feat(providers): Codex CLI provider — OpenAI via ModelProvider.OPENAI (#659)

* feat(providers): Codex CLI provider — OpenAI via ModelProvider.OPENAI

Mirrors the grok blueprint end to end: CodexCliProvider (RO ~/.codex
mount, ANTHROPIC_* blanked), an orchestrator-side codex_auth.py
refresher (JWT-exp staleness, atomic rewrite, lock-serialized single-use
rotation, --check backstop; the CLI's own in-process refresh write
no-ops on the RO mount by design — margins keep the orchestrator ahead
of the CLI's 5-minute window), config.toml rendering with required=true
gateway MCP servers, execpolicy deny rules (forbidden-only), per-role
--sandbox (developer=workspace-write, review/doc roles read-only),
codex exec --json with pinned ROBOCO_CODEX_CLI_MODEL (gpt-5.3-codex),
usage summed from typed turn.completed events priced via the real
4-bucket split, dedicated image + entrypoint, registry/park/finalize/
compose/release wiring. V1 excludes interactive intake/secretary.

Per adversarial review: migration 083 seeds the openai provider row
enabled=True (without it every routing path 404'd — the whole feature
was operationally dead code; grok needed the same seed in 039), the
panel picker gained the OpenAI catalog group it silently lacked, and
exit classification is structural — only stderr and error.message
fields from error events are sniffed (word-boundaried patterns, exact
auth phrases, bare 'login' dropped), so the model echoing on-topic
words can never false-park the provider fleet-wide, proven by a
benign-transcript test. Known open risk flagged, not claimed: whether
codex's workspace-write OS sandbox excludes /app is unverified, and no
hook mechanism exists to port the bash-guard defense-in-depth.

* fix(providers): containment barrier on usage.json reads (code scanning)

CodeQL flagged the codex usage read as path injection — correctly:
os.path.basename does not neutralize '..', and the upstream segment
validator isn't in CodeQL's taint model. The grok/codex reads collapse
into one _read_usage_json_contained helper that resolves the built path
and refuses anything outside the resolved usage root — a hostile id can
never escape regardless of upstream drift. Traversal + containment
regression tests added; a stray noqa in the test file replaced with a
named constant per repo rule.

* fix(providers): use realpath+startswith containment CodeQL recognizes

The is_relative_to() guard was a real barrier but not in CodeQL's
py/path-injection sanitizer model, so the alert persisted. Switch to
the canonical os.path.realpath + startswith(root + os.sep) form, which
CodeQL recognizes as a path-traversal barrier; behavior is identical
(refuse any candidate resolving outside the usage root).

* fix(providers): regexp-allowlist the usage-id segment (CodeQL barrier)

Neither is_relative_to nor realpath+startswith was recognized by
CodeQL's py/path-injection sanitizer model across the str->Path->open
flow. Sanitize the tainted component at the source instead: the id must
fullmatch a strict slug token ([A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*, no
separators, no '..'), which CodeQL recognizes as a path-injection
barrier; the realpath+startswith containment stays as defense-in-depth.

* fix(providers): standalone regexp guard so CodeQL recognizes the barrier

The sanitizer was one disjunct of a compound 'or' condition, which
CodeQL's guard analysis does not trace as a barrier. Split the regexp
fullmatch into its own single-condition guard (the redundant '..' check
is dropped — the required alphanumeric first char already excludes it).

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Renzo F
2026-07-23 03:20:29 +02:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by Renn F
parent 165892dc62
commit c70ff3cf9a
33 changed files with 3316 additions and 33 deletions
@@ -45,6 +45,11 @@ const {
provider_type: "grok",
display_name: "Grok Build 0.1",
},
{
model_name: "gpt-5.3-codex",
provider_type: "openai",
display_name: "GPT-5.3 Codex",
},
]),
getOllamaKey: vi.fn(async () => ({ has_key: false, enabled: true })),
setOllamaKey: vi.fn(async () => ({ has_key: true, enabled: true })),
@@ -276,6 +276,10 @@ export function AIRoutingCard() {
(c: { provider_type: ModelProvider }) =>
c.provider_type === ModelProvider.GROK,
);
const catalogOpenaiOnly = catalog.filter(
(c: { provider_type: ModelProvider }) =>
c.provider_type === ModelProvider.OPENAI,
);
const catalogAnthropicOnly = catalog.filter(
(c: { provider_type: ModelProvider }) =>
c.provider_type === ModelProvider.ANTHROPIC,
@@ -1033,6 +1037,29 @@ export function AIRoutingCard() {
</SelectGroup>
)}
{/* Codex (OpenAI) models */}
{catalogOpenaiOnly.length > 0 && (
<SelectGroup>
<SelectLabel>
<ProviderBadge variant="openai" />
Codex (OpenAI)
</SelectLabel>
{catalogOpenaiOnly.map(
(c: {
model_name: string;
display_name: string;
}) => (
<SelectItem
key={c.model_name}
value={c.model_name}
>
{c.display_name}
</SelectItem>
),
)}
</SelectGroup>
)}
{/* Ollama Cloud models */}
{catalogOllamaOnly.length > 0 && (
<SelectGroup>
@@ -1247,19 +1274,21 @@ function errMsg(e: unknown): string {
function ProviderBadge({
variant,
}: {
variant: "anthropic" | "grok" | "ollama" | "self-hosted";
variant: "anthropic" | "grok" | "openai" | "ollama" | "self-hosted";
}) {
const styles: Record<string, string> = {
anthropic: "bg-blue-500/20 text-blue-700 dark:text-blue-400",
ollama: "bg-violet-500/20 text-violet-700 dark:text-violet-400",
"self-hosted": "bg-purple-500/20 text-purple-700 dark:text-purple-400",
grok: "bg-teal-500/20 text-teal-700 dark:text-teal-400",
openai: "bg-emerald-500/20 text-emerald-700 dark:text-emerald-400",
};
const labels: Record<string, string> = {
anthropic: "A",
ollama: "O",
"self-hosted": "S",
grok: "G",
openai: "C",
};
return (
<span