v0.17.0 — Wave 3: sandbox DB, DB isolation, mobile UI, cloud auth, X account, roadmap engine (#303)

* feat(sandbox): throwaway per-agent Postgres/Redis sandbox containers Orchestrator-provisioned sibling containers per agent spawn (SandboxProvisioner, roboco/runtime/sandbox.py). Per-project opt-in via projects.sandbox_services (migration 057); master switch ROBOCO_SANDBOX_DB_ENABLED, default-off, armed in the NAS compose only. When active, ROBOCO_TEST_DB_* / ROBOCO_TEST_REDIS_* point at the sandbox and the prod-creds gate-env injection is suppressed (sandbox replaces, never coexists). Sandbox lifetime tracks the agent container: teardown at every removal path, orphan janitor at startup + each reaper tick with a grace window for mid-flight spawns. The pre-spawn stale-clear spares the just-provisioned sandbox; provision pre-clears stale same-named containers from a crash-missed teardown. Panel: per-project sandbox-service switches in the edit dialog + feature flag card entry. * docs: CLAUDE.md entry for the sandboxed dev DB/Redis subsystem * feat(security): isolate prod Postgres/Redis from agent containers (roboco_data network) Second user-defined bridge roboco_data carries postgres+redis only; the orchestrator is multi-homed (default + data). Spawned agents and their sandbox sidecars stay on roboco_default and can no longer resolve or reach roboco-postgres:5432 / roboco-redis:6379 (redis has no auth — membership is its only containment). Normal bridge, so host-published ports (15432/16379) keep working. Applied to both build composes and the registry compose; docker-compose.yml re-synced byte-identical with docker-compose.yaml (it had drifted by the sandbox flag block). ROBOCO_DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED (config default false, armed alongside the topology) suppresses the legacy _append_gate_env prod-creds injection: under isolation those creds dead-end, and unreachable creds are worse than none. DB-needing projects opt into sandbox_services instead. The flag is deliberately not a panel feature flag - it must travel with the compose networks: stanzas. Preserved by construction: agent<->agent A2A and orchestrator->agent SDK polls on :9000, MCP->orchestrator on :8000, ollama reachability, docker exec/inspect (daemon socket), host port publishing. * feat(panel): full mobile responsiveness pass Shared primitives: useIsMobile (useSyncExternalStore, hydration-safe, memoized matchMedia subscribe), ResponsiveTable table->card switch below md (single subtree mounted, no duplicated interactive rows), scrollable snap TabsList in the base primitive (justify-center-safe so the first tab stays reachable on overflow), persistent md:hidden bottom tab bar (Overview/Tasks/Kanban/Chat, safe-area padded). Applied: card lists for tasks/projects/products/work-sessions/sessions + the three raw metrics tables; CEO approval queue / release proposal / playbook review action rows stack on narrow; command-center reorders approvals above the fold on mobile; task-header metadata wraps; Communications + A2A become URL-driven single-pane drill-downs below lg (fixes the unconstrained-height ScrollArea bug) with dvh heights; recharts label density/radius adapts via useIsMobile; git diff viewer gets mobile font + wrap toggle; vh->dvh sweep; chat composers get safe-area-inset padding; dashboard main p-4 md:p-6 + pb-20 for the bar. Verified at 375px on the built app: bottom bar, drawer, approval-first overview, swipeable kanban tab strip. All gates green (eslint, tsc, vitest 249, next build 24/24 routes). * feat(auth): cloud auth via FastAPI Users (default-off, single-user cookie session) ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_ENABLED (default off) lets the panel/API be exposed beyond localhost without changing the CEO's local no-login flow while off — get_agent_context and the WS gate are byte-for-byte unchanged in off-mode. On: header-trust dies for humans — any agent-role claim (ceo or a privileged PM/board role) with no valid HMAC token or session cookie is 401, closing the header-spoof hole on the host-published :8000 port for every role. The agent-fleet HMAC path and the system self-PATCH keep working unmodified in both modes. Single seeded CEO user (migration 058 users table, UserTable), no registration router — idempotent env-driven upsert at startup by PK. Cookie transport (httponly/secure/samesite=lax) + a JWTStrategy bound to a fingerprint of the current password hash (rotating the password invalidates every prior session). Sliding 30-day session: every authenticated request re-mints the cookie, so an active session never expires — no unexpected logouts. Panel: (auth)/login page + proxy.ts (Next 16 rename of middleware; probes /auth/status over the docker-internal URL, fails open to off) gate the dashboard; client.ts gets withCredentials + 401->/login. nginx unchanged. Review hardening: broadened the on-mode rejection from ceo-only to every non-CEO role without a valid token (was only