lets a PM plan+delegate many roots in parallel, and a per-agent lock
would serialize those claims and regress it. Matches the existing
_COORDINATOR_ROLES already_active/paused guard exemption. A hash
collision only causes benign false serialization, never a false
negative.
Tests: unit (dev acquires lock before guard read; coordinator does
not) + real-PG integration (same-agent serializes, different-agent
does not, releases on rollback).
* [F021] handle SSE transport errors so the intake composer isn't stuck
openStream registered listeners for the server-sent event kinds but not
the EventSource's own transport-level error. The 'error' kind IS in
LIVE_EVENT_KINDS, so a server-sent event:error (JSON MessageEvent) was
handled — but a dropped connection / dead session fires a plain Event
with NO data, which JSON.parse(undefined) swallowed in the try/catch,
so the stream 'stayed open' (EventSource loop-reconnected a session that
no longer existed) and isSending stayed true — the composer was
permanently disabled.
Fix: route the 'error' event by payload. A MessageEvent with string
data is a server-sent error → handleEvent (unchanged). A no-data Event
is a transport error → handleTransportError: clear streamingId/activity,
set isSending false, add a 'connection lost' error message, keep a
draft/batch preview up (so the human can still act on a proposed card)
else land on 'chatting', and close the dead stream so EventSource stops
loop-reconnecting.
Tests: renderHook + a jsdom EventSource double that fires a transport
error (plain Event, no data) vs a server-sent error (MessageEvent +
JSON). RED: transport error left isSending true; GREEN: resets to
false, surfaces the message, closes the stream. The server-sent-JSON
path is unchanged. Full panel suite (129) green; eslint/typecheck/prettier clean.
* [F081] Approve dialog: label notes required (>=20 chars), not optional
The CEO Approve dialog's notes label fell into the default branch
('Notes (optional') for the approve action, but approve actually
requires substantive notes >= 20 chars — enforced client-side
(toast error on < 20) and server-side. So the CEO was told 'optional'
and only learned the real requirement from a toast after hitting
submit with empty notes.
approve and start both require >= 20 chars; reject only requires a
reason. Collapse the label to two branches: reject -> 'Reason for
rejection (required)'; everything else (approve + start) ->
'Approval notes (required, >= 20 characters)'. The approve
placeholder now also signals intent ('Why this is ready to ship...').
Tests: render the queue, click Approve, assert the notes label says
'required' + '20' and does NOT say 'optional'. RED: label read
'Notes (optional)'; GREEN: 'Approval notes (required, >= 20
characters)'. eslint/typecheck/prettier clean.
* [F082] surface release-proposal query failures instead of silent hide
The card collapsed any non-404 backend failure (500 / network drop) onto
`!proposal` and returned null, so the CEO had no idea the release-proposal
endpoint was unreachable. Distinguish the cases: isError + a Retry affordance
vs the 404 null empty state that stays hidden. Mirrors PrReviewQueue.
* [F083] clear stale usage snapshot when /ws/system leaves connected
The hook synced wsState into the store but never dropped usageData when the
stream dropped, so on reconnect wsState flipped to "connected" before any
fresh USAGE_SNAPSHOT arrived and UsageOverviewPanel rendered the prior
session's totals/cost as if they were live. Clear usageData whenever state
leaves "connected" so the panel falls back to the polling summary until a
new snapshot lands. Connected->connected is a no-op clear skip.
* [F084] scope per-control disable to the in-flight mutation, not all
FeatureFlagsCard disabled every switch while any one flag toggle was pending,
and PlaybookReviewQueue disabled every row's Approve while any one approve was
pending — so the operator couldn't act on an independent control during a
slow round-trip. Gate the disable on the in-flight mutation's variables
(matching key / id) so only the control being mutated locks; the others stay
usable. The same-flag double-tap protection is preserved.
* [F085] reject submitting both project_id and product_id
validate() only checked 'at least one of project/product', so the dialog let
both be submitted together. The server silently lets product_id win at routing
and drops project_id, recording a misleading, never-used repo. Add a validator
that refuses the ambiguous submit with a clear error. The at-least-one rule and
the single-pick submit paths are unchanged.
* [F020] kanban: confirm admin-override drags that skip lifecycle preconditions
A drag on the operator kanban routes the status move through the admin
status-override, which bypasses the in-band lifecycle validator entirely.
That override is intentional (it's how an operator recovers a wedged task)
but it also let a careless drag skip material preconditions silently —
completing a task with no open PR, QA-bypassing, finishing docs on a task
whose docs aren't complete.
Leave the override intact but make the bypass explicit: compute the
preconditions the dragged move would skip (open PR, docs complete,
self-verified + commits + progress for submit-qa, visible non-terminal
subtasks for coordination-root targets) and, when any are skipped, hold the
move behind a confirmation dialog that lists exactly what's being skipped.
Precision over recall — only warn on what the panel can verify from the
task and its in-list children; never fabricate a 'satisfied' claim, and
stay silent on benign transitions that gate on nothing we can check.
The admin status-override capability is preserved (Confirm still fires it);
this only surfaces the bypass instead of letting it happen silently. Does
not touch the master-merge invariant — the board's updateTask is the
operator override, not the Main-PM merge path.
* [F086] prompter: restore parked cell content on project toggle off/on
rebuildCellWork appended a blank {summary:'', items:[]} entry for a newly-
selected cell, so toggling a cell's project OFF then back ON in the MegaTask
review card discarded the agent-authored per-cell summary/items — the entry
was dropped on toggle-off and re-added blank on toggle-on.
Park each draft's last per-cell content in client-only BatchProposal state
(parkedCellWork, keyed by draft index — never sent to the backend; confirm
ships only title/drafts/project_ids/route, and it ride-alongs into the
localStorage persist slice so the restore survives a reload mid-review).
rebuildCellWork gains an optional priorByCell map: a re-added cell with no
live entry restores its parked summary/items (with the new project_id) in-
stead of blanking; a live entry still wins over a stale parked copy so an
in-place edit is never regressed. parkCellWork is the pure merge seam
(prevParked seeds, live work overwrites) the setBatchDraftProjects updater
calls — kept pure so the updater stays a thin caller.
Tests: rebuildCellWork restore/blank-fallback/live-wins + parkCellWork
retain/overwrite/merge (6 new), 19 GREEN. eslint/typecheck/prettier clean.
