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docs(security): record that WebSocket auth is REST-only and /ws/system is unauthenticated

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Token enforcement currently covers the REST API only; the /ws/* endpoints —
including the read-only operator stream /ws/system, which carries rate-limit and
token-usage telemetry — do not validate X-Agent-Token even in secure mode (nginx
injects it for the panel, but a direct WS connection is not rejected). Recorded
under the existing trusted-network disclaimer; the streams are read-only with no
control surface.
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Renn F
2026-06-15 08:26:00 +02:00
parent 77771c280c
commit 892fd20aac
1 changed files with 9 additions and 0 deletions
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README.md
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@@ -274,6 +274,15 @@ and team. Token enforcement is gated by `ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED`:
never holds the signing secret. Generate that token with `make panel-token`
and set it as `ROBOCO_PANEL_AGENT_TOKEN` in `.env` before enabling secure mode.
**WebSocket streams.** Token enforcement is currently REST-only. The `/ws/*`
endpoints authenticate by `agent_id` query param at most and do not yet validate
`X-Agent-Token`, even in secure mode — nginx injects the token so the panel
works, but a direct WebSocket connection that bypasses nginx is not rejected. In
particular the operator stream `/ws/system` (rate-limit lifecycle + token-usage
snapshots for the dashboard) is unauthenticated. These streams are read-only —
no control surface, secrets, or task content — but treat the orchestrator port
as trusted-network-only until WebSocket auth lands.
**Secrets** (the Fernet `ROBOCO_ENCRYPTION_KEY`, GitHub PATs) live encrypted in
the database and in gitignored env files — never in the repo. Per-project git
tokens are Fernet-encrypted at rest and never returned by the API.