closed when ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED was also armed); Next-16 proxy.ts rename to clear the middleware deprecation warning. * feat(x): RoboCo X account engine — HoM drafts, per-post CEO approval (default-off) ROBOCO_X_ENGINE_ENABLED (default off, inert without creds). Mirrors the ReleaseManagerEngine held-artifact shape: XEngine drafts a post when a release publishes (via a draft_release_post seam on ReleaseProposalService .approve) and drafts replies to meaningful mentions (dedicated poll loop, x_seen_mentions dedup ledger, per-cycle/open caps). Drafting is local-model-only, clamped to 280 chars. Nothing auto-posts — every tweet is a held task (source x_post/x_reply, confirmed_by_human=False, Secretary-owned, dispatcher-skipped) the CEO edits/approves/rejects in a panel queue. The four OAuth 1.0a secrets live Fernet-encrypted in a singleton x_credentials row (migration 059, all-or-nothing, API returns only has_credentials); decryption is server-side, agents never hold creds or egress. Hand-rolled OAuth 1.0a HMAC-SHA1 signer, no new dependency; NullXClient makes the unconfigured path a graceful no-op. XPostService.approve (CEO-only) is the sole caller of post_tweet. Review hardening: closed a double-post race — the approve path now re-reads committed task state inside the Redis lock and commits COMPLETED before releasing, so a concurrent approve that acquires the lock after the winner released can't re-post (SET-NX is non-waiting, and the route-level commit landed after the lock dropped). Added a regression test. * feat(roadmap): board roadmap engine — PO proposes themed cycles, CEO approves per-item (default-off) ROBOCO_ROADMAP_ENGINE_ENABLED (default off). Weekly, RoadmapEngine opens ONE held exploration task (source=board_roadmap, confirmed_by_human=False, Product-Owner-assigned), deduped to one open cycle. A dedicated one-shot _dispatch_roadmap_exploration spawns the PO solo (not the two-reviewer board path, which would also spawn HoM + fire Approve-&-Start). The PO explores read-only (git/KB/metrics/releases/charter/web) and makes one propose_roadmap call (PO-only content verb) authoring a themed cycle — goal + 3-7 item drafts — persisted as a roadmap_cycle marker (no table, no migration; head stays 059). The CEO acts per-item in the panel roadmap queue: approve materializes a BACKLOG task (source=roadmap, no assignee — never auto-starts), reject records a reason; all-items-terminal completes the exploration task. RoadmapService is idempotent per item. Dispatchers skip board_roadmap. Includes a real SQLAlchemy dirty-check fix (deep-copy the JSON marker before mutating, or the in-place edit + reassign compares equal to its own baseline and the UPDATE is skipped). Review hardening: create_task_from_draft now honors a draft-declared source only from a {prompter, roadmap} whitelist — drafts are LLM-authored, so an unbounded source could impersonate a privileged origin (release_manager would even wedge that engine's dedup). * chore(release): 0.17.0 Wave 3 — six default-off subsystems: sandboxed dev DB/Redis, prod Postgres/Redis network isolation, full mobile UI pass, cloud auth (FastAPI Users), the RoboCo X account engine, and the board roadmap engine. Plus the waves 1+2 work already on master since 0.16.0. Version bumped across the canonical set (config.py, __init__.py, pyproject.toml, panel/package.json, uv.lock); CHANGELOG [Unreleased] cut to [0.17.0]; docs/map delta added. Compose: every optional feature armed :-true in the NAS composes, OFF in the user-facing registry compose. Two opt-in exceptions default off (CLOUD_AUTH — needs email/password/secret + TLS, would otherwise fail startup; ROUTING_STRICT — fail-closed spawning). DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED stays on in both (coupled to the roboco_data topology). * chore(compose): arm cloud_auth + routing_strict ON in the NAS composes Every feature defaults ON in the NAS composes per policy — these two were wrongly left off. Both keep the ${VAR:-true} form so the operator controls the real runtime via .env: cloud auth needs ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_EMAIL/_PASSWORD/_SECRET + TLS set there before a boot (else startup fails loud), and routing_strict is fail-closed. Registry compose keeps both off. * fix(ci): reflow board.md prose (quality gate) + document v0.17.0 env creds The roadmap section added hard-wrapped prose that failed the markdown prose gate; reflowed (token-invariant). Also brought .env.example current: cloud auth (now armed — needs SECRET or startup fails), routing strict, the X engine (panel-entered OAuth), and web research. * fix(ci): reduce cyclomatic complexity of five wave-3 blocks (xenon gate) The wave-3 subagents introduced C-rank functions the CI xenon gate rejects (my per-item reviews ran ruff/mypy/pytest but not xenon): - sandbox.janitor_sweep -> extract _list_labeled_sandboxes / _list_live_agent_containers / _prune_grace - x_client.fetch_mentions -> extract _parse_mention_items - x_engine.run_cycle -> extract _process_mentions - orchestrator._dispatch_pm_work -> extract the source-skip into a MODULE-level _is_held_ceo_source (module, not method, so the wholesale-mocked dispatcher unit tests exercise the real logic) - auth/seed.ensure_seed_user -> extract _apply_seed_updates (module avg -> A) Behavior-preserving; full suite green (11902), xenon clean. * fix(ci): declare pyjwt + fastapi-users-db-sqlalchemy as direct deps (deptry) The cloud-auth code imports jwt and fastapi_users_db_sqlalchemy directly but they were only transitive deps (via fastapi-users), which deptry (quality gate, DEP003) rejects. Declared explicitly; deptry roboco/ clean. Missed originally because local make quality stopped at earlier gates before reaching deptry. * feat(x): gate mention replies behind ROBOCO_X_REPLIES_ENABLED (default off) Per CEO decision: the X engine should only post about releases by default. Reading mentions needs a paid X API tier, so the mention-reply half is now a deliberate opt-in on top of release posting. New default-off flag x_replies_enabled gates the mentions poll loop (_x_mentions_poll_loop) and XEngine.run_cycle; release-post drafting (the release-proposal approve hook) is unaffected and still runs when x_engine_enabled + credentials are set. Added to FEATURE_FLAGS + the panel card. Tests: release posting works with replies off; run_cycle + the poll loop are no-ops with replies off. * fix: 401 only redirects to /login when cloud auth is on; panel-token strips .env quotes Two bugs that together dead-ended login in secure mode: - client.ts redirected to /login on ANY 401, so a mismatched panel token (header-trust/secure mode, cloud auth off) bounced the user to a login page whose backend route isn't mounted -> 404. Now it probes /auth/status (bare fetch, no interceptor re-entry) and only redirects when cloud_auth_enabled. - make panel-token read the .env secret with grep|cut without stripping surrounding quotes, so a quoted ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET produced a token signed with the quotes included — which never verifies against the orchestrator (docker-compose/pydantic unquote the secret). Now strips surrounding single/double quotes. * fix: git-log 500 on '|' in commit message; X queue shows an empty state - GET /api/git/log 500'd (ValueError: Invalid isoformat) when a commit SUBJECT contained a '|' (e.g. the 'curl|sh' lockdown commit): the fixed '|' field delimiter let the subject's pipe shift the split so author+date collapsed into one field. Switched to \x1f (Unit Separator), which can't appear in commit content. Regression test with a piped subject. - The X Post Queue returned null when empty, so there was no visible place for the X drafts. It now renders a discoverable empty state pointing at Settings -> X credentials. * docs: bring docs/rag + docs/map current for v0.17.0 (waves 1-3) Agent-facing RAG corpus and codebase map updated for every feature in the 0.17.0 span, code-verified: - wave 3: sandbox DB, DB network isolation, cloud auth, X engine (+ x_replies_enabled sub-flag), board roadmap engine — new RAG architecture pages + role/tool/config-reference updates; new symbols, migrations 057-059, panel surfaces, and the get_agent_context dual-path across the map slices. - waves 1-2: A2A live view + switchboard, prompter memory (search_past_tasks), Secretary edit access + PM-lighter scope, the PR-gate auto-submit turn cut (ROBOCO_PR_GATE_AUTO_SUBMIT_ENABLED). - correctness fix: api-routes-schemas.md no longer claims the A2A admin routes are reachable by any authenticated agent — they carry a _require_ceo gate (wave 2c). docs/internal, _front.md deltas, and the frozen _complete_map.md snapshot untouched. * fix(rag): atomic upsert for indexed-doc tracking (kills e2e segfault) The indexed-document tracking write used check-then-insert in two paths (IndexedDocumentRepository.upsert_batch and the file-source _upsert_doc_record). Under concurrent indexing both callers saw no row and both inserted, so the second violated uq_indexed_doc_source and poisoned its transaction — surfacing in CI as the intermittent _checkin_failed SIGSEGV on the failed connection's pool checkin. Both paths now use INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE against the constraint: coalesce keeps an existing title/preview when the new value is empty (matching the old guards) and metadata is jsonb-merged. The batch dedupes within itself first (ON CONFLICT can't touch a row twice in one statement). expire_all after the Core upsert keeps same-session ORM reads consistent with the merged DB row. --------- Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-03 07:23:24 +02:00 · 2026-07-03 19:24:00 +02:00
parent 12745352aa
commit 3ccc723cd4
179 changed files with 12734 additions and 948 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+import api from "./client";
+
+// Matches roboco.api.auth.routes.auth_status's response shape.
