feat: Telegram V2 — inbound commands + actionable approve/reject from chat (#551)

* feat(telegram): V2 inbound — command router, actionable approve/reject keyboards, chat-gated poll loop

* fix(release,x,video,telegram): terminal-state guards on approve/reject; sender-identity check

* docs(map,rag): Telegram V2 inbound surfaces and terminal-state approve/reject guards

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>

docs/map/product-strategy-research-pitch.md

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ The product / strategy / research / pitch slice covers the "company layer" above
 | `roboco/services/roadmap_service.py` | CEO's per-item approve/reject glue over a held roadmap cycle; approve materializes a BACKLOG task | 211 |
 | `roboco/api/routes/roadmap.py` | CEO-only routes: list open cycles, approve/reject one item | 124 |
 | `roboco/services/x_engine.py` | Dormant "engine 4": drafts X (Twitter) release posts (event hook), mention replies (poll), and — new — feature-spotlight explorations (dormant interval, spawns Head of Marketing), ALL held for CEO approval (default off) | 463 |
-| `roboco/services/x_post_service.py` | CEO's approve/reject over a held X draft; approve posts via a Redis single-flight lock, idempotent | 223 |
+| `roboco/services/x_post_service.py` | CEO's approve/reject over a held X draft; approve posts via a Redis single-flight lock, idempotent on already-posted AND on already-rejected (CANCELLED) | 298 |
 | `roboco/services/x_client.py` | OAuth 1.0a HMAC-SHA1 X API client (`LiveXClient`) + `NullXClient` (no creds, never egresses) + `build_x_client` factory | 318 |
 | `roboco/services/x_credentials.py` | Singleton Fernet-encrypted OAuth 1.0a credential CRUD; decrypts server-side only | 140 |
 | `roboco/api/routes/x.py` | CEO-only routes: list open X posts, approve/reject one draft | 164 |
@@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ The product / strategy / research / pitch slice covers the "company layer" above
 | `screen_external_text` | function | foundation/policy/injection_guard.py:95 | Shared screen-and-neutralize guard for unattended attacker-writable text feeds (X mentions, vault inbox notes): wraps the text in an untrusted-content envelope and flags any matched injection-pattern LINE inline — nothing is removed, so the CEO-facing draft still shows what the source really said |
 | `XEngine.open_feature_spotlight_exploration` | method | x_engine.py:337 | No-ops unless `x_engine_enabled` AND `x_feature_spotlight_enabled`, no creds, a cycle already open, the open-post cap reached, or project unresolvable; else opens ONE held PENDING exploration task for the Head of Marketing (`source=x_feature_exploration`) carrying a `x_seen_features` marker snapshot |
 | `XEngine.materialize_feature_spotlight` | method | x_engine.py:433 | Called from the `propose_feature_spotlight` do-tool: marks the feature slug seen (`XSeenFeatureTable`), creates the held draft (`source=x_feature`, identical shape to a release/reply draft), completes the exploration task |
-| `XPostService.approve` | method | x_post_service.py:77 | The ONLY caller of `x_client.post_tweet`; Redis single-flight lock, re-reads task under lock, idempotent on an already-posted draft |
-| `XPostService.reject` | method | x_post_service.py:180 | Records the CEO's reason; cancels the held draft |
+| `XPostService.approve` | method | x_post_service.py:92 | The ONLY caller of `x_client.post_tweet`; Redis single-flight lock, re-reads task under lock, idempotent on an already-posted draft (`already_posted`); a CANCELLED draft is refused both pre-lock and re-checked under lock (`already_rejected`) — a stale approve (e.g. a queued Telegram button) can't resurrect a draft the CEO already rejected |
+| `XPostService.reject` | method | x_post_service.py:251 | Records the CEO's reason; cancels the held draft |
 | `XClient` / `NullXClient` / `LiveXClient` | ABC/class | x_client.py:150 / 166 / 186 | `NullXClient.configured` is False (no creds) — drafting still runs (content nobody can post is a no-op upstream), just never originates; `LiveXClient` signs OAuth 1.0a HMAC-SHA1 |
 | `build_x_client` | factory | x_client.py:306 | Returns `LiveXClient` when credentials decrypt, else `NullXClient` |
 | `XCredentialsService.set_credentials` / `.get_decrypted` | method | x_credentials.py:61 / 116 | All-or-nothing Fernet-encrypted singleton credential set/clear; decrypts server-side only, never exposed to agents |
@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ product-strategy-research-pitch
 - **`build_provider` returns `NullProvider` for an unknown provider name (research.py:326- 328).** A typo in `ROBOCO_RESEARCH_PROVIDER` (validated by pydantic pattern, so unlikely) would silently degrade to empty results rather than erroring.
 - **`GitHubProvisioningService.enabled` requires master + token + org (github_provisioning.py:64).** `provisioning_enabled` defaults `True`, so the flag alone is not enough — an operator who toggles the flag without setting token/org still gets `enabled=False` and `approve` raises `ProvisioningDisabledError`.
 - **`PitchService._seed_main_pm_task` requires a `main-pm` agent row (pitch.py:241-243).** If the agent slug is missing it raises `ValidationError` after provisioning has already happened — another partial-failure window (repos + Product created, no seed task).
+- **`XPostService.approve` did NOT check for a CANCELLED (already-rejected) task before Wave 5 (`11915f36`, PR #551).** Before the fix, approving a draft the CEO had already rejected would proceed straight to posting it — reachable via the Telegram inbound bridge's inline Approve button (targets a draft by id regardless of its current status) and equally via a replayed HTTP `POST /api/x/posts/{id}/approve`. The guard now returns `already_rejected` both before acquiring the lock and again after re-reading the task under lock.
 