No wire-payload change, no regression to the fill/drop/one-repo-per-cell
invariants.
* Updated domain
* [F087,F088] enforce panel token on live-chat bridges (Phase 5)
Add a CEO-bound, header-token-only gate (require_panel_token) at the route
level of the prompter_live + secretary_live bridges, which were the only
panel-facing API surface that ran unauthenticated. It mirrors the WS
_require_panel_token and _check_agent_auth_token contracts: in dev
(ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED unset) a missing token is allowed; a
presented-but-forged token is rejected even in dev; in prod nginx already
injects the CEO-signed X-Agent-Token on /api/ for GET + POST, so the SSE
stream (EventSource can't set headers) and the POSTs are now checked instead
of anonymous. Applied to start/stream/status/messages/stop on both routers;
preview_live_batch switched from CurrentAgentContext+noqa to the route-level
gate (genuinely auth-only). confirm/confirm-batch/re-interview keep
CurrentAgentContext (they use agent.identity). The container->relay /events
callback is intentionally left ungated (internal Docker network, opaque
session id) — gated by a test sentinel so Option B (spawn+SDK token wiring)
is a deliberate future decision. No panel/nginx/spawn/SDK changes; master
merge invariant untouched. 22 new TDD auth tests, 492 api tests green.
* [F089] honest WorkSession agent_id nullability across the read path
The work_sessions.agent_id column is nullable=True with ondelete=SET
NULL — deleting an agent nulls the FK on every session it ever held. The
ORM annotation lied (Mapped[UUID] non-optional), the converter papered
over the lie (typing_cast to a non-optional UUID), and the response
model rejected None outright (WorkSessionResponse.agent_id: UUID). A
session whose agent had been deleted crashed the GET endpoint with a
pydantic ValidationError instead of serializing agent_id: null.
Make the read path honest end-to-end:
- WorkSessionTable.agent_id: Mapped[UUID | None] (matches the column).
- WorkSessionResponse.agent_id: UUID | None (serializes null, no crash).
- session_to_response passes agent_id via typing_cast('UUID | None', ...)
to bridge SQLAlchemy's UUID[Any] to stdlib uuid.UUID while preserving
None-ness (the cast stays for the same mypy-plugin reason every other
field uses one; it no longer narrows away None).
WorkSessionCreate.agent_id stays UUID — at create time the claiming
agent is always known. The unused WorkSession pydantic read model is
left as-is (never materialized from a DB row). task.py:_needs_revision_dev
already None-guards ws.agent_id via to_python_uuid (returns None -> skip).
* [F090] drop auditor from write_roles on main-pm-board / board-private
The auditor is a silent, read-only observer on every channel, but the
channel catalog (roboco/foundation/policy/communications.py) listed it
in write_roles for main-pm-board and board-private 'for parity' with the
legacy CHANNEL_ACCESS table, while the actual silent-observer rule was
enforced only at the say/dm guard (content_actions._NO_COMMS_ROLES) and
PermissionService.can_write_channel's auditor short-circuit.
That left the catalog-only enforcement path — the HTTP messaging route
(messages.py send_message -> validate_channel_access) — authorizing an
auditor write that both the say/dm guard and PermissionService would
have blocked. A reader of the catalog also believed the auditor could
post to those channels, which is false.
Fix: remove Role.AUDITOR from write_roles on both channels (main-pm
+ board remain writers; ceo remains a writer on board-private). The
auditor stays in read_roles, so its silent read is unchanged. silent_roles
is left empty (matches the announcements precedent: auditor reads via
read_roles, not the silent bucket) — the DB seed and silent_observers
field are untouched.
Logical-regression check: the auditor's read access on both channels
is byte-for-byte preserved (still in read_roles, so validate_channel_access
read returns True via the direct list); the legitimate writers (main-pm,
product-owner, head-marketing, ceo) are untouched; CHANNEL_ACCESS is
derived from the spec so the foundation/seed drift tests self-adjust;
PermissionService.can_write_channel already short-circuited auditor to
False everywhere, so no behavior change there; AUDITOR_SILENT_ACCESS is
unchanged (auditor not added to silent_roles -> no DB silent_observers
change -> no group-access behavior change); the say/dm _NO_COMMS_ROLES
guard is unchanged. Tests: 3 new in test_channel_access.py — auditor
write on main-pm-board/board-private now raises ChannelAccessDeniedError
(RED before: returned True), auditor read still True, main-pm/ceo still
write.
* [F091] warn at spawn time when host grok auth.json is missing
GrokCliProvider._append_grok_auth_mount silently skipped the mount when
the host ~/.grok/auth.json was absent. The spawn still succeeded (docker
run returned 0 — the container was created), so the operator had no
spawn-time signal that the agent was doomed: the entrypoint's
`python -m roboco.llm.providers.grok_auth --check` backstop then
refused to start (exit 78) and the failure only surfaced later via the
container's log markers.
Fix: emit a spawn-time WARNING (module logger) naming the missing file
and the remediation (`grok login` on the host, or set
ROBOCO_HOST_GROK_DIR) when the mount is skipped. The spawn outcome is
unchanged — the container still starts and the existing exit-78 -> park
flow (F041) still catches it — but the operator now sees the missing
credential immediately instead of diagnosing a later exit-78.
Logical-regression check: the mount-present path is byte-for-byte
unchanged (auth.json exists -> the -v bind is appended, no warning); the
spawn still succeeds when auth is absent (no raise — the existing
test_grok_spawn_omits_auth_mount_when_absent still passes: no mount, no
crash); the exit-78 entrypoint backstop and the orchestrator's
exit-78-park handling (F041) are untouched; a module-level logger adds no
side effects. Tests: new test_grok_spawn_warns_when_auth_absent uses
caplog to assert a WARNING mentioning auth.json + `grok login` is
emitted on a missing-credential spawn (RED before: no warning; GREEN
after). 102 grok tests green; ruff/mypy clean.
* [F092] decode JWT exp when refresh omits expires_in
xAI's refresh-token response sometimes omits expires_in. Without it the
new access token kept the stale pre-refresh expires_at, so is_valid /
--check forever rejected a fresh token — and the refresh loop re-rotated
the single-use refresh token every tick, killing the credential (F006).
The access token is a JWT whose exp is the authoritative expiry: decode it
when expires_in is absent. Fallback to the documented ~6h TTL + a structlog
warning when the JWT exp is unreadable, so a fresh token is treated as live
instead of stale.