+export interface AuthStatus {
+  cloud_auth_enabled: boolean;
+}
+
+export const authApi = {
+  // Always available regardless of the flag — the panel middleware and the
+  // login page both probe this before deciding whether to gate/redirect.
+  status: async (): Promise<AuthStatus> => {
+    const { data } = await api.get<AuthStatus>("/auth/status");
+    return data;
+  },
+
+  // FastAPI Users' cookie-login route expects an OAuth2 form body
+  // (username/password), not JSON — the session cookie rides back on the
+  // response, set by the browser automatically.
+  login: async (email: string, password: string): Promise<void> => {
+    const body = new URLSearchParams();
+    body.set("username", email);
+    body.set("password", password);
+    await api.post("/auth/login", body, {
+      headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
+    });
+  },
+
+  logout: async (): Promise<void> => {
+    await api.post("/auth/logout");
+  },
+};
@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@ const api: AxiosInstance = axios.create({
    "Content-Type": "application/json",
  },
  timeout: 60000, // Increased to 60s for long operations like reindexing
+  // Rides the cloud-auth session cookie. Harmless when cloud auth is off
+  // (same-origin requests already carry cookies regardless), and required
+  // for a cross-origin dev setup that talks to the backend directly.
+  withCredentials: true,
 });

 // Request interceptor to add auth headers and logging
@@ -42,6 +46,29 @@ api.interceptors.request.use(
  },
 );

+// A 401 only means "log in" when cloud auth is actually on. In header-trust /
+// secure mode (cloud auth off) a 401 is a misconfigured agent token, not a
+// missing session — bouncing to /login would dead-end on a page whose backend
+// route isn't mounted. Probe the public status endpoint (a bare fetch so it
+// doesn't re-enter this interceptor) and only redirect when cloud auth is on.
+async function redirectToLoginIfCloudAuth(): Promise<void> {
+  if (typeof window === "undefined" || window.location.pathname === "/login") {
+    return;
+  }
+  try {
+    const res = await fetch(`${API_URL}/auth/status`, {
+      credentials: "include",
+    });
+    if (!res.ok) return;
+    const data = (await res.json()) as { cloud_auth_enabled?: boolean };
+    if (data.cloud_auth_enabled) {
+      window.location.href = "/login";
+    }
+  } catch {
+    // Can't confirm cloud auth is on -> don't dead-end the user on /login.
