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Enforcements, hooks and code quality

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Renn F
2026-04-21 17:48:45 +02:00
parent e4b4ac6d33
commit d15b7ae561
90 changed files with 8614 additions and 5012 deletions
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docker/scripts/bash-guard-hook.sh
Regular → Executable
+52
View File
@@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ if echo "$low" | grep -qE '(\.git/config|\.gitconfig|\.git-credentials|\.netrc|\
exit 2
fi
# /proc-based env/secret exfil: /proc/<pid>/environ, /proc/self/environ, etc.
if echo "$low" | grep -qE '/proc/(self|[0-9]+|\$\$|\$\{.*\})/(environ|cmdline|cwd|exe)'; then
echo "Denied: reading /proc/*/environ or /proc/*/cmdline can leak credentials from another process. Ask the orchestrator for the specific value you need." >&2
exit 2
fi
if echo "$low" | grep -qE '(^|[[:space:];&|])(curl|wget|http|https)[[:space:]][^|]*(github\.com|api\.github\.com)'; then
echo "Denied: direct GitHub HTTP calls bypass the PAT handler. Use roboco_git_* MCP tools." >&2
exit 2
@@ -74,6 +80,52 @@ if echo "$low" | grep -qE '(^|[[:space:];&|])(env|printenv)([[:space:]]|$)' && !
fi
fi
# Shell built-ins that dump variables / exported env. `set -e`, `set -u`,
# `set -o pipefail` etc. must still pass — so we only deny `set` with no args
# or followed by a terminator (`|`, `;`, `&&`, newline/EOL).
if echo "$low" | grep -qE '(^|[[:space:];&|])set([[:space:]]*$|[[:space:]]*[|;&])'; then
echo "Denied: bare \`set\` dumps all shell variables including exported credentials." >&2
exit 2
fi
if echo "$low" | grep -qE '(^|[[:space:];&|])(declare|typeset)[[:space:]]+-[[:alpha:]]*[xp]'; then
echo "Denied: \`declare -x\` / \`typeset -p\` dumps exported variables." >&2
exit 2
fi
if echo "$low" | grep -qE '(^|[[:space:];&|])export[[:space:]]+-p([[:space:]]|$)'; then
echo "Denied: \`export -p\` dumps exported variables." >&2
exit 2
fi
if echo "$low" | grep -qE '(^|[[:space:];&|])compgen[[:space:]]+-[[:alpha:]]*[ve]'; then
echo "Denied: \`compgen -v\` / \`compgen -e\` enumerates variables/exports." >&2
exit 2
fi
# Sourcing credential-bearing files via `source` or `.` dot-sourcing.
if echo "$low" | grep -qE '(^|[[:space:];&|])(source|\.)[[:space:]]+[^|;&]*(\.env|/etc/environment|/proc/[^[:space:]]*environ|\.profile|\.bashrc|\.zshrc|\.git/config|\.netrc)'; then
echo "Denied: sourcing credential-bearing files exposes secrets in the current shell." >&2
exit 2
fi
# Binary/encoding tools pointed at credential files — catches `base64 .env`,
# `xxd ~/.netrc`, `strings .git/config`, `od -c .git-credentials`, etc.
if echo "$low" | grep -qE '(^|[[:space:];&|])(base64|od|xxd|hexdump|strings|uuencode)[[:space:]]+[^|;&]*(\.env|\.git/config|\.gitconfig|\.git-credentials|\.netrc|\.ssh/|id_rsa|id_ed25519)'; then
echo "Denied: encoding/inspecting a credential file is still exfiltration." >&2
exit 2
fi
# Interpreter one-liners reading credential paths.
if echo "$low" | grep -qE '(^|[[:space:];&|])(python3?|perl|node|ruby|awk|sed)[[:space:]]+[^|;&]*-[ce][[:space:]]+[^|;&]*(\.env|\.git/config|\.gitconfig|\.git-credentials|\.netrc|/proc/[^[:space:]]*environ|id_rsa|id_ed25519)'; then
echo "Denied: interpreter snippet reads a credential file. Ask orchestrator for the value you need." >&2
exit 2
fi
# Redirected reads from /proc/self/environ: `read -r var < /proc/self/environ`,
# `while read … < /proc/…/environ`, etc.
if echo "$low" | grep -qE '<[[:space:]]*/proc/(self|[0-9]+)/(environ|cmdline)'; then
echo "Denied: redirecting from /proc/*/environ leaks credentials." >&2
exit 2
fi
# --- destructive ops on system paths ------------------------------------------
# Agents should only rm -rf inside their own workspace. Block system paths
# outright. Cross-workspace rm isn't regex-decidable here (we don't know the