 ## Drift from CLAUDE.md
 
@@ -365,6 +366,7 @@ product-strategy-research-pitch
 > - `c71f9b3b` ([chore] logical-gaps: kanban board column coverage + status-class fixes, 2026-06-30): `kanban.py` — added `_load_subtask_counts` batch query; `_task_to_card` now takes a `subtask_counts` dict and populates real subtask counts (#198). Added "Other" fallback column in `_build_columns` to prevent any task-card from being built-then-discarded. `get_qa_board`: removed `VERIFYING` from QA statuses (dev self-verification, not a QA state). `get_documenter_board`: added `task_type == DOCUMENTATION` filter. `get_main_pm_board_flat`: broadened status filter to include `PENDING`/`CLAIMED`/`COMPLETED` and added proper column routing (incoming/distributed/done). Added "Coordination" column for non-cell-team tasks (#196).
 > - `b3558d4e` ([chore] complexity: split 5 C-rank blocks to <=B, 2026-06-30): `kanban.py` `get_main_pm_board_flat` — refactored if/elif routing to a dict-dispatch (`status_col` + `team_col` maps) for xenon complexity gate; no functional change.
 > - **v0.18.0** (2026-07-04): the X feature-spotlight content in this slice (`XEngine` feature-spotlight methods, `_x_feature_spotlight_loop`/`_dispatch_feature_spotlight_exploration`, migration 061, `x_feature_spotlight_enabled`) was authored directly into this file's Files/Key Symbols/Data Flow/Mermaid/Logical Tree/Entry Points sections at implementation time rather than landing as a dated delta — noted here for changelog continuity; the body text above is current as of this date. (Config Flags is unchanged — the X-engine flags live in deployment-tooling.md's comprehensive list, not here.)
+> - `11915f36` (PR #551, Telegram V2 security follow-up, 2026-07-17): `x_post_service.py` — `XPostService.approve`/`_approve_locked` add a CANCELLED-task guard (pre-lock and re-checked under lock) returning a new `already_rejected` status, closing a live-reproduced approve-after-reject hole reachable via a stale Telegram Approve button (or a replayed HTTP call).
 
 ## Regression Risks