+  }
+}
+
 // Response interceptor for comprehensive error handling
 api.interceptors.response.use(
  (response) => {
@@ -128,6 +155,7 @@ api.interceptors.response.use(
      );
    } else if (status === 401) {
      console.error("[API] Unauthorized - check API authentication headers");
+      void redirectToLoginIfCloudAuth();
    } else if (status === 403) {
      console.error(
        "[API] Forbidden - insufficient permissions for this action",
@@ -24,3 +24,14 @@ export type {
 } from "./release";
 export { playbooksApi } from "./playbooks";
 export type { Playbook } from "./playbooks";
+export { authApi } from "./auth";
+export type { AuthStatus } from "./auth";
+export { xApi } from "./x";
+export type {
+  XPost,
+  XMentionRef,
+  XPostExecuteResult,
+  XCredentialsStatus,
+} from "./x";
+export { roadmapApi } from "./roadmap";
+export type { RoadmapCycle, RoadmapItem, RoadmapItemActionResult } from "./roadmap";
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ export const projectsApi = {
        ci_watch_workflow: null,
        dep_update_command: null,
        dep_update_paths: null,
+        sandbox_services: null,
        workspace_path: null,
        last_synced_at: null,
        head_commit: null,
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+import api from "./client";
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Board roadmap engine — the Product Owner authors a themed cycle of roadmap
+// items (a goal + 3-7 drafts); the CEO approves or rejects each item
+// individually here. Approving materializes a BACKLOG task; nothing starts
+// automatically.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+export interface RoadmapItem {
+  id: string;
+  title: string;
+  description: string;
+  acceptance_criteria: string[];
+  project_slug: string;
+  team: string;
+  priority: number;
+  rationale: string;
+  status: "proposed" | "approved" | "rejected";
+  reject_reason?: string | null;
+  materialized_task_id?: string | null;
+}
+
+export interface RoadmapCycle {
+  task_id: string;
+  title: string;
+  status: string;
+  goal: string;
+  items: RoadmapItem[];
+}
+
+export interface RoadmapItemActionResult {
+  status: string;
+  item_id: string;
+  materialized_task_id?: string | null;
+  detail: string;
+}
+
+export const roadmapApi = {
+  listCycles: async (): Promise<RoadmapCycle[]> => {
+    const { data } = await api.get<RoadmapCycle[]>("/roadmap/cycles");
+    return data;
+  },
+  approveItem: async (
+    taskId: string,
+    itemId: string,
+  ): Promise<RoadmapItemActionResult> => {
+    const { data } = await api.post<RoadmapItemActionResult>(
+      `/roadmap/cycles/${taskId}/items/${itemId}/approve`,
+      {},
+    );
+    return data;
+  },
+  rejectItem: async (
+    taskId: string,
+    itemId: string,
+    reason: string,
+  ): Promise<RoadmapItemActionResult> => {
+    const { data } = await api.post<RoadmapItemActionResult>(
+      `/roadmap/cycles/${taskId}/items/${itemId}/reject`,
+      { reason },
+    );
+    return data;
+  },
+};
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+import api from "./client";
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// X (Twitter) engine — held release-post + mention-reply drafts the CEO edits
+// and approves (posts) or rejects (cancels) in the panel. Nothing posts until
+// an explicit approve; credentials are write-only (the API never returns
+// the stored secrets).
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+export interface XMentionRef {
+  id: string;
+  author_id: string;
+  text: string;
+}
+
+export interface XPost {
+  task_id: string;
+  source: "x_post" | "x_reply";
+  title: string;
+  status: string;
+  body: string;
+  char_count: number;
+  release_version?: string | null;
+  mention?: XMentionRef | null;
+  reject_reason?: string | null;
+}
+
+export interface XPostExecuteResult {
+  status: string;
+  tweet_id?: string | null;
+  detail: string;
+}
+
+export interface XCredentialsStatus {
+  has_credentials: boolean;
+}
+
+export const xApi = {
+  listPosts: async (): Promise<XPost[]> => {
+    const { data } = await api.get<XPost[]>("/x/posts");
+    return data;
+  },
+  approve: async (
+    taskId: string,
+    editedBody?: string,
+  ): Promise<XPostExecuteResult> => {
+    const { data } = await api.post<XPostExecuteResult>(
+      `/x/posts/${taskId}/approve`,
+      editedBody ? { edited_body: editedBody } : {},
+    );
+    return data;
+  },
+  reject: async (taskId: string, reason: string): Promise<XPost> => {
+    const { data } = await api.post<XPost>(`/x/posts/${taskId}/reject`, {
+      reason,
+    });
+    return data;
+  },
+  getCredentialsStatus: async (): Promise<XCredentialsStatus> => {
+    const { data } = await api.get<XCredentialsStatus>("/x/credentials");
+    return data;
+  },
+  setCredentials: async (creds: {
+    api_key: string;
+    api_secret: string;
+    access_token: string;
+    access_token_secret: string;
+  }): Promise<XCredentialsStatus> => {
+    const { data } = await api.post<XCredentialsStatus>(
+      "/x/credentials",
+      creds,
+    );
+    return data;
+  },
+};