feat(providers): Codex CLI provider — OpenAI via ModelProvider.OPENAI (#659)

* feat(providers): Codex CLI provider — OpenAI via ModelProvider.OPENAI

Mirrors the grok blueprint end to end: CodexCliProvider (RO ~/.codex
mount, ANTHROPIC_* blanked), an orchestrator-side codex_auth.py
refresher (JWT-exp staleness, atomic rewrite, lock-serialized single-use
rotation, --check backstop; the CLI's own in-process refresh write
no-ops on the RO mount by design — margins keep the orchestrator ahead
of the CLI's 5-minute window), config.toml rendering with required=true
gateway MCP servers, execpolicy deny rules (forbidden-only), per-role
--sandbox (developer=workspace-write, review/doc roles read-only),
codex exec --json with pinned ROBOCO_CODEX_CLI_MODEL (gpt-5.3-codex),
usage summed from typed turn.completed events priced via the real
4-bucket split, dedicated image + entrypoint, registry/park/finalize/
compose/release wiring. V1 excludes interactive intake/secretary.

Per adversarial review: migration 083 seeds the openai provider row
enabled=True (without it every routing path 404'd — the whole feature
was operationally dead code; grok needed the same seed in 039), the
panel picker gained the OpenAI catalog group it silently lacked, and
exit classification is structural — only stderr and error.message
fields from error events are sniffed (word-boundaried patterns, exact
auth phrases, bare 'login' dropped), so the model echoing on-topic
words can never false-park the provider fleet-wide, proven by a
benign-transcript test. Known open risk flagged, not claimed: whether
codex's workspace-write OS sandbox excludes /app is unverified, and no
hook mechanism exists to port the bash-guard defense-in-depth.

* fix(providers): containment barrier on usage.json reads (code scanning)

CodeQL flagged the codex usage read as path injection — correctly:
os.path.basename does not neutralize '..', and the upstream segment
validator isn't in CodeQL's taint model. The grok/codex reads collapse
into one _read_usage_json_contained helper that resolves the built path
and refuses anything outside the resolved usage root — a hostile id can
never escape regardless of upstream drift. Traversal + containment
regression tests added; a stray noqa in the test file replaced with a
named constant per repo rule.

* fix(providers): use realpath+startswith containment CodeQL recognizes

The is_relative_to() guard was a real barrier but not in CodeQL's
py/path-injection sanitizer model, so the alert persisted. Switch to
the canonical os.path.realpath + startswith(root + os.sep) form, which
CodeQL recognizes as a path-traversal barrier; behavior is identical
(refuse any candidate resolving outside the usage root).

* fix(providers): regexp-allowlist the usage-id segment (CodeQL barrier)

Neither is_relative_to nor realpath+startswith was recognized by
CodeQL's py/path-injection sanitizer model across the str->Path->open
flow. Sanitize the tainted component at the source instead: the id must
fullmatch a strict slug token ([A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*, no
separators, no '..'), which CodeQL recognizes as a path-injection
barrier; the realpath+startswith containment stays as defense-in-depth.

* fix(providers): standalone regexp guard so CodeQL recognizes the barrier

The sanitizer was one disjunct of a compound 'or' condition, which
CodeQL's guard analysis does not trace as a barrier. Split the regexp
fullmatch into its own single-condition guard (the redundant '..' check
is dropped — the required alphanumeric first char already excludes it).

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>

docker-compose.yaml

@@ -391,6 +391,20 @@ services:
     depends_on:
       - agent-grok-image
 
+  # ==========================================================================
+  # Agent Codex Image Builder (OpenAI via the official codex CLI). One-shot
+  # delivery roles only in V1 — no interactive prompter/secretary variant.
+  # ==========================================================================
+  agent-codex-image:
+    build:
+      context: .
+      dockerfile: docker/agent-codex.Dockerfile
+    image: roboco-agent-codex
+    entrypoint: ["/bin/sh", "-c", 'echo "Agent Codex image built"']
+    restart: "no"
+    depends_on:
+      - agent-base-image
+
   # ==========================================================================
   # Sandbox PG Image Builder (kitchen-sink postgres for parameterized dev DBs)
   # Only pulled by the provisioner when a venture requests pg extensions; bare
@@ -474,6 +488,9 @@ services:
       # SuperGrok auth (host ~/.grok) for Grok-CLI agents — the orchestrator
       # mounts <dir>/auth.json into each Grok agent. Run `grok login` on the host.
       ROBOCO_HOST_GROK_DIR: ${ROBOCO_HOST_GROK_DIR:-/home/renzof/.grok}
+      # ChatGPT-subscription auth (host ~/.codex) for Codex-CLI agents — same
+      # shape as ROBOCO_HOST_GROK_DIR. Run `codex login` on the host.
+      ROBOCO_HOST_CODEX_DIR: ${ROBOCO_HOST_CODEX_DIR:-/home/renzof/.codex}
       ROBOCO_HOST_DATA_DIR: ${ROBOCO_HOST_DATA_DIR:-/volume1/roboco/data}
       # Public base URL for commit-trailer links. Default 127.0.0.1 produces
       # unusable links in commit message bodies; set to NAS LAN IP so
@@ -669,6 +686,10 @@ services:
       # (grok_auth.refresh_if_stale) so agents never mount a dead credential;
       # each agent's own auth.json mount stays read-only.
       - ${ROBOCO_HOST_GROK_DIR:-/home/renzof/.grok}:${ROBOCO_HOST_GROK_DIR:-/home/renzof/.grok}
+      # Codex CLI auth — same shape as the SuperGrok mount above. Read-WRITE:
+      # the orchestrator auto-refreshes the access token in place
+      # (codex_auth.refresh_if_stale); each agent's own mount stays read-only.
+      - ${ROBOCO_HOST_CODEX_DIR:-/home/renzof/.codex}:${ROBOCO_HOST_CODEX_DIR:-/home/renzof/.codex}
       # Shared config directory for MCP configs (writable)
       - ${ROBOCO_DATA_DIR:-./data}/mcp-configs:/app/mcp-configs
       - ${ROBOCO_DATA_DIR:-./data}/vault:/app/vault
@@ -681,6 +702,8 @@ services:
       # Per-agent GROK usage capture: each Grok agent writes usage.json under
       # <agent_id>/; the finalizer reads the captured tokens/cost back here.
       - ${ROBOCO_DATA_DIR:-./data}/grok-usage:/data/grok-usage
+      # Per-agent CODEX usage capture — same shape as grok-usage above.
+      - ${ROBOCO_DATA_DIR:-./data}/codex-usage:/data/codex-usage
       # Persistent logs — survive `docker compose down/up`. Orchestrator and
       # each spawned agent write structured logs here so we can audit past
       # runs instead of relying on ephemeral `docker logs`.