* [F093] serialize concurrent live-chat spawns under a per-agent lock
The intake and secretary agent ids are each a single fixed id, so two
concurrent start_intake_session / start_secretary_session calls raced on
the container name (docker run --name roboco-agent-<id>) and the
_instances[<id>] write: both passed the reap-prior check before either
registered, both ran docker run, and the last _instances write won,
orphaning the other container + its relay.
Add _intake_spawn_lock / _secretary_spawn_lock (asyncio.Lock) and wrap the
_spawn_intake_container / _spawn_secretary_container bodies so the second
start waits for the first to fully register before its own reap-prior check
runs. Distinct from self._lock (which stop_agent takes) to avoid a
reentrancy deadlock: the spawn body holds the spawn lock then calls
stop_agent (acquires self._lock) — lock order is always spawn_lock ->
self._lock, never the reverse.
* [F094] add a persistent-probe-failure escape hatch to provider parking
_on_probe_failure only incremented the failure counter and, at 10 failures,
sent a one-shot CEO notification. It never cleared the tracker, never gave
up, never fell back to time-expiry. _do_probe returns False for any non-2xx
AND any httpx error, so a permanently unreachable probe endpoint (removed
API key, network partition to the probe host, misconfigured base URL) kept
the provider parked forever — every agent on it gated by
_provider_spawn_parked, their tasks reaped to pending but the spawn gate
queuing every spawn, sitting pending forever. The only recovery was the
operator manually clearing the Redis key.
Past _PROBE_GIVE_UP_THRESHOLD (30) persistent failures, fall back to the
same time-expiry optimism the unprobeable-provider path uses (_do_probe
returns True when there is no probe URL): clear the park and resume parked
agents. If the provider is genuinely still down the real workload attempts
re-park via the 429/5xx path, so this is bounded burn — strictly better
than a silent forever-strand. Kept above the CEO-notify threshold (10) so
the operator still gets the notification first.
* [F095] orchestrator: parked-provider spawn short-circuits before expensive prepare
spawn_agent ran the full _prepare_agent_spawn (writes blueprint/settings/
briefing/MCP files, ensures the image, registers a STARTING instance) every
dispatcher tick only to bail at the after-prepare parked-provider check —
wasting all that file I/O while the provider stayed parked and leaving a
STARTING instance registered then downgraded to OFFLINE.
Move the parked check before _prepare_agent_spawn: resolve the route cheaply
via _resolve_agent_route (only provider_type is needed) and bail with a
minimal unregistered OFFLINE instance. The existing-running check stays
first (inside the lock) so a live agent is never replaced; a TOCTOU
re-check guards the unlocked window before prepare; the after-prepare
check is kept as a rare-race defense (a park landing during prepare).
* [F096] orchestrator: serialize fire-and-forget respawn persists per commit order
_persist_respawn_record is fire-and-forget per gate mutation; a respawn loop
fires count 1->2->3->4 in quick succession, scheduling one persist per
increment for the same (agent_slug, task_id). The ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE upsert
is row-level race-free, but the fire-and-forget tasks can still COMMIT out of
order: a slow stale persist (count=2) scheduled first can resolve AFTER a fast
fresh one (count=4) scheduled second, leaving the durable row at the stale low
count and re-burning the strike threshold on restart.
Fix: acquire self._respawn_persist_lock (new asyncio.Lock) as the FIRST await
in _persist_respawn_record, so acquisition order = task creation order (FIFO
ready queue) = logical schedule order, and commits land in that order. The
durable row always ends at the latest logical value. The lock lives in the bg
task, so the dispatcher hot path never blocks; persists are best-effort and
a slow one queuing the rest just delays the durable catch-up (in-memory record
stays authoritative).
* [F097] orchestrator: back off grok re-park retry_after within a rate-limit episode
_probe_target returns (None, {}) for grok — the grok CLI's xAI endpoint is
closed and the SuperGrok OIDC access token is not a valid bearer for the metered
api.x.ai, so a real probe would either no-op or strand grok parked forever.
_do_probe treats url-is-None as success (time-expiry optimism), so once the
60s retry_after passes the probe loop optimistically clears the grok park, a
cleared park dispatches a fresh grok agent that hits the still-active xAI 429,
exits 75, and re-parks — a flat ~90s crash-retry cycle for the whole xAI
rate-limit window (each cycle costs container startup + a rejected grok call).
Fix: track _grok_repark_count + _grok_last_park_at in _park_grok_rate_limited
and back the re-park retry_after off exponentially within one episode
(60 -> 120 -> 240 -> ... capped at 2**4 = ~16min cycle) so the churn dampens. A
gap past _GROK_REPARK_EPISODE_GAP_S (25min, > the capped cycle) means no re-park
for that long => the rate limit actually lifted => a fresh episode resets the
count to the base 60s, so recovery latency isn't penalized across episodes.
The first park in a fresh episode is unchanged at 60s.
* [F098] orchestrator: keep waiting record through a re-park during probe-success resume
resolve_wait deleted the waiting record (in-memory + durable) BEFORE calling
spawn_agent. A re-park in the window between the probe-success clear and the
spawn — the provider's rate limit lifts then immediately re-limits, or a second
provider limit lands — bails spawn with an OFFLINE instance (the parked-provider
short-circuit). Deleting the record first orphaned the agent: with no record
the probe-resume loop can never revive it and the spawn gate bails every tick,
so the agent is lost until the operator intervenes.
Fix: spawn first, then tear down the record only once a container actually
launched (instance.state == ACTIVE). On an OFFLINE bail the record stays so the
next probe-success re-attempts the resume. On a spawn EXCEPTION the record is
torn down + re-raised so the probe loop doesn't keep re-resuming a task that
moved to a different state (e.g. readiness refused -> task auto-blocked) —
matching the pre-fix behavior where the record was deleted before the spawn.
* [F099] wire pr_pass/pr_fail self_review block in the spec gate
The pr_pass/pr_fail ActionSpecs carry self_review_block=True, but
_gate_preflight never populated Context.original_developer_slug, and
actor_slug was read off agent.slug — which GatewayAgentView does not
carry, so it was always None in production. The block was structurally
dormant: a reviewer who was also the original developer of the
assembled PR could pass (or fail) their own work. The service-layer
_validate_not_self_review backstop only covers qa/documenter, not
pr_reviewer, so the spec gate is the only defense.
Set actor_slug=str(reviewer_agent_id) (GatewayAgentView has no slug,
so the UUID is the identity) and original_developer_slug from the
original_developer marker (a UUID stored as a string). Both resolve to
UUID strings, so the spec's string-equality comparison fires when the
reviewer IS the recorded original developer.
The marker is never set on assembled coordination tasks (only on
dev-leaf tasks at QA/doc claim), so the block stays dormant by design
in production — but the gate is now correctly wired to fire if the
marker were ever set to the reviewer. Zero production behavior change;
the dormant-in-production state is pinned by the no-marker test.
* [F100] atomic Redis probe-failure counter via server-side Lua
increment_probe_failures / reset_probe_failures did a non-atomic
get_state (GET) -> mutate -> set (SET) in Python. A concurrent
activate() re-park writes a FRESH episode blob (probe_failures: 0 +
fresh activated_at / retry_after / affected_agents / kind); if the
stale increment's SET landed after the fresh activate's SET, the stale
blob overwrote the fresh episode metadata AND un-reset the counter
(clobbering the new episode).
Redis single-threads a Lua EVAL, so a server-side read-modify-write
is indivisible: activate's SET is serialized entirely before or after
the script, never interleaved between the script's GET and SET. The
two scripts mutate ONLY probe_failures, so every other episode field
survives the bump. activate stays a single atomic SET (a fresh episode
resetting the counter to 0 is correct semantics).
* [F101] enforce PR-open state gate on gateway open_pr (parity with HTTP path)
* [F102] make project_id mandatory on pr_target (close cross-repo pr_number collision)
* [F103] make project_id mandatory on close_pull_request (close cross-repo collision)
* [F104] fail-closed on conventions resolution errors (block gate no longer silently disabled)
* [F106] compound (timestamp, id) keyset cursor for message pagination
get_messages used strict timestamp inequalities with a non-deterministic
order_by(timestamp.desc()), so equal-timestamp messages were cut by limit
on one page and excluded (strict < T / > T) from the next — they vanished
across pages. Bundled the (timestamp, id) pair into a MessageCursor dataclass
so the next page resumes exactly past the cursor's id at the shared
timestamp (or_: strictly-older OR same-timestamp-smaller-id for before; the
mirror for after), with a deterministic order_by(timestamp.desc(), id.desc())
so the last-item cursor is unambiguous. id is None for a legacy timestamp-
only cursor (strict inequality, prior behavior). The route builds cursors
from the flat before/before_id + after/after_id HTTP params; the schema now
carries the tie-breaker ids. Also clears PLR0913 (cursors replace the
before_id/after_id params).
* [F107] defer Redis bus publish until DB commit (no phantom notifications)
deliver() and _persist_and_deliver() ran inside the caller's open
transaction: the notification row was flushed but not committed, yet
NOTIFICATION_SENT was published to the Redis bus immediately. A commit
failure (DB hiccup, constraint, asyncpg error) rolled the row back while
connected WebSocket clients had already received a push for an id that
no longer existed — a phantom notification (notify_get -> NotFoundError).
Added a deferred-publish (transactional-outbox) helper: defer_bus_publish
enqueues the event on session.info and registers one-shot after_commit /
after_rollback listeners on session.sync_session the first time it is
called for that session. On commit, the after_commit listener schedules
the async drain via asyncio.create_task on the running loop (the listener
fires synchronously inside await AsyncSession.commit, so the loop is
active); the task handles are stashed on the session so callers/tests can
await them. On rollback, after_rollback drops the pending queue — a
rolled-back txn emits nothing. deliver() now builds the per-recipient
events up front (data materialized to strings, so deferral is safe even
if the ORM object later expires) and defers each; the delivered_at DB
marker stays in-tx (rolls back with the row). The bus block stays
best-effort (try/except + log) so a bus-init failure never propagates or
rolls back the notification row — matching the prior inline semantics.
This fixes every deliver/_persist_and_deliver caller at once (the two
cited in F107 plus the orchestrator + task.py deliver sites), since they
all commit the session afterward (the deferred publish fires on that
commit; the row is durable by the time the event goes out).
* [F108] atomic replace_chunks: single-txn delete+insert closes reindex race
* [F109] playbook curation status guards: approve/reject draft-only, archive approved-only
* [F110] draft slug TOCTOU: catch IntegrityError on flush -> ConflictError (no 500)
* [F113] collapse WorkSession creation to the validated service path
_create_work_session_if_needed constructed WorkSessionTable directly,
duplicating WorkSessionService.create's validation (existing-active
check, single-active-per-task supersede, project/task existence). The
two sites had drifted. Route through WorkSessionService.create instead,
mapping ConflictError to the idempotent 'if needed' None. Remove the
now-dead _supersede_other_active_sessions (create's
supersede_active_sessions_for_task replaces it).
Fix three pre-existing RED tests surfaced by the sweep (all confirmed
failing on the F110 commit before this change):
- test_fail_qa_work_session_fallback_excludes_qa_session: inserted two
ACTIVE work_sessions per task, violating uq_work_sessions_one_active
_per_task (migration 047). The QA session is now ABANDONED — still in
the fallback query's result set (the query filters by task_id +
agent_id, not status), so the exclude filter (agent_id != qa_id) is
still exercised and the dev is resolved.
- test_ceo_reject_routes_coordination_task_to_main_pm /
test_ceo_reject_routes_batch_umbrella_to_main_pm: ceo_reject emits an
audit row keyed to CEO_AGENT_ID, but the tests never seeded the CEO
agent row (fk_audit_log_agent_id_agents). Seed the CEO agent (get-or-
create, mirroring test_ceo_reject_writes_handoff_journal).
* [F114] single-claimant guard on pr_gate_claim
pr_gate_claim delegated straight to _qa_or_doc_claim, which overwrites
claimed_by / active_claimant_id with no single-claimant check. Two
reviewers race-claiming the same awaiting_pr_review task would
last-write-wins overwrite the first claim, and the first reviewer's
subsequent pr_pass / pr_fail would actor-mismatch against the new owner
(wasting a review cycle). The orchestrator's gate dispatcher already
prevents double-reviewer-dispatch in normal flow (one task -> one team
-> one reviewer + is_agent_active + per-tick spawned set), so the race
is only reachable via direct concurrent API calls (defense-in-depth).
Add a role-aware single-claimant guard in pr_gate_claim: lock the row
FOR UPDATE (serialize concurrent claims, mirroring the dev claim path),
then refuse only when the task is already actively claimed by a
DIFFERENT PR-reviewer. The gate task is owned by the PM at entry
(submit_for_review does not clear ownership, unlike submit_for_qa), so
the guard must distinguish a PM/dev owner — which the first reviewer
legitimately overclaims — from a competing reviewer claim; checking the
existing claimant's role (pr_reviewer) does exactly that. A re-claim by
the same reviewer is idempotent (skipped by the != check). The gateway
claim_gate_review handler already maps a None return to a clean
invalid_state envelope ('it may already be claimed; give_me_work for
the next'), so no gateway change is needed.
TDD: 3 integration tests in test_task_service_basics.py — reject a second
reviewer race-claim (returns None, first claim intact), allow the first
reviewer when the PM owns the root (regression guard for the
PM-owns-at-entry model), idempotent re-claim by the same reviewer.
Confirmed the reject test RED first (race-claim succeeded, overwriting
reviewer1).
* [F115] sample monorepo per (repo,workflow)/(repo,command) not per repo
The CI-watch and dep-update loaders collapsed a monorepo's cell-projects
to one canonical entry per repo (slug-sorted-first), so a repo whose cells
each carry their OWN ci_watch_workflow / dep_update_command had only the
canonical cell's workflow/command sampled — a red on another cell's
workflow or drift on another cell's lockfile was missed (under-count).
Refactor the shared one-per-repo collapse into _projects_one_per_key, keyed
by repo identity for external-PR discovery (unchanged: one review per PR per
repo), by (repo, effective workflow) for CI-watch, and by (repo, command)
for dep-update. Each distinct workflow/command is now sampled once; the
engines' per-git_url fix-task dedup still prevents duplicate fix tasks for
the same repo. _projects_one_per_repo now delegates to _projects_one_per_key.
key_fn uses a string annotation (Callable lives under TYPE_CHECKING, like
the existing Coroutine/Iterable annotations at lines 4193/5279).
* [R115] originate ci_watch/dep_update fix tasks as PLANNING coordination roots
The Main-PM-code-impossibility guard (commit e202ce39, Thread 4 of this
audit) made team=MAIN_PM + task_type=CODE impossible — a Main PM coordinates,
it does not write code. But the ci_watch and dep_update engines still
originated their fix tasks as task_type=TaskType.CODE assigned to main-pm,
so task_svc.create raised MAIN_PM_NO_CODE and NO fix task was ever opened
— a regression introduced by the earlier audit fix (confirmed: the engine
tests pass at e202ce39~1 and fail at HEAD).
Mirror the hardened self_heal_engine precedent (self_heal_engine.py:197)
which already uses task_type=TaskType.PLANNING for its Main-PM coordination
root with an explicit 'decompose the fix and delegate the code work to a
cell dev — the Main PM does not write the fix itself' description. Both
engines now originate PLANNING coordination roots with matching delegation
guidance in the description + acceptance criteria. confirmed_by_human
stays True for both (they ride the normal delivery flow without the CEO
gate, unlike self-heal — intentional per the architecture).
The dedupe/open-cap queries (list_open_ci_watch_tasks /
list_open_dep_update_tasks) key on source + non-terminal status + git_url,
NOT task_type, so the type change does not break dedup (still one open fix
task per repo).
The two source-test fixtures (test_ci_watch_source / test_dep_update_source)
created CODE+MAIN_PM tasks directly to exercise the listing queries — same
guard violation; switched to PLANNING (the queries assert on source/status,
not task_type, so the fixture type matches the engines' corrected type).
* [F116] hold the read-clone lock across the dep-probe local clone
dry_upgrade_changes_lockfile called ensure_read_clone (which syncs the
read clone under the _meta-conventions lock then releases it) and ran
'git clone --local --no-hardlinks <read_clone>' OUTSIDE the lock. A
concurrent ensure_read_clone -> _sync_read_clone (fetch + hard-reset to
origin's default branch) could mutate the read clone's working tree /
object db mid-clone, racing the clone and producing an inconsistent or
failing probe.
Split _probe_lockfile_change into _clone_local_into (the local clone,
run under the read-clone lock) + _probe_lockfile_on_clone (the upgrade +
git status, run without the lock on the now-independent copy). The probe
acquires _ensure_lock_for(slug, '_meta-conventions') — the same lock
ensure_read_clone syncs under — and holds it only for the clone step; the
upgrade operates on the full --no-hardlinks copy and never touches the
read clone, so the lock is released before it to avoid blocking
conventions reads for the upgrade duration.
The tiny gap between ensure_read_clone releasing the lock and the probe
re-acquiring it is safe: any concurrent _sync_read_clone completes under
the lock before the probe acquires, so the clone reads a stable state.
* [F117] stop the orchestrator in lifespan shutdown BEFORE closing the DB
The lifespan shutdown closed OptimalService + the DB, and only THEN did
bootstrap's finally block call orchestrator.stop() — so stop() ran with
the DB already closed. stop() drains fire-and-forget _bg_tasks writes
(respawn_tracker upserts, audit-log rows) and stop_agent finalizes work
sessions / agent state, all needing the DB still open; closing it first
silently dropped those final writes (the durable PM-respawn counter's
last few strikes, the metrics-bearing audit trail tail).
Move orchestrator.stop() into the lifespan shutdown path, BEFORE
close_optimal_service + close_db, guarded by a new get_orchestrator_or_none()
safe accessor (no crash when no orchestrator is wired — tests,
skip_orchestrator). bootstrap's finally-block stop() becomes an idempotent
safety net: stop() gains a _stopped flag (getattr-guarded so __new__-
constructed test instances still stop) so the double-call is a clean no-op,
not a re-stop of already-stopped agents / re-drain of an empty bg set.
* [F118] coerce a lone-string where_to_look into a list
where_to_look is a list-typed handoff field like consequences/next_steps
but was the only one NOT in the _wrap_scalar_in_list field_validator. A
well-intentioned where_to_look='src/api/' 422'd at the route with no
remediation envelope, and the agent's retry loop tripped the do-server
circuit breaker — the exact failure mode the other list fields were
hardened against. Add it to the mode='before' validator so a lone string
is wrapped into a one-element list before type coercion.
* [F119] sender reaps dead sockets on send error instead of waiting for receive idle timeout
* [F120] release a stopped agent's claimed task immediately on budget-kill/shutdown
* [F122] name the already-open PR in submit_up's None-state remediate
submit_up's create_pr pre-side-effect opens the cell→root PR BEFORE
submit_for_review runs (its pr_created gate requires it — lifecycle.py:1338-1343).
When submit_for_review returns None (a concurrent state change raced the task
out of in_progress between the precondition gate and the composed action), the
old remediate ('check task state — must be in_progress with PR ready') hid
that the PR was already open on GitHub — an orphaned external artifact the PM
could not reconcile. Mirror submit_root's F016 None-envelope remediate: name
the open PR, point the PM at re-fetch + reconcile, and note create_pr is
idempotent so a re-issue re-attaches to the existing PR (no duplicate). Pure
message improvement — zero behavior change; reordering is off the table
(create_pr must precede the pr_created gate).
* [F124] re-check dependency state before releasing a dependency-blocked claim
The unmet_dependency guard read dependency state via an unlocked SELECT, then
fired release_dependency_blocked_claim (a state mutation: claimed/in_progress
-> pending, clears branch_name, abandons WorkSession) as a side-effect BEFORE
returning the rejection. An upstream dependency that reached a terminal state
(completed/cancelled) in the microseconds between the read and the release left
the task NEEDLESSLY released — its branch cleared + WorkSession abandoned +
assignee bounced, only to be re-dispatched + re-claimed when the dependency-
completion re-dispatch fired a moment later.
Re-check unmet_dependency_ids immediately before the release and skip it
(returning None — proceed) when the upstream just completed. Dependencies are
monotonic (unmet -> met only; terminal states never reopen), so a fresh read
that now finds them met stays met: safe to proceed without releasing. The
'still unmet' path is byte-for-byte the prior behavior (no regression). The
cross-task residual window (upstream completes between the re-check and the
release) is not closable by a row lock on the dependent, but the re-check
narrows the window from [first read -> release] to [re-check -> release], and
in the common case the first read already sees met (no guard fires). No
committed-work loss either way (a dependency-blocked task has none; the branch
ref + commits persist across the branch_name clear).
* [F125] serialize same-parent delegate via per-parent advisory lock
The delegate sibling-dedup guard read the parent's existing subtasks via an
unlocked get_subtasks SELECT (the dedup read) then created the subtask (the
write) with no DB serialization between them. Two concurrent delegate calls
for the same parent (PM re-delegating while a reaper re-dispatches, or two
orchestrator ticks racing) each read a duplicate-free sibling set, each passed
the dedup guard, and each created a subtask — the parent got the duplicate the
guard exists to prevent (the smoke-run runaway pattern).
Fix: a PostgreSQL transaction-scoped advisory lock keyed by the parent task
id (seed 1, disjoint from the per-agent claim lock's seed 0), acquired at the
top of the delegate body before the first get_subtasks read (the briefing
context read AND the dedup sibling read) and held through create_subtask's
flush + the outer request commit. The second concurrent same-parent delegate
blocks until the first commits, then its dedup read sees the committed
sibling and is rejected.
Per-PARENT (not per-agent): a coordinator PM legitimately delegates many
subtasks under one parent in quick succession and plans many roots in
parallel — a per-agent lock would serialize all of a PM's delegates and
regress the PM coordinator concurrency feature. The per-parent lock
serializes only same-parent delegates (the dedup invariant is per-parent)
and leaves different parents untouched.
TDD: red-first ordering test (lock acquired before first get_subtasks read
and before create_subtask) + no-regression test (create still runs).
* [F127] per-task advisory lock prevents open_pr milestone double-emit
open_pr's idempotent re-entry guard (pr_number is not None) read t.pr_number
from an unlocked fetch. Two concurrent same-task open_pr calls (the
alive-but-unresponsive respawn race) both fetched pr_number=None, both passed
the guard, both ran the runner (GitHub 422 ensures one PR), and both reached
_record_milestone_progress -> a double-emitted 70% 'opened PR #N' entry.
Fix: acquire_task_lock (pg_advisory_xact_lock, seed 2) before the fetch, held
through the runner + milestone + request commit. The second concurrent call
blocks until the first commits, then its fetch sees the committed pr_number
and the idempotent guard short-circuits without re-emitting. Per-task (single-
active-task guard means same-task concurrent open_pr is only the bug case).
* [F128] require active claim on explicit-task content posts
_verify_explicit_task_ownership checked assigned_to, which is stale
across a reap/handoff (persists until reassignment; active_claimant_id is
cleared on release). A reaped agent could keep posting say/dm/note to its
former task. Add the active-claimant check when assigned_to == caller;
assigned_to=None keep its existing allow (read-side inspection between
reassignments uses evidence, which has its own ownership path).
Existing 'active owner' test mocks passed assigned_to=agent_id without
active_claimant_id; production sets both together on claim, so the mocks
were incomplete. Updated to set both — realistic, not a behavior change.
* [F129,F130] harden quality gate _run_one exit status + timeout cleanup
F129: _run_one returned 'proc.returncode or 0', masking a None returncode
(communicate returned without a recorded exit code — process killed
out-of-band) as 0 / success. Treat None as a non-zero failure (fail-closed).
F130: on timeout, _run_one killed the subprocess but never awaited wait()
— communicate() was cancelled so it never closed the stdout/stderr pipes,
leaving a transient zombie + leaked FDs. Await wait() after kill() to reap
the process and close the transports.
* [F132] timeout the conventions validator + reap on hang
_run_conventions_validator awaited proc.communicate() with no timeout —
a hung subprocess (tree-sitter deadlock, huge repo) hung the
i_am_done/pr_pass gate forever and orphaned the python subprocess on
orchestrator restart. Wrap communicate() in wait_for(120s); on timeout
kill+wait the proc and fail closed (could_not_run=True → block gate
refuses the submit), matching the validator's own fail-loud philosophy.
* [F135] re-check activity before sweeper closes a session (TOCTOU)
sweep_timed_out_sessions read last_activity_at once at the candidate
SELECT, then closed. A message landing in that window refreshed
last_activity_at in the DB, but the sweeper closed on its stale in-memory
value — closing a just-used session. Re-read last_activity_at fresh right
before the close and skip if the session is no longer timed out.
* [F136] cancel startup indexing task on OptimalService.close()
close() cancelled only the periodic update task, then cleared the plugins.
The startup _indexing_task (background auto-index, slow Ollama / large repo)
could still be mid-flight at shutdown and write against closed/cleared
plugins. Cancel and await _indexing_task FIRST (its tail starts the periodic
task, so ordering also prevents a late periodic spawn), then the periodic
task, then clear plugins.
* [F139] scope active_task_owns_branch to the polled project
active_task_owns_branch did an unscoped WHERE branch_name = ? — a cross-project
branch_name collision (UUID-derived 8-char prefixes, theoretical) made the
internal-PR reviewer skip the WRONG project's PR (project A's leftover PR
skipped because project B happened to have an active task with the same
branch). Pass project_id (in scope at the orchestrator call site) and add
TaskTable.project_id == project_id to the WHERE. Correct for single-project
tasks and MegaTask multi-repo batches alike: each root-subtask carries its own
project_id matching its own repo, so a branch on project A's repo is owned
only by a task whose project_id == A.
* [sweep] strip Fxxx audit-ID tokens + trim bloated comments/docstrings + add behavior-change docs
Post-audit sweep over the 135 audit-fix commits since 19a474d3:
1. Stripped every # Fxxx: audit-ID token from comments AND every Fxxx token
from docstring openings across 211 blocks / ~626 lines. The CEO flagged
these twice: audit-issue IDs in code confuse future devs/agents. The
descriptive text is preserved; only the Fxxx token is removed (and bloated
narrative blocks trimmed to 1-3 lines keeping the one non-obvious invariant).
2. Trimmed bloated comments/docstrings to the concise standard (1-3 lines).
3. Added missing behavior-change docs for the audit-fix batch: prompts/roles
(documenter, pr_reviewer, qa), user-facing docs (api auth, websockets,
agent-gateway, megatask, merge-model, task-lifecycle, grok, resilience,
conventions, panel, security, troubleshooting), and the RAG corpus (cell-pm,
main-pm, pr-reviewer, qa roles; conventions; messaging-tools; escalation;
megatask; task-claiming workflows).
Comment/docstring/prose ONLY — zero code-line edits (verified: the diff
contains no def/class/return/if/for/await/assignment/call lines). Gates green:
ruff format + ruff check clean, mypy clean on roboco/. The only pytest failures
are the pre-existing sync_branch tracing-decision gap (B1, 250be5c2) — not
sweep-caused and tracked separately.
* [fix] register sync_branch in VERBS_WITHOUT_TRACING
sync_branch (B1, 250be5c2) is a git-only rebase+force-push verb (composes=(),
no DB transition, side_effects=()) but was never registered in the tracing
parity tables, so test_every_intent_verb_has_a_tracing_decision failed.
Mirrors open_pr: a mechanical git op with inline preconditions (ownership),
no journal/plan rationale required.
* chore(release): 0.14.0
* [fix] resolve 16 mypy errors across 9 test files (make quality gate)
type-clean the test files so make quality (mypy roboco/ tests/) is green:
- Any-typed locals for the two TypeError-asserting scoping tests (bypass
the required-arg check without getattr/ruff B009)
- Any-typed view for the shutdown-drain _drain_bg_tasks override (bypass
mypy method-assign without setattr/ruff B010)
- cast("uuid.UUID", ...) / cast("UUID", ...) for SQLAlchemy UUID[Any]
returns (TC006-quoted), config=None for AgentInstance stubs, None-narrowed
await_args, Iterator return on a yielding fixture, UUID annotation on the
_task helper. No type:ignore / noqa.
* [docs] regenerate lifecycle artifacts for sync_branch + branch-keyed submit_root gate
The committed artifacts were stale: lifecycle.py grew the sync_branch verb
(B1) and the branch-keyed submit_root gate description (B2/B3) but the
generated markdown/json were never regenerated. make foundation-check
enforces artifact==generator(lifecycle.py); regenerating restores that.
No source change — pure generator output.
* [refactor] reduce xenon C-rank blocks to A (behavior-preserving)
Extract helpers / flatten conditionals in 11 blocks that rated C(11)+
under xenon --max-absolute B, dropping pr_gate.py module rank B->A in
the process. Pure move-and-call refactors: each extracted helper holds
the original logic verbatim and the caller delegates to it; no control
flow, return values, or side effects changed.
Sites: validators._extract_strs, sequencing.dev_task_collision_edges,
evidence_builder.build_task_handoff, intake_driver._coerce_draft,
task.claim_task_for_agent (2 guards), prompter.create_task_from_draft
(validate+assignee), pr_gate._gate_decision (3 helpers),
orchestrator._handle_stopped_container + _reap_with_service,
_impl._create_subtask_from_inputs + complete.
_impl helper returns tuple[TaskNature, list[str]] to preserve mypy
narrowing of acceptance_criteria at the TaskCreateRequest site.
Also fix vulture: rename unused __aexit__ param tb->_tb in
test_conventions_cache_put.py (was hidden while xenon short-circuited
the gate).
* [security] bash-guard uv run --active deny + CodeQL path-traversal fixes
Fix 1 (be-dev-1 brick prevention): bash-guard now denies 'uv run --active'
and 'uv run'/'uvx' against /app targets. In the agent container
VIRTUAL_ENV=/app/.venv is baked globally, so 'uv run --active' always
resolves onto the image-baked MCP-gateway venv and uv rebuilds it,
deleting /app/.venv/bin and bricking every MCP server spawn. Bare
'uv run' (workspace .venv, cwd-relative) is untouched.
CodeQL fixes:
- docs.py: replace bypassable '..' substring guard with a
resolve-and-contain helper (_resolve_contained_path). An absolute
path made pathlib reset (base / '/etc/passwd' == '/etc/passwd'),
letting read_doc/delete_doc reach arbitrary files. Applied to both
sinks.
- orchestrator.py: _safe_agent_path_segment at the spawn_agent
chokepoint (rejects traversal-shaped agent_id before any fs op) and
inside _remove_container (slug guard before the log-dir mkdir,
defense-in-depth).
- agent_sdk/server.py: /usage/sync transcript_path now resolved and
contained under ROBOCO_TRANSCRIPT_DIR with a .jsonl suffix requirement
(was Path(raw) — unauthenticated endpoint could stat arbitrary files).
TDD RED->GREEN across all four; make quality green (4890 passed).
* [fix] enum-parity gate: drop false-green mask, skip empty/unmigrated DB
The foundation-check gate ran the enum verifier behind
`|| echo "(skipped — postgres unreachable)"`, which swallows ANY
non-zero exit — including real drift — and prints 'All quality gates
passed'. On a host with a dockerized but empty/unmigrated `roboco` DB
(0 tables: the agentrole/team enum types don't exist), the verifier
connected, found every foundation value 'missing', exited 1, and the
mask relabeled it 'skipped' → false-green.
Fix:
- scripts/verify_postgres_enums.py: move skip semantics INTO the script.
Distinguish unreachable (skip, exit 0), DB-not-migrated/both-enum-types-
absent (skip, exit 0), real drift (exit 1), match (exit 0). Extract
pure enum_drift + should_skip_for_unmigrated helpers + a type_exists
probe so an empty DB is 'no migrated target', not drift.
- Makefile: drop the `|| echo` mask — real drift now fails the gate.
TDD RED->GREEN (10 tests); make quality green (10906 passed).
* [security] docs path guard: reject '.'/empty segments for clean 400
_resolve_contained_path used an '..' substring ban, which (a) left rel='.'
passing the guard — read_doc/delete_doc then got the base DIRECTORY itself
and raised IsADirectoryError (500) instead of a clean ValidationError, and
(b) false-rejected legit filenames containing '..' like 'v1..v2.md'.
Replace the substring ban with a raw-segment check (rel.split('/')) that
rejects any '.', '..', or empty segment. Path(rel).parts was the wrong tool
— pathlib collapses '.' and empty segments on 3.13, hiding them. The split
check catches '.' / 'a/./b' / 'a//b' / '..' / 'a/../b' while allowing
'v1..v2.md' ('..' inside a filename, no bad segment). The post-resolve
parents-containment check (the real defense) is unchanged.
TDD RED->GREEN (4 new tests); make quality green (10910 passed).
Follow-up to the CodeQL path-traversal review: the two CodeQL 'High' alerts
on this guard are false-positives-on-the-fix (resolve-and-contain already
contains the bypass); this hardening closes the one genuine low residual
(rel='.' -> 500) the review surfaced, which CodeQL did not flag.
---------
Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(release): add release-manager feature flag (default off)
* feat(release): change classification + semver-bump derivation
* feat(release): readiness audit (changelog/version-ref/docs/migration/gate)
* feat(release): release-manager engine proposes a gated release
* feat(release): fail-closed release executor (bump, gate, publish)
* feat(release): CEO approve/reject release-proposal surface
* docs(release): document the gated release manager
* feat(memory): add org-memory feature flags (default off)
* feat(memory): add playbooks table + status enum + migration
* feat(memory): playbook service with auditor curation transitions
* feat(memory): playbooks RAG index plugin
* feat(memory): index a playbook into RAG on approval
* feat(memory): distill a high-signal lesson at task completion
* feat(memory): keep private journal reflections out of the shared RAG corpus
* feat(memory): draft_playbook verb + auditor curation verbs
* fix(ci): resolve mypy tests/ errors blocking the gate (UUID casts, annotations)
* feat(memory): auto-inject similar lessons/playbooks into the briefing
* feat(memory): auditor playbook review queue (api + panel)
* docs(memory): document the org-memory loop + playbook verbs
* fix(provisioning): idempotent pitch provisioning (reuse product/project by slug on re-approval)
* fix(memory): add chunks_playbooks to the chunk schema + isolate release route tests
- Migration 030's CHUNK_TABLES was missing chunks_playbooks, breaking the
IndexType<->migration parity guard once the PLAYBOOKS index landed. The
upgrade is ALTER ... IF EXISTS so adding it is safe on any DB shape.
- The release-route fixture's approve/reject paths call db.commit() (real
behavior), so a held proposal outlived the per-test rollback and leaked
into engine tests that read the global list_open_release_proposals().
Tear down source=release_manager rows after each test.
- Make the gather_snapshot real-repo smoke version-agnostic (semver match)
so it stops pinning the literal repo version.
* chore(release): 0.13.0
* ++
---------
Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
The decomposition floor that pairs with the roll-up gate (spec 4): a PM
cannot finish decomposing a parent while one of its acceptance criteria has
no subtask responsible for it — the "two leaves, half the ACs silently
dropped" pattern. Three parts:
- Gate: i_am_idle is rejected for a cell_pm/main_pm whose owned parent still
has criteria in unclaimed_parent_acceptance_criteria (claimed = referenced
by any live, non-cancelled child). Distinct from the roll-up gate, which
fires at submit_up/complete and demands a *completed* child; this fires
earlier and asks only that every criterion be *claimed*. Safe-by-
construction: inert until a PM declares coverage, so legacy / not-yet-
adopted decompositions are never blocked.
- Visibility: PM-facing briefings (give_me_work, i_will_plan, submit_up) and
every delegate response now carry parent_ac_coverage ({id,text,claimed,
verified} per criterion) + unclaimed_parent_acs, so a PM can map subtasks
to criterion ids via covers_parent_criteria and see what is still
uncovered after each delegate. Off for leaf roles, so a developer's own
criteria never surface as bogus "unclaimed" noise.
- Prompts: cell_pm / main_pm role prompts document covers_parent_criteria and
the new idle enforcement in the existing Coverage discipline.
TaskService.{parent_ac_coverage,unclaimed_parent_acceptance_criteria} added
beside uncovered_parent_acceptance_criteria; all three refactored onto a
shared _parent_ac_ref_sets helper (keeps each under the xenon B ceiling,
preserves the committed roll-up behavior). Verb tables regenerated for the
new delegate param — the regen also syncs pre-existing table drift that was
never regenerated after earlier merges (read_messages, pass_review
ac_verdicts, board pitch). Two brand-new generated tables (prompter,
secretary) are left untracked pending a separate decision.
regenerate_verb_tables.py imported roboco.api.schemas.v2, which no longer
exists (schemas moved to v1), so it raised on import and the generated
verb/tool tables could never be refreshed — leaving _generated/verbs.md
and the per-role prompts stale (e.g. listing submit_for_qa, omitting the
notify_*/channels/progress/pr_update content tools). Repoint the imports
to v1, fix the renamed schema (OpenPrRequest), and regenerate.
