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feat(providers): Codex CLI provider — OpenAI via ModelProvider.OPENAI (#659)
* feat(providers): Codex CLI provider — OpenAI via ModelProvider.OPENAI Mirrors the grok blueprint end to end: CodexCliProvider (RO ~/.codex mount, ANTHROPIC_* blanked), an orchestrator-side codex_auth.py refresher (JWT-exp staleness, atomic rewrite, lock-serialized single-use rotation, --check backstop; the CLI's own in-process refresh write no-ops on the RO mount by design — margins keep the orchestrator ahead of the CLI's 5-minute window), config.toml rendering with required=true gateway MCP servers, execpolicy deny rules (forbidden-only), per-role --sandbox (developer=workspace-write, review/doc roles read-only), codex exec --json with pinned ROBOCO_CODEX_CLI_MODEL (gpt-5.3-codex), usage summed from typed turn.completed events priced via the real 4-bucket split, dedicated image + entrypoint, registry/park/finalize/ compose/release wiring. V1 excludes interactive intake/secretary. Per adversarial review: migration 083 seeds the openai provider row enabled=True (without it every routing path 404'd — the whole feature was operationally dead code; grok needed the same seed in 039), the panel picker gained the OpenAI catalog group it silently lacked, and exit classification is structural — only stderr and error.message fields from error events are sniffed (word-boundaried patterns, exact auth phrases, bare 'login' dropped), so the model echoing on-topic words can never false-park the provider fleet-wide, proven by a benign-transcript test. Known open risk flagged, not claimed: whether codex's workspace-write OS sandbox excludes /app is unverified, and no hook mechanism exists to port the bash-guard defense-in-depth. * fix(providers): containment barrier on usage.json reads (code scanning) CodeQL flagged the codex usage read as path injection — correctly: os.path.basename does not neutralize '..', and the upstream segment validator isn't in CodeQL's taint model. The grok/codex reads collapse into one _read_usage_json_contained helper that resolves the built path and refuses anything outside the resolved usage root — a hostile id can never escape regardless of upstream drift. Traversal + containment regression tests added; a stray noqa in the test file replaced with a named constant per repo rule. * fix(providers): use realpath+startswith containment CodeQL recognizes The is_relative_to() guard was a real barrier but not in CodeQL's py/path-injection sanitizer model, so the alert persisted. Switch to the canonical os.path.realpath + startswith(root + os.sep) form, which CodeQL recognizes as a path-traversal barrier; behavior is identical (refuse any candidate resolving outside the usage root). * fix(providers): regexp-allowlist the usage-id segment (CodeQL barrier) Neither is_relative_to nor realpath+startswith was recognized by CodeQL's py/path-injection sanitizer model across the str->Path->open flow. Sanitize the tainted component at the source instead: the id must fullmatch a strict slug token ([A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*, no separators, no '..'), which CodeQL recognizes as a path-injection barrier; the realpath+startswith containment stays as defense-in-depth. * fix(providers): standalone regexp guard so CodeQL recognizes the barrier The sanitizer was one disjunct of a compound 'or' condition, which CodeQL's guard analysis does not trace as a barrier. Split the regexp fullmatch into its own single-condition guard (the redundant '..' check is dropped — the required alphanumeric first char already excludes it). --------- Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -45,6 +45,11 @@ const {
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provider_type: "grok",
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display_name: "Grok Build 0.1",
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},
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{
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model_name: "gpt-5.3-codex",
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provider_type: "openai",
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display_name: "GPT-5.3 Codex",
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},
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]),
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getOllamaKey: vi.fn(async () => ({ has_key: false, enabled: true })),
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setOllamaKey: vi.fn(async () => ({ has_key: true, enabled: true })),
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@@ -276,6 +276,10 @@ export function AIRoutingCard() {
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(c: { provider_type: ModelProvider }) =>
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c.provider_type === ModelProvider.GROK,
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);
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const catalogOpenaiOnly = catalog.filter(
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(c: { provider_type: ModelProvider }) =>
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c.provider_type === ModelProvider.OPENAI,
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);
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const catalogAnthropicOnly = catalog.filter(
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(c: { provider_type: ModelProvider }) =>
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c.provider_type === ModelProvider.ANTHROPIC,
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@@ -1033,6 +1037,29 @@ export function AIRoutingCard() {
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</SelectGroup>
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)}
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{/* Codex (OpenAI) models */}
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{catalogOpenaiOnly.length > 0 && (
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<SelectGroup>
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<SelectLabel>
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<ProviderBadge variant="openai" />
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Codex (OpenAI)
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</SelectLabel>
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{catalogOpenaiOnly.map(
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(c: {
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model_name: string;
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display_name: string;
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}) => (
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<SelectItem
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key={c.model_name}
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value={c.model_name}
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>
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{c.display_name}
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</SelectItem>
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),
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)}
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</SelectGroup>
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)}
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{/* Ollama Cloud models */}
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{catalogOllamaOnly.length > 0 && (
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<SelectGroup>
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@@ -1247,19 +1274,21 @@ function errMsg(e: unknown): string {
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function ProviderBadge({
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variant,
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}: {
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variant: "anthropic" | "grok" | "ollama" | "self-hosted";
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variant: "anthropic" | "grok" | "openai" | "ollama" | "self-hosted";
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}) {
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const styles: Record<string, string> = {
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anthropic: "bg-blue-500/20 text-blue-700 dark:text-blue-400",
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ollama: "bg-violet-500/20 text-violet-700 dark:text-violet-400",
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"self-hosted": "bg-purple-500/20 text-purple-700 dark:text-purple-400",
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grok: "bg-teal-500/20 text-teal-700 dark:text-teal-400",
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openai: "bg-emerald-500/20 text-emerald-700 dark:text-emerald-400",
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};
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const labels: Record<string, string> = {
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anthropic: "A",
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ollama: "O",
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"self-hosted": "S",
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grok: "G",
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openai: "C",
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};
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return (
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